Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ocial evaluation; the impoundment and immobilization of all vehicles that Mr. Kelly owns for 90 days; and the permanent revocation of Kelly's driver's license or driving privilege. See §§ 316.193(2)(b)(3), 775.083(1)(c), 316.193(5), 316.193(6)(c), 322.28(2)(e), Fla....

...nt offense's length of incarceration. Second, there is nothing preventing the State from permanently removing Kelly, and similarly situated repeat DUI offenders, from Florida's roads by permanently revoking their driver's licenses. In relevant part, section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2003), provides: The court shall permanently revoke the driver's license or driving privilege of a person who has been convicted four times for violation of s....

...Section 8 amends section 322.26, Florida Statutes which deals with mandatory revocation of driver's licenses. Section 9 amends section 322.271, Florida Statutes, which deals with petitions for reinstatement of driving privileges. Section 10 deals with amendments to section 322.28, Florida Statutes, concerning the period of suspensions and revocations of driver's licenses. Section 11 creates section 322.28, Florida Statutes relating to the commencement of the period of suspension or revocation of driver's licenses for incarcerated offenders while section 12 amends section 322.34, Florida Statutes dealing with driving while license suspended, revoked, canceled or disqualified....

...The County Court for Sarasota County certified the following question to this court as one of great public importance: WHETHER, WHEN A COUNTY JUDGE HAS DECLARED THAT A PRIOR CONVICTION FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE CANNOT BE USED TO ENHANCE THE PENALTIES CONCERNING SUSPENSION AND REVOCATION OF LICENSES AS PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 322.28, FLORIDA STATUTES (1984), AND WHEN THE JUDGE TREATS A DEFENDANT AS A, "FIRST TIME OFFENDER", AND SUSPENDS THE LICENCE [sic] FOR A TIME CERTAIN OF SIX MONTHS, THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES CAN NEVERTHE-LESS [sic] CONSIDER THE PRIOR "...

...v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 [100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169] (1980)." Thereupon, the judge sentenced Vogt as if his current DUI conviction were his first DUI conviction. He ordered Vogt's driver's license revoked for a period of six months pursuant to section 322.28(2), Florida Statutes (1983), which specifies that upon a first conviction for DUI, the offender's driver's license or driving privilege shall be revoked for not less than 180 days or more than one year....

...ound that the period of revocation had expired. In the meantime, however, the Department had checked its records and found Vogt's prior DUI conviction. Accordingly, the Department had revoked Vogt's driver's license for five years in accordance with section 322.28(2)(a)(2), which specifies that upon a second DUI conviction, the driver's license *1170 of the offender shall be revoked for not less than five years....

...She argued that the trial court had no authority to permanently revoke her driver's license under section 316.655(2), because a more specific statute applies and the more specific statute authorizes a license revocation of five years, but no more. See § 322.28(2)(a)(2), Fla....

...The Second District then certified conflict with Whipple v. State, 789 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), wherein the Fourth District concluded that the defendant's driver's license could not be permanently revoked for a second DUI conviction under section 316.655 because the more specific statute, section 322.28(2)(a)(2), controlled, and that under the specific statute, the Legislature contemplated permanent revocation after four DUI convictions, not two....

...result of the driver's violation of this chapter, and the extent of any property damage resulting from the driver's violation of this chapter. Stoletz argues that section 316.655(2) is not applicable to her because there is a more specific statute, section 322.28(2)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1999), that controls....

...Upon a second conviction within a period of 5 years from the date of a prior conviction for a violation of the provisions of s. 316.193 or former s. 316.1931 or a combination of such sections, the driver's license or driving privilege shall be revoked for not less than 5 years. § 322.28(2), Fla....

...We agree with the Second District's conclusion in this case that there is no conflict between these two statutes and that both statutes would permit a trial court to permanently revoke a driver's license if warranted by the circumstances. In contrast, the Fourth District in Whipple found section 322.28(2)(a)(2) was applicable and did not allow permanent revocation after the second DUI....

...The trial court permanently revoked Whipple's driver's license under the general statute, section 316.655(2). Id. The Fourth District held that Whipple's driving privileges could not be permanently revoked under section 316.655(2) because the trial court was bound by the more specific statute, section 322.28(2)(a)(2). Id. at 1135. Moreover, the Fourth District opined that the more specific statute, section 322.28(2)(a)(2), does not provide for the permanent revocation of a driver's license after only a second DUI conviction, stating that "the legislature did not contemplate the permanent revocation of a driver's license without the requisite number of DUI convictions." Id. at 1137. We agree, however, with the Second District's view that "nothing in section 322.28(2)(a)(2) prohibits a court from imposing a term of suspension or revocation longer than five years for a second conviction for DUI, and section 316.655(2) specifically permits a court to do so." Stoletz, 842 So.2d at 868....

...In addition, "a specific statute covering a particular subject area always controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms." McKendry v. State, 641 So.2d 45, 46 (Fla.1994). The language of the general statute, section 316.655(2), and the language of the more specific statute, section 322.28(2)(a)(2), is plain and unambiguous....

...Section 316.655(2) provides generally for the revocation or suspension of driving privileges based upon the totality of the circumstances resulting in a conviction of any offense prohibited by chapter 316 or *576 any other law of this state regulating motor vehicles, including chapter 322. Section 322.28(2)(a)(2) specifically addresses periods of revocation or suspension of driving privileges resulting from DUI convictions under section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1999). Applying the rule that a specific statute controls over a more general one, section 322.28(2)(a)(2) would apply when determining the period for which a court may suspend or revoke a driver's license for a DUI conviction. Stoletz was convicted of her second DUI, so the more specific section 322.28(2)(a)(2) applies in determining the license revocation period for her DUI conviction. Pursuant to section 322.28(2)(a)(2), Stoletz's license "shall be revoked for not less than 5 years." The Fourth District has held that section 322.28(2)(a)(2) does not allow for a permanent driver's license revocation when read within the context of the entire statute. Whipple, 789 So.2d at 1137. However, the plain language of the section provides for a mandatory minimum period for a license revocation, not a mandatory maximum. See § 322.28(2)(a)(2), Fla....

...It is particularly important to note that the immediately preceding provision in this statute does, in fact, set forth a mandatory maximum time period for license revocation. [1] It is also noteworthy that prior to a 1982 amendment, the revocation period in section 322.28(2)(a)(2) did provide a mandatory minimum and maximum of "not less than 6 months or more than 24 months." § 322.28(2)(a)(2), Fla....

...s or its reasonable and obvious implications.'" Holly, 450 So.2d at 219 (quoting Am. Bankers Life Assur. Co. v. Williams, 212 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)) (alterations in original). We therefore agree with the Second District that "nothing in section 322.28(2)(a)(2) prohibits a court from imposing a term of suspension or revocation longer than five years for a second conviction for DUI." Stoletz, 842 So.2d at 868....

...4th DCA 1999) (finding the trial court properly considered the totality of circumstances, including the fact that a death occurred, in permanently revoking a defendant's license pursuant to section 316.655(2) after his conviction for reckless driving). Thus, in this case, both the specific statute applicable to DUI, section 322.28(2)(a)(2), and the general statute, section 316.655(2), authorized the trial court's permanent revocation of Stoletz's driver's license....

...PARIENTE, J., concurs in result only with an opinion. PARIENTE, J., concurring in result only. I concur in result only because although I agree that the trial court had authority to permanently revoke Stoletz's driver's license, that authority is derived from section 316.655(2) and not from section 322.28(2)(a)(2). I thus disagree with the majority that a trial court has unfettered discretion under section 322.28(2)(a)(2) to permanently revoke a driver's license based solely on a second DUI conviction without regard for the circumstances of the offense....

...discretion under section 316.655(2) in permanently revoking Stoletz's driving privileges for the offense of driving with a license suspended for habitual traffic offenses. However, I disagree with the majority that a trial court could rely solely on section 322.28(2)(a)(2) to permanently revoke Stoletz's license. At the time of the offenses in this case, section 322.28, Florida Statutes (1999), provided, in pertinent part: (2) In a prosecution for a violation of s....

...(e) The court shall permanently revoke the driver's license or driving privilege of a person who has been convicted four times for violation of s. 316.193 or former s. 316.1931 or a combination of such sections. (Emphasis supplied.) In holding that a permanent revocation is authorized under section 322.28(2)(a)(2), the majority reads the provision's phrase "shall be revoked for not less than 5 years" in isolation....

...Richter, 671 So.2d 149, 154 (Fla.1996) ("[S]tatutory phrases are not to be read in isolation, but rather within the context of the entire section."). Applying this principle in Whipple v. State, 789 So.2d 1132, 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), the Fourth District correctly concluded that section 322.28(2)(a)(2) did not authorize a permanent license revocation for a second DUI conviction. Although subsection (2)(a)(2) does not specify a maximum period of revocation, it is part of a statutory scheme that increases the terms of revocation for each DUI conviction, culminating in permanent revocation for a fourth conviction. See § 322.28(2)(e), Fla....

...ay Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Bender, 497 So.2d 1332, 1334 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, successive DUI convictions authorize commensurately longer suspensions and revocations. See Whipple, 789 So.2d at 1137. A construction of section 322.28(2) that allows permanent revocation for a second or subsequent conviction undermines the link between DUI recidivism and the duration of license revocation evident in the legislative scheme. In addition, the majority's construction of section 322.28(2) provides trial courts with the option of a revocation from five years to permanent without criteria to guide that discretion. At the very least, section 322.28(2) should be considered in pari materia with section 316.655(2) because pursuant to section 316.655(2), DUI constitutes a violation of a "law of this state regulating motor vehicles." Section 316.655(2) requires that in determining the...

...extent and nature of the driver's violation..., the number of persons killed or injured as the result of the driver's violation..., and the extent of any property damage resulting from the driver's violation." This construction of the provisions of section 322.28(2) and its relationship to section 316.655(2) would give effect to the language in both statutes. First, it would be consistent with the dictate of sections 322.28(2)(a)(2) and (3) that the revocation be for periods of "not less than" five and ten years, respectively....

...fied by the "the need to provide for the maximum safety for all persons who travel on or who are otherwise affected by the use of the highways of this state." Finally, this construction would give trial courts guidance in exercising discretion under section 322.28(2). Absent application of the criteria supplied by section 316.655(2), revocations imposed upon second-and third-time DUI offenders under section 322.28(2) could vary widely, without regard to the circumstances of the offense. Further, without articulated criteria, there is no basis for an appellate court to determine whether a trial court abused its discretion in permanently revoking a license under section 322.28(2). I do not believe the Legislature intended this result in authorizing commensurately longer revocations for repeat DUI offenders. NOTES [1] Section 322.28(2)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (1999), states: Upon a first conviction for a violation of the provisions of s....

...etitioner for being in actual, physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a violation of section 316.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1982). The county court revoked petitioner's driver's license for six months pursuant to section 322.28, Florida Statutes (1982)....

...ol. The issues presented to us principally involve the definition of "in actual, physical control" under section 316.193(1)(a), whether petitioner was in actual, physical control of the car, and, if so, whether his license was properly revoked under section 322.28....

...icating liquor from getting into their vehicles, except as passengers." See State v. Schuler, 243 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1976). Finally, we conclude that petitioner's sentence which in part revoked petitioner's driver's license for six months was correct. Section 322.28 provides that revocation of a driver's license is a penalty for the offense of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages....

...as a direct consequence of which the defendant should have been advised for his plea to be voluntary. Id. at 829. The Fourth District has since restated this holding in other cases concerning the suspension and revocation of a driver's license under section 322.28, Florida Statutes....

..." 511 So.2d at 961 (emphasis added). In contrast to the statutes at issue in Daniels and other cases, in which the court revoked the driver's licenses of certain drug offenders, see, e.g., § 322.055, Fla. Stat. (2007), or of defendants convicted of DUI manslaughter, see, e.g., § 322.28(2)(e), Fla....

...t. GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER and HALL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The record before us affords some degree of confusion whether the bumper sticker is intended as a condition of probation, or as a condition of obtaining the work permit authorized by section 322.282, Florida Statutes (1985). If Goldschmitt had not desired to drive on a restricted basis during the period of suspension of his license pursuant to section 322.28(2)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (1985), the trial court apparently would not have included the bumper-sticker condition in the order of probation....

...Gen., Tallahassee, Sharon A. Wood, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee, cross-appellant. EN BANC KLEIN, Judge. We affirm appellant's convictions for driving under the influence, but reverse the permanent revocation of his driver's license under section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1991), because we conclude that the statute contemplates convictions arising out of separate driving episodes, not multiple convictions arising out of one driving episode....

...[1] Appellant had one prior DUI conviction. The trial court concluded that the three convictions arising out of this accident, when added to the one prior DUI conviction, constituted four convictions and permanently revoked defendant's driver's license under section 322.28, Florida Statutes (1991). The pertinent provisions of section 322.28 provide: (2)(a) Upon conviction of the driver, the court, along with imposing sentence, shall revoke the driver's license or driving privilege of the person so convicted and shall prescribe the period of such revocation in accordance with the following provisions: 1....

...We affirm the trial court's permanent revocation of appellant's driving privileges. Appellant was convicted of one count of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol and causing serious bodily injury under section 316.193(3)(c)2., Florida Statutes (2008). Pursuant to section 322.28(4)(a), the trial court shall revoke the driving privileges of a person convicted under section 316.193(3)(c)2....

..."for a *823 minimum period of 3 years." This section permits the trial court to revoke a defendant's driving privileges permanently. Stoletz v. State, 875 So.2d 572 (Fla.2004). The trial court, however, revoked appellant's driving privileges pursuant to section 316.655(2), not section 322.28(4)(a)....

...Section 316.655(2) may not be used to revoke driving privileges for a DUI conviction. Stoletz, 875 So.2d at 575-76. Nevertheless, while the trial court cited the incorrect statute, the trial court's order revoking appellant's driving privileges was a sound exercise of its discretion under section 322.28(4)(a), and we affirm....

...The charge stemming from that 1993 incident resulted in a reckless driving charge and the DUI was nolle prossed. Appellant argued that only one of the two DUI's in the present case could be counted for suspension purposes, and thus, he did not qualify for a lifetime suspension under section 322.28(2)(a)3....

...Lastly, he claimed that the trial court erred in assessing victim injury points. At the hearing on the motion to withdraw plea, appellant's former attorney, Gerald Salerno, testified that he was surprised by the lifetime driver's license suspension because he did not believe that section 322.28 called for a lifetime suspension....

...years. In its order denying appellant's motion to withdraw plea, the court held that section 316.655 empowered the court to suspend or terminate driving privileges if warranted under the facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, it was not bound by section 322.28, as argued by appellant....

...We reverse, finding error in the permanent revocation of appellant's driver's license and in the denial of appellant's motion to withdraw plea based on the misadvice of counsel. The trial court erroneously revoked appellant's driving privileges pursuant to section 316.655, Florida Statutes (1999). Rather, it was bound by section 322.28, Florida Statutes (1999). Appellant was convicted under section 316.193(3)(c)2, a third degree felony, for DUI with serious bodily injury and had only one prior DUI conviction. The pertinent provisions of section 322.28 provide: (2) In a prosecution for a violation of s....

...316.193(3)(c)2., involving serious bodily injury, is also a subsequent conviction as described under paragraph (2)(a), the court shall revoke the driver's license or driving privilege of the person convicted for the period applicable as provided in paragraph (2)(a) or paragraph (2)(e). (emphasis supplied). Subsection 322.28(4)(a) specifically provides that where a conviction under section 316.193(3)(c)2, involving serious bodily injury, is also a subsequent conviction, the court shall revoke the person's driving privilege for the period applicable as provided in paragraph (2)(a). Since this was appellant's second DUI conviction within five years, section 322.28(2)(a)2 requires that his driving privilege be revoked for not less than 5 years....

...construction. See State v. Bradford, 787 So.2d 811 (Fla.2001)(quoting Capers v. State, 678 So.2d 330, 332 (Fla.1996)). Where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need for judicial interpretation. See id. The language of section 322.28 is facially clear and unambiguous. The statute specifically mandates the suspension of driving privileges for violations of section 316.193. Unlike section 322.28, section 316.655, a permissive catch-all statute, does not address periods of suspension or revocation of driving privileges stemming from a DUI conviction under section 316.193. Rather, section 316.655, provides generally for the revocation or suspension of driving privileges based on the totality of the circumstances and the violation of any offense prohibited by chapter 316 or any law of this state. Thus, section 322.28, the more specific statute, controls in this instance....

...on of public safety." State, Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Grapski, 696 So.2d 950, 951-52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). It is the duty of the courts and the department to follow the provisions of Chapter 322. See id. at 952. *1137 In this case, section 322.28(2)(a)2 specifically provides that upon a second conviction within a period of 5 years from the date of a prior conviction under section 316.193, the driver's license shall be revoked for not less than five years....

...a subsequent conviction as described in paragraph (2)(a), the court shall revoke the driver's license of the person convicted for the period applicable as provided in paragraph (2)(a) or paragraph (2)(e). Clearly, the trial court was bound to follow section 322.28. Under the statutory scheme of section 322.28, we conclude that the trial court erred in permanently revoking appellant's driver's license....

...In so holding, we rely upon this court's decision in Jackson v. State, 634 So.2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)( en banc ). In that case, this court affirmed a defendant's DUI convictions, but reversed the permanent revocation of his driver's license under section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1991), on the grounds that the statute contemplated convictions arising out of separate driving episodes, not multiple convictions arising out of one driving episode....

...manent revocation of his driver's license. See id. In reaching its conclusion, the court applied the basic tenet of statutory construction that "statutory provisions are to be read within the context of the entire statute." Id. at 1106. In analyzing section 322.28, the court held: A reading of the fourth conviction provision in context with the second and third conviction provisions of this statute leads us to conclude that the overall scheme is for increased terms of suspension based on the num...

...der the influence. The statute increases the length of suspension each time the offender repeats the offending conduct, and when the offender does it the fourth time, his driving privileges are permanently revoked. Id. Under this court's analysis of section 322.28, the legislature did not contemplate the permanent revocation of a driver's license without the requisite number of DUI convictions....

...In this case, while appellant was advised that there would be a license revocation, he was never told that there could be a permanent license revocation. Salerno testified that he was surprised by the permanent revocation because he did not believe that section 322.28 called for such a sanction in this case....

...ence that appellant be able to work and make restitution. A permanent revocation would have direct impact on appellant's ability to make restitution. As in Daniels, the court was required to determine that appellant understood that he was subject to section 322.28 and a permanent revocation....

...Section 8 amends section 322.26, Florida Statutes which deals with mandatory revocation of driver's licenses. Section 9 amends section 322.271, Florida Statutes, which deals with petitions for reinstatement of driving privileges. Section 10 deals with amendments to section 322.28, Florida Statutes, concerning the period of suspensions and revocations of driver's licenses. Section 11 creates section 322.28, Florida Statutes relating to the commencement of the period of suspension or revocation of driver's licenses for incarcerated offenders while section 12 amends section 322.34, Florida Statutes dealing with driving while license suspended, revoked, canceled or disqualified....

...Galanter, and Patricia L. Marino, Miami, and Nicole Morris McNeal, Aventura, for appellee. Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and GERSTEN and GODERICH, JJ. GERSTEN, Judge. We review a county court order certifying the following question to be of great public importance: Does section 322.28(6) prevent a county court judge from ordering the Department to stay a driver license revocation/suspension pending appeal where a defendant has pled no contest, specifically reserving the right to appeal the denial of a Motion to Dism...

...Succinctly, this section mandates that the Department revoke the license of any individual convicted of DUI. However, the county court granted Degrossi's motion to stay the revocation, and then issued a rule to show cause when the Department failed to comply with the stay order. Although the trial court was aware of Section 322.28(6), Florida Statutes (1995) which states that, "no suspension or revocation of a driving privilege shall be stayed upon appeal of the conviction or order that resulted therein," the trial court ordered the Department to stay the five year driver license revocation pending appeal....

...[1] In response to this threat, the legislature enacted Section 322.26(2) which imposes a duty upon the Department to suspend the driver's license of any person convicted of DUI in order to protect the public from potentially dangerous drivers. [2] In Section 322.28(6), the *1095 legislature further provided that once the Department issued an administrative suspension/ revocation, the suspension/revocation cannot be stayed upon an appeal of the conviction or order that resulted therein....

...The answer initially turns on the meaning of "conviction" as used in the statute. Section 322.01(10) defines "conviction" as "a conviction of an offense relating to the operation of motor vehicles on highways which is a violation of this chapter...." Degrossi contends "conviction" as used in Sections 322.26(2) and 322.28(6), refers to the final judgment after appeal and thus the Department lacked the authority to suspend his license pending the final outcome on appeal....

...Having established that the Department's duty is triggered by the initial judgment of guilt, we next address the trial court's authority to stay the revocation. A trial court has inherent authority to stay litigation pending appellate review. Loeb v. State, 387 So.2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). This authority is not disrupted by Section 322.28(6) because revocation of a driver's license is an administrative remedy which is separate and apart from the sentence imposed for the criminal conviction....

...ed privilege to drive by simply filing a notice of appeal. The risk to an individual of an erroneous suspension is far outweighed by the state's compelling interest in removing intoxicated drivers from public roadways. Because Sections 322.26(2) and 322.28(6) must be construed in accordance with the legislative intent to ensure safe roadways and protecting the public from intoxicated drivers, we reverse the trial court's stay of the license suspension....

...others and their disrespect for the laws of the state and the orders of the state courts and administrative agencies." § 322.263, Fla.Stat. (1995). See Keith v. Capers, 362 So.2d 130 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 1363 (Fla.1979). [3] Section 322.28(6) specifically provides: "No administrative suspension of a driving privilege under s....

...*194 In his motion to correct sentence appellant contested only the length of suspension. He claimed that notwithstanding the inclusion of two separate counts in the charging instrument this should be considered a "first offense" justifying suspension of his license for no more than one year. § 322.28(2)(a)(1), Fla....

...(1987). However, the trial court held that appellant's conviction on the second count of the information constituted a second violation for purposes of suspension. Accordingly the court was authorized to suspend the license for "not less than 5 years." § 322.28(2)(a)(2), Fla....

...§ 316.193(2)(a) and (b), Fla. Stat. (1987). In conjunction with the fines and jail terms provided in the foregoing statute, the defendant's driving privileges must be suspended, with the minimum length of the suspension period escalating with the number of convictions. § 322.28, Fla....

...NOTES [1] (3) Any person: (a) Who is in violation of subsection (1); (b) Who operates a vehicle; and (c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes: 2. Serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. [2] Section 322.28 is not penal in nature, but is designed to protect and promote the public safety....

...The county court thereupon ordered Bender's license revoked for "not less than 180 days or more than one (1) year." Differing with the county court, the Department considered Bender's September 24, 1984, conviction to be his third DUI conviction and applied section 322.28(2)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1983), which specifies that upon a third DUI conviction, the driver's license of the offender must be revoked for not less than ten years....

...Accordingly, on December 27, 1986, the Department revoked Bender's license for ten years. Bender filed a petition for certiorari in circuit court challenging the Department's authority to revoke his license for ten years because, at the time of his third offense, section 316.028 was not specifically enumerated in section 322.28(2)(a)3 for the purpose of determining a driver's license revocation....

...Therefore, Bender contended, the Department could not consider his two prior convictions for violation of section 316.028. The circuit court agreed with Bender and quashed the Department's order thereby preventing it from revoking Bender's license for more than one year. The circuit court construed section 322.28 as penal in nature and, as such, found that it must be strictly construed against the Department. The court reasoned that since section 316.028 was not specifically enumerated as an offense to be counted toward revocation in section 322.28 at the time of Bender's third DUI conviction, the Department lacked authority to revoke Bender's drivers' license for ten years. The Department argues that section 322.28 is not penal in nature but rather is designed to protect the public from drunken drivers and should be liberally construed to further the public safety purposes of the *1334 statute. The Department notes that on October 1, 1984, shortly after Bender's third conviction for DUI, the legislature included section 316.028 within section 322.28. § 322.28(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1984). The Department contends that that amendment was declaratory of existing law and only expressed the legislature's prior intent and long-standing public policy concern — to protect the public. We agree that section 322.28 is not penal in nature but rather was designed to protect the public....

...The legislature has consistently indicated its intent to provide greater protection to the public from persons who had accumulated multiple DUI convictions. The legislature merely clarified and underlined that intent when it added section 316.028 to section 322.28 on October 1, 1984....

...e enumeration of the statute which proscribes the offending conduct. Clearly, Bender was convicted three times in ten years for the offense of driving under the influence. It is the duty of the courts, and the Department, to follow the provisions of section 322.28(2)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...ndition of which probation is that the offender must perform fifty hours of community service. See Fla.Stat. § 316.193(5) and (6). Also, the offender’s driving privileges are revoked “for not less than 180 days or more than 1 year.” Fla.Stat. § 322.28 (Supp....

...The appellant contends that the latter portion of the sentence suspending his license is error. We agree. The trial court's own authority to suspend or revoke drivers' licenses is permitted under certain circumstances, none of which are present here. See, e.g., § 322.28, Fla....

...Robert Lee McDaniel, Jr., appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to rule 3.800. He maintains that the trial court erred in permanently revoking his driver's license. Although we conclude that the trial court incorrectly interpreted section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1993), that statute is administrative in nature....

...There is no indication in this record that his attorney objected to this condition, and Mr. McDaniel did not appeal the imposition of this condition. In his motion, Mr. McDaniel alleged that the trial court could not lawfully revoke his license on a permanent basis pursuant to section 322.28(2)(e) because he had only been convicted of one alcohol-related offense. The trial court denied the motion, finding that because Mr. McDaniel "was convicted of DUI manslaughter in violation of § 316.193, he met the requisite criteria for permanent revocation." It is obvious that the trial court construed section 322.28(2)(e) to require a mandatory permanent revocation of Mr. McDaniel's license because his only DUI offense resulted in a death. In 1993, section 322.28(2)(e) provided in pertinent part: The court shall permanently revoke the driver's license ... of a person who has been convicted ... of manslaughter resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle or vehicular homicide and who has been convicted of a violation of s. 316.193 or former s. 316.1931. (Emphasis added.) In comparison, section 322.28(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), provided: Upon a conviction for a violation of s. 316.193(3), a conviction of manslaughter resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle, or a conviction of vehicular homicide, the court shall revoke the driver's license of the person convicted for a minimum of 3 years. (Emphasis added.) Section 322.28 was not a model of clarity....

...ration of a motor vehicle," Mr. McDaniel's single conviction for DUI manslaughter would not fit within the language of the permanent revocation statute in 1993 because it clearly required two separate convictions. The trial court's interpretation of section 322.28(2)(e) renders subsection 5(a) meaningless. We note that the legislature substantially revised this statute in 1996. See Ch. 96-330, Laws of Fla. Now, a single DUI manslaughter conviction mandates a permanent revocation under section 322.28(2)(e)....

...evocation under subsection 5(a), the question remains whether this error may be corrected on a motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a). The state forcefully argues that the order should be affirmed because revocation is administrative in nature and because section 322.28(5)(a) does not contain an express maximum length of revocation....

...that pursuant to his plea, his drivers license would be suspended for one year. Prianti was since advised by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles that his license was permanently revoked as this conviction was his fourth offense. See § 322.28(2)(e), Fla....

...488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997), to the question of whether driver's license revocation and the unavailability of a hardship license constitutes criminal punishment. I. FACTS AND RELEVANT STATUTORY HISTORY Lescher was convicted of DUI four times: in 1979, 1983, 1991, and 2000. Section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2000), required that "[t]he court shall permanently revoke the driver's license or driving privilege of a person who has been convicted four times" for this offense. After his 2000 conviction, therefore, Lescher's license was permanently revoked. Section 322.271(4), Florida Statutes (1997), formerly provided that drivers whose licenses had been permanently revoked under section 322.28(2)(e) could, after five years, petition for reinstatement of the "driving privilege." [1] A petitioner had *1080 to establish that he qualified....

...Dep't of Corrections, 845 So.2d 880 (Fla.2003) (concluding under a Hudson analysis that sections of the Florida Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims' Remedy Act did not operate as a criminal punishment). We now apply this analysis to the DUI permanent revocation provision, section 322.28(2)(e), and the hardship license provision, section 322.271(4)....

...435, 447, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989)). We address each factor in turn. 1. Affirmative Disability or Restraint The first factor is whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99-100, 118 S.Ct. 488. Neither section 322.28(2)(e) (the license revocation provision) nor section 322.271(4) (the hardship license provision) imposes an affirmative disability as the Supreme Court has applied this factor....

...with four DUI convictions have not been viewed as criminal punishment. 3. Scienter The third factor is whether the sanction comes into play only on a finding of scienter. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99-100, 118 S.Ct. 488. The license revocation statute, section 322.28, does not contain a scienter element....

...4. Punishment and Deterrence The fourth factor is whether operation of the license revocation and hardship license statutes will promote the traditional aims of punishment, retribution, and deterrence. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99-100, 118 S.Ct. 488. Section 322.28(2) provides for lengthening periods of license suspension or revocation as the number of DUI convictions increases....

...Section 322.42 requires that chapter 322 be "liberally construed" to give "the greatest force and effect ... to its provisions for the promotion of public safety." A driver's license is not permanently revoked upon a single—or even the second or third—DUI infraction. Rather, section 322.28(2) requires *1086 revocation of driver's licenses for increasing amounts of time with each DUI conviction....

...stated purpose of protecting the public. Nor is the felonious nature of a fourth DUI conviction sufficient to convert this civil remedy into a criminal punishment. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to show by the "clearest of proof" that sections 322.28(2)(e) and 322.271(4) are "so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate th[e] intention" of imposing a civil penalty thus effecting a civil remedy....

...We answer the certified question "no" and approve the district court's decision. It is so ordered. WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and BELL, JJ., concur. QUINCE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur in result only. NOTES [1] The statute provided in pertinent part as follows: (4) Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 322.28(2)(e), a person whose driving privilege has been permanently revoked because he or she has been convicted four times of violating s....

...or session law is no longer subject to challenge on the grounds that it violates the single subject requirement."), aff'd, 842 So.2d 782 (2003). [4] Section 322.271(4), Florida Statutes (2005), reads as follows: (4) Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 322.28(2)(e), a person whose driving privilege has been permanently revoked because he or she has been convicted of DUI manslaughter in violation of s....

...Raag Singhal of Law Offices of Kaplan & Singhal, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee-Jeffrey Alan Sondik. Alexander Kapetanakis, Coral Gables, for Appellee-Francisco Garcia. KLEIN, J. A county judge, in a substantial number of DUI cases, back-dated the convictions in order to evade section 322.28(2)(a)1, Florida Statutes (1993), which requires that a driver's license be revoked for no less than 180 days for a first DUI conviction....

...table under rule 3.800, but certified the following question to us as one of great public importance: WHETHER RULE 3.800(a) PERMITS THE CORRECTION OF A DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION WHICH FAILS TO MEET THE MANDATORY STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN F.S. 322.28 AS AN "ILLEGAL SENTENCE." The penalty for a first DUI conviction is provided by section 316.193, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...nt, see § 316.193(5) & (6)(a), and the impoundment or immobilization of a vehicle for ten days, see § 316.193(5) & (6)(d). There is no provision in section 316.193 for revocation of the defendant's driver's license. Rather that occurs by virtue of section 322.28(2)(a) 1, Florida Statutes (1993), which provides: (2) In a prosecution for a violation of s....

...Degrossi, 680 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)(suspension of driver's license is administrative remedy separate and apart from sentence imposed for criminal conviction); and State, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Bender, 497 So.2d 1332 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)(section 322.28 is not penal in nature)....

...minimal sentence allowable by Statute for such first conviction." In August 1984 appellee was convicted of DUI. According to appellant's records this conviction was a second conviction and required a revocation of his driver license for five years. § 322.28, Fla....

...The circuit court denied the motion for rehearing and the Department appeals. In this case the Department revoked the driver's license without notice or preliminary hearing under statutes that authorized the Department to do so based on the driver's prior history as determined by the Department "from its records" (§§ 322.28(2)(d) and 322.282(2), Fla....

...Ringsmuth, Fort Myers, for appellee. RYDER, Acting Chief Judge. The state challenges the trial court's order reducing sentence, whereby the court rescinded its previous order which revoked Landon Todd Walters' driver's license for life, pursuant to section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), and ordered that the revocation be decreased to three years, pursuant to section 322.28(5)(a), Florida Statutes, (1987)....

...The state correctly argues that the trial court mistakenly applied the law that uncounseled guilty pleas to prior crimes cannot be used to enhance a subsequent criminal charge or sentence. The suspension of a defendant's driving privilege, pursuant to section 322.28(2)(e) is not a criminal punishment, but is strictly administrative....

...dge has no judicial discretion. Id. at 1170. Therefore, the uncounseled nature of the prior conviction can have no bearing on the court's duty to permanently revoke Walters' driving privileges. This conclusion is further supported by the language in section 322.28(2)(e) that places upon the Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles the duty to suspend DUI offender's driving privileges for life if the court fails to perform its duty, within thirty days after sentencing. We reverse and set aside the order to reduce sentence. Although we recognize that the Department has the authority to revoke Walters' driver's license pursuant to section 322.28(2)(e), inasmuch as we are reversing the trial court, we remand with instructions to the trial court to reinstate the previous order revoking Walters' driver's license for life, and for any further proceedings needed to accomplish the permanent revocation....

...e before forcing the state to surrender its sword. ISSUE WRIT; QUASH CIRCUIT COURT JUDGMENT. DAUKSCH and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(c)(1)(A). [2] See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979). [3] § 322.28(2)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (1985). [4] § 322.28(2)(a)2., Fla....

...picion of a traffic violation and/or DUI when Griffin's vehicle was observed idling at an open railroad crossing on a major roadway and forcing other drivers to go around him, (2) that the circuit court erred in finding that the no-stay provision of section 322.28(5), Florida Statutes, which precludes a circuit court from staying a driver's license suspension while certiorari review was being sought was unconstitutional, and (3) that the circuit court erred in finding Griffin's license suspensio...

...orari to quash the circuit court's order requiring it to issue Johnny Fountain, a hardship driver's license. We grant the petition and quash the order. On January 29, 1991, the Department permanently revoked Fountain's driving privileges pursuant to section 322.28 Florida Statutes, because he had been convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) four times. The 1991 through 1997 versions of the statute permitted Fountain to request reinstatement upon meeting certain criteria. See § 322.271(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). However, in 1998, the Legislature amended section 322.28, to provide that a person convicted of four DUIs could no longer have driving privileges for any reason. See § 322.28(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). In March 2003, the Florida Supreme Court ruled chapter 98-223, Laws of Florida, which created, in part, the 1998 versions of sections 322.271 and 322.28, Florida Statutes, violated the single subject rule....

...Weekly D2298, ___So.2d ___, 2003 WL 22259634 (Fla. 1st DCA, Oct. 3, 2003). The record indicates Gordon's DUI convictions were actually only one year and two months apart. The Department notified Gordon that her license was administratively revoked for five years, as required by section 322.28(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2000)....

...tive function rather than the imposition of a criminal sentence. See Grapski, 696 So.2d at 951. Here, Gordon had two DUI convictions within a five year period. Thus, the statute mandated her driver's license be suspended for at least five years. See § 322.28(2)(a)2., Fla....

...The trial court denied his motion and we reverse. In his motion, which was denied without a hearing, appellant alleged that neither his counsel nor the trial judge informed him, before he entered his plea, that the court was required to revoke his driver's license under section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1999), as a result of his conviction for DUI manslaughter....

...plea were contrary to Major v. State, 814 So.2d 424 (Fla.2002). As Judge Allen's dissent in Caswell pointed out, however, the Florida Supreme Court in Major, 814 So.2d at 429, quoted from Daniels and did not suggest Daniels was anything but correct. Section 322.28(2)(e) provides that the "court shall permanently revoke the driver's license" of a person convicted of DUI manslaughter....

...Our current driver's license revocation statutes provide that, after a first DUI conviction, revocation shall be for six months to one year, and that on second, third, and fourth violations, the periods of revocation increase, with a lifetime revocation following a fourth DUI conviction. § 322.28(2), Fla....

...The trial court directed appellant to proffer any questions he wanted to pose to the witness on a particular issue and appellant chose not to do so. He cannot now be heard to complain that it was error to refuse to permit such questions. We also affirm the trial court's permanent revocation of appellant's driver's license. § 322.28(2)(e), Fla....

...error so fundamental in character as to fatally infect the [circuit court's] judgment," State v. Smith, 118 So.2d 792, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960), making relief by writ of common law certiorari appropriate. Administrative Proceedings In accordance with section 322.28(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes (1991), William Wayne Davis' driver's license was revoked upon his third conviction for driving under the influence in violation of section 316.193, Florida Statutes....

...that he has four convictions for DUI." We will now explain why we must reverse. Johnson was convicted of his fourth offense for driving under the influence of alcohol, and on January 14, 1993, his driver's license was permanently revoked pursuant to section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes. Sometime thereafter—the record does not reveal the date—Johnson petitioned to have his license reinstated pursuant to section 322.271(4), Florida Statutes (1997), which provided that a person whose driver's license was permanently revoked under section 322.28(2)(e) was permitted, "upon the expiration of 5 years after the date of such revocation ....

...When the fine and costs were announced at sentencing, Trombley did not object nor did he later move to withdraw his plea. See § 924.051(3), Fla. Stat.; Fla.App. R. Proc. 9.140(b)(2)(B)(ii) and (iv). Third, Trombley contends the trial court erred in suspending his driver's license for five years pursuant to section 322.28....

...2d 572, 576 (Fla. does not preclude the application of gain time. This issue was not addressed by the Fourth District and is not properly before this Court. -4- 2004) (acknowledging that the phrase “for not less than 5 years” in section 322.28(2)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1999), established a mandatory minimum period for license revocation)....

...that the Department revoke the license of any individual convicted of DUI. The county court then granted defendant's motion to stay the revocation and issued a rule to show cause when the Department failed to comply with the stay order. Even though section 322.28(6) states that "no suspension or revocation of a driving privilege shall be stayed upon appeal of the conviction or order that resulted therein," the trial court ordered the Department to stay the driver license revocation pending appe...

...The Third District in Degrossi reversed the county court and remanded to vacate the stay. Degrossi noted that section 322.26(2) imposes a duty upon the Department to suspend the driver's license of any person convicted of DUI to protect the public from potentially dangerous drivers and that section 322.28(6) provides that "no suspension or revocation of a driving privilege shall be stayed upon appeal of the conviction or order that resulted therein." Degrossi concluded that the county court as trial court lacked jurisdiction to stay an...

...*1251 Significantly, Stockman drew a distinction between the type of review before it and that involved in Degrossi. Stockman acknowledged the holding in Degrossi that in cases involving the appeal of a conviction that caused the license suspension, a stay of the license suspension is barred by section 322.28(6)....

...Gaskins' driving record reflects convictions for DUI on July 30, 1982, and May 27, 1987, and a conviction for DUI manslaughter on January 14, 1991, all being violations of section 316.193, Florida Statutes. The Department permanently revoked Gaskins' driving privilege, effective January 14, 1991, pursuant to section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...The legislature cured the defect when it "reenacted the 1999 version of the Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 2003." Id. at 301 n. 1. Thus, as of July 1, 2003, section 322.271(4) specifically provided as follows: (4) Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 322.28(2)(e), a person whose driving privilege has been permanently revoked because he or she has been convicted of DUI manslaughter in violation of s....

...different than that of her conviction for DUI, pursuant to section 316.193. The court also certified the following questions as being ones of great public importance: DOES THE REVOCATION OF A DEFENDANT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE PURSUANT TO FLORIDA STATUTE 322.28(1)(a)(1) FROM THE DATE OF CONVICTION AS PART OF A SENTENCE VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION OR DUE PROCESS LAWS OR DOUBLE JEOPARDY OR THE SEPARATION OF POWERS UNDER THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS WHEREIN THE DEFENDANT HAS ALREADY SERVED A DRIVER'...

...She was sentenced to twelve months on probation, and the court also provided that her driver's license be revoked for six *1073 months, nunc pro tunc to November 17, 2002. After her conviction, the Department, which was not a party to the criminal case, suspended Brandenburg's license, acting pursuant to section 322.28(2)(b)....

...and thus did not contradict the court's order calling for "revocation." However, at oral argument, the Department conceded that in this context, the words "suspension" and "revocation" have the same effect and meaning and appear to have been used in section 322.28 as interchangeable terms. [7] *1074 We conclude that the statutory scheme of sections 322.28 and 322.2615 establish two different time periods a driver's license must be suspended or revoked; upon arrest, and upon conviction....

...by this section, are not admissible in evidence in any criminal trial arising out of the same incident or episode and that " [t]he disposition of any related criminal proceedings shall not affect a suspension imposed pursuant to this section. " [8] Section 322.28 deals with administrative requirements in the event the arrest and suspension under section 322.2615 are not challenged or overturned, the case goes forward to trial, and a conviction results....

...We also agree with the Department that the two different periods for suspension and revocation of driver's licenses provided for in the statutes do not violate double jeopardy. [12] That concept applies to double or multiple criminal punishments. [13] *1075 The two statutes discussed above, sections 322.28 and 322.2616, are not criminal statutes and they do not impose criminal punishments. [14] Section 316.193, entitled "Driving under the influence, penalties," is the criminal statute which provides criminal penalties for this DUI offense, including fines. Sections 322.28 and 322.2616 are purely administrative provisions, and the requirements they impose fall within the Legislature's constitutional power to insure public safety on the highways....

...Beach Harbor Club Ass'n, Inc., 343 So.2d 625 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). [6] See Dept. of Children & Families, 782 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)(intervention); Florida Rule App. Proc. 9.160. See also Florida Rules of Crim. Proc. 3.800; 3.850. [7] The heading of section 322.28 reads: "Period of suspension or revocation." Subsection (1) reads: "Unless otherwise provided by this section, the department shall not suspend a license for a period of more than one year, and upon revoking a license in any case...." The remainder of the statute refers to revocation. [8] § 322.2615(14), Fla. Stat. [9] § 322.28(2)(a), Fla. Stat. [10] § 322.2892(a)1., Fla. Stat. [11] § 322.28(2)(b), Fla....

not the result of the mandatory provisions of section 322.28(2)(e), but rather under the broad and discretionary

..."Moreover, `second appeal' certiorari requires something more than `simple legal error.' To merit a `second appeal,' the error must be a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Id. at 144. Scinta's driver's license was permanently revoked pursuant to section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1995), on November 19, 1996....

...entry of an order granting certiorari and reinstating respondent Davis's driving *990 privilege. We grant the Department's petition and quash the lower court's order. In 1983, Respondent Davis's driving privilege was permanently revoked pursuant to section 322.28(2)(f), Florida Statutes, on the basis of his eight convictions for driving under the influence (DUI)....

first would not alter the duty of the court, under § 322.28(2), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., relating to successive

a period of five years, under the terms of section 322.28(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2013). Our standard

less than 180 days or more than one year. See § 322.28(2)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2011). In addition, the trial

...partment of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to suspend appellant's driving privileges for such time as appropriate under the law. As so amended, the judgments and sentences are affirmed. GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHEB and DANAHY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 322.28(2)(f), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...petition for certiorari to the circuit court does not itself stay the enforcement of the suspension, revocation, or cancellation of license. However, the department may order a stay of the enforcement upon appropriate terms and conditions." Further, section 322.28(6) provides that no administrative suspension of a driving privilege shall be stayed upon request for review of the departmental order and no suspension or revocation shall be stayed " upon an appeal of the conviction or order that resulted therein." (emphasis added)....

...evoking a license. A discretionary stay is not prohibited. [3] However, in cases involving the appeal of a conviction or order that caused the suspension or revocation, suspension and revocation of such administrative orders are apparently barred by section 322.28(6)....

DUI conviction within the preceding five years. § 322.28(2)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2020). Appellant’s previous

Administrative Proceedings In accordance with section 322.28(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes (1991), William Wayne

license but the application was denied based upon section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes. That statute was amended

...(DUI) was not voluntary because she was not informed prior to the plea that as a consequence of the DUI conviction (apparently her fourth), the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles could permanently revoke her driver's license pursuant to section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes....

similar structure. Both section 316.193 and section 322.28 list penalties for first, second, and third

find that the circuit court’s orders violate section 322.28(5), Florida Statutes (1999), and thus, the

permanent revocation was imposed pursuant to section 322.28, Florida Statutes (1981), for Tremmel’s fourth

essential requirements of law because it violates section 322.28(5), Florida Statutes (1999), which provides

license is permanently revoked pursuant to section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2002), rather than

...Sayles entered a no contest plea to several charges in exchange for a sentence of thirty-six months' probation with the condition that he serve eight months in jail. Because two of the offenses were driving under the influence of alcohol, the revocation of his driver's license was an issue. See § 322.28, Fla....

of The State of Florida (Department) applied Section 322.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1984), in an

license for a minimum of three years under section 322.28(4)(a), Florida Statutes. We review a trial

permit the court to do so, and nothing in section 322.28(2) prohibits such a revocation. On this point

relicensed for a minimum of five years. The latter, § 322.28(2) (c), provides that any person having his license

that resulted in the suspension or revocation.” § 322.28(5), Fla. Stat. (1999); Accord State, Dept. of

...which provides in part that “[w]hen an agency has suspended or revoked a license other than on an emergency basis, a licensee may file with the court a motion for stay on an expedited basis.” The Department relies upon sections 322.271(5)(c) and 322.28(5), Florida Statutes (2015), in support of its argument that the trial court lacked authority to stay Respondent’s dismissal from the SSSP and the cancellation of his hardship license. Section 322.271 is entitled “Authority to modify re...

...Section 322.271(5)(c) provides, “The petitioner must assume the reasonable costs of supervision. If the petitioner does not comply with the required supervision, the program shall report the failure to the department, and the department shall cancel such person’s driving privilege.” (Emphasis added). Section 322.28 is entitled “Period of suspension or revocation.” The first four subsections of the statute detail those circumstances in which the Department must either suspend or revoke an individual’s driver’s license....

...322.2616 during judicial review of the departmental order that resulted in such suspension, and a suspension or revocation of a driving privilege may not be stayed upon an appeal of the conviction or order that resulted in the 4  suspension or revocation. § 322.28(5), Fla....

...There, the Department sought certiorari review in four cases where the circuit court entered stays of driver’s license suspensions pending appellate review of the suspensions. Id. at 278. We granted the certiorari petitions, finding that the orders departed from the essential requirements of law by violating section 322.28(5)....

...hearing officer in each case determined that the suspension would be upheld. Id. In each case, the circuit court entered an order granting a stay of the suspension pending the outcome of the certiorari case in circuit court. Id. We explained that section 322.28(5) “specifically provides that a court may not stay the administrative suspension of a driver’s license during judicial review of the suspension” and that three other Florida appellate courts had determined that circuit court...

...2d DCA 2000) (granting the Department’s certiorari petition and holding that the order staying the suspension of the respondent’s driver’s license, which was suspended for one year for refusing to submit to a blood, breath, or urine test pursuant to section 322.2615, violated section 322.28(5)); Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v....

...6 pursuant to rule 9.310 to issue a stay of the suspension of the petitioner’s driver’s license, which occurred after he refused to submit to a breath, blood, or urine test, given the 1999 amendment to section 322.28 prohibiting stays). We find the Department’s reliance upon Begley misplaced as this case does not involve section 322.2615. As for section 322.28(5), that statute does not expressly apply to hardship or restricted licenses and participation in and dismissal from DUI programs. Nor does it cite to section 322.271 as it does sections 322.2615 and 322.2616. We note also that section 322.28(5) speaks to the revocation and suspension of a person’s driving privilege, not the cancellation of such as does section 322.271(5)(c)....

...ment, is convicted of an offense for which mandatory revocation is required, this case involves subsection (5)(c) and the cancellation of a hardship license. We also find it significant that section 322.271 does not expressly prohibit stays as do section 322.28(5) and other statutes in chapter 322....

...greatest force and effect may be given to its provisions for the promotion of public safety.” § 322.42, Fla. Stat. (2015). However, we may not add words to section 322.271 that were not included therein by the Legislature, and we decline to apply section 322.28(5) to the dismissal from a DUI program and cancellation of a hardship license for the reasons stated herein....

required by section 322.28(2)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1993). We conclude that it did. Section 322.28(2)(a)2

suspension alleging that subsection (5) of section 322.28, Florida Statutes (1999), recently added to

effective June 29, 1984, under the authority of section 322.28(2)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1983). For some unexplained

driver’s license despite the provisions of section 322.28, Florida Statutes (1983). State Department

683 So.2d 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Although section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1993), authorizes

...Jimenez-Morales, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. The appellant challenges a summary final judgment by which the trial court concluded that the appellant was not entitled to a full, unrestricted reinstatement of his previously revoked Florida driver's license pursuant to section 322.28, Florida Statutes....

...All of the elements of the New York statute are included in its Florida counterpart. The appellate division properly denied the petitioner relief. The petitioner also claims that he was denied due process when the Department imposed the maximum period of revocation —one year—pursuant to paragraph 322.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes, without providing a preliminary hearing....

...tate, would be grounds for the suspension or revocation of his or her license. § 322.24, Fla. Stat. (2008). [2] The appellate division also explained that care must be taken to distinguish section 322.24—where the "same offense" test applies—from section 322.28—where a "similar offense" test applies. Section 322.28 specifies the period of suspension or revocation for a DUI conviction where the offender has a prior DUI record....

...For length of suspension, prior offenses include out-of-state convictions for certain enumerated offenses "or any other [out-of-state] alcohol-related or drug-related traffic offense similar to the offense of driving under the influence as proscribed by s. 316.193. . . ." § 322.28, Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). This length-of-suspension statute—section 322.28—has no bearing on the interpretation of section 322.24.

revoked Petitioner’s driver’s license pursuant to section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1993), because Petitioner

authorized to suspend a driver’s license. See § 322.28, Fla.Stat. (1987). Certain sections of Chapter

547 So.2d 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Although section 322.28, Florida Statutes (1987), permits a trial court