Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Faison seeks disapproval of his kidnapping convictions on the grounds that the victims' detention and confinement were merely incidental to and were not materially different from the detention necessarily involved in the course of the sexual batteries. He was convicted under subsection 787.01(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1979), [5] which provides that kidnapping means to forcibly, secretly, or by threat, confine, abduct, or imprison another person against his will with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of any felony....

...Sexual battery is a felony, so the issue is whether the threats and force used to transport the victims, and their subsequent detention, constitute a separate crime of kidnapping. In Harkins v. State, 380 So.2d 524 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), the Fifth District Court of Appeal construed section 787.01 and reasoned that, if it were literally applied, it would convert every first-degree robbery and every forcible rape into two life felonies....

...pping). The fact that relatively short distances were involved makes no difference. 399 So.2d at 21-22 (citations omitted, footnote omitted, emphasis in original). Subsequent to the district court decision in the instant case, this Court interpreted section 787.01 in Mobley v. State, 409 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 1982). In Mobley we observed that a literal construction of subsection 787.01(1)(a)2 "would apply to any criminal transaction which inherently involves the unlawful confinement of another person, such as robbery or sexual battery." Id. at 1034. We then adopted the view that subsection 787.01(1)(a)2 did not apply to unlawful confinements or movements that were merely incidental to other felonies, but recognized an exception in the case of hostages....

...that the district court reached the correct result in the instant case. We do not approve, however, of the language and reasoning used by the court in note 2 to Faison, where the third district, apparently, argues for a literal interpretation of subsection 787.01(1)(a)2....

...*967 ALDERMAN, Chief Justice, concurring in result only. I concur only in the result of this opinion affirming the convictions for kidnapping and quashing the district court's holding concerning Faison's conviction for sexual battery. By approving the Fifth District's construction of section 787.01(1)(a)2 in Harkins v....

...It emphasized that Florida's statute is significantly broader than the Kansas statute involved in Buggs, pointing out that "the present Kansas statute requires an abduction or confinement with the intent to `facilitate flight or the commission of any crime.' K.S.A. 21-3420(b). § 787.01(1)(a)2, on the other hand, requires an intent either to `commit or facilitate commission of any felony.' (e.s.) Under statutes like ours, it has been widely held, apparently by a majority of the jurisdictions which have considered the quest...

...The majority, in adopting standards more stringent than required by the legislature, has, in effect, rewritten this statute. This we cannot do. I would not find the general statements in Mobley v. State relative to the unfeasibility of the literal construction of section 787.01(1)(a)2 to be controlling precedent here....

...The standards which the district court used to apply the principle, however, and the results that it reached, are erroneous. I dissent to the majority's approval of those standards and results. In Mobley v. State, 409 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 1982), we observed that if subsection 787.01(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1979), were construed literally, "this subsection would apply to any criminal transaction which inherently involves the unlawful confinement of another person, such as robbery or sexual battery." 409 So.2d at 1034....

...of its purposes. But if all rapists and robbers are held to be kidnappers too, then the additional deterrent force of the kidnapping law is lost on one who has already decided to commit rape or robbery. NOTES [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. [2] § 787.01(1)(a)2, Fla. Stat. (1979) (kidnapping); § 794.011, Fla. Stat. (1979) (sexual battery); § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979) (burglary). [3] § 947.16, Fla. Stat. (1979). [4] 399 So.2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). [5] § 787.01 reads as follows: (1)(a) "Kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...evidentiary support when there was an alternative theory of guilt for which the evidence was sufficient."). Armed Kidnapping Charge We hold that the trial court properly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal as to the armed kidnapping charge. Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), defines kidnapping as forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: .......

...ories of intent and that Boyd used a deadly weapon during the kidnapping. Boyd also argues that any confinement that did take place was incidental to the other felonies charged. We have held that to find kidnapping under the *184 theory of intent in section 787.01(1)(a)(2), the resulting movement or confinement: (a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime; (b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and (c) Must have some significan...

...from the Texaco station away from her car made the sexual battery and murder of Dacosta substantially easier to commit and lessened the risk of the crimes being detected while they were being perpetrated. Boyd was also charged with kidnapping under section 787.01(1)(a)(3) of the kidnapping statute....

...itated murder of Amanda Brown between September 10 and 11, 1998. Count II of the indictment charged Crain with kidnapping Amanda on the same dates "with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony, to wit, homicide" in violation of section 787.01(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1997). The kidnapping statute found in section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1997), defines the offense in pertinent part as follows: (1)(a) The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...ty; three, that Willie Seth Crain acted with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of homicide. (Emphasis added.) Thus, while the trial court instructed the jury only on the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of homicide under section 787.01(1)(a)(2) as to the kidnapping charge in count II, the trial court instructed the jury that it could find Crain guilty of felony murder based on kidnapping in count I if it found that he abducted Amanda with either the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of homicide or the intent to inflict bodily harm upon her under section 787.01(1)(a)(3)....

...See Mills v. State, 407 So.2d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The significance of the intent element flows from the status of kidnapping as a specific intent crime. See Sochor v. State, 619 So.2d 285, 290 (Fla.1993). Modern, statutory kidnapping as codified in section 787.01, Florida Statutes, differs from its lesser included offense of false imprisonment in its requirement of proof by the State of one of the four intent elements set out in the statute....

...n's truck, the jury could reasonably have inferred to the exclusion of all other hypotheses that Crain took Amanda from the trailer without the consent of her mother. This conduct establishes an unlawful confinement under the kidnapping statute. See § 787.01(1)(b) ("Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is against her or his will within the meaning of [kidnapping] if such confinement is without the consent of her or his parent or legal guardian.")....

...However, we find that there was sufficient evidence of a kidnapping here: Walls was convicted of two counts of kidnapping because he forcibly confined Peterson against her will, without lawful authority, for the purpose of inflicting bodily harm and terrorizing his victim. See § 787.01, Fla....

...Voluntary intoxication is a defense to felony murder when the underlying felony is a specific-intent crime. Linehan v. State, 476 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 1985). Kidnapping is a specific-intent crime. Heddleson v. State, 512 So.2d 957 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Mullin v. State, 425 So.2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); see § 787.01, Fla....

...umstances in this case; (11) the sentence is disproportionate; (12) the sentence violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); and (13) the murder in the course of a felony aggravator is unconstitutional. [2] Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), provides, in part: The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...pect of the crime. Additionally, Chavez maintains that the trial court erred in finding the "in the course of a kidnapping" aggravator in this case. Here, Chavez was charged in the indictment with the offense of kidnapping Jimmy Ryce. As provided in section 787.01(1)(a)(2)-(3), Florida Statutes (1995), "[t]he term `kidnapping' means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ... [c]ommit or facilitate commission of any felony," or to "[i]nflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim or another person." Further, under section 787.01(1)(b), "[c]onfinement of a child under the age of 13 is against his will within the meaning of this subsection if such confinement is without the consent of his parent or legal guardian." In Faison v....

...Smalls' trousers had "splashed" or "dropped blood" on them consistent with dragging a body. DNA evidence was also presented at trial indicating that Henyard raped Ms. Lewis. Henyard was found guilty by the jury of three counts of armed kidnapping in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1995), one count of sexual battery with the use of a *244 firearm in violation of section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1995), one count of attempted first-degree murder in violation of sections 782.04(1)(a)(1) and 7...

...The perpetrator committed robbery under section 812.13 when he demanded the Victim’s money and rings and when he took the money she had withdrawn from her bank accounts. The perpetrator falsely imprisoned the Victim and her children pursuant to section 787.01, and violated section 787.02 by kidnapping the children. We cannot say that the non-sexual acts were “connected” to the sexual acts such that the non-sexual acts would not have occurred “but for” the sexual misconduct....

...which shows wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard of the safety and welfare of the public, or such an indifference to the rights of others as is equivalent to an intentional violation of such rights. *997 EXHIBIT 4 KIDNAPPING F.S. 787.01 Before you can find the defendant guilty of kidnapping, the state must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Elements 1....

...find, as an aggravating factor, killing in order to avoid detection and prevent arrest. Under a literal reading of Florida’s criminal statutes, sexual battery will nearly always entail at least the possibility of a kidnapping charge. See Fla.Stat. § 787.01(l)(a)(2) (defining "kidnapping” to include forcibly confining another person against his or her will with intent to commit a felony); Fla.Stat....

...Hold for ransom or reward or as a shield or hostage. 2. Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. 3. Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. 4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

...Florida Statutes (1989); burglary of an occupied dwelling with a firearm, a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment pursuant to section 810.02(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989); kidnapping with a firearm, a first-degree felony, pursuant to section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (1989), which was reclassified to a life felony under section 775.087(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), because a firearm was used in the commission of the offense....

...Pearce forcibly or by threat confined and abducted Crawford and Tuttle against their will; (2) Pearce had no lawful authority to do so; and (3) Pearce acted with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victims or another person. See § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

...Pearce had no lawful authority to do so. Even assuming that Pearce did not originally intend to kill the victims, he clearly intended to inflict bodily harm upon them as evidenced by his statement to Loucks that he meant to "rough up" the victims and teach them a lesson. See § 787.01(1)(a)(3), Fla....

...was established. See State v. Allen, 335 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1976). With regard to the kidnapping conviction, appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the kidnapping count of the indictment. Appellant was charged with violating section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides: (1)(a) "Kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...The state complied, averring that appellant kidnapped the victim with intent to rob her. Appellant has cited no authority, and we have found none, for the proposition that the specific felony intended to be committed or facilitated is an essential element of the offense proscribed by section 787.01(1)(a)2 and must be alleged....

...the statute appellant acted with when he abducted the victim. We do not read Goins v. State, 406 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), and Jones v. State, 385 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), as being based on a per se rule that a charge of kidnapping under section 787.01(1)(a)2 must set forth the specific felony which the accused intended to commit or facilitate by means of the kidnapping....

...for ransom or reward or as a shield or hostage; 2) commit or facilitate commission of any felony; 3) inflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim or another person; or, 4) interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

conviction for kidnapping under Fla. Stat. § 787.01 is also a qualifying violent felony.

...As their third point appellants claim that their kidnapping convictions should be reversed since their conduct in confining the guards and the attorney was merely incidental to their attempted escape. Appellants were convicted under Florida's new kidnapping statute, section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1979), [1] which has not yet been construed by this Court. Specifically, appellants were convicted under subsection 787.01(1)(a)2., which prohibits the unlawful confining of another person with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of any felony....

...to the trial judge to state with individual particularity his reasons for retaining jurisdiction over the first third of each appellant's sentence. It is so ordered. SUNDBERG, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] 787.01 Kidnapping....

creates a partial exception to that doctrine. "Section 787. 1. Defintion. — Where the same act is within

...murder because there is insufficient evidence to support those crimes. The relevant statute defines "kidnapping" as "forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority." § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

...f mind when at issue in a case is admissible. § 90.803(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). In the present case, the victim's mental state was at issue regarding the elements of the kidnapping which formed the basis for the state's felony murder theory. Under section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), it was necessary for the state to prove that the victim had been forcibly abducted against her will, which was not admitted by defendant....

...in addition to the intentional act of entering, section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1981), and kidnapping, which requires the subjective intent, inter alia, to hold for ransom in addition to the intentional act of confining, abducting or imprisoning, section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...at Howard did not consent to sexual intercourse with Thomas and that Thomas sexually battered Howard. Thomas's second claim is that the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal for the kidnapping charge. Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), states in pertinent part that: The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: *134 ....

...Count II of the indictment alleged that Bedford unlawfully and forcibly, secretly, or by threat, confined, abducted or imprisoned Herdmann against her will and without lawful authority with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize her, in violation of section 787.01(1)(a), (3), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...We also find no merit to Bedford's contention that a conviction for kidnapping cannot be sustained because any confinement was "merely incidental" to the homicide. Bedford was charged with confining, abducting, or imprisoning Herdmann with the intent to "[i]nflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize" Herdmann, under section 787.01(1)(a), (3), rather than with the intent to "[c]ommit or facilitate commission of any felony," under subsection 787.01(1)(a), (2)....

...stration under subsection (6) and community and public notification under subsection (7) if: 1. The felony meets the criteria of former ss. 775.22(2) and 775.23(2), specifically, the felony is: a. A capital, life, or first-degree felony violation of s. 787.01 [kidnapping] or s....

...847.0145 [selling/buying minors], or a violation of a similar law of another jurisdiction; b. An attempt to commit a capital, life, or first-degree felony violation of chapter 794, where the victim is a minor, or a violation of a similar law of another jurisdiction; or c. Any second-degree or greater felony violation of s. 787.01 [kidnapping] or s....

...827.071 [sexual performance of a child]; or s. 847.0145; or a violation of a similar law of another jurisdiction, and the offender has previously been convicted of or found to have committed, or has pled nolo contendere or guilty to, regardless of adjudication, any violation of s. 787.01 or s....

...847.0145, or a violation of a similar law of another jurisdiction[.] § 775.21(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998) (emphasis added). Before 1998, all qualifying felonies involved a sexual component. See § 775.21, Fla. Stat. (1997). In chapter 98-81, section 3, Laws of Florida, the Legislature added sections 787.01 (kidnapping) and 787.02 (false imprisonment) to the list of qualifying felonies....

...The Act does not separately define "sexual predator." Robinson was automatically designated a sexual predator solely because he was convicted of kidnapping a child of whom he is not the parent. See § 775.21(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The crime of kidnapping does not by definition contain a sexual component. See § 787.01, Fla....

...istration under subsection (6) and community and public notification under subsection (7) if: 1. The felony meets the criteria of former ss. 775.22(2) and 775.23(2), specifically, the felony is: a. A capital, life or first-degree felony violation of s. 787.01 [kidnapping] or 787.02 [false imprisonment], where the victim is a minor and the defendant is not the victim's parent.......

...Moreover, the purposes of the Act—to protect the citizenry, particularly children, from those who have committed or attempted to commit sexual or sexually exploitative crimes—are in no way served by designating non-sexual offenders as sexual predators. [9] In 1998, the Legislature added sections 787.01 and 787.02 to the list of enumerated felonies giving rise to sexual predator designation....

...of the information. Those counts charged the defendants with (1) kidnapping Jamie Smith "with intent to inflict bodily harm or to terrorize her or" her mother and (2) kidnapping Sandra Smith "with intent to inflict bodily harm or to terrorize her." Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), provides four alternative ways of establishing the intent element of kidnapping; the state charged the defendants in this case with only one theory of intent, the one described in section 787.01(1)(a)3. On Counts V and VI, the court instructed the jury that to prove the crime of kidnapping, the state had to prove that the defendants had acted "with intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a robbery," the intent element contained in section 787.01(1)(a)2, which was not charged in the information....

...e murder of Yorkcavage, section 782.04(3), Florida Statutes; (III) first degree robbery of Johnson, section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes; (IV) attempted robbery of Purolator Security, section 777.04(1), Florida Statutes; (V) kidnapping of Johnson, section 787.01, Florida Statutes; (VI) attempted first degree murder of Spurlin, section 777.04(1), Florida Statutes; (VII) attempted first degree murder of Moore, section 777.04(1), Florida Statutes; and (VIII) possession of a weapon in the commission of a criminal offense, section 790.07(2), Florida Statutes....

...Berry was convicted of armed robbery and kidnapping. The district court of appeal affirmed *969 the kidnapping conviction, concluding that the actions of Berry and his companions satisfied the test adopted in Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla.1983), to support a conviction for kidnapping under section 787.01(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1993). The district court went on to hold that the act of binding or tying up a victim during the course of a felony, standing alone, will support a kidnapping conviction under Faison. Section 787.01 states in relevant part: 787.01 Kidnapping; kidnapping of child under age 13, aggravating circumstances....

...Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. 4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. (Emphasis added.) As a preliminary matter, we agree with the district court that the act of tying someone up constitutes a "confinement" within the meaning of section 787.01....

...intent listed in the statute. However, the inquiry into whether a kidnapping has occurred does not end with an examination of the statute. In Mobley v. State, 409 So.2d 1031, 1034 (Fla.1982), this Court recognized that a literal interpretation of subsection 787.01(1)(a)2 would result in a kidnapping conviction for "any criminal transaction which inherently involves the unlawful confinement of another person, such as robbery or sexual battery." Thus, in an effort to limit the circumstances under which a confinement, abduction, or imprisonment will constitute kidnapping under subsection 787.01(1)(a)2, this Court in Faison adopted the test of the Supreme Court of Kansas....

...897, 459 P.2d 225 (1969); People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793, 104 N.E.2d 842 (1965). In State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720 (1976), the Kansas Supreme Court construed the scope of its kidnapping statute, K.S.A. 21-3420, which is similar in many respects to section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...plication of the statute in respect to taking or confining another person with the intent to facilitate commission of another crime. The Florida statute is broader and less restrictive in one important respect. The intent listed in subsection (2) of section 787.01(a) is: "Commit or facilitate commission of any felony." (Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, we do not believe that the Florida Legislature intended to convert every first degree robbery and every forcible rape into two life felonies. Therefore, we construe section 787.01, Florida Statutes, to mean that "confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person ......

...Valenti" in the record and briefs. [5] Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). [6] Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). [7] § 777.04(1), 782.04(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). [8] § 787.01(1)(a)2, § 775.087(1), § 775.087(2)(a)1., Fla....

...The State candidly and properly concedes that the conviction for this offense is not supported by sufficient evidence. That being the *221 case, the only question is whether the evidence that Mills participated in Meli's kidnapping with the intent to steal his car supports the conviction for kidnapping. Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), provides, in pertinent part: "`Kidnapping' means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: "1....

...Voluntary intoxication is a defense to felony murder when the underlying felony is a specific-intent crime. Linehan v. State, 476 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 1985). Kidnapping is a specific-intent crime. Heddleson v. State, 512 So.2d 957 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Mullin v. State, 425 So.2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); see § 787.01, Fla....

...Imami, the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy of Richard Montgomery, was out of the country and unavailable to testify at the penalty phase. [3] Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla.1993). [4] In the present case, the trial judge was the trier of fact in the guilt phase. [5] Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), defines kidnapping as follows: The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...nowledged conflict with Williamson v. State, 510 So.2d 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We approve the decision of the Third District in the instant case and disapprove Williamson. The pertinent parts of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1987), concerning the offense of kidnapping provide: (1)(a) The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...arly provide: (1)(a) The term "false imprisonment" means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in s. 787.01....

...included offense of the crime of kidnapping and require those instructions be given. See Fla.Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) at 260. Accord Cabe v. State, 408 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), review denied, 435 So.2d 821 (Fla. 1983). A comparison of sections 787.01(1)(a) and 787.02(1)(a) reveals they are identical except for the question of intent. We find the general intent of section 787.02(1)(a)(false imprisonment) is included in the specific intent of section 787.01(1)(a)(kidnapping), consequently false imprisonment is a necessarily lesser included offense....

...Thus, pecuniary gain can be demonstrated if one of the motives for commission of the crime is to get the victim's money or other items of value or to actually receive compensation for having committed the crime. The aspect of the crime for which pecuniary gain is applicable is the motive. On the other hand, section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), defines kidnapping as follows: (1)(a) The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...follows: *1512 (1) Robbery with a firearm or other deadly weapon contrary to Fla.Stat. §§ 812.13(1) and 812.13.(2)(a) (convicted of lesser included offense of robbery without a firearm or other deadly weapon); (2) Kidnapping contrary to Fla.Stat. § 787.01 (convicted of lesser included offense of assault); (3) Attempted sexual battery contrary to Fla.Stat....

...f five 30-year consecutive sentences, each requiring the three-year mandatory minimum to be served. We agree with appellant's contention that under a proper construction of Florida's kidnapping statute, the kidnapping convictions should be reversed. § 787.01, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...the bathroom and the door was shut. Within five minutes the employees opened the door and found that the robbers had departed. We conclude that these facts are insufficient to sustain appellant's kidnapping convictions. Florida's kidnapping statute, § 787.01, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part that: (1)(a) "Kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: * * * * * * 2. Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. Although appellant's actions might be considered within the literal language of the statute, we are unable to find any reasonable basis for construing § 787.01(1)(a)2 as intended to include confinement that is simply inconsequential or inherent in the nature of the related felony....

...The circumstances in this case therefore indicate that the confinement was without independent significance, that it was not materially different from the restraint necessarily involved in the felony of armed robbery, and that it was accordingly not within the intended purview of § 787.01(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes....

...constitutes fundamental error. The crime of kidnapping The supreme court has held that the crime of kidnapping, which consists of "confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person ... with intent to commit or facilitate commission of any felony," § 787.01(1)(a)2, Fla....

...“Racketeering activity” is defined as “any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, ... which is chargeable under State law.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1)(A) (Supp.1984) Conspiracy to kidnap and conspiracy to murder are chargeable under Florida law. See Fla. StatAnn. §§ 777.04, 787.01, 782.04 (Supp....

...ce of the conspiracy. Id. The evidence amply demonstrates Fernandez’ intent and agreement to forcibly abduct and confine Rogelio against his will with the intent to commit or facilitate murder or to inflict bodily harm upon him. See Fla.Stat. Ann. § 787.01(l)(a) (Supp.1986) (Florida kidnapping statute)....

...[4] The defense also called defendant's uncle and mother to the witness stand. Their testimony, however, has no effect on the issues discussed herein. [5] We note that, as concerns this 1991 offense, the issue of remoteness was not raised below and was consequently waived. [6] Section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1997), reads as follows: (1)(a) The term "kidnaping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: ....

...893.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), when he committed and was convicted in case number 00-687 of aggravated assault with a firearm in violation of section 784.021(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), (count I), kidnaping with a firearm in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1999), (count II), car jacking with a firearm in violation of section 812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), (count III), robbery with a firearm in violation of section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), (count...

...5th DCA 1990), the Fifth District reached the same conclusion. In that case, the appellants were convicted for kidnapping, which is also a first degree felony punishable by a sentence not exceeding life imprisonment "or as provided in ... s. 775.084." Id. at 1108 (quoting s. 787.01(2) Fla....

...Thus, even though offenses which are designated life felonies were never made subject to enhanced sentencing under the habitual felony statute, reference to such statute is nonetheless made within each statute prescribing the penalty for life felonies. See, e.g., Section 787.01(3)(a)5., Fla....

...or hostage." Citing Johnson v. State, 637 So.2d 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), review denied, 649 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1994), he claims, in essence, that one may never be guilty of kidnapping his own child. We disagree. The kidnapping statute provides as follows: 787.01 Kidnapping; kidnapping of child under age 13, aggravating circumstances....

...Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. (b) Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is against his will within the meaning of this subsection if such confinement is without the consent of his parent or legal guardian.[e.s.] § 787.01(1), Fla....

...r an ulterior and unlawful purpose which is specifically forbidden by the kidnapping statute itself. See People v. Senior, 3 Cal. App.4th 765, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 14 (1992). Thus, Lafleur was lawfully convicted, as charged, of "abducting or imprisoning," § 787.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993), the child "with intent [to hold him] as a shield or hostage," § 787.01(1)(a)1, Fla....

...r to molest her"); State v. Viramontes, 163 Ariz. 334, 788 P.2d 67 (1990) (cited in Johnson; defendant properly convicted of kidnapping when he took his child to commit the separate felony of abandoning her, as precluded by the Arizona equivalent to § 787.01(1)(a)2.)....

...It is clear, and conceded, that habitual violent felony sentences were improperly imposed for the life felonies of armed burglary with a firearm and committing an assault, § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993) (count 1), and armed kidnapping with a firearm, §§ 787.01, 775.087, Fla....

...te a felony. Johnson’s first-degree murder conviction, based on theories of premeditation and felony murder, is also supported by competent, substantial evidence. The felony upon which Johnson’s conviction was based was the kidnapping. § 787.01(1)(a)2., Fla....

...a pattern of criminality. Finally, appellant asserts that the trial court should have granted a judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge. Appellant was convicted of kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony. § 787.01, Fla....

...11(5), Florida Statutes (1985). § 924.34, Fla. Stat. (1987). The convictions on all other counts are affirmed and the case remanded for resentencing. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. CAMPBELL, C.J., and RYDER, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 787.01, Fla....

...Apparently, the prosecutor, the defense attorney, the trial court and appellant were all laboring under the erroneous belief that armed kidnapping is a first-degree felony punishable by a term of years not exceeding life when, in actuality, it is a life felony. See § 787.01(2), Fla....

...The use of the word "incidental" is Appellant's. In this case the removal of the victim was not incidental and no part of the removal constituted an element of either act of sexual battery. In Harkins v. State, 380 So.2d 524 (Fla. 5th DCA, 1980), this court construed Section 787.01, Florida Statutes as not including movement or confinement that is inconsequential or inherent in the nature of the felony....

...Each of these counts charges that Kennedy "forcibly, secretly or by threat" confined, abducted or imprisoned the named victim against that person's will "with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission" of — robbery or grand theft contrary to section 787.01(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes. The Florida Supreme Court, in Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla. 1983), adopted a three-pronged test to determine whether kidnapping has occurred in instances where it is charged that the defendant engaged in activity proscribed by section 787.01, Florida Statutes, with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of any felony....

...Unless this is substantially equivalent to a provision that intent is not a necessary element of the crime of false imprisonment then the test is not met. A more logical interpretation is that scienter is an essential element of the crime of false imprisonment. Accepting that premise an intent (other than Section 787.01(a) motives) must be alleged in the accusatory pleading and proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict a person of false imprisonment....

...30, 2001). On remand the court shall vacate this conviction and sentence. Braggs also argues that the court erred in entering the kidnapping convictions because there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. We agree. Braggs was charged under section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (1997), with kidnapping with the intent to "commit or facilitate commission of any felony." Faison v....

...is not sufficient evidence to support the kidnapping conviction. Additionally, there is no preservation problem with this issue. Although defendant was charged with kidnapping with the intent to "commit or facilitate commission of any felony," under section 787.01(1)(a)2., the jury was also instructed under the terrorizing subsection of the statute. The jury was asked to decide whether defendant had committed a kidnapping with the intent to "inflict great bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim...." § 787.01(1)(a)3., Fla.Stat....

...ape." Id. at 1037. Unlike in Mobley, appellant in this case was charged under that portion of the statute that defines kidnapping as the unlawful confining of another person against his will with the intent of holding him as a shield or hostage. See § 787.01(1)(a)1, Fla....

...he offense of kidnapping within the meaning of Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla.1983). To begin with, we note that the State charged the defendant under two different alternatives in the kidnapping statute. The relevant provisions are as follows: 787.01 Kidnapping; kidnapping of child under age 13, aggravating circumstance.— (1)(a) The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: . . . . 2. Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. 3. Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. . . . . § 787.01, Fla....

...iction. [2] The Faison test is not applicable to false imprisonment convictions because the test was established for a particular element of the kidnapping statute that is not *990 included in the false imprisonment statute. Kidnapping is defined in section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), as follows: The term kidnapping means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. 4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. As this Court stated in Berry v. State, 668 So.2d 967, 969 (Fla.1996), the Faison test was established because this Court recognized that a literal interpretation of subsection 787.01(1)(a)2 would result in a kidnapping conviction for "any criminal transaction which inherently involves the unlawful confinement of another person, such as robbery or sexual battery." Thus, in an effort to limit the circumstances under which a confinement, abduction, or imprisonment will constitute kidnapping under subsection 787.01(1)(a)2, this Court in Faison adopted the test of the Supreme Court of Kansas....

...hen a charge alleges false imprisonment. The Chaeld court held: This so-call Faison instruction must be given upon the defendant's request whenever the state charges kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony under § 787.01(1)(a)2....

...[4] The Chaeld court cited this Court's decision in Bedford v. State, 589 So.2d 245 (Fla.1991), in which this Court stated: Bedford was charged with confining, abducting, or imprisoning [the victim] with the intent to "[i]nflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize" [the victim] under section 787.01(1)(a), (3), rather than with the intent to "[c]ommit or facilitate commission of any felony," under subsection 787.01(1)(a), (2)....

...1st DCA 1992) ] holds that a Faison analysis does not apply to a false imprisonment charge, only to kidnapping. To reach this conclusion, the court focuses on the scienter requirement of the kidnapping and false imprisonment statutes. However, the rationale of Faison is that the conduct element of section 787.01(1)(a)—"confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will"—must be limited to avoid a broad construction that would doubly criminalize the same conduct....

...(1997), with § 812.13, Fla. Stat. (1997). False imprisonment is a separate offense from robbery. [3] This Court recognized the difference between the crimes of kidnapping and false imprisonment in State v. Sanborn, 533 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Fla.1988). A comparison of sections 787.01(1)(a) and 787.02(1)(a) reveals they are identical except for the question of intent. We find the general intent of section 787.02(1)(a) (false imprisonment) is included in the specific intent of section 787.01(1)(a) (kidnapping), consequently false imprisonment is a necessarily lesser included offense....

...y threat, confine, abduct or imprison PHYLLIS E. STINSON, against that person's will, with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of sexual battery and/or inflict bodily harm or to terrorize PHYLLIS E. STINSON, contrary to Florida Statute 787.01(1)(a)....

...to support an enhancement. Id.; State v. McKinnon, 540 So.2d 111, 113 (Fla. 1989). Accordingly, we reverse the conviction for armed kidnapping and remand with direction to enter judgment for kidnapping and to resentence appellant in accordance with section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...In sum, we reverse appellant's sentence on counts (1) and (2) as to the imposition of the three year mandatory minimum pursuant to section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1989), and appellant's judgment and sentence on count (2) as to armed kidnapping and remand for sentencing for kidnapping pursuant to section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...I concur specially only because I think we should not speculate upon the inviting dictum in Carawan. NOTES [1] The written sentence for the aggravated assault erroneously reflected 27 years, the third issue raised by this appeal. [2] Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). [3] Section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1987) provides as follows: 787.01 Kidnapping; kidnapping of child under age 13, aggravating circumstances....

...provides as follows: The term "false imprisonment" means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in s. 787.01 [the kidnapping statute]....

...On the issue of intent, there are conflicting interpretations of section 787.02(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1989). The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Rauso v. State, 425 So.2d 618, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), stated in dicta that "an intent (other than section 787.01(a) motives) must be alleged in the accusatory pleading and proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict a person of false imprisonment." The Second District Court of Appeal in State v....

...may be refused unless the requesting Party gives assurances satisfactory to the requested Party that the death penalty will not be carried out. Under Florida law, the crime of kidnapping is punishable by a term of years not to exceed life. Fla.Stat. § 787.01(2)....

...y did then and there forcibly, secretly, or by threat, confine, abduct or imprison another person, to wit: Bryan Bruce, against Bryan Bruce's will, with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of any felony, in violation of Florida Statute 787.01. (Emphasis added) Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), provides: `Kidnapping' means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without authority, with intent to: * * * * * * 2....

...NOTES [1] Chaeld holds that a Faison analysis does not apply to a false imprisonment charge, only to kidnapping. To reach this conclusion, the court focuses on the scienter requirement of the kidnapping and false imprisonment statutes. However, the rationale of Faison is that the conduct element of section 787.01(1)(a)—"confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will"—must be limited to avoid a broad construction that would doubly criminalize the same conduct....

...irst report" of a sexual assault or excited utterance (section 90.803(2)) exceptions to the hearsay rule. [5] We are aware that like Cooper, the other two witnesses testified prior to the victim, however no objection was made to their testimony. [6] § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

...Prior to amendment of the statute in 1995, false imprisonment was defined in this way: (1)(a) The term "false imprisonment" means forcibly by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining, another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in s. 787.01. (emphasis supplied). See § 787.02, Fla.Stat. (1991). The above underlined language referred to the kidnapping statute, section 787.01, which contained the following specific intent element not included in the crime of false imprisonment: (1)(a) The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...cible sexual intercourse with her. We hold that appellant's removal of the victim from the bedroom to the living room during the course of this criminal episode did not constitute the separate offense of kidnapping within the meaning of the statute, Section 787.01, Florida Statutes....

...State, 385 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), under facts even stronger than those presented here. We adopt the same reasoning as did the court in the Friend case, and find that the circumstances with respect to the "confining, abducting, or imprisoning" (Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes) were "without independent significance," and that these actions were "not materially different from the restraint necessarily involved" in the commission of the sexual battery offense....

...State, 733 So.2d 980, 985 (Fla.1999). In reviewing the motion, this Court uses a de novo standard of review and upholds the conviction if it is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002). Kopsho was charged under both sections 787.01(l)(a)(2) and 787.01(l)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (2000). Section 787.01(l)(a) defines kidnapping as: forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: ......

...Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. In Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963, 965 (Fla.1983), we adopted the test from State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203 , 547 P.2d 720 (1976), and held that to support a kidnapping conviction under section 787.01(l)(a)(2) the movement or confinement also: (a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime; (b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and (c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection. We have held that the State need not prove these additional elements to obtain a conviction under section 787.01(1)(a)(3), which only requires an intent to “inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize another person.” Boyd v....

...Thus, Kopsho argues that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confinement was not slight and not merely incidental to the shooting. However, the argument is irrelevant because, as mentioned above, the State need not prove that the confinement was not incidental under section 787.01(l)(a)(3)....

...Gen., Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. WENTWORTH, Judge. This case is before us upon appeal from a conviction and sentence on two counts of attempted kidnapping. We find that appellant's conduct was within the intended purview of § 787.01, Florida Statutes, and affirm the judgment appealed....

...nt's presence. After approximately one hour, appellant was apprehended by local law enforcement officials. The charge in this case was attempted kidnapping with the intent to facilitate the commission of escape from prison. Kidnapping, as defined in § 787.01, Florida Statutes, includes "confining ... or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ... facilitate commission of any felony." § 787.01(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes. Appellant argues that the circumstances of this case involve an insubstantial confinement not within the intended purview of § 787.01....

...him for an extended time, and actual confinement of over one hour), with the degree of control maintained over the victims, constitutes confinement sufficiently substantial to be within the statutory prohibition of an attempt to kidnap as defined by § 787.01....

...the prison, had not abandoned his flight, and was attempting to secure transportation from the area. Those facts support a conclusion that the victims' confinement was intended to facilitate the continuing escape within the statutory prohibition of § 787.01(1)(a)2....

...thstanding the scoresheet error. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. LEHAN, A.C.J., and SANDERLIN, J., concur. NOTES [1] The elements of kidnapping can include an intent to inflict bodily harm upon the victim. § 787.01(1)(a)(3), Fla....

...njury can be scored if the charging instrument alleges and the evidence demonstrate physical contact. Moore v. State, 469 So.2d 947 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), quashed on other grounds, 489 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 1986). However, Brown states he was charged under section 787.01(1)(a)(2), kidnapping with the intent to facilitate the commission of another felony, and that neither the information nor the evidence support a finding that victim injury was an element of that offense....

...Analysis Sutton argues, based on Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla.1983), that his involvement in confining or moving Alford was inconsequential and, therefore, insufficient to support a conviction for kidnapping. In Faison, the defendant was charged under section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes, which provides that "`[k]idnapping' means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ......

...ovement or confinement that is inconsequential or inherent in the nature of the felony." Faison, 426 So.2d at 966 (quoting Harkins v. State, 380 So.2d 524, 528 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)). The problem with Sutton's argument is that he was not charged under section 787.01(1)(a)2. Rather, he was charged under section 787.01(1)(a)3., which requires that the victim be confined against her or his will with the intent to "[i]nflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person." The standard adopted in Faison does not apply to offenses charged under section 787.01(1)(a)3. Waddell v. State, 696 So.2d 1229, 1229-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (noting that "Faison adopted a test only for a determination of whether a kidnapping had taken place with the intent to commit a felony pursuant to section *335 787.01(1)(a)2.," and thus is inapplicable to convictions under section 787.01(1)(a)3.) (footnote omitted) (citing Bedford v....

...that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection. Having adopted the three-pronged test we address the second question concerning the proper jury instructions under a charge of violating section 787.01(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...The decision and opinion of the district court in this cause is approved. It is so ordered. BOYD, OVERTON and EHRLICH, JJ., concur. ADKINS, Acting C.J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] Carron v. State, 414 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). We have jurisdiction pursuant to art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. [2] § 787.01(1)(a)2, Fla....

...State, 720 So.2d 232 (Fla.1998). Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on Kidnapping Charge Appellant next argues that his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted because the evidence presented at trial did not support his conviction for kidnapping. We agree. Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), states that "[t]he term `kidnapping' means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: ... 2. Commit or facilitate the commission of any felony." § 787.01(1)(a)2., Fla....

...ed to address. THE SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM — AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that armed robbery is a felony of the first degree punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life. However, pursuant to section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes, kidnapping is punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life and, when committed with a firearm, is enhanced to a life felony pursuant to section 775.087(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...[2] , in carefully limited situations. The respondent is charged with kidnapping a child under the age of thirteen years with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a lewd, lascivious or indecent assault or act upon her in violation of Section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We affirm in all respects, except we remand to the trial court with directions to correct Newton's habitual offender sentences as to counts I-IV. Newton was convicted of four counts of kidnapping pursuant to section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and these convictions were enhanced to life felonies pursuant to section 775.087(1)(a), Florida Statutes, because Newton used a firearm during the kidnappings....

...Upon hearing him leave, she was able to open the door enough to squeeze her hand through, loosen the cord, and move the door sufficiently to escape. Appellant contends that this confinement was inconsequential and merely incidental to the robbery, and therefore insufficient to support a conviction for kidnapping. Section 787.01, Florida Statutes, provides: (1)(a) The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 2....

...Sanders was charged with sexual battery under section 794.011, Florida Statutes (2001), and the information alleged that Sanders used or threatened to use a deadly weapon (knife). Sanders was also charged with armed kidnapping to facilitate a felony, in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2001); burglary with an assault or battery while armed, in violation of section 810.02, Florida Statutes (2001); and attempted armed robbery with a deadly weapon, in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...e was committed at all. . . . `[A] conviction imposed upon a crime totally unsupported by evidence constitutes fundamental error.'" F.B. v. State, 852 So.2d 226, 230 (Fla.2003) (quoting in part Troedel v. State, 462 So.2d 392, 399 (Fla.1984)). Under section 787.01(1)(a)(2), and pertinent to this case, kidnapping "means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her ....

...rest. Accordingly, the search was illegal and the motion to suppress should have been granted. The point on appeal, being dispositive of the case, the judgment of conviction and sentence should be reversed and the defendant discharged. [2] NOTES [1] Section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1981), provides in part: (1)(a) "Kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: * * * * * * 3....

...Johnson forced Tinequa and Katrina to leave with him. Johnson was arrested and charged with, among other things, one count of kidnapping Katrina and one count of kidnapping Tinequa. At trial, Johnson argued that he could not be found guilty of kidnapping Tinequa as he was her biological parent. Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1991) provides: "The term `kidnapping' means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining ... another person against his will... ." With regard to children, section 787.01(1)(b) further defines confinement: "Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is against his will within the meaning of this subsection if such confinement is without the consent of his parent or legal guardian." The jury found Johnson guilty of the kidnapping charges....

...The trial court then found that there was, in fact, reason to depart and imposed the same 15-year concurrent sentences. Johnson appeals. We reverse Johnson's conviction for kidnapping Tinequa because, as her natural *4 father, he cannot be held criminally liable under section 787.01(1)(b)....

...arent or legal guardian.' (Emphasis added.) It does not say both parents must consent." Id. We agree with the fifth district's reasoning as expressed in Badalich and hold that a biological parent cannot be convicted of kidnapping his own child under section 787.01(1)(b)....

...Rather, there was a distance of at about three feet between them at the closest point. (Doc. 42, at 4). . The exact wording is unclear. . The Court notes that this was technically not a case of "kidnapping” because John Alex was over the age of 13 and there was no force or felonious intent involved. See Fla. Stat. § 787.01 ....

...The trial court summarily denied the petition after considering a response filed by the state. In his motion, appellant contended that his sentences for sexual battery exceeded the statutory maximum in section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1984), and his sentences for kidnapping exceeded the statutory maximum in section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1984)....

...ntence, including any probationary period, must not exceed 40 years). On the other hand, kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in section 775.082, 775.083 or 775.084. See section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (1984)....

...Section 787.02, Florida Statutes (1975), provides: "(1)(a) `False imprisonment' means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in § 787.01....

...provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084." The appellant's constitutional attack is directed at the language of subsection (1)(a) of the statute and is grounded in a comparison of the wording found in that subsection with the wording of subsection 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), enacted simultaneously with the statute in question, wherein the Legislature defined "kidnapping" as "forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority......

...Faison's most substantial argument challenges his convictions of two counts of kidnapping. Faison was found guilty of these crimes on the ground that he had "forcibly ... abduct[ed] [each victim] against h[er] will ... with intent to ... [c]ommit or facilitate [the] commission of [the] felony" of sexual battery. Section 787.01(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...volved in Buggs. As the Harkins opinion noted, at 380 So.2d 528, but did not consider decisive, the present Kansas statute requires an abduction or confinement with the intent to "facilitate flight or the commission of any crime." K.S.A. 21-3420(b). § 787.01(1)(a)2, on the other hand, requires an intent either to "commit or facilitate commission of any felony." [e.s.] Under statutes like ours, it has been widely held, apparently by a majority of the jurisdictions which have considered the quest...

...fter the victim's body was found on a bed equipped with restraining devices. Harkins argued that his kidnapping conviction could not stand because any confinement of the victim was merely incidental to the sexual batteries and the murder. Construing § 787.01(1)(a)2 of the kidnapping statute, the Harkins court observed that the legislature could not have intended to convert every first degree robbery and forcible rape into two life felonies....

...ally lessens the risk of detection. Faison, 426 So.2d at 965. This so-called Faison instruction must be given upon the defendant's request whenever the state charges kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony under § 787.01(1)(a)2....

...1983); Kennedy v. State, 564 So.2d 1127, 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). See also Fla.Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) at 94. It has no application when the charge alleges that the defendant kidnapped the victim with any of the other specific intentions identified in § 787.01(1)(a)1, 3 or 4....

...er, proof of "some amount of force" to restrain the victim is sufficient. Proko v. State, 566 So.2d 918, 920 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Accordingly, the appellant's conviction for false imprisonment is affirmed. ZEHMER and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 787.01(1)(a) defines kidnapping as follows: The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...Section 787.02(1)(a) defines false imprisonment in this manner: The term "false imprisonment" means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in s. 787.01.

...Greenhalgh also claims that his 99-year sentence for kidnapping exceeds the statutory maximum. This point highlights a statutory anomaly with regard to the punishment of certain serious felony offenses. Ordinarily kidnapping is a first degree felony "punishable by a term of years not exceeding life." § 787.01(2), Fla....

...Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986) ("A court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied."). In Faison, we recognized that the plain text of section 787.01, Florida Statutes, could lead to potentially absurd results....

...akes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection. Faison, 426 So.2d at 965 (quoting Buggs, 547 P.2d at 731) (emphasis supplied). We also explained that we had previously "adopted the view that subsection 787.01(1)(a)2 did not apply to unlawful confinements or movements that were merely incidental to other felonies, but [had] recognized an exception in the case of hostages....

...Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corces, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. HOBSON, Judge. The state charged James Manford Peck in a two-count information with 1) kidnapping (of six persons), in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1981), and 2) robbery with a firearm (of one of the six persons), in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...current on the robbery. The appellants claim that, because life sentences are not subject to habitual offender enhancement, the trial court erred in indicating on the sentencing forms for the kidnapping convictions that they were habitual offenders. Section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that "[a] person who kidnaps a person is guilty of a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s....

...etermined that only one of the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel merits further consideration. Appellant was charged in a two-count information with sexual battery, under section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes, and with kidnapping under section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes....

...It was this confinement which gave rise to the kidnapping charges against Elozar. On appeal Elozar argues that kidnapping is the "confining, abducting, or imprisoning" of another person with intent to "commit or facilitate commission of any felony." See § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

...1975) (footnote ommitted). Where the state has produced competent evidence to support every element of the crime, a judgment of acquittal is not proper. Anderson v. State, 504 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (citing Newton v. State, 490 So.2d 179, 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)). Section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1989), provides, in pertinent part: (1)(a) The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: * * * * * * (1)(a)2....

...Polin, Bureau Chief, and Magaly Rodriguez, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, FL, for Respondent. PARIENTE, J. We have for review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Delgado v. State, 19 So.3d 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), involving the application of a provision of Florida's kidnapping statute, specifically section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2006), and the interplay of that provision with our decision in Faison v....

...Later that day, police found him along with his accomplice near the scene where the vehicle was recovered. Based on the foregoing acts, Delgado was charged with four offenses: burglary of an occupied conveyance, grand theft, auto theft, and kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate a felony in violation of section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2006)....

...during the execution of that underlying felony. In resolving this issue, we first review Florida's kidnapping statutory scheme and the three-part test this Court adopted in Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla.1983). Next, we examine the elements of section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2006)....

...ng on Taylor v. State, 879 N.E.2d 1198 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). Finally, we apply the correct rule of law to the facts of this case and hold that insufficient evidence exists to support Delgado's conviction for kidnapping. The Interplay between Faison and Section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes In Florida, the crime of kidnapping requires a specific intent on the part of the defendant. See Crain v. State, 894 So.2d 59, 69 (Fla.2004); Sochor v. State, 619 So.2d 285, 290 (Fla.1993). Section 787.01(1), Florida Statutes (2006), codifies this offense and sets forth four separate categories of specific intent, the establishment of any one of which will support a conviction under the statute....

...Hold for ransom or reward or as a shield or hostage. 2. Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. 3. Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. 4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. § 787.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Further, under section 787.01(1)(b), "[c]onfinement of a child under the age of 13 is against her or his will within the meaning of this subsection if such confinement is without the consent of her or his parent or legal guardian." § 787.01(1)(b), Fla. Stat. [5] In this case, Delgado was convicted of kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate commission of the underlying felony of auto theft pursuant to section 787.01(1)(a)2. While the statutory definition of section 787.01(1)(a)2....

...of another person, such as robbery or sexual battery.'" Berry v. State, 668 So.2d 967, 969 (Fla.1996) (quoting Mobley v. State, 409 So.2d 1031, 1034 (Fla.1982)); see also Lynch v. State, 2 So.3d 47, 62 (Fla.2008) (recognizing that "the plain text of section 787.01, Florida Statutes, could lead to potentially absurd results")....

...203, 547 P.2d 720 (1976), wherein that court interpreted a similar, but not identical, kidnapping statute. See Faison, 426 So.2d at 965-66. Faison provided the framework for analyzing the facts of a case to determine whether a defendant's conduct amounts to a confinement crime under section 787.01(1)(a)2....

...tion. Faison, 426 So.2d at 965 (quoting Buggs, 547 P.2d at 731) (alteration in original). Since our decision in that case, we have adhered to the principle that proof of each factor adopted in Faison is necessary for a kidnapping conviction under subsection 787.01(1)(a)2. to be upheld. See, e.g., Lynch, 2 So.3d at 62-63 (applying the Faison test to section 787.01(1)(a)2.); Boyd v....

...State, 910 So.2d 167, 183-84 (Fla.2005) (same); Chavez v. State, 832 So.2d 730, 764 (Fla.2002) (same). However, by adopting the Buggs three-part test in Faison, we did not hold that the test's three elements would supplant, or stand in lieu of, the statutory language of section 787.01(1)(a)2. Rather, we recognized that because a literal application of section 787.01(1)(a)2....

...would convert any forcible felony into two distinct felonies— kidnapping and the underlying felony— applying the statutory language in addition to the three-part test would justifiably serve to limit that provision's broad scope. Under the proper analysis, to establish the offense of kidnapping pursuant to section 787.01(1)(a)2., the State must first demonstrate that every element of the statute has been satisfied before turning to the three-part test we adopted in Faison. The Elements of Section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes This Court has previously recognized that "[t]he Legislature is vested with the authority to define the elements of a crime." Reynolds v....

...State, 842 So.2d 46, 49 (Fla.2002). For that reason, we begin our analysis of whether Delgado committed the crime of kidnapping in order to commit or facilitate the commission of the underlying felony of auto theft with an examination of the plain language of section 787.01(1)(a)2. See GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So.2d 781, 785 (Fla.2007) ("The plain meaning of the statute is always the starting point in statutory interpretation."). As stated above, section 787.01(1)(a)2....

...e and an intent to counter that force in opposition"). Such knowledge should arise either before or during the commission of the underlying felony used to support the kidnapping charge. Accordingly, where a defendant is charged with kidnapping under section 787.01(1)(a)2., the State must prove that the defendant was first aware of the victim's presence in order to kidnap that victim with a specific intent to commit or facilitate the commission of an underlying felony. See § 787.01(1)(a)2., Fla....

...t is dependent upon the status of the victim as an adult or a helpless child. In reviewing the trial court's denial of Delgado's motion for judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge, the Third District bypassed an application of the language of section 787.01(1)(a)2....

...t because doing so "would lead us to stray even further from the language of the statute." Berry, 668 So.2d at 970. Notwithstanding this Court's prior admonition, the State argues that the Third District's expansive interpretation and application of section 787.01(1)(a)2....

...and the Faison test, in particular, were proper. We disagree and conclude that the Third District misapplied our decision in Faison in two important aspects. We first conclude that the Third District's decision incorrectly conflates the language of section 787.01(1)(a)2....

...After Delgado became aware of the child's presence, the district court explained, the child's " continued confinement ... was essential to [his] attempt to avoid apprehension for the theft of the vehicle and its contents," and thus supported a kidnapping conviction. Id. (emphasis added). However, under section 787.01(1)(a)2., a defendant's awareness of the victim must arise before or during the commission of the underlying felony—auto theft in this case—and not after the fact, as the Third District presumes took place....

...The Third District's decision disregards satisfying the language of the statute as an inquiry separate from Faison. and in doing so, misapplies the principles we announced in that decision. *64 Under the Third District's decision, the State would be able to avoid its burden to satisfy the statutory requirements set forth in section 787.01(1)(a)2....

...that it was occupied, in this case, Delgado does not make a similar concession and actually asserts that he was unaware of the child's presence. Further, Taylor's "special danger" analysis was not used to interpret a kidnapping provision similar to section 787.01(1)(a)2., under which a separate felony is used to support a kidnapping conviction; rather, the Indiana court's assessment of special harm focused on whether Taylor applied the requisite level of force amounting to one, distinct felony....

...Given the sparse facts in the record, we conclude that the State did not introduce competent, substantial evidence demonstrating that Delgado became aware of the child's presence when he stole the vehicle. Accordingly, the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain Delgado's kidnapping conviction under section 787.01(1)(a)2., notwithstanding the applicability of the Faison test to this circumstance, and the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal....

...CONCLUSION In accordance with our analysis above, we conclude that because the State failed to produce sufficient evidence demonstrating Delgado's awareness of the child before or during his execution of the underlying felony of auto theft, the statutory requirements under section 787.01(1)(a)2....

...LABARGA, J., specially concurring. I concur in the majority opinion because I agree that the district court failed to correctly analyze the issue in the case when it applied the Faison test without first determining if the State proved all the elements of a kidnapping under section 787.01, Florida Statutes. The majority is correct that only after the evidence satisfies the statutory elements set forth in section 787.01 may the court then apply Faison's three-part test....

...Although the truck was found only three miles from where it was taken, up to thirty minutes had passed before it was located. Thus, Detective Hernandez's evidence was not inconsistent with the child beginning to cry after Delgado left the scene. I therefore agree with the majority that under section 787.01(1)(a)(2), the State failed to prove that the defendant was aware of the victim's presence—proof that is necessary in order to convict Delgado of kidnapping the child with a specific intent to commit or facilitate the commission of the underlying felony of auto theft....

...I write, however, to express my view that if the evidence had proven that Delgado became aware of the presence of the child at any time during the auto theft, up until the time he left the vehicle, the facts would support his conviction for kidnapping. As noted by the majority, "under section 787.01(1)(a)(2), a defendant's awareness of the victim must arise before or during the commission of the underlying felony." Majority op....

...[2] The furniture store where the auto theft took place was located in Flamingo Plaza at 901 East 10th Avenue in Hialeah, Florida. The site of where the vehicle and child were later found was located approximately three miles away at 9371 Northwest 27th Avenue. [3] The current 2010 version of section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes, is the same as the 2006 version at issue in this case....

...Perez contends that he is entitled to have a judgment of acquittal on the false imprisonment charges. He argues that while the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of kidnapping, it cannot support a conviction of false imprisonment. Under section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1987): The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...des, in part: (1)(a) The term "false imprisonment" means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in s. 787.01....

...hreat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: . . . . 2. Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. 3. Inflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim or another person. § 787.01(1)(a)2, 3, Fla....

...ilitate commission of any felony." See Bedford v. State, 589 So.2d 245, 251 (Fla. 1991). It does not apply where the charge is confining, abducting or imprisoning with intent to "[i]nflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim or another person." § 787.01(1)(a)3, Fla....

...arge of false imprisonment, the question before this court is whether appellant's actions satisfied the test adopted in Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla.1983), as hereinafter set forth, to support his conviction for armed false imprisonment under section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...cept for the question of intent). Thus, proof of the elements of the kidnapping statute, under Sanborn, constitutes proof of the elements of false imprisonment. See Perez v. State, 566 So.2d 881, 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); § 787.02, Fla. Stat. (1995). Section 787.01, Florida Statutes, defines "kidnapping" [1] as follows: (1)(a) The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...t to avoid a literal interpretation of the two statutes that would "convert almost every forcible felony" into an additional crime. See Rohan v. State, 696 So.2d 901, 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). As the Faison court noted, a literal interpretation of subsection 787.01(1)(a)2 would result in a kidnapping conviction for "any criminal transaction which inherently involves the unlawful confinement of another person, such as robbery or sexual battery." Faison, 426 So.2d at 966(quoting Mobley v....

...1289 imprison Melissa Shires against her will and without lawful authority with intent to commit or facilitate commission of a felony, to-wit: Armed Robbery, and in the course thereof, he armed himself with a weapon, to-wit: a handgun, contrary to F.S. 787.01 and F.S....

...is directly applicable. See Waddell v. State, 696 So.2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), review denied, 707 So.2d 1128 (Fla.1998)( Faison, has no applicability where the charge for kidnapping alleges any of the other specific intentions identified in section 787.01(1)(a)1, 3 or 4.)....

...They threatened to shoot the boys if they called the police. The appellants further rummaged through the house and finally left. The boys freed themselves and ran for help. The appellants were later arrested, and property stolen from the house was recovered. Appellants were charged with kidnapping under section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (1979), which reads as follows: (1)(a) "Kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: ......

...l's motion for judgment of acquittal on his false imprisonment conviction. In Count IV of the amended information, the state charged Waddell alternatively with kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony pursuant to section 787.01(1)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) and/or kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim pursuant to section 787.01(1)(a)(3), Fla....

...nted the judgment of acquittal. The trial court's reliance upon Faison, however, was misplaced in this case because Faison adopted a test only for a determination of whether a kidnapping had taken place with the intent to commit a felony pursuant to section 787.01(1)(a)(2) [1] . Where, as here, there was *1230 evidence to sustain a conviction for kidnapping with the intent to "[i]nflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim" under section 787.01(1)(a)(3), the Faison test has no applicability....

...1773, 118 L.Ed.2d 432 (1992); see also Chaeld v. State, 599 So.2d 1362, 1364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ( Faison jury instruction has no application when the charges alleged that the defendant kidnapped the victim with any of the other specific intentions identified in sections 787.01(1)(a)(1), (3) or (4))....

...We therefore reverse the judgment of acquittal entered on the false imprisonment conviction and remand for resentencing on this charge. Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. NOTES [1] Specifically, the supreme court in Faison adopted the following test to determine whether a kidnapping had taken place under section 787.01(1)(a)(2): [I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement: (a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to...

...Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Joseph W. Stanco, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. NIMMONS, Judge. The defendant was convicted of unarmed robbery under Section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes, kidnapping under Section 787.01(2), and two counts of sexual battery under Section 794.011(5)....

...d); Ferguson v. State, 533 So.2d 763 (Fla.1988) (asportation was not inherent in the crime of robbery which could have been committed on the spot without any movement whatsoever). In Robinson, the court interpreted kidnapping under Florida Statutes, section 787.01, as meaning "secretly" confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against that person's will.......

...The fact that S.G., a minor, may not have quickly realized what was going to happen to her is of no legal consequence. The criminality resides in Corner's actions of "confining or abducting of the victim with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim." Carter at 1027, citing § 787.01, Fla....

...d a concurrent 30-year sentence for the kidnapping conviction. He now appeals the judgment and sentence for kidnapping. We agree with appellant that the conviction and sentence for kidnapping should be reversed, based upon the proper construction of section 787.01(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes, and this court's decision in Friend v....

...Manning also stated that the purpose for placing Baker in the bathroom was so that he would not be able to observe the car's tag number. Appellant was subsequently convicted of both armed robbery and kidnapping with intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony. Section 787.01(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes....

...In fact, the robbery had already been completed at the time Baker was placed in the bathroom. We therefore adopt the reasoning used by this court in Friend v. State, supra , and find the confinement to have been "without independent significance" and "not within the intended purview of § 787.01(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes." 385 So.2d at 697....

...ter level in moving to and from the safe supports a jury finding that the movement and confinement served to lessen the risk of detection, Ayendes v. State, 385 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), and to facilitate the commission of the crime of robbery. Section 787.01(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ential act that is merely incidental to a robbery. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the test adopted in Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963, 965-66 (Fla. 1983), used to determine whether evidence is sufficient to constitute kidnapping under section 787.01, Florida Statutes....

...He attributes his illegal detention to an erroneous computation by the Florida Parole and Probation Commission of his presumptive release date. According to the sworn petition, Taylor was charged with two counts of sexual battery, both counts under section 794.011(5), Florida Statutes, and one count of kidnapping under section 787.01....

...eet this requirement. [5] And, it also appears that evidence in Morgan's case was already DNA tested, or if not, Morgan fails to describe it or its current location. AFFIRMED. THOMPSON and MONACO, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. [2] § 787.01, Fla....

...a Statutes (1977), provides: "`False imprisonment' means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in § 787.01." in order to convict the restraint must have been imposed by threat or in a secret manner....

...Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ. PER CURIAM. The primary point on appeal is the challenge to defendant's conviction for the possession and the use of a firearm during the commission of a felony, here, a kidnapping. We reverse. The defendant was convicted of kidnapping, section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1985), as well as possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, section 790.07(2), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...State, 786 So.2d 1173 (Fla.2001). As found by the trial court, armed kidnapping is a life felony and not a first-degree felony punishable by life. See Williams v. State, 650 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). The offense of kidnapping is a first-degree felony punishable by life. § 787.01(2), Fla....

...r habitual sentences for life felonies. The claim lacked merit because, despite the sentencing judge’s comments about use of a firearm, Sims was charged and convicted of kidnapping [without a firearm], a first-degree felony punishable by life, see § 787.01(2), Fla....

...Sanders "against her will, and without, lawful authority, with intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony, to-wit: armed robbery" at the same convenience store, and during the incident "carried, displayed, used, threatened or attempted to use or possessed a weapon, to-wit: a revolver," contrary to sections 787.01(1)(a) and 775.087, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...ducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to," inter alia, "[c]ommit or facilitate commission of any felony" or "[i]nflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person." § 787.01(1)(a)2....

..., life for kidnapping and five years for escape. The first three sentences were to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to the sentence for escape. At the time the court sentenced appellant, the penalty for kidnapping was life in prison. Section 787.01, Florida Statutes *1165 (1977)....

...The State's first theory—Mackerley's enticing Black to Florida by trick—is easily dismissed by reference to the text of the kidnaping statute itself. Kidnaping means "forcibly, secretly or by threat confining, abducting or imprisoning another person against his will." § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

...Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corces, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. SCHOONOVER, Judge. The appellant, Robert William Cahill, appeals from the judgment and sentence entered against him pursuant to a jury verdict finding him guilty of kidnapping in violation of section 787.01 1(a)(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...In count II, the kidnapping charge, the information alleged that the acts of confinement, abduction or imprisonment of the victim were done with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a sexual battery or battery on a person over sixty-five, contrary to Florida Statutes section 787.01(1)(a). The statute provides four alternative ways of committing kidnapping. The one with which Defendant was charged was section 787.01(1)(a)2: when the confinement is with the intent to "commit or facilitate commission of any felony." Another means of kidnapping is when the confinement is done with the intent to "[i]nflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person." § 787.01(1)(a)3....

...ter level in moving to and from the safe supports a jury finding that the movement and confinement served to lessen the risk of detection, Ayendes v. State, 385 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), and to facilitate the commission of the crime of robbery. Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...dley v. State, 787 So;2d 732, 738 (Fla.2001)). The State charged Allen with first-degree felony murder during the course of a kidnapping, and kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm or terrorize the vic *959 tim. See §§ 782.04(1)(a)2.f.; 787.01(1)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2005). First-degree felony murder is “[t]he unlawful killing of a human being: [w]hen committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, a kidnapping ...” § 782.04(l)(a)2.f., Fla. Stat. (2005). Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), defines kidnapping as the follows: The term “kidnapping” means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...bruised. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction of kidnapping with the intent to “inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person,” and that the kidnapping was not merely incidental to the killing. See § 787.01(l)(a)3., Fla....

...State, 409 So.2d 1031, 1034 (Fla.1982); Sanders v. State, 905 So.2d 271, 272 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Mackerley v. State, 754 So.2d 132, 137 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In Faison , the following test was applied when a defendant was charged with two crimes, one of which was kidnapping under section 787.01(a)(2), “if a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement”: (a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental t...

...ave some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection. Faison, 426 So.2d at 965 . The decision in Faison is limited to kidnapping under section 787.01(a)(2). When a defendant is charged with confining, abducting or imprisoning with the intent to “inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize” under section 787.01(l)(a)3., Faison , has no application....

...defendant's Fifth Amendment rights under Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106? [5] The cause is reversed and remanded for new trial. ANSTEAD, C.J., and WALDEN, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 810.02(2), Fla. Stat. (1983). [2] § 787.01, Fla....

...STEVENSON, GROSS and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Petitioner was charged with one count of sexual battery on a person with a mental defect, contrary to section 794.011(4)(e), Florida Statutes, a first degree felony, and one count of kidnaping, contrary to section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes, a first degree felony punishable by life....

...Section 787.02(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), defines false imprisonment as "forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in section 787.01 [kidnapping]." [1] Upon review of the motion, we believe fact questions exist as to whether a restraint or confinement occurred and, if so, whether such restraint or confinement was accomplished by threat....

...(2004) (emphasis added). In contrast, "kidnapping" is defined as "forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his or her will and without lawful authority," with specific intent to commit another offense. § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

...Sanborn's first contention is that the Abramsons were not kidnapped because they were not moved from their bed. The state responds that even though the Abramsons were not moved, they were nevertheless kidnapped, according to the pertinent provisions of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1983). Section 787.01(1)(a) provides in part: (1)(a) "Kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. 3. Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. The state argues that the evidence establishes the charges of kidnapping "with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of any felony," § 787.01(1)(a)2, and kidnapping "with intent to inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim." § 787.01(1)(a)3....

...4th DCA 1987). Compare Kirtsey v. State, 511 So.2d 744 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (where victims are moved about interior of store and forced to open safe, acts are slight and merely incidental to robbery offense). The evidence also supports conviction under section 787.01(1)(a)3....

...Furthermore, when the state does so charge, the proof must be established without the benefit of section 810.07. Our conclusion finds further support in the recent Florida Supreme Court decision in Justus v. State, 438 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1983). There, the court, in interpreting section 787.01(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1977), [3] stated that in making a charge of kidnapping, the state is not required to state the specific felony that is intended to be committed or facilitated by means of the kidnapping....

...GOSHORN and HARRIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] A second degree felony under sections 812.03(2)(a) and 777.04, Florida Statutes (1991). [2] A first degree felony punishable by life under section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991). [3] A first degree felony punishable by life under section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...On September 28, 1993, appellant knocked his victim from her bicycle and carried her into nearby woods where he beat and raped her. He was charged with and convicted of kidnapping during which an aggravated battery was committed, contrary to sections 787.01(2) and 775.087(1)(a), Florida Statutes, sexual battery, and aggravated battery....

...The separate conviction for aggravated battery is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing and correction of the judgment. The judgment, sentence, and sentencing scoresheet should clearly reflect that appellant was not only convicted of kidnapping to facilitate a felony under section 787.01, Florida Statutes, but also of aggravated battery in violation of section 775.087, which re-classified the kidnapping as a life felony....

...We agree that consolidation of the charges on the morning of trial was error, and we reverse. The state charged appellant by indictment with sexual battery as proscribed by *220 section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes (1981), and by information with kidnapping as proscribed by section 787.01(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...We now indulge in dicta for the guidance of counsel in future cases and as an invitation to the legislature to consider whether a change is desirable. Appellants were charged with kidnapping. The statute under which they were charged provides, in pertinent part: 787.01 Kidnapping....

...That statute provides, inter alia: 787.02 False imprisonment. — (1)(a) "False imprisonment" means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in s. 787.01....

...Unless this is substantially equivalent to a provision that intent is not a necessary element of the crime of false imprisonment then the test is not met. A more logical interpretation is that scienter is an essential element of the crime of false imprisonment. Accepting that premise an intent (other than Section 787.01(a) motives) must be alleged in the accusatory pleading and proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict a person of false imprisonment....

...a habitual offender, but it cannot do both. Anderson v. State, 637 So.2d 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED for resentencing. DAUKSCH and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] § 787.01(1)(a)(2), Fla....

...rial and, accordingly, reverse and remand for a new trial. In view of the disposition of the case, we find it unnecessary to discuss the appellant's other points raised on appeal. The appellant was charged with three counts of kidnapping pursuant to section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...a life felony; burglary of an occupied dwelling with a firearm pursuant to Section 810.02(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), a first-degree felony punishable by a terms of years not exceeding life imprisonment; and kidnapping with a firearm pursuant to Section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (1989), a first-degree felony, which was reclassified to a life felony under Section 775.087(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), because Lamont used a firearm in the commission of the kidnapping....

...Defendant Lamont was convicted of sexual battery with a firearm, kidnapping with a firearm, and burglary of an occupied dwelling with a firearm. Section 794.011(3), which defines sexual battery with a firearm, Section 810.02(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), which defines burglary of an occupied dwelling with a firearm, and Section 787.01(2) which defines kidnapping, all state that persons convicted under the statute may be punished "as provided in s....

...4(2), 775.087(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989), and (2) on the defendant Andre Henry Lamont for (a) the life felony of sexual battery with a deadly weapon, § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1989), and (b) the reclassified life felony of kidnapping with a firearm §§ 787.01(2), 775.087(1)(a), Fla....

...Section 810.02 reads in pertinent part: "Burglary is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083 or s. 775.084 if, in the course of committing the offense, the offender: ... (b) is armed... ." (Emphasis added). And, Section 787.01(2) states in pertinent part: "A person who kidnaps a person is guilty of a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s....

...Enix contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on count one for attempted kidnapping because there was insufficient evidence that Enix committed an overt act toward the completion of the kidnapping. Enix was charged with attempted kidnapping under sections 777.04(1) and 787.01(1)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...This required the State to prove that Enix attempted to "forcibly, secretly, or by threat" confine, abduct, or imprison Grace Pizzo against her will and without lawful authority with the intent to hold her "for ransom or reward or as a shield or hostage." § 787.01(1)(a)(1)....

...Blackshear appeals from the trial court's imposition of two concurrent life sentences. We reverse and remand for resentencing. Appellant was originally sentenced to serve two concurrent 65-year sentences pursuant to his plea of guilty to charges of armed sexual battery and armed kidnapping under Sections 794.011(3) and 787.01(2), Florida Statutes, respectively....

...sentences, Blackshear contends and the state agrees that the sentences are improper because they are not within the parameters provided by statute. Blackshear pled guilty to a violation of Section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes, [footnote omitted] and Section 787.01, Florida Statutes....

...ace the burden on the trial judge to explain his sentence. We reverse the sentences only on the basis of the sentencing guidelines departure issue, and remand for resentencing. WENTWORTH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Actually, a violation of Section 787.01(2) is not per se a "life felony." However, it was a life felony in this case by virtue of the operation of Section 775.087(1)(a) in "bumping up" this first degree felony to a life felony because the defendant was carrying a weapon....

...Kidnapping differs from false imprisonment by requiring proof by the State of one of four intent elements. [1] The information in this case charged Sean with kidnapping with the intent to "inflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim or another person," in violation of section 787.01(1)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Because Sean committed the offenses within the applicable window period, he is entitled to reconsideration of his sentences. See Smith v. State, 761 So.2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Accordingly, we affirm Sean's convictions and remand for reconsideration of his sentences. SALCINES and DAVIS, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1995), provides, in part: (1)(a) The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...sisted of the fact that the perpetrator ordered two restaurant employees to go into the freezer, closed the door behind them, and told them to remain in there. This evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to sustain the kidnapping convictions. Section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000), defines "kidnapping" as follows: (1)(a) The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. 4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. In Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla. 1983), the Supreme Court recognized that a literal interpretation of subsection 787.01(1)(a)2 would lead to a kidnapping conviction for "any criminal transaction which inherently involves the unlawful confinement of another person, such as robbery or sexual battery." Faison, 426 So.2d at 966 (quoting Mobley v....

...The errors were, however, harmless under the circumstances of this case, and did not amount to fundamental error. See Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366, 369-70 (Fla.2002). The defendant in this case was charged with attempted kidnapping. The kidnapping statute provides, in relevant part: 787.01 Kidnapping; kidnapping of child under age 13, aggravating circumstances.— (1)(a) The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: .... 2. Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. 3. Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. § 787.01(1)(a)2., 3., Fla....

...The jury found the defendant guilty as charged. In so doing, the jury necessarily found the defendant was guilty under subparagraph 3, that is, that the defendant acted with the intent to "[i]nflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person." § 787.01(1)(a)3., Fla....

...t the state has proved this case against you beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. And based upon that I must pass sentence. At this time, as I said, having been found guilty by a jury of your peers of the crime under statute number 787.01, attempted kidnapping with a firearm, *564 the court hereby sentences you to thirty years in the state penitentiary....

...ority for life sentences in a contrary fashion in Salas v. State, 589 So.2d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). In Salas, the defendant was convicted of kidnapping, a first degree felony. This court upheld the sentence of ninety-nine years due to the fact that section 787.01(2) specifically allows for a sentence of "a term of years not exceeding life[.]" [4] This is identical language as the authority set forth in section 812.13(2)(a) that allowed a sentence of a term of life for the first degree felony of armed robbery....

...At the same time, the court upheld 99 year sentences for kidnapping because kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable "by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment." § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1983). Section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...n of felony which he terms "first degree punishable by life." Jones contends that, because Section 775.087(1)(a) does not provide for reclassification of a "first degree felony punishable by life," the reclassification herein was error. We disagree. Section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes, provides that "[a] person who kidnaps a person is guilty of a felony of the first degree" (emphasis supplied)....

...I agree with the majority opinion with the caveat expressed in my specially concurring opinion in State v. Rousseau, 509 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1987). NOTES [*] The information charged Ochoa with abduction "with intent to hold the [victim] for ransom or reward." See § 787.01(1)(a)1, Fla....

...We fully concur in the decision and the reasoning of the court in Rivero, and therefore conclude that no error has been shown. See also State v. Miller, 313 So.2d 656 (Fla. 1975). Next, appellant argues that because he was charged by information only with kidnapping pursuant to Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes, he could not be convicted of false imprisonment because it is not a lesser-included offense of kidnapping....

...Consequently, we reverse for resentencing on this claim. In all other respects, we affirm. The jury convicted Mr. Jackson of one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (firearm), one count of kidnapping with a firearm, and four counts of sexual battery with a firearm. See §§ 784.021, 787.01(1)(a)(3), 794.011(3), Fla....

...year sentences for the other three sexual batteries, concurrent with the first sexual battery sentence; and five years for the third-degree felony aggravated assault, concurrent with the sexual battery sentences. Kidnapping is a first-degree felony. § 787.01(2)....

...em. Even though the issue of sufficiency of the evidence to prove a kidnapping occurred may not have been sufficiently preserved or presented at trial, [4] we think the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to establish Kent committed that crime. Section 787.01(1)(a) defines "kidnapping" to mean: [F]orcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ......

...DAUKSCH, J., concurs specially with opinion. *270 DAUKSCH, Judge, concurring specially. While I agree the judgments should be affirmed, I cannot subscribe to the obiter dicta regarding section 924.051(8), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996). NOTES [1] § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993). [2] § 787.01(1)(a)2, Fla....

...acquittal on the kidnaping charge which related to Charles, because his tying her up was merely incidental to the underlying offense and it was not performed in order to commit or facilitate the commission of any other felony. The kidnaping statute, section 787.01(a)(2) provides: The term "kidnaping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 2....

...We therefore strike the aggravated battery causing great bodily harm conviction. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part. THOMPSON, CJ., and SAWAYA, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.045(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (1999). [2] § 784.045(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (1999). [3] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). [4] § 787.01(1)(a)2., Fla....

...With regard to the second point presented for review, i.e., the two concurrent 65-year sentences, Blackshear contends and the state agrees that the sentences are improper because they are not within the parameters provided by statute. Blackshear pled guilty to a violation of Section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes, [1] and Section 787.01, Florida Statutes....

...consent, and in the process thereof uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon or uses actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury shall be guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. [2] § 787.01, Florida Stat. (1983), provides: 787.01 Kidnapping....

...d separated by time and space. See also Morales v. State, 451 So.2d 941 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Count VI of the amended information charged the defendant with kidnapping Ms. Courtney with intent to "hold for ransom or reward or as a shield or hostage." § 787.01(1)(a)1, Fla....

...Defendant contends that victim injury was not an essential element of any offense at sentencing and thus erroneously scored. However, he overlooks the fact that kidnapping includes "forcibly ... confining, abducting or imprisoning another person against his will ..." § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

...Two deputy sheriffs quickly located and captured the defendant. On July 14, 1986, the state filed a multiple-count information, charging the defendant with kidnapping, grand theft of an automobile, and aggravated battery. Concerning the kidnapping charge, the information identifies section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1985), as the citation of law violated....

...re forcibly, secretly, or by threat, confine, abduct or imprison another person, to-wit: [victim's name], against that person's will, with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony. The count essentially tracks the language of subsection 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), but it alleges only the second intent described in that statute....

...Hold for ransom or reward or as a shield or a hostage. 2. Commit or facilitate the commission of any felony. 3. Inflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim or another person. 4. Interfere with the performance of a governmental or political function. § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

...ften a basis for a new trial. DuBoise v. State, 520 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1988). Without regard to the timing of the motion, however, the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss. In this case, the information adequately alleges a violation of subsection 787.01(1)(a)2....

...In fact, defense counsel addressed both grand theft and aggravated battery when he argued the alleged insufficiency of the evidence in his motion for a judgment of acquittal. The defendant next contends that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the intent to terrorize the victim, which is contained in subsection 787.01(1)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...[1] Warner was charged with five offenses arising out of a single criminal episode: robbery, in violation of section 812.13(1), (2)(c), Florida Statutes (2002); grand theft, § 812.014(1), (2)(c)(1); grand theft auto, § 812.014(2)(c)(6); kidnapping, § 787.01(1)(a)(2), Fla....

...ourth District’s decision in Va-rona. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On June 19, 2008, the State charged Marston with three counts of sexual battery (deadly weapon or force causing injury) (§ 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (2008)), one count of kidnapping (§ 787.01(1)(a)2., Fla....

...The false imprisonment statute provides in part as follows: 787.02 False imprisonment. — (1)(a) "False imprisonment" means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in s. 787.01. The information was dismissed because it failed to allege a specific purpose other than those referred to in section 787.01, the kidnapping statute....

...State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 335 N.E.2d 310, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 277, 46 L.Ed.2d 257 (1975). The last line of the false imprisonment statute merely states that it encompasses all unlawful restraints effected without the specific intents enumerated in section 787.01....

...itual Felony Offender on another count, no error was shown here. AFFIRMED. PETERSON and SAWAYA, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In Case No. CR97-12781, Bright was charged with seven offenses; carjacking (§ 812.133); kidnaping with intent to commit a felony (§ 787.01(1)(a)2.); burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery (§ 810.02(1), (2)(a), battery on a law enforcement officer (§ 784.07(2)(b); resisting an officer with violence (§ 843.01); resisting arrest without violence (§ 843.02); and a...

...Muniz's five-week-old son. We affirm the conviction for domestic violence battery, but reverse the conviction for kidnaping. The kidnaping statute does not criminalize the confinement of a child under the age of thirteen by "a parent or a legal guardian." See § 787.01(1)(b), Fla....

...(1997) (providing voluntary acknowledgment of paternity creates rebuttable presumption of paternity). We need not resolve the question of whether Mr. Muniz was a legal guardian of the child. Even if the mother was the guardian of this child, Mr. Muniz clearly was a "parent" of the child. See § 787.01(1)(b); Johnson, 637 So.2d 3....

...Nonetheless, Lafleur is distinguishable on the ground that the father's conduct in that case violated an existing court order. Thus, we do not expressly conflict with Lafleur, although we question whether the court order in that case was sufficient to deprive Mr. LaFleur of his status as "parent" under section 787.01(1)(b)....

...Muniz with assault on the child, see § 784.011, Fla. Stat. (1997); child abuse, see § 827.03(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997); contributing to the dependency of a minor, see § 827.04(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997); or resisting an officer, see § 843.02, Fla. Stat. (1997). Nevertheless, section 787.01(1)(b) prevents prosecution of Mr....

...de circumstances similar to those presented here. We reverse the conviction for kidnaping and remand to the trial court for discharge on that count only. NORTHCUTT and CASANUEVA, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] See § 784.03(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). [2] See § 787.01(1), Fla....

...tatutory maximum. Mitchell. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and THREADGILL and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Sexual battery, as defined in § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] Kidnapping, § 787.01(2), Fla....

...tatute. In Bedford v. State, 633 So.2d 13 (Fla.1994), a defendant convicted of kidnapping was sentenced to life without eligibility for parole. Kidnapping was a first degree felony "punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life." § 787.01(1)(a)(2), Fla....

...t. (Emphasis added). It is undisputed that Mr. Postell (d/o/b 10/24/1984) met the age requirement for a youthful offender sentence. What caused the confusion here was the mistaken belief that at least one of Mr. Postell's offenses was a life felony. Section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that "[a] person who kidnaps a person is guilty of a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s....

...Postell is necessarily entitled to resentencing as a youthful offender; rather, he is entitled to be sentenced at a proceeding at which the trial court is fully informed of its discretion. REVERSED and REMANDED. GRIFFIN and EVANDER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §§ 787.01(1)(a)(2), 775.087(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (2004). [2] §§ 787.01(1)(a)(3), 775.087(1), (2), Fla....

...Apprendi. See 530 U.S. at 489-90, 120 S.Ct. 2348. In his initial brief, Mr. Kleppinger argues only a violation of Apprendi in the sentence of natural life for the kidnapping conviction. Kidnapping is a felony of the first degree punishable by life. § 787.01(1)(a)(2), Fla....

...sical force likely to cause serious personal injury, in violation of Section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1987); armed burglary, with an assault, in violation of Section 810.02(2)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1987); and kidnapping, in violation of Section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Burglary during which an assault is committed, or while armed with a deadly weapon, is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life. Section 810.02(2)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. (1987). The same is true of kidnapping. Section 787.01(2), Fla....

...We agree that petitioner's appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an issue of fundamental error in the jury instructions, and therefore grant the petition. Among other offenses, Rogers was charged with armed kidnapping. Kidnapping is defined in section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), as follows: The term kidnapping means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...NOTES [1] Section 787.02(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), provides: `False imprisonment' means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in § 787.01....

...bruises on my arm. * * * * * * Q What happened then? A I ran to the phone and picked the phone up. It was my brother. He asked me where I had been and I say — and I started crying and screaming and I told him what happened and he came round there. Section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (1983), under which the defendant was charged, provides: (1)(a) "Kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: * * * * * * 2....

...he remaining two robbery counts. From his conviction and sentence, he appeals. In reviewing a ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, a de novo standard of review applies. Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002). Kidnapping is defined in section 787.01(l)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2008), as “forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ......

...ted of several crimes, including the *193 kidnapping of his eleven-year-old son, which occurred between February 2000 and July 2000. The conflict issue before us centers on whether a parent can lawfully be convicted of kidnapping his own child under section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000). For the reasons expressed below, we approve the decision of the Third District in Davila to the extent that it held that a parent can be criminally liable for kidnapping his own child pursuant to section 787.01 under certain circumstances, but disapprove the reasoning and analysis of the district court....

...(A MINOR), against that person’s will, with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or any other person, and in the course of committing said offense, the defendant committed aggravated child abuse, as defined in s. 827.03, in violation of s. 787.01(3)(a) and s....

...nd, thus, a parent of the alleged victim. Id. at 729-30. The district court held that “[t]he kidnaping statute does not criminalize the confinement of a child under the age of thirteen by ‘a parent or a legal guardian.’ ” Id. at 729 (quoting § 787.01(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997)). The court ruled that while the defendant’s conduct was inappropriate, “section 787.01(l)(b) prevents prosecution of Mr. Muniz for the first-degree felony offense of kidnaping his own child.” Id. at 731. ANALYSIS The conflict issue in this case centers on whether section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000), provides a basis to convict a parent of kidnapping his or her own child as the term “kidnapping” is defined in the statute....

...“Further, we are ‘without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications.’ ” Id. at 1164-65 (quoting McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998)). We thus begin our analysis with the language of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000). The criminal offense of kidnapping, which is codified in section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000), is defined in relevant part as follows: (l)(a) The term “kidnapping” means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...Hold for ransom or reward or as a shield or hostage. 2. Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. 3. Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. 4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. § 787.01(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000). Subsection (l)(b) further provides: “Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is against her or his will within the meaning of this subsection if such confinement is without the consent of her or his parent or legal guardian.” § 787.01(l)(b), Fla....

...kidnapping a child under the age of thirteen, the State had to prove that the defendant “forcibly or by threat confined or imprisoned R.D. against his will ... with intent to inflict bodily harm upon or terrorize R.D.” Davila contends that under section 787.01(l)(b), a parent of a child under the age of thirteen cannot be criminally liable for kidnapping that child where there was no court order depriving the parent of custody and where the alleged confinement of the child was with that parent’s consent. We disagree. The plain language of section 787.01(l)(a) requires the State to prove an overt act on the part of the defendant; namely, a forceful, secretive, or threatening act that confines, abducts, or imprisons another person against his will....

...The plain language of subsection (l)(b) of the statute sets forth a method of proof which allows the State to establish that the overt act on the part of the defendant was against a person’s will when that person is a child under the age of thirteen. The unambiguous language of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000), does not exempt a parent from criminal liability for kidnapping his or her own child. Thus, by its own terms, section 787.01 permits Davi-la to be legally convicted of kidnapping R.D....

...3 It is our view that if the Legislature intended to exempt a parent from criminal liability for kidnapping his or her own child, it would have expressly stated so. We trust that if the Legislature did not intend the result mandated by the plain and unambiguous language of section 787.01, the Legislature itself will amend *197 the statute. Until such time, we hold that a parent is not exempt from criminal liability for kidnapping his or her own child under section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000). Having resolved the conflict issue presented before us, we decline to address the parties’ remaining assertions. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the plain language of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000), does not preclude a parent from being held criminally liable for kidnapping his or her own child....

...of aggravated child abuse occurring during a six-month period. Id. Davila does not raise any of these claims before this Court. . Our holding today does not suggest that a parent may never discipline his or her own child. However, under our holding, section 787.01 does not exempt a parent from criminal liability for committing a forceful, secretive, or threatening act that confines, abducts, or imprisons a child when such an overt act is committed with one of the four specific intents delineated...

...* * (c) ... [U]pon conviction, an offender shall be designated as a "sexual predator"... if: 1. The felony meets the criteria of former § 775.22(2) and 775.23(2), specifically, the felony is: a. A capital, life, or first-degree felony violation of s. 787.01 or s....

...nvolving rules of construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended"). Section 775.21(4)(c)1 expressly required the trial court to make a finding of sexual predator status in the instant case because Robinson was convicted of violating section 787.01 and because the baby was not his child....

...STONE, J., dissenting. I would affirm. Although I agree that the rational relationship test is applicable, I do not concur in the conclusion that classifying any person, other than a parent, convicted of kidnapping a minor as a sexual predator, under sections 787.01 and.02, is unconstitutionally over-inclusive....

...child is kidnapped or the length of time the child is held and notwithstanding an absence of evidence of what occurred during the captivity. The civil sexual predator statute is plainly worded and is not ambiguous. It places all who violate sections 787.01 and .02 on *454 notice that, upon conviction, they will be classified under section 775.21....

...*988 Even though the option provision was officially approved on June 17, 1993, it was just as officially deleted before it ever became effective. Therefore, section 921.001(4)(b) was never legally amended to grant the option. NOTES [1] § 782.04, Fla.Stat. (1993); § 777.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] § 787.01(1)(a), Fla.Stat....

...Since the incarcerative portion of the sentence was 14 years, it did not exceed the recommended guideline sentence of 12 to 17 years. The combined terms of incarceration and probation do not exceed the statutory maximum of life. 2. Lindsey is correct when he asserts that kidnapping under section 787.01, Florida Statutes, is a felony of the first degree....

...risonment statute which has since been amended. Until 1993, the statute was the same as the current version quoted in footnote 1, but it included at the end of the provision this additional language: "with any purpose other than those referred to in s. 787.01," which is the kidnaping statute. Accordingly, section 787.02(1) expressly excluded the offense of confinement with intent to commit a felony under the kidnaping statute set out in section 787.01, which was the provision the court was construing in Faison....

...NOTES [1] In proscribing false imprisonment, section 787.02(1) provides: "The term `false imprisonment' means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against her or his will." [2] § 787.01(1)(a)(2), Fla....

...sical force likely to cause serious personal injury, in violation of section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1987); armed burglary, with an assault, in violation of section 810.02(2)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1987); and kidnapping, in violation of section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Burglary during which an assault is committed, or while armed with a deadly weapon, is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life. § 810.02(2)(a) & (b), Fla. Stat. (1987). The same is true of kidnapping. § 787.01(2), Fla....

...own. Wilson then got on top of the victim, pulled down her shorts and underwear, and forced her to have sexual intercourse. Wilson then fled the scene. The victim continued to struggle during the entire encounter, which lasted five to seven minutes. Section 787.01(l)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (2010), defines the crime of kidnapping as “forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ......

...In 1990, Walters was sentenced to several 70 year concurrent sentences in two Hernando County cases, 89-948-CF and 90-376-C, pursuant to a plea agreement which also addressed other uncharged crimes. He now complains that the sentences were illegal for the two crimes: (1) kidnaping, a life felony pursuant to section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (1989) and enhanced by section 775.087(1) for the use of a weapon; and (2) armed sexual battery pursuant to section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...We affirm in all respects, addressing only the issue of whether the trial court erred in determining that it did not have the discretion to impose a youthful offender sentence because of the 10/20/Life statute. Appellant was convicted of kidnaping, a first degree felony, section 787.01(2), and the jury found that he possessed a gun....

...Upon remand, the trial court may again modify Pelz's order of probation, or alternatively, the court may revoke that probation and resentence him. REVERSED. W. SHARP, and HARRIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §§ 782.04, 777.04(1) & (4), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] §§ 794.011(3), 777.04, Fla. Stat. (1991). [3] § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

...inal episode. [3] Appellant's total sentence in this case is life imprisonment, followed by two consecutive one-year terms. Because the trial court could have imposed a life sentence on count IV even without habitual felony offender enhancement, see § 787.01(2), Fla....

...Miller prevented her from leaving the home. We will not detail the entire events during the four hours, but there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for kidnapping with the intent to terrorize or to inflict great bodily harm pursuant to section 787.01(l)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...A jury found appellant guilty of two counts of sexual battery in violation of section 794.011, Florida Statutes (1987), one count of attempted sexual battery in violation of sections 794.011 and 777.04, Florida Statutes (1987), and one count of kidnapping in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...First, citing Mobley v. State, 409 So.2d 1031 (Fla.1982), Somers argues that the State failed to establish that the confinement element of the kidnapping charge was not merely incidental to the other crimes charged. However, Somers was charged with kidnapping under section 787.01(l)(a)3., Florida Statutes, which states: “The term ‘kidnapping’ means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ... inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person.” § 787.01(1)(a)3., Fla....

...Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. 4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. . . . . (2) A person who kidnaps a person is guilty of a felony of the first degree, *545 punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life.... § 787.01(1)(a) & (2), Fla....

...l, because at the time of his offenses, life felonies were not subject to enhanced punishment as a habitual offender. We agree.  Armed sexual battery is a life felony. See § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1993). Kidnapping is a first degree felony. See § 787.01(2), Fla....

...That same day, judgment was entered against him. That judgment read as follows: COUNT CRIME OFFENSE STATUTE DEGREE NUMBERS 1 KIDNAPPING WITH A FIREARM 787.01 & 775.087 LIFE 2 ROBBERY WITHOUT A FIREARM 812.13 2F 3 BURGLARY WITH A FIREARM 810.02 & 775.087 1F 5 SEXUAL BATTERY WITH A DEADLY 794.011 (3)...

...imposed on the kidnapping conviction. Kidnapping, unlike burglary and sexual battery, is a “felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life” irrespective of the possession (personally or vicariously) of a firearm or weapon. § 787.01(2), Fla....

...victim was younger than 18 years of age at the time the offender committed the primary offense; and (ii) the primary offense was committed on or after October 1, 2014, and is a violation of: a. section 787.01(2) (kidnapping) or 787.02(2) (false imprisonment), Florida Statutes, if in the course of committing the kidnapping or false imprisonment the defendant committed a sexual battery under chapter 794, Florida Statutes, or a lewd act under section 800.04 or 847.0135(5), Florida Statutes, against the victim; b. section 787.01(3)(a)2....

...Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and SHEVIN and RAMIREZ, JJ. SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge. We reject the appellant's only claim of trial error on the holding that the evidence was sufficient to justify his conviction for kidnapping under the "terrorizing" provision of the statute, section 787.01(1)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...as *232 dragged by her throat for almost ten feet from one room to another in the course of the defendant's vicious attack upon her is sufficient to demonstrate the confinement, abduction or imprisonment required to establish any form of kidnapping. § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

...As the parties agree, however, the defendant's sentence as a violent career criminal is vacated in accordance with State v. Thompson, 750 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1999) and the cause remanded for re-sentencing. Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. NOTES [1] 787.01 Kidnapping; kidnapping of child under age 13, aggravating circumstances.— (1)(a) The term "kidnapping" means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...cilitate the commission of a felony, and/or to inflict bodily harm upon or terrorize [the victim], and during the commission of the aforementioned kidnapping,” he “carried or had in his possession a weapon, contrary to the provisions of Sections 787.01(l)(a)[2....

...hand, placed what she believed to be a knife against the side of her neck, and sexually assaulted her. More than a decade later, based on DNA evidence, Mr. Miller was identified as the assailant and charged with kidnapping as well as sexual battery. Section 787.01(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), provides: The term “kidnapping” means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...Miller argues the state failed to prove the victim was confined within the meaning of the statute arid failed to prove intent to terrorize her beyond the harm or terror inherent in sexual battery. In part he relies on language in Mobley v. State, 409 So.2d 1031, 1034 (Fla.1982), where the Florida Supreme Court said that if section 787.01(1)(a)2....

...ion of the robbery, the act neither had any significance independent of the robbery nor substantially lessened the risk of detection”). Mr. Miller’s act of placing a pillow over the victim’s face also fails to establish confinement pursuant to section 787.01(l)(a)3. (which prohibits the unlawful confining of another person with the intent to .inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim). Although the three-part test set forth in Faison is limited to kidnapping under section 787.01(l)(a)2., and has been held not to be determinative when a defendant is charged with confining, abducting or imprisoning with the intent to “inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize,” Allen v....

...victim that amounted to kidnapping. Id. In the present case, too, the evidence is insufficient to prove asportation or confinement that amounts to kidnapping. The state has brought to our attention no case in which a conviction for kidnapping under section 787.01(l)(a)3....

...ce for kidnapping. Reversed. LEWIS, C.J. and WETHERELL, J„ concur. Cf. Allen v. State, - So.3d -, -, 2013 WL 3466777 , 38 Fla. L. Weekly S592 , S596 (Fla. July 11, 2013) (finding sufficient evidence to support the kidnapping conviction pursuant to section 787.01(l)(a)3....

...[the victim's] legs were tied with a belt so that she could not move” and noting that the facts established "the kidnapping was not merely incidental to the killing, but was sufficiently separate from the murder”); Kopsho v. State, 84 So.3d 204, 218 (Fla.2012) (affirming conviction for kidnapping pursuant to section 787.01(l)(a)3....

...d the truck” and "any confinement that began while Kopsho and Lynne were in the truck continued as Kopsho chased Lynne along the side of the road”); Perry v. State, 57 So.3d 910, 913 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (affirming conviction for kidnapping under section 787.01(l)(a)3....

...one room, dragged by her hair into another room where the beating continued, and then dragged by her neck or hair outside where the beating concluded”); Maldonado Melendez v. State, 51 So.3d 624, 625 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (affirming conviction under section 787.01(1)(a)3., based on evidence he "dragged the victim at gunpoint, by her hair, down a hallway and up half a flight of stairs to a more secluded landing in the back of a building”); State v....

...grabbed her by the neck and dragged her through the house to her bedroom, where he strangled her, smothered her with a pillow, and forced her to perform oral sex”); Lee v. State, 770 So.2d 231, 231-32 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (affirming conviction under section 787.01(1)(a)3....

...Under the kidnapping statute, the kidnapping offense is enhanced from a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment, to a life felony, where the kidnapping victim is a child under the age of thirteen and the defendant commits aggravated child abuse on that child. § 787.01(2), (3), Fla....

...In case number 4D11-4687, appellant appeals another untimely and successive postconviction motion that he filed in this case. He claims that the information allegedly contains incorrect language as to the kidnapping charge. The information tracks the language of the statute and is *574 clearly sufficient. See § 787.01(l)(a), Fla....

...“If, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction.” Id. (emphasis added). Section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2014), defines kidnapping as “forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ....

...3d 47, 62 (Fla. 2008)). The supreme court has since elaborated on the Faison test: Faison provided the framework for analyzing the facts of a case to determine whether a defendant’s conduct amounts to a confinement crime under section 787.01(1)(a)2....

...In moving for a judgment of acquittal a defendant admits both the facts stated in the evidence and every reasonable conclusion favorable to the state that the trier of fact might fairly infer from the evidence. Lynch v. State, 293 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1974). Jones was charged with kidnaping pursuant to Section 787.01(1)(a)(2), Fla....

...We reverse that conviction and the sentence imposed. We remand to the circuit court with instructions to enter a conviction on the lesser included offense of false imprisonment and to sentence Stanley for that crime. The State charged Stanley with kidnapping under section 787.01(l)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...e. See § 924.34, Fla. Stat. (2010). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. WALLACE, J., Concurs. LaROSE, J., Concurs with opinion. . The State correctly argues that the Faison test is not applicable when the kidnapping charge is based on section 787.01(l)(a)(3). See Conner v. State, 19 So.3d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). But Stanley was not charged under that subsection; he was charged under subsections 787.01(l)(a)(2) and 787.01(3)....

...The latter statute addresses kidnapping for the purpose of committing sexual acts on a child under thirteen. The portion of the information that charges kidnapping tracks the language of these two statutes. The victim was thirteen years old at the time of the crime, and did not fit within the dictates of section 787.01(3)....

...As a result, a judgment of acquittal is improper if the State presents competent, substantial evidence to establish the elements of the charged offense. Id. Gloston was charged with kidnapping with the intent to commit a felony, sexual battery, pursuant to section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count." The trial court did not err in imposing life sentences for first degree murder, which is a capital felony, see § 782.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1999), kidnapping while using a firearm, § 787.01(2), Fla....

AFFIRMED. GOSHORN and PETERSON, JJ., concur. . § 787.01, Fla.Stat. (1987). . § 794.011(3), Fla.Stat

...lows: a. For a felony punishable by life, by a term of imprisonment for life; b. For a felony of the first degree, by a term of imprisonment of 30 years; The kidnapping statute, which Vargas violated, is a first-degree felony punishable by life. See § 787.01(2), Fla....

...Radabaugh, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Michael J. Kotler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. PER CURIAM. On June 27, 1985, Michael Dilla was charged with kidnapping in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1985), and extortion in violation of section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Appellant then dragged the victim outside by her neck or hair where he continued beating her. The attack lasted at least seven minutes, and the victim’s injuries included bruised ribs, two broken toes, and a concussion. Appellant was arrested and charged with attempted second-degree murder and kidnapping under section 787.01(l)(a)3, Florida Statutes (2008)....

...der the kidnapping statute, the movement, must be of independent significance from the other crime charged and not slight or incidental to the other crime. Subsequent cases have made clear that this test applies only when kidnapping is charged under section 787.01(l)(a)2, 3 and Appellant concedes that Faison does not apply in this case because he was charged under subparagraph 3 of the statute....

...tim and was not significant enough to support a kidnapping charge. In support of his argument, Appellant cites Conner v. State, 19 So.3d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), in which the Second District reversed the defendant’s conviction for kidnapping under section 787.01(l)(a)3....

...bparagraph 2. See id. at 1122 (referencing the Fifth District’s decision in Harkins v. State, 380 So.2d 524, 528 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), which was subsequently approved in Faison). We need not address the merits of the Second District’s analysis of section 787.01(l)(a)3 in Conner because the case is distinguishable on its facts....

...he victim being beaten in one room, dragged by her hair into another room where the beating continued, and then dragged by her neck or hair outside where the beating concluded. These facts are sufficient to establish confinement under any reading of section 787.01(l)(a)3. Moreover, we agree with the state that this case is similar to Lee v. State, 770 So.2d 231 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), where the defendant was convicted of kidnapping under section 787.01(l)(a)3 after he “dragged [the victim] by her throat for almost ten feet from one room to another in the course of [his] vicious attack upon her[J” Id....

...The Third District affirmed the conviction, finding these facts sufficient to establish confinement under the kidnapping statute. Id. This case is also similar to Melendez v. State, 51 So.3d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011), where the defendant was convicted of kidnapping under section 787.01(l)(a)3 after he “dragged the victim at gunpoint, by her hair, down a hallway and up half a flight of stairs[.]” Id....

...1st DCA 1992) (holding that the Faison test does not apply to false imprisonment and observing that the test “has no application when the charge alleges that the defendant kidnapped the victim with any of the other specific intentions identified in § 787.01(l)(a)l, 3 or 4.”), superseded by statute as recognized in Davis v....

...State, 804 So.2d 1185, 1195 (Fla.2001). Fencher has not shown any abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we AFFIRM Fencher's convictions and sentences. GRIFFIN and MONACO, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 794.011(4), Fla. Stat. (2004). [2] § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). [3] § 787.01(1)(a)(2), Fla....

...dnapping Brant was charged in count three of the indictment with kidnapping by forcibly, secretly, or by threat, confining, abducting, or imprisoning the victim with the intent to inflict bodily harm or terrorize the victim, in violation of section 787.01(1)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2004)....

...e denial of his motion. In Bedford, we held that the State is required to prove the three aforementioned elements when the kidnapping is charged as kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of another felony under subsection 787.01(1)(a)2., but not where the kidnapping is charged as kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize under section 787.01(1)(a)3....

...This ensued for about five to seven minutes, and afterwards, defendant again told E.K. not to tell anyone. Defendant argues that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the aggravated kidnapping charges because the acts which constituted kidnapping were incidental to the underlying alleged sexual misconduct. Section 787.01, Florida Statutes, provides: (l)(a) The term “kidnapping” means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: *801 1....

...(b) Pursuant to s. 775.021(4), nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit the imposition of separate judgments and sentences for the life felony described in paragraph (a) and for each separate offense enumerated in subparagraphs (a)l.-5. § 787.01, Fla....

...firearm or weapon is an essential element of the offense. § 775.087(1). However, as the state agrees in its response to this court's order to show cause, use of a weapon or firearm is not an essential element of the offense of kidnapping a person. Section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (1989), makes kidnapping a person a first degree felony punishable by life....

...Williams was tried in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, on four counts. Williams was informed against with: (1) Robbery with a firearm or other deadly weapon contrary to Florida Statutes §§ 812.13(1) and 812.13(2)(a); (2) Kidnapping contrary to § 787.01; (3) Attempted sexual battery contrary to §§ 777.04(1), 777.04(4), and 794.011(4)(a); and (4) Burglary with an assault contrary to §§ 810.02 and 810.07....

...Floyd's additional claim that his life sentence for kidnapping was unauthorized because a sentence for a life felony cannot be enhanced under the habitual offender statute is without merit. His kidnapping conviction was a first degree felony, not a life felony. See § 787.01(2), Fla....

...property Comment This instruction was adopted in 2009 [6 So. 3d 574] and amended in 2016 [190 So. 3d 1055], and 2017. 9.1 KIDNAPPING § 787.01, Fla....

...Read only if confinement is alleged and victim is under 13 years of age. Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is against the child’s will if such confinement is without the consent of the child’s parent or legal guardian. If a violation of § 787.01(3), Fla....

...ition Over a Computer Service] against (same victim as in element #2). Define applicable felony unless included in other instructions. Lesser Included Offenses KIDNAPPING* — 787.01 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...The Kidnapping statute does not exempt a parent from criminal liability for kidnapping his or his own child. See Davila v. State, 75 So. 3d 192 (Fla. 2011). *If the State alleged the life felony of Kidnapping with aggravating circumstances in § 787.01(3), Fla....

...[1] In 1994 defendant filed his motion to correct illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The motion raised two points. Defendant first contended that his sentence for kidnapping was illegal. In this case the defendant's kidnapping charge under subsection 787.01(1), Florida Statutes (1987), was a first degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. Id. § 787.01(2)....

...He requests that the reclassification be stricken and that his sentencing guidelines scoresheet be recalculated accordingly. Defendant's claim is not properly cognizable under Rule 3.800(a). Here, the judgment reflects that defendant was convicted of violation of sections 787.01 and 775.087, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...cause it does not constitute an illegal sentence. See Davis v. State, 661 So.2d 1198, 1197 (Fla.1995), receded from in part on other grounds, Carter v. State, 786 So.2d 1173, 1177 (Fla.2001); Isom v. State, 915 So.2d 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). See also § 787.01(2), Fla....

...ial court, and we dismiss this appeal, sua sponte, as being premature and piecemeal, and thus one this court lacks jurisdiction to hear. Motion DENIED; Appeal DISMISSED. COBB and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1993). [2] § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

...orida Statutes); killings, with a premeditated design to effect the death (section 782.04(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes); assaults with a specific prohibited intent (section 784.021(1)(b), Florida Statutes); kidnapping with a specific prohibited intent (section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes); burglary (section 810.02(1), Florida Statutes); obtaining or using property with a specific prohibited intent (sections 812.014(1); 817.02; 817.03; and 817.034(3)(d), Florida Statutes)....

...The State alleged the defendant kidnapped each of the victims by “forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning” them against their will and without lawful authority with the intent to “[c]ommit or facilitate [the] commission of” the underlying burglary and robberies, in violation of section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2015). The evidence presented at trial primarily centered on the issue of identity—whether the defendant was one of the perpetrators of the crimes. However, because the evidence presented to the jury es...

...rglary with a firearm, not armed burglary with assault or battery as charged. 1 However, the judgment does contain a scrivener’s error which should be corrected. The information charged Swain with one count of armed kidnapping in violation of *475 section 787.01(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1997); one count of armed burglary with assault or battery in violation of sections 810.02(1), 810.02(2)(a), and 810.02(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997); and one count of aggravated assault with a firearm in violation of sections 775.087 and 784.021, Florida Statutes (1997). The jury found Swain guilty of armed kidnapping pursuant to section 787.01(l)(a); armed burglary with a firearm pursuant to sections 810.02(1) and 810.02(2)(b); and aggravated assault with a firearm pursuant to sections 775.087 and 784.021....

...d or Hill . As found by the state court, the record included substantial evidence, noted in the State’s factual basis, to support the kidnapping conviction under state law. The Supreme Court of Florida has construed the Florida kidnapping statute, Section 787.01(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes, to preclude a conviction for “unlawful confinements or movements that were merely incidental to other felonies, but recognized an exception in the case of hostages.” Faison, 426 So.2d at 966 (citing Mobley, 409 So.2d 1031 )....

...Glaid, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Mark Seiden and Todd Michaels, Miami, for appellee. Before WELLS, CORTIÑAS, and SALTER, JJ. CORTIÑAS, J. Raymond Lumarque ("Lumarque") was charged by information with kidnapping in violation of section 787.01(1)(a)(2) and, alternatively, section 787.01(1)(a)(3) of the Florida Statutes....

...(an adult) against that person's will, with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of any felony, to wit: sexual battery and/or attempted first degree murder and/or inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim ... in violation of s. 787.01(2), Fla....

...at Lumarque's behavior did not legally constitute kidnapping. We reverse because there was sufficient evidence to withstand a motion to dismiss the charge of kidnapping with the intent to "[i]nflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim" under section 787.01(1)(a)(3) of the Florida Statutes....

...t or confinement that is inconsequential or inherent in the nature of the felony.") (quoting Harkins v. State, 380 So.2d 524, 528 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)). However, the trial court's reliance upon Faison was misplaced. Faison may correctly be applied to section 787.01(1)(a)(2), which involves kidnapping with the intent to commit a felony, but it is not applicable to a kidnapping charge based upon section 787.01(1)(a)(3), which addresses kidnapping with the intent to "[i]nflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim." See Biggs v....

...3d DCA 2000) (finding that dragging the victim by her throat from one room to another during the defendant's attack upon her was sufficient to demonstrate the necessary confinement, abduction, or imprisonment required to establish any form of kidnapping, including kidnapping under the "terrorizing" provision found in section 787.01(1)(a)(3))....

...ons. The state appeals the order granting the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict contending that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the kidnapping counts. We agree. Section 787.01, Florida Statues (1995), states in relevant part: 787.01 Kidnapping; kidnapping of child under age 13, aggravating circumstances....

...Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. 3. Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. 4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. “[T]he act of tying someone up constitutes a ‘confinement’ within the meaning of section 787.01.” Berry v....

...have granted his JOA motion because the State did not present any evidence that the victim(s) had been sufficiently confined to warrant a kidnapping conviction. This argument reflects a misunderstanding of the law on kidnapping as well as the evidence introduced at trial. Section 787.01(a), Florida Statutes (2007), provides as follows: (1)(a) The term “kidnapping” means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. 4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. (emphasis added). When a defendant is charged with kidnapping with the intent to facilitate the commission of a felony under subsection 787.01(1)(a)2, the State must also prove that the confinement was not “inconsequential or inherent in the nature of the felony [sought to be furthered by the kidnapping].” Faison v....

...the specific intent to commit or facilitate the commission of another felony. See Perry v. State, 57 So. 3d 910, 912 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (noting that the case law clearly provides that the Faison test applies only when kidnapping is charged under section 787.01(1)(a)2). In this case, the State charged the defendant in the alternative with kidnapping to facilitate the commission of a felony (specifically, aggravated assault) under subsection (a)2, and also with the intent to terrorize the victim under subsection (a)3....

...and authorize them for publication and use. Some of the more significant changes to the standard jury instructions are as follows. With respect to instructions 9.1 and 9.2, amongst other changes, the instructions are amended to include the enhancement in sections 787.01(3)(a) and 787.02(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), respectively, which enhances the offense of kidnapping or false imprisonment from a first-degree felony punishable by life to a life felony if the victim was less than thirteen years of age a...

...of the States Court Administrator, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner -4-  APPENDIX 9.1 KIDNAPPING § 787.01, Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Kidnapping, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1....

...ld victim is under 13 years of age. Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is against [his] [her] the child’s will if such confinement is without the consent of [his] [her] the child’s parent or legal guardian. If a violation of § 787.01(3), Fla....

...n (victim)]. Define applicable felony unless included in other instructions. -6-  Lesser Included Offenses KIDNAPPING — 787.01 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...(1987); Attempted Burglary, §§ 810.02 and 777.-04, Fla.Stat. (1987); Grand theft, § 812.-014(2)(c), Fla.Stat. (1987); Armed Robbery, four (4) counts, § 812.13(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1987); Attempted Armed Robbery, three (3) counts, §§ 812.13(2)(a) and 777.04, Fla.Stat. (1987); and Kidnapping, § 787.01(l)(a)2., Fla.Stat....

...The term “kidnapping” means “forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority” with the intent, inter alia, to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony. § 787.01(l)(a)2., Fla....

...her from meaningful contact with the public. When, as in the present case, the victim is under the age of thirteen, the “against her or his will” element is met if the confinement is without the consent of the child’s parent or legal guardian. § 787.01(l)(b), Fla....

...Bishop next contends that double jeopardy principles prevent him from being adjudicated guilty of lewd or lascivious molestation or lewd or lascivious conduct, where the acts supporting these adjudications were also used to enhance his kidnapping conviction from a first degree felony to a life felony. We disagree. Section 787.01(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2006) provides that it is a life felony to kidnap a child under the age of thirteen when, in the course of committing the offense, the defendant commits: 3. Lewd or lascivious battery, lewd or lascivious molestation, lewd or lascivious conduct, or lewd or lascivious exhibition in violation of s. 800.04. Significantly, section 787.01(3)(b) provides that “nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit the imposition of sep *80 arate judgments and sentences for the life felony described in paragraph (a) and for each separate offense enumerated in sub-parag...

...State, 939 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). On remand, the trial court shall vacate Bishop’s conviction for lewd or lascivious conduct. AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; REMANDED. JACOBUS, J., concur. COHEN, J., concurs and concurs specially with opinion. . § 787.01(3)(a), Fla....

...Accordingly, we vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing upon correction of the scoresheet and reclassification of the two felony offenses as noted. *456 CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES VACATED; REMANDED. ORFINGER and COBB, JJ., concur. . § 810.02(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985). . § 787.01(l)(a)(2), Fla.Stat....

...� 5 Accordingly, we reverse the sentence and remand the cause to the trial court to re-sentence Powell within the recommended range provided by the guidelines. Williams . ERVIN and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . § 794.01 l(4)(b), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1984). . § 787.01(l)(a), Fla.Stat....

...The Brooks’ residence was approximately 1.5 miles from Brown’s car. Based on the above, there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of first-degree murder. Additionally, we find that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of felony-murder. Calhoun was convicted of kidnapping pursuant to section 787.01(l)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2009)....

...Laercy Maceo appeals from a trial court order designating him as a sexual predator pursuant to Section 775.21, Florida Statutes (2002). After a careful review of the record, and in accordance with the state’s proper confession of error, we reverse. Maceo was convicted of the life felony of armed kidnapping, in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1997). The victim, however, was not a minor and therefore Maceo does not qualify for classification as a sexual predator as provided by section 775.21(4)(a)l.a., Florida Statutes (2002) 1 based on a violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes....

...e, could be raised for the first time on appeal as it involved fundamental liberty due process interests because amendments allowed court to impose substantial extended term of imprisonment on defendant). AFFIRMED. PLEUS and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. . § 787.01(l)(a), (2), Fla....

... Robert Rodriguez appeals a final judgment of conviction and sentence following a jury trial. The amended information charged Rodriguez with: kidnapping a child under the age of 13, with aggravated child abuse and sexual battery, in violation of section 787.01(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2013); aggravated child abuse, in violation of section 827.03(2), Florida Statutes (2013); and sexual battery by a person 18 years of age or older on a person less than 12 years of age, in violation of section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes (2013)....

...ing of such sexual misconduct. 3. Section 394.4593 , relating to sexual misconduct with certain mental health patients and the reporting of such sexual misconduct. 4. Section 775.30 , relating to terrorism. 5. Section 782.04 , relating to murder. 6. Section 787.01 , relating to kidnapping....

...1st DCA 1991). Convictions AFFIRMED; sentencing for kidnapping VACATED; REMANDED for resentencing. GOSHORN, J., concurs. HARRIS, C.J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion in which GOSHORN, .J., concurs. . § 782.04(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1991). . § 787.01(1), Fla.Stat....

...In response to our order to show cause, the State conceded that the error was fundamental. We agree and grant the petition. By way of background, VanWagner was charged with (1) robbery with a firearm and (2) kidnapping "with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of robbery" in violation of section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004). Section *573 787.01(1)(a) provides four separate and distinct acts, any one of which can be used to establish the intent element in kidnapping. [1] VanWagner was charged only with the intent to commit or facilitate commission of robbery which applies to subpart 2 under the definition of "kidnapping" in section 787.01(1)(a)....

...Hold for ransom or reward or as a shield or hostage. 2. Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. 3. Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. 4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

WALLACE, Judge. Robert E. Conner was found guilty by a jury of attempted first-degree murder, §§ 777.04(1), 782.04(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997), and kidnapping, § 787.01, Fla....

...ion in State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203 , 547 P.2d 720 (1976), persuasive. Harkins, 380 So.2d at 528 . In Buggs , the Supreme Court of Kansas stated the following test for determining if conduct qualifies as kidnapping under the Kansas counterpart of subsection 787.01(l)(a)(2): [I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement: (a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to...

...to a place of seclusion is. The forced direction of a store clerk to cross the store to open a cash register is not a kidnapping; locking him in a cooler to facilitate escape is. Buggs, 547 P.2d at 731 (emphasis added). Applying the Buggs test to subsection 787.01(l)(a)(2) (“[c]ommit or facilitate commission of any felony”), the Harkins court concluded: [W]e do not believe that the Florida Legislature intended to convert every first degree robbery and every forcible rape into two life felonies. Therefore, we construe section 787.01, Florida Statutes, to mean that “confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person ......

...Faison was convicted of two counts of kidnapping, two counts of sexual battery, and one count of first-degree burglary arising from two separate attacks on two women occurring on the same day. Faison, 426 So.2d at 964 . On the kidnapping counts, Faison was convicted under section 787.01(l)(a)(2) (intent to commit or facilitate commission of any felony)....

...As a result, the supreme court concluded that the acts leading to the kidnapping charges satisfied the three parts of the test described in Buggs. Id. B. The Inapplicability of the Faison Test to Subsection (l)(a)(3). Unlike Faison, Mr. Conner was charged under section 787.01(l)(a)(3), i.e., that he forcibly, secretly, or by threat confined, abducted, or imprisoned another person against her will with intent to “[i]n-flict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person.” In the Faison case, the issue before the supreme court was whether the confinement had been perpetrated to facilitate the commission of another crime under subsection 787.01(l)(a)(2). The difference is significant because, as the supreme court later noted in Bedford v. State, 589 So.2d 245, 251 (Fla.1991), the Faison test does not apply when the defendant is charged under section 787.01(l)(a)(3): We also find no merit to Bedford’s contention that a conviction for kidnapping cannot be sustained because any *1122 confinement was “merely incidental” to the homicide. Bedford was charged with confining, abducting, or imprisoning Herdmann with the intent to “[ijn-flict bodily harm upon or to terrorize” Herdmann, under section 787.01(l)(a), (3), rather than with the intent to “[c]ommit or facilitate commission of any felony,” under subsection 787.01(l)(a), (2)....

...unlawful confinements or movements that were merely incidental to or inherent in the nature of the underlying felony, has no application here. See also State v. Lumarque, 990 So.2d 1241, 1242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“Faison may correctly be applied to section 787.01(l)(a)(2), ... but it is not applicable to a kidnapping charge based upon section 787.01(l)(a)(3)-”); Sutton v. State, 834 So.2d 332, 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“The standard adopted in Faison does not apply to offenses charged under section 787.01(l)(a)[ (]3[) ].”); Biggs v....

...nal) (citation omitted)); Waddell v. State, 696 So.2d 1229, 1229-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (“Where, as here, there was evidence to sustain a conviction for kidnapping with the intent to ‘[ijnflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim’ under section 787.01(l)(a)(3), the Faison test has no applicability.” (alteration in original))....

...bsumed in the other criminal act. Surely a person who commits a sexual battery, for example, has the requisite intent under subsection (l)(a)(3) both to “inflict bodily harm” and to “terrorize the victim.” But such an expansive reading of subsection 787.01(l)(a)(3) would lead to the very result that the Fifth District noted could not possibly have been the intent of the legislature, and one which would perpetuate the problem the Harkins court sought to avoid — that any first-degree robbery or forcible sexual battery could be converted into two life felonies....

...To explore this problem further, we must focus our attention on the overt acts which form the basis of a kidnapping offense (the actus reus) instead of the requisite intent underlying those acts (the mens rea). C. Searching for the Meaning of “Con-ñning” “[Tjhe ‘gist of the offense’ [of kidnapping under section 787.01j is the feloni *1123 ous act of a confinement or abduction with a specific intent.” Crain v....

...(2004) (emphasis added). In contrast, “kidnapping” is defined as “forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his or her will and without lawful authority,” with specific intent to commit another offense. § 787.01(l)(a), Fla....

...ot sure how long the whole thing took." When asked at the first trial how long the incident lasted, the victim testified, "About — at the most fifteen, twenty seconds.” . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). .Section 787.01(l)(a) provides: The term "kidnapping” means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. *1120 3. Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. 4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. .Although the Fifth District’s analysis in Harkins is specific to section 787.01(l)(a)(2), the court's opinion does not state whether Har-kins was actually charged under any particular subsection of 787.01(l)(a)....

...k help. The movement of the victim into the passenger seat was slight and was incidental to the underlying crimes of sexual battery and robbery; therefore, it was error to deny Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge. Section 787.01(l)(a) defines “Kidnapping” as: [Fjoreibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ......

...The only question raised is whether the petition was facially sufficient to require a hearing on the merits. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. Wade was convicted of sexual battery and is presently serving his sentence of fifteen years in prison. He was charged and tried on a count for- kidnapping in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes, and a second count for sexual battery in *576 violation of section 794.011(5)....

...The Commission seeks to uphold the trial court’s orders, arguing that its explanation does not refer to any abduction or holding of the victim for ransom and that the trapping of the victim in the vehicle is not the equivalent of kidnapping. We do not agree with this argument. The pertinent language of section 787.01 defines kidnapping as “forcibly confining ......

...State, 610 So.2d 435, 438 (Fla.1992). This claim is cognizable under rule 3.800(a). See Young v. State, 787 So.2d 259, 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The trial court failed to refute conclusively this claim. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. Under section 787.01(3), Florida Statutes (1989), kidnapping is enhanced to a life felony if the victim is under the age of thirteen, and during the course of the kidnapping, the defendant commits one of several enumerated offenses, including sexual battery....

...the age of thirteen and a sexual battery occurred during the course of the kidnapping. The kidnapping was listed and scored as a life felony on the sentencing guidelines scoresheet, and the judgment shows that the kidnapping was a violation of both section 787.01(l)(a)(2) and section 787.01(3), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Thus, in the interests of judicial economy, we reverse and remand with directions that the court grant the petition and enter an order affording Mediate the opportunity to file a belated 3.850 motion. REVERSED AND REMANDED with directions. HARRIS and PETERSON, JJ., concur. . § 787.01, Fla....

...l court’s jurisdiction ended and the motion was deemed denied.”). As to the merits of Appellant’s motion, we agree with appellate counsel that the written judgment erroneously cites Appellant’s aggravated battery conviction as a violation of section 787.01(l)(a)3., Florida Statutes, instead of section 784.045(l)(a)....

...The record supports the trial court’s conclusion, in this regard. Moreover, the record presents no evidence to support a finding that defendant’s confessions were coerced. See Bruno v. State, 574 So.2d 76 (Fla.1991). Defendant’s remaining points raised on appeal lack merit. § 775.084(2), Fla.Stat. (1991); § 787.01(1)(a)2., Fla.Stat....

...owledged conflict with Williamson v. State, 510 So.2d 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We approve the decision of the Third District in the instant case and disapprove Williamson . The pertinent parts of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1987), concerning the offense of kidnapping provide: (l)(a) The term “kidnapping” means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...provide: (l)(a) The term “false imprisonment” means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in s. 787.01....

...We reverse in part and remand for a supplemental evidentiary hearing on whether he relied on the misadvice in deciding to go to trial. The trial court did not reach the question of reliance because it did not recognize the misadvice as such. Mr. Bevans was convicted after trial on one count of kidnapping in violation of section 787.01(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), and three counts of sexual battery on a victim less than twelve years old, in violation of section 794.011(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999)....

(1989); and (2) kidnapping, in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1989), a first-degree felony

...However, the judgment and sentencing documents, as well as the court’s order denying the rule 3.800(b) motion, make it clear that the appellant was placed on probation for the kidnapping *770 count only. The kidnapping conviction is a violation of section 787.01. Section 948.03(5)(a) does not require the imposition of the sex offender conditions for defendants placed on probation for violations of section 787.01....

...Voluntary intoxication is a defense to felony murder when the underlying felony is a specific-intent crime. Linehan v. State, 476 So.2d 1262 (Fla.1985). Kidnapping is a specific-intent crime. Heddleson v. State, 512 So.2d 957 (Fla. 4th DCA1987); Mullin v. State, 425 So.2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA1983); see § 787.01, Fla.Stat....

imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life.” § 787.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). The judgment, however,

...ze. Thus, to find that claimant was convicted of kidnapping with intent to commit sexual battery we would have to disregard the mention of intent to inflict harm or to terrorize, which is a separate and distinct intent in the kidnapping statute. See § 787.01(l)(a)(3), Fla.Stat....

...ne previously convicted of a felony, or subject to certain other disqualifiers, is itself a felony.11 If the felon 7 Fla. Stat. §§ 787.02(2), 775.082(3)(d). 8 State v. Sanborn, 533 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1988). 9 Fla. Stat. §§ 787.01(2), 775.082(3)(b). 10 Fla. Stat. § 787.01(1)(a) reads in full: (1)(a) The term “kidnapping” means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against her or his will, with intent to: 1....

...3.140(d)(1), (o). We grant the petition as to the double jeopardy violation only and remand for the trial court to vacate the conviction and sentence for the lesser offense. We also direct the trial court to correct the citation error in the judgment to refer to the proper subsection of the kidnapping statute, section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Granted in part and remanded with directions. 1 Which offense constitutes the lesser, may not be entirely settled....

...Voluntary intoxication is a defense to felony murder when the underlying felony is a specific-intent crime. Linehan v. State, 476 So.2d 1262 (Fla.1985). Kidnapping is a specific-intent crime. Heddleson v. State, 512 So.2d 957 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Mullin v. State, 425 So.2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); see § 787.01, Fla.Stat....

...478 court this was the maximum permitted by the 1990 guidelines. In a motion to correct sentencing error, appellant argued that armed kidnapping was improperly scored as a life felony when in fact it was a first degree felony punishable by life. See § 787.01(2), Fla....

...use those offenses should have been reclassified to life felonies. We affirm, without discussion, as to all except the last issue. Among other offenses, appellant was charged with, and convicted of, kidnapping while armed with a firearm. Pursuant to section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (1991), one who commits the offense of kidnapping is guilty of a first-degree felony, punishable by a term of years not exceeding life in prison....

or to terrorize the victim or another person.” § 787.01(l)(a)3, Fla. Stat. (2014). Defendant’s captivity

...ectly in the appellate court. It is thus an inappropriate remedy and an abuse of procedure. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition. Petition to Invoke All Writs' Jurisdiction DISMISSED. COBB and HARRIS, JJ., concur. . § 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2001) . § 787.01, Fla....

...Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. FARMER, Judge. When the legislature enacts a statute that is clear and unambiguous, there is still the problem of how this clear statute will be applied to varying factual situations. The criminal kidnapping statute is a case in point. See § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

...State, 448 So.2d 628 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). We thus grant rehearing and reverse that part of the sentences imposing the mandatory minimum sentences for use of a firearm. In all other respects our original opinion stands. GUNTHER and KLEIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), says: "The term `kidnapping' means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...R CURIAM. Defendant, Robert Morgan, appeals his judgments and sentences which were imposed by the trial court after a jury found defendant guilty on four counts of sexual battery, section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1989), one count of kidnapping, section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1989), and one count of aggravated battery, section 784.-045(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...the evidence. Kidnapping is defined as “forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ... inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim_” § 787.01(l)(a)3, Fla.Stat....

BROWNING, J. A jury found Demetrice Conelle Spencer, the appellant, guilty of one count of carjacking without a weapon, a violation of section 812.133(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997); and two counts of kidnapping without a weapon, a violation of section 787.01(l)(a)l, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...The trial court orally adjudicated the appellant guilty in accordance with the jury verdict and imposed concurrent sentences of 35 years in prison. However, the written judgment erroneously lists the carjacking statute subsection as 812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes 1 , and the kidnapping statute subsection as 787.01(l)(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

...mum. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the convictions and REMAND with directions to the trial court to correct the judgment to reflect carjacking without a weapon pursuant to section 812.133(2)(b), Florida Statutes; and kidnapping without a weapon pursuant to section 787.01(l)(a)l., Florida Statutes; and to RESENTENCE the appellant on the carjacking conviction to no more than 30 years. The sentences for kidnapping without a weapon are AFFIRMED. See § 787.01(2), Fla....

bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim,” see § 787.01(l)(a)3, evidence that the defendant uttered the

...rs of age or older and the victim was younger than 18 years of age at the time the offender committed the primary offense, and if the primary offense was an offense committed on or after October 1, 2014, and is a violation of s. 787.01(2) or s. 787.02(2), if the violation involved a victim who was a minor and, in the course of committing that violation, the defendant committed a sexual battery under chapter 794 or a lewd act under s. 800.04 or s. 847.0135(5) against the minor; s. 787.01(3)(a) 2....

...ld is met. The parties disagree as to both portions on appeal. First, the State argues that the adult-on-minor multiplier was not applicable to Millien’s sentencing because the multiplier applies only when there has been a violation of either section 787.01(2) or section 787.02(2), Florida Statutes, and a violation of one of the various sexual offenses listed....

...(i) the offender was 18 years of age or older and the victim was younger than 18 years of age at the time the offender committed the primary offense; and (ii) the primary offense was committed on or after October 1, 2014, and is a violation of: a. section 787.01(2) (kidnapping) or 787.02(2) (false imprisonment), Florida Statutes, if in the course of committing the kidnapping or false imprisonment the defendant committed a sexual battery under chapter 794, Florida Statutes, or a lewd act under section 800.04 or 847.0135(5), Florida Statutes, against the victim; b. section 787.01(3)(a)2....

governmental or political function,” as proscribed by section 787.01(l)(a)(4), ■ Florida Statutes (2011). Although

...that a jury might fairly and reasonably infer from the evidence.” Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 1974). Our standard of review for a motion of acquittal is de novo. Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002). Geralyn Graham was indicted for violating section 787.01(1)(a)4., Florida Statutes (2000)....

...Geralyn Graham’s second argument is that the kidnapping statute under which she was charged does not apply to this situation. Graham argues that her alleged removal of Rilya from the home did not “interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function.” § 787.01(1)(a)4., Fla....

...being construed is ambiguous. Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157 (Fla. 1931)). The subject kidnapping statute is written in plain and unambiguous terms. The significant language of section 787.01(1)(a)4....

...opinion could result in prosecution for kidnapping whenever a person interferes with a state agency’s custody of a child or removes a child from the state contrary to an order of a state agency or court. The kidnapping statute under which Geralyn Graham was charged, section 787.01(1)(a)4., more appropriately encompasses the totality and gravity of Geralyn Graham’s felonious conduct than the crimes defined in sections 787.02 (false imprisonment), 787.03 (interference with custody), and 787.04 (removal of child from state)....

...787.04) are not necessarily forcible, secret, by threat, or against the will of the child. Geralyn Graham’s violent acts toward Rilya, combined with her deliberate, orchestrated effort to mislead DCF officials and interfere with DCF’s duties, implicated section 787.01 foremost....

...performance of any governmental function, to wit: The care, custody and responsibility for the welfare, safety and whereabouts of RILYA WILSON by the Department of Children and Families, a duly authorized agency of the State of Florida, in violation of s. 787.01(1) & (2), Florida Statutes....

...s without the consent of his parent or legal guardian. (3) Whoever kidnaps a person is guilty of a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in chapter 775. § 787.01, Fla....

...Rather, the State alleged that, by removing the child from the custody of the Department of Children and Families, Graham acted with the intent to “interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function.” I conclude that the relevant statutory language of section 787.01(1)(d) (“with intent to . . . [i]nterfere with the performance of any governmental or political function”) is ambiguous and, in light of the overall statutory scheme of Chapter 787, Florida Statutes9; the history and source of the 9 See and compare § 787.01, Fla....

...or of the vault. The record also indicates that Patak ordered three other employees at gunpoint to lie on the bank floor, and then sprayed them with pepper spray or mace. Patak admitted that he sprayed the pepper spray or mace to aid his escape. See § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

lesser-included offense of conspiracy to kidnap under Section 787.01(1)(a)(3). We do not reach the merits of this

...Previously, upon the proposal of the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (Committee), the Court authorized for publication and use amendments to instructions 9.1 (Kidnapping) and 9.2 (False Imprisonment) in response to recent amendments to section 787.01(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), and section 787.02(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2014)....

...n of the Committee and are not necessarily indicative of the views of this Court as to their correctness or applicability. It is so ordered. LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. APPENDIX 9.1 KIDNAPPING § 787.01, Fla....

...Read only if confinement is alleged and victim is under 13 years of age. Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is against the child’s will if such confinement is without the consent of the child’s parent or legal guardian. If a violation of § 787.01(3), Fla....

...ercial Sexual Activity in which [a Child under the Age of 18] [a Mentally Defective Person] [or] [a Mentally Incapacitated Person] was Involved]. Define applicable felony unless included in other instructions. Lesser Included Offenses KIDNAPPING — 787.01 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...Previously, upon the proposal of the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (Committee), the Court authorized for publication and use amendments to instructions 9.1 (Kidnapping) and 9.2 (False Imprisonment) in response to recent amendments to section 787.01(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), and section 787.02(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2014)....

...venth Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, Responding with Comments -3-  APPENDIX 9.1 KIDNAPPING § 787.01, Fla....

...Read only if confinement is alleged and victim is under 13 years of age. Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is against the child’s will if such confinement is without the consent of the child’s parent or legal guardian. If a violation of § 787.01(3), Fla....

...[or] [a Mentally Incapacitated Person] was Involved]. Define applicable felony unless included in other instructions. -5-  Lesser Included Offenses KIDNAPPING — 787.01 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr. Judge. At trial, the jury returned a verdict finding appellant guilty on Count I, sexual battery with a deadly weapon in violation of section 794.011(3) and on Count IV, kidnapping in violation of section 787.01(l)(a)....

...Motions for Judgment of Acquittal Rancourt first contends the trial court should have granted his motions for judgment of acquittal on the charge of kidnapping because the victim left the bar with him voluntarily and did not physically resist when he removed her from the car. Section 787.01(l)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1999), defines kidnapping as “forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: ......

...We agree for the reason stated below that he is entitled to such credits, and reverse. In 1988, Bishop pled guilty to kidnapping and was sentenced to forty years in prison. In the information filed against him, the kidnapping charge stated in pertinent part that Bishop did, in violation of Florida Statute 787.01, forcibly, secretly, or by threat confine, abduct, or imprison [name deleted], a child under the age of thirteen (13) years old, against her will and without lawful authority, with intent to commit or facilitate commission of a felony, to-wit: Sexual Battery or a Lewd Act....

support convictions of armed kidnapping under section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1995), in addition to robbery

...The gun went off when the defendant took the car keys from Ms. Boyd, but she was not hit. The defendant then got into Ms. Boyd’s car and drove away, with the baby in the back seat. The defendant was charged with armed robbery and armed kidnapping. The kidnapping was charged under Section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...victim was younger than 18 years of age at the time the offender committed the primary offense; and (ii) the primary offense was committed on or after October 1, 2014, and is a violation of: a. section 787.01(2) (kidnapping) or 787.02(2) (false imprisonment), Florida Statutes, if in the course of committing the kidnapping or false imprisonment the defendant committed a sexual battery under chapter 794, Florida Statutes, or a lewd act under section 800.04 or 847.0135(5), Florida Statutes, against the victim; b. section 787.01(3)(a)2....

2 added). Section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (2021), provides: “A person

...45, Florida Statutes (1983); and the tying-up of the victim is an inherent element of the charged offense of kidnapping, i.e., “forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will • ••[»]” § 787.01, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The defendant suggests the use of the inaccurate scoresheet was not harmless. He requests that we reverse and remand for a new sentencing. 1 o The Scoresheet Errors o Level of Offense Kidnapping is a first degree felony, punishable up to life and is ranked as a level nine offense. §§ 787.01(2); 921.0022(3)(i), Fla....

...State, 217 So. 3d 210, 213 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)) (quoting Brooks v. State, 969 So. 2d 238, 241 (Fla. 2007)). First, both the defendant and State agree that the judgment contains a scrivener’s error in the statute referenced. The judgment references § 787.01(a), Fla. Stat (2017), but it should read § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

...pe in violation of section 944.40, Florida Statutes (1985), robbery in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1985), burglary of a dwelling in violation of section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1985), and two counts of kidnapping in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...From the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have found that the alleged kidnappings were committed in order to facilitate the escape or the robbery, or both, and the jury was so instructed. See Ayendes v. State, 385 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA), petition for review denied, 392 So.2d 1371 (1980); § 787.01, Fla.Stat....

POLEN, Judge. Appellant Pabon seeks review of the entry of a sentence of life imprisonment for the crime of attempted armed kidnapping in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1987), count I, and ten years’ imprisonment for the crime of aggravated assault in violation of section 784.021, Florida Statutes (1987), count II....

...instructions and asks that the Court authorize the amended standard instructions.1 We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. The Committee proposes amending instruction 9.1 (Kidnapping) and 9.2 (False Imprisonment), in response to recent amendments to section 787.01(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), and 787.02(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2014)....

...are required or will be accepted. -3- for Petitioner -4-  APPENDIX 9.1 KIDNAPPING § 787.01, Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Kidnapping, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1....

...Read only if confinement is alleged and victim is under 13 years of age. Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is against the child’s will if such confinement is without the consent of the child’s parent or legal guardian. If a violation of § 787.01(3), Fla....

...[or] [a Mentally Incapacitated Person] was Involved]. Define applicable felony unless included in other instructions. -6-  Lesser Included Offenses KIDNAPPING — 787.01 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...one in the apartment. Leaving with E.L., Diez removed Eunice’s handcuffs, pointed the gun at her, told her not to call the police and that he would shoot her if she moved. Diez then drove E.L. to the grandparents in Miami. Kidnapping is defined in section 787.01(l)(a), Florida Statutes, in relevant part, as “forcibly, secretly or by threat confining, abducting or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ......

...In August 1998, appellant snatched a seven-year-old girl as she was walking to a park with her eleven-year-old sister. He carried her off and took her in his car to an abandoned road where he vaginally and anally penetrated her. In 1999, a jury convicted appellant of aggravated kidnapping in violation of section 787.01(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1997) 1 and lewd, lascivious, or indecent act upon a child under sixteen in violation of section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Angel Maldonado Melendez appeals his conviction for kidnapping with a firearm, arguing the facts were insufficient to establish confinement. Melendez recognizes the three-part test in Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla.1983), 1 is inapplicable because he was charged under section 787.01(1)(a)3., Florida Statutes, 2 not under section 787.01(1)(a)2., kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of any felony....

...doubt: (1) Kirkman forcibly, secretly, or by threat, confined, abducted, or imprisoned Darice against her will; (2) Kirkman had no lawful authority to do so; and (3) Kirkman acted with intent to inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize Darice or another person. See § 787.01(1)(a), Fla....

...This is an appeal from an adjudication of guilty of conspiracy, attempted kidnapping, attempted robbery and resisting arrest with violence. The brief and argument of the appellant are addressed only to the convictions for conspiracy and attempted kidnapping. Appellant’s first point is directed to the constitutionality of Section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1975), which defines the crime of kidnapping....

...isonment provides: (l)(a) “False imprisonment” means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in § 787.01. Section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1981), defines the crime of kidnapping and provides in relevant part: (l)(a) ‘Kidnapping’ means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...This case originated when the appellant was charged by information with sexual battery by use of actual physical force likely to cause serious injury, contrary to section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1983), and kidnapping with intent to commit sexual battery, contrary to section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (1983)....

with intent to commit a felony in violation of section 787.01(l)(a)2. The victim was fourteen years old at

...(“Any woman inmate who gives birth to a child during her term of imprisonment may be temporarily 5 It should be noted that Florida law only allows a custodial parent to be charged with kidnapping under certain specific enumerated circumstances. See Davila v. State, 75 So. 3d 192, 196 (Fla. 2011); see also § 787.01, Fla....

...The State alleged the defendant kidnapped each of the victims by “forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning” them against their will and without lawful authority with the intent to “[c]ommit or facilitate [the] commission of” the underlying burglary and robberies, in violation of section 787.01(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2015). The evidence presented at trial primarily centered on the issue of identity—whether the defendant was one of the perpetrators of the crimes. However, because the evidence presented to the jury es...

...co-conspirator, Manuel Marin. Gandulla drove off in Isaac’s rented pickup truck, leaving Isaac with Marin and the captive victim. We conclude that this direct testimony from Gandulla constitutes competent, substantial evidence to support the kidnapping conviction. See § 787.01(1)(a)3., Fla....

...The balance of Jackson’s arguments lack merit or constitute claims which should have been raised on direct appeal or in the prior rule 3.850 motion. AFFIRMED. PALMER, WILLIAM D., Associate Judge, and HARRIS, CHARLES C., Senior Associate Judge, concur. . § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. . § 787.01(l)(a)(3), Fla....

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge. The state appeals from an order granting the defendant’s “(c)(4)” motion to dismiss a count of an information charging kidnapping under section 787.01(l)(a)2 1 , Florida Statutes (1993), by confining the five-year-old victim to facilitate the commission of a robbery....

...ndant took the child from an at least semi-public waiting room to a private examining room of a doctor’s office, where she took jewelry from the child, may be found to have constituted an imprisonment (by definition, against the will of the child, § 787.01(l)(b), Fla.Stat....

...1st DCA 1993), review denied, 639 So.2d 976 (Fla.1994); Tutt v. State, 620 So.2d 1110 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Gay v. State, 607 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), review denied, 620 So.2d 760 (Fla.1993); Rodriguez v. State, 558 So.2d 211 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). . 787.01 Kidnapping; kidnapping of child under age 13, aggravating circumstances (l)(a) The term "kidnapping” means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: ⅜ ⅜ ⅝ * * ⅜ 2....

...(A MINOR) against that person's will and/or said victim being under the age of thirteen (13) years and said confinement was without the consent of said victim’s parent or legal guardian, with the intent to commit or facilitate the commission of any felony, to wit: ROBBERY, in violation of s. 787.01, Fla....

...ant, by force, had sexual intercourse with the older sister. At one point the defendant forced the older sister, while naked, to pass through the room where the eight year old sister was located. The defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping (§ 787.01(3)(a)3., Fla.Stat.), and appeals. Section 787.01(3)(a)3., Florida Statutes, provides: A person who commits the offense of kidnapping upon a child under the age of 13 and who, in the course of committing the offense, commits one or more of the following: * * * * * * 3....

...unger sister. Even the rape of the older sister in the adjoining room occurred within the sensory presence of the child and was alone sufficient to violate section 800.04(3), Florida Statutes, and to constitute the predicate crime for a violation of section 787.01(3)(a)3., Florida Statutes....

AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH, C. J., and COWART, J., concur. . § 787.01(l)(a)2, Fla.Stat. (1979). . § 794.011(3), Fla

...was slight, inconsequential, and merely incidental to the robbery. Kidnapping means “forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another ... with intent to commit or facilitate commission of any felony. Florida Statutes, § 787.01(l)(a)(2)(1985)....

...the evidence on that charge was legally insufficient because "the victim was ordered into the bathroom only a few feet away, and was not confined by [Cole]." The trial court denied that motion as well. Cole now raises the same issue in this appeal. Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), defines the term "kidnapping" as: forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: *1012 * * * * (2) Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. While this statutory definition appears straightforward, the supreme court has recognized that "a literal interpretation of subsection 787.01(1)(a)2 would result in a kidnapping conviction for `any criminal transaction which inherently involves the unlawful confinement of another person, such as robbery or sexual battery.'" Berry v....

...them. Even though the issue of sufficiency of the evidence to prove a kidnapping occurred may not have been sufficiently preserved or presented at trial, 4 we think the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to establish Kent committed that crime. Section 787.01(l)(a) defines “kidnapping” to mean: [FJorcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ......

...Further, a palm print taken from the headboard of the victim’s bed where the sexual battery took place matched Kent’s and DNA evidence established Kent had raped her. AFFIRMED. COBB, J., concurs. DAUKSCH, J., concurs specially with opinion. . § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993). . § 787.01(1)(a)2, Fla....

years. There may have been some confusion in that § 787.01, Fla.Stat. (1977) — the statute in force at the

...Tallahassee, and Marilyn Muir Beccue, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. LaROSE, Judge. A jury convicted Jesse Lee Solomon, III, of (1) kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person, § 787.01(1)(a)(3), Fla....

...] forcibly, secretly, or by threat [2] confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person [3] against his or her will and without lawful authority [4] with intent to . . . [i]nflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person." § 787.01(1)(a)(3)....

(2001), kidnapping with a knife in violation of section 787.01 of the Florida Statutes (2001), and two counts

...3 Defendant’s argument is correct as to his armed kidnapping conviction and sentence only. Defendant was charged, by information, with (a) two counts of armed sexual battery, pursuant to section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (2006), 4 and (b) one count of armed kidnapping, pursuant to section 787.01(l)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2006), 5 and section 775.087(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Therefore, the trial court did not err in adjudicating defendant guilty on two counts of armed sexual battery and in sentencing him to life in prison since armed sexual battery is a life felony. See § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. With regards to kidnapping, section 787.01(l)(a)2. does not provide, as part of the elements for kidnapping, that a defendant may be convicted of armed kidnapping by using or threatening to use a deadly weapon. Moreover, on its own, kidnapping is a first-degree felony. See § 787.01(2), Fla....

...threatens to use a deadly weapon or uses actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury commits a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 794.0115. § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). . Section 787.01(l)(a)2....

...states: "(l)(a) The term 'kidnapping' means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ... 2. Commit or facilitate commission of any felony.” § 787.01(l)(a)2„ Fla....

...in prison to a life felony pursuant to section 775.087(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1991). We agree, and the State concedes, as the record shows that the jury did not expressly find a weapon used during the kidnapping. Because kidnapping in violation of section 787.01 is a first degree felony punishable by a term of years up to life in prison, the thirty year sentence imposed on Sosa is permissible....

...anied by a written statement reflecting the reasons for departing from the guidelines. Murray, 491 So.2d at 1123 ; Junco, 540 So.2d at 900 . Accordingly, we affirm the convictions, but remand for reclassification of the kidnapping charge pursuant to section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1993), and for appropriate resen-tencing of the robbery charge....

...pose. Defendant need not be present. Affirmed; direct conflict certified; remanded for correction of judgment. 4 . Defendant’s conviction on count 4, kidnapping, was enhanced to a life felony because of the use of a firearm during the crime. See §§ 787.01, 775.087(1), Fla....

...Mancino, 714 So.2d 429 (Fla.1998). The State agreed with defendant that he was entitled to correction of this error and recalculation of the scoresheet. Without the enhancement, the kidnapping *558 count became a first-degree felony punishable by'life imprisonment. See § 787.01(2), Fla....

...ount 1, second degree murder, see § 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (1989); count 2, armed robbery, see id. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Slat.; count 3, burglary of an occupied structure with a firearm and assault, see id. § 810.02(2); count 4, kidnapping, see id. § 787.01(2)....

...nies under the habitual offender statute. The trial court denied this claim as to the armed robbery and kidnapping convictions correctly finding that both are first-degree felonies absent any enhancement or reclassification, see § 812.13(2) (a) and § 787.01(2), Fla....

...2 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. FULMER, A.C.J., and GREEN, J., Concur. . Both are also punishable by life absent ha-bitualization. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995) (providing that armed robbery with a firearm is a first-degree felony punishable by life); § 787.01(2), Fla....

...Thus, the Defendant was convicted of a Life felony and his scoresheet correctly calculates that as his primary offense.... 2. A jury found the Defendant guilty of kidnapping as charged in Count 5 of the information. [3] The crime of kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by life. See Fla. Stat. 787.01 [1989]....

...intertwined, it would have been admissible as an element of the kidnapping charge. To prove the crime of kidnapping, the State had to prove that the appellant kidnapped the victim by confining or imprisoning her with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize her. § 787.01(1)(a)3., Fla....

...violation of probation. We affirm the judgments for all offenses and the sentences for violation of probation and robbery with a deadly weapon, however, we remand the sentence for armed kidnapping. *449 Armed kidnapping is a life felony. § 775.087, § 787.01 Florida Statutes (1991)....

PATTERSON, Judge. Of the four issues presented by the appellant, only one merits discussion. Luis Rivera was charged with and convicted of capital sexual battery and kidnapping. The information charges Rivera with kidnapping under section 787.01(l)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1985), a first degree felony. This section is recited in the judgment as well. However, Rivera’s guidelines scoresheet shows the conviction as a life felony. The child involved in this case was only eleven. Section 787.01(3)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1985), provides that a person who kidnaps a child under the age of 13 with intent to commit sexual battery has committed a life felony....

...d for a second-degree felony is thirty years. On resentencing, Cooper was sentenced to thirty years. Cooper now claims that the court’s enhancement and habitual violent felony offender sentences on the convictions for armed kidnaping were illegal. Section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (1995), states that kidnaping is a first-degree felony punishable by a term of years not exceeding life....

was charged with kidnapping in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1991), count one; sexual

...other person, (d) interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function. This instruction requires a jury to find an accused not guilty of false imprisonment if he acts for one of the purposes enumerated in the kidnapping statute, section 787.01(1), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...This section provides: “The term ‘false imprisonment’ means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in s. 787.01.” The evidence in this case indicated that the seven victims were falsely imprisoned in order to facilitate the commission of the other crimes for which the appellant was being tried, i.e....

...Sanborn, 533 So.2d 1169 (Fla.1988), the supreme court said the crimes of kidnapping and false imprisonment are identical except for the question of intent. The court found that the general intent of section 787.02(l)(a), false imprisonment, is included in the specific intent of section 787.01(l)(a) kidnapping, and that consequently false imprisonment is a necessarily lesser included offense of the crime of kidnapping....

...Davis was convicted of kidnapping with a firearm. Additionally, the judgment incorrectly designates the kidnapping offense to which she pled as a life felony, rather than a first degree felony punishable for a term of years not exceeding life. See § 787.01(2), Fla....

THREADGILL, Acting Chief Judge. Billy Chester Hinson was convicted of kidnapping in violation of section 787.01(l)(a)2, Florida Statutes (1991), a first degree felony punishable by life, and two counts of sexual battery in violation of section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1991), a life felony....

...Prior to 1993, false, imprisonment was defined as confinement against a person’s will for any purpose other than those listed in the kidnapping statute. See § 787.02, Fla. Stat. (1991). The kidnapping statute included confinement with the intent to “[cjommit or facilitate commission of any felony.” § 787.01(l)(a)2, Fla....

...and remand to the trial court. On remand, the trial court should examine appellant’s judgment and sentence for false imprisonment to determine if appellant’s allegation is true. If, as appellant contends, the judgment and sentence does refer to section 787.01, the kidnapping statute, then the trial court must correct it to reflect the appropriate section number, section 787.02....

...as corpus, Patricio Nino asserts that his judgment improperly reflects that he was convicted of a weapons violation in connection with his kidnaping conviction. The kidnaping conviction on the judgment makes reference to both the kid-naping statute, section 787.01, Fla....

...Count II of the indictment charged appellant with armed kidnapping, alleging that appellant and “others unknown” kidnapped the victim against his will “and in the course thereof, there was carried a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife, contrary to Sections 787.01(a) [sic], 787.01(2) and 775.087(1)(a), (L10), of the Florida Statutes.” The jury was instructed that one of the elements of armed kidnapping was that “a weapon was carried in the course of committing the kidnapping.” The jury found appellant...

...He contends that his conviction must be reduced to kidnapping and the cause remanded for resentencing. Discussion “Whether an error is fundamental is a de novo determination.” Terrien v. State, 94 So. 3d 648, 649 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Section 787.01, Florida Statutes, governs the crime of kidnapping, which is a first-degree felony punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life. § 787.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). Section 787.01 makes no distinction between armed and unarmed kidnapping. However, section 775.087(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that when a person is charged with a first-degree felony in which the use of a weapon or firearm is not a...

opinion. . § 794.011(5), Fla.Stat. (1989). . § 787.01, Fla.Stat. (1989). . § 831.02, Fla.Stat. (1989)

...to charge a crime so that a conviction for armed kidnapping could not be predicated thereon, even though no motion to dismiss this count of the information was ever filed below. The kidnapping count in the instant information specifically referenced section 787.01, Florida Statutes. Since that section defines the elements of the offense of kidnapping, including the intent to “[cjommit or facilitate commission of any felony,” § 787.01(l)(a)2., Fla.Stat....

...3d at 227 (quoting Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)). The State charged Allen with first-degree felony murder during the course of a kidnapping, and kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm or terrorize the victim. See §§ 782.04 (1)(a)2.f.; 787.01(1)(a)3., Fla....

...First-degree felony murder is “[t]he unlawful killing of a human being: [w]hen committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, a - 20 - kidnapping . . . ” § 782.04(1)(a)2.f., Fla. Stat. (2005). Section 787.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), defines kidnapping as the follows: The term “kidnapping” means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1....

...and her body was bruised. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction of kidnapping with the intent to “inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person,” and that the kidnapping was not merely incidental to the killing. See §787.01(1)(a)3., Fla....

...1982); Sanders v. State, 905 So. 2d 271, 272 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Mackerley v. State, 754 So. 2d 132, 137 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In Faison, the following test was applied when a defendant was charged with two crimes, one of which was kidnapping under section 787.01(a)(2), “if a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement”: (a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and mer...

...(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection. Faison, 426 So. 2d at 965. The decision in Faison is limited to kidnapping under section 787.01(a)(2). When a defendant is charged with confining, abducting or - 22 - imprisoning with the intent to “inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize” under section 787.01(1)(a)3., Faison, has no application....

years not exceeding life. However, pursuant to section 787.-01(2), Florida Statutes, kidnapping is punishable

...ement purposes. State v. Tripp, 642 So.2d 728 (Fla.1994). Since there was no specific jury finding of use of a firearm, Toro’s conviction for kidnapping cannot be reclassified as a life felony. The kidnapping offense is a first degree felony under section 787.01(2), Florida Statutes (1993), and a defendant who has been convicted of a first degree felony can have his punishment enhanced to life imprisonment when he is found to be a habitual felony offender....

...The state concedes, and we agree, that the order of restitution must be reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Dubois v. State, 650 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). While on remand, the lower court is instructed to enter a corrected judgment deleting the reference to section “787.01'’, a non-existent statute, and adding the correct statutory reference....