Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 812.133
CopyCited 114 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 428, 1997 Fla. LEXIS 1017, 1997 WL 378626
...At the time (defendant) appeared to have the ability to carry out the threat. 3. The act of (defendant) created in the mind of (victim) a well-founded fear that the violence was about to take place. 4. (Victim) was at the time 65 years of age or older. (13) CARJACKING F.S. 812.133 [New] Before you can find the defendant guilty of carjacking, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Elements 1....
CopyCited 78 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 3101858
...n: when a sentencing error is raised under rule 3.800(a), which harmless error test applies? The courts answered the question differently. In the case under review, Brooks pled no contest to carjacking without a firearm a first-degree felony. See § 812.133(1)-(2)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2004 WL 524922
...See §
775.21(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The crime of kidnapping does not by definition contain a sexual component. See §
787.01, Fla. Stat. (1999) (defining kidnapping). Neither does carjacking, the other crime of which he was convicted. See §
812.133, Fla....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 87367
...For the following reasons, we conclude that double jeopardy does not bar convictions and punishments for robbery and carjacking. FACTS Petitioner James Cruller was convicted of robbery without a firearm in violation of section
812.13, Florida Statutes (1995), and carjacking without a firearm in violation of section
812.133, Florida Statutes (1995)....
...rom the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. Section 812.133(1), Florida Statutes (1995), defines "carjacking" as the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the o...
...or robbery and carjacking, where the offenses are predicated on a single underlying criminal transaction. See State v. Anderson,
695 So.2d 309, 311 (Fla.1997). As the First District explained in Ward: Armed carjacking with a firearm is proscribed by section
812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995).......
...rson or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. Moreover, section 812.133(1) defines "carjacking" as the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle,...
...The only difference between the two offenses of robbery and carjacking is that robbery involves the taking of "money or other property which may be the subject of larceny," §
812.13, Fla. Stat.; whereas, carjacking is limited to "the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny." §
812.133, Fla....
...The Third District held that under the circumstances the defendant properly was "convicted and sentenced for both armed robbery of the personal effects under section
812.13(2)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1993), and the armed carjacking of a different item, the vehicle, which is forbidden by a different statute, section
812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)." Id....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 561685
...of aggravated assault with a firearm in violation of section
784.021(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), (count I), kidnaping with a firearm in violation of section
787.01, Florida Statutes (1999), (count II), car jacking with a firearm in violation of section
812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), (count III), robbery with a firearm in violation of section
812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), (count V), and possession of a firearm during the *1173 commission of the other four felonies in violation of section
790.07(2), Florida Statutes (1999), (count IV)....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 21359657
..."Carjacking" means the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. § 812.133(1), Fla....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 99229
...At one point while they were in possession of the Jeep, they had been approached by a police officer behind a Miami Subs in Hollywood. The state charged Williams with carjacking and third degree murder. The carjacking was charged as a first degree felony under section 812.133(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2000)....
...offense, nor does it change the analysis courts should apply when viewing theft for other purposes, such as venue or jurisdiction. AFFIRMED. KLEIN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This court has jurisdiction. See Fla. R.App.P. 9.140(c)(1)(E). [2] Section 812.133, Florida Statutes (2000) provides: (1) "Carjacking" means the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or...
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 22023174
...Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. THOMPSON, J. Bernard Leon Allen appeals an order changing his mandatory minimum sentence from three years to ten years. We affirm. Allen was convicted of carjacking with a firearm in violation of section 812.133, Florida Statutes (2000)....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 675130
...Minerva, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Brian Durden appeals his conviction and sentence for carjacking while armed with a deadly weapon. See § 812.133, Fla....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 119083
...s, he was properly convicted and sentenced for both armed robbery of the personal effects under section
812.13(2)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1993), and the armed carjacking of a different item, the vehicle, which is forbidden by a different statute, section
812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 224936
...ransaction or episode, double jeopardy bars separate convictions and sentences unless each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not. See M.P. v. State,
682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996). Armed carjacking with a firearm is proscribed by section
812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)....
...Accordingly, double jeopardy precludes convictions for both offenses. Armed robbery with a firearm and armed carjacking with a firearm are both first-degree felonies punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life. §§
812.13(2)(a) &
812.133(2)(a), Fla....
...s, he was properly convicted and sentenced for both armed robbery of the personal effects under section
812.13(2)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1993), and the armed carjacking of a different item, the vehicle, which is forbidden by a different statute, section
812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 657, 2013 WL 5270683, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 2025
...For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the building in question constitutes a dwelling under section
810.011(2), Florida Statutes (2009) and approve the Fifth District’s denial of relief. We further conclude that Young’s actions constitute a carjacking under section
812.133, Florida Statutes (2009)....
...The information further alleged that Young took certain property from the victim, in violation of sections
812.13(2)(a) and
775.087(2), Florida Statutes (2009); that he took the victim’s motor vehicle by force, violence, assault or putting in fear, in violation of sections
812.133(1),
812.133(2)(a) and
775.087(2), Florida Statutes (2009); and that he did have in his care, custody, control or possession a firearm, after previously being convicted of a felony in violation of section
790.23, Florida Statutes (2009)....
...y from the person or custody of another, [2] with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, [3] when in the course of the taking there is use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” § 812.133(1), Fla....
...The Fourth District concluded that the robbery was not an afterthought, but that the “beating of [the victim] intertwined with the taking of the taxicab in time and place, so that the use of force occurred ‘in the course of the taking’ within the meaning of section 812.133(3)(b),” and therefore constituted a carjacking....
...The Legislature has determined that “[a]n act shall be deemed ‘in the course of the taking’ if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events.” § 812.133(3)(b), Fla....
...We find that the putting in fear of the victim in order to take the victim’s keys before walking outside and driving away in the victim’s car constitutes a continuous series of events, as to classify the fear as being within the course of taking the vehicle, within the meaning of section 812.133(3)(b)....
...This argument is not persuasive in light of the Legislature’s definition of what constitutes “in the course of taking.” To allow these criminal acts to be so easily separated would render the Legislature’s definition of “in the course of taking” meaningless. See § 812.133(3)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 12152, 2011 WL 3300103
...775.083, or s.
775.084. (b) If in the course of committing the carjacking the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon, then the carjacking is a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. §
812.133, Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). Here, the information alleged that Deleon possessed a firearm during the offense, citing section
812.133, but the jury was instructed that it could find him guilty of carjacking with a deadly weapon as a lesser-included offense....
...the evidence; the victim testified that Deleon carried a gun, and there was no evidence that he carried any other weapon during the commission of the offense. We reject the State's argument that because the information cited the applicable statute, section 812.133, Deleon was put on notice that he could be convicted of carjacking with deadly weapon....
...render an indictment so defective that it will not support a judgment of conviction when the indictment references a specific section of the criminal code which sufficiently details all the elements of the offense."). Although the information cited section 812.133, it specifically included the element of a firearm while it *395 specifically excluded the element of a deadly weapon....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2011 WL 2060061
...ect of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.133(1), Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 8252, 2014 WL 2217338
...ntal defect inherent in a verdict that finds the defendant guilty of violating the statute in the ways that were not charged. See Deleon,
66 So.3d at 394 (“We reject the State’s argument that because the information cited the applicable statute, section
812.133, Deleon was put on notice that he could be convicted of carjacking with deadly weapon”)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 755120
...It is evident from the record that the victim was in fear based upon the well-founded belief appellant was about to kill her. That is aggravated assault because he used a gun, a deadly weapon. §
784.021, Fla. Stat. (1993). CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED in part; REMANDED. COBB and ANTOON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §
812.133, Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 22047694
...Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present evidence of this subsequent crime to the jury. Finally, we agree with the appellant's argument that his carjacking charge should be reduced to grand theft. Carjacking has been defined in section 812.133(1), Florida Statutes (1999), as follows: "Carjacking" means the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person o...
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 16554, 2009 WL 3670707
...Carjacking involves the following elements: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle from the person or custody of another; (2) with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person of the motor vehicle; and (3) during the taking, there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. § 812.133(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). If, in the course of committing the carjacking, the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, the offense is a felony of the first degree. § 812.133(2)(a)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 1215595
...We reject appellant's contention that his motion for judgment of acquittal adequately preserved the argument that the state failed to prove all the elements of the offense of carjacking, [2] and we also reject his "fundamental error" argument. A careful reading of section 812.133, Florida *1143 Statutes (1997), undermines the assertion that his actions with regard to the Pontiac could not have constituted carjacking as a matter of law....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 827758
...custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. (Emphasis added.) Section
812.133(1), Florida Statutes (1995), defines carjacking nearly identically, replacing the emphasized language with the words "a motor vehicle." Section
775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), precludes multiple convictions when one offense co...
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 17694, 2009 WL 4060861
...from the person or custody of another, [2] with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, [3] when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." § 812.133(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). Section 812.133(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2007), further provides that "[a]n act shall be deemed `in the course of the taking' [under element 3] if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events." (Emphasis added.) Appellant focuses on the third element of section 812.133(1), arguing that his taking of the taxicab was an afterthought to the use of force against Laroche....
...ey." Id. at 570 n. 5. This case is distinguishable from Flores because appellant's beating of Laroche intertwined with the taking of the taxicab in time and place, so that the use of force occurred "in the course of the taking" within the meaning of section 812.133(3)(b)....
...Appellant turned off the car's ignition, engaged the victim about not paying the fare, beat the victim, took his glasses, and drove the taxicab away as the victim watched. Thus, the "use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear" occurred "prior to" the taking of the property in a "continuous series of acts or events." § 812.133(3)(b), Fla....
...ence involved in taking the keys may have . . . occurred `prior to' stealing the car, it took place within a logically interrelated `continuous series of acts or events,' and thus `in the course of the taking' of the vehicle itself as provided in subsection 812.133(3)(b)." Id....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 1062243
...Before COPE, GODERICH, and FLETCHER, JJ. PER CURIAM. Finding no merit in the defendant's contentions on appeal, we affirm his convictions and sentences for robbery without a firearm in violation of section
812.13, Florida Statutes (1995) and carjacking without a firearm in violation of section
812.133, Florida Statutes (1995)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 875598
...Because of what appears to have been a defect in the keys, he was unable to do so. Shortly thereafter he was grabbed by witnesses, disarmed, and held until the police arrived. We conclude that the taking of the car keys satisfied the "taking" element of the statute. Section 812.133, Florida Statutes (1997), does not require the accused's successful departure from the crime scene in the victim's car....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 7642, 2014 WL 2100805
...Appellant makes a confused claim that he was convicted of a “nonexistent offense” *32 because chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, was found to have violated the single subject requirement. See Heggs v. State,
759 So.2d 620, 621 (Fla.2000). However, this chapter law made no change to the carjacking statute. See §
812.133(2)(a), Fla....
...Appellant argues that he was convicted of life felonies that were not subject to habitualization before the amendment. See Lamont v. State,
610 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1992). 2 This claim is without merit as carjacking with a firearm and robbery with a firearm are first degree felonies punishable by life, not life felonies. §
812.133(2)(a), Fla....
...He seeks to capitalize on the Lamont anomaly and argues that this offense should have been reclassified to a life felony and thus not subject to habitualization. But, this statute is wholly inapplicable as the use of a firearm or deadly weapon was an essential element of the carjacking offense. § 812.133(2)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 2149626, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 7991
...Such a verdict occurs when a “not-guilty finding on one count negates an element on another count that is necessary for conviction.” Id. at 1221 . Here, the jury’s finding that Nettles did not possess a firearm negated the possession element necessary for conviction of carjacking with a firearm, section
812.133(2)(a), and robbery with a firearm, section
812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2011)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 2029418
...of his use of the firearm, we must vacate his conviction and sentence on the charge of possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The defendant was charged with committing the crimes of carjacking with a firearm in violation of sections
812.133 and
775.087(2) of the Florida Statutes (2000), burglary of dwelling with a firearm in violation of sections
810.02 and
775.087(2) of the Florida Statutes (2000), aggravated assault with a firearm in violation of sections
784.021(1)(a) and 775...
...the porch and ordered him inside the house, and the armed carjacking occurred later when the defendant took the victim's car keys and fled with the vehicle. We agree with the State. The statutory definition of the crime of carjacking is as follows: 812.133....
...larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. § 812.133, Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 1930656
...to the State, demonstrates that the victim could not have been subjected to "the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear during the course of the taking of the motor vehicle." Flores v. State,
853 So.2d 566, 569 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)(citing §
812.133(1), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 731362
...Thus, although Bright was sentenced for count seven as a Prison Releasee Reoffender and as a Habitual Felony Offender on another count, no error was shown here. AFFIRMED. PETERSON and SAWAYA, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In Case No. CR97-12781, Bright was charged with seven offenses; carjacking (§
812.133); kidnaping with intent to commit a felony (§
787.01(1)(a)2.); burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery (§
810.02(1), (2)(a), battery on a law enforcement officer (§
784.07(2)(b); resisting an officer with violence (§
843.01...
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 11352
...by sudden
snatching and carjacking each provide that the offense shall be classified as a higher-
degree offense if “in the course of committing” the crime the offender carries a
firearm or deadly weapon. See §§
812.13(2)(a),
812.131(2)(a),
812.133(2)(a), Fla.
Stat....
...the attempt or commission.
§
812.131(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015).
An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing the carjacking” if
it occurs in an attempt to commit carjacking or in flight after the attempt
or commission.
§
812.133(3)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 162742
...llant terrified an elderly woman, his fingerprints were on the car, and he had confessed to stealing the car. As the State argued at trial, although evidence of force was introduced, the State only had to prove that Appellant put the victim in fear. § 812.133, Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13655, 1995 WL 271582
...ors of this state, and WHEREAS, any person convicted of such felony, or a similar crime, should not have adjudication of guilt suspended, deferred, or withheld unless the offender successfully completes probation or community control; NOW THEREFORE. Section 812.133, Florida Statutes (1993), provides: (1) "Carjacking" means the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or...
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 1906102
...n the same criminal episode. Therefore, the trial judge should not be barred from imposing consecutive sentences, as long as the PRR sentence is served first. AFFIRMED. PALMER and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §§
787.01,
775.087, Fla. Stat. [2] §
812.133(2)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 31322534
...We find no merit in this issue, and further note that if there was error in the trial court's discretionary ruling on this matter, there was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the jury's verdict. State v. DiGuilio,
491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986). [2] §
812.133(1), Fla....
...[5] In reaching this conclusion, we note a distinction between the home invasion robbery of section
812.135(1), which subsumes the offense of a burglary by requiring, as an element, an entry into a dwelling with the intent to commit a robbery, and the carjacking offense of section
812.133(1), which merely requires the taking of a motor vehicle by force and does not require entry with an intent to commit an offense therein. See McAllister, above, in which the court ruled the offense of burglary is a subsumed offense of home invasion robbery. [1] Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299,
52 S.Ct. 180,
76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). [2] §§
812.133(1) and (2)(b);
775.087(1), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 2666, 2009 WL 790125
...MONACO, J., and PLEUS, R.J., Senior Judge, concur. NOTES [1] A violation of double jeopardy constitutes fundamental error which may be raised for the first time on appeal. Vasquez v. State,
778 So.2d 1068 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). [2] §
812.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006). [3] §
812.133(1) and (2)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 9680, 2004 WL 1474550
...rceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” § 812.133(1), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 1154006
...The offense of carjacking is "the taking of a motor vehicle ... with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear." Id. § 812.133(1)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 14627, 2006 WL 2516367
...propriate the motor vehicle of the victim to his own use or to the use of any person not entitled to it. See Fryer v. State,
732 So. 2d 30, 33 n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) ( citing Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases,
697 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1997); §
812.133, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 1175922
...Stat. (1999) ("If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm ... then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment."), and armed carjacking. § 812.133(2)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2017 WL 2814888, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 9420
...n is great, every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions.” Armed carjacking and robbery, with a firearm are first degree felonies punishable by life. § 812.133(2)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 10848, 2010 WL 2925356
...ce showed that the defendant had taken the car keys at gunpoint; but, due to a defect in the keys, he was unable to start the car and drive away. The Third District held "that the taking of the car keys satisfied the `taking' element of the statute. Section 812.133, Florida Statutes (1997), does not require the accused's successful departure from the crime scene in the victim's car." Id....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 3050415
...In the trial, appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal on both carjacking charges. He asserted there was no evidence he took possession or control of either Mr. Sausville's or Ms. Hunter's car, as required by statute. The trial court denied the motion. Section 812.133, Florida Statutes, provides: "Carjacking" means the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. See § 812.133(1), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 942034
...Before RAMIREZ and SALTER, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. The only salient issue on this appeal from multiple convictions and life sentences stemming from a brutal home invasion burglary-robbery-kidnapping concerns the validity of the defendant's conviction for carjacking under section 812.133, Florida Statutes (2003)....
...nce involved in taking the keys may have indeed occurred "prior to" stealing the car, it took place within a logically interrelated "continuous series of acts or events," and thus "in the course of the taking" of the vehicle itself as provided in subsection 812.133(3)(b)....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 13496, 2015 WL 5240538
...unconstitutionally allowed the judge, rather than the jury, to find that he
qualified as a PRR. We reject this last argument without further comment.
See Chapa v. State,
159 So. 3d 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
By way of background, Louima was charged with carjacking pursuant
to section
812.133, Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Cf. Deleon,
66 So. 3d at 394-95 ("We reject the State's
argument that because the information cited the applicable statute, . . . Deleon was put
on notice that he could be convicted of carjacking with deadly weapon. Although the
information cited section
812.133, it specifically included the element of a firearm while
it specifically excluded the element of a deadly weapon." (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)).
The State contends that "even if [it] had charged all three of t...
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 5658356, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 16589
...Therefore, we reverse the defendant’s conviction for carjacking with a firearm and direct the trial court to vacate that conviction and sentence. We affirm the defendant’s other convictions and sentences. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED. ORFINGER and BERGER, JJ., concur. . § 812.133, Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 17719, 2003 WL 22734827
...a vehicle. Here, as in Fotopoulos , “one crime induced the other crime,” see Smithers v. State,
826 So.2d 916, 923 (Fla.2002), and therefore “a sufficient causal link existed to permit joinder,” id. AFFIRMED. PLEUS and TORPY, JJ., concur. . §
812.133(2)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 4953, 1997 WL 231482
...life imprisonment or as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. (b) If in the course of committing the car jacking the offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon, then the car jacking is a felony of the first degree,.... §
812.133, Fla.Stat....
...This could have been part of the original plan, or a means to escape. Either satisfies the statute. These events constitute a continuous series of acts perpetrated by Ponds and his co-defendant, culminating in the taking of the vehicle. As such, they fit the statutory definition of car jacking in section 812.133(1), as well as the aggravated charge in subsection (2)(a), because Ponds was carrying a firearm....
...e prior, continuous events leading to the theft of the car. See Mason v. State,
665 So.2d 328 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Smart v. State,
652 So.2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), rev. denied,
660 So.2d 714 (Fla.1995). AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. . §
812.133(2)(a), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...weapon was a first-degree felony punishable by a maximum of
thirty years in prison absent any allegation or jury finding that he
carried a “firearm” or a “deadly weapon.” By operation of rule
3.800(b)(2)(B), the motion was “deemed denied.”
Section 812.133, Florida Statutes (2015), provides in
pertinent part:
(2)(a) If in the course of committing the carjacking
the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon,
then the carjacking is a felony of the first degree,...
...weapon, then the carjacking is a felony of the first degree,
punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084.
2
The possession of a firearm or deadly weapon is an essential
element of armed carjacking under section
812.133(2)(a). Jacobs v.
State,
162 So. 3d 29, 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). A defendant can only
be convicted of carjacking as a first-degree felony under section
812.133(2)(b)—rather than a first-degree felony punishable by life
under section
812.133(2)(a)—when the information omits any
allegation that the defendant was armed with a firearm or deadly
weapon during the carjacking....
...The maximum penalty for a felony of the
first-degree is thirty years under section
775.082(3)(b), Florida
Statutes (2015). See Spencer v. State,
780 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2001) (holding that the maximum sentence for unarmed
carjacking under section
812.133(2)(b) is thirty years).
Morris claims, and the state properly concedes, that he was
illegally sentenced to life in prison for carjacking with a “weapon,”
which was a first-degree felony punishable by a maximum of thirty
years in prison absent any allegation or jury finding that he carried
a “firearm” or “deadly weapon.” Even though section
812.133(2)(b)
sets forth the punishment for unarmed carjacking when “the
offender carried no firearm, deadly weapon, or other weapon,”
there is no crime defined for armed carjacking with such “other
weapon.” Under the rule of lenity,...
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 2946, 2001 WL 228022
...A few hours later, the Corvette was recovered, and Lovett was arrested and charged with carjacking and resisting arrest without violence. On appeal, Lovett contends that he was guilty only of grand theft auto, a violation of section
812.014(1), Florida Statutes (1999) and not carjacking, a violation of section
812.133, Florida Statutes (1999)....
...ar of death or great bodily harm if he or she does resist. But unless prevented by fear there must be some resistance to make the taking one done by force or violence. Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (97-1),
697 So.2d 84, 94 (Fla.1997); §
812.133, Fla....
..."In the course of the taking” means that the act occurred before, during or after the taking of the motor vehicle and that the act and the taking of the motor vehicle constitute a continuous series of acts or events. See Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases,
697 So.2d 84, 94 (Fla.1997), §
812.133, Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 4117, 2001 WL 277045
BROWNING, J. A jury found Demetrice Conelle Spencer, the appellant, guilty of one count of carjacking without a weapon, a violation of section
812.133(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997); and two counts of kidnapping without a weapon, a violation of section
787.01(l)(a)l, Florida Statutes (1997). The trial court orally adjudicated the appellant guilty in accordance with the jury verdict and imposed concurrent sentences of 35 years in prison. However, the written judgment erroneously lists the carjacking statute subsection as
812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes 1 , and the kidnapping statute subsection as
787.01(l)(l)(a), Florida Statutes....
...entence for carjacking without a weapon improperly exceeds the 30 year statutory maximum. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the convictions and REMAND with directions to the trial court to correct the judgment to reflect carjacking without a weapon pursuant to section
812.133(2)(b), Florida Statutes; and kidnapping without a weapon pursuant to section
787.01(l)(a)l., Florida Statutes; and to RESENTENCE the appellant on the carjacking conviction to no more than 30 years....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 2064, 1997 WL 100901
...McClendon expressly agreed to a fifteen-year mandatory term, and expressly stated that he understood that under present law the fifteen-year mandatory term is irrelevant because he must serve eighty-five percent of his sentence, that is, thirty-four years. Carjacking while armed is a first-degree felony PBL. § 812.133(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). Carjacking while unarmed is merely a first-degree felony. § 812.133(2)(b), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 9477, 2015 WL 3824060
BENTON, J. On direct appeal, Robert Burns contends his convictions for carjacking, in violation of section
812.133(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), and attempted voluntary manslaughter, in violation of sections
782.07(1) and
777.04, Florida Statutes (2011), should be reversed on grounds jury instructions, which were not objected to below, were erroneous....
...A law enforcement officer dispatched as a result saw Mr. Burns driving Mr. Canada’s truck, and apprehended him after he crashed the vehicle. Mr. Burns was charged with, and found guilty at trial of, among other things, 2 carjacking in violation of section 812.133, Florida Statutes (2011), which provides, in part: (1) “Carjacking” means the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily de...
...victim in order to take the victim’s keys before walking outside and driving away in the victim’s car constitutes a continuous series of events, [so] as to classify the fear as being within the course of taking the vehicle, within the meaning of section 812.133(3)(b).”); Baptiste-Jean v....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 29, 2004 WL 32665
...Appellant, who was convicted of car jacking, argues that his taking the victim’s car did not involve fear or force and accordingly the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal on that charge. We affirm. The elements of car jacking are contained in section 812.133(1), Florida Statutes (2001): “Car jacking” means the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the o...
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 2945, 2016 WL 747022
...ess she is unable to write a [b]rief on
2
Mr. Harrison has indicated in some of his filings that his counsel should
have challenged his life sentence for armed carjacking. Life is a legal sentence for this
offense. See § 812.133(2)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...5”‘*&
DCA 1997).
If the circumstances Were such as to ordinarily induce fear in the mind
of a reasonable person, then theg victim may be found to have been in fear,
and actual fear on the part of thea victim need not be shown.
In the course ofthe taking § 812.133(3)(b), Fla....
...erson of a victim,
It is sufficient if the motor vehicle taken is under the custody of a victim so
that it cannot be taken without the use of force, violence, or intimidation
directed against a victim,
Enhancedpenalty. Giveo_nly if applicable. §§ 812.133(2)(a) and
812.133(3)(a) Fla....
...the eQarjacking” the defendant carried seme-kind-efa firearm or other deadly
weapon. An act is “in the course of committing the eQarjacking” if it occurs in
an attempt to commit eQarjacking or in flight after the attempt or
commission.
With afirearm or deadly weapon. § 812.133(2)(a), Fla....
...Way likely to produce death or great bodily harm.
Wheeler v. State,
203 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
“Great bodily harm” means great as distinguished from slight, trivial,
minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises.
With nofirearm or weapon. §
812.133(2)(b) Fla....
...Stat.
If you find that the defendant carried no firearm or deadly weapon in
the course of committing the eQarjacking, but did commit the eQarjacking,
you should find [him] [her] guilty only of eQarjacking.
{( ll
16
Lesser Included Offenses
*CARJACKING _ 812.133
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...5thth
DCA 1997).
If the circumstances were such as to ordinarily induce fear in the mind
of a reasonable person, then thea victim may be found to have been in fear,
and actual fear on the part of thea victim need not be shown.
In the course of the taking. § 812.133(3)(b), Fla....
...n of a victim.
It is sufficient if the motor vehicle taken is under the custody of a victim so
that it cannot be taken without the use of force, violence, or intimidation
directed against a victim.
Enhanced penalty. Give only if applicable. §§ 812.133(2)(a) and
812.133(3)(a) Fla....
...the cCarjacking” the defendant carried some kind ofa firearm or other deadly
weapon. An act is “in the course of committing the cCarjacking” if it occurs in
an attempt to commit cCarjacking or in flight after the attempt or
commission.
With a firearm or deadly weapon. § 812.133(2)(a), Fla....
...harm.
Wheeler v. State,
203 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
“Great bodily harm” means great as distinguished from slight, trivial,
minor, or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises.
With no firearm or weapon. §
812.133(2)(b) Fla....
...deadly weapon, not for carrying a nondeadly weapon as in the robbery statute.
If applicable, see Instruction 5.1 for “attempt.”
16
Lesser Included Offenses
*CARJACKING — 812.133
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 2875, 2009 WL 928532
...The circuit court denied the motion, attaching a copy of the transcript of the plea colloquy and the stipulations regarding the appellant's HVFO notice and qualification. The record indicates that the appellant's conviction in case number F01-29279 was for the offense of "carjacking" under section
812.133, Florida Statutes (2001), and that he was not convicted of a separate offense of "robbery" under section
812.13....
