Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...11, 80 L.Ed.2d at 743 n. 11. When the State of Florida decriminalized its traffic laws, ch. 74-377, Laws of Fla., it chose to maintain criminal sanctions for certain serious traffic offenses, including reckless driving and fleeing or eluding an officer, see § 316.655(1), (4), Fla....

...She was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for driving while license suspended, followed by one year of probation for DUI, a special condition of which was nine months' incarceration in county jail. In addition, her license was permanently revoked under section 316.655(2), Florida Statutes (1999). Stoletz appealed, challenging only the permanent revocation of her driver's license. She argued that the trial court had no authority to permanently revoke her driver's license under section 316.655(2), because a more specific statute applies and the more specific statute authorizes a license revocation of five years, but no more....

...te. The Second District then certified conflict with Whipple v. State, 789 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), wherein the Fourth District concluded that the defendant's driver's license could not be permanently revoked for a second DUI conviction under section 316.655 because the more specific statute, section 322.28(2)(a)(2), controlled, and that under the specific statute, the Legislature contemplated permanent revocation after four DUI convictions, not two. This Court granted review based on express and direct conflict of decisions. LAW AND ANALYSIS Section 316.655(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides: Drivers convicted of a violation of any offense prohibited by this chapter or any other law of this state regulating motor vehicles may have their driving privileges revoked or suspended by the c...

...river's violation *575 of this chapter, the number of persons killed or injured as the result of the driver's violation of this chapter, and the extent of any property damage resulting from the driver's violation of this chapter. Stoletz argues that section 316.655(2) is not applicable to her because there is a more specific statute, section 322.28(2)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1999), that controls....

...s bodily injury, DUI with injury to property or person, and driving without a valid driver's license causing serious bodily injury. Whipple, 789 So.2d at 1134. The trial court permanently revoked Whipple's driver's license under the general statute, section 316.655(2). Id. The Fourth District held that Whipple's driving privileges could not be permanently revoked under section 316.655(2) because the trial court was bound by the more specific statute, section 322.28(2)(a)(2)....

...DUI convictions." Id. at 1137. We agree, however, with the Second District's view that "nothing in section 322.28(2)(a)(2) prohibits a court from imposing a term of suspension or revocation longer than five years for a second conviction for DUI, and section 316.655(2) specifically permits a court to do so." Stoletz, 842 So.2d at 868....

...Bradford, 787 So.2d 811, 817 (Fla.2001). In addition, "a specific statute covering a particular subject area always controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms." McKendry v. State, 641 So.2d 45, 46 (Fla.1994). The language of the general statute, section 316.655(2), and the language of the more specific statute, section 322.28(2)(a)(2), is plain and unambiguous. Section 316.655(2) provides generally for the revocation or suspension of driving privileges based upon the totality of the circumstances resulting in a conviction of any offense prohibited by chapter 316 or *576 any other law of this state regulating motor vehicles, including chapter 322....

...2d at 868. Although we find that when a defendant is convicted of a DUI, a trial court should utilize the statute which specially applies to DUI convictions to determine the permissible license revocation period for the DUI conviction, in this case, section 316.655(2) is also applicable because the defendant was convicted of another driving offense....

...lation of section 322.34(5). When a defendant is convicted of another offense in chapter 316 or any other law of this state regulating motor vehicles, and the totality of the circumstances merits a suspension or revocation, a trial court may utilize section 316.655(2) to suspend or revoke the defendant's license....

...Because Stoletz was convicted of an additional offense which *577 was a violation of a "law of this state regulating motor vehicles," the trial judge did not err in considering the totality of the circumstances when permanently revoking Stoletz's license under section 316.655(2). See Reed v. State, 744 So.2d 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (finding the trial court properly considered the totality of circumstances, including the fact that a death occurred, in permanently revoking a defendant's license pursuant to section 316.655(2) after his conviction for reckless driving). Thus, in this case, both the specific statute applicable to DUI, section 322.28(2)(a)(2), and the general statute, section 316.655(2), authorized the trial court's permanent revocation of Stoletz's driver's license....

...PARIENTE, J., concurs in result only with an opinion. PARIENTE, J., concurring in result only. I concur in result only because although I agree that the trial court had authority to permanently revoke Stoletz's driver's license, that authority is derived from section 316.655(2) and not from section 322.28(2)(a)(2)....

...ly revoke a driver's license based solely on a second DUI conviction without regard for the circumstances of the offense. In this case, Stoletz was convicted of, among other offenses, driving with a suspended license (for habitual traffic offenses). Section 316.655(2) provides: Drivers convicted of a violation of any offense prohibited by this chapter or any other law of this state regulating motor vehicles may have their driving privileges revoked or suspended by the court if the court finds su...

...killed and two others seriously injured in the accident in which she was involved. [2] On these facts the trial court, *578 taking into consideration "the totality of the circumstances" and "all pertinent factors," acted within its discretion under section 316.655(2) in permanently revoking Stoletz's driving privileges for the offense of driving with a license suspended for habitual traffic offenses....

...In addition, the majority's construction of section 322.28(2) provides trial courts with the option of a revocation from five years to permanent without criteria to guide that discretion. At the very least, section 322.28(2) should be considered in pari materia with section 316.655(2) because pursuant to section 316.655(2), DUI constitutes a violation of a "law of this state regulating motor vehicles." Section 316.655(2) requires that in determining the length of the revocation, the trial court is to "consider all pertinent factors, including, but not limited to, such factors as the extent and nature of the driver's violation..., the number of persons killed or injured as the result of the driver's violation..., and the extent of any property damage resulting from the driver's violation." This construction of the provisions of section 322.28(2) and its relationship to section 316.655(2) would give effect to the language in both statutes....

...First, it would be consistent with the dictate of sections 322.28(2)(a)(2) and (3) that the revocation be for periods of "not less than" five and ten years, respectively. Second, this construction would effectuate the Legislature's intent, expressed in section 316.655(2), that the decision to revoke a driver's license be justified by the "the need to provide for the maximum safety for all persons who travel on or who are otherwise affected by the use of the highways of this state." Finally, this construction would give trial courts guidance in exercising discretion under section 322.28(2). Absent application of the criteria supplied by section 316.655(2), revocations imposed upon second-and third-time DUI offenders under section 322.28(2) could vary widely, without regard to the circumstances of the offense....

...o represent an indigent charged with violation of the statute. The Fifth District recognized dissonance when reading together section 775.08(2), which excepted from the definition of "misdemeanor," "any violation of any provision of chapter 316" and section 316.655, which read in pertinent part: (1) A violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, except criminal offenses enumerated in section (4), shall be deemed an infraction, as defined in § 318.13(3)....

..."for a *823 minimum period of 3 years." This section permits the trial court to revoke a defendant's driving privileges permanently. Stoletz v. State, 875 So.2d 572 (Fla.2004). The trial court, however, revoked appellant's driving privileges pursuant to section 316.655(2), not section 322.28(4)(a). Section 316.655(2) may not be used to revoke driving privileges for a DUI conviction....

...ould be suspended for five years. Appellant claimed that he would not have entered a guilty plea had he known that his license could be suspended for more than five years. In its order denying appellant's motion to withdraw plea, the court held that section 316.655 empowered the court to suspend or terminate driving privileges if warranted under the facts and circumstances of the case....

...We reverse, finding error in the permanent revocation of appellant's driver's license and in the denial of appellant's motion to withdraw plea based on the misadvice of counsel. The trial court erroneously revoked appellant's driving privileges pursuant to section 316.655, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...person's driving privilege for the period applicable as provided in paragraph (2)(a). Since this was appellant's second DUI conviction within five years, section 322.28(2)(a)2 requires that his driving privilege be revoked for not less than 5 years. Section 316.655, Florida Statutes (1999), relied upon the trial court, provides: (2) Drivers convicted of a violation of any offense prohibited by this chapter or any other law of this state regulating motor vehicles may have their driving privileges...

...Where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need for judicial interpretation. See id. The language of section 322.28 is facially clear and unambiguous. The statute specifically mandates the suspension of driving privileges for violations of section 316.193. Unlike section 322.28, section 316.655, a permissive catch-all statute, does not address periods of suspension or revocation of driving privileges stemming from a DUI conviction under section 316.193. Rather, section 316.655, provides generally for the revocation or suspension of driving privileges based on the totality of the circumstances and the violation of any offense prohibited by chapter 316 or any law of this state....

...A permanent revocation would have direct impact on appellant's ability to make restitution. As in Daniels, the court was required to determine that appellant understood that he was subject to section 322.28 and a permanent revocation. Moreover, the trial court erroneously relied upon section 316.655 and never informed appellant of that fact until the pronouncement of sentence....

...Pape, 15 Wis.2d 300, 112 N.W.2d 693 (1961); Gattus v. State, 204 Md. 589, 105 A.2d 661 (1954); Black's Law Dictionary 600 (5th ed. 1979). [2] When section 901.25 was amended in 1978 by the Florida Legislature, violations of sections 316.605 and 316.610 were deemed to be infractions by section 316.655(1), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...y or a right to court appointed counsel. Section 318.13, Florida Statutes (1974), was part of the Florida Uniform Disposition of Traffic Infractions Act enacted by the Legislature in 1974. In the same year, section 316.026, which subsequently became section 316.655, was also enacted....

...[10] Section one makes no exceptions for political campaigning, for charitable work, or for permitted conduct. *1252 A person violating section one commits a non-criminal pedestrian violation or infraction punishable by a fifteen dollar fine. Fla. Stat. § 316.2045(1); Fla. Stat. § 316.655(1); Fla....

...re any person or persons to do any one of such unlawful acts. Fla. Stat. § 316.2055. A person violating § 316.2055 commits a non-criminal pedestrian violation or infraction punishable by a fifteen dollar fine. Fla. Stat. § 316.2055(1); Fla. Stat. § 316.655(1); Fla....

...jaywalking, against driving in the wrong lane, or against speeding. Whether the decedent violated statutes such as section 316.003 and .130, invoked in this case, would be pertinent only if the decedent were to be charged with those violations, see section 316.655, Fla....

...ble doubt: L (Defendant) operated a motor vehicle in a careless or negligent manner. 2, Give 2a or 2b as applicable a. At the time, [his][her] [driver’s license] [driving privilege] was [suspended] [revoked] [canceled] pursuant to Florida Statute [316.655] [322.26(8) ] [322.27(2) ]_[322.28(2) ] [322.28(4) ]....

...316, Fla. Stat. (1989). This chapter is generally intended to create a uniform, statewide traffic control system. See § 316.002, Fla. Stat. (1989). This uniform system treats many violations as noncriminal infractions rather than criminal offenses. See § 316.655, Fla....

...The offense which Sheffield allegedly committed is defined in Section 316.063, which requires one who collides with and damages an unattended vehicle to immediately stop and locate and notify the owner or attach a note to the vehicle. Failure to do so is to be punished as provided in Section 316.655, which clearly identifies the offense as an infraction as defined in Section 318.13(3)....

...s no right to a trial by jury or a right to court appointed counsel." Appellant argues that when Section 316.645 and Chapter 318 are construed in pari materia, the term "offense" in 316.645 must be limited to the criminal offenses listed in Sections 316.655(4) and 318.17, and since Sheffield's arrest was for a noncriminal infraction, not a criminal offense, it cannot be justified under Section 316.645 or any other statutory provision, therefore any arrest of Sheffield was illegal and any subsequent consent to accompany her upstairs was invalid....

...ermit, even if he can meet the requirements for the DMV’s discretionary exercise. Appellant argues that the revocation was not the result of the mandatory provisions of section 322.28(2)(e), but rather under the broad and discretionary language of section 316.655(2), which would allow the DMV to consider his application....

thus expressly preempted by state law. (2) Section 316.655 provides that all traffic infractions be punished

STONE, J. We affirm Reed’s sentence which includes a provision for the permanent suspension of his driver’s license pursuant to section 316.655(2), Florida Statutes....

...Reed was involved in a fatal automobile accident and was charged with manslaughter and vehicular homicide. He was found guilty of reckless driving, a lesser-included offense of vehicular homicide. It is undisputed that the victim died at the scene. Section 316.655(2) provides in pertinent part: Drivers convicted of a violation of any offense prohibited by this chapter or any other law of this state regulating motor vehicles may have their driving privileges revoked or suspended by the court if...

...and nature of the driver’s violation of this chapter, the number of persons killed or injured as the result of the driver’s violation of this chapter, and the extent of any property damage resulting from the driver’s violation of this chapter. § 316.655(2), Fla....

...yce , and thus, we affirm the dismissal of the charge. The state charged Smith with the violation of section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1991), which provides: Any person whose driver’s license has been canceled, suspended, or revoked pursuant to s. 316.655, s....

...Accordingly, it is clear that simple negligence, standing by itself, cannot constitute a criminal act. For example, as applied to the operation of a motor vehicle, the offense of “careless driving” provided in section 316.1925, Florida Statutes (1991), is a traffic infraction punishable by a civil penalty pursuant to section 316.655(1)(3), Florida Statutes (1991), rather than criminal sanctions....

...Thus, these sections read together state that a violation of section 316.193 is a “criminal offense.” We do not believe it can be seriously questioned that a “criminal offense” is a crime. Section 775.08(4) states that the “term ‘crime’ shall mean a felony or misdemeanor.” Section 316.655(1) refers to section 318.-13(3)....

...ng for resentencing. Respondent was convicted in county court of reckless driving and sentenced “to custody of the Juvenile Detention Center for a period of thirty-seven (37) days.” He appealed to circuit court. The circuit court determined that section 316.655, Florida Statutes (1981), did not permit such a sentence. That statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 316.655 Penalties.— (4) Any person convicted of a violation of ......

...The receiving facility shall have adequate staff to supervise and monitor the minor’s activities at all times. Nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit the placing of two or more minors in the same cell. We would agree with the circuit judge that section 316.655(4)(f) does not provide for incarceration....

unincorporated area of the county." Prior to 1996, section 316.655(7), Florida Statutes (1995), provided: "In

...Reason], the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. (Defendant) operated a motor vehicle in a careless or negligent manner. 2. At the time, [his] [driver’s license] was [suspended] pursuant to Florida Statute [316.655]....

summons for a civil infraction pursuant to Section 316.655(1) and (2), Florida Statutes.

...Likewise, we have no occasion to decide whether restitution would be appropriate for damages arising out of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle in a case where the defendant’s punished offense was for a specific traffic infraction or offense. See generally § 316.655, Fla....

...ve all of the rights and all of the duties applicable to the driver of any other vehicle under this chapter, except as to special regulations in this chapter, and except as to provisions of this chapter which by their nature can have no application. Section 316.655 , F.S., provides in relevant part: (1) A violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, except criminal offenses enumerated in subsection (4), shall be deemed an infraction, as defined in s....

...Nicole Stoletz appeals her convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) and felony driving while license suspended (habitual), challenging only the trial court’s order requiring the permanent revocation of her driver’s license. We affirm the lifetime revocation of Ms. Stoletz’s license because both sections 316.655(2) and 322.28(2)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1999), permit the court to do so, and nothing in section 322.28(2) prohibits such a revocation....

...Stoletz to five years’ imprisonment for felony driving while license suspended, followed by one year of probation for DUI, a special condition of which was nine months’ incarceration in county jail. The trial court also permanently revoked Ms. Stoletz’s driving privileges pursuant to section 316.655(2)....

...Ms. Stoletz argues that section 322.28(2) prohibited the trial court from imposing a lifetime revocation for a second DUI conviction. Moreover, she argues that the specific provisions in section 322.28(2), relating to the crime of DUI, control over section 316.655(2), a catch-all provision relating to state uniform traffic control. Section 316.655(2) allows a trial court to suspend or revoke a *868 defendant’s license following a conviction for any offense in chapter 316 if the totality of the circumstances merits a suspension or revocation. In support of her argument, Ms. Stoletz cites Whipple, 789 So.2d 1132 . In Whipple , the Fourth District concluded that the trial court could not permanently revoke Mr. Whipple’s driver’s license after his second DUI conviction under section 316.655, because the more specific statute, section 322.28(2)(a)(2), controlled. Whipple, 789 So.2d at 1136 . The court concluded that section 322.28(2)(a)(2) was clear and unambiguous and a more specific statute than the “catch-all” provision of section 316.655....

...The Fourth District reasoned that section 322.28(2) indicated “the legislature did not contemplate the permanent revocation of a driver’s license without the requisite number of DUI convictions.” Id. at 1137 . We cannot agree with Whipple . Rather, we conclude that there is no conflict between sections 316.655(2) and 322.28(2)(a)(2), and that both permit the trial court’s permanent revocation of Sto-letz’s license....

...316.1931 or a combination of such sections, the driver’s license or driving privilege shall be revoked for not less than 5 years. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, nothing in section 322.28(2)(a)(2) prohibits a court from imposing a term of suspension or revocation longer than five years for a second conviction for DUI, and section 316.655(2) specifically permits a court to do so. There is no argument in this case that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the totality of the circumstances here justified the lifetime revocation of Ms. Stoletz’s license under section 316.655(2)....

...pending this review. J.R.S. appeals the final order imposing incarceration as a condition of probation, focusing his argument on the issues raised by the county court’s certified question. This matter requires us to interpret sections 316.1935 and 316.655(4), Florida Statutes (1983), as they pertain to juveniles convicted of criminal traffic offenses....

...to exceed 1 year, or by fine not to exceed $1,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment.” The county court has jurisdiction over minors charged with violating section 316.1935, a non-felony criminal traffic offense. § 316.635, Fla.Stat. (1983). Section 316.655(4), Florida Statutes (1983), states that “any person convicted of a violation of...s....

...*836 However, under no circumstances shall a minor be placed in the same cell as an adult. The receiving facility shall have adequate staff to supervise and monitor the minor’s activities at all times. Nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit the placing of two or more minors in the same cell. § 316.655(4), Fla.Stat. (1983) (emphasis added). Appellant concedes that, under a literal reading of sections 316.1935 and 316.655, a county court judge has the authority to incarcerate a minor for a violation of section 316.1935....

...Recognizing that the legislature has the final word in this matter, appellant urges us to examine the history behind the statutes and find a legislative intent to protect juveniles convicted of criminal traffic offenses. We find, however, that we need not look behind the express language of sections 316.1935 and 316.655(4) to determine legislative intent....

...Lauderdale Board of Adjustment, 462 So.2d 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Puglia v. Drinks on the Beach, 457 So.2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The Florida Legislature has expressly provided that a judge has discretion to either impose the alternate sanctions of section 316.655(4) or order a prison sentence in county jail for up to one year under section 316.1935....

...We cannot agree because, simply *62 put, we do not believe the issue presented rises to the level of sufficient public importance that the appeal should be entertained despite its conceded mootness. This is so particularly in view of the subsequent passage of Section 316.655(5), Florida Statutes (1987), which, as we read it, answers many of the due process concerns which prompted the trial court to order the post-suspension administrative hearing in this case....

(2), 775.-08(2), (3), reproduced above, and section 316.655:4 316.655 Penalties.— (1) A violation of the

...ials into a motor vehicle or to offer such material to the occupant of a motor vehicle. Section 316.2045 (1), F.S., states that "any person or persons who violates the provisions of this subsection, upon conviction, shall be punished as set forth in s. 316.655 ." Section 316.655 , F.S., is a penalty provision and makes violations of any of the provisions of Ch....

...775.082 or 775.083 , F.S. For the conviction of such crimes, imprisonment may not exceed 60 days and the fine imposed may not exceed 500. Like violations of s. 316.2045 (1), F.S., as discussed above, violations of s. 316.2055 , F.S., are punishable as set forth in s. 316.655 , F.S....

...Sincerely, Robert A. Butterworth Attorney General RAB/tgk Enclosures 1 Letter to Carl Summerall, Chief of Police of the Howey-in-the-Hills Police Department from Lawton Chiles, Governor, and Robert Butterworth, Attorney General, dated March 12, 1993. 2 Section 316.655 (1), F.S. 3 Section 316.655 (3), F.S.

Beach utilize the fees collected pursuant to section 316.655(6), Florida Statutes, to upgrade the city's

unincorporated area of the county." Prior to 1996, section 316.655(7), Florida Statutes (1995), provided: "In