Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...se therein. § 810.02, Fla. Stat. (1977). In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure at any time stealthily and without the consent of the owner is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense. § 810.07, Fla....

...Although the information alleged that at the time of the attempted unlawful entry the accused intended to commit theft inside the dwelling, the state argued to the district court that pleading and proof of intent to commit a specific offense were unnecessary. The state also argued that section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), could be relied upon to establish proof of the requisite criminal intent....

...So, the district court certified the following questions of great public importance: 1. In a prosecution for burglary under section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1979), is it necessary for the state to allege an intent to commit a specific offense? 2. Is the statutory rebuttable presumption contained in section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), sufficient to prove a prima facie case of intent to commit the specific offense of theft? 401 So.2d at 1133....

...tinue. We merely hold that specification of the offense intended is not so essential a part of the intent element as to require that it always be set out in the charging document. The second certified question pertains to the operation and effect of section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), which provides: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense. In framing the certified question, the district court was mindful of the fact that in *70 this case the information alleged intent to commit theft. Thus the court was focusing on the facts of this case when it asked us whether section 810.07 is "sufficient to prove a prima facie case of intent to commit the specific offense of theft[.]" In this case, however, section 810.07 is inapplicable on its face because here the charge was attempted burglary rather than burglary and because here there was no proof of entering, but only of an attempt to break and enter. It is elementary that penal statutes are to be strictly construed. We therefore decline to expand the scope of section 810.07 beyond the clearly expressed legislative intent. In order to provide guidance to the courts, however, we will attempt to respond to the certified question, which we modify to read as follows: "In a trial on a charge of burglary, is proof of the factual elements set out in section 810.07 sufficient to establish a prima facie case of intent to commit an offense?" The predecessor of section 810.07 was first enacted in 1895....

...sufficient showing to allow a case of burglary to go to the jury even if there is no other evidence of the defendant's state of mind at the time of the unlawful entering, and will be legally sufficient proof of intent to support a verdict. [4] Thus section 810.07 provides the state with an alternative method of proving a charge of burglary when it is unable to adduce any evidence of the defendant's criminal intent when unlawfully entering a structure or conveyance. In State v. Fields, 390 So.2d 128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), the court concluded that section 810.07 provided an alternative means of alleging the crime of burglary....

...e basis of the Fields court's suggestion is now removed. All indictments and informations charging burglary must allege the essential element of intent as set forth in the statutory definition. See Rozier v. State, 402 So.2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Section 810.07 only comes into operation as an alternative means of proving the element of intent....

...Indictments and informations charging the crime of burglary or attempted burglary must allege that the accused committed the unlawful act with the intent to commit an offense but need not always specify the offense. Proof of the elements set out in section 810.07 is sufficient to establish prima facie evidence of such intent in a trial on a charge of burglary....

...lative intent to make non-consent an essential element of burglary. The critical element in both the prior and present burglary statutes is that a defendant enter or remain in the premises "with the intent to commit an offense therein." We note that section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), which existed prior to the 1975 revision, provides that the state can establish a prima facie case of burglary by showing that a defendant stealthily, and without the consent of the owner, entered a structure....

...State, 464 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 1985) that the exact nature of the offense alleged is surplusage so long as the essential element of intent to commit an offense is alleged and subsequently proven. Id. at 1196. In L.S., we said that the state may rely on section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1983), the burglary presumption of intent statute, whether or not the state had charged a defendant with the intent to commit a specified crime within the structure....

...Subsequently, in what can only be construed as a conscious decision to refocus on the safety of property and of the people therein, the Legislature abandoned these distinctions and said that proof of intent to commit any offense would suffice. Section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1979). As indicated earlier, section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), is fully consistent with this approach for it provides a method of establishing the essential element of intent to commit a crime within the structure without reference to a specific offense....

...area of the premises that [he] [she] knew was not open to the public, (defendant) committed a burglary if [he] [she] entered that non-public area with the intent to commit [an offense][(the crime alleged)]in that non-public area. Give if applicable. § 810.07 Fla....

...premises were closed to the public] [or] [if he or she entered into or remained in areas of the premises which he or she knew or should have known were not open to the public]. if he or she had the intent to commit the crime described in the charge. § 810.07 Fla....

...2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). [6] Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). [7] § 777.04(1), 782.04(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). [8] § 787.01(1)(a)2, § 775.087(1), § 775.087(2)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2005). [9] § 810.02(1)(b), § 810.02(2)(b), § 810.07, Fla....

...Even though he did not enter Wilson's house, he did enter Wilson's "dwelling." Stealth is not an element of burglary. Stealthy entry, together with the absence of owner or occupant consent, is an evidentiary tool with which to establish prima facie proof of intent to commit an offense. § 810.07 Fla....

...alleging the entry was made with intent to commit a specific offense is subject to a motion to dismiss." Given this opportunity to revisit Lee, we continue to believe that it correctly states the law insofar as it goes. However, it does not address Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), wherein the Legislature said that proof of stealthful entry without consent of the owner or occupant "shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense." By this provision, the Legisla...

...State, 76 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1954); Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir.1967); State v. Murie, 140 Wash. 71, 248 P. 79 (1926). Therefore, in order to comply with the "general to particular" rule of pleading and yet give force and effect to Section 810.07, we hold that in alleging the crime of burglary, the state must either list the specific crime intended to be committed within the structure, or, alternatively, allege that an offense was intended to be committed therein in that the entry was gained stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant....

...Subsequently, in what can only be construed as a conscious decision to refocus on the safety of property and of the people therein, the Legislature abandoned these distinctions and said that proof of an intent to commit any offense would suffice. Section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1979). As indicated earlier, Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), is fully consistent with this approach for it provides a method of establishing the essential element of intent to commit a crime within the structure without reference to a specific offense....

...t to commit the crime alleged; this can even be done by defense counsel suggesting in argument that the accused may have intended to commit some offense other than the one alleged. Understandably the State looks for some relief from this difficulty. Section 810.07, Florida Statutes, enacted in 1975, provides: Prima facie evidence of intent In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupan...

...evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense. (emphasis added) In Lee, the burglary information charged the defendant entered or remained in a dwelling "with intent to commit an offense therein contrary to Florida Statutes 810.02(1)(3) and 810.07" and contended that the statutory references were a sufficient substitute for specifying a particular offense. The defendant attacked the sufficiency of the information by a pretrial motion to dismiss. The Fourth District Court of Appeal did not agree with the contention of the State, saying that section 810.07 had to do with proof of intent....

...ive but not fatally so and if the defect was not attacked by timely motion to dismiss it would be considered waived. The State in this case contends that the charge in count 2 sufficiently alleged *542 intent by alleging the statutory presumption of section 810.07. We do not agree. Section 810.07, Florida Statutes, was apparently an attempt by the legislature to help the State with its evidentiary problem in the trial of burglary cases by establishing a prima facie case as to the accused's intent to commit an offense....

...cally alleged an intent to commit an offense and in this case count 2 of the information does not make that allegation. We hold that the "the intent to commit an offense therein" is an essential element of this statutory offense of burglary and that section 810.07 is not sufficient to make "stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof" an allegational equivalent of that intent element. We do note with interest that while section 810.07 attempts to make stealth and lack of consent an evidentiary equivalent of proof of an intent to commit an offense in a structure, that statute does not make those two facts prima facie evidence of intent to commit a particular crime, such as theft. As long as the "general to particular" rule is applied to the element of intent in burglary cases, requiring the State to allege and prove the accused's intent to commit a particular crime, the statutory presumption created by section 810.07, Florida Statutes, relating as it does only to a prima facie case as to an intent to commit an offense generally, will be of little or no value to the State because it will be insufficient to carry a burden of proof as to intent to commit a particular crime. In view of the substantial authority cited above which requires the state to allege and prove the specific offense intended in a burglary case, we do not feel we can now hold otherwise. Nor can we extend the words and meaning of section 810.07 to make it applicable to allegations in the charging document as distinguished from proof at trial. The solution to this problem is either for the Florida Supreme Court to rule that the "general to particular" rule is not applicable to the intent element of statutory burglary or for the legislature to amend section 810.07, Florida Statutes, to provide that proof of stealth and lack of consent constitutes prima facie evidence of the intent to commit a particular crime, such as theft....

...Petitioner Graham was charged by the state with, inter alia, attempted burglary in violation of sections 777.04(1) and 810.02(1), Florida Statutes (1983). Over objection, the trial judge instructed the jury based on the burglary presumption of intent statute, section 810.07, which provides: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense....

...al case in which a defendant is charged with attempted burglary, and there is proof at trial of defendant's unlawful entry into the structure or residence involved, is it proper for the trial court to rely upon the statutory presumption set forth in section 810.07 in instructing the jury on proof of intent to commit an offense? 453 So.2d at 529....

...In order to answer the certified question, we must clarify our decision in State v. Waters, 436 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1983). Waters was charged with attempted burglary. One of the certified questions concerned the establishment of a prima facie case of burglary under the presumption of intent statute, section 810.07. As a part of our answer to the certified question, we stated: In this case, however, section 810.07 is inapplicable on its face because here the charge was attempted burglary rather than burglary and because here there was no proof of entering, but only of an attempt to break and enter. It is elementary that penal statutes are to be strictly construed. We therefore decline to expand the scope of section 810.07 beyond the clearly expressed legislative intent. 436 So.2d at 70 (emphasis added). The state urges us to focus on the quoted language immediately following the italics and hold that section 810.07 may be relied on in a prosecution for attempted burglary where there is proof of entry. This we decline to do. As we stated in Waters, section 810.07 is inapplicable on its face in a prosecution for attempted burglary because by its express terms it pertains only "[i]n a trial on the charge of burglary." When the language of a penal statute is clear, plain and without ambiguity, effect must be given to it accordingly....

...In summarizing our conclusions in Waters, we said: Indictments and informations charging the crime of burglary or attempted burglary must allege that the accused committed the unlawful act with the intent to commit an offense but need not always specify the offense. Proof of the elements set out in section 810.07 is sufficient to establish prima facie evidence of such intent in a trial on a charge of burglary....

...re. Where an accused is charged with either burglary or attempted burglary, the charging document must allege the intent to commit an offense, though it need not specify that offense. In a prosecution for burglary, the state may rely on section *466 810.07 as prima facie evidence of intent to commit an offense, whether or not the offense is specified. L.S. v. State, 464 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 1985); Frederick v. State, 472 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1985). Where, however, the prosecution is for attempted burglary, the state is precluded from reliance on section 810.07 by the express terms of the statute, even where there is some evidence of unlawful entry....

...The information does allege that the structure was not open to the public and that the accused was not licensed or invited to enter or remain. The information also alleges that the (attempted) entry was gained stealthily and without the consent of the owner or occupant. This latter allegation was obviously suggested by section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...5th DCA), approved, 442 So.2d 213 (Fla. 1983). The state's proof regarding the accused's specific intent will almost always be circumstantial since the state will rarely have direct proof as to the defendant's exact objectives, motives and intentions. Further, section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1989), provides that proof of stealthy entry is prima facie evidence of intent....

...e ex post facto clause of the Constitution, the Waters decision was not an unforeseeable enlargement of the burglary statute. In our view the Waters decision merely permitted the state to allege a violation of the burglary statute in the language of § 810.07, Fla....

...At best, Karp asserts that the evidence supported nothing more than a simple trespass. We disagree. The state produced eyewitness testimony that Karp stealthily entered the closed restaurant and that his entry was without the owner's consent. According to section 810.07(1), Florida *579 Statutes (1993) [1] , this evidence was sufficient prima facie evidence of Karp's intent to commit an offense inside of the restaurant....

...of the premises that [he] [she] knew was not open to the public, (defendant) committed a burglary if [he] [she] entered that non-public area with the intent to commit [an offense] [ (the crime alleged) ] in that non-public area. Give if applicable. § 810.07 Fla....

...2d DCA 2001), here there was no evidence to support an inference that J.J.D. entered the house for the purpose of committing an offense inside. Nor was there evidence that J.J.D. entered in a stealthy manner and thus triggered the presumption of intent under section 810.07(1) (stating that “proof of the entering of such structure ......

...with the intent to commit an offense therein," "the premises ... [were] at the time [not] open to the public," and "the defendant ... [was not] licensed or invited to enter or remain" on the premises. Id. A prima facie case of burglary was made out under Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1983), which provides that "[i]n a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure ......

...State, 385 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Subsequently, in State v. Fields, 390 So.2d 128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), we modified that view somewhat by suggesting that the state has the choice of alleging the specific offense or of alleging its reliance upon Section 810.07 of the burglary statute, which provides that an entry made "stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant" creates a rebuttable presumption that the entry was made with the intent to commit an offense inside the premises....

...Because we remain concerned, as we were in the Lee and Fields decisions, supra, as to the necessity in a burglary prosecution for the state to allege and prove an intent to commit a specific offense and as to the effect of the evidentiary presumption created by Section 810.07, supra, we hereby certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following questions of great public importance: 1. In a prosecution for burglary under Section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1979), is it necessary for the state to allege an intent to commit a specific offense? 2. Is the statutory rebuttable presumption contained in Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979) sufficient to prove a prima facie case of intent to commit the specific offense of theft? Accordingly, the judgment and sentence is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court with directions that ap...

...Otherwise, burglary is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or 775.084. [2] Booker v. State, 397 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1981). [3] Had the state not alleged an intent to commit a specific offense and instead alleged reliance upon Section 810.07 as provided in Fields, supra, the result might be different.

...Gen., Miami, for respondent. ADKINS, Justice. Petitioner, a juvenile, seeks our review of the following question: Whether the state may attempt to establish the element of intent in a burglary prosecution by use of the presumption of intent statute, section 810.07, Florida Statutes, where the charging document alleged that the defendant entered with the intent to commit a specified offense....

...The burglary count was charged as follows: This child ... did unlawfully enter or remain in a certain structure ... with the intent to commit an offense therein, to wit: THEFT in violation of 810.02, Florida Statutes. At trial, the state successfully relied on the presumption of intent statute, section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1983), to prove the essential element of intent necessary to obtain petitioner's conviction for burglary. Section 810.07 provides: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense....

...he state could not hereafter rely on the presumption of intent statute for proof of intent to commit "an offense"; rather, the state must prove that the defendant did intend to commit the specified *1196 offense and must do so without the benefit of section 810.07....

...e, there would be no incentive for the state to ever enumerate the particular offense. We hold, therefore, that when the state charges that the defendant did intend to commit a specific offense after the breaking and entering, it may avail itself of section 810.07....

...In this case, there was no innocent explanation as to why Couzo punched a hole in the roof of the check cashing store in the middle of the night. This was not a case where Couzo's criminal intent could have formed after his entry into the store. Under section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (2001), in burglary cases, "proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commi...

...The information alleged that the defendant, like appellant here, broke and entered with the intent to commit theft. The defendant in Waters was convicted, and the state argued on appeal that it did not need to plead intent to commit a specific offense and that whether it did or did not so plead, section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981), [2] could be used to prove the requisite criminal intent....

...eme court held that "in a burglary charge it is not per se required that the particular offense which the accused allegedly intended to commit in the premises be specified." Waters, 436 So.2d at 69. The court also held that the statutory language of section 810.07 allows the state, during the course of a burglary trial, to prima facie establish the intent to commit an offense if the state has not charged the intent to commit a specific offense....

...For example, the state may or may not allege in the charging document that the accused broke and entered with the intent to commit an offense therein, to wit: sexual battery. Second, if the state does not allege that the accused intended to commit a specific offense, section 810.07 may be used as an alternative method to prima facie establish that a defendant has the intent to commit an unspecified offense after the breaking and entering occurs....

...Third, if the state charges that a defendant did intend to commit a specific offense after the breaking and entering occurs, then the state must prove that the defendant did in fact intend to commit this offense. Furthermore, when the state does so charge, the proof must be established without the benefit of section 810.07....

...For example, he could have as easily broken and entered the school to commit arson or otherwise *1036 destroy school property. In addition, he could have merely intended to use the telephone, as he stated at trial during the course of his unrebutted testimony. Since section 810.07 only applies when no specific offense is alleged in an information charging burglary, the state cannot rely on the presumption contained in that statute since here it has alleged a burglary with the intent to commit the specific offense of theft....

...the public, (defendant) committed a burglary if [he][she] entered that non-public area with the intent to commit [ (the crime alleged) ] [an offense other than burglary or trespass] [(the crime alleged)-} in that non-public area. Give if applicable. § 810.07 Fla....

...As the supreme court stated in Toole, The essential element to be alleged and proven on a charge of burglary is the intent to commit an offense, not the intent to commit a specified offense. Id. at 1175 (emphasis in original). See also L.S. v. State, 464 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 1985); § 810.07, Fla....

...4th DCA 1982), that the offense of trespass is a "category four" lesser included offense under Brown v. State, 206 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1968). Because our ruling does not require that we determine whether an allegation of stealth and lack of consent of the owner pursuant to Section 810.07, Florida Statutes, is a sufficient substitute for an allegation of intent to commit a specific offense in charging a burglary, we have no occasion to choose between the allegedly conflicting opinions on this point found in Rozier v....

...6 curtilage to take the block of wood from under the tarp and then left the curtilage to throw the wood at the window. Appellant's intent to commit an offense, which is an essential element of burglary, may be inferred from his stealthy entry. Thus, section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that "proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an...

...The yard was secluded due to the presence of fencing and shrubs. Choosing a secluded location calculated to avoid discovery may constitute stealth. See Irvin v. State, 590 So.2d 9 (Fla.3rd DCA 1991) (in prosecution for attempted burglary of a conveyance, stealth instruction was proper under § 810.07(2) where the defendant selected a van parked next to a wall in a deserted parking lot)....

...Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Ivy R. Ginsberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and COPE, JJ. PER CURIAM. Bernard Irvin appeals his conviction of attempted burglary of a conveyance. We affirm. At trial the State relied on section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1989), which provides in part, "In a trial on the charge of attempted burglary, proof of the attempt to enter such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without the consent of the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of attempting to enter with intent to commit an offense." Id. § 810.07(2)....

...from the proof of unlawful entry. Simpson v. State, 81 Fla. 292, 87 So. 920 (1921); Griffin v. State, 276 So.2d 842 (Fla.4th DCA 1973). Here the State offered no proof of intent to commit theft. This case is unaffected by the "presumption statute," Section 810.07, which creates a prima facie inference of intent to commit an offense upon proof of a stealthy, non-consensual entry....

...The decisions are in conflict with State v. Fields, 390 So.2d 128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), and Waters v. State, 401 So.2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. These cases have to do with the construction and application of sections 810.02 [1] and 810.07, [2] Florida Statutes (1979), pertaining to the definition and proof of the crime of burglary....

...The second count alleged that he had entered or remained in the dwelling stealthily and without the consent of the owner. The jury returned verdicts finding respondent not guilty on the first count but guilty on the second count. The main question on appeal was whether allegations of the elements of section 810.07 were a sufficient substitute for an allegation of intent to commit an offense....

...Under the circumstances of this case, however, we are unable to conclude that the defect did not affect the fundamental fairness of the trial. Under count two of the information, the jury may have been under the impression that proof of stealthy entry and lack of consent pursuant to section 810.07 constituted conclusive proof of guilt of burglary. Proof of the elements of section 810.07 does not, however, prove the crime but only constitutes prima facie evidence of intent to commit an *75 offense. See Fitzgerald v. State, 339 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1976); McNair v. State, 61 Fla. 35, 55 So. 401 (1911). Thus proof of the section 810.07 elements is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a finding of the intent element but the intent element, before being thus proved, must be placed in issue by being alleged in the charging document....

...or conveyance, the burglary is a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Otherwise, burglary is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. [2] Section 810.07 provides: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to...

...asserts that at best the evidence supported no more than simple trespass. We disagree. The eyewitness testimony that M.S. ran from the back exit of the apartment late at night, coupled with the owner's call to the police, clearly demonstrate that his entry was stealthy and lacked the owner's consent. Pursuant to section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (1999), [2] this was prima facie evidence of his entering with the intent to commit an offense inside the unit....

...d in Heuring. Given the prejudicial nature of this evidence, we are unable to hold that its admission was harmless error. Appellant also contends there was insufficient evidence presented for the trial court to give an instruction on stealthy entry. Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1985) states: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and *1042 without consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense....

...duce evidence of an act committed toward an attempted, unauthorized entry into a dwelling with the intent to commit an offense therein. See §§ 777.04(1), 810.02(1)(b), (3), Fla. Stat. (2005). Intent may be inferred through a statutory presumption. Section 810.07(2) provides: "In a trial on the charge of attempted burglary, proof of the attempt to enter such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without the consent of the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of attempt...

...intended by the perpetrator, and "proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense") (quoting § 810.07(1), Fla....

...commit, Giangrasso v. State, 793 So.2d 71, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), though the standard jury instruction is phrased to provide for doing so. "In many instances, the state does not know the exact offense intended by the defendant. In that case, absent section 810.07, the state could not take the case to a jury in the face of the Standard Jury Instruction." Duncan, 606 So.2d at 1229....

...The crime of burglary is defined as: [E]ntering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain. § 810.02(1), Florida Statutes (1989). A subsequent section, 810.07(1), provides that: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense....

...It is not necessary to allege the specific crime intended. Id. Whether a specific crime is charged or not, the specific crime intended need not be proven. Graham v. State, 472 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1985). Furthermore, in a prosecution for burglary the state may rely on section 810.07 as prima facie evidence of intent to commit an offense whether the offense has been specified or not. The Graham court pointed out, however, that, in a prosecution for attempted burglary, the state is precluded from reliance on said statute. That pronouncement is no longer effective since the legislature amended section 810.07 by adding subsection two in 1987, which provides that: In a trial on the charge of attempted burglary, proof of the attempt to enter such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without the consent of the owner or occupant t...

...nse. The foregoing demonstrates that, in a prosecution for burglary or attempted burglary, the specification of the specific offense intended is no longer required in the charging document and that the proof of intent may be facilitated by resort to section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...the underlying offense as provided by the burglary instruction in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in *1229 Criminal Cases (1989 Ed.). In many instances, the state does not know the exact offense intended by the defendant. In that case, absent section 810.07, the state could not take the case to a jury in the face of the Standard Jury Instruction....

...by the court, and was sentenced to a term of three years in state prison. The information contained no allegation about the specific crime intended to be committed at the time of the breaking and entering. Obviously the information was framed under Section 810.07, Florida Statutes 1953, and F.S.A., and the trial proceeded accordingly. At the conclusion of the testimony the judge instructed the jury that the information was "drawn and *148 prepared under Chapter 810.07" and that it was therefore necessary for the state to prove the three elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; namely, (1) the breaking and entering in the nighttime of (2) a dwelling house (3) stealthily....

...State, 358 So.2d 217, 220 ("This court may adopt the term `curtilage' without reference to the common law restriction to dwellings to preserve the plan [sic] meaning of Florida Statutes Section 810.011(1)."). [12] As noted in Baker, "[s]tealth is not an element of burglary." Instead, "it is an evidentiary tool [under section 810.07] with which to establish prima facie proof of intent to commit an offense." 636 So.2d at 1344....

...2d DCA 2001), here there was no evidence to support an inference that J.J.D. entered the house for the purpose of committing an offense inside. Nor was there evidence that J.J.D. entered in a stealthy manner and thus triggered the presumption of intent under section 810.07(1) (stating that "proof of the entering of such structure ....

...See § 777.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1997); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 77 (1996). Proof of an attempt to enter a conveyance stealthily and without the consent of the owner is prima facie evidence of attempting to enter with intent to commit an offense. See § 810.07(2), Fla....

...The State did not prosecute this case on the theory that Johnson entered with consent and then remained with the intent to commit a crime. We see no scenario under which Johnson could enter someone's home uninvited through a window, secure a weapon, and accost a woman sleeping there with no criminal design. See § 810.07, Fla. Stat. (2000) (defining prima facie evidence of intent to commit a crime in a trial on a charge of burglary as "proof of the entering of [a] structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof"); § 810.07, Fla....

...was required to prove that he had that specific intent. However, he contends that the state not only failed to prove this specific intent, but it failed to prove intent at all, erroneously relying on proof of the presumption of intent as provided in section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Waters, 436 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1983). Waters held that the information need not identify the specific offense which the defendant intended to commit once inside the structure. It then addressed the issue of whether proof of the factual elements set out in section 810.07 would be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of intent to commit an offense and concluded: Looking at the plain language of the statute, we can see that it sets out three factual elements: entry, stealth, and lack of consent....

...re would be no incentive for the state to ever enumerate the particular offense. We *1150 hold, therefore, that when the state charges that the defendant did intend to commit a specific offense after the breaking and entering, it may avail itself of section 810.07....

...We conclude that the victim's testimony that she cleaned the sill between the time of the two burglaries negates the juvenile's suggestion that the prints were made by the juvenile at some earlier time. Summerson v. State, 200 So.2d 594 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). See also Sorey. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. NOTES [1] Section 810.07 provides: Prima facie evidence of intent....

...to be admitted into the condominium by the security person. The security person had not authorized his entry into the building. Therefore, the officers could reasonably suspect that Graham had entered in some unauthorized and surreptitious way. Cf. § 810.07(1), Fla....

...Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 13.1. The jury was also instructed: “You may infer that the defendant had the intent to commit an offense inside the motor vehicle if he entered or attempted to enter stealthily and without the consent of the owner.” See § 810.07(1); Fla....

...In denying the motion for judgment of dismissal, the trial court stated that it could infer the requisite intent to commit a crime in the conveyance if entry was done in a stealthy manner without the owner’s consent. The trial court was referring to the statutory presumption in section 810.07(1)....

...The statute provides that in a burglary trial “proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense.” § 810.07(1); see also J.J.D., 973 So.2d at 1255 (stating that there was no evidence that the juvenile “entered in a stealthy manner and thus triggered the presumption of intent under section 810.07(1)”); J.A.S....

...resumption is prima facie proof of the charge of burglary of a conveyance. Because the jury did not accept defendant's explanation as reasonable, the inference is enough to sustain the conviction. Affirmed. GUNTHER and WARNER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 810.07(1), Fla....

...Lanzo further testified that after looking at Smith's bike, he realized that it was not his bike and that he would have walked away without the bike even if Smith had not arrived at that moment. At the charge conference, the State requested that the jury be instructed on the statutory presumption set forth in section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...jury as follows: You may infer that Mark Anthony Lanzo had the intent to commit a crime inside a structure if the entering of the structure was done stealthily without the consent of the owner or occupant.... To utilize the presumption set forth in section 810.07, the State must present evidence of the owner or occupant's lack of consent and that entry into the structure was done "stealthily." While the statute does not define "stealth," this term has been interpreted to mean activity that is "surreptitious, furtive, or sly." J.A.S....

...had the intent to commit a crime. On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal determined that J.A.S.'s motion should have been granted. The court rejected the State's argument that intent could be inferred based upon the statutory presumption set forth in section 810.07, concluding there was insufficient evidence to permit the presumption's use....

...Rather, in broad daylight, they approached and remained near the front entrance of a house (located on a residential street), where their activities could readily be observed by any passerby. In the instant case, there is similarly insufficient evidence to support the employment of the statutory presumption set forth in section 810.07....

...While it is true that stealthily entering a structure can create prima facie evidence of intent to commit an offense inside the structure, we are unconvinced that the teenagers’ stealth in stepping on the outside porch, which was apparently available to the public, satisfies this statute. See § 810.07(1)....

...2d DCA 1983), because there was insufficient evidence to prove that appellant intended to steal anything when he entered the house trailer. Since the state charged appellant with intending to commit a specific offense, it may not rely upon the presumption afforded by section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...re would be no incentive for the state to ever enumerate the particular offense. We hold, therefore, that when the state charges that the defendant did intend to commit a specific offense after the *1009 breaking and entering, it may avail itself of section 810.07. We appreciate the concern expressed by our sister court. It further appears that by seeking a bill of particulars, a defendant may be able to circumvent section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981), even when the state does not allege the intent to commit a specific offense....

...The defendant was charged by information with unlawfully entering or remaining in a structure, "with the intent to commit the offense of Theft therein, or [of entering] through a window at about 4:45 A.M. stealthily without the occupant's consent with intent to commit some offense, contrary to Sections 810.07 and 810.02, Florida Statutes." This information was drafted in one count with an alternative allegation instead of being drafted in two separate counts....

...At a pretrial hearing the defendant apparently moved to strike the alternative allegation of stealthy entry without the occupant's consent with intent to commit some offense therein. Relying on Rozier v. State, 402 So.2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), defendant argued that § 810.07, Fla....

...ect interpretation of the requirements for pleading burglary in State v. Fields, 390 So.2d 128, 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) when they wrote: Therefore, in order to comply with the "general to particular" rule of pleading and yet give force and effect to Section 810.07, we hold that in alleging the crime of burglary, the state must either list the specific crime intended to be committed within the structure, or, alternatively, allege that an offense was intended to be committed therein in that the entry was gained stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant....

...than they do with the defendant’s overall disposition or character”). Indeed, it is noteworthy that the prosecutor did not argue at trial that Jackson’s intent to commit the burglary was shown by his prior violent interactions with Woodard; rather, she argued consistent with section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes, 4 that the requisite intent — “the intent to commit an act therein” — was shown by the time and manner in which Jackson allegedly entered the apartment: at night by prying open the back door with a crowbar....

...The statute provides: “In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with the intent to commit an offense.” § 810.07(1), Fla....

...warranted. Specifically, the resident’s report described Appellee’s numerous attempts to enter a conveyance stealthily and without the owner’s consent, which is prima facie evidence of an attempt to enter with intent to commit an offense. See § 810.07(2), Fla....

...re was warranted. Specifically, the resident's report described Appellee's numerous attempts to enter a conveyance stealthily and without the owner's consent, which is prima facie evidence of an attempt to enter with intent to commit an offense. See § 810.07(2), Fla....

...act committed after July 1, 2001. S.D. argues on appeal the evidence presented was insufficient to show he had the intent to commit an offense when entering the property. The state's case, however, is aided by the statutory presumption contained in section 810.07(1) which treats "proof of the entering of [a] structure ......

...awfully enter or remain in a structure, to-wit: a residence ... without being licensed or invited, with the intent to commit an offense therein, to-wit: theft and/or did enter stealthily and without the owner’s consent pursuant to Florida Statutes Section 810.07, contrary to Section 810.02, Florida Statutes.......

...State’s case, constitutes reversible error. At issue, is the question of whether the State may satisfy the intent requirement necessary to establish a prima facie case of burglary by relying exclusively on the evidentiary presumption set forth in § 810.07, which states that: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense. Relying on two decisions of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in State v. Fields, 390 So.2d 128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) and Waters v. State, 401 So.2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), the State contends that the eviden-tiary presumption set forth in § 810.07 makes evidence of stealth and lack of consent an evidentiary equivalent of proof of intent to commit an offense in a structure and thus prima facie evidence of burglary....

...ier v. State, 402 So.2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), which held that proof of a stealthful entry is not the evidentiary equivalent of intent to commit a specific offense in a structure. The Rozier court observed that: We do note with interest that while section 810.07 attempts to make stealth and lack of consent an evidentiary equivalent of proof of an intent to commit an offense in a structure, that statute does not make those two facts prima facie evidence of intent to commit a particular crime, such as theft. As long as the “general to particular” rule is applied to the element of intent in burglary cases, requiring the State to allege and prove the accused’s intent to commit a particular crime, the statutory presumption created by section 810.07, Florida Statutes, relating as it does only to a prima facie case as to an intent to commit an offense generally, will be of little or no value to the State because it will be insufficient to carry a burden of proof as to intent to commit a particular crime. In view of the substantial authority cited above which requires the State to allege and prove the specific offense intended in a burglary case, we do not feel we can now hold otherwise. Nor can we extend the words and meaning of section 810.07 to make it applicable to allegations in the charging document as distinguished from proof at trial. The solution to this problem is either for the Florida Supreme Court to rule that the “general to particular” rule is not applicable to the intent element of statutory burglary or for the legislature to amend section 810.07, Florida Statutes, to provide that proof of stealth and lack of consent constitutes prima facie evidence of the intent to commit a particular crime, such as theft....

...4th DCA 1981) certified to be of great public importance: 1. In a prosecution for burglary under section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1979), is it necessary for the state to allege an intent to commit a specific offense? 2. Is the statutory rebuttable presumption contained in section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979) sufficient to prove a prima facie case of intent to commit the specific offense of theft? State v....

...commit. If all the essential statutory elements of the offense are alleged, the accusatory document will generally be deemed sufficient.” Id. at 69. As to the second certified question, the court noted that the evidentiary presumption set forth in 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), was inapplicable to the Waters case because the presumption statute only applied to the charge of burglary and not attempted burglary, the crime which Waters was charged with committing. Nevertheless, the court responded to the certified question, which it modified to read as follows: In a trial on a charge of burglary, is proof of the factual elements set out in Section 810.07 sufficient to establish a prima fa-cie case of intent to commit an offense? Id....

...g to allow a case of burglary to go to the jury even if there is no other evidence of the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the unlawful entering, and will be legally sufficient proof of intent to support a verdict, [footnote omitted] Thus, section 810.07 provides the State with an alternate method of proving a charge of burglary when it is unable to adduce any evidence of the defendant’s criminal intent when unlawfully entering a structure or conveyance....

...than his arm. Nor did the State contend that the utility knife was stolen from Stolzenberg. The jury may well have found the necessary intent based on the fact that the entering was done “stealthily and without the consent of the owner ...” (See section 810.07, Florida Statutes, which is a part of the jury instructions on burglary) and the fact that items belonging to Stolzenberg were found stacked near Anderson’s bicycle outside Stol-zenberg’s house....

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 810.07(2), Fla.Stat....

...State, 124 So.3d 215, 220 (Fla.2013)). “In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offensé.” § 810.07(1), Fla....

...4th DCA 1995) (“We cannot agree that the defendant’s self-serving statements concerning his allegedly innocent reasons for breaking and entering into the victim’s home in the early hours of the morning are sufficient to impair the statutory presumption created by section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1989), precluding the case from going to the jury.”)....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Section 810.07, Florida Statutes....

armed burglary of a structure, in violation of section 810.07 and 810.02(2), Florida Statutes, and aggravated

...was not open to the public, (defendant) committed a burglary if [he] [she] entered that non-public area with the intent to commit [(the crime alleged)] [an offense other than burglary or trespass] in that non-public area. Give if applicable. § 810.07 Fla....

PER CURIAM. We affirm J.M.’s conviction for burglary. While J.M. claimed that she entered the dwelling to retrieve her own property, she admitted to her stealthy entry in the middle of the night. Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes that proof of stealthy entry is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense....

...er-dale Historical Society, Inc., (Florida Non Profit Corporation) d/b/a Pioneer House, without the consent of said owner or said occupant, with intent to commit an offense therein, contrary to Fla.Stat. 810.02(1), Fla. Stat. 810.02(3) and Fla.Stat. 810.07.” Gonzalez filed a motion to declare Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), unconstitutional....

...Moreover, the present case is unlike the cases cited above in that there was clear evidence in those cases that the premises entered had been abandoned for some time prior to the breaking and entering. Secondly, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in its failure to-explain the meaning of Section 810.07, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and that this failure so confused the jury as to be considered fundamental error. The trial court instructed the jury under Section 810.07, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...ailure to give that instruction cannot then be assigned as error on appeal. We further note that no Florida cases have been cited and none have been found making it necessary to give a further instruction or explanation to a charge given pursuant to Section 810.07, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and we do not believe that the failure to do so is error....

...Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938, 955 (Fla.2007). Section 810.02(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2007), defines burglary as: "Entering a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein. . . ." § 810.02(1)(b)1., Fla. Stat. Section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides, "In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense." § 810.07(1), Fla....

...was not open to the public, (defendant) committed a burglary if [he] [she] entered that non-public area with the intent to commit [(the crime alleged)] [an offense other than burglary or trespass] in that non-public area. Give if applicable. § 810.07, Fla....

...Therefore, even assuming that the court erred in instructing the jury that it may infer the intent to commit a theft from proof of entering stealthily without consent, Graham, 472 So.2d at 466 (it was error for the court to instruct the jury on the burglary presumption of intent statute, § 810.07, Fla.Stat. (1983), in a case of attempted burglary); cf. Waters, 436 So.2d at 70 (section 810.07 does not apply to attempted burglary), the error was corrected by placing the ultimate burden of proof with respect to Golden’s intent upon the state....

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 810.07(2), Fla....

WELLS, Chief Judge. Affirmed. See § 810.07(2), Fla....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Fla. Stat. § 810.07 (2) (2016) ; Irvin v....

...sproved the petit larceny intent. We view as unsound the contention of the state that the conviction should be upheld on the basis that the entry of the dwelling stealthily was prima facie evidence of entry with intent to commit a misdemeanor, under § 810.07 Fla.Stat., F.S.A....

...2d DCA 1983), because there was insufficient evidence to prove that appellant intended to steal anything when he entered the house trailer. Since the state charged appellant with intending to commit a specific offense, it may not rely upon the presumption afforded by section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...e would bé no incentive for the state to ever enumerate the particular offense. We hold, therefore, that when the state charges that the defendant did intend to commit a specific offense after the *1009 breaking and entering, it may avail itself of section 810.07. We appreciate the concern expressed by our sister court. It further appears that by seeking a bill of particulars, a defendant may be able to circumvent section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981), even when the state does not allege the intent to commit a specific offense....

...We cannot agree that the defendant’s self-serving statements concerning his allegedly innocent reasons for breaking and entering into the victim’s home in the early hours of the morning are sufficient to impair the statutory presumption created by section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1989), precluding the case from going to the jury. Pui’suant to section 810.07, proof of entering stealthily and without consent is prima facie evidence of entering with the intent to commit an offense....

...(2019) (“[B]urglary” means … [e]ntering a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter[.]”) (emphases added); § 810.07(1), Fla....

...We accepted for review the decision in Smith v. State, No. 84-326 (Fla. 4th DCA Dec. 28, 1984), to determine the following issue: Whether the state may attempt to establish the element of intent in a burglary prosecution by use of the presumption of intent statute section 810.07, Florida Statutes, where the charging document alleged that the defendant entered with the intent to commit a specified offense....

...They also saw her exit the shed and flee from them, thus establishing her entry into the structure. This was direct evidence contradicting her hypothesis of innocence. State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187, 188-89 (Fla. 1989). Furthermore, to prove intent, the State could rely on the statutory presumption of section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (2013), that stealthy entry into a structure presumes an intent to commit an offense therein....

of the presumption of intent as provided in section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981).1 In support of his

the burglary presump*1067tive intent statute, section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981),1 when it has charged

penalties for burglary under certain conditions. Section 810.07 has to do with proof of intent: “In a trial

to commit a particular crime. We affirm. Since § 810.07, Fla.Stat., relied upon by the state in drafting

...ter, or that the premises were open to the public. [Citations omitted]. 3. [ (Defendant) was not [licensed] [invited] to enter the [strueture][convey-anee].] [The premises were not open to the public at the time of the entering.] Give if applicable. § 810.07, Fla....

...remises were closed to the public], [or] [if he or she entered into or remained in areas of the premises which he or she knew or should have known were not open to the public], if he or she had the intent to commit the crime described in the charge. § 810.07, FlaStat....

...4th DCA 2017) (unpublished table decision). In ground one of his rule 3.850 motion, Torres claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that the state would be able to rely on the “stealthy entry” inference to prove intent. See § 810.07(1), Fla....

...WINOKUR, J. Shaun D. Reed (“Reed”) appeals his conviction for burglary of an occupied dwelling accompanied by an assault or battery, contending that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the stealthy-entry inference set forth in section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes....

...Hathaway ran outside yelling for Tramar, who came back to the apartment, saw Reed stabbing Jackson, hit Reed, and told him to get off of his mother, at which point Reed fled. III. In accordance with section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes, evidence in a burglary trial that the defendant entered a structure or conveyance “stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of...

...e.” The trial judge instructed the jury on this inference over Reed’s objection that the evidence did not support the contention that he entered Jackson’s apartment “stealthily.” Before the trial judge may instruct the jury on the section 810.07 inference, the State “must present evidence of the owner or occupant’s lack of consent and that entry into the structure was done ‘stealthily.’” Lanzo v....

...was not open to the public, (defendant) committed a burglary if [he] [she] entered that non-public area with the intent to commit [(the crime alleged)] [an offense other than burglary or trespass] in that non-public area. Give if applicable. § 810.07 Fla....

...included portions in Spanish which were not translated). No motion for new trial appears in this record, and there is no indication that Appellant ever objected or challenged the standard jury instruction for the stealthy entry inference on a burglary charge as given at trial. See § 810.07(1), Fla....

ADKINS, Justice. Petitioner, a juvenile, seeks our review of the following question: Whether the state may attempt to establish the element of intent in a burglary prosecution by use of the presumption of intent statute, section 810.07, Florida Statutes, where the charging document alleged that the defendant entered with the intent to commit a specified offense....

...with the intent to commit an offense therein, to wit: THEFT in violation of 810.02, Florida Statutes. At trial, the state successfully relied on the presumption of intent statute, section 810.-07, Florida Statutes (1983), to prove the essential element of intent necessary to obtain petitioner’s conviction for burglary. Section 810.07 provides: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense....

...tate could not hereafter rely on the presumption of intent statute for proof of intent to commit “an offense”; rather, the state must prove that the defendant did intend to commit the specified *1196 offense and must do so without the benefit of section 810.07....

...e, there would be no incentive for the state to ever enumerate the particular offense. We hold, therefore, that when the state charges that the defendant did intend to commit a specific offense after the breaking and entering, it may avail itself of section 810.07....

...ct committed after July 1, 2001. S.D. argues on appeal the evidence presented was insufficient to show he had the intent to commit an offense when entering the property. The state’s case, however, is aided by the statutory presumption contained in section 810.07(1) which treats “proof of the entering of [a] structure ......

...lawfully enter or remain in a structure ... with the intent to commit the offense of Theft therein, or did enter through a window at about 4:45 A.M. stealthily without the occupant’s consent with intent to commit some offense, contrary to Sections 810.07 and 810.02, Florida Statutes. Thus the information charged burglary by the conventional method first and then as an alternative charge set out the elements of section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...sponse to which the trial court entered an order dismissing the entire information. On appeal the district court reversed the order dismissing the entire information but affirmed the dismissal of the charge made by alleging the elements set forth in section 810.07. The district court relied on Rozier v. State, 402 So.2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), which held that section 810.07 does not establish a substantive offense. We recently approved the Rozier decision relied on by the court below. State v. Rozier, 436 So.2d 73 (Fla.1983). There and in State v. Waters, 436 So.2d 66 (Fla.1983), we held that the elements in section 810.07 do not constitute the crime of burglary and therefore do not provide an alternative method of alleging the crime....

...f intent to commit an offense. In the present case it might be argued that the alternative set of allegations was sufficient to charge burglary because, after Waters , all the essential elements were there. However, we held in Waters and Rozier that section 810.07 should not be used as an allegational alternative but only as an evidentiary alternative on the issue of intent....

...asserts that at best the evidence supported no more than simple trespass. We disagree. The eyewitness testimony that M.S. ran from the back exit of the apartment late at night, coupled with the owner’s call to the police, clearly demonstrate that his entry was stealthy and lacked the owner’s consent. Pursuant to section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (1999), 2 this was prima facie evidence of his entering with the intent to commit an offense inside the unit....

...lary. We agree with appellant that the evidence was insufficient to prove an attempted burglary because: (a) the state failed to show the intent to commit an offense within Ms. Schraader’s home; and (b) the court erred in deriving that intent from section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981), which does not operate in the case of an attempted burglary where there is no entry....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See State v. Waters, 436 So.2d 66 (Fla.1983); Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1989).

...here is proof at trial of an unlawful entry into the residence, albeit *529 minimal, 1 it is proper for the trial court to give an instruction allowing the jury to find proof of intent to commit theft, based on the statutory presumption set forth in section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...intent existed. In State v. Waters, 436 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1983), the supreme court answered a similar question certified to it by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in the negative, holding that it was improper to rely on the statutory presumption of section 810.07 where the charge is attempted burglary, because the statutory presumption on its face does not apply to attempts. However, the court indicated that the statutory presumption may be used where there is proof of an entry: In this case, however, section 810.07 is inapplicable on its face because here the charge was attempted burglary rather than burglary, and because here there was no proof of entering, but only of an attempt to break and enter....

...CASE IN WHICH A DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH ATTEMPTED BURGLARY, AND THERE IS PROOF AT TRIAL OF DEFENDANT’S UNLAWFUL ENTRY INTO THE STRUCTURE OR RESIDENCE INVOLVED, IS IT PROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO RELY UPON THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION SET FORTH IN SECTION 810.07 IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON PROOF OF INTENT TO COMMIT AN OFFENSE? AFFIRMED....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...nt of dismissal, the trial court stated that it could infer the requisite intent to commit a crime in the conveyance if entry was done in a stealthy manner without the owner's consent. The trial court was referring to the statutory presumption in section 810.07(1)....

...The statute provides that in a burglary trial "proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without -3- consent of the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense." § 810.07(1); see also J.J.D., 973 So. 2d at 1255 (stating that there was no evidence that the juvenile "entered in a stealthy manner and thus triggered the presumption of intent under section 810.07(1)"); J.A.S....

...We conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient. See Diaz v. State, 845 So.2d 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Lopez v. State, 811 So.2d 839 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); C.C. v. State, 823 So.2d 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); State v. Dawson, 681 So.2d 1206 , 1207 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); see also § 810.07(1), Fla....

He argues that a jury instruction based on section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979)2 should not have been

...4th DCA 1982), that the offense of trespass is a “category four” lesser included offense under Brown v. State, 206 So.2d 377 (Fla.1968). Because our ruling does not require that we determine whether an allegation of stealth and lack of consent of the owner pursuant to Section 810.07, Florida Statutes, is a sufficient substitute for an allegation of intent to commit a specific offense in charging a burglary, we have no occasion to choose between the allegedly conflicting opinions on this point found in Rozier v....

...in Heuring . Given the prejudicial nature of this evidence, we are unable to hold that its admission was harmless error. Appellant also contends there was insufficient evidence presented for the trial court to give an instruction on stealthy entry. Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1985) states: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and *1042 without consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense....

In L.S., we said that the state may rely on section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1983), the burglary presumption

...The trial court stated, “Frankly speaking, I think you were too drunk to know what you were doing, but you did something, and that’s what I have to deal with.” J.D.Z., the juvenile defendant, appeals his adjudication of delinquency maintaining the evidence of intent to steal was insufficient. The State relies upon Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), which provides: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense....

...and also as to the sexual battery; thirty years incarceration as to the burglary. Appellant first argues that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on stealthy entry because the state is prohibited from relying on the presumption created by section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1983), in order to prove intent to commit “an offense” when the information alleges intent to commit a specific crime....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. State v. Fields, 390 So.2d 128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); § 810.07, Fla.Stat....

...was not open to the public, (defendant) committed a burglary if [he] [she] entered that non-public area with the intent to commit [(the crime alleged)] [an offense other than burglary or trespass] in that non-public area. Give if applicable. § 810.07 Fla....

...duce evidence of an act committed toward an attempted, unauthorized entry into a dwelling with the intent to commit an offense therein. See §§ 777.04(1), 810.02(l)(b), (3), Fla. Stat. (2005). Intent may be inferred through a statutory presumption. Section 810.07(2) provides: “In a trial on the charge of attempted burglary, proof of the attempt to enter such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without the consent of the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of attem...