CopyCited 35 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 1932071
...r Respondent. LEWIS, C.J. We have for review a decision of a district court of appeal on the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance: MAY A POLICE OFFICER CONSTITUTIONALLY CONDUCT A SAFETY INSPECTION STOP UNDER SECTION 316.610 AFTER THE OFFICER HAS OBSERVED A CRACKED WINDSHIELD, BUT BEFORE THE OFFICER HAS DETERMINED THE FULL EXTENT OF THE CRACK? Hilton v....
...ASIS THAT THE CRACK RENDERS THE WINDSHIELD "NOT IN PROPER ADJUSTMENT OR REPAIR" UNDER SECTION 310.610 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES (2001). We answer this question in the negative and hold for the reasons discussed below that a cracked windshield violates section 316.610 only if it renders the vehicle in "such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property." § 316.610, Fla....
...The court initially stated that while section
316.2952 of the Florida Statutes (2001) mandates that cars be equipped with a windshield and have working windshield wipers, the section says nothing about cracks. See id. at D1475. The Second District noted in its first opinion that section
316.610 of the Florida Statutes provides that it is a traffic violation to drive a car that either is unsafe or does not contain equipment in the proper condition....
...t does not contain requirements for the "proper condition" of the windshield, the initial panel of the Second District reasoned that driving with a cracked windshield would be a traffic violation only if it violated the "unsafe condition" portion of section 316.610....
...otor vehicle, the officers lawfully stopped Hilton because his cracked windshield constituted a noncriminal traffic infraction. See Hilton v. State,
901 So.2d 155, 156-57 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ( Hilton II ). On rehearing, the Second District noted that section
316.610(1) of the Florida Statutes authorizes a police officer to stop a driver and submit a vehicle to an inspection if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle is "unsafe or not equipped as required by law or that its equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair." Id. at 157 (quoting §
316.610(1))....
...tend to limit the authority of the police only to cases in which the defective equipment created an immediate or heightened level of risk. See id. In further support of its conclusion on rehearing, the Second District quoted the opening paragraph of section 316.610, which provides: It is a violation of this chapter for any person to drive ....
...does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with such lamps and other equipment in proper condition and adjustment as required in this chapter, or which is equipped in any manner in violation of this chapter. . . . *288 Id. (quoting §
316.610(1)). The Second District concluded that because a windshield is required by section
316.2952, it is a violation of section
316.610 to drive a vehicle with a windshield that is not in proper condition. See id. The Second District also noted that because subsection (2) of section
316.610 authorizes an officer to give a driver written notice to repair a vehicle equipment defect even where that defect does not present unduly hazardous operating conditions, officers may properly stop a vehicle to give such a notice. See id. The Second District additionally held on rehearing that section
316.610(1) does not violate the Fourth Amendment....
...Concluding that the issue presented by this case "affects the power of law enforcement throughout the state," the Second District certified the above-quoted question to this Court as one of great public importance. See id. at 160. ANALYSIS It is a question of statutory interpretation as to whether section
316.610 of the Florida Statutes permits a stop for a cracked windshield on the basis that the crack renders the windshield "not in proper adjustment or repair," even if the crack does not otherwise render the vehicle unsafe. Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks,
863 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla.2003). Section
316.610 of the Florida Statutes, a general statute addressing defective equipment on vehicles, provides, in pertinent part:
316.610....
...mmediately repaired or removed from use. However, if continuous operation would not present unduly *289 hazardous operating conditions . . . the officer shall give written notice to require proper repair and adjustment of same within 48 hours. . . . § 316.610(1)-(2), Fla....
...(5) [Addressing grove equipment] (6) A violation of this section is a noncriminal traffic infraction, punishable as a nonmoving violation as provided in chapter 318. §
316.2952, Fla. Stat. (2001). In holding that the stop of Hilton was proper under section
316.610, the Second District noted that under section
316.610(1), officers have the authority to stop a vehicle if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that vehicle is "unsafe or not equipped as required by law or that its equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair." Hilton II,
901 So.2d at 157....
...The Second District reasoned that a visible crack in a windshield provides a legal basis for a traffic stop because the windshield is not in proper repair. See id. Further, the Second District concluded that since a windshield is required by section
316.2952, a cracked windshield is a violation of section
316.610 because the windshield is not in proper condition and adjustment. See id. Under the tenets of statutory construction and our interpretation of section
316.610 in prior case law, we conclude that the Second District's analysis is incorrect....
...d, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage." Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of New York,
840 So.2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003). As noted earlier, the introductory paragraph of
316.610 provides that it is a violation for a vehicle to be driven "which does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with such lamps and other equipment in proper condition and adjustment as required in this chapter. " §
316.610, Fla....
...constitute a traffic violation under that statute. To conclude that any defect or *290 damage renders a vehicle's equipment "not in proper adjustment or repair," and, therefore, subject to stop and inspection by law enforcement officers pursuant to section
316.610(1), would ignore the language in the introductory paragraph of the statute which provides that it is a violation for a vehicle not to have equipment that is in proper condition or adjustment "as required in this chapter." §
316.610, Fla. Stat. (2001); see also Hechtman,
840 So.2d at 996. Further, even though section
316.610(1) lacks the "as required in this chapter" language that is contained in the unnumbered introductory paragraph, see §
316.610, Fla....
...the vehicle or an occupant is subject to seizure for a violation of law. See Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 663,
99 S.Ct. 1391,
59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). Thus, for a stop to be constitutional under the "not in proper adjustment or repair" section of
316.610(1), the equipment defect or damage must be in violation of the law. See id. at 663,
99 S.Ct. 1391. However, it is the unnumbered introductory paragraph of
316.610, not subsection (1), that provides the types of equipment defects which constitute a violation under the statute. See §
316.610, Fla....
...s not prohibit the operation of a vehicle with a crack in the windshield, see §
316.2952, Fla. Stat. (2001); therefore, an officer may stop a vehicle for a windshield crack only if the crack poses a safety hazard. An officer is not authorized under section
316.610 to stop a vehicle for just any windshield crack under the "not in proper adjustment or repair" provision of subsection (1). Moreover, to determine the types of equipment defects which authorize an officer to stop a vehicle and submit it to a purported safety inspection pursuant to section
316.610(1), we have previously held that "[s]ection
316.610 ....
...This Court determined that the relevant statute only required taillights to emit a red light that is visible from a certain distance, and the crack in the lens cover/reflector did not violate the statute. Therefore, the stop was improper. See id. at 446-47. We rejected the State's argument that section 316.610 authorizes law enforcement officers to stop a vehicle for malfunctioning *291 equipment, "even if the equipment is not required by statute, poses no safety hazard, or otherwise violates no law." Id....
...bumpers. Under Doctor, the dent would not justify a stop because the statute delineating the specific bumper requirements for vehicles does not require that bumpers be free of dents. In other words, a bumper may be dented *292 and still comply with section
316.610 if it is "in proper condition and adjustment as required in this chapter." See
901 So.2d at 163-64 (Northcutt, J., dissenting). We conclude that Judge Northcutt's analysis accurately interprets this Court's holding in Doctor with regard to the necessary interaction between section
316.610 and other sections of chapter 316....
...ens covers/reflectors of taillights. See
596 So.2d at 446. Similarly, section
316.2952 requires a windshield on vehicles, but does not address or prohibit cracks in windshields. See §
316.2952, Fla. Stat. (2001). As we noted in Doctor, interpreting section
316.610 to authorize traffic stops for just any type of equipment malfunction, even if such equipment is not required by law, would permit officers to stop vehicles for such defects as a broken radio antenna or a dent in the passenger door of the vehicle. Further, even where certain equipment is required by statute, section
316.610 would permit stops where the equipment is in compliance with the statute but possesses some defect which is not specifically addressed or prohibited by the statute....
...For example, section
316.252 of the Florida Statutes requires that trucks or semi-trailers of certain weights be "equipped with fenders, covers, or other splash and spray suppressant devices." §
316.252(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). Under the State's interpretation of section
316.610, if a truck is equipped with fenders, but those fenders are dented, law enforcement officers would be authorized to initiate a traffic stop. As this Court concluded unanimously in Doctor, placing such a broad interpretation on section
316.610 would produce results "clearly beyond the statute's intended purpose of ensuring the safe condition of vehicles operating on our state's streets and highways."
596 So.2d at 447. Therefore, under the analysis adopted by this Court in Doctor, and under principles of statutory construction, see Hechtman,
840 So.2d at 996; Clines,
912 So.2d at 557, we conclude that the provision of section
316.610 which authorizes vehicle stops for equipment that is "not in proper adjustment or repair," §
316.610(1), Fla....
...Stat. (2001), does not encompass windshield cracks. Thus, a stop for a cracked windshield is permissible only where an officer reasonably believes that the crack renders the vehicle "in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property." § 316.610, Fla....
...Stat. (2001). [4] Based on the foregoing analysis, we must next consider whether the facts of the instant case support a conclusion that a reasonable officer would have believed that the crack in Hilton's windshield violated the "unsafe" requirement of section 316.610, and, therefore, whether the stop of Hilton's vehicle was constitutionally valid....
...2d DCA 2005) (officer mistakenly believed that air fresheners hanging from rear view mirror constituted traffic violation under Florida law). However, in Florida, a cracked windshield can constitute a traffic violation only if it renders the vehicle in "such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property." § 316.610, Fla....
...Thus, even though Officers Sena and Harrison may have been mistaken in the belief that they could stop Hilton for the mere existence of a windshield crack, if the crack as it existed and as it was observed by the officers would have created an objectively reasonable suspicion that Hilton's vehicle was unsafe in violation of section 316.610, then the stop would be valid....
...[8] Having reviewed the record, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence presented at the hearing to provide "a particularized and objective basis" to suspect that the crack in Hilton's windshield rendered his vehicle unsafe in violation of section 316.610....
...1391; Johnson,
63 F.3d at 245. To the extent that the dissent challenges the preceding analysis, the opinion appears to take two inconsistent positions. In one portion of its opinion, the dissent concludes that only those windshield cracks that pose a safety risk violate section
316.610....
...violation of the law, depending on the circumstances of the crack."). However, the dissent later appears to agree with the analysis of the Second District in Hilton II that any crack in a windshield renders a vehicle subject to a traffic stop under section 316.610....
...is vehicle unsafe, we agree with this assertion. See majority op. at 295-96 ("[I]f the crack as it existed and as it was observed by the officers would have created an objectively reasonable suspicion that Hilton's vehicle was unsafe in violation of section 316.610, then the stop would be valid.")....
...se decisions do not compel a different holding. In some of the cases, the trial courts properly reviewed whether evidence of the crack demonstrated an objectively reasonable basis for an officer to believe that the vehicle was unsafe in violation of section 316.610....
...5th DCA 2005), although the Fifth District concluded that stopping the vehicle for a cracked windshield was valid, the court did not discuss the crack in any detail and instead focused on the length of the detention after the stop. Therefore, the dissent's reliance upon this case for purposes of interpreting section 316.610 is dubious. Finally, other cases mentioned by the dissent rely upon the reasoning in Hilton II in concluding that the traffic stop was valid under section 316.610, see, e.g., State v....
...side an area that likely would be obscured by a turned-down sunvisor the crack did not impede Hilton's view of the road. The crack simply could not reasonably have caused the officers to believe that Hilton's vehicle was unsafe in violation of section 316.610....
...1769,
135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop depends on whether "the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred," not on the motivations of the officers involved. Under the majority's interpretation of section
316.610(2), Florida Statutes (2001), an officer must have a reasonable belief that a cracked windshield renders a vehicle unsafe to drive to constitute probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred....
...Interestingly, the Third District's decision in Perez-Garcia, which involved an inoperative rear brake light, rested on the court's conclusion that "a vehicle traveling the highway with an inoperable brake light is a vehicle in an `unsafe condition' within the meaning of . . . section
316.610."
917 So.2d at 897....
...p. Their major purpose on the night of the stop was to intercept drugs by stopping all traffic law violators. To that end, they stopped Doctor's car because of a cracked lens cover on one of his car's taillights, a condition which allegedly violated section 316.610, Florida Statutes (1987)....
...le. This is the very reason that section
316.2952 requires a device to keep the windshield cleared from moisture and for windshield wipers. In order to safeguard the user of the motor vehicle, as well as passengers and pedestrians, the provisions of section
316.610 allow police officers to stop cars that do not appear to be in good repair or may be unsafe. Obviously, a motor vehicle's windshield, which is integral to the safe operation of the vehicle, is included within the equipment to which section
316.610(1) refers....
...rrect in its decision in the present case and would likewise approve the decisions of three of the other four district courts that have decided the issue. In fact, after its Burke decision, even the Fourth District reached a similar result, holding: Section 316.610(1) expressly gives a police officer the authority to require the driver of a vehicle to stop and submit the vehicle to an inspection if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle is "unsafe or not equipped as require...
...level of risk. See Hilton v. State,
901 So.2d 155, 157 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("By necessary implication, the stop of a vehicle is proper even if the equipment violation does not create an unduly hazardous operating condition."). A stop is lawful under section
316.610 where the vehicle reasonably appears to have an equipment violation....
...ble officer test "in favor of a strict objective test which asks only whether any probable cause for the stop existed." Id. at 759. However, Whren did not overrule this Court's utilization of principles of statutory interpretation to address whether section 316.610 of the Florida Statutes permits law enforcement officers to stop a vehicle for any type of malfunctioning equipment....
...Contrary to the dissent's assertions, see dissenting op. at 305 n. 13, we solely rely upon Doctor for purposes of determining what constitutes a traffic violation under Florida law. Judge Northcutt correctly noted in his dissent in Hilton II that " Doctor controls the interpretation of subsection
316.610(1) notwithstanding the majority's refusal to recognize it." Hilton II,
901 So.2d at 164 (Northcutt, J., dissenting)....
...Judge Northcutt in his dissent. See Burke,
902 So.2d at 957. [4] To the extent that the dissent contends that the law permits a traffic stop for any windshield crack, it is merely disagreeing with our interpretation of the interplay between sections
316.610 and
316.2952 and agreeing with the interpretation adopted by the Second District in Hilton II, an interpretation that we reject today....
...stop of the vehicle, even if it was later determined that the windshield did not meet the definition of excessive cracking or damage. See id. at 587. Similarly, if an officer reasonably believes that a windshield crack renders a vehicle unsafe under section 316.610 of the Florida Statutes, the officer may constitutionally initiate a stop, and the propriety of that stop does not depend on whether the crack actually rendered the vehicle unsafe....
...I conclude that the statute intends for equipment required by the statute, including windshields, to be in "proper condition and adjustment," and when the equipment does not meet this standard, a traffic officer can cite the driver for the equipment violation under section 316.610. Pursuant to section 361.6105, the person cited can mitigate the civil fine by getting the defect corrected. As the Fourth District wrote in Schuck: Section 316.610(1) expressly gives a police officer the authority to require the driver of a vehicle to stop and submit the vehicle to an inspection if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle is "unsafe or not equipped as require...
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 30 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 453
...use the equipment violation *157 was a noncriminal traffic infraction. Section
316.2952, Florida Statutes (2001), provides that a windshield is required on every motor vehicle and that a violation of this statute is a noncriminal traffic infraction. Section
316.610(1), expressly gives a police officer the authority to require the driver of a vehicle to stop and submit the vehicle to an inspection if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle is "unsafe or not equipped as requir...
...tances an officer may stop a car to perform a safety inspection of a broken windshield, we conclude that an officer may stop a vehicle with a visibly cracked windshield regardless of whether the crack creates any immediate hazard. We first note that section 316.610(1) permits a stop when a vehicle is unsafe or when a vehicle has equipment that is not in proper repair. Thus, the legislature clearly did not limit the authority of the police to only those cases in which the equipment created some immediate or heightened level of risk. We agree with the dissent that the first, unnumbered paragraph of section 316.610 is also relevant to our analysis and believe that the language supports our position....
...y manner in violation of this chapter.... (Emphasis added.) Because a windshield is required by this chapter, §
316.2952, it is a violation of this section to drive a vehicle with a windshield that is not in proper condition and adjustment. Second, section
316.610(2) addresses stops for equipment violations which are not unduly hazardous: In the event the vehicle is found to be in unsafe condition or any required part or equipment is not present or is not in proper repair and adjustment, and th...
...give written notice to repair the vehicle. By necessary implication, the stop of a vehicle is proper even if the equipment violation does not create an unduly hazardous operating condition. Third, we conclude that the power extended to the police in section 316.610(1) does not violate the Fourth Amendment....
...e illegally tinted, a noncriminal traffic infraction); State v. Kindle,
782 So.2d 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (holding that stop of appellee's car was clearly lawful where car was pulling a trailer that had no taillights or license plate in violation of section
316.610); Scott v. State,
710 So.2d 1378 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (concluding that officer had probable cause to stop appellant's car pursuant to *159 section
316.610(1) where turn signal on car was not operating properly)....
...icle with an excessively cracked windshield. The pertinent question instead is whether it was reasonable for Trooper Spetz to believe that the windshield was cracked to an impermissible degree.
216 F.3d at 587. Therefore, even if section
316.2952 or section
316.610 stated that a cracked windshield would be a traffic violation only if it created an unsafe condition, an officer may be reasonable in his or her belief that the crack met such criteria, even though an examination of the windshield after the stop revealed that the crack did not create an unsafe condition....
...erpret this section to allow vehicle stops for malfunctioning equipment, "even if the equipment is not required by statute, poses no safety hazard, or otherwise violates no law." The court rejected this argument and noted that such an application of section 316.610 would permit police to stop a vehicle for a malfunctioning air conditioner or radio....
...Therefore, Doctor has no application to the present case, because Hilton's cracked windshield was a violation of Florida law, and the officers had probable cause to stop his car. With all due respect to Judge Northcutt's dissent, we do not believe that we are misreading subsection 316.610(1)....
...any car on the highway. We conclude that the legislature was not required to detail the nature of each and every violation that warrants a notice to repair. Likewise, if Judge Northcutt is correct in his interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, then section 316.610(1) would seem to be facially unconstitutional because it expressly permits a police officer to stop a car to perform a vehicle inspection based on reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle is unsafe, not equipped as required by law, or its equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair....
...he Fourth Amendment. Because this issue affects the power of law enforcement throughout the state, we certify the following question as a matter of great public importance: MAY A POLICE OFFICER CONSTITUTIONALLY CONDUCT A SAFETY INSPECTION STOP UNDER SECTION 316.610 AFTER THE OFFICER HAS OBSERVED A CRACKED WINDSHIELD, BUT BEFORE THE OFFICER HAS DETERMINED THE FULL EXTENT OF THE CRACK? Affirmed....
...The majority's assertion to the contrary rests on its mistaken belief that a statute providing simply that a vehicle must be equipped with a windshield necessarily requires the windshield to be pristine. This belief stems from an erroneously literal, and therefore overbroad, reading of subsection 316.610(1), Florida Statutes (2002), notwithstanding the Florida Supreme Court's instructions to the contrary. For Fourth Amendment purposes, it is important to note that subsection 316.610(1) does not describe any crime or infraction....
...ection. My colleagues acknowledge the Fourth Amendment's requirement that officers who stop a vehicle must first have a reasonable basis to believe that the operator of the vehicle has violated the law. But the majority also seems to suggest that subsection 316.610(1) is intended to permit officers to develop a valid basis for a stop based on what they discover after the stop is made....
...ater investigation reveals that, in fact, there was no violation. Cashman does not hold, as the majority suggests, that officers *162 may stop a vehicle based on a mere hunch that the operator is violating the traffic laws. Neither does Florida's subsection 316.610(1)....
...Amendment requires that an officer have reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle is being operated in violation of the law prior to stopping the vehicle. In Hilton's case, there was no reasonable cause to believe that he was violating the law. Section 316.610 begins with an unnumbered paragraph that reads in pertinent part: It is a violation of this chapter for any person to drive or move ......
...ntain those parts or is not at all times equipped with such lamps or other equipment in proper condition and adjustment as required in this chapter, or which is equipped in any manner in violation of this chapter.... This paragraph is followed by subsection 316.610(1), on which the majority relies: (1) Any police officer may at any time, upon reasonable cause to believe that a vehicle is unsafe or not equipped as required by law, or that its equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair, requi...
...equipped. Therefore, our focus must be on the first two kinds of violations listed in the statute. FLORIDA LAW DID NOT PROHIBIT HILTON TO DRIVE WITH A CRACKED WINDSHIELD The majority maintains that the officers lawfully stopped Hilton pursuant to subsection 316.610(1) because his windshield was "not in proper adjustment or repair." Of the dozen or so authorities mentioned in the majority opinion, only one Doctor v....
...It is telling that the supreme court interpreted subsection (1) in a manner consistent with the statute's above-quoted introductory paragraph, which prohibits driving a vehicle that does not contain equipment "in proper condition or adjustment as required in this chapter. " § 316.610 (emphasis supplied)....
...47 (emphasis supplied). Whren did not, and could not, abrogate the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of a Florida statute, as evidenced by Frierson,
851 So.2d at 296, in which the Fourth District found Doctor to control the interpretation of subsection
316.610(1) some seven years after Whren....
...ot). As will be seen, insofar as the officers who stopped Hilton believed that Florida law proscribes all windshield cracks, they were mistaken. Neither is Doctor distinguishable because, as the majority observes, it rejected an interpretation of subsection 316.610(1) that would permit stops for malfunctioning air conditioners or radios. "In contrast," the majority writes, "a windshield is required by statute." This statement completely ignores that Doctor involved the application of subsection 316.610(1) to a cracked taillight, which also was required by statute....
...with bumpers. Under Doctor, the dent would not justify a stop because the statute delineating the specific bumper requirements for vehicles does not require that bumpers be free of dents. In other words, a bumper may be dented and still comply with section 316.610 if it is "in proper condition and adjustment as required in this chapter....
...Even if I thought the majority's view of the issue was the more correct oneobviously, I do notI would be compelled to dissent from this disregard of controlling Florida Supreme Court precedent. See Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So.2d 431 (Fla.1973). Doctor controls the interpretation of subsection
316.610(1) notwithstanding the majority's refusal to recognize it. That refusal is ironic, given the majority's assertion that my "interpretation of the Fourth Amendment" would render subsection
316.610(1) unconstitutional....
...cumstances support a reasonable belief that the driver has committed a crime or traffic infraction. Consistent with that interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the Florida Supreme Court has held that the "proper adjustment or repair" language in subsection
316.610(1) "must be read in conjunction with those statutes which delineate the specific equipment requirements for vehicles." Doctor,
596 So.2d at 446. Thus, Doctor requires us to interpret subsection
316.610(1), which itself does not proscribe or prescribe any conduct, in light of statutes that do....
...able cause to believe that the condition of its equipment violates the specific requirements of chapter 316. And, as such, the subsection comports with Fourth Amendment safeguards. In other words, my colleagues' fear that the constitutionality of subsection 316.610(1) may be questioned has nothing to do with my purported interpretation of the Fourth Amendment....
...ited the arrival of a narcotics detection dog. None of the opinions in those cases described the windshield cracks giving rise to the stops. This is significant because, as will be discussed, a windshield crack might violate the other prohibition in section 316.610 if its location or severity places the vehicle "in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property." For this reason, a court's simple observation that a motorist was stopped for having a cracked windshield in violation of...
...) and
316.234(2), which together require that every vehicle be equipped with front and rear turn signals that in normal sunlight are visible from 300 feet or 500 feet, depending on the size of the vehicle. Under Doctor, those stops were proper under section
316.610 because they all involved violations of statutes delineating specific equipment requirements for vehicles. On the other hand, no Florida statute prohibited Hilton to drive with a crack in his windshield. Therefore, the officers were not authorized to stop Hilton for violating section
316.610's prohibition against driving with equipment that is not "in proper condition and adjustment as required in [chapter 316]." THE STOP WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BECAUSE THE CRACK IN HILTON'S WINDSHIELD PLACED HIS VEHICLE IN SUCH UNSAFE CONDITION AS TO ENDANGER ANY PERSON OR PROPERTY. As mentioned, a cracked windshield might justify a traffic stop if it violates the *167 other prohibition set forth in section
316.610, i.e., if it renders the vehicle "in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property." See, for example, Judge Warner's dissent from the Fourth District's affirmance of an order suppressing contraband seized after a traffic stop in State v. Savino,
686 So.2d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Judge Warner argued that under Whren the officer had authority to stop the defendants' car for a violation of section
316.610, based on the officer's testimony that it would have been difficult to see through the "spider" crack in the defendants' windshield....
...ger sidean area that likely would be obscured by a turned-down sunvisorthe crack did not impede Hilton's view of the road. The crack simply could not reasonably have caused the officers to believe that Hilton's vehicle was unsafe in violation of section 316.610....
...NOTES [1] "The Fourth Amendment guarantees `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Whren,
517 U.S. at 809,
116 S.Ct. 1769. [2] The prohibitions contained in the introductory paragraph of section
316.610 are also set forth verbatim in section
316.215(1)....
