Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent. SUNDBERG, Justice. This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Stanfill v. State, 360 So.2d 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), holding that section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1975), creates but a single crime, that being the felony of "willfully" leaving the scene of an accident. This decision conflicts with the decisions in State v. Patterson, 284 So.2d 9 (Fla.2d DCA 1973), and Diggs v. State, 334 So.2d 333 (Fla.2d *142 DCA 1976), which hold that section 316.027 creates two crimes, the misdemeanor of "unlawfully" leaving the scene and the felony of "willfully" leaving. We resolve this conflict by adopting the first district's holding that section 316.027 creates but one crime, a felony....

...er from properly preparing his defense. Petitioner, James Rickey Stanfill, was charged by indictment with one count of manslaughter and three counts of "unlawfully" leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury, in violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...fill's attack on the indictment was untimely. Stanfill replied that these rules were inapplicable because the indictment contained a valid charge. The trial judge, rejecting Stanfill's argument, allowed the state to prosecute for felony violation of section 316.027....

...ulting in injury to, or death of, a person to "willfully" fail to stop at the scene of the accident. The trial judge did not instruct the jury that unlawfully leaving the scene of the accident is a lesser included misdemeanor offense provided for in section 316.027....

...Adjudication was withheld on the other two counts. *143 On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, First District, was presented with the question of whether an indictment charging a driver with "unlawfully," as distinguished from "willfully," violating section 316.027, charges a misdemeanor, as Stanfill contended, or whether it defectively charges a felony, and, if it does defectively charge a felony, whether this defect was waived and cured by the application of Florida Rules of Criminal Procedures 3.140( o ) and 3.190(c). Receding from its previous decisions in State v. Shepard, 299 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), and Holmes v. State, 342 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), the first district rejected the "unlawful-willful" distinction and held that section 316.027 creates but a single crime, that being a felony. The district court based its decision on the language contained in two other related statutes, section 775.08(2) and section 316.026(4), which it read in conjunction with section 316.027. [4] The district court reasoned that, in enacting section 316.027, the legislature never intended, by the first two subsections, to create two crimes, a misdemeanor by subsection (1) and a felony in subsection (2), and that the legislature intended to condemn "willful" leaving....

...lure by Stanfill to attack these counts prior to trial, pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.140( o ) and 3.190(c), constituted a waiver of the defect and cured the indictment. Stanfill concedes that the district court's construction of section 316.027, as charging but one crime, is correct and that the decisional conflict should be resolved by our adopting this construction. He contends, however, that Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.140( o ) and 3.190(c) are not applicable because the indictment is defective in that it fails to allege "willful." The state argues that the district court's construction of section 316.027 is correct, but it maintains that the district court was also correct in holding that the defect was waived and that the indictment was cured pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.140( o ) and 3.190(c). The first district's construction of section 316.027 is correct, and we hold that section 316.027 creates only the felony of "willfully" leaving the scene of an accident. When sections 775.08(2) and 316.026(4) are read together with section 316.027, it is obvious that, in enacting section 316.027, the legislature never intended to create a misdemeanor by subsection (1). Accordingly, we approve the first district's construction of section 316.027 and disapprove the decisions in State v....

...The indictment alleged that Stanfill "unlawfully" left the scene of an accident. As noted previously, several decisions of the district courts of appeal, including the District Court of Appeal, First District, unequivocally held that use of the term "unlawfully" in an information charged a misdemeanor pursuant to section 316.027(1), while use of the term "willfully" charged a felony pursuant to section 316.027(2)....

...and 3.190(c). *144 At the time petitioner was charged with a crime, counts II, through IV, of his indictment contained valid charges of a misdemeanor. It was only at trial that it became apparent that the state was pursuing a felony conviction under section 316.027(2). To hold that petitioner should have challenged his indictment before that time would be tantamount to holding that petitioner should have foreseen our disapproving the district court decisions construing section 316.027....

...OVERTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. ALDERMAN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, with which BOYD, J., concurs. BOYD, J., dissents. OVERTON, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur with the majority holding that section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1975), creates but one offense, a felony....

...I dissent from the remand to sentence for a misdemeanor that we have just held is nonexistent. I would remand for a new trial for the felony offense as the majority has defined it. ALDERMAN, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur with that part of the majority opinion holding that section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1975), creates but a single crime, that being the felony of "willfully" leaving the scene of an accident....

...s felony judgment and sentence be vacated and that the trial court enter a judgment of conviction of a misdemeanor and impose sentence accordingly. How can this Court direct the trial court to adjudge Stanfill guilty of a misdemeanor in violation of section 316.027 and at the same time hold that this section creates but a single crime, a felony....

...Stanfill is either guilty of a felony, or he is guilty of nothing. He cannot be sentenced for a crime that does not exist. What is the effect of the State's failure to allege a "willful" leaving of the scene. Stanfill argues that willfulness is an essential element of the crime proscribed by section 316.027 and that failure to allege willfulness rendered the indictment fundamentally defective. I reject this argument. It cannot be said that this indictment wholly fails to charge a violation of section 316.027 because it does allege that Stanfill "unlawfully" left the scene of an accident....

...orida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c), if not raised in a timely motion. Stanfill did not challenge the legal sufficiency of the indictment until after the impanelling of the jury. Accordingly, I would deny the writ. BOYD, J., concurs. NOTES [1] Section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1975), provides in pertinent part: (1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close there...

...penitentiary for not more than 1 year or by fine of not more than $5,000 or by both such fine and imprisonment. [2] At the time of Stanfill's indictment and trial, several cases had held that the use of "unlawfully" charged a misdemeanor pursuant to section 316.027(1), while the use of "willfully" charged a felony pursuant to section 316.27(2)....

...provided for shall be taken to have been waived. [4] Section 775.08(2) provides that the term "misdemeanor" does not mean a conviction for any violation of any provision of chapter 316, and section 316.026(4) provides that the penalty for violating section 316.027 is a felony....

...State, 39 So.3d 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). This instruction was adopted in 2008 [976 So.2d 1081] and amended in 2011. 28.82 AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death then Causing Serious Bodily Injury or Death) § 316.1935(4)(b) and § 316.027, Fla....

...der to stop, willfully fled in a vehicle in an attempt to elude the law enforcement officer.] 7. As a result of (defendant) fleeing or eluding, [he] [she] caused [serious bodily injury to] [the death of] (name of victim). I further instruct you that § 316.027, Fla....

...Lesser Included Offenses --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death and then Causing Serious Injury Bodily Injury or Death)—316.1935(4)(b) and 316.027 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA.STAT....

...316.1935(4)(a) 28.84 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(1) 28.6 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leaving Scene of Accident 316.027(1)(b) 28.4 Involving Death --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leaving Scene of Accident 316.027(1)(a) 28.4 Involving Injury --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.81 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- *143 Fle...

...State, 39 So.3d 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). This instruction was adopted in 2008 [976 So.2d 1081] and amended in 2011. 28.84 AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death then Causing Injury or Property Damage to Another) § 316.1935(4)(a) and § 316.027 Fla....

...er to stop, willfully fled in a vehicle in an attempt to elude the law enforcement officer.] 7. As a result of (defendant) fleeing or eluding, [he] [she] caused [an injury to] [damage to the property of] (name of victim). I further instruct you that § 316.027, Fla....

...Lesser Included Offenses ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death and then Causing Injury or Property Damage to Another)—316.1935(4)(a) and § 316.027 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA.STAT....

...---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(1) 28.6 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leaving Scene of Accident 316.027(1)(b) 28.4 Involving Death ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leaving Scene of Accident 316.027(1)(a) 28.4 Involving Injury ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.81 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------...

...Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for respondent. HARDING, Justice. We have for review Mancuso v. State, 636 So.2d 753, 755 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified the following question to be one of great public importance: IN A PROSECUTION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 316.027, FLORIDA STATUTES (1991), MUST THE STATE SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANT KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE INJURY OR DEATH; AND THE JURY BE SO INSTRUCTED? We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, and answer the certified question in the affirmative. Dennis Mancuso was charged with leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury under section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...n willfully left the scene and willfully failed to render aid or give certain information as required by section 316.062, Florida Statutes (1991). [2] Mancuso's requested instruction essentially included "actual knowledge of injury" as an element of section 316.027....

...the absence of any instruction to the jury on "`constructive knowledge' of the death/injury." Mancuso, 636 So.2d at 754. The district court granted the State's subsequent motion for certification and certified the question to this Court. Id. at 756. Section 316.027, as well as the "hit-and-run" statutes in a number of other jurisdictions, was modeled after the Uniform Vehicle Code....

...ce); see also State v. Tennant, 173 W. Va. 627, 319 S.E.2d 395, 400 (1984) (stating that "hit-and-run" statute of West Virginia and a large number of other states are modeled after the Uniform Vehicle Code). This Court has previously determined that section 316.027 creates only one crime, the felony of "willfully" leaving the scene of an accident involving injury. Stanfill v. State, 384 So.2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980). In reaching that determination, this Court implicitly recognized that knowledge of the accident is an essential element of section 316.027, for one cannot "willfully" leave an accident without awareness that an accident has occurred....

...Kaufman, Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Showing in a Criminal Prosecution Under a "Hit-and-Run" Statute Accused's Knowledge of Accident, Injury, or Damage 23 A.L.R.3d 497 (1969 & Supp. 1994). The question presented in this case, whether knowledge of injury is an essential element of section 316.027, is one of first impression for this Court....

...facts giving rise to this affirmative duty in order to perform such a duty," Kimoktoak, 584 P.2d at 31. We are persuaded that the interpretation followed by the majority of other jurisdictions is correct. Thus, we hold that criminal liability under section 316.027 requires proof that the driver charged with leaving the scene either knew of the resulting injury or death or reasonably should have known from the nature of the accident and that the jury should be so instructed....

...Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision below that reversed and remanded for a new trial. We do not address the other issues raised by Mancuso. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1991), provides in pertinent part: (1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close there...

...injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop" at the scene and fulfill the requirements of section 10-104. Section 10-104 imposes a duty to give certain information (name, address, and vehicle registration number) and render aid. Sections 316.027 and 316.062, Florida Statutes (1991), essentially track the language of these sections of the Uniform Vehicle Code.

...IN STATE V. MANCUSO, 652 So.2d 370 (Fla. 1995), REQUIRING THAT THE JURY BE CHARGED REGARDING THE KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED PRIOR TO CONVICTING A DEFENDANT OF LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT WITH INJURY OR DEATH, DID THE 1993 AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA STATUTE 316.027, WHICH DIVIDED THE OFFENSE OF LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT INTO TWO FELONIES, ONE A SECOND DEGREE FELONY IF A DEATH WAS INVOLVED, AND THE OTHER A THIRD DEGREE FELONY IF AN INJURY WAS INVOLVED, THEN REQUIRE THAT THE JURY BE CHARGED REGARDI...

...The statute under which Dumas was convicted, entitled "Accidents involving death or personal injuries," was amended in 1993 to create two separate offenses: leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, a third degree felony; and leaving the scene of an accident involving death, a second degree felony. [1] See § 316.027(1), Fla....

...The district court cited this Court's analysis in State v. Mancuso, 652 So.2d 370 (Fla.1995), and the new jury instruction which followed our decision in Mancuso as supporting this conclusion in Dumas' case. Dumas, 686 So.2d at 626. In Mancuso, this Court held that "criminal liability under section 316.027 requires proof that the driver charged with leaving the scene [of an accident involving death or injury] either knew of the resulting injury or death or reasonably should have known from the nature of the accident and that the jury should be so instructed." 652 So.2d at 372....

...ative depending on the charge involved. Dumas, 686 So.2d at 626. The court further concluded that such instruction is consistent with the reasoning of Mancuso. Id. We do not agree. In Mancuso, we determined that knowledge was an essential element of section 316.027 because (1) the statute imposes a more severe penalty for leaving an accident where personal injuries are involved than does a similar statute imposing sanctions where only property damage is involved; and (2) the statute requires a driver to take an affirmative course of action which necessarily requires that the driver be aware of the facts giving rise to the duty. 652 So.2d at 372. When this Court decided Mancuso in 1995, section 316.027 addressed only one crime, the felony of willfully leaving the scene of an accident involving injury or death....

...The 1993 amendment divided the offense into two felonies: leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury (which remained a third-degree felony) and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death (which became a second-degree felony). See § 316.027(1)(a)-(b), Fla....

...Florida law imposes an affirmative duty on a driver to stop, render aid, and provide certain information necessary for an insurance claim and an accident report whenever there is an injury. § 316.062, Fla. Stat. (1995). Florida law further makes it a felony to fail to complete these duties. § 316.027(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). One of the main purposes of the statute is to ensure that accident victims receive medical assistance as soon as possible. Herring v. State, 435 So.2d 865, 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) ("It is apparent that the purpose of sections 316.027 and 316.062 is to assure that any injured person is rendered aid and that all pertinent information concerning insurance and names of those involved in the traffic accident is exchanged by the parties.")....

...Moreover, requiring proof that a driver had knowledge of death would lead to an absurd result: a driver who callously leaves the scene of a serious accident can avoid a second-degree felony conviction by disavowing knowledge of death. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, we find this construction of section 316.027 to be consistent with our opinion in Mancuso....

...ene of an accident where injury or death is involved. Compare § 316.061(1), Fla. Stat. (1995) (sanction for leaving scene of accident involving property damage is fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than sixty days or both) with § 316.027(1)(a) (sanction for leaving scene of accident involving personal injury is fine not exceeding $5000 or term of imprisonment not exceeding five years or both) and § 316.027(1)(b) (sanction for leaving scene of accident involving death is fine not exceeding $10,000 or term of imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years or both)....

...e court in Mancuso directed the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases to prepare an instruction consistent with the Mancuso holding. The Committee has now done so and although the new instruction relates to the amended version of section 316.027(1) and was not approved in time to be applicable to our case, it is nevertheless persuasive....

...Dumas, 686 So.2d at 625 (first and fourth emphasis added). Judge Harris "hit the nail on the head" when he pointed out that under the reasoning in Mancuso a driver could not willfully leave the scene of an accident involving death, and thereby assume the risk of being prosecuted under section 316.027(1)(b), if the driver was unaware of the death....

...I would adhere to our ruling and reasoning in Mancuso and approve the opinion of the Fifth District. KOGAN, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur. NOTES [1] Prior to the 1993 amendment, the statute provided that leaving the scene of an "accident resulting in injury or death" was a third-degree felony. § 316.027, Fla....

...the scene of the accident until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. Any person who willfully violates this paragraph is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084 ... § 316.027, Fla....

...n a dark stretch of U.S. 441. While we otherwise affirm, we reverse appellant's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, as we hold that appellant's dual convictions for leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, see § 316.027(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995), and leaving the scene of an accident involving death, see id. § 316.027(1)(b), violated the prohibition against double jeopardy where both convictions related to the same accident....

...The offenses charged in Counts IV and V are different degrees of the same crime. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the predecessor statute described only a single offense, making it a third degree felony to leave the scene of an accident which involved either injury or death. See § 316.027(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (1985). The current statute separates its predecessor into two discrete offenses, distinguishing accidents on the basis of whether they involve death or mere injury. See § 316.027(1)(a), (b), Fla....

...[1] Because the two offenses are different degrees of the same crime, the legislature may have intended only a single conviction in this case. See § 775.021(4)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (1995). The State responds that multiple convictions are appropriate in this case because there were multiple victims. However, our reading of section 316.027 convinces us that the intended "unit of prosecution" for these offenses is not the number of victims, but the number of accidents....

...ing injuries and one count of leaving the scene of an accident involving death. Id. at 401. On appeal, the Fifth District vacated four of these five convictions, holding that the multiple convictions violated the prohibition against double jeopardy: Section 316.027, Florida Statutes, provides that The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident....

...at the scene of the accident until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. Any person who willfully violates this paragraph is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 316.027(1)(b), Fla....

...n at the scene of the accident until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. Any person who willfully violates this paragraph is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 316.027(1)(a), Fla....

...He did not stop his vehicle at the scene of the accident. He was convicted of seven offenses, viz: manslaughter by driving while intoxicated (§ 316.1931(2), Fla. Stat.); manslaughter by culpable negligence (§ 782.07, Fla. Stat.); leaving the scene of an accident with a death (§ 316.027, Fla. Stat.); and four counts of leaving the scene of an accident with injuries (§ 316.027, Fla....

...as to but one death. See Houser v. State, 474 So.2d 1193 (Fla. 1985); Vela v. State, 450 So.2d 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction for manslaughter by culpable negligence (§ 782.07, Fla. Stat.) is reversed and vacated. Section 316.027, Florida Statutes, provides that The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident....

...5th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 484 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1986), where this court held that giving three altered dollar bills to one person at one time constituted but one criminal act of uttering. Hoag's second, third, fourth, and fifth convictions of violating section 316.027, Florida Statutes, are reversed and vacated....

...Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial on the charge of leaving the scene of an accident with injuries. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part and REMANDED for a new trial. COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.045(1)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. (1993). [2] § 316.027, Fla....

...ual of both vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of an accident with death or injuries. See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 769 So.2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) ("Both the First and Fourth Districts have held that double jeopardy bars prosecution under section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (1991), because that section is subsumed by section 782.071(2), Florida Statutes (1991).") (citing Pierce v. State, 744 So.2d 1193, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Wright v. State, 573 So.2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)). [5] McKnight also cites Franklin v. State, 719 So.2d 938, 940 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), wherein the court stated that "[b]ecause section 316.027 did not intend multiple charges for leaving the scene of one accident, appellant's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury must be reversed on this ground as well." The obvious distinction between the cases McKnight relies upon and the instant case is that McKnight is not faced with convictions for leaving the scene of an accident pursuant to section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2001), in addition to his convictions for vehicular homicide under section 782.071(1). Moreover, effective October 1, 1996, the Legislature amended section 782.071(1)(b) by deleting the language "willfully fails to stop or comply with the requirements of s. 316.027(1)" and substituting the provision that the defendant "failed to give information and render aid as required by s....

...riminal conduct to be punished under section 782.071(1)(b) is the defendant's failure to render aid to each victim of the accident as required by section 316.062 rather than the defendant's act of fleeing from a single accident scene in violation of section 316.027. See Franklin, 719 So.2d at 940 ("Moreover, the intended unit of prosecution under section 316.027 is each accident rather than each victim."); Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979, 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ("[O]ur reading of section 316.027 convinces us that the intended `unit of prosecution' for these offenses is not the number of victims, but the number of accidents.")....

...a driver to stop, render aid, and provide certain information necessary for an insurance claim and an accident report whenever there is an injury. § 316.062, Fla. Stat. (1995). Florida law further makes it a felony to fail to complete these duties. § 316.027(2), Fla....

...s a common element, are not contrary to legislative intent and do not constitute double jeopardy; receding from Pelham v. State, 771 So.2d 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)), review denied, 821 So.2d 297 (Fla.2002). [6] We note with interest that violation of section 316.027(1) is a felony, while violation of section 316.062 constitutes a noncriminal traffic infraction.

...eal, are as follows: Mr. Sims was driving his wife's truck when he struck and killed Bernell Williams (the "Victim"). For reasons not specified[,] Mr. Sims left the scene of the accident without ever stopping the truck. He was charged with violating section 316.027(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), and found guilty as charged in the information....

...In Florida, the decision of a trial court to impose victim-injury points is subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Key v. State, 837 So.2d 535, 536 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). However, here, Sims contends that the trial court did not follow the law and instead misinterpreted sections 316.027(1)(b) and 921.0021(7)(a), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...e review. Based upon the plain language of section 921.0021(7)(a), which defines "victim injury" for the purpose of scoring victim-injury points, we conclude that under these facts, the imposition of such points for leaving the scene in violation of section 316.027(1)(b) was incorrect....

...Instead, Sims was only charged with the offense of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death. It is reasonable to conclude that the decision to charge Sims with this lesser offense was due to the circumstances surrounding the accident, which made the collision "nearly unavoidable." [10] Section 316.027(1)(b), which governs this offense, provides: The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash resulting in the death of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and must rem...

...5th DCA 1990) (receded from on different grounds in State v. Hampton, 692 So.2d 278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)); Fleming, 524 So.2d 1146. Therefore, we grant the petition, issue the writ, and order the trial court to discharge Billie Jean Neal. FULMER, A.C.J., and QUINCE and NORTHCUTT, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 316.027(1), Fla....

...parate homicide convictions. Accordingly, the defendant's convictions for both vehicular homicide and DUI manslaughter cannot stand as they violate double jeopardy. The jury also convicted the defendant of leaving the scene of a fatal accident under section 316.027(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...It is generally required that the issue on appeal be encompassed within the specific legal argument presented below, see Tillman v. State, 471 So.2d 32 (Fla. 1985), and appellant does not now contest his multiple convictions. Rather, he challenges the multiple sentences under section 782.071(2) and section 316.027(1)....

...306 (1932), and is concerned only with the statutory elements and not with the evidence presented at trial or the facts alleged in the information. See Donovan v. State, 572 So.2d 522 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). The statutory offenses charged in the present case are: 316.027 Accidents involving death or personal injuries — (1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close thereto as possib...

...— (1) `Vehicular homicide' is the killing of a human being by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another... . (2) Any person who commits vehicular homicide and willfully fails to stop or comply with the requirements of s. 316.027(1) *1001 is guilty of a felony of the second degree.... [1] The state argues that multiple sentences are permissible because the two statutes contain distinct elements, as section 782.071(2) requires a predicate vehicular homicide, whereas section 316.027 does not....

...s of which are subsumed by the greater offense." As in Donovan, supra, where the court found that the offense of theft was subsumed within the offense of organized fraud, even though organized fraud contained additional elements, in the present case section 316.027(1) (a third degree felony) may be subsumed within section 782.071(2) (a second degree felony), even though the greater offense may also involve additional elements; the necessary analysis is whether section 782.071(2) encompasses all of the elements of section 316.027(1). The statutory elements of section 316.027(1) require that the defendant shall have been the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death, and shall have failed to stop, remain at the scene, etc. Section 782.071(2) elevates the offense of vehicular homicide when the defendant fails to stop or comply with section 316.027(1). Section 782.071(2) thus necessarily and explicitly subsumes section 316.027(1)....

...And "vehicular homicide" is defined at section 782.071(1) as occurring when the defendant operates a motor vehicle in a reckless manner which is likely to and does cause death or great bodily harm to another. Driving a motor vehicle which is involved in an accident resulting in injury or death, as specified in section 316.027(1), would also be encompassed by the operation of a motor vehicle in a reckless manner which results in the death of another, as specified in section 782.071(1). Since appellant's statutory offense under section 316.027(1) is necessarily subsumed within the statutory offense under section 782.071(2), appellant should not have been sentenced for the lesser offense. The sentence under section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes, is therefore vacated, the judgments and sentences otherwise affirmed, and the cause remanded....

...diction to hear the charge because the circuit court and not the county court, has original exclusive jurisdiction of all felonies. The circuit court affirmed the trial court and this petition ensued. The complaint charged Sclafani with violation of § 316.027, Fla....

...It appears from the testimony, the sentence imposed and the entire record, that the court intended to and did try him for the felony of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury. The county court did not have jurisdiction to try Sclafani or to sentence him pursuant to § 316.027, Fla....

...ntence him to 10 days each for two careless driving charges and 10 days for leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage. The writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment and sentence of the county court on the charge of violation of § 316.027, Fla....

...if: (a) At the time of the accident, the person knew, or should have known, that the accident occurred; and (b) The person failed to give information and render aid as required by s. 316.062. The statute criminalizing leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1997), provides, in pertinent part: (1)(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close thereto as p...

...t until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. Any person who willfully violates this paragraph is guilty of a felony of the third degree, ... Both the First and Fourth Districts have held that double jeopardy bars prosecution under section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (1991), because that section is subsumed by section 782.071(2), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...See Pierce v. State, 744 So.2d 1193, 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Wright v. State, 573 So.2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). This analysis applies to the 1997 version of the vehicular homicide statute as well. Section 782.071 subsumes the requirement found in section 316.027 that the motorist stop and comply with the requirements of section 316.062, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Henri C. Cawthon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. MILLS, Judge. Motyka appeals from a sentence of 3 1/2 years in prison following conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injuries. Section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The trial court stated it saw no reason to deviate from the guidelines and sentenced Motyka to 3 1/2 years in prison. As amended on 8 May 1984, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(7) provides: "Victim injury shall be scored if it is an element of any offenses at conviction." [1] Section 316.027 prohibits leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injuries....

...offense. The last sentence of the committee note to Rule 3.701(d)(7) provides: "Victim injury is to be scored for each victim for whom the defendant is convicted of injuring and is limited to physical trauma." (emphasis supplied). A conviction under Section 316.027 does not necessarily mean the defendant is guilty of injuring anyone....

...82. On November 9, 1982, the state attorney filed an amended information containing four counts. Count one charges that appellee struck and injured three persons while operating a motor vehicle and then fled the scene of the accident in violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...rooper LaForte on August 27, 1982, the trial court properly suppressed appellee's statements with respect to these three counts. Count I of the amended information charges appellee with leaving the scene of the accident with injuries in violation of Section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...he trial court to reimpose the original judgment and order of probation, including the special condition of restitution. On September 12, 1983, petitioner was charged by information with leaving the scene of an accident with injuries in violation of section 316.027(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...phrenia and committed to a state mental hospital. Following treatment and the administration of antipsychotic drugs, his competency was restored. In December 2005, Maxwell was charged with leaving the scene of an accident with death, in violation of section 316.027(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), and felony driving while license suspended or revoked, in violation of section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). See also § 775.021(4)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. (1997); Gordon v. State, 780 So.2d 17, 19-20 (Fla.2001). The two offenses each require proof of an element that the other does not. Compare § 316.193(3)(c)(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998), with § 316.027(1)(b), .062(2), Fla....

...In this case, although the offense of leaving the scene of an accident involving death requires a showing that the defendant was involved in an accident resulting in death, it does not require a showing that the defendant actually caused the death. § 316.027(1)(b), Fla....

...Kevin Kelly was convicted of the following third-degree felonies: (1) driving under the influence with serious bodily injury, (2) driving without a valid driver's license with serious bodily injury, and (3) leaving the scene of an accident with injury. See §§ 316.193(3)(c)(2), 322.34(6), 316.027(1)(a), Fla....

...See § 316.193(3)(c)(2). The leaving the scene of the accident with injury offense does not require that Kelly caused the injury; the offense only requires that he was driving a vehicle that was involved in an accident in which injury occurred. See § 316.027(1)(a)....

...Appellant's car struck and injured an elderly lady who was crossing a street in St. Petersburg. Appellant fled, and was charged with leaving the scene of an accident which resulted in injury, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year. [1] Section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...ld not be required to unanimously agree on which theory was proven. Euceda v. State, 711 So.2d 122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Dejerez v. State, 580 So.2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). The reverse was found in State v. Dumas, 700 So.2d 1223 (Fla.1997), regarding section 316.027, which prohibits leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury....

...Foster guilty for an improper reason. [2] Due to our reversal, we need not reach Foster's other issue concerning improper closing arguments made by the prosecutor. Reversed and remanded for a new trial. WHATLEY and NORTHCUTT, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 316.027(1)(a), Fla....

...ERE WAS ONLY ONE HOMICIDE VICTIM? *1099 AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED; CONVICTION FOR DWI MANSLAUGHTER VACATED. ORFINGER, J., and BLOUNT, URIEL, Jr., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] § 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (1981). [2] § 860.01(2), Fla. Stat. (1981). [3] § 316.027, Fla....

...al offense) which includes physical impact or contact. Victim injury is to be scored for each victim for whom the defendant is convicted of injuring and is limited to physical trauma. In the present case, Benedict was convicted of violating sections 316.027 and 316.062, Florida Statutes, which require the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to stop and render aid and to furnish certain information upon request. In Motyka v. State, 457 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), a case virtually identical to the present case, the court concluded that victim injury is not an element of leaving the scene of an accident (section 316.027) in the sense that one must injure or kill someone to be guilty of the offense....

...e case is one of exceptional importance and that it is also necessary to maintain uniformity in the court's decisions. Appellant, Jasper Tisdale, was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident involving the death of another person in violation of section 316.027(1)(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...offense. We think he's right, and that prohibition is appropriate. [1] Relator was arrested on May 13, 1973 and charged by a Uniform Traffic Citation with "failure to remain at the scene of an accident involving injury in violation of State Statute § 316.027." Thereafter, such *10 citation was filed in the County Court of Pinellas County, there to serve, pursuant to § 316.081, F.S....

...He concludes, therefore, that the two charges are really the "same offense" within the discipline of double jeopardy considerations and that prohibition will lie to preclude prosecution of the impending felony charge. The state on the other hand contends that a violation of § 316.027, supra, is a felony only, with no misdemeanor included within it....

...ting police officer, and, further, to render aid to or assist any injured person as may be apparently necessary; or, if any of the foregoing are impossible or impracticable, to promptly report the accident to the nearest authorized police authority. Section 316.027, the critical section involved herein, is quoted in material part as follows: "316.027 Accidents involving death or personal injuries....

...imprisonment." (Italics ours.) We parenthetically point out here that § 316.062, supra, does not expressly require that a driver stop to comply therewith; but it is obviously impossible to comply without stopping. On the other hand, the aforequoted § 316.027 expressly requires the driver to stop and/or to remain at the scene and fully to comply with the aforesaid § 316.062....

...But in any case, it is obvious that both sections must be read in pari materia and that each relates to the same wrongful conduct, to-wit: failure to comply with § 316.062. The state can take no solace, therefore, in the fact that the Uniform Traffic Citation first issued as aforesaid expressly cited a violation of § 316.027 while the pending information in the Circuit Court cites a violation of § 316.062....

...Each such section proscribes essentially the same acts or omissions. Now again, as early pointed out above, relator contends that failing to stop and/or to remain at the scene of an accident until complying with § 316.062, supra, in violation of subsection (1) of § 316.027, is a misdemeanor punishable pursuant to the aforesaid omnibus misdemeanor section. He further contends that such misdemeanor is included in the felony which he says is expressly defined by subsection (2) of said § 316.027, the only additional element in the latter section being the element of willfulness. We agree. Clearly, subsection (1) of § 316.027, of itself and without more, completely proscribes conduct malum prohibitum, and under the settled law on the subject mere present ability to comply with the mandate of such a statute compels obedience thereto; scienter, willfulness, purity of motive, unawareness or ignorance are irrelevant....

...e, he is nonetheless amenable to prosecution therefor. But, we hold, he is only guilty of a misdemeanor because of the absence of the required additional element of willfulness expressly included in the felony fully defined by subsection (2) of said § 316.027. Obviously, there are any number of instances where a driver might fail to comply with § 316.027 non-willfully; and the legislature clearly recognized this by condemning willful non-compliance in subsection (2) thereof and making it a felony. Who would gainsay that willful non-compliance is more reprehensible? Finally, we express our view that the misdemeanor defined by subsection (1) of § 316.027 is included within the felony defined by subsection (2) thereof since, as noted, the two principal sections involved, i.e., § 316.027 itself and § 316.062, both condemn the same conduct; the additional element of willfulness found in subsection (2) of § 316.027 merely makes such proscribed conduct a higher degree of the "same offense." Accordingly, double jeopardy considerations come into play. [4] We hold, therefore, that the County Court had jurisdiction to try relator for a misdemeanor as defined by §§ 316.026 and *12 316.027(1), supra, and that by entering his plea of guilty to such charge in that court relator was placed in jeopardy thereof upon acceptance of such plea. [5] Since we also think that such misdemeanor is included within the felony defined by § 316.027(2), supra, it follows that the state is now precluded from prosecuting relator on the pending felony charge, since it is but a higher degree of the "same offense." In view whereof, the rule heretofore issued herein should be, and it is hereby, made absolute....

...We remand for resentencing on the driver's license charge which was not appealed, and we remand for a new trial on the leaving the scene of an accident charge. REVERSED and REMANDED. DANIEL, C.J., and COBB, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 782.07, Fla. Stat. (1987). [2] § 316.027, Fla....

...Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's decision to permit the computer generated animation to be shown to the jury as a demonstrative exhibit illustrating Detective Babcock's reconstruction of the motor vehicle accident. C) JURY INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT UNDER SECTION 316.027, FLORIDA STATUTES (1991) Briefly, we advise that it would be prudent for the trial court to conform, upon remand, to the requirements of State v. Mancuso, 652 So.2d 370 (Fla.1995). The Florida Supreme Court has held that criminal liability under section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1991), requires proof that the driver charged with leaving the scene either knew of the resulting injury or death or reasonably should have known from the nature of the accident and that the jury should be so instructed....

...Santiago's argument is well taken. In count seven, the superseding indictment cited section 316.1935(4) and charged that Santiago was in the course of unlawfully leaving or attempting to leave the scene of an accident in violation of Florida Statute 316.027 or 316.061, and had knowledge of an order to stop by a duly authorized law enforcement officer [and] did willfully refuse or fail to stop in compliance with such order, and as a result of such fleeing or eluding did cause injury to another person or damage to property of another.......

...Section 316.1935(4), defining the second-degree felony of aggravated fleeing or eluding, specifically refers to leaving the scene of a crash. (4) Any person who, in the course of unlawfully leaving or attempting to leave the scene of a crash in violation of s. 316.027 or s....

...The felony of aggravated fleeing or eluding constitutes a separate offense for which a person may be charged, in addition to the offense of unlawfully leaving the scene of a crash which the person had been in the course of committing or attempting to commit when the order to stop was given. Section 316.027 is titled "Crash involving death or personal injuries" and section 316.061 is titled "Crashes involving damage to vehicle or property." Both apply by their plain language only to the driver of a vehicle involved in a crash....

...The Committee reports that proposed instructions were originally filed with the Court for review in Case No. SC07-705. However, after further consideration about the requirements established in State v. Dumas, 700 So.2d 1223, 1225 (Fla.1997) (holding that section 316.027, Florida Statutes, only requires the State to prove a defendant's knowledge of injury to obtain conviction for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, a second-degree felony), coupled with necessary amendments to proposed...

...ce to the published opinion of this Court authorizing the instruction. It is so ordered. LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. APPENDIX 28.4 LEAVING THE SCENE OF ACCIDENT A CRASH INVOLVING DEATH OR INJURY § 316.027(1), Fla....

...Lesser Included Offenses No lesser included offenses have been identified for this offense. Comment This instructions was adopted in 1995 [665 So.2d 212] and amended in 2008. 28.82 AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death then Causing Serious Bodily Injury or Death) § 316.1935(4)(b) and § 316.027, Fla....

...der to stop, willfully fled in a vehicle in an attempt to elude the law enforcement officer.] 7. As a result of (defendant) fleeing or eluding, [he] [she] caused [serious bodily injury to] [the death of] (name of victim). I further instruct you that 316.027, Fla....

..."Reasonable assistance" includes carrying or making arrangement to carry the injured person to a physician or hospital for medical treatment. Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death and then Causing Serious Injury Bodily Injury or Death) -316.1935(4)(b) and 316.027 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA.STAT. INS. NO. Aggravated Fleeing 316.1935(4)(a) 28.84 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(1) 28.6 Leaving Scene of Accident 316.027(1)(b) 28.4 Involving Death Leaving Scene of Accident 316.027(1)(a) 28.4 Involving Injury Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.81 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(a) 28.8 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(2) 28.7 Reckless Driving 316.192 28.5 *436 Comments This instruction was adopted in 2008. 28.84 AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death then Causing Injury or Property Damage to Another) § 316.1935(4)(a) and § 316.027 Fla....

...er to stop, willfully fled in a vehicle in an attempt to elude the law enforcement officer.] 7. As a result of (defendant) fleeing or eluding, The] [she] caused [an injury to] [damage to the property of] (name of victim). I further instruct you that § 316.027, Fla....

..."Reasonable assistance" includes carrying or making arrangement to carry *437 the injured person to a physician or hospital for medical treatment. Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death and then Causing Injury or Property Damage to Another) -316.I935(4)(a) and § 316.027 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA.STAT. INS. NO. Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(1) 28.6 Leaving Scene of Accident 316.027(1)(b) 28.4 Involving Death Leaving Scene of Accident 316.027(1)(a) 28.4 Involving Injury Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.81 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(a) 28.8 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(2) 28.7 Reckless Driving 316.192 28.5 Comments This instruction was adopted in 2008.

...n the substantive crime. The standard jury instruction for a companion statute, section 316.061, does not contain any reference to "constructive knowledge" of damage; however, nowhere in that statute is there any requirement of "willfulness." [1] In section 316.027, for which there is no standard jury instruction, the statute provides in part: (1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the a...

..."Willfully" is defined to mean that Dennis Mancuso intended to leave the scene of an accident knowing it resulted in personal injury to another. The trial court denied the request and gave the following instruction: LEAVING THE SCENE ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DEATH OR PERSONAL INJURY F.S. 316.027 Before you can find the defendant guilty of Leaving the Scene of an Accident Involving Death or Personal Injury, the State must prove the following three elements: 1....

...GLICKSTEIN, FARMER and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. ON MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF QUESTION AS ONE OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE PER CURIAM. We grant the state's motion for certification of the following question as being one of great public importance: IN A PROSECUTION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 316.027, FLORIDA STATUTES (1991), MUST THE STATE SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANT KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE INJURY OR DEATH; AND THE JURY BE SO INSTRUCTED? GLICKSTEIN, FARMER and PARIENTE, JJ., concur....

...State, 350 So.2d 1114 (Fla.2d DCA 1977). Applying these propositions to the facts here we hold that the trial court erred in placing appellant on probation for five years for leaving the scene of an accident. The maximum punishment which the court could have imposed under Section 316.027 Florida Statutes (1975) for leaving the scene of an accident was one year....

...Riner appeals from his sentence of probation with the special condition that he pay restitution. Riner's car struck a car occupied by Rafael Garcia, injuring Garcia. Riner then left the accident scene without stopping. The state charged Riner with leaving the scene of an accident involving an injury, in violation of Section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...See Austin v. State, 699 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Other portions of the Wright holding remain undisturbed. Wright involved the same statutes at issue here, and held that convictions under both section 782.071(2), Florida Statutes (1991), and section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (1991), violate the defendant's right against double jeopardy. See 573 So.2d at 1000. Section 782.071(2) provides: Any person who commits vehicular homicide and willfully fails to stop or comply with the requirements of s. 316.027(1) is guilty of a felony of the second degree. Section 316.027(1) stated: The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close thereto as possible, and shall forthwith return to, and in every event shall remain at the scene of, the accident until he has fulfilled the reporting requirements of s. 316.062. Wright held that section 316.027(1) was subsumed within section 782.071(2)....

...a discrete crime against an individual in which causation of injury to the "victim" is related to the leaving the scene charge. This court, in Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), held that dual convictions under the amended version of section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (1995), violated double jeopardy. That statute now separates former section 316.027(1) into two subsections, the first making it a second-degree felony to leave the scene of an accident resulting in death, and the second making it a third-degree felony to leave the scene of one resulting in injury. This court held that conviction under both subsections 316.027(1)(a) and 316.027(1)(b), where one person was injured and two were killed, was error because the effect of the statute was to prohibit a driver from leaving the scene of an accident that involves injury or death....

...4th DCA 1999)(double jeopardy bars separate convictions for vehicular homicide, leaving the scene, and leaving the scene of an accident with injuries). Although this appeal does involve different statutes, section 782.071(2), Florida Statutes (1991)(vehicular homicide, failure to stop), and former section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (1991), as distinguished from section 316.027(1)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1995)(accident resulting in injury or death, failure to stop), we conclude that the Hardy rationale, nevertheless, applies....

...[2] The state's theory of "relatedness" is that "if appellant had not caused the accident, there would not have been a scene for him to leave." This argument is only true in one sense. There could have been a scene for Triplett to leave even if he had not been at fault. For purposes of section 316.027(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), it did not matter if he caused the accident. Section 316.027(1)(a) prohibits the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident from leaving the scene....

...ence of any damage to the vehicle or property introduced at the violation hearing. Instead, all the evidence introduced by the state suggested the appellant committed the crime of leaving the scene of an accident with personal injury, a violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2012)....

...ion of probation which required her to pay restitution. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Appellant was charged with and, following a bench trial, was found guilty of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injuries, in violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1985). On appeal, she claims that there was insufficient evidence from which the trial court could conclude that she had the mental capacity to "willfully" leave the scene of an accident. See § 316.027(2), Fla....

...We conclude that victim injury points were properly assessed and affirm. Mr. Sims was driving his wife's truck when he struck and killed Bernell Williams (the "Victim"). For reasons not specified Mr. Sims left the scene of the accident without ever stopping the truck. He was charged with violating section 316.027(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), and found guilty as charged in the information....

...While trying to dislodge the body, the defendant swerved from side to side and dragged the body approximately 500 feet, throwing the body into the middle of the street where it was struck by another car. The defendant pled no contest to the charges of leaving the scene of an accident involving death in violation of section 316.027(1)(b)....

...See also Seccia v. State, 786 So.2d 12, 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). An issue arose at the oral argument of this case concerning whether victim injury points are already factored into the offense level for the offense of which he was convicted. Mr. Sims points out that section 316.027(1)(a), Florida Statutes, makes the offense of leaving the scene of a crash resulting in injury a third degree felony, while subsection (1)(b) of that statute makes leaving the scene of a crash involving death a second degree felony....

...The trial judge concluded that the accident which caused the death of the victim was "nearly unavoidable." Sims was not charged with vehicular manslaughter or DUI/manslaughter. Rather, he was only tried and convicted of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in the death of a person. Section 316.027(1)(b) provides: The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash resulting in the death of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and must remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s....

...The question raised by this appeal is whether the legislature provided a punishment for the offense of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury without willful intent, an included offense and a misdemeanor by court construction of Section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1975). State ex rel. Miller v. Patterson, 284 So.2d 9 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1973), and State v. Shepard, 299 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1974). Section 316.027 does not set forth a punishment [see Section 316.026(4), Florida Statutes (1975)], and the Miller case fails to state the degree of the misdemeanor or the punishment....

...First, he argues that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.151(c) required dismissal of the charge, because he had been previously tried and acquitted on a related offense. Second, he argues that leaving the scene of an accident is a single offense under section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), no matter how many victims are involved. Finally, he contends that the subsequent prosecution was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We agree that the conviction for leaving the scene of an accident must be reversed under both rule 3.151(c) and section 316.027; therefore, we decline to reach the collateral estoppel argument....

...p.1996), in connection with an automobile accident which occurred on August 2, 1996, in which James McWilliams was killed. A second count charged appellant with leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death of a person, McWilliams, contrary to section 316.027(1) (b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996)....

...Less than one month later, the state filed a third amended information; the first count reiterated the offense of DUI manslaughter of McWilliams, and the second that of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury to a person, Troy Craig, contrary to section 316.027(1) (a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996). [1] Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the second count of the information, arguing that the successive prosecution was prohibited under rule 3.151, that double jeopardy barred successive prosecutions for the same offense, [2] that section 316.027 only allows one charge for leaving the scene regardless of the number of people injured or killed, and that collateral estoppel precluded further prosecution....

...charge of one related offense. Id. Under the circumstances, the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss under rule 3.151(c), and the conviction for leaving the scene must be reversed. The conviction must also be reversed, because section 316.027 precludes multiple charges for leaving the scene of an accident, whether in the same proceeding or in a subsequent prosecution. In Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), the Fourth District explained that although sections 316.027(1)(a) and (b) set forth separate provisions for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury and death, respectively, the offenses are actually different degrees of the same crime....

...Although the general rule is to convict for each crime committed in a criminal episode, an exception exists if the offenses are degrees of the same crime. See § 775.021(4)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). Moreover, the intended unit of prosecution under section 316.027 is each accident rather than each victim. Hardy, 705 So.2d at 980. See also Hoag v. State, 511 So.2d 401, 402 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). Because section 316.027 did not intend multiple charges for leaving the scene of one accident, appellant's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury must be reversed on this ground as well....

...Gen., Tallahassee and John D. Cecilian, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. ALAN R. SCHWARTZ, Associate Judge. We reject each of Bolen's arguments for reversal of his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, in violation of Section 316.027, Fla....

...For the remaining issues on appeal—the denial of the motion to suppress blood test results and the trial court's refusal to admit *619 testimony about an experiment—we find no error. Reversed and remanded for the court to sever the remaining charges and conduct new trials. SHAHOOD, C.J., and FARMER, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2007) provides in pertinent part: The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property that results in the death of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the c...

...Cooper holds that "it is inappropriate to enhance the degree of both crimes by using a single homicide." Cooper, 634 So.2d at 1075. Section 316.061, Florida Statutes (1995), makes it a misdemeanor for a driver to leave the scene of an accident resulting in any property damage. Section 316.027(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), makes it a third-degree felony for a driver to leave the scene of an accident resulting in injury to any person. Section 316.027(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), makes it a second-degree felony for a driver to leave the scene of an accident resulting in the death of any person....

...REVERSED and REMANDED. COBB and PETERSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The judge who denied the defendant's motion for postconviction relief was not the judge who initially sentenced the defendant. [2] § 316.192, Fla. Stat. (1995). [3] § 316.1935, Fla. Stat. (1995). [4] § 316.027, Fla....

...We find merit in his argument that the trial court erred in failing to give two requested special jury instructions. We therefore reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial. We further certify the following question to the supreme court as one of great public importance: In a prosecution for violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006), should the standard jury instruction require actual knowledge of the crash? The defendant was driving a heavy pickup truck northbound on A1A....

...The defense also requested the following special jury instruction: The Defendant’s knowledge that his car caused the personal injuries to [the victim] is a necessary element of the offense of failing to remain at the scene of an accident under Florida Statute Section 316.027....

...The defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied along with the defendant’s Renewed Post-Verdict Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial. The defendant now appeals. The defendant argues that the standard jury instructions included an incorrect statement of law regarding section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006), because the law requires actual knowledge of the accident....

...ues in the case properly.’ ” McConnell v. Union Carbide Corp., 937 So.2d 148, 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting Force v. Ford Motor Co., 879 So.2d 103, 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)) (emphasis added). Here, the defendant was charged with a violation of section 316.027, which provides: The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property that results in injury of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible,...

...st remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of § 316.062. Any person who willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084. § 316.027(l)(a), Fla....

...While our supreme court addressed the knowledge issue as it related to “injury,” it has not been asked to address knowledge of the “accident” as an element of the crime. Even so, the supreme court explained that “knowledge of the accident is an essential element of section 316.027, for one cannot ‘willfully’ leave an accident without awareness that an accident has occurred.” Id. at 371 . At the time of the Mancuso trial, no standard jury instruction for violation of section 316.027 existed....

...We now request the court to focus on the knowledge requirement as it relates to the accident itself. We reverse and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial. We further certify the following question to the supreme court. In a prosecution for violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006), should the standard jury instruction require actual knowledge of the accident? Reversed and Remanded....

...As a result of a burglary charge, defendant was placed on probation for a period of three years. During the probationary term, he was charged with violating his probation (1) by failing to stop and remain at the scene of an accident involving death or personal injuries, in violation of Section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1979), and by failing to leave his name and address as required by Section 316.062, Florida Statutes (1979); (2) by driving while impaired, in violation of Section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1979); and (3) by drivin...

...manslaughter sentence if otherwise permitted by the guidelines. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for new trial with directions. SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and LAZZARA, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 782.07, Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] § 316.027, Fla....

...Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Ira Loewy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Before BARKDULL, C.J., and PEARSON and HAVERFIELD, JJ. PEARSON, Judge. The appellant was charged with "leaving [the] scene of [an] accident involving personal injury" in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.027....

...dent that the State's case was, therefore, not proved beyond a reasonable doubt because it is possible that the defendant did not know what he was doing and, accordingly, lacked the element of willfulness required in the felony defined by Fla. Stat. § 316.027(2)....

...See Douglas v. State, 349 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Onesky contends that Hoag v. State, 511 So.2d 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), is dispositive of this appeal. We disagree. In Hoag, the Fifth District held that Hoag could only be convicted once for violating section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1987), which provides: "The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident." Although Hoag's accident caused...

...n on another count." State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 732-33 (Fla. 1996) (citations omitted) (quoting Gonzalez v. State, 440 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)). Here, the jury found Linen guilty of violating sections 316.027(2)(a) and 316.061(1), Florida Statutes (2015). Section 316.027(2)(a) provides as follows: -2-  The driver of a vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property which results in injury to a person...

...DNA was recovered from the rear vehicle's airbag, which had deployed during the accident, and it was a match to Mr. Gomillion. On March 13, 2017, the State filed an information charging Mr. Gomillion with one count of leaving the scene of an accident, see § 316.027(2)(a), Fla....

...The record fails to show any violations by the trial court or the state attorney which warrant reversal of his convictions and sentences. AFFIRMED. PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 316.193(3)(a),(b) and (c)2, Fla. Stat. (1997) [2] § 316.193(3)(a),(b) and (c)1, Fla. Stat. (1997). [3] § 316.027, Fla....

...*129 F. Palmer Williams and Everett P. Anderson, Tallahassee, for appellant. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Doris E. Jenkins, Legal Assistant, for appellee. PER CURIAM. By this appeal we are required to construe section 316.027(1) and (2), Florida Statutes 1975, in the light of State ex rel....

...g as authority this court's opinion in State v. Ansley, 349 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). We are faced therefore squarely with the query as to whether an indictment charging a driver with "unlawfully", as distinguished from "willfully", violating F.S. 316.027 charges a misdemeanor or whether it defectively charges a felony....

...iver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to, or death of, a person to "willfully" fail to stop at the scene of the accident. The trial judge did not instruct the jury that a misdemeanor is a lesser included offense provided in F.S. 316.027....

...The first count of the indictment, charging manslaughter, was nol. prosed. and the defendant was found guilty on the three counts of willfully failing to stop at the accident scene. It is from the judgment rendered on that verdict, and the resulting sentence, from which this appeal emanates. F.S. 316.027 provides as follows: "(1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close thereto as possible, and shall forthwith r...

...for not more than 1 year or by fine of not more than $5,000 or by both such fine and imprisonment." Our sister court of the Second District in State ex rel. Miller v. Patterson, supra, a prohibition proceeding, squarely and unequivocally held that F.S. 316.027(1) proscribes conduct the violation of which is a misdemeanor and that the violation of F.S. 316.027(2) constitutes a felony....

...Shepard, supra, also a prohibition proceeding, adopted the reasoning and conclusions of that case. Again, in Diggs v. State, supra, the Second District Court of Appeal, citing State ex rel. Miller v. Patterson, supra, held that an information charging a violation of F.S. 316.027 but which did not recite the *131 word "willfully" charged a misdemeanor, saying: "A person not charged with willfully failing to stop under these circumstances can only be convicted of a misdemeanor." In Holmes v....

...The term `misdemeanor' shall not mean a conviction for any violation of any provision of chapter 316 or any municipal or county ordinance." (emphasis supplied) Clearly and without equivocation, that language eliminates an answer that a misdemeanor charge is encompassed within subsection (1) of F.S. 316.027. Further enlightenment may be found in Section 316.026(4), F.S., 1975, Penalties. It is noted that the penalty for violation of F.S. 316.027 is as provided in subsection (4) of Section 316.026. The punishment is a felony, not a misdemeanor. The legislature is presumed to know existing law when enacting statutes. 30 Fla.Jur., Section 110. In order to properly construe F.S. 316.027(1) and (2) that statute must be scrutinized along with, and side by side by, F.S. 316.026(4) and F.S. 775.08(2), and in pari materia with them. Our reasoned judgment is that the legislature, in drafting and passing F.S. 316.027, never intended by the first two subsections to create two crimes, a misdemeanor by subsection (1) and a felony in subsection (2)....

...State, supra, that a court is without authority to impose a sentence upon a defendant who has been convicted of a crime for which the legislature provides no punishment is correct. That opinion is also correct in recognizing and acknowledging that it was not the legislature but the courts which declared F.S. 316.027(1) to proscribe a misdemeanor....

...odily harm to, another. Vehicular homicide is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. (2) Any person who commits vehicular homicide and willfully fails to stop or comply with the requirements of s. 316.027(1) is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. The information filed by the State charged appellant with Count I, manslaughter under Section 782.07, and Count II, leaving the scene of an accident with personal injury in violation of Section 316.027....

...ld not be required to unanimously agree on which theory was proven. Euceda v. State, 711 So.2d 122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Dejerez v. State, 580 So.2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). The reverse was found in State v. Dumas, 700 So.2d 1223 (Fla.1997), regarding section 316.027, which prohibits leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury....

...Barker, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before SUAREZ and CORTIÑAS, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. Carrada appeals from a conviction for leaving the scene of a crash resulting in personal injury in violation of section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...That he did so, he contends, only to appropriately summon help is properly considered a matter of defense. The obviously adverse effect of the errors on that defense, however, requires a new trial. [3] Reversed and remanded for a new trial. NOTES [1] Section 316.027(1)(a) provides: The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash resulting in injury of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and must remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s....

...(2) In the event none of the persons specified are in condition to receive the information to which they otherwise would be entitled under subsection (1), and no police officer is present, the driver of any vehicle involved in such crash, after fulfilling all other requirements of s. 316.027 and subsection (1), insofar as possible on his or her part to be performed, shall forthwith report the crash to the nearest office of a duly authorized police authority and submit thereto the information specified in subsection (1)....

...The victim was struck by Appellant's vehicle and dragged approximately 500 feet. After the initial collision, the victim was run over by another vehicle. Appellant was sentenced on a no contest plea on charges of leaving the scene of an accident involving death in violation of section 316.027(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and driving with a suspended license in violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes....

...State, 777 So. 2d 385, 389 (Fla. 2000) (noting circumstantial-proof standard). We review this claim de novo. Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002). A driver who willfully leaves the scene of an accident involving death commits a felony. § 316.027(2)(c), Fla....

...guilty of "leaving the scene of an accident" as a lesser of the charged offense of leaving the scene of a crash with injury, we reverse as to this count. During the adjudicatory hearing, J.J.'s counsel moved for a dismissal of the charge of leaving the scene of a crash with injury, in violation of section 316.027(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), because the State failed to prove injury....

...first-degree misdemeanor. The trial court adopted the State's suggestion. The order of juvenile probation indicates that J.J. was found guilty of "Leave Scene of Accident." The order does not cite a statutory reference for this offense. Pursuant to section 316.027(1), it is a third-degree felony to leave the scene of a crash resulting in injury and a second-degree felony to leave the scene of a crash resulting in death....

...There is no statute that makes it a criminal offense to leave the scene of a crash when there is no resulting death, injury, or damage to a vehicle or other property. The trial court correctly recognized that the State failed to introduce any evidence of injury as required to support a *267 delinquency adjudication under section 316.027(1)(a)....

...on probation and to enter a dismissal as to count II of the delinquency petition. [1] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. ALTENBERND, C.J, and KELLY, J, Concur. NOTES [1] Because we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a delinquency adjuudication under either section 316.027 or 316.061, we do not decide whether leaving the scene of a crash with property damage is a lesser included offense to a charge of leaving the scene of a crash with death or injury.

...lege in section 316.066(4) does not confer any benefit or privilege on a person who abandons her duty to remain at the scene of any automobile accident which results in death, and who chooses instead to leave the scene of an accident, contrary to section 316.027(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes (2013). For this reason, we approve the decision of the trial court which correctly denied Williams’ dispositive motion to dismiss the statements made by her concerning the automobile crash in...

...Compare § 782.071(l)(a) (vehicular homicide), with § 316,027(2)(c) (leaving the scene of a crash with death). Moreover, leaving the scene of a crash with death also' requires that a defendant willfully leave the scene of a crash, whereas vehicular homicide has no such element. Compare § 782.071(l)(a), with § 316.027(2)(c)....

...3 These two convictions also do not violate the single homicide rule. To establish the crime of leaving -the scene of a crash with death, the State need only prove that the defendant left the scene of a crash which resulted in death—not that the defendant caused • the death. § 316.027(2)(c) (requiring ■ only that the crash “results in the death of a person”)....

...lful attempt to flee or elude a law enforcement officer in an authorized patrol vehicle. § 316,1935(3). Leaving the scene of a crash with death does not contain such an element and instead requires willfully leaving the scene of a crash with death. § 316.027(2)(c)....

...§ 316.1936(3)(b). Ás we already explained, to establish the crime of leaving the scene with death, the State need only prove that the defendant left the scene of a crash which resulted in death, without having to prove that an offender caused the death, § 316.027(2)(c)....

...ed. We affirm McCullough’s remaining convictions and sentences. We also instruct the trial court to correct a scrivener’s error in the judgment to clarify that McCullough’s conviction for leaving the scene of a crash with death was pursuant to section 316.027(2)(c), not section 316.027(l)(b)....

...Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded with instructions; conflict certified. SILBERMAN, J., Concurs with opinion. SLEET, J., Concurs with opinion. . Although the parties do not dispute that McCullough was charged with and pleaded no contest to leaving the scene of a crash with death pursuant to section 316.027(2)(c), we note that the information and judgment, list section 316.027(l)(b) as the appropriate statute....

...der aid to the child, all in *1007 direct violation of Florida Statutes. As a result of said conduct of the Defendant, the child died." Plaintiff has also proved that on December 10, 1981 the debtor pleaded guilty to the Florida felony defined under § 316.027(1) and (2), Florida Statutes: "(1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close thereto as possible, and shall fo...

...the defendant committed the offense, the crime was classified as a second-degree felony punishable by up to 15 years in prison, and that the defendant received a legal sentence of eight years of incarceration followed by five years of probation. See § 316.027(1)(b) Fla....

...This instruction was adopted in 1992 and amended in 1998 [723 So. 2d 123], 2009 [6 So. 3d 574], and 2013 [131 So. 3d 720], and 2016. 28.4 LEAVING THE SCENE OF A CRASH INVOLVING [DEATH] [SERIOUS BODILY INJURY] [INJURY] § 316.027(12), Fla....

...If the State proves that the defendant willfully failed to give any part of the “identifying information” or willfully failed to give reasonable assistance, the State satisfies this element of the offense. Give if serious bodily injury is charged. § 316.027(1)(a), Fla. Stat.; § 316.027(2)(b), Fla....

...driver, which consists of a physical condition that creates a substantial risk of death, serious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ. Enhancement. Give when the State alleged the victim was a “vulnerable road user.” § 316.027(2)(f), Fla....

...nsert applicable definitions from § 316.003, Fla. Stat. - 23 -  Lesser Included Offenses LEAVING THE SCENE OF A CRASH INVOLVING DEATH OR INJURY — 316.027(12)(c) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. None Leaving the 316.027(2)(b) 28.4 Scene of a Crash Involving Serious Bodily Injury* Leaving the Scene of a 316.027(2)(a) 28.4 Crash Involving Injury* Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 LEAVING THE SCENE OF A CRASH INVOLVING SERIOUS BODILY INJURY — 316.027(2)(b) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. Leaving the Scene of a 316.027(2)(a) 28.4 Crash Involving Injury Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Comments * In Williams v....

...whether the State must prove the defendant knew, or should have known, of either the crash or the property damage to violate this statute. Compare State v. Dorsett, 158 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2015) and Mancuso v. State, 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995) dealing with § 316.027, Fla....

...Stat., contains an explicit willfulness requirement. This instruction was adopted in 2016. 28.8(b) AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Serious Bodily Injury, Injury or Death then Causing Serious Bodily Injury or Death) § 316.1935(4)(b) and § 316.027, Fla....

...law enforcement officer.] 7. As a result of (defendant) fleeing or eluding, [he] [she] caused [serious bodily injury to] [the death of] (name of victim). - 27 -  § 316.027, Fla....

...willfully failed to give any part of the “identifying information” or willfully failed to give reasonable assistance, the State satisfies this element of the offense. Enhancement. Give when the State alleged the victim was a “vulnerable road user.” § 316.027(2)(f), Fla....

...Fla. Stat. § 316.003(75), Fla. Stat. “Vehicle” means every device, in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. § 316.027(1)(a), Fla....

...Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death and then Causing Serious Injury Bodily Injury or Death) — 316.1935(4)(b) and 316.027(2)(c) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA.STAT. INS. NO. Leaving Scene of a 316.027(2)(c) 28.4 Crash Involving Death* Leaving the Scene of 316.027(2)(b) 28.4 a Crash Involving Serious Bodily Injury* Aggravated Fleeing 316.1935(4)(a) 28.84 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(1) 28.6 Leaving Scene of a 316.027(1)(b) 28.4 Crash Involving Death Leaving Scene of a 316.027(1)(a)(2)(a) 28.4 Crash Involving Injury* Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(1) 28.6 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.81 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(a)...

...whether the State must prove the defendant knew, or should have known, of either the crash or the property damage to violate this statute. Compare State v. Dorsett, 158 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2015) and Mancuso v. State, 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995) dealing with § 316.027, Fla....

...3d 136], and 2015 [166 So. 3d 161], and 2016. 28.8(d) AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Serious Bodily Injury, Injury or Death then Causing Injury or Property Damage to Another) § 316.1935(4)(a) and § 316.027 Fla....

...to stop, willfully fled in a vehicle in an attempt to elude the law enforcement officer.] 7. As a result of (defendant) fleeing or eluding, [he] [she] caused [an injury to] [damage to the property of] (name of victim). § 316.027, Fla....

...willfully failed to give any part of the “identifying information” or willfully failed to give reasonable assistance, the State satisfies this element of the offense. Enhancement. Give when the State alleged the victim was a “vulnerable road user.” § 316.027(2)(f), Fla....

...Fla. Stat. § 316.003(75), Fla. Stat. “Vehicle” means every device, in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. § 316.027(1)(a), Fla....

... Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death and then Causing Injury or Property Damage to Another) — 316.1935(4)(a) and § 316.027(2)(c) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA.STAT. INS. NO. Leaving Scene of a 316.027(2)(c) 28.4 Crash Involving Death* Leaving Scene of 316.027(2)(b) 28.4 Crash Involving Serious Bodily Injury* Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(1) 28.6 Leaving Scene of a 316.027(1)(b) 28.4 Crash Involving Death Leaving Scene of a 316.027(1)(a)(2)(a) 28.4 Crash Involving Injury* Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(1) 28.6 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.81 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.19...

...whether the State must prove the defendant knew, or should have known, of either the crash or the property damage to violate this statute. Compare State v. Dorsett, 158 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2015) and Mancuso v. State, 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995) dealing with § 316.027, Fla....

...[3] In the Yaros case which was relied upon by the State in its argument to the circuit court, the defendant was convicted in county court for the felony of leaving the scene of an accident with injuries. Yaros, 728 So.2d at 1201. The offense considered in Yaros, which was based upon section *783 316.027(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), [4] could only be classified as a felony....

...v. State, 771 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). See also Garrett v. State, 803 So.2d 801 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). [4] The text of the Yaros opinion contains a misprint which resulted in a reference to section 316.021(1), Florida Statutes (1997), rather than section 316.027(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

accident involving injury, in violation of section 316,027 (2002). The trial court did not, however, find

...Appellant, Brian David Ferris, appeals his judgment and sentence arising out of his nolo contendere plea to the charges of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in personal injuries, failure to remain at the scene and give information and render aid in violation of sections 316.027 and 316.062, Florida Statutes (1987), and driving while his license was suspended or revoked in violation of section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Appellant first challenges that part of his sentence that suspended his driver's license for four years. Appellant is correct that the trial court had no authority to suspend appellant's driver's license. Mandile *180 v. State, 547 So.2d 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). However, both sections 316.027(3) and 322.26(4), Florida Statutes (1987) require that the Department of Safety and Motor Vehicles shall forthwith revoke appellant's license upon receipt of the record of appellant's conviction from the trial court....

...tion plus three years consecutive probation exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment of five years for a third degree felony. § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (1987). Leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injuries is a third degree felony. § 316.027(2), Fla....

...he trial court were invalid. We reverse because the stated reasons constituted an impermissible basis for imposing a departure sentence. Defendant pled guilty to the second degree felony of leaving the scene of an accident involving injury or death, section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1993), and to the first degree misdemeanor of obstruction of an officer without violence, section 843.02....

...We have for review Gaulden v. State (Gaulden II), 132 So.3d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA), review granted, 145 So.3d 824 (Fla. 2014), in which the First District Court of Appeal interpreted the meaning of the phrase “involved in a crash” in Florida’s hit-and-run statute, section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2010), Having concluded that a driver’s vehicle may be “involved in a crash” under this statute when a passen *1124 ger separates from a moving vehicle and lands on the roadway or adjacent area, the district c...

...For the reasons we explain, we disagree with the First District’s conclusion and answer the certified question in the negative. I. BACKGROUND Jacob Thomas Gaulden was charged with leaving the scene of a crash involving a death, a first-degree felony under section 316.027(l)(b)....

...In brief, the statute requires “[t]he driver of any vehicle involved in a crash ... that results in the death of any person” to “immediately stop” at the scene, comply with certain reporting requirements, and render assistance to anyone injured. § 316.027(l)(b), Fla....

...His body evidenced road rash consistent with tumbling across the surface of the road, lacerations from blunt force trauma, contusions of the brain, and a fractured skull. Gaulden was convicted of leaving the scene of a crash that resulted in death *1125 in violation of section 316.027(l)(b), Florida Statutes....

...CRASH” SO THAT THE DRIVER MAY BE HELD CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAVING THE SCENE? Gaulden II, 132 So.3d at 922 . II. ANALYSIS The answer to the certified question turns on the meaning of the operative phrase — “involved in a crash” — in section 316.027, which is a criminal statute....

...ishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Any person who willfully violates this paragraph while driving under the influence as set forth in s. 316.193(1) shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 2 years. § 316.027(1), Fla....

...atute, section 316.645, Florida Statutes (2005). The appellant in Williams had driven through a stop sign, across the road, and into a drainage ditch, resulting in damage to the front end of her car. 937 So.2d at 816 . The statute in that ease, like section 316.027(l)(b) in the instant case, did not define crash....

...the statute. Id. *1127 Subsequently,, in State v. Elder, 975 So.2d 481 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), the Second District also employed the dictionary to ascertain the application of the hit-and-run statute to the facts of that case. Elder was convicted under section 316.027(l)(b), as was Petitioner in this case....

...trict reversed the trial court’s granting of the motion, reasoning that “[although Elder’s car did not crash, Elder was nevertheless ‘involved’ in the crash because her driving caused [a crash].” The appellate court explained as follows: Section 316.027(l)(b) does not limit its application to the driver of any vehicle that collides with another vehicle but instead requires the driver of any vehicle “involved” in a crash to stop....

...In - her dissent in Gaulden I, Judge Davis pointed out that the majority’s broad construction of the statute was more consistent with the prior iteration of the statute which used the word accident, ■not crash. She noted that the legislative staff analysis of the 1999 revision, to 316.027(1)....

...y phrase “any vehicle involved in a crash” to include a passenger separating from a vehicle and colliding with the pavement. This holding is inconsistent with the Legislature’s decision to narrow the statute by replacing accident with crash in section 316.027....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. July 21, 2010. Michael A. Catalano, for appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Forrest L. Andrews, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before GERSTEN, SHEPHERD, and LAGOA, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 316.027(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008); Carrada v. State, 919 So.2d 592, 595 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (noting that under section 316.027(1)(a), "the [S]tate need only prove the actual existence of the accident and the victim's injury, the defendant's admitted knowledge that both occurred, and the admitted fact that he did not remain at the scene") (citation omitted).

...We affirm without discussion the remaining convictions and sentences. Haag contends that his conviction for vehicular homicide/leaving the scene pursuant to section 782.071(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), and his two convictions for leaving the scene of a crash involving injury pursuant to 316.027(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), violated double jeopardy principles and constituted fundamental error....

...Nothing in our record indicates that Haag waived the double jeopardy claim in the trial court. In Hunt , this court recognized that convictions for vehicular homicide/leaving the scene of an accident involving death under section 782.071(2), Florida Statutes (1997), and leaving the scene of an accident involving injury under section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (1997), violated double jeopardy principles because Hunt left the scene of only one accident....

...2d DCA 1999) (determining that only one conviction for leaving the scene of an accident could stand because the defendant left the scene of only one accident); Waldecker v. State, 707 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (same). This court stated in Hunt that “[sjection 782.071 subsumes the requirement found in section 316.027 that the motorist stop and comply with the requirements of section 316.062, Florida Statutes (1997).” 769 So.2d at 1111 ....

...double jeopardy violation where the defendant fled and failed to give aid to the victims. Id. at 369 . In rejecting McNight’s argument, the Fifth District recognized that it was not addressing convictions for leaving the scene of an accident under section 316.027 in addition to the vehicular homicide convictions. Id. at 373 . Here, because Haag’s two convictions for leaving the scene of a crash involving injury under section 316.027 are subsumed within the conviction for vehicular homicide/leaving the scene under section 782.071(l)(b), double jeopardy principles require that the two convictions under *353 section 316.027 be reversed....

dismiss the charge filed against her under section 316.027(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), for leaving

...cie case of the charged offense. M.F. v. State, 35 So.3d 998, 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). In cases involving circumstantial evidence, the State must also present evidence that is inconsistent with the defendant's reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. Section 316.027(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), proscribes the crime of leaving the scene of a crash involving personal injury or death....

BENTON, J. Jacob Thomas Gaulden appeals his conviction and sentence for leaving the scene of a “crash ... that resulted] in ... death,” in violation of section 316.027(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...resulting in injury or death to provide information such as the driver’s name, address, vehicle registration number, and license, and to render reasonable assistance, including arranging for medical treatment if necessary). Charged with violating section 316.027(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), Mr. Gaulden moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion. Section 316.027(1) provides in pertinent part: (a) The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash ......

...Any person who willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the first degree.... In the absence of any evidence that the truck hit the decedent, the trial court ruled that the decedent’s hitting the pavement did not constitute a “crash” within the meaning of section 316.027(l)(b)....

...As then Chief Judge May explained, “While our supreme court addressed the knowledge issue as it related to ‘injury,’ it has not been asked to address knowledge of the ‘accident’ as an element of the crime. Even so, the supreme court explained that ‘knowledge of the accident is an essential element of section 316.027, for one cannot “willfully” leave an accident without awareness that an accident has occurred.’” Dorsett , 38 Fla....

...y followed the truck, but that, when they reached it a few minutes later, the decedent was not in the truck with Mr. Gaulden. The decedent’s body was eventually found near where the truck swerved and accelerated. .The standard jury instruction for section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes, reads as follows: To prove the crime of Leaving the Scene of a Crash, the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1....

...The trial court also rejected the following special jury instruction requested by the defendant: The Defendant’s knowledge that his car caused the personal injuries to [the victim] is a necessary element of the offense of failing to remain at the scene of an accident under Florida Statute Section 316.027....

...ctim’s] resulting injury, or reasonably should have known of such injury from the nature of the accident. Id. at D233, at _ (emphasis omitted). On appeal, Dorsett argued the standard jury instructions included an incorrect statement of law because section 316.027 requires actual knowledge of the accident. The Dorsett court reversed, remanded for a new trial, and certified the following question to the supreme court: "In a prosecution for violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006), should the standard jury instruction require actual knowledge of the accident?” Id....

STRINGER, Judge. Octavious Cummings challenges his judgment and sentence for leaving the scene of an accident with death, contrary to section 316.027(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...This was a close case on the issue of appellant's recklessness, a necessary element of the crime. On that issue, we are bound by McCreary v. State, 371 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1979), a case involving slightly less egregious facts than those in this case. I also note that appellant might well have been charged under section 316.027(1)(b), Florida Statutes *900 (2008), also a first degree felony, which does not require proof of recklessness.

...ruction for leaving the scene of accident involving death misstates the law and constitutes fundamental error in this case. We agree with appellant. Appellant was convicted of leaving the scene of a crash involving death, a first degree felony under section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2011), which stated in relevant part that: (b) The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property that results in the death of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the s...

...e of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and must remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062.... Any person who willfully *576 violates this paragraph commits a felony of the first degree... § 316.027(l)(b), Fla....

...accident involving injury or death, and that element may be proven through evidence that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that injury occurred. 1 The court went on and stated that knowledge of an accident is an essential element of section 316.027. This Court has previously determined that section 316.027 creates only one crime, the felony of “willfully” leaving the scene of an accident involving injury. Stanfill v. State, 384 So.2d 141,143 (Fla.1980). In reaching that determination, this Court implicitly recognized that knowledge of the accident is an essential element of section 316.027, for one cannot “willfully" leave an accident without awareness that an accident has occurred....

...he jury instructions cannot permit a conviction based on mere constructive knowledge of the crash. 3 We, therefore, certify as did the Fourth District, the following question as being one of great public importance: IN A PROSECUTION FOR VIOLATION OF 316.027, FLORIDA STATUTES (2011), SHOULD THE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACCIDENT? We also feel this is an issue the Legislature may wish to address....

...Therefore, we find the State presented competent, substantial evidence supporting a conviction of vehicular homicide. Thus, we affirm that conviction. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED. QUESTION CERTIFIED. LEWIS, C.J., and WETHERELL, J., concur. . Mancuso considered the 1991 version of section 316.027, which prohibited leaving the scene of an accident involving injury or death....

...Thereafter, the appellant was charged with one count of aggravated fleeing or eluding in violation of section 316.1935(4), Florida Statutes (2002). Section 316.1935(4), provides, in relevant part: Any person who, in the course of unlawfully leaving or attempting to leave the scene of a crash in violation of s. 316.027 or s....

...ruling on attorney's fees because the ruling was not reduced to writing. See Walker v. State, 647 So.2d 262, 262 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Gatlin v. State, 618 So.2d 765, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Owens v. State, 579 So.2d 311, 312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). [2] Section 316.027 requires a driver involved in a crash resulting in injury or death to immediately stop at the scene of the crash and section 316.061 requires a driver involved in a crash resulting in property damage to immediately stop at the scene o...

...The driver of another automobile, Ms. Johns, had crashed into a stationary object, a brick mailbox, and had come to a stop in a residential yard while C.J.P. was present. Ms. Johns' vehicle was the only one involved in the "accident." To establish culpability under section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1993), the prosecution had to prove, in addition to C.J.P.'s failure to remain at the scene, that he was "the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury ......

RAY, J. The State appeals from an order dismissing a charge that Jacob Thomas Gaul-den, Appellee, left the scene of a crash involving death, contrary to section 316.027(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2010). In granting Appellee’s motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that a driver does not violate section 316.027(l)(b) by failing to stop when a passenger suffers death as a result of being separated from the driver’s moving vehicle....

...Because there was no evidence that the decedent’s body came into contact with Appellee’s vehicle, the trial court concluded that the decedent’s separation from the vehicle and collision with the road did not constitute a “crash” within the meaning of section 316.027(l)(b)....

...A trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a criminal charge is a question of law, subject to de novo review. Sexton v. State, 898 So.2d 1187, 1188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). The propriety of the trial court’s ruling in this case turns on its interpretation of section 316.027(l)(b), which is also a question of law, reviewable de novo....

...scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and must remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062.... Any person who willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the first degree.... § 316.027, Fla....

...State, Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Williams, 937 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); State v. Elder, 975 So.2d 481, 483 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). In State v. Elder, the Second District determined that the most pertinent definitions of the term “involved” as used in section 316.027(l)(b) are “to draw in as a participant,” to “implicate,” “to relate closely,” to “connect,” “to have an effect on,” to “concern directly,” and to “affect.” 975 So.2d at 483 (quoting Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 271, 226 (10th ed....

...ved that the verb “crash” is synonymous with the term “collide,” which means “to come together with solid or direct impact.” 937 So.2d at 817 (quoting Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 226 (10th ed. 1998)). Applying these definitions to section 316.027, we hold that a driver must stop when his vehicle is a participant in, or has an effect on, a collision that results in injury or death....

...The rule of lenity, in particular, is a “canon of last resort,” to be employed only when statutory language is so ambiguous as to be susceptible of differing, irreconcilable interpretations, even after application of other rules of statutory construction. See Kasischke, 991 So.2d at 814 . The language of section 316.027(l)(b) is broad, but it is not unclear....

...ntation of one of the statute’s main purposes, which is to ensure that crash victims receive medical assistance as soon as possible. See State v. Dumas, 700 So.2d 1223, 1225 (Fla.1997); § 316.062(1) (requiring a driver who has stopped pursuant to section 316.027 to pro *984 ■vide reasonable assistance to anyone injured from a crash involving the driver’s vehicle, including the making of arrangements for medical treatment)....

conviction under section 316.027(2)(c) must stand, while the two convictions based on section 316.027(2)(a) must

...the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in . injury or death . . ., unlawfully and willfully failed to remain at the scene of the accident or to otherwise comply with the provisions of Section 316.062, Florida Statutes, contrary to the provisions of Section 316.027(1) and 316.027(2), Florida Statutes.” Following a jury trial, the jury returned a form verdict which recited the following: “We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of leaving the scene of accident resulting in death or injury.” Judgment of guilt was entered for the offense of “leaving scene of accident with injury or death” and a sentence .of one year imprisonment was imposed. Defendant contends that the jury verdict found him guilty of a misdemeanor under Section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes, since the verdict failed to make the specific finding of willfulness necessary to constitute the felony offense under Section 316.027(2), Florida Statutes....

...State, supra, receded from this court’s holding in State ex rel. Seal v. Shepard, supra, which had adopted the reasoning of State ex rel. Miller v. Patterson, supra. It is clear that the verdict rendered is defective in that it failed to contain the essential element of “willfulness” set forth in Sections 316.027(1) and (2), Florida Statutes....

...The judgment, which must conform to the verdict, is defective in the same particular. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to enter a proper judgment. The defendant need not be present for such purpose. MILLS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN, J., concur. . It is now clear that Section 316.027(1) is not a lesser included offense of the charge....

leaving the scene of an accident in violation of section 316.-027(1)(2), Florida Statutes. All of the charges

...Lawson, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. SMITH, Judge. Shaun Wyrich appeals the sentence rendered on April 7, 2022. Mr. Wyrich was sentenced to fifteen years in prison with a four-year minimum mandatory for leaving the scene of a crash involving death without rendering aid in violation of section 316.027(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2020)....

3d 1123, 1128 (Fla. 2016) (holding that section 316.027’s operative phrase “‘any vehicle involved

...However, a sentence of six years’ incarceration as a youthful offender upon a technical violation of probation or community control for a conviction of leaving the scene of an accident with injury, a third-degree felony punishable by a maximum of five years’ incarceration, is illegal. See § 316.027(l)(a), Fla....

2d 454, 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Under section 316.027, Florida Statutes, to prove that the driver

INJURY OR DEATH, DID THE 1993 AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA STATUTE 316.027, WHICH DIVIDED THE OFFENSE OF LEAVING THE

the time he committed the crime, pursuant to § 316.027(l)(b) and § 775.082(3)(c) (2003). Respondent contends

...road repair detail. After hitting the Plaintiff, Ms. Tin Suryanti proceeded to the Bush Boulevard exit without stopping. She was apprehended, arrested, and charged with the felony Leaving the Scene of an Accident with Injury or Death, a violation of § 316.027, Florida Statutes....

...r person attending the vehicle and to any police officer investigating the crash. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 28.4. In Booker v. State, 103 So.3d 1035, 1037 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), the court explained the state’s burden in proving a violation of section 316.027 as follows: To meet the intent requirement of the statute as written, it is not enough for the State to prove that the defendant was involved in a crash that resulted in injury or death, that the defendant knew or should have known th...

of an accident with death in violation of section 316.027(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2022), and tampering

...He subsequently was charged with: Death by an impaired driver in violation of Section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1986); Vehicular Homicide in violation of Section 782.071, Florida Statutes (1985); Leaving the scene of an accident with personal injuries in violation of Section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1985); and Driving with a revoked or suspended license in violation of Section 322.34, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...vs. DEONTAE PALINSKI JOHNSON, Respondent. March 17, 2022 MUÑIZ, J. This case presents a certified question about the interpretation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2021), a provision titled “Crash involving death or personal injuries.” Under this statute, when a car crash results in the injury or death of “a person,” the driver of a vehicle involved in the crash mus...

...316.062.” Section 316.062, Florida Statutes (2021), in turn requires the driver to provide identifying information to any injured person and the police, and to render reasonable assistance to any injured person. A driver’s willful violation of section 316.027 is a first, second, or third-degree felony, depending on the severity of the crash victim’s injury. The certified question is as follows: Given the requirements of section 316.062(1), Florida Statutes, does conviction on multiple counts under section 316.027(2), Florida Statutes, stemming from a single crash involving multiple victims, expose a defendant to multiple punishments for one offense in violation of the double-jeopardy protections of the U.S. Constitution? Johnson v. State, 307 So. 3d 853, 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). Because we conclude that section 316.027(2) contemplates prosecution on a per-crash-victim basis, rather than on a per-crash basis, our answer to the certified question is no....

...ding and the ramifications thereof.” This argument has no basis in the constitution or our case law. -2- injuries to three others. Johnson fled the crash scene without fulfilling his obligations under sections 316.027 and 316.062. The State charged Johnson with four violations of section 316.027(2)— one violation for each crash victim—and the jury entered a guilty verdict on each count....

...crash.” Johnson, 307 So. 2d at 854. The district court agreed and vacated two of Johnson’s three convictions. Judge Winokur concurred, but only because he was bound by First District precedent. “Writing on a clean slate,” Judge Winokur would have held that “section 316.027(2) permits separate punishments for each victim” and that Johnson’s multiple convictions therefore did not constitute double jeopardy....

...prohibit the government from prosecuting and punishing a criminal defendant multiple times for the same offense. What is disputed here is how to apply that principle in Johnson’s case. When Johnson fled a four-victim crash scene without complying with section 316.027, did he commit one offense or four? A. To answer that question, we must determine the permissible unit of prosecution for a violation of section 316.027(2)....

...immaterial. Our precedents establish that resolving the parties’ dispute about the permissible unit of prosecution is a matter of statutory -4- interpretation. As is often the case with criminal statutes, section 316.027 does not explicitly specify a unit of prosecution. Therefore we must do our best to infer the permissible unit of prosecution from “the overall statutory scheme and language of the statute.” Rubio, 967 So. 2d at 778. By that standard, we think the State and Judge Winokur are right: section 316.027 contemplates a per- crash-victim unit of prosecution. Section 316.027 is a victim-centric statute. Its criminal prohibitions are found in section 316.027(2), which is divided into three paragraphs that impose increasing degrees of punishment, depending on the severity of harm suffered by a crash victim....

...how a car crash has affected each individual victim; the choices are inconsistent with legislative indifference to the number of victims in the crash. -5-  The Legislature’s decision to connect the criminal prohibitions of section 316.027 to the driver’s compliance with section 316.062 also shows a victim-oriented focus. Section 316.062(1) requires the driver to “render to any person injured in the crash reasonable assistance,” including facilitating their medical care. Section 316.027 makes it a crime for the driver to leave a crash scene until the driver has complied with section 316.062. Given that section 316.027 gives the driver duties that run to each crash victim, it makes sense to punish a driver’s noncompliance with section 316.027 on a per-crash-victim basis. Finally, we note the portion of section 316.027(2)(d) saying that “if the driver of a vehicle violates paragraph (a), paragraph (b), or paragraph (c), the court shall order the driver to make restitution to the victim.” (emphasis added)....

...permissible unit of prosecution is each crash and that the number of injured crash victims is immaterial. -6-  B. Johnson’s principal textual argument on the other side is that section 316.027 says that the driver “shall stop” and “shall remain” at the crash scene. 2 According to Johnson, the criminal activity punished by the statute is a driver’s failure to remain at the scene, making the crash itself the unit of prosecution. We think that this argument gives insufficient weight to section 316.027’s command that the driver stop and remain “until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of section 316.062.” The text shows that the Legislature defined the criminal activity not just in terms of leaving the crash scene, b...

...to “any person injured in the crash.” (emphasis added). But in this context, the Legislature used the word “any” to mean “each,” which only confirms the statutory focus on each individual crash victim. -7- prosecution for section 316.027 is per crash scene....

...1st DCA 2008); Hardy v. State, 705 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Hoag v. State, 511 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). The fountainhead of that line of authority is the Fifth District’s decision in Hoag, which interpreted an earlier version of section 316.027. Like the current version, 3 the 1987 version of section 316.027 required the driver to remain at a crash scene “until he has fulfilled the requirements of s....

...316.062.” But in 1987 the statute referred generally to “an accident resulting in injury or death of any person,” without making the distinctions present in the current version. Also in contrast to the current version, the 1987 version of section 316.027 made all willful violations third-degree felonies, regardless of the severity of a victim’s injury....

...-8- accident constituted but one offense although that accident resulted in injuries to four persons and the death of a fifth.” Id. We are not sure that Hoag got the unit of prosecution analysis right, even as to the 1987 version of section 316.027. But ultimately that is irrelevant; since 1987 the Legislature has amended section 316.027 to make the statute even more explicitly victim-centric. Moreover, the Hoag court and the district courts that relied on it gave short shrift to the Legislature’s decision to incorporate into section 316.027 the victim-oriented duties of section 316.062. Given the evolution of the statute and the analytical incompleteness of these district court decisions, we are unpersuaded by the Hoag line of district court authority. III. We hold that section 316.027(2) contemplates a per-crash- victim unit of prosecution....

...L, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. LABARGA, J., dissenting. Because I conclude that a defendant may only be prosecuted under section 316.027(2), Florida Statutes, on a per crash basis and not per victim, I dissent to the majority’s interpretation of the statute, and I would approve the First District Court of Appeal’s decision. Application for Review of the Decisio...

...16.1931, Florida Statutes (1983); manslaughter in violation of section 782.07, Florida Statutes (1983); vehicular homicide in violation of section 782.071, Florida Statutes (1983); and leaving the scene of an accident involving death in violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...pon remand by following proper procedure. Smith v. State, 622 So.2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED; RESTITUTION VACATED; COSTS STRICKEN. HARRIS, C.J., concurs. THOMPSON, J., concurs in part; dissents in part, with opinion. . § 316.027(l)(a), Fla.Stat....

McCORD, Judge. Appellant, who was adjudged to be indigent, was charged with a violation of § 316.027, Florida Statutes, (leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury)....

...For reasons not explained in the record before us, Roblero Escalante was not arrested until October 21, 2012, and it was not until November 26, 2012, that the State charged Roblero Escalante with leaving the scene of a crash involving death as a first- degree felony under section 316.027(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...rders to provide opportunity for meaningful and efficient judicial review. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 647, 649 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). -3- degree felony if the crash resulted in injury or death. § 316.027.2 Therefore, the State had three years to commence prosecution....

...opposed to the accident itself, that caused the death of the victim, then Roblero Escalante must be discharged. Petition granted with directions. CASANUEVA, BLACK, and SLEET, JJ., Concur. 2 In 2006, section 316.027 was amended to punish the crime as a first- degree felony if the crash results in the death of any person. Ch. 06-225, § 2, at 2486, Laws of Fla. Currently, section 316.027 defines three separate crimes: a first-degree felony if the crash results in a death, a second-degree felony if the crash results in serious bodily injury, and a third-degree felony if the crash results in injury that does not qualify as serious bodily injury....

January 1, 1972. The correct statutory citation is § 316.027, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., and is the same in substance

...State Courts Administrator, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner -4-  APPENDIX 28.4 LEAVING THE SCENE OF A CRASH INVOLVING [DEATH] OR [INJURY] § 316.027(1), Fla....

...1st DCA 1987). “Willfully” means knowingly, intentionally and purposely. Lesser Included Offenses No lesser included offenses have been identified for this offense. LEAVING THE SCENE OF A CRASH INVOLVING DEATH OR INJURY — 316.027(1) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...2d 1081] and amended in 2011 [73 So. 3d 136] and 2015. 28.82(b) AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death then Causing Serious Bodily Injury or Death) § 316.1935(4)(b) and § 316.027, Fla....

...ttempt to elude the law enforcement officer.] - 14 -  7. As a result of (defendant) fleeing or eluding, [he] [she] caused [serious bodily injury to] [the death of] (name of victim). § 316.027, Fla....

...Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death and then Causing Serious Injury Bodily Injury or Death) — 316.1935(4)(b) and 316.027 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA.STAT....

...INS. NO. Aggravated Fleeing 316.1935(4)(a) 28.84 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(1) 28.6 - 15 - Leaving Scene of a 316.027(1)(b) 28.4 Crash Accident Involving Death Leaving Scene of a 316.027(1)(a) 28.4 Crash Accident Involving Injury Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.81 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(a) 28.8 Fleeing to Elude LEO...

...2d 1081] and amended in 2011 [73 So. 3d 136] and 2015. 28.84(d) AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death then Causing Injury or Property Damage to Another) § 316.1935(4)(a) and § 316.027 Fla....

...willfully fled in a vehicle in an attempt to elude the law enforcement officer.] 7. As a result of (defendant) fleeing or eluding, [he] [she] caused [an injury to] [damage to the property of] (name of victim). § 316.027, Fla....

...- 20 -  Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Injury or Death and then Causing Injury or Property Damage to Another) — 316.1935(4)(a) and § 316.027 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA.STAT. INS. NO. Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(1) 28.6 Leaving Scene of a 316.027(1)(b) 28.4 Crash Accident Involving Death Leaving Scene of a 316.027(1)(a) 28.4 Crash Accident Involving Injury Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.81 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(a) 28.8 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(2)...

...Diggs was tried in the circuit court on an information charging him with unlawfully departing the scene of an accident involving a personal injury. 1 At trial the state recognized that the statute number set forth in the information, to wit, § 316.061, was incorrect and moved to amend the statute number to § 316.027, which motion was granted by the court. The state failed to amend the body of the information to include the word “willfully” so as to make the offense a felony under § 316.027(2). 2 The jury returned a guilty verdict and the court, assuming that Diggs had been convicted of a felony under § 316.027(2), sentenced him to six months to five years....

...reservation of the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue has no right to a direct appeal. §§ 924.06(3), .051(4), Fla. Stat. (2021). Schaefer did not expressly reserve the right to appeal the double jeopardy issue in the trial 1 See § 316.027(2)(c), Fla....

...Demps, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. WALLACE, Judge. Robert Leonard appeals from his judgment and sentences following his conviction in a bench trial for the offenses of leaving the scene of an accident with death contrary to section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2009), a first-degree felony, and tampering with evidence contrary to section 918.13, Florida Statutes (2009), a third- degree felony....

...jured].” We also conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s determination that Olguin either knew or should have known of the resulting injury. See State v. Mancuso, 652 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla.1995) (“criminal liability under section 316.027 requires proof that the driver charged with leaving the scene either knew of the resulting injury or death or reasonably should have known from the nature of the accident”)....

...Cunniff was charged with aggravated fleeing and eluding pursuant to section 316.1935(4), Florida Statutes (2003). Section 316.1935(4) states: Any person who, in the course of unlawfully leaving or attempting to leave the scene of a crash in violation of s. 316.027 or s....

...attempting to leave the scene of a crash as defined in the statute but rather was leaving the scene of a shooting. In the present case, the petitioner was fleeing in a truck he had just stolen. He was not leaving the scene of a crash in violation of section 316.027 or section 316.061....

...We remand with instructions to the trial court to enter judgment for the lesser-included offense of fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer under section 316.1935(1). See Santiago, 847 So.2d at 1061. Petition denied in part and granted in part. FULMER and WALLACE, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Section 316.027 prohibits leaving the scene of a crash involving death or personal injuries....

PER CURIAM. Appellant was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury contrary to section 316.027(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...s specified are in condition to receive the information to which they otherwise would be entitled under subsection (1), and no police officer is present, the driver of any vehicle involved in such accident, after fulfilling all other requirements of s. 316.027 and subsection (1), insofar as possible on his or her part to be performed, shall forthwith report the accident to the nearest office of a duly authorized police authority and submit thereto the information specified in subsection (1)....

...This is an appeal from the trial court’s summary denial of appellant’s motion for postconviction relief from his convictions for vehicular homicide, a violation of section 782.071, Florida Statutes (1998), and leaving the scene of an accident with injury, a violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1998), both third degree felonies....

617 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). As for Count VI, section 316.027(2), Florida Statutes (1979), is violated if

...was convicted and were pending before the court at the time of sentencing of the primary offense. Thus victim injury points for the additional offense of reckless driving were properly scored. AFFIRMED. THOMPSON, C.J., ORFINGER, R.B., J., concur. . § 316.027(l)(a), Fla....

element under Florida’s hit-and-run statute, section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2010). We, however, conclude

...taining to whether the defendant caused the victim’s injury or death as part of aggravated fleeing or eluding: Give if it is alleged in the charging document that the defendant caused victim injury or death as part of violating § 316.027, Fla....

...nd amended in 1998 [723 So. 2d 123], 2009 [6 So. 3d 574], 2013 [131 So. 3d 720], and 2016 [192 So. 3d 1190], and 2019. 28.4 LEAVING THE SCENE OF A CRASH INVOLVING [DEATH] [SERIOUS BODILY INJURY] [INJURY] § 316.027(2), Fla....

...If the State proves that the defendant willfully failed to give any part of the “identifying information” or willfully failed to give reasonable assistance, the State satisfies this element of the offense. Give if serious bodily injury is charged. § 316.027(1)(a), Fla. Stat.; § 316.027(2)(b), Fla....

...determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] [she] caused [death] [or] [severe injury] [or] [moderate injury] [or] [slight injury] to (victim). Enhancement. Give when the State alleged the victim was a “vulnerable road user.” § 316.027(2)(f), Fla....

...If the “vulnerable road user” enhancement is given, insert applicable definitions from § 316.003, Fla. Stat. Lesser Included Offenses LEAVING THE SCENE OF A CRASH INVOLVING DEATH — 316.027(2)(c) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. Leaving the Scene of a 316.027(2)(b) 28.4 Crash Involving Serious Bodily Injury* Leaving the Scene of a 316.027(2)(a) 28.4 Crash Involving Injury* Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 LEAVING THE SCENE OF A CRASH INVOLVING SERIOUS BODILY INJURY — 316.027(2)(b) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. Leaving the Scene of a 316.027(2)(a) 28.4 Crash Involving Injury Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Comments * In Williams v....

...addressing the issue of whether the State must prove the defendant knew, or should have known, of either the crash or the property damage. Compare State v. Dorsett, 158 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2015), and Mancuso v. State, 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995), dealing with § 316.027, Fla....

...he defendant knew, or should have known, of either the crash or the property damage. Compare State v. Dorsett, - 36 - 158 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2015), and Mancuso v. State, 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995), dealing with § 316.027, Fla....

...3d 244], and 2019. 28.8(b) AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Serious Bodily Injury, Injury or Death then Causing Serious Bodily Injury or Death) § 316.1935(4)(b) and § 316.027, Fla....

...to stop, willfully fled in a vehicle in an attempt to elude the law enforcement officer.] 7. As a result of (defendant) fleeing or eluding, [he] [she] caused [serious bodily injury to] [the death of] (name of victim). § 316.027, Fla....

...entifying information” or willfully failed to give reasonable assistance, the State satisfies this element of the offense. Give if it is alleged in the charging document that the defendant caused victim injury or death as part of violating § 316.027, Fla....

...then determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] [she] caused [death] [or] [severe injury] [or] [moderate injury] [or] [slight injury] to (victim). Enhancement. Give when the State alleged the victim was a “vulnerable road user.” § 316.027(2)(f), Fla....

...“Vehicle” means every device, in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway[, excepting personal delivery devices, mobile carriers, and devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks]. § 316.027(1)(a), Fla....

...- 53 -  AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Death and then Causing Serious Injury Bodily Injury or Death) — 316.1935(4)(b) and 316.027(2)(c) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. Leaving Scene of a 316.027(2)(c) 28.4 Crash Involving Death* Leaving the Scene of 316.027(2)(b) 28.4 a Crash Involving Serious Bodily Injury* Aggravated Fleeing 316.1935(4)(a) 28.8428.8(d) Leaving Scene of a 316.027(2)(a) 28.4 Crash Involving Injury* Fleeing to Elude 316.1935(1) 28.6 LEO Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.8128.8(a) Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(a)...

...have known, of either the crash or the property damage to violate this statute. - 57 - CompareCompare State v. Dorsett, 158 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2015), and Mancuso v. State, 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995), dealing with § 316.027, Fla....

...3d 244], and 2019. 28.8(d) AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Serious Bodily Injury, Injury or Death then Causing Injury or Property Damage to Another) § 316.1935(4)(a) and § 316.027 Fla....

...to stop, willfully fled in a vehicle in an attempt to elude the law enforcement officer.] 7. As a result of (defendant) fleeing or eluding, [he] [she] caused [an injury to] [damage to the property of] (name of victim). § 316.027, Fla....

...entifying information” or willfully failed to give reasonable assistance, the State satisfies this element of the offense. Give if it is alleged in the charging document that the defendant caused victim injury or death as part of violating § 316.027, Fla....

...then determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] [she] caused [death] [or] [severe injury] [or] [moderate injury] [or] [slight injury] to (victim). Enhancement. Give when the State alleged the victim was a “vulnerable road user.” § 316.027(2)(f), Fla....

...“Vehicle” means every device, in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway[, excepting personal delivery devices, mobile carriers, and devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks]. § 316.027(1)(a), Fla....

... Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Death and then Causing Injury or Property Damage to Another) — 316.1935(4)(a) and § 316.027(2)(c) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. Leaving Scene of a 316.027(2)(c) 28.4 Crash Involving Death* Leaving Scene of 316.027(2)(b) 28.4 Crash Involving Serious Bodily Injury* Leaving Scene of a 316.027(2)(a) 28.4 Crash Involving Injury* Fleeing to Elude 316.1935(1) 28.6 LEO Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.8128.8(a) Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(a)...

...have known, of either the crash or the property damage to violate this statute. CompareCompare State v. Dorsett, 158 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2015), and Mancuso v. - 65 - State, 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995), dealing with § 316.027, Fla....

...For the purposes of this opinion, we consolidate these two cases, which involve two separate automobile accidents. Each defendant was charged with leaving the scene of an accident with injury. Each defendant was ordered to pay restitution for damages arising out of the automobile accident. § 316.027, Fla.Stat....

on the scene prior to appellee’s departure. Section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (1981), requires the driver

...screte crime against an individual in which causation of injury to the “victim” is related to the leaving the scene charge. This court,-in Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), held that dual convictions under the amended version of section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (1995), violated double jeopardy. That statute now separates former section 316.027(1) into two subsections, the first making it a second-degree felony to leave the scene of an accident resulting in death, and the second making it a third-degree felony to leave the scene of one resulting in injury. This court held that conviction under both subsections 316.027(l)(a) and 316.027(l)(b), where one person was injured and two were killed, was error because the effect of the statute was to prohibit a driver from leaving the scene of an accident that involves injury or death....

...4th DCA *444 1999) (double jeopardy bars separate convictions for vehicular homicide, leaving the scene, and leaving the scene of an accident with injuries). Although this appeal does involve different statutes, section 782.071(2), Florida Statutes (1991) (vehicular homicide, failure to stop), and former section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (1991), as distinguished from section 316.027(l)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1995) (accident resulting in injury or death, failure to stop), we conclude that the Hardy rationale, nevertheless, applies....

...Those convictions were based on one accident in which three people were injured and the car which they occupied was damaged. Section 316.061(1), Florida Statutes (1997), one of the statutes under which appellant was convicted, prohibits leaving the scene of a "crash resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other property." Section 316.027(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997) prohibits leaving the scene of a "crash resulting in injury of any person." Appellant argues that the jury's finding of guilt for leaving the scene of an accident involving injuries is inconsistent with...

...that he did not know that the “something” he had hit was a person. He therefore claimed that he did not have the requisite intent to have violated the statute requiring motorists to remain at the scene of an accident causing injury or death. See § 316.027, Fla....

...e case of the charged offense. M.F. v. State, 35 So.3d 998, 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). In cases involving circumstantial evidence, the State must also present evidence that is inconsistent with the defendant’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. Section 316.027(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), proscribes the crime of leaving the scene of a crash involving personal injury or death....

...for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Giselle Denise Lylen, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. THOMAS, J. Appellant appeals her conviction for leaving the scene of a crash involving death in violation of section 316.027(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2011).1 She also 1 In 2014, the Legislature amended the statute re-designating subsection (1) as subsection (2), with the new subsection (1) which includes various definitions. appeals the final judgment...

...Instruction (Criminal) 28.4, which provides that the State must prove that a defendant “knew or should have known” of the injury or death of the victim. See State v. Mancuso, 652 So. 2d 370, 372 (Fla. 1995) (holding “that criminal liability under section 316.027 requires proof that the driver charged with leaving the scene either knew of the resulting injury or death or reasonably should have known from 6 the nature of the accident and that the jury should be so instructed.”)....

...Aleman was involved in a car accident which resulted in death of the driver of the other car. Aleman was charged with manslaughter by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, § 316.1931, Fla.Stat. (1985), and with leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury, § 316.027, Fla.Stat....

...lorida, for Petitioner -4-  APPENDIX 28.4 LEAVING THE SCENE OF A CRASH INVOLVING [DEATH] [SERIOUS BODILY INJURY] [INJURY] § 316.027(2), Fla....

...If the State proves that the defendant willfully failed to give any part of the “identifying information” or willfully failed to give reasonable assistance, the State satisfies this element of the offense. Give if serious bodily injury is charged. § 316.027(1)(a), Fla. Stat.; § 316.027(2)(b), Fla....

...driver, which consists of a physical condition that creates a substantial risk of death, serious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ. Enhancement. Give when the State alleged the victim was a “vulnerable road user.” § 316.027(2)(f), Fla....

...If the “vulnerable road user” enhancement is given, insert applicable definitions from § 316.003, Fla. Stat. Lesser Included Offenses LEAVING THE SCENE OF A CRASH INVOLVING DEATH — 316.027(2)(c) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. Leaving the Scene of a 316.027(2)(b) 28.4 Crash Involving Serious Bodily Injury* Leaving the Scene of a 316.027(2)(a) 28.4 Crash Involving Injury* Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 -7-  LEAVING THE SCENE OF A CRASH INVOLVING SERIOUS BODILY INJURY — 316.027(2)(b) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. Leaving the Scene of a 316.027(2)(a) 28.4 Crash Involving Injury Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Comments * In Williams v....

...2016). As of August 2017, there was no case law directly addressing the issue of whether the State must prove the defendant knew, or should have known, of either the crash or the property damage. Compare State v. Dorsett, 158 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2015), and Mancuso v. State, 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995), dealing with § 316.027, Fla....

...addressing the issue of whether the State must prove the defendant knew, or should have known, of either the crash or the property damage. Compare State v. Dorsett, 158 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2015), and Mancuso v. State, 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995), dealing with § 316.027, Fla....

...3d 161], and 2018. 28.8(b) AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Serious Bodily Injury, Injury or Death then Causing Serious Bodily Injury or Death) § 316.1935(4)(b) and § 316.027, Fla....

...to stop, willfully fled in a vehicle in an attempt to elude the law enforcement officer.] 7. As a result of (defendant) fleeing or eluding, [he] [she] caused [serious bodily injury to] [the death of] (name of victim). § 316.027, Fla....

...willfully failed to give any part of the “identifying information” or willfully failed to give reasonable assistance, the State satisfies this element of the offense. Enhancement. Give when the State alleged the victim was a “vulnerable road user.” § 316.027(2)(f), Fla....

...22 -  § 316.003(75), Fla. Stat. “Vehicle” means every device, in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. § 316.027(1)(a), Fla....

...Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Death and then Causing Serious Injury Bodily Injury or Death) — 316.1935(4)(b) and 316.027(2)(c) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA.STAT. INS. NO. Leaving Scene of a 316.027(2)(c) 28.4 Crash Involving Death* Leaving the Scene of 316.027(2)(b) 28.4 a Crash Involving Serious Bodily Injury* Aggravated Fleeing 316.1935(4)(a) 28.84 Leaving Scene of a 316.027(2)(a) 28.4 Crash Involving Injury* Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(1) 28.6 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.81 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(a) 28.8...

...addressing the issue of whether the State must prove the defendant knew, or should have known, of either the crash or the property damage to violate this statute. Compare State v. Dorsett, 158 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2015), and Mancuso v. State, 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995), dealing with § 316.027, Fla....

...3d 1190], and 2018. - 27 -  28.8(d) AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Serious Bodily Injury, Injury or Death then Causing Injury or Property Damage to Another) § 316.1935(4)(a) and § 316.027 Fla....

...to stop, willfully fled in a vehicle in an attempt to elude the law enforcement officer.] 7. As a result of (defendant) fleeing or eluding, [he] [she] caused [an injury to] [damage to the property of] (name of victim). § 316.027, Fla....

...willfully failed to give any part of the “identifying information” or willfully failed to give reasonable assistance, the State satisfies this element of the offense. Enhancement. Give when the State alleged the victim was a “vulnerable road user.” § 316.027(2)(f), Fla....

...ment. § 316.003(75), Fla. Stat. “Vehicle” means every device, in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. § 316.027(1)(a), Fla....

... Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED FLEEING OR ELUDING (Leaving a Crash Involving Death and then Causing Injury or Property Damage to Another) — 316.1935(4)(a) and § 316.027(2)(c) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA.STAT. INS. NO. Leaving Scene of a 316.027(2)(c) 28.4 Crash Involving Death* Leaving Scene of 316.027(2)(b) 28.4 Crash Involving Serious Bodily Injury* Leaving Scene of a 316.027(2)(a) 28.4 Crash Involving Injury* Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(1) 28.6 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(b) 28.81 Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(3)(a)...

...addressing the issue of whether the State must prove the defendant knew, or should have known, of either the crash or the property damage to violate this statute. Compare State v. Dorsett, 158 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2015), and Mancuso v. State, 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995), dealing with § 316.027, Fla....

...Beveridge [“Beveridge”] appeals the order denying his motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm. On February 6, 2002, Beveridge was charged by information with leaving the scene of an accident with injury, a third-degree felony, in violation of section 316.027(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

...ZACHARIAH DORSETT, Respondent. [February 26, 2015] CANADY, J. In this case, we answer a certified question regarding the knowledge element of Florida’s hit-and-run statute, section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...accident involving an injury the statute requires the State to prove that the driver had “actual knowledge” of being involved in a crash. The district court certified to this Court the following question: “In a prosecution for violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006), should the standard jury instruction require actual knowledge of the crash?” 147 So....

...For the reasons explained below, we answer the certified question in the affirmative. I. BACKGROUND Zachariah Dorsett was charged with leaving the scene of a crash resulting in an injury under this state’s hit-and-run statute, a third degree felony under section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...The jury found Dorsett guilty, and the trial court subsequently sentenced him to twenty-four months in prison for the third-degree felony. On appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Dorsett again argued “that the standard jury instructions included an incorrect statement of law regarding section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006), because the law requires actual knowledge of the accident.” 147 So....

...and the jury should be so instructed. Dorsett, 147 So. 3d at 536-37. As a result the Fourth District reversed and remanded the case for new trial but also certified the -4- following question: “In a prosecution for violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006), should the standard jury instruction require actual knowledge of the crash?” 147 So....

...3d at 533 (emphasis in original). II. ANALYSIS Whether Florida’s hit-and-run statute requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver had actual knowledge of being involved in a crash is a question of law that requires interpretation of section 316.027 to give effect to the Legislature’s intent....

...However, when the language of a statute is unclear or ambiguous, we employ rules of statutory construction to discern that intent. Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 811 (Fla. 2008). The relevant portion of Florida’s hit-and-run statute, subsection 316.027 provides as follows: (1)(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property that results in injury of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the cr...

...that results in injury of any person” to “immediately stop,” “remain at the scene,” and comply with section 316.062, which requires the driver to provide reasonable assistance to anyone injured and to provide identifying information as specified. § 316.027(1)(a). Although section 316.027 does not expressly state that actual knowledge is required for a violation, the law does expressly provide that a felony criminal violation requires that the driver “willfully” violate the statute. For the reasons we explain, we conclude that a willful violation can be established only if the driver had actual knowledge that a crash occurred. In Mancuso, 652 So. 2d at 370, we addressed a related claim that section 316.027 contained a requirement of actual knowledge that an injury had occurred. In that case, the defendant was charged under section 316.027 with leaving the scene of an accident involving a personal injury or death....

...lfully failed to stop at the scene.” Id. (emphasis added). Mancuso was convicted and on appeal, the district court approved the trial court’s instruction and certified the following question to this Court: “In a prosecution for violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1991), must the State show that the defendant knew or should have known of the injury or death; and the jury be so instructed?” Id. at 370; see Mancuso v. State, 636 So. 2d 753, 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). On review, we relied on our decision in Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1980), to answer the question. In that case, we rejected the contention that section 316.027 created two offenses—the misdemeanor of unlawfully leaving the scene and the felony of willfully leaving the scene—and held the statute “creates only the felony of ‘willfully’ leaving the scene of an accident.” 384 So. 2d at 141- 42, 143. Accordingly, in Mancuso, we explained that [i]n reaching [the determination in Stanfill], this Court implicitly recognized that knowledge of the accident is an essential element of section 316.027, for one cannot “willfully” leave an accident without awareness that an accident has occurred....

...concluded that knowledge of the accident must be read into the statute. Mancuso, 652 So. 2d at 371 (emphasis added). With regard to the element of knowledge of the injury, however, we held in Mancuso that “criminal liability under section 316.027 requires proof that the driver charged with leaving the scene either knew of the resulting injury or death or reasonably should have known from the nature of the accident and that the jury should be so instructed.” Id....

...aid, and provide certain information necessary for an insurance claim and an accident report whenever there is an injury. § 316.062, Fla. Stat. (1995). Florida law further makes it a felony to fail to complete these duties. § 316.027(2), Fla....

...One of the main purposes of the statute is to ensure that accident victims receive medical assistance as soon as possible. Herring v. State, 435 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“It is apparent that the purpose of sections 316.027 and 316.062 is to assure that any injured person is rendered aid and that all pertinent information concerning insurance and names of those involved in the traffic accident is exchanged by the parties.”)....

...established from the surrounding circumstances.” Id. at 576 n.2 (quoting Miller, 308 N.W.2d at 7). III. CONCLUSION We agree with the Fourth District’s holding that in a prosecution under Florida’s hit-and-run statute, section 316.027, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver had actual knowledge of the crash, an essential element of the crime of leaving the scene of a crash....

...At that point and in consultation with her attorney, Sylvester refused on fifth amendment grounds to answer any further questions. Thereafter the State filed an information charging the defendant with willfully failing to remain at the scene of the accident involving an injury in violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...We find no merit in Prestano’s remaining claims for relief. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED. COHEN, C.J., EDWARDS, J. and JACOBUS, B. W., Senior Judge, concur. 1 Prestano wished to claim lack of mental capacity, which could be a valid defense to the crime of leaving the scene. See § 316.027(1)(b), Fla....

...titution provisions from her written sentence and order of probation. I. Facts Latham entered an open plea of guilty to the charged offense of leaving the scene of an accident causing death, a first-degree felony. See § 316.027(1)(b), Fla. Stat....

...ges were not caused by the defendant's offense of leaving the scene. At a hearing on the objection, defense counsel admitted that he had failed to object at the sentencing hearing. The trial court stated that the statute that Latham had violated, section 316.027, had been recently amended and represents "one of the unique areas [in which damage or loss] does not have to be causally related" to the crime. See § 316.027(1)(c) (specifically addressing "restitution to the victim for any damage or loss" for violations of subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b)). Defense counsel maintained that "there still has to be . . . some connection." The State asked the trial court to continue the hearing so that the State could research the amendment to section 316.027....

...5th DCA 2014) (reversing a portion of restitution on the basis that it was not statutorily authorized where issue was preserved in a rule 3.800(b) motion). B. Restitution Latham was convicted under subsection (1)(b) of section 316.027. Subsection (1)(c) of that same section provides as follows: Notwithstanding s....

...uirement that the court order payment to the Crimes Compensation Trust -6-  At the two hearings on Latham's objection to restitution, the trial court and the parties addressed section 316.027(1)(c), specifically the language in the first sentence regarding "any damage or loss." But everyone failed to note that no restitution to the victim had been ordered....

...restitution to the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund, unless specifically waived in accordance with subparagraph (b)1. 2 Accordingly, we do not decide whether restitution to the victim in this case would have been proper under section 316.027(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2012). -7- "victim" is eligible for awards under chapter 960. Section 960.03(14) defines "[v]ictim" as "[a] person who suffers personal physical injury or death as a direct result of a crime."3 Section 960.03(3)(b) in turn defines "[c]rime" as [a] violation of s. 316.193, s. 316.027(1), s....

...limits the violations of those six statutes to acts that intentionally inflicted injury or death through the use of a vehicle, boat, or aircraft. While the victim suffered death as a result of Latham's accident and Latham was charged with violating section 316.027(1), Latham's offense does not constitute a crime under section 960.03 because the "death was [not] intentionally inflicted through the use of [Latham's] vehicle." § 960.03(3)(b).5 Therefore, under the plain language of the above-m...

...Butterworth, Attorney General, and Dominique T. Suite-Brown, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before COPE, LEVY, and SHEVIN, JJ. PER CURIAM. Derondeil Tirell Butler appeals his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident with injuries. See § 316.027, Fla....

...The State argued that the nature of the crash was such that Booker should have known of Alvarado’s presence and injuries. The trial court denied the motion for judgment of *1037 acquittal, and the jury subsequently found Booker guilty as charged on this count. He now appeals the resulting conviction and sentence. Section 316.027(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), provides: The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property that results in injury of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as cl...

...Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deborah A. Cheesman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. PALMER, J. Joseph Daugherty (the defendant) appeals his conviction on the charge of leaving the scene of a crash involving death. See § 316.027(2)(c), Fla....

...The defendant backed the car out of the driveway in an attempt to avoid contact with the victim and, as he accelerated to leave the area, the victim (who was holding on to the vehicle through the open window) fell to the ground, sustaining a fatal head injury. Section 316.027 provides: 316.027....

...person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and shall remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. § 316.027(2)(c), Fla....

declared that only a felony is created by section 316.027 with or without the word “willfully.” Stanfill

DAUKSCH, Judge. This is an appeal from a sentence. Appellant was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident involving injuries. § 316.027, Fla.Stat....

...It does not preclude the circuit court from exercising jurisdiction where, as in the present case, another statute (section 26.012(2)(d)) specifically provides for circuit court jurisdiction. REVERSED and REMANDED. MONACO, C.J., concurs. COHEN, J., dissents with opinion. . § 316.027(l)(a), Fla....

...ing a felony such as high speed flight to avoid arrest, battery upon the investigating officer, resisting with violence, or, as in this case, leaving the scene of an accident with injuries. Surely this is not what the Legislature intended. NOTES [1] § 316.027(1)(a), Fla....

...We conclude that the trial court correctly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4) on the ground that the undisputed facts demonstrated that he had complied with the requirements of section 316.062(2), Florida Statutes (1983), and was therefore not in violation, as charged, of section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (1983)....

“accident.” To establish culpability under section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1993), the prosecution had

...guilty of “leaving the scene of an accident” as a lesser of the charged offense of leaving the scene of a crash with injury, we reverse as to this count. During the adjudicatory hearing, J.J.’s counsel moved for a dismissal of the charge of leaving the scene of a crash with injury, in violation of section 316.027(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), because the State failed to prove injury....

...-degree misdemeanor. The trial court adopted the State’s suggestion. The order of juvenile probation indicates that J.J. was found guilty of “Leave Scene of Accident.” The order does not cite a statutory reference for this offense. Pursuant to section 316.027(1), it is a third-degree felony to leave the scene of a crash resulting in injury and a second-degree felony to leave the scene of a crash resulting in death....

...There is no statute that makes it a criminal offense to leave the scene of a crash when there is no resulting death, injury, or damage to a vehicle or other property. The trial court correctly recognized that the State failed to introduce any evidence of injury as required to support a *267 delinquency adjudication under section 316.027(l)(a)....

...on probation and to enter a dismissal as to count II of the delinquency petition. 1 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. ALTENBERND, C.J., and KELLY, J., Concur. . Because we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a delinquency adjudication under either section 316.027 or 316.061, we do not decide whether leaving the scene of a crash with property damage is a lesser included offense to a charge of leaving the scene of a crash with death or injury.