Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...KOGAN, Justice. We have for review Robertson v. State, 569 So.2d 861 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), which certified the following questions of great public importance: (A) May a chemical analysis performed in accordance with the approved methods contemplated by section 316.1933 be conducted under the supervision of a permittee by individuals not possessing [a Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS")] permit? (B) Can the state introduce into evidence test results of blood samples taken at the request of law enforcement if the requirements of section 316.1933 are not satisfied? If so, upon proof of qualification of the person taking blood or conducting the test, can the state nonetheless rely on the provisions of section [] 316.1933 to prove a violation of section 316.193 or must the state introduce competent proof wholly independent of the statute? Robertson v....

...It thus is clear both from this testimony and the overall record that Robertson did not actually consent to the withdrawal of blood, nor was blood withdrawn for some medical purpose. [1] Rather, blood was withdrawn at the direction of the officer pursuant to the implied-consent provision of section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1987), [2] in an attempt to gather evidence to prosecute Robertson for a DUI-related offense....

...The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services may approve satisfactory techniques or methods, ascertain the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct such analyses, and issue permits which will be subject to termination or revocation at the discretion of the department. § 316.1933(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987) (emphasis added). Once a blood-alcohol test is validly taken under subsection 316.1933(2), the Florida Statutes then create a presumption that anyone with a blood-alcohol content of 0.10 percent or more is impaired....

...Since there is no statutory ambiguity here, we have no need to resort to rules of construction, nor may we vary the language beyond its plain meaning. Accordingly, we hold that the test conducted by Dr. Duer in this instance was not an authorized test within the meaning of subsections 316.1933(2)(b) and 316.1934(3), Florida Statutes (1987), because Dr....

...evidence of blood-alcohol test results and related testimony produced by an unlicensed expert, subject to two important provisos. First, the blood must have been drawn by a person authorized to do so by the implied consent statute. [9] See Gillman; § 316.1933(2)(a), Fla....

...enforcement officer, to a test of his blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content thereof... . The law enforcement officer may use reasonable force if necessary to require such person to submit to the administration of the blood test § 316.1933(1), Fla. Stat. (1987). [3] The parties have not raised, and we do not address, the propriety of this procedure under the various provisions of article I of the Florida Constitution. [4] The implied consent law consists of sections 316.1932, 316.1933, and 316.1934, Florida Statutes (1987), which essentially require all persons accepting a license to drive in Florida to consent to a blood-alcohol test upon being arrested for driving under the influence....

...As applicable to the present case, this list consists of physicians, certified paramedics, registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, licensed clinical laboratory technicians, and licensed clinical laboratory technicians, and licensed clinical laboratory technologists. § 316.1933(2)(a), Fla....

...cle at the time. "Alcoholic beverages" are considered to be substances of any kind and description which contain alcohol. F.S. ( ) is a chemical substance under Florida law. 877.111(1) Ch. 893, ( ) is a controlled substance under Florida law. F.S. F.S. 316.1933 "Serious bodily injury" means a physical condition that creates a substantial risk of death, serious personal disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ....

...( ) is a chemical substance under Florida law. § 877.111(1), Fla. Stat. § 877.111(1), Fla.Stat. (Specific substance alleged) is a chemical substance under Florida law. Chapter 893, Fla.Stat. (Specific substance alleged) is a controlled substance under Florida law. § 316.1933, Fla._Stat....

...For the reasons stated below, we answer the certified question in the negative. PROCEEDINGS TO DATE Miles was involved in an automobile accident which resulted in the death of a passenger of another vehicle. Without Miles' consent, the law enforcement officers at the scene required him to submit to a blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...and the deficiency of the rule in protecting the integrity of the process, the State would not be entitled to the presumption of impairment provided for pursuant to section 316.1934(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1995). [1] *952 The court recognized that section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), authorizes that the FDLE approve "satisfactory techniques or methods, ascertain the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct such analyses, and issue permits that are subject to terminat...

...the dictates of Robertson, and thus certified the aforementioned question. See id. THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAW To address the problem of drunk driving on Florida roads, the Legislature enacted what is known as the implied consent law. See §§ 316.1932, 316.1933, 316.1934, Fla....

...lic blood content of the defendant. See § 316.1934(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] The Legislature delegated to the FDLE the task of formulating and approving the process in which a person's blood is analyzed in determining its alcoholic content. Hence, section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes, provides: A chemical analysis of the person's blood to determine the alcoholic content *953 thereof must have been performed substantially in accordance with methods approved by the Department of Law Enforcem...

...court admitted the test results. See id. at 787-88. The Fifth District affirmed and certified the following question: Can the state introduce into evidence test results of blood samples taken at the request of law enforcement if the requirements of section 316.1933 are not satisfied? If so, upon proof of qualification of the person taking blood or conducting the test, can the state nonetheless rely on the provisions of section 316.1933 to prove a violation of section 316.193[ [7] ] or must the state introduce competent proof wholly independent of the statute? Id....

...nces, when affected to the extent that the person's normal faculties were impaired or to the extent that he or she was deprived of full possession of his or her normal faculties, the results of any test administered in accordance with s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 and this section are admissible into evidence when otherwise admissible, and the amount of alcohol in the person's blood or breath at the time alleged, as shown by chemical analysis of the person's blood, or by chemical or physical test of the person's breath, gives rise to the following presumptions: ....

...rious penalties associated therewith. [8] The Fifth District actually certified two questions. The other question, which the Court answered negatively, stated: May a chemical analysis performed in accordance with the approved methods contemplated by section 316.1933 be conducted under the supervision of a permittee by individuals not possessing [a Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") ] permit? See Robertson, 604 So.2d at 786 (alteration in original)....

...administration ... of [the] section, including definitions," and sections 316.1932(1)(a)(2)(f), (g), and (p) address FDLE's authority to "approve" operators, instruments, and repair facilities relating to breath and blood testing. Finally, sections 316.1933(2)(b) [11] and 316.1934(3) [12] both provide that chemical analysis of a person's blood and breath must be performed "substantially in accordance with methods approved by [FDLE]." Significantly, there is no mention of urine testing in any of these subsections of the implied consent law....

...onsidered valid under this section, must have been performed substantially according to methods approved by the Department of Law Enforcement. For this purpose, the department may approve satisfactory techniques or methods. (Emphasis supplied.) [11] Section 316.1933 addresses the right to use reasonable force when conducting blood tests for impairment or intoxication in case of death or serious bodily injury....

...He raises two issues on appeal: 1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the blood test results because (a) the officer who directed that the blood sample be taken lacked probable cause to believe that appellant's normal faculties *918 were impaired by alcohol; (b) section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1982 Supp.), violates the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable seizures since it fails to provide the degree of intoxication required before probable cause will be deemed to exist; and (c) the blood test was administered in violation of statutory and regulatory procedures....

...micide statute as "driving with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of other persons," which is the statutory definition of the separate offense of reckless driving in section 316.192, Florida Statutes (1982 Supp.). Regarding the first issue, section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1982 Supp.), states in pertinent part: [I]f a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by ......

...an intoxicated person is necessarily under the influence of alcoholic beverages, a person does not have to be intoxicated or have his normal faculties impaired in order to be "under the influence of alcoholic beverages." Probable cause exists under section 316.1933(1) to order a blood test if the officer, based upon reasonably trustworthy information, has knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect driver was under the infl...

...4th DCA 1976), the state has met its burden in this case by showing that Trooper Roberts smelled alcohol on appellant's breath, knew the circumstances causing the accident, and knew that appellant was the driver of the motor vehicle which caused a death. We likewise find no merit in appellant's argument that section 316.1933(1) is unconstitutional under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution because it permits seizure of a person's blood without probable cause to believe that such person's normal faculties were impaired at the time of the accident....

...Appellant argues that since section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1982 Supp.), defining the offense of driving while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, requires that a person be under the influence to the extent that normal faculties are impaired before he can be guilty of the offense, section 316.1933, to be constitutionally acceptable, should contain the same standard for determining when a blood test can be taken....

...eal specifically with the question here presented. They do, however, support the proposition that the facts relied on by the officer must show probable cause to believe a criminal offense has been committed. The purpose of the blood test taken under section 316.1933(1) is to aid in determining whether the driver causing a serious automobile accident, when reasonably believed to be under the influence of alcoholic beverages, had his normal faculties impaired by alcohol....

...t, i.e., that the blood test was inadmissible because the state failed to show that the individual who analyzed the blood specimen, Mr. Peter Lardizabel, held the statutorily required permit from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. § 316.1933(2)(b), Fla....

...Appellant's argument that Drury is applicable to the present case is founded upon the assumption that the blood sample herein was taken under section 316.1932. As discussed in our opinion, the blood sample was properly taken pursuant to the authority of section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...that courts are not at liberty to define the elements of a crime in terms different from those the legislature used. In State v. Perez, 531 So.2d 961 (Fla.1988), the supreme court was concerned with the meaning of another section of the DUI statute, Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...9.030(b)(4), 9.160. Moreover, for the reasons which follow, we answer the certified question in the negative upon a holding that the withdrawal of such a blood sample (1) constitutes a violation of Florida's implied consent law under Sections 316.1932(1)(c), 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1991), and (2) cannot otherwise be justified on the basis of the defendant's voluntary consent; accordingly, we affirm the order under review suppressing as evidence the results of the subject blood test....

...le taken from him. The motion came on for an evidentiary hearing at which the above-stated facts were adduced. The defendant contended below that the police were only authorized to demand a blood sample from a motorist under Sections 316.1932(1)(c), 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1991), and that neither of these statutes were applicable to this case; accordingly, he argued that the blood sample was illegally obtained from the defendant and the results of the subsequent blood test performed on this sample should be suppressed at defendant's criminal traffic trial....

...tutes were observed in this case. *425 The trial court agreed with the defendant and suppressed the blood test results based on its conclusion that "blood may be withdrawn for a DUI prosecution only within the parameters of [§§] 316.1932(1)(c) and 316.1933(1)" which, without dispute, were not complied with by the police in this case....

...1989) (pen registers regulated under Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution) with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (pen registers; Fourth Amendment). Indeed, it is the established law of this state that Florida's implied consent statutes [§§ 316.1932, 316.1933, 316.1934, Fla....

...the right of the state of Florida to extend to its citizenry protections against unreasonable searches and seizures greater than those afforded by the federal constitution [through the Fourth Amendment]. This it has done through the enactment of section 322.261, Florida Statues (1975) [now sections 316.1932, 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1991)]." As further stated by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v....

...quite apart from the implied consent statutes. See Robertson v. State, 604 So.2d 783, 790 (Fla. 1992) (following State v. Wallin, 195 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Iowa 1972)); compare Chu v. State, 521 So.2d 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). 2 Sections 316.1932(1)(c) and 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1991) carve out two exceptions to the above statutory scheme under which a blood sample may be taken from a person lawfully arrested for DUI....

...eding. Moreover, the person must be advised that the failure to submit to a blood withdrawal will result in the suspension of the person's driving privileges — the same advisement which must be given prior to obtaining a breath or urine withdrawal. Section 316.1933(1) provides that a law enforcement officer is authorized to demand a *427 blood withdrawal from any person who is lawfully arrested for DUI if there is probable cause to believe that the person "has caused the death or serious bodily...

...Only then may a blood test be requested, subject to the person's refusal. The subsection further provides penalties for such a refusal but does not authorize the officer to proceed with the test regardless of the refusal. The other exception to the general scheme of breath and urine testing is found in section 316.1933(1), the statute in question....

...State, 521 So.2d 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) has interpreted the above statutes as follows: "We think it is clear that the legislature intended and provided for the use of breath and urine tests, except under the circumstances described in sections 316.1932(1)(c) and 316.1933(1) and that the legislature did not intend to authorize a law enforcement officer to request a blood test when the conditions described in these statutes do not exist....

...ied consent statutes to request or order the withdrawal of such sample in the first instance as discussed above. These detailed procedures are generally not required by the Fourth Amendment and, for this most part, exceed Fourth Amendment standards. Section 316.1933(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991) authorizes "[o]nly a physician, certified paramedic, registered nurse, other personnel authorized by a hospital to draw blood, or duly licensed clinical laboratory director, supervisor, technologist, or technician" [3] to withdraw blood from a DUI arrestee at the request of a law enforcement officer. Section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991) further provides that a chemical analysis of such a blood sample "must have been performed substantially in accordance with methods approved by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services [4] a...

...lts and related testimony produced by an unlicensed expert, subject to two important provisos. First, the blood must have been drawn by a person authorized to do so by the implied consent statute. See [ State v. ] Gillman [390 So.2d 62 (Fla. 1980)]; § 316.1933(2)(a), Fla....

...a misrepresentation. State v. Burnett, 536 So.2d 375 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); see also State v. Polak, 598 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (breath sample). Beyond that, there was utterly no basis for an involuntary blood withdrawal from the defendant under Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...To the contrary, the record shows that the defendant was involved in a one-car traffic accident in which neither he nor any third party was seriously injured in any way. Because the blood sample taken from the defendant in this case was entirely unauthorized under Sections 316.1932(1)(c), 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1991), and was otherwise involuntarily given, it is plain that this blood sample and the results of the scientific test performed on this sample were inadmissible in evidence at the defendant's DUI trial below under the Sambrine-Perez line of cases....

...ood withdrawal from a person lawfully arrested for DUI than those required by the Fourth Amendment. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). Florida has done precisely that by enacting Sections 316.1932(1)(c), 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1991), which, without dispute, the police violated in this case....

...Second, the state argues that the blood sample was scientifically withdrawn from the defendant and subsequently tested in full compliance with the "core policies" of the implied consent statutes and therefore — notwithstanding the violation of Sections 316.1932(1)(c), 316.1933(1) — the blood test results were admissible under the exclusionary rule announced in Robertson v....

...dence. For the above-stated reasons, the county court order under review suppressing the results of a blood test performed on a blood sample involuntarily drawn from the defendant at the request of the police in violation of Sections 316.1932(1)(c), 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1991), is, in all respects, Affirmed....

...NOTES [1] It is assumed for purposes of this appeal that this arrest was based on probable cause. [2] State v. Perez, 531 So.2d 961 (Fla. 1988) (blood sample taken from a lawfully arrested DUI defendant without his consent after being involved in accident in which only he was injured held unauthorized under then-existing Section 316.1933(1), and thus results of scientific test performed on such sample were inadmissible in evidence); Sambrine v....

...Burnett, 536 So.2d 375 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (blood sample taken from a defendant who was lawfully arrested for DUI not involving a traffic accident after he was injured in the county jail following his arrest held unauthorized by Sections 316.1932(1)(c), 316.1933(1), and thus results of scientific test performed on such sample were inadmissible in evidence); State v. Prues, 478 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (blood sample taken from a defendant arrested for DUI involved in one-car traffic accident in which only the defendant was seriously injured held unauthorized under then-existing Section 316.1933(1) and thus results of scientific test performed on such sample were inadmissible in evidence); McDonald v....

...statutes and thus results of scientific test performed on such sample were inadmissible in evidence); State v. Riggins, 348 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (same), cert. dismissed, 362 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 1978). [3] The current version of this statute, § 316.1933(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1993), includes a "licensed practical nurse" among the acceptable blood-withdrawal personnel. [4] The current version of the statute, § 316.1933(2)(b), Fla....

...s narrowly defined the circumstances in which a blood draw may be performed in place of a breath or urine test without the driver's express consent. One circumstance allowing for forcible extraction of a blood sample is set forth in Florida Statutes section 316.1933(1) (1997)....

...This section authorizes a blood test where an officer has probable cause to believe a driver under the influence of alcoholic beverages has caused death or serious injury to a human being, including himself. The situation presented in this case does not fall within section 316.1933(1), because, as the parties stipulated, the police officer did not reasonably believe that appellee caused the injuries resulting from the accident....

...lcohol on appellee's breath did not provide the officer with reasonable cause to believe that he was under the influence of alcohol. It simply showed that he had consumed alcohol to an unknown extent. In Brown, the defendant's blood was tested under section 316.1933(1), because the officer believed that the defendant caused fatal injuries to a bicyclist while the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol....

...also suggested the required relevance and likely success of [i.e., probable cause for] a test of... blood for alcohol." 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826. In Brown, the fifth district reasoned that the probable cause necessary for a search (blood withdrawal) under section 316.1933(1) involves the same findings for probable cause for a DUI arrest....

...Probable cause for a DUI arrest under section 316.193 is based upon a belief that the driver is under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties are impaired. For that reason, the fifth district interpreted the phrase "under the influence of alcoholic beverages" in section 316.1933(1) as equivalent to "impairment" and not the mere consumption of alcohol. Cf. Jackson v. State, 456 So.2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In Jackson, the First District Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion. It acknowledged that probable cause for a DUI arrest is required under section 316.1933(1) but determined that the phrase "under the influence of alcoholic beverages" is not equivalent to the term "intoxicated" or "impaired." The court stated: The purpose of the blood test taken under section 316.1933(1) is to aid in determining whether the driver causing a serious automobile accident, when reasonably believed to be under the influence of alcoholic beverages, had his normal faculties impaired by alcohol....

...In Cesaretti we reversed the suppression of blood alcohol test results upon determining that the smell of alcohol on the driver's breath, along with evidence that the driver had caused serious bodily injury, gave the officer sufficient probable cause to request a blood test under section 316.1933(1). We point out, however, that the blood sample in this case was ordered under a different statute. Unlike section 316.1933(1), the section applicable to the blood draw herein, section 316.1932(1)(c), does not require that the driver cause death or serious bodily injury to someone....

...f medical treatment, and unable to take a breath or urine test. There is no "accident" factor that can provide a reliable indicator of impairment—i.e, dangerous or erratic driving. Without the additional *22 "causing serious injury" factor found in section 316.1933(1), this statute does not contain sufficient requirements for probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, unless driving "under the influence of alcoholic beverages" is interpreted to include the phrase "to the extent that...

...physician at the hospital to draw blood from him and report on the blood-alcohol level. The report showed a blood-alcohol level of .09. The officer ordering the blood test acted under one of Florida's implied consent statutes. See §§ 316.1932 and 316.1933, Fla....

...the influence of alcohol and consequently impaired. The proposition that the legislature was aware of the distinction between probable and reasonable is evident from a comparison of the two implied consent statutes— viz., section 316.1932(1)(c) and section 316.1933(1). Section 316.1933(1) is the statute involved in State v. Brown, 725 So.2d 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), prominently relied upon by the majority. Section 316.1933(1) is restricted to cases of death or serious injury and provides that an officer may require the driver to submit to a blood test if the officer has probable cause to believe that the driver was under the influence of alcoholic beverages....

...The trial court granted the motion to suppress on grounds that this procedure did not meet the standards of section 316.1932(1)(f)1., Florida Statutes (1989). The Fifth District reversed. The district court found that section 316.1932 was not applicable to this case; that the blood sample instead was taken pursuant to section 316.1933; and that the presumption of admissibility established in section 316.1934 must prevail here....

...We begin by recognizing that the various provisions of Florida's implied consent laws, §§ 316.1932-.34, Fla. Stat. (1989), are not a model of clarity. Here, the district court has seized upon the different wording of subsections 316.1932(1)(f)1. and 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), to justify the distinction it has drawn....

..." that must be used as well as to "provide an approved method of administration which shall be followed in all such tests," see § 316.1932(1)(f)1., Fla. Stat. (1989), even in those instances where blood is involuntarily withdrawn by operation of subsection 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...approved by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for reliability of result and facility of administration, and shall provide an approved method of administration which shall be followed in all such tests given under this section. Subsection 316.1933(2)(b) provides: A chemical analysis of the person's blood to determine the alcoholic content thereof must have been performed substantially in accordance with methods approved by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services a...

...blood alcohol level. [1] It is evident from the record that the state introduced that result as presumptive evidence of impairment but failed to establish substantial compliance with the relevant regulations adopted by HRS pursuant to the mandate of section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...f the medically compelled blood test. In State v. Quartararo, 522 So.2d 42 (Fla.2d DCA), rev. denied, 531 So.2d 1354 (Fla. 1988), we interpreted State v. Strong, 504 So.2d 758 (Fla. 1987), to permit test results without regard to the requirements of section 316.1933, provided that the blood sample is drawn for a medical purpose by a qualified healthcare professional, and provided further that the state establishes the traditional predicate for admissibility: the test's reliability, the examiner's qualifications, and the meaning of the test results....

...Having reviewed the record of these proceedings, we conclude for the following reasons the trial court properly allowed the .196 blood-alcohol reading. First, in compliance with the implied consent law, a qualified healthcare provider extracted Michie's blood. See § 316.1933(2)(a), Fla....

...NOTES [1] Section 316.1934, Florida Statutes (1991), provides that 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be prima facie evidence that the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired. [2] Section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), uses the following language: A chemical analysis of the person's blood to determine the alcoholic content thereof must have been performed substantially in accordance with methods approved by the Depar...

...unts, the state asked for a vacatur of the guilty verdict as to 3 of the six BUI manslaughter counts, 3 of the six UBAL manslaughter counts, the UBAL bodily injury count, and the UBAL property damage count. [3] Section 327.352(3) is a carbon copy of section 316.1933(4), applicable to motor vehicle operators....

...r review the trial court's ruling. The fourth district affirmed, but held: We think it is clear that the legislature intended and provided for the use of breath and urine tests, except under the circumstances described in sections 316.1932(1)(c) and 316.1933(1) and that the legislature did not intend to authorize a law enforcement officer to request a blood test when the conditions described in these statutes do not exist....

...In Chu, the trooper had probable cause to believe that she had been driving while under the influence of alcohol. No such evidence existed in this case. Hence, the limitations on blood testing found in section 316.1932(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2007), and section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), are not implicated because this test was done outside the scope of the implied consent law....

...." Further, section 316.1932(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2007), authorizes blood withdrawals where an officer has probable cause to believe that the driver was impaired and the driver appears for treatment at a medical facility and the administration of a breath or urine test is impractical or impossible. Likewise, section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), expressly authorizes blood tests where an officer has probable cause to believe an impaired driver has caused death or serious injury to a human being....

...Here, Murray and Brink were not under lawful arrest and did not seek medical treatment, and the troopers did not have probable cause to believe that they were impaired. Consequently, the implied consent law was clearly not implicated. [2] While Robertson involved section 316.1933(1)(a), the provisions of section 316.1932(1)(a)1.a....

...es or controlled substances, when affected to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired or to the extent that he was deprived of full possession of his normal faculties, the results of any test administered in accordance with § 316.1932 or § 316.1933 and this section shall be admissible into evidence when otherwise admissible, ......

...les and the blood alcohol test results based upon: (1) lack of probable cause to believe appellant was under the influence of intoxicants to require a blood test; (2) blood sample removed by illegal search and seizure; and (3) unconstitutionality of section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1983), insofar as it permits a search and seizure (the taking of a blood sample) not incident to arrest. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion. Section 316.1933(1) provides: Notwithstanding any recognized ability to refuse to submit to the tests provided in s....

...The blood test shall be performed in a reasonable manner. The term "serious bodily injury" means a physical condition which creates a substantial risk of death; serious, personal disfigurement; or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. In enacting section 316.1933, the Legislature has clearly differentiated between the rights of motor vehicle operators with respect to tests for impairment or intoxication under sections 316.1932 and 316.1933, depending upon whether the operator has "caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being." Some of the differences are specifically delineated in the statutes; others are implicit. As we read section 316.1933, where there is probable cause to suspect intoxication, consent and withdrawal of implied consent to the extraction of a blood sample are not options available to the operator of a motor vehicle who has caused death or "serious bodily injury," as therein defined....

...ly injury, the only restrictions or limitations are: (1) the officer is confined to the use of "reasonable force" — if force is necessary at all; and (2) the statutory qualifications and methods employed by the person performing the extraction. See § 316.1933(2), Fla....

...al emergency room doctor, clerk, and technician to support the officer's conclusion that appellant could be intoxicated or under the influence of intoxicants at the time of the accident and caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being. § 316.1933(1), Fla....

...California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), which expressly held that there was no right to *782 counsel at the taking of a blood sample to determine blood-alcohol content. Id. at 766, 86 S.Ct. at 1833. We would also note that, under section 316.1933 and the facts of this case, there was no issue on which counsel could have advised appellant because a blood test is required upon a showing of probable cause, which was shown here. Appellant further challenges the denial of his motion to suppress on the basis that section 316.1933 is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to permit a search and seizure (blood sample) not incident to lawful arrest....

...preme Court. The issue in this case concerns one of the rules promulgated by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to implement the provisions known as Florida's implied consent law. "The implied consent law consists of sections 316.1932, 316.1933, and 316.1934, Florida Statutes, which essentially require all persons accepting a license to drive in Florida to consent to a blood-alcohol test upon being arrested for driving under the influence." See Robertson v....

...to ensure scientific reliability of the test. [2] The only question raised by appellee's motion to suppress or alternative motion to exclude blood-alcohol test results was whether the rule relating to preservation of blood samples drawn pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1995), adequately protects the due process rights of those persons charged with driving under the influence of alcohol....

...State, 632 So.2d 593 (Fla.1993); therefore, I would certify the following question to the supreme court: WHETHER EITHER SECTION 316.1932(1)(f)1, FLORIDA STATUTES, OR CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT TO ADOPT RULES PERTAINING TO THE PRESERVATION OF BLOOD SAMPLES TAKEN PURSUANT TO SECTION 316.1933, FLORIDA STATUTES? I concur, however, in that portion of the opinion that allows the state to utilize the statutory presumption regarding intoxication pursuant to Robertson v....

...of alcoholic beverages has caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being, by providing that the law enforcement officer may use reasonable force, if necessary to require such person to submit to the administration of the blood test. See § 316.1933(1), Fla....

...icle accident in which a person was killed. We affirm the order suppressing the blood test results. Wenger's blood sample was drawn for medical treatment purposes rather than for determination of blood alcohol content pursuant to section 316.1932 or section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...[2] The trial judge ruled that the police officer who ordered the blood test (Trooper Campbell), lacked probable cause to believe Brown was under the influence of alcoholic beverages at the time of the fatal collision between Brown's car and a bicyclist and thus Brown's blood was not properly taken and tested pursuant to section 316.1933(1)....

...That, he felt, was not enough to show Brown was "under the influence" of alcohol. Further, the trial judge was concerned and troubled by Trooper Campbell's testimony that although he thought he had probable cause to order the blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933(1), he did not think he had probable cause to arrest Brown for DUI....

...Trooper Campbell also testified he was in doubt about arresting Brown at the accident scene and had telephoned the state attorney's office for advice. He was advised to follow "policy" and await the results of the blood test. He could then make an arrest for DUI. Section 316.1933(1) provides in pertinent part: [I]f a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual physical control of a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages ......

...1st DCA 1984) that "under the influence" as used by this statute means the driver's normal faculties were "impaired," *444 not simply that the driver had consumed alcohol. Whether a person has consumed sufficient alcohol to be deemed "under the influence" or impaired to an appreciable degree pursuant to section 316.1933(1) is a judgment call made by a police officer....

...Trooper Campbell said the smell of alcohol was the decisive factor, but not the only one in ordering the test. In our view, based on these objective, uncontroverted facts and circumstances, we *445 think Trooper Campbell had probable cause to order the blood draw, pursuant to section 316.1933(1)....

...avior are the controlling criteria to look at in these cases. We think they were sufficient in this case to establish probable cause for the blood draw. We hold that the results of Brown's blood test is and should have been admissible at trial under section 316.1933(1)....

...Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test. Among the grounds raised in support of his motion were that the blood sample had not been drawn by "a physician, registered nurse, or duly licensed clinical laboratory technologist or clinical laboratory technician," as required by Section 316.1933(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982); and that the test performed was not "substantially in accordance with methods approved by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services," as required by Section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...At that hearing, testimony established unequivocally that the person who had drawn the blood sample was not at the time "a physician, registered nurse, or duly licensed clinical laboratory technologist or clinical laboratory technician," as required by Section 316.1933(2)(a); and that the blood had not been collected in compliance with Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Rule 10 D.E.R....

...containing an acceptable anticoagulant substance." In addition, the testimony revealed for the first time that the person who had actually analysed the blood did not possess a permit from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to do so, as required by Section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982). Despite timely objections that the results of the blood test were inadmissible because Section 316.1933(2)(a) and (b) had not been complied with, the trial court allowed the results of the test into evidence....

...f vehicular homicide as well as manslaughter by an intoxicated motorist. The jury found defendant not guilty of manslaughter by an intoxicated motorist, but guilty of vehicular homicide. Our legal analysis must commence with the undisputed fact that Section 316.1933(2)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...e present case show a "lack of trustworthiness" which would further preclude admissibility under § 90.803(6). Accordingly, the order appealed is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. MILLS and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 316.1933(2)(a), Florida Statutes. [2] See § 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes....

...slature, the statute may not be enlarged or expanded to cover cases not falling within its provisions." (citations omitted). The plain language of the implied consent statute shows that when the circumstances described in sections 316.1932(1)(c) and 316.1933(1) are not present, the legislature provided for the use of a breath test to determine the alcoholic content of the operator's blood and for a urine test to determine the presence of chemical substances: Any person who accepts the privilege...

...substance has caused death or serious bodily injury of a human being." [2] We think it is clear that the legislature intended and provided for the use of breath and urine tests, except under the circumstances described in sections 316.1932(1)(c) and 316.1933(1) and that the legislature did not intend to authorize a law enforcement officer to request a blood test when the conditions described in these statutes do not exist....

...al, clinic, or other medical facility as a result of his involvement as a driver in a motor vehicle accident and the administration of a breath or urine test is impractical or impossible. The blood test shall be performed in a reasonable manner. [2] Section 316.1933(1) provides: (1) Notwithstanding any recognized ability to refuse to submit to the test provided in s....

...A licensee has the privilege of withdrawing his implied consent by refusing to take the test, as long as he is not incapable of refusing to take the test or has not caused an accident involving death or serious bodily injury. §§ 316.1932(1)(c) and 316.1933(1), Fla....

...sented to an approved blood test for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the blood... . Any person who is incapable of refusal by reason of unconsciousness ... shall be deemed not to have withdrawn his consent to such a test... . [9] Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1989) provides: (1) Notwithstanding any recognized ability to refuse to submit to the tests provided in s....

...refusal). See §§ 316.1932, 322.261, Fla. Stat. (1989). If later convicted of DUI, the more severe sentences will not be applicable to them but their refusal to take the test may be used against them in the criminal trial. [15] §§ 316.1932(1)(c), 316.1933, Fla....

...te omitted). Thus, obtaining blood based on probable cause appears to be constitutionally permissible even in misdemeanor DUI cases not involving an accident or serious injury. [2] The trial court also found that the blood draw was not authorized by section 316.1933(1)(a), which mandates that a police officer shall require a driver to submit to a blood test, by reasonable force if necessary, if the officer has probable cause to believe "that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual physical control of a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages ......

...der the influence of alcohol to advise the driver that a refusal to submit to a breath test will result in the suspension of the driver's license. Other statutory provisions such as section 316.1932(1)(c) (medical condition precludes breath test) or section 316.1933(1) (impaired driver caused serious injury or death) authorize blood withdrawal; however, they were not applicable in this case....

...Reliability may be proven by a showing of general acceptance within the scientific community. Stokes v. State, 548 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1989). Prior to the adoption of section 322.261 and section 322.262, Florida Statutes (1977) (now section 316.1932 and section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1991)), the state was required to demonstrate reliability of the blood or breathalyzer testing in all cases where it sought to introduce the results of such tests....

...the actual physical control of__________________ (Patient's Name) while under the influence of alcohol, any chemical substance, or any controlled substances, has caused the death or serious bodily injury to any person. Pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 316.1933, I request the ORLANDO REGIONAL HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, its employees and agents, release to the law enforcement officer listed above the patient's test results relating to the alcoholic content of the patient's blood or the presence of chemical substance or controlled substance in the patient's blood....

...ime. Alcoholic beverages are considered to be substances of any kind and description which contain alcohol. (-) is a controlled substance under Florida law. Ch. 893, Fla. Stat. (_) is a chemical substance under Florida law. § 877.111(1), Fla. Stat. § 316.1933, Fla....

...ND IS THE ONLY PERSON TO SUSTAIN BODILY INJURY, MAY A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WHO HAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE DRIVER IS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES OR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES REQUIRE THE DRIVER TO SUBMIT TO A BLOOD TEST UNDER SECTION 316.1933(1) EVEN THOUGH THE DRIVER OBJECTS THERETO? We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We conclude that section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1985), applies only to a driver who has injured or killed another person in a motor vehicle accident; consequently, that section does not require a driver to submit to a blood test when the driver is the only party injured....

...Perez was accordingly cited for driving under the influence in violation of section 316.193(1), Florida Statutes (1985). Perez moved to suppress the blood-test evidence at trial, claiming the sample was drawn illegally. The trial court stated that it believed the sample had been drawn lawfully pursuant to section 316.1933(1), which provides: Notwithstanding any recognized ability to refuse to submit to the tests provided in s....

...Only then may a blood test be requested, subject to the person's refusal. The subsection further provides penalties for such a refusal but does not authorize the officer to proceed with the test regardless of the refusal. The other exception to the general scheme of breath and urine testing is found in section 316.1933(1), the statute in question....

...[w]as a habitual traffic offender as defined in s. 322.264; or 3. [h]ad been previously convicted of a violation of this subsection." § 316.1931(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985). It is significant that this last provision, section 316.1931(2)(b), refers to the section at issue, section 316.1933, for a definition of the term "serious bodily injury." There is no dispute that the instant statute authorizes a blood test when the suspect driver has caused such injury to another person....

...at section where he has caused his own death, and posthumous prosecution has never been a practice in this state. The most probable reading of section 316.1931(2)(b), (c), consequently, is that it encompasses all of the circumstances contemplated in section 316.1933 for which blood testing will be allowed: seriously injuring or killing someone other than the suspect driver....

...vided in section 316.193(2). In sum, we conclude that a law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe a driver is under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled substances may require that driver to submit to a blood test under section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1985), only when the driver has caused the death of or serious bodily injury to someone other than himself....

...[3] Accordingly, *965 we approve the decision of the district court below. It is so ordered. OVERTON, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur. McDONALD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which GRIMES, J., concurs. McDONALD, Justice, dissenting. The statute under discussion, section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1985), authorizes the involuntary drawing of blood from a suspected drunk driver when that driver's vehicle has caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being....

...The statute does not say another human being or a third party human being. The driver is a human being and qualifies for the drawing of blood whether the driver or another person is injured. I suggest that the plain meaning rule for construing statutes requires the application of section 316.1933(1) to include the driver when he is seriously injured regardless of the absence of injury to another person....

...evisions to the statutory scheme regarding driving a motor vehicle while under the influence. Although the title of the bill declares that it is providing "clarifying language" with respect to certain provisions, it states that the act is "amending" section 316.1933....

...We agree with the trial court's ruling. Furthermore, the fact that the officer initially requested and obtained, from the medical staff, the blood alcohol content of the blood drawn in the course of Thomas's treatment, instead of specifically requesting a blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933(1), does not warrant exclusion of the medical records subsequently obtained pursuant to the State's subpoena. On the facts of this case, we conclude that the officer would have been authorized to request a blood draw. And, pursuant to section 316.1933(2)(a), "the failure of a law enforcement officer to request the withdrawal of blood shall not affect the admissibility of a test of blood withdrawn for medical purposes." Moreover, even if we concluded that the officer did not have probable cause to request a blood test pursuant to section 316.1933(1), on this record, the officer's verbal request for the nurse to tell him the blood test results does not constitute the type of governmental misconduct that would warrant exclusion of the medical records subsequently obtained through the State's subpoena issued after proper notice to Thomas....

...We agree with appellant that the trial court erred in suppressing the results of the blood test on Cesaretti. A law enforcement officer, having probable cause to believe that a driver is under the influence of alcohol and has caused "serious bodily injury", may request a blood test. Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes....

...Bender, 382 So.2d 697 (Fla.1980). In Robertson v. State, 604 So.2d 783 (Fla.1992), our supreme court was asked to answer the certified question of whether the test results of blood samples taken at the request of law enforcement are admissible where the requirements of section 316.1933, Florida Statutes are not met....

...although Trooper Burke had probable cause to order a blood draw, because a urine test had not been impractical or impossible, the requirements for ordering a blood draw had not been met. The court also found that the blood draw was not authorized by section 316.1933(1) because that statute did not apply to the instant facts....

...Although the trial court was convinced, as was the State, that section 316.1932(1)(c) was the correct statute to be applied in determining the validity of the blood draw, we disagree. We believe that the factual circumstances here require the application of section 316.1933....

...possible.... Any person who is incapable of refusal by reason of unconsciousness or other mental or physical condition is deemed not to have withdrawn his or her consent to such test. (Emphasis added.) The statute that the court should have applied, section 316.1933(1), provides: Notwithstanding any recognized ability to refuse to submit to the tests provided in s....

...resents the additional fact that the officer had probable cause to believe that the driver, while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, caused death or serious bodily injury to another. This placed the case squarely within the intended purview of section 316.1933(1). The trial court offered two reasons that section 316.1933(1) did not apply to the instant case. First, the trial court cited State v. Kliphouse, 771 So.2d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). However, Kliphouse is distinguishable on its facts. The court in Kliphouse concluded that section 316.1933(1) did not apply there because the statute requires that before a blood draw may be authorized, law enforcement must reasonably believe that the defendant caused the injuries....

...In addition, the *818 record not only supports the trial court's conclusion that the trooper had the requisite reasonable cause under section 316.1932(1)(c) to believe that Serrago was driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, but also supports the conclusion that he had the probable cause required by section 316.1933(1) to believe that while driving in such a condition, she caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being. Therefore, Kliphouse did not support the trial court's conclusion that section 316.1933(1) did not apply to the instant case. Second, the trial court stated that section 316.1933(1) did not apply because that section anticipated a conscious driver and required that a law enforcement officer request the blood draw of the driver, neither of which occurred here. However, nothing in section 316.1933(1) refers to the driver's consciousness. Furthermore, it appears that the statutory reference in section 316.1933(1) to the officer's "request" that the driver submit to a test misled the trial court to conclude that the request must be made of the driver, who may then refuse the test....

...The statute also refers to the officer's ability to use reasonable force to require the person to submit to a blood test. See Cox v. State, 473 So.2d 778 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (stating that officer's threat to hit defendant over head to obtain blood sample was not unreasonable force). As this court stated in Cox, "[a]s we read section 316.1933, where there is probable cause to suspect intoxication, consent and withdrawal of implied consent to the extraction of a blood sample are not options...." Id....

...formed. See State v. Webb, 753 So.2d 145 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). In the context of this statute, the officer's request is the proverbial "offer that one cannot refuse." Having found no merit in the two reasons offered by the trial court for not applying section 316.1933, and finding that the trial court improperly applied section 316.1932, we conclude that the trial court erred in requiring the State to show that a breath or urine test was impractical or impossible before allowing admission of the blood test. We therefore conclude that section 316.1933 applies, that the requirements of section 316.1933 have been met, and that the results of the blood test should have been admitted....

...Flaherty of Syprett, Meshad, Resnick, Lieb, Dumbaugh, Jones & Krotec, Sarasota, for Appellee. DANAHY, PAUL W., Senior Judge. The State appeals the trial court's order granting Tammy Catt's motion to suppress the results of a blood draw taken pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...ospital in St. Petersburg to determine the extent of her injuries. The EMTs expressed concerns about possible serious head or internal injuries. After the child was airlifted from the scene, the police ordered blood to be drawn from Catt pursuant to section 316.1933....

...Catt moved to suppress the results on the grounds that the officers at the scene did not have the necessary probable cause to order the blood draw. After a full hearing, the trial court granted Catt's motion and suppressed the results of the blood draw. The State then brought this appeal. Section 316.1933(1), which provides for compelled blood draws under certain circumstances, states in pertinent part: [I]f a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual physical control of a pe...

...Officers Cramer and Campbell both testified that they smelled alcohol on Catt's breath. This testimony was sufficient to support the trial court's finding of probable cause on this issue. See State v. Brown, 725 So.2d 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (noting that *760 "under the influence" in section 316.1933 means something more than having simply consumed an alcoholic beverage but something less than intoxicated and stating that the odor of alcohol on a driver's breath is a critical factor in determining whether probable cause existed)....

...Officer Jones testified that he understood that the extent of the child's injuries was not clear but that the EMTs were very concerned about the child. This testimony was sufficient to establish that the officers had probable cause to believe that the accident had caused serious bodily injuries as defined by section 316.1933(1)....

...an out-of-county hospital, was sufficient to support a common sense conclusion that the child had suffered serious bodily injuries in the accident. Cf. Gerlitz, 725 So.2d at 394 (holding that officers had probable cause to support a blood draw under section 316.1933(1) when they knew that a cyclist was hit by a car, thrown to the ground, and removed from the scene by ambulance and when emergency personnel told the officers that the cyclist's injury was possibly severe); Cesaretti. 632 So.2d at 1106 (holding that the fact that an accident victim was screaming, holding her side, and having trouble breathing was sufficient to establish probable cause for purposes of section 316.1933(1))....

...The trial court's finding to the contrary is not supported by the evidence. Thus, because the police had probable cause to believe that Catt was driving while under the influence and that serious bodily injuries had resulted, the blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933(1) was proper....

...Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied March 22, 1988. DANAHY, Chief Judge. The question we must decide is whether otherwise reliable blood alcohol test results are admissible evidence in a prosecution for DUI manslaughter where the blood sample was withdrawn by a person not authorized to do so by section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ver the objections of that individual. Therefore, since the blood sample is constitutionally obtained, the test results are admissible into evidence. Schmerber. The Florida legislature covered some of the same ground as Schmerber in the enactment of section 316.1933....

...ontent thereof. Subsection (2)(a), however, contains the same provision as in section 316.1932(1)(f)2, describing those persons who may withdraw blood for the purpose of such a test. The question, then, is whether, in a situation within the scope of section 316.1933, blood alcohol test results are admissible into evidence when taken by persons other than those described in section 316.1933(2)(a)....

...The state obtained the blood samples and the resulting tests by means of a lawful search warrant. The supreme court rejected Strong's contention that this evidence was inadmissible because the technician qualification requirements of section 316.1932(1)(f)2 were not met. Drawing upon Strong for a similar conclusion under section 316.1933, the state posits that if a blood test otherwise qualifies for admissibility under the Schmerber rule and is proved to have been taken by a person medically qualified to take blood, and is shown to have been taken in a medically-appr...

...manner shown to be reliable for alcohol blood testing purposes, the tests should be admitted into evidence even if the sample was obtained in a nonstatutory manner. We agree with the state's reasoning. We do not believe that the legislature intended section 316.1933 to have the effect of an exclusionary rule requiring suppression of evidence which has been constitutionally obtained by the state....

...under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the withdrawal of a blood sample from the appellee by paramedic Arnold was proper, and the blood alcohol test results based on that sample are not subject to suppression by application of the provisions of section 316.1933(2)(a)....

...may be performed in place of a breath test. [2] State v. Perez, 531 So.2d 961 (Fla. 1988). The first circumstance in which blood may be drawn is set forth in section 316.1932(1)(c), which has been discussed above. The second occasion is described in section 316.1933(1) [3] which authorizes a blood test where an officer has probable cause to believe an impaired driver has caused death or serious injury to another human being....

...Sentence was stayed pending review by this court by certified question, which question states: WHETHER A POLICE OFFICER HAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT AN ACCIDENT VICTIM IS SUFFERING FROM SERIOUS BODILY INJURIES WITHIN THE MEANING OF FLORIDA STATUTE 316.1933(1) WHERE HE IS INFORMED BY PARAMEDICS THAT THE ACCIDENT VICTIM IS UNCONSCIOUS AND POSSIBLY SUFFERING FROM NECK AND/OR OTHER UNSPECIFIED INTERNAL INJURIES....

...We have considered the record, the briefs of the parties, and the certified question and answer the latter in the affirmative. Furthermore, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court. LETTS, J., and McNULTY, JOSEPH P., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1987), provides: Notwithstanding any recognized ability to refuse to submit to the tests provided in s....

...*1162 Appellant filed a pretrial motion seeking suppression of the evidence pertaining to the blood alcohol test, contending that Trooper Juliano lacked the necessary probable cause to order the test. The trial court denied the motion and permitted the state to introduce such evidence at trial. In this, the court erred. Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that a blood sample may be taken by reasonable means upon the request of a law enforcement officer where the officer "has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by ... a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled substances has caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being." In Jackson v. State, 456 So.2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), this Court stated: Probable cause exists under section 316.1933(1) to order a blood test if the officer, based upon reasonably trustworthy information, has knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect driver was under the infl...

...If the evidence is not suppressed, the trial court may consider alternative sanctions pursuant to rule 3.220(n). Petition granted; order quashed; and cause remanded. STRINGER and KELLY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Evidently, there was a second blood draw taken at the request of law enforcement pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (2002)....

...Appellant challenges his judgment and sentence for DUI manslaughter and vehicular homicide. We affirm. Appellant raises the following three issues in this appeal: I. Whether the trial court erred by allowing into evidence the results of blood tests obtained from blood drawn from the appellant in violation of section 316.1933, Florida Statutes....

...hok and appellant. Blood *50 was drawn from both boys at the scene by emergency medical personnel. Appellant argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to suppress the results of the blood sample taken from appellant at the scene of the accident. Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1995), provides in pertinent part: [I]f a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual physical control of a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages ......

...blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content thereof. Appellant argues that the blood obtained by Trooper Lawrence from appellant and Walchok at the scene, at the request of Corporal Carlock, did not meet the statutory requirements of section 316.1933, because neither Trooper Lawrence nor Corporal Carlock had probable cause to believe that one boy, as opposed to the other, was the driver of the vehicle....

...motor vehicle. Appellant argues that Corporal Carlock and Trooper Lawrence could only have had probable cause as to one of the boys and without there being probable cause specifically as to appellant alone as the driver, the blood drawn pursuant to section 316.1933 was inadmissible. We conclude that appellant's argument is too narrow a construction of the probable cause required by section 316.1933....

...er, gave law enforcement probable cause to draw appellant's blood for blood alcohol testing. Appellant suggests that the police must have probable cause that he was the only one who committed the crime before they could obtain his blood sample under section 316.1933....

...jury's verdict. Reversed and remanded. LEWIS and ROBERTS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Mr. Robinson did not provide a breath sample and the law enforcement officers who arrested him failed to obtain blood test results, notwithstanding the duty imposed by section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), when there is probable cause to believe someone driving under the influence of alcohol has caused serious bodily injury or death to a human being....

...igher level of citizen protection than that which is required by the Fourth Amendment. As stated in State v. Slaney, 653 So.2d 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995): [I]t is the established law of this state that Florida's implied consent statutes [Secs. 316.1932, 316.1933, 316.1934, Fla.Stat....

...the right of the state of Florida to extend to its citizenry protections against unreasonable searches and seizures greater than those afforded by the federal constitution [through the Fourth Amendment]. This it has done through the enactment of section 322.261, Florida Statutes (1975) [now section 316.1932, 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1991)]." As further stated by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v....

...at 430-31, and the circuit court panel was entirely correct in affirming the county court order. We should deny certiorari. NOTES [1] There were no injuries in the present case. Where an accident has caused serious bodily injury or death, the blood test provisions of section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, become available....

...e's breath nor observe White walk or talk. A treating paramedic testified that he detected an odor of alcohol on White at the accident site and when he asked White if he had been drinking White replied he had a couple of beers. The state relied upon Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...uence of alcoholic beverages has caused the death of a human being, such person shall submit to a blood alcohol test. This court held in Jackson v. State, 456 So.2d 916, 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), that probable cause to order a blood test exists under Section 316.1933(1) if the officer, based upon reasonably trustworthy information, has knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect driver was under the influence of alcoholic bev...

...on a motion to suppress. There was a hearing in this case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding the hearing after the trial commenced. As to the second point on appeal, we affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1997), permits blood to be drawn when a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a person has sustained serious bodily injury in an accident caused by a person driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages....

...The accident involved a pick-up truck hitting a bicyclist. When the investigating officer arrived on the scene, the bicyclist was being transported to the hospital. The trial court's express findings of fact support a finding of probable cause under section 316.1933(1): I find that [the investigating officer] had that probable cause from all the factors that he testified to during his testimony and that he came on the scene where a truck had struck a cyclist, the cyclist had been thrown to the ground and had to be removed from the scene for medical care....

...t, i.e., that the blood test was inadmissible because the state failed to show that the individual who analyzed the blood specimen, Mr. Peter Lardizabel, held the statutorily required permit from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. § 316.1933(2)(b), Fla....

...The state raises one point on cross-appeal. We find merit in the state's point. We now address each of the three points. Appellant contends that the results of the blood test should have been suppressed because Sgt. Waters lacked probable cause to order the test. Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1985), provides: [I]f a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual physical control of a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled...

...enforcement officer, to a test of his blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content thereof or the presence of chemical substances... . In Jackson v. State, 456 So.2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), the court held: Probable cause exists under section 316.1933(1) to order a blood test if the officer, based upon reasonably trustworthy information, has knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect driver was under the infl...

...cial at the time and location of the scheduled hearing: (1) Any infraction which results in an accident that causes the death of another; or (2) Any infraction which results in an accident that causes "serious bodily injury" of another as defined in s. 316.1933(1). There is no evidence that Galgano's traffic infraction fell within the ambit of section 318.19. Galgano's failure to yield the right-of-way did not result in death or cause "serious bodily injury" as defined in section 316.1933(1) [1] . While Buchanan suffered a broken leg which resulted in a 5% permanent impairment, his injury did not amount to a "serious bodily injury" as defined in section 316.1933(1)....

...Because of the taint to the jury as a result of the admission of this prejudicial evidence, we must remand for a new trial on liability and damages. As a result, we decline to address the remaining issues raised in this appeal [2] . REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. GUNTHER and STONE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 316.1933(1) involves a blood test for impairment or intoxication in cases of death or serious bodily injury....

...See Johnson v. State, 660 So.2d 648, 657-58 (Fla. 1995); Jackson v. State, 456 So.2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Moreover, we find that the chemical analysis of Henninger's blood was *489 performed "substantially" in compliance with approved methods as required by section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...draw performed by fire rescue and determined that Montes-Valeton was at fault for the traffic crash. At the hearing, Montes-Valeton argued that the trial court should grant the motion to suppress because Trooper Molina lacked probable cause to extract blood from him under section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (2008)....

...He claimed that the trial court erred by admitting the blood test results because Trooper Molina did not have probable cause to believe he was under the influence of alcoholic beverages before requiring him to submit to the blood draw as required by section 316.1933(1)(a)....

...The warnings threatened that a refusal would result in the suspension of his driver license. Trooper Molina further explained Florida’s “implied consent law”1 to him. But because Trooper Molina lacked probable cause 1. The implied consent law consists of sections 316.1932, 316.1933, and 316.1934, Florida Statutes (2008), “which essentially require all persons accepting a license to drive in Florida to consent to a blood-alcohol test upon being arrested for driving under the influence.” Robertson v....

...2d 783, 789 n.4 (Fla. 1992). The record before this Court does not provide full details concerning what Trooper Molina explained to Montes-Valeton regarding Florida’s implied consent law. - 10 - to require the blood draw under section 316.1933(1)(a), neither the implied consent warnings nor Florida’s implied consent law applied to Montes-Valeton....

...We also find no error with regard to the jury instruction in this case. The law in this state provides that anyone who operates a motor vehicle is deemed to have consented to submit to appropriate testing to determine his blood alcohol content. See §§ 316.1932, 316.1933, Fla....

...nt at the time of the accident. See § 316.1934(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000). The legislature delegated to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement *994 (FDLE) the task of formulating and approving the process by which a person's blood is analyzed. See § 316.1933(2)(b), Fla....

...For present purposes we assume that appellee suffered serious bodily injury in the accident, that the blood test was taken without his consent, and that the state failed to comply with section 316.1932, Florida Statutes (1983). The issue is whether the blood test was properly administered pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...It has, however, been addressed indirectly and in dicta by two other district courts of appeal. In State v. Williams, 417 So.2d 755 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), the court noted that the "more lengthy revised statute which goes into effect July 1, 1982" (referring to sections 316.1932 and 316.1933) contains "a new `get tough' section [which] provides that a driver ......

...absence of another injured person. The case of Beasley v. Mitel of Delaware, 449 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), involved a single-car collision in which the driver died. No other persons were involved. A blood sample taken from decedent pursuant to section 316.1933 was found to have been improperly admitted into evidence in a workers' compensation proceeding because of irregularities in the manner in which the blood was drawn. There was no discussion as to the applicability or nonapplicability of section 316.1933 to an accident in which only the driver himself was injured; rather, it was apparently taken for granted that the statute applied. Had the issue been raised and considered, the court might well have found the statute to be inapplicable. There is no express language in section 316.1933(1) which states that the accused driver is intended to be excepted from the statute. However, section 316.1933(1) does say that a driver who is suspected of being intoxicated "shall submit, upon the request of a law enforcement officer," to a blood test where he has caused the "death ......

...indication that the alternative in the statute of causing "serious bodily injury" is to be interpreted in a different manner. Also, there is a strong indication in another section of chapter 316, as amended in 1984, that the "injury" referred to in section 316.1933(1) must be incurred by one other than the accused driver. Section 316.1931(2)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1984), states in pertinent part that "[a]ny person in violation of subsection (1) who by reason of such operation of a vehicle causes serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933 ... is guilty of a felony of the third degree... ." (emphasis added.) We conclude that section 316.1933(1) is inapplicable here and that the trial court did not err in granting appellee's motion to suppress....

...Trooper Roberts testified that he had no opinion regarding whether appellant's normal faculties were impaired at the time of the accident or when the blood sample was ordered. The results of the blood test showed .17 percent by weight of alcohol in appellant's blood. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 917 (footnote omitted). Section 316.1933(1) Florida Statutes (1983) provides: Notwithstanding any recognized ability to refuse to submit to the tests provided in s....

...[1] In addition, Gikas reported Rodriguez had noticeably bloodshot eyes. Based on his investigation, Trooper Gikas believed that there was a reasonable basis for him to conclude that Rodriguez was under the influence to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired. As such, a blood draw was ordered. See § 316.1933(1), Fla....

...njury, and one count of DUI with property damage. He raises three issues on appeal. The first issue concerns the correctness of the pretrial denials of the suppression motions. This issue is without merit. Probable cause for a blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933, clearly was established by the information available to Trooper Gikas....

...lood if such person (1) appears for treatment at a hospital, clinic, or other medical facility as a result of his involvement as a driver in a motor vehicle accident, and (2) the administration of a breath or urine test is impractical or impossible. Section 316.1933 provides that if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by, or in the actual physical control of, a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages has caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being, such person shall submit, upon the request of a law enforcement officer, to a test of his blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content thereof. The latter statute applies to the present case. Section 316.1933 does not have language paralleling the key language of paragraph (1)(f) of section 316.1932 relied on by defendant; instead, paragraph (2)(b) of section 316.1933 requires that the chemical analysis of the person's blood: must have been performed substantially in accordance with methods approved by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the department for this purpose....

...The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services may approve satisfactory techniques or methods, ascertain the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct such analysis, and issue permits which will be subject to termination or revocation at the discretion of the department. § 316.1933, Fla. Stat. (1989). Sections 316.1932 and 316.1933 have similar, but clearly independent functions and the language of the two statutes is different. Section 316.1933 does not reference or incorporate the testing provision of section 316.1932(1)(f)....

...The legislature has maintained this same dichotomy in the subsequent legislation concerning operation of a watercraft while intoxicated. The "driving privilege" statute incorporates 316.1932(1)(f), but the probable cause statute does not. The probable cause statute incorporates section 316.1933(2)....

...ate where law enforcement has probable cause to believe the driver had caused death or serious injury through driving under the influence of alcohol. Section 316.1934 provides: [T]he results of any test administered in accordance with s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 and this section shall be admissible *1387 into evidence when otherwise admissible... . (emphasis added). We can find no basis to conclude that section 316.1932 controls availability of the section 316.1934 presumption in the case where a blood sample is taken pursuant to section 316.1933. Because it appears that section 316.1932 does not control in this case, we must consider whether the procedure utilized by HRS complies with the terms of sections 316.1933(2)(b) and 316.1934. Sections 316.1933(2)(b) and 316.1934(3) require that a chemical analysis of a person's blood be performed substantially in accordance with methods approved [not "adopted"] by HRS and by a person possessing a valid permit issued by HRS for this purpose....

...duct blood analysis using that specific method. Unlike the problem we encountered with breath analysis pursuant to section 316.1932 in State v. Reisner, 584 So.2d 141, rev. denied, 591 So.2d 184 (Fla. 1991), the HRS procedure for testing blood under section 316.1933 has been formally adopted in rules....

...ique has ever produced any inaccurate test result. [15] Nor is there any evidentiary basis to conclude that a single, uniform test method is necessary or practical. The state met its burden at the hearing. Where HRS has promulgated rules required by 316.1933 and the state has followed the rules in conducting the test of defendants' blood, the presumption applies....

...est and in the questions certified to the Florida Supreme Court. However, I cannot subscribe to any suggestion that the legislature intended different requirements regarding the administration of blood tests under section 316.1932(1)(f) and sections 316.1933(2)(b) and 316.1934(3) of the Florida Statutes (1989), depending on whether the method of blood testing is required to be "adopted" or "approved". There is no rational basis to draw a distinction between blood tests in a section 316.1932 DUI case and a section 316.1933 case of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence causing death or serious bodily injury. If the language in sections 316.1933(2)(b) and 316.1934(3) of "approved methods" is to be construed to require less stringent criteria for assuring reliable blood test results, then we are faced with the question of whether such a distinction is reasonable because the effect of such a construction is to require greater reliability for the lesser offense encompassed by section 316.1932. In order to avoid such a construction and because the provisions of section 316.1933 augment the provisions of section 316.1932, I conclude that the provisions of these two sections as well as the applicable provisions of section 316.1934(2) and (3) were intended to be read in pari materia....

...the blood test on appellant. There is no indication that the operator deviated from the approved method or that the utilized method would not provide accurate results. Thus, appellee's blood test results are admissible under sections 316.1932(1)(f), 316.1933(2)(b) and 316.1934(2) and (3) of the Florida Statutes (1989) and rules 10D-42.028 through 10D-42.030 of the Florida Administrative Code....

...This evidence would also be admissible if the state is able to satisfy the traditional predicates for admissibility as stated in the majority opinion. NOTES [1] Review of this order is proper pursuant to the ruling in State v. Saufley, 574 So.2d 1207 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). [2] Whether the blood was drawn pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1989) has not been made an issue in this case....

...o be admitted as evidence. Under Florida's Implied Consent Law, certain evidence of DUBAL creates a presumption that the driver was impaired. § 316.1934(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2006) (results of any test administered in compliance with §§ 316.1932 and 316.1933 give rise to the presumption that driver was impaired). To give rise to the presumption of impairment, the tests must comply with regulations promulgated by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. § 316.1933(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006). The blood-alcohol evidence admitted in this case complied with section 316.1933(2)(b)....

...pert testimony explains the science behind the test and the outcome. 382 So.2d at 699. In Robertson v. State, 604 So.2d 783 (Fla.1992), the court held that the statutory presumption of impairment is not available when the State has not complied with section 316.1933(2)(b)....

...er belief that the driver was intoxicated. At trial, appellant objected to the admission of the results of the blood alcohol tests on the ground that the person who performed the test, Dr. Wayne Duer, was not certified by HRS as required by statute. Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1987), provides: (1) Notwithstanding any recognized ability to refuse to submit to the tests provided in s....

...death or serious bodily injury of a human being, such person shall submit, upon the request of a law enforcement officer, to a test of his blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content thereof... . (emphasis added) Subsection (2)(b) of section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1987) contains the restriction relied upon by appellant: A chemical analysis of the person's blood to determine the alcoholic content thereof must have been performed substantially in accordance with methods approv...

...ining on homicide cases. On this record, we agree with the trial court and adopt its recommendation. Nevertheless, we recognize that criminal statutes are to be construed in favor of accused persons and that whether the certification requirements of 316.1933 can be satisfied through supervision is a close question....

...revailing FDLE procedures, we conclude this issue should be certified as a matter of *863 great public importance to our supreme court. There is an alternative basis for our affirmance. At least one other court has concluded that the requirements of section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, need not be met at all so long as the state has probable cause to extract and test a driver's blood....

...In State v. Quartararo, 522 So.2d 42 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 531 So.2d 1354 (Fla. 1988), the Second District Court of Appeal read State v. Strong, 504 So.2d 758 (Fla. 1987), to hold test results admissible without regard to the requirements of section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, provided the state could satisfy the traditional predicates for admissibility, including test reliability, the technician's qualifications, and the test results' meaning. Based on Strong and Quartararo, it appears that section 316.1933 either merely creates a convenient shorthand evidentiary device for admission of testing done in compliance with the statute, or it establishes minimal standards for admissibility of testing in DUI cases where there is probable cause...

...ly what its evidentiary alternatives (and burdens) are in such cases, we certify to the supreme court as a matter of great public importance the following: (A) MAY A CHEMICAL ANALYSIS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPROVED METHODS CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 316.1933 BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A PERMITTEE BY INDIVIDUALS NOT POSSESSING AN HRS PERMIT? (B) CAN THE STATE INTRODUCE INTO EVIDENCE TEST RESULTS OF BLOOD SAMPLES TAKEN AT THE REQUEST OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IF THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 316.1933 ARE NOT SATISFIED? IF SO, UPON PROOF OF QUALIFICATION OF THE PERSON TAKING BLOOD OR CONDUCTING THE TEST, CAN THE STATE NONETHELESS RELY ON THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 316.1933 TO PROVE A VIOLATION OF SECTION 316.193 OR MUST THE STATE INTRODUCE COMPETENT PROOF *864 WHOLLY INDEPENDENT OF THE STATUTE? AFFIRMED....

...Stat. Alcoholic beverages are considered to be substances of any kind and description which contain alcohol. ( ) is a controlled substance under Florida law. Ch. 893, Fla. Stat. ( ) is a chemical substance under Florida law. § 877.111(1), Fla. Stat. § 316.1933, Fla....

...16.1932(1)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2002) ("An analysis of a person's breath, in order to be considered valid under this section, must have been performed substantially according to methods approved by the Department of Law Enforcement.") (emphasis added); § 316.1933(2)(b), Fla....

...ood test. While he was attempting to ask his father his legal options, his phone was taken from him. It is reasonably clear that at such time appellant was under custodial arrest. In fact, as the majority noted, a blood draw cannot be demanded under section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), unless the investigating officer has probable cause to believe the defendant operated his vehicle while under the influence, resulting in the death or serious bodily injury of another person....

...al, alluded to in the court's order, appears a problematic remedy in that, as the record discloses, law enforcement impeded appellant's opportunity to be made aware of such right. Although Smallridge lacked the right to refuse the test authorized by section 316.1933(1)(a), he retained the choice under the statute of seeking an independent test; that option, however, was effectively denied him by the officers' active interference with his right to confer with an attorney....

...ther human being. Such interpretation is clearly at variance with the terms of section 316.1932(1)(f)3, authorizing the administering of an independent test, in addition to that administered at the direction of a law-enforcement official pursuant to section 316.1933(1)(a)....

...Clarke, 744 So.2d 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). The appeal process took approximately one year. [2] Robertson held that evidence of blood-alcohol test results produced by an unlicensed expert may be admitted into evidence if the blood was drawn by a person authorized to do so by section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1987), and if the State establishes the predicate spelled out in Bender....

...ence. See Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013). The State does not challenge this ruling. We suspect that law enforcement conflated the provision for securing a breath or urine test under section 316.1932 with section 316.1933, the provision for obtaining a blood sample in cases of death or serious injury when law enforcement has probable cause to believe that a driver is under the influence....

...for the court to reconsider its ruling suppressing the medical records or as a motion to “cure” by resubpoena. The State conceded that at the first hearing it did not establish a factual basis to obtain the legal blood alcohol test results under section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (2007)....

...rly low for the State to obtain the medical records.” Despite noting that had the motion to suppress been done properly the first time the court’s ruling may have been different, the court declined reconsideration. Legal Blood Test Results Under Section 316.1933 A law enforcement officer may request that a blood test be conducted on a person involved in a crash when (1) the officer has independent probable cause to believe that the person was driving under the influence, see § 316.1933(l)(a); or (2) a healthcare provider has informed the officer that the patient’s medical blood test results show a blood alcohol level that is over the legal limit, see § 316.1933(2)(a)(l)....

...5th DCA 2005) (holding that suppression of medical records was required where a police officer obtained the defendant’s medical blood test results but did not comply with section 395.3025 and did not request that blood be drawn and tested pursuant to section 316.1933(1)). Trooper Moseley testified that he went to the hospital to determine Salle-Green’s status. Under section 316.1933(2)(a)(l), Trooper Moseley would have been authorized to request a blood sample if a doctor or nurse had notified him that Salle-Green’s blood alcohol level was above the legal limit....

...cal records subsequently obtained through the State’s subpoena issued after proper notice.) Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order suppressing Salle-Green’s medical blood alcohol test results. Reversed. DAVIS and BLACK, JJ., Concur. . Section 316.1933(2)(a)( 1) states the following: [IJf a health care provider, who is providing medical care in a health care facility to a person injured in a motor vehicle crash, becomes aware, as a result of any blood test performed in the course o...

...Johnson's blood alcohol level was .09. Defense counsel moved to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground that there was no probable cause justifying the officer's request. Section 316.1934(2) provides that the results of blood tests performed pursuant to section 316.1933 are admissible in any civil or criminal trial and a test result of .08 or greater, is prima facie evidence that the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages. Section 316.1933 prescribes the methods and procedures which must be followed in conducting a blood test in order to make it admissible and to establish it as a basis for the statutory presumption. They are not at issue in this case. Probable cause for the officer's request for a blood test is contested. Subsection (1) of section 316.1933 provides a law enforcement officer may order or compel a blood test if he or she: [H]as probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual physical control of a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages, ......

...ay testify as to any statement made to the officer by the person involved in the accident if that person's privilege against self-incrimination is not violated. The results of breath, urine, and blood tests administered as provided in s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 are not confidential and shall be admissible into evidence in accordance with the provisions of s....

...[2] We note that the statute has now been changed and that a suspect in such cases may be forced to submit to a blood test if there is probable cause that an accident involving death or serious bodily injury was committed through the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The new statute, Section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Section 316.193(3)(c)2, which has remained materially unchanged since 1987, makes it a third degree felony to operate a vehicle while under the influence and cause, as the result of such operation, “[sjerious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933.” (Emphasis added). Section 316.1933(1), in turn, provides that if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by ......

...The driver of a vehicle was not encompassed within the definition of serious bodily injury until the statute was amended in 1988. Ch. 88-5, § 4, at 195, Laws of Fla. This amendment was apparently a legislative response to appellate decisions interpreting section 316.1933(1) as authorizing a blood test only where a person other than the driver had been killed or seriously injured....

...The State’s toxicologist testified that the blood-alcohol content of the blood sample was .08, but she was unable to give an opinion as to what Banoub’s blood-alcohol level would have been at the time of the accident because she did not have sufficient information to extrapolate. Section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that, if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages has caused the death or serious bodily injury o...

...The trial court granted Banoub’s motion to suppress the blood-alcohol test results “based on the failure of the state to comply with the reasonableness requirement of F.S. Sec. 319.1933(1).” The reasoning underlying the trial court’s ruling is set out in the order as follows: Florida Statute Sec. 316.1933(1) is the Florida codification of Schmerber v....

...at even if the officer had probable cause to believe that Henderson was the driver of the vehicle involved, the court found that he did not have probable cause to believe that Henderson was under the influence of alcohol, and suppression was proper. Section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1997), reads in pertinent part: 316.1933 Blood Test for Impairment or Intoxication in Cases of Death or Serious Bodily Injury; Right to Use Reasonable Force (1) Notwithstanding any recognized ability to refuse to submit to the tests provided in s....

Based on this information and pursuant to section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1989), the deputy requested

inadmissible, however, the trial court relied on section 316.1933 and on State v. Prues, 478 So.2d 1196 (Fla

...The insurer argued that the insured’s blood alcohol content of over .10% raised the presumption of impairment. The beneficiary argued that section 316.1934(2)(c) could not be applied because there was neither probable cause for taking the blood test, see § 316.1933(1), Fla.Stat....

...Officer Alli testified that he had been "close enough to the Defendant [to see] his eyes were slightly open" and notice "they were bloodshot red and watery still"; the officer also "detect[ed] the odor of alcoholic beverage" on the man's breath. Over multiple objections, including hearsay and violation of section 316.1933(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), Officer Alli testified that medical personnel advised him that "the Defendant" had a blood alcohol level of .423. Officer Alli further testified that upon speaking with an unidentified officer at the...

...r’s qualifications; and the meaning of the test results. This “medical purposes” admissibility test differs from the “legal purposes” test which focuses on the state’s substantial compliance with HRS’ relevant regulations as adopted by section 316.1933(2)(b)....

...COBB, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. . Fla.R.App.P. 9.140(c)(1)(B). . § 860.01(2), Fla.Stat. (1981). This section is now section 316.1931, Florida Statutes (1983). . Section 322.261(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), has been amended and is now found under section 316.1933(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983). Section 316.1933(2)(a), provides: Only a physician, registered nurse, or duly licensed clinical laboratory technologist or 457 So.2d — 14 clinical laboratory technician, or a paramedic certified as provided in s....

...[1] During Kutik's treatment, hospital personnel tested his blood and determined his blood alcohol level. A police officer obtained Kutik's blood alcohol level from his medical records, but did not get his permission to review the medical records and did not request that blood be drawn and tested pursuant to section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...legal blood sample. However, at the time he requested Kutik's medical records, he did not realize that the form could be used only to obtain a legal blood draw, but not blood alcohol test results. [4] Rather than requesting a blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933, Demeulenaere requested Kutik's medical records because he knew that almost two days had elapsed since the accident and a new blood test would not reflect Kutik's blood alcohol level on the night of the accident....

...Even though the Court disagrees with the holding in Johnson, it feels constrained to follow it. The State appeals, arguing two intertwined theories based upon Thomas. First, the State contends that the investigating officer requested and obtained Kutik's blood alcohol test results through a written form that complied with section 316.1933(2)(a)....

...Id. at 394. In this case, unlike Johnson, Demeulenaere never attempted to comply with section 395.3025. Although he went to ORMC while Kutik was there, he never sought permission to obtain Kutik's medical records or obtain a legal blood draw under section 316.1933(1)....

...He testified that his sergeant instructed him to obtain the medical records because they would otherwise obtain only a legal blood draw two days after the accident. Although Demeulenaere may not have known the statutory requirements of section 395.3025, that ignorance does not establish good faith. Sections 395.3025 and 316.1933(2)(a) have long been Florida law, and Johnson was decided in 2002....

...had reasonable time to object, but failed to do so. Therefore, the information contained in the medical records was admissible. Id. The Second District also concluded that the officer would have been allowed to request a legal blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933(1) and that the officer's request for the nurse to tell him the blood results did not constitute the type of governmental misconduct that would warrant exclusion of the medical records subsequently obtained through the State's subpoena issued after proper notice....

...fter the results became known to the medical personnel. The purpose of the statute is to provide law enforcement probable cause to request a legal blood draw. In this case, Demeulenaere should have requested a blood draw when he arrived at ORMC. See § 316.1933(1)....

...NOTES [1] Kutik was charged with one count of DUI manslaughter, a violation of sections 316.193(3)(c)(3) and 316.193(1), Florida Statutes (2002), and two counts of DUI with serious bodily injury, violations of sections 316.193(3)(c)(2) and 316.193(1). [2] Section 316.1933(1)(a) provides in part: If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by ....

...the motor vehicle to submit to a test of the person's blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content thereof. . . . The law enforcement officer may use reasonable force if necessary to require such person to submit to the administration of the blood test. Section 316.1933(2)(a) states that "the failure of a law enforcement officer to request the withdrawal of blood shall not affect the admissibility of a test of blood withdrawn for medical purposes." [3] Section 395.3025 provides: (4) Patient records...

...ecords to the patient or his or her legal representative. [4] During the hearing, Demeulenaere admitted that he recently read the form and realized it could only be used to authorize a legal blood draw, not for the collection of medical records. [5] Section 316.1933(2)(a)(1), provides: Notwithstanding any provision of law pertaining to the confidentiality of hospital records or other medical records, if a health care provider, who is providing medical care in a health care facility to a person i...

...In its order, the court stated: 4) As the taking of the blood sample is in derogation of the common law but is now authorized by statute, the statute providing for the taking of a blood sample must be strictly construed. Both Florida Statute 316.1932(l)(f)(2) and Florida Statute 316.1933 provide that a paramedic may take a blood sample from a defendant if certified pursuant to F.S....

...rt’s finding that the law enforcement officer “was not possessed with sufficient facts at the time the blood alcohol test was performed from which to formulate the requisite probable cause to request the blood test in the first instance” under section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1993). 1 Probable cause to order a blood test exists under section 316.1933(1) if an officer, based upon reasonably trustworthy information, has knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect driver was under the influence of alcoholic beve...

...ath), we find as a matter of law that this uncontradicted evidence, along with the serious bodily injuries suffered by the driver of the other car involved in the accident, provided probable cause for the police officer to request a blood test under section 316.1933(1)....

maintained in compliance with the mandates of § 316.1933, the State may not avail itself of the presumptions

...dant’s condition and the vehicular accident known to the law enforcement officer who ordered the blood test gave him probable cause to believe that the defendant’s operation of her vehicle while intoxicated caused the other driver’s death, see § 316.1933(1), Fla....

...d even if he had objected to the taking). Id. at 1005. The same observation applies to this case. In addition, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the amount of force used by the police to secure a blood sample was reasonable. Cf § 316.1933, Fla.Stat....

...wo pedestrians. This being so, the blood test in question was properly administered to the defendant. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1835 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 919 (1966); Jackson v. State, 456 So.2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); § 316.1933(1), Fla.Stat....

...Of the nine errors complained of, at least five concern prosecutorial misconduct. (We were advised at oral argument that the prosecutor involved is no longer with the state attorney’s office.) The remaining errors had to do with sentencing guidelines. . Detective Schneider specifically apprised Gargone of section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1983): 316.1933 Blood test for Impairment or intoxication In cases of death or serious bodily injury; right to use reasonable force.— (1) Notwithstanding any recognized ability to refuse to submit to the tests provided in s....

WARNER, J. In a prosecution for driving under the influence, the county court suppressed the results of a blood test conducted upon appellee without her consent on the ground it violated section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...est. Appellee refused, and the officer ordered a forced blood test because he believed serious injury was involved. Appellee was arrested for driving under the influence. Appellee moved to suppress the blood test because it was taken in violation of section 316.1933....

...the Florida Constitution) with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 , 99 S.Ct. 2577 , 61 L.Ed.2d 220 *139 (1979) (pen registers; Fourth Amendment). Indeed, it is the established law of this state that Florida’s implied consent statutes [§§ 316.1932, 316.1933, 316.1934, Fla....

...the right of the state of Florida to extend to its citizenry protections against unreasonable searches and seizures greater than those afforded by the federal constitution [through the Fourth Amendment]. This it has done through the enactment of section 322.261, Florida Statutes (1975) [now sections 316.1932, 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1991) ].” As further stated by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v....

...Accordingly, the limiting language in article I, section 12 does not prohibit the legislature from passing statutes which give Florida citizens greater protections than the Fourth Amendment. We therefore approve the decision of the trial court. FARMER and KLEIN, JJ., concur. . "F.S. 316.1932, F.S. 316.1933, F.S....

...Admission of the Blood Test Results The defendant raises two points of error regarding the admissibility of the blood test results. First, the defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting the blood test results because the State failed to present evidence that the blood was drawn by a qualified person pursuant to section 316.1933(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...who might be able to correct the defects. Filan, 768 So.2d at 1101 -02 (quoting Jackson, 738 So.2d at 386 ). In the instant case, the defendant’s counsel objected to the admission of the blood evidence based on “improper predicate.” 2 Because section 316.1933 includes many requirements, the lack of specificity did not put the trial court or the State on notice as to the grounds for the objection to enable the trial court to make an “informed decision” or for the State to cure the alleged defects....

...Second, the defendant argues the trial court erred by admitting the blood test results because the law enforcement officer did not have probable cause to believe the defendant was under the influence of alcoholic beverages before requiring the defendant to submit to the blood draw as required by section 316.1933(l)(a)....

...4th DCA 2000) (concluding that evidence that the driver caused a serious or fatal accident coupled with evidence that his breath smelled of alcohol was enough to provide the officer with probable cause to believe the person had committed a DUI offense and therefore to request a blood test under section 316.1933(1)); State v....

...the jury’s verdict. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986) (requiring the reviewing court to search the whole record and determine whether there is any reasonable doubt that the error played no role in the conviction). Affirmed. . Section 316.1933(2)(a) provides in relevant part: Only a physician, certified paramedic, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, other personnel authorized by a hospital to draw blood, or duly licensed clinical laboratory director, supervisor, te...

...ately described to [the defendant] what would occur if a warrant were sought.” Id. The State argues that like the officer in Miller, the trooper here did not misrepresent his authority because he had probable cause to compel a blood draw under section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2016)....

...Further, being under the influence of alcohol does not necessarily require intoxication. See State v. Kliphouse, 771 So. 2d 16, 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Evidence that a driver was drinking coupled with evidence that the driver caused a serious or fatal accident suffices for probable cause to compel a blood draw under section 316.1933(1)....

...s (2000), or that the actual blood samples are the least intrusive means of satisfying its interest in the information. The state has the toxicology reports on the blood available under the subpoena. We are unpersuaded by the state’s argument that section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, permitting an officer to use reasonable force to compel submission by a driver to a blood test, requires the records custodian to release a blood sample to the state in this case....

...clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” Broward Cnty. Sheriff's Office v. Hamby, 300 So. 3d 213, 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1The term “legal blood draw” typically refers to blood taken at the request of law enforcement pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, while the term “medical blood draw” typically refers to blood taken at the hospital for purposes of treatment....

blood was collected and analyzed pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1989). The results indicated

...2d DCA 2003), and Keeton v. State, 525 So.2d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Mr. Palazzotto s other point does not warrant discussion. Mr. Palazzotto claims that the trial court erred in ruling that a law enforcement officer had probable cause to order a blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (2004). 1 Section 316.1933(l)(a) allows a forcible blood draw after a traffic accident with serious bodily injury where there is probable cause to believe that the driver was under the influence of alcohol....

...The odor of alcohol was not the only evidence of Mr. Palazzotto’s impairment. The speed at which he had been driving and his violent behavior at the hospital, coupled with the odor of alcohol, provided probable cause to order a blood draw. Affirmed. KELLY and WALLACE, JJ„ Concur. . 316.1933 Blood test for impairment or intoxication in cases of death or serious bodily injury; right to use reasonable force.— (l)(a) If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual physica...

...Stat. Alcoholic beverages are considered to be substances of any kind and description which contain alcohol. ( ) is a controlled substance under Florida law. Ch. 893, Fla. Stat. ( ) is a chemical substance under Florida law. § 877.111(1), Fla. Stat. § 316.1933, Fla....

...Seltzer went to the hospital and made contact with Schreiber. He claimed she *346 still smelled of alcohol as they spoke. Seltzer asked her if he could take a sample of her blood; however, he did not read her her rights under the Implied Consent Law, §§ 316.1932, 316.1933, 316.1934, Fla....

...We find no error in the lower court’s findings Schreiber’s consent was not knowing and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Jerome, 541 So.2d 756, 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Furthermore, we hold Officer Seltzer lacked authority to compel Schreiber’s blood pursuant to section 316.1933(1), where the only injury resulting from the accident was Schreiber’s two fractured ankles, from which she fully recovered; Seltzer had no *348 probable cause that her operation of the motor vehicle had resulted in the “death or serious bodily injury of a human being.” § 316.1933(1), Fla. Stat. (2001); see Galgano v. Buchanan, 783 So.2d 302 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(broken leg resulting in 5% permanent impairment did not constitute “serious bodily injury” under section 316.1933(1)); cf. Gerlitz v. State, 725 So.2d 393 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(compelled blood provisions of section 316.1933(1) applicable where victim of car accident suffered a broken back)....

...nces, when affected to the extent that the person's normal faculties were impaired or to the extent that he or she was deprived of full possession of his or her normal faculties, the results of any test administered in accordance with s. 316.1932 or s. 316.1933 and this section are admissible into evidence when otherwise admissible, and the amount of alcohol in the person’s blood or breath at the time alleged, as shown by chemical analysis of the person's blood, or by chemical or physical test...

...The State suggests that because an officer may compel a driver to submit to a blood test where the officer has probable cause to believe that the driver was operating the motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages and has caused death or serious injury, (section 316.1933(1)) which test need not be incident to arrest, that when death or serious injury has occurred the driver can consent to the administration of a less intrusive breath test which should thus be admissible as would be a non-consensual blood test....

...ence. See Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013). The State does not challenge this ruling. We suspect that law enforcement conflated the provision for securing a breath or urine test under section 316.1932 with section 316.1933, the provision for obtaining a blood sample in cases of death or serious injury when law enforcement has probable cause to believe that a driver is under the influence....

...Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of manslaughter by intoxication and sentenced to six years’ incarceration to be followed by nine years’ probation. Appellant filed a motion for reduction of sentence. The court denied the motion. Section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1985), provides as to a blood test for intoxication in cases of death or serious bodily injury that: *88 (2)(a) Only a physician, certified paramedic who is present at the scene of an accident for the purpose of re...

GREEN, J. The state appeals an order suppressing the results of a blood alcohol test administered to the appellee motorist pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1995), after she was involved in an automobile accident causing serious bodily injury to another motorist. We affirm. Section 316.1933(1) provides that if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe a motor vehicle driven by a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages has caused the death or serous bodily injuries to a human being, such person shall submit to a blood alcohol test....

...In fact, the record evidence affirmatively reflects that the ap-pellee’s blood was ordered to be drawn as nothing more than a standard operating procedure in an accident involving serious bodily injuries. Thus, because the appel-lee’s blood alcohol test was not ordered in accordance with the statutory requirements of section 316.1933, we conclude that the trial court properly suppressed the results of the test in this case....

...2d 878, 884 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). - 13 -  The Implied Consent Law, Bender,5 and Miles To address drunk driving in Florida, the Legislature enacted the implied consent law. See §§ 316.1932, 316.1933, 316.1934, Fla....

...Through various statutes, the Legislature delegated authority to FDLE for “formulating and approving the process in which a person’s blood is analyzed in determining its alcoholic content.” Miles, 775 So. 2d at 952; see §§ 316.1932(1)(a)2., (f)1., Fla. Stat.; § 316.1933(2)(b), Fla....

...Jones also alleged that she would not have pleaded guilty if counsel had moved to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test performed on her. According to Jones, the police had no probable cause on which to request a forced blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), and in fact did not request a legal blood draw....

defendant to submit to blood testing under section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (2018). Defendant, however

...on should be denied. Consequently, it subsequently entered an order certifying a question of great public importance questioning the propriety of State v. Prues. In its order, the county court stated that the appellee’s blood was drawn pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...ontrol of a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages or controlled substances has caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being, such person shall submit upon the request of a law enforcement officer, to a test of his blood.... § 316.1933(1), Fla.Stat. (1985). In State v. Prues, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that section 316.-1933(1) only applies where one other than the driver has died or been seriously injured. We believe this is a correct interpretation of section 316.1933(1) because section 316.1931(2)(a), the statute that describes the type and degree of crime that has been committed by a driver under the influence who causes serious bodily injury, refers only to serious bodily injury of another....

...ich a driver thought to be under the influence has been arrested and taken to a medical facility and the administration of a breath or urine test is impractical or. impossible. § 316.-1932(l)(c), Fla.Stat. (1985). Consequently, an interpretation of section 316.1933(1) contrary to that of the Fourth District in State v....

...ND IS THE ONLY PERSON TO SUSTAIN BODILY INJURY, MAY A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WHO HAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE DRIVER IS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES OR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES REQUIRE THE DRIVER TO SUBMIT TO A BLOOD TEST UNDER SECTION 316.1933(1) EVEN THOUGH THE DRIVER OBJECTS THERETO? Affirmed....

EVANDER, J. The State appeals the trial court’s order granting Stephen Kleiber’s motion in li-mine to exclude the results of his blood alcohol test based on the State’s alleged failure to comply with section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (2010), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.012....

...1st DCA 2002) (holding that appellate court has jurisdiction to review trial court’s non-final order suppressing evidence of marijuana in defendant’s system because blood specimen upon which expert testimony sought to be excluded was obtained by search and seizure). By enacting section 316.1933, the Legislature provided a statutory basis for the admission of blood alcohol test results in criminal trials. State v. St. Pierre, 693 So.2d 102, 103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), provides that “a chemical analysis of a person’s blood to determine the alcoholic content thereof must have been performed substantially in accordance with methods approved by [FDLE].” Pursuant to this legislative delegation, FDLE promulgated rule 11D-8.012....

...with dry gauze rather than an antiseptic. Under Florida’s implied consent statute, “[a]ny insubstantial differences between approved methods or techniques . and actual testing procedures, ... shall not render the test or test results invalid.” § 316.1933(2)(b), Fla....

...ial compliance with the promulgated rule in question. 2 REVERSED and REMANDED. COHEN, J. and ZAMBRANO, R.A., Associate Judge, concur. . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). . Even if suppression is required under section 316.1933, the State may seek introduction of blood alcohol test results based upon the traditional rules of evidence for the admission, of scientific results....

...4th DCA 2018)). Florida’s Implied Consent Law Several statutes address Florida’s “implied consent” landscape and under what circumstances law enforcement officers are permitted or required to obtain blood tests for the State’s use, regardless of the driver’s consent. See §§ 316.1932(1)(a) & (c), 316.1933, Fla....

...as a result of a DUI offense specified in the statutes.’” State v. Murray, 51 So. 3d 593, 595 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (omission in original) (quoting Robertson v. State, 604 So. 2d 783, 790 n.7 (Fla. 1992)). A footnote in Murray clarified that “[w]hile Robertson involved section 316.1933(1)(a), the provisions of section 316.1932(1)(a)1.a....

...3  Subsection 316.1932(1)(c) applies when the driver appears at a hospital or medical facility for treatment. Appellee’s blood draw occurred in a fire rescue ambulance parked at the accident scene, not at a hospital or medical facility. Section 316.1933 requires law enforcement to perform a blood test if the officer has “probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual physical control of a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical su...

...caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being.” (emphasis added). “Evidence that a driver was drinking coupled with evidence that the driver caused a serious or fatal accident suffices for probable cause to compel a blood draw under section 316.1933(1).” State v....

...scene, as was the case in Chu. 5 3d 475, 480 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Murray to support the Court’s holding that, because the law enforcement officer had “lacked probable cause to require the blood draw under section 316.1933(1)(a), neither the implied consent warnings nor Florida’s implied consent law applied to [the defendant]”). Murray highlighted that “[a] person only receives the protection of the implied consent law if the testing provisions of that law are being utilized by the state....

...In Perez , the Florida Supreme Court considered the admissibility of blood alcohol test results where the test was administered against the suspect’s will. The court held that a person who is involved in an automobile accident but who does not injure another may not be forced to submit to a blood test under section 316.1933(1), Florida Statutes (1985); 1 the court did not address the issue in the present case, namely, whether an arrest is a prerequisite to a request for a blood test. For that reason, the court’s statements about the arrest requirement do not apply, and the motion to suppress the results was properly denied. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying the motion to suppress. Affirmed. . Section 316.1933, was amended by Chapter 88-5, section 4, Laws of Florida.

...t's holding in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the blood draw results were inadmissible because the blood was obtained without a warrant, consent, or any other recognized exception to the warrant requirement. The State argues that section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), is a general exception to the warrant requirement that applies even after McNeely....

...We have consolidated these cases for purposes of disposition only. 2 indications that Liles and Willis may have been under the influence of alcohol when the crashes occurred and requested blood draws pursuant to section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2011)....

...The State argues that the warrantless blood draws here should be upheld under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. The State concedes that Liles and Willis did not give actual consent to the blood draws. However, it argues that both blood samples were properly drawn on the authority found in section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), the mandatory blood- draw provision of Florida’s implied consent statutory scheme,2 which provides as follows: 2 This Court and other Florida courts have consistently recognized that section 316.1933 is part of the trilogy of statutes comprising the implied consent statutory scheme....

...Under this statutory scheme, section 316.1932 provides that any person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given consent to blood alcohol testing if the driver is lawfully arrested on suspicion of a drunk driving offense. § 316.1932, Fla. Stat. (2011). Section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (2011), requires a police officer to obtain a driver’s blood when the officer has probable cause to believe an impaired driver has caused death or serious injury to a human being and to use reasonable force if necessary....

...iving, they explicitly revoked that consent when they refused to submit to the blood draws. Because Liles and Willis did forth various legal presumptions associated with different blood alcohol levels and the testing methods. The mandate found in section 316.1933 is a directive to law enforcement to perform the test....

...dence that exigent circumstances existed to support the warrantless blood draws under the totality of the circumstances in either case. Indeed, the State made no effort to do so, as the blood draws were based solely on the officers’ reliance on section 316.1933(1). See McNeely, 133 S....

...s not apply in these cases and that the Schmerber rule is as broad as previously believed. After McNeely, law enforcement must obtain a warrant or later show that exigent circumstances prevented them from doing so. Following McNeely, we must read section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, as a directive to law enforcement to obtain blood samples in serious and deadly crashes when probable cause exists to suggest impaired driving....

...he Exclusionary Rule Although we conclude that neither the consent nor exigent circumstances exceptions applies to these cases, we nonetheless reverse the suppression of the blood draws based on the police officers’ good-faith reliance on section 316.1933....

...340, 355 (1987). Applying the objective standard of reasonableness mandated by Krull to the facts presented here, we conclude that, before McNeely, it was reasonable for the officers to have a good-faith belief in the constitutional validity of a warrantless blood draw authorized by section 316.1933(1)(a)....

...te v. Foster, 856 N.W.2d 847, 859- 60 (Wis. 2014) (holding that good-faith exception to exclusionary rule applied to 4 Liles’s cross-appeal, challenging whether there was probable cause for the warrantless blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933(1)(a), is without merit....

...t's holding in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the blood draw results were inadmissible because the blood was obtained without a warrant, consent, or any other recognized exception to the warrant requirement. The State argues that section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), is a general exception to the warrant requirement that applies even after McNeely....

...We have consolidated these cases for purposes of disposition only. 2 indications that Liles and Willis may have been under the influence of alcohol when the crashes occurred and requested blood draws pursuant to section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2011)....

...The State argues that the warrantless blood draws here should be upheld under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. The State concedes that Liles and Willis did not give actual consent to the blood draws. However, it argues that both blood samples were properly drawn on the authority found in section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), the mandatory blood- draw provision of Florida’s implied consent statutory scheme,2 which provides as follows: 2 This Court and other Florida courts have consistently recognized that section 316.1933 is part of the trilogy of statutes comprising the implied consent statutory scheme....

...Under this statutory scheme, section 316.1932 provides that any person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given consent to blood alcohol testing if the driver is lawfully arrested on suspicion of a drunk driving offense. § 316.1932, Fla. Stat. (2011). Section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (2011), requires a police officer to obtain a driver’s blood when the officer has probable cause to believe an impaired driver has caused death or serious injury to a human being and to use reasonable force if necessary....

...iving, they explicitly revoked that consent when they refused to submit to the blood draws. Because Liles and Willis did forth various legal presumptions associated with different blood alcohol levels and the testing methods. The mandate found in section 316.1933 is a directive to law enforcement to perform the test....

...dence that exigent circumstances existed to support the warrantless blood draws under the totality of the circumstances in either case. Indeed, the State made no effort to do so, as the blood draws were based solely on the officers’ reliance on section 316.1933(1). See McNeely, 133 S....

...s not apply in these cases and that the Schmerber rule is as broad as previously believed. After McNeely, law enforcement must obtain a warrant or later show that exigent circumstances prevented them from doing so. Following McNeely, we must read section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, as a directive to law enforcement to obtain blood samples in serious and deadly crashes when probable cause exists to suggest impaired driving....

...he Exclusionary Rule Although we conclude that neither the consent nor exigent circumstances exceptions applies to these cases, we nonetheless reverse the suppression of the blood draws based on the police officers’ good-faith reliance on section 316.1933....

...340, 355 (1987). Applying the objective standard of reasonableness mandated by Krull to the facts presented here, we conclude that, before McNeely, it was reasonable for the officers to have a good-faith belief in the constitutional validity of a warrantless blood draw authorized by section 316.1933(1)(a)....

...te v. Foster, 856 N.W.2d 847, 859- 60 (Wis. 2014) (holding that good-faith exception to exclusionary rule applied to 4 Liles’s cross-appeal, challenging whether there was probable cause for the warrantless blood draw pursuant to section 316.1933(1)(a), is without merit....

that the state substantially complied with section 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), and the relevant