Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...threat of injury to another person “with the intent thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatsoever, or with intent to compel the person so threatened . . . to do any act or refrain from doing any act against his or her will . . . .” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 836.05....

...Stat. (1985). [6] We agree that in certain circumstances the legislature can criminalize coercive attempts to elicit even truthful testimony from a witness. For example, some conduct of this type may constitute extortion that would be criminal under section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...1981), and Pagano v. State, 387 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1980). [1] We hold that one may never be convicted of a nonexistent crime and remand for a new trial, finding that defense counsel invited the error. The state charged petitioner with extortion under section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...This cause is before us on direct appeal from the Criminal Court of Record of Palm Beach County, Florida. Appellant was charged and convicted of conspiracy, extortion and impersonating a police officer. Our jurisdiction was established when the trial judge specifically ruled that the extortion statute in question, Fla. Stat. § 836.05, F.S.A., was constitutional....

...ith jail; have threatened to accuse him and have accused him of a criminal violation of the Records Act; and have threatened "injury to the person, property or reputation of Ferre." FERRE contends that these alleged threats constitute a violation of Section 836.05, Florida Statutes, which makes it a felony to maliciously threaten to accuse another of any crime or offense with the intent to extort money or any pecuniary advantage or to compel another to do, or refrain from doing, an act against his will. Section 836.05, however, does not expressly provide for a private right of action nor, plaintiffs argue, does the statute create a private right of action by implication. This Court agrees with plaintiffs that Judge Pearson's concurring opinion in Roger Rankin Enterprises, Inc. v. Green, 433 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) is persuasive authority for the proposition that in enacting § 836.05 the Florida Legislature did not intend to create a private civil cause of action....

...the Legislature intended to create a private right of action *977 under the statute it would have expressly provided for one, as it did under the criminal theft statute § 812.035, Florida Statutes. Judge Pearson's reasoning is equally applicable to § 836.05 which is similarly devoid of any suggestion that the legislature intended to create a private civil cause of action for damages. Accordingly, as there is no private right of action under § 836.05, this Court finds judgment on the pleadings should be entered as to Count III....

...Kogan, Miami, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Steven L. Bolotin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for appellee. ADKINS, Justice. The Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County has upheld the constitutionality of sections 836.05 and 877.02, Fla....

...see that articles against the project are printed and will organize and represent the people who live in the development against the construction of the marina. The defendant was charged with felonious extortion and solicitation of legal business. §§ 836.05 and 877.02, Fla....

...The extortion statute prohibits only those utterances or communications which constitute malicious threats to do injury to another's person, reputation, or property. Furthermore, the threats must be made with the intent to extort money or the intent to compel another to act or refrain from acting against his will. § 836.05, Fla....

...State, 334 So.2d 589 (Fla. 1976). Just as the elements of malice and intent prevent overbroad application of the statute, they lend sufficient clarity to provide adequate notice of the proscribed activity to persons of ordinary intelligence and understanding. We hold that section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1977), is constitutional....

...ation of the appellant's ability to pay all or a part of the restitution amount set by the court. Pursuant to his plea of nolo contendere, the defendant was placed on probation for *975 a period of 15 years on a charge of "extortion by threat" under Section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...The Court stated that merely interfering or depriving someone of property was insufficient as a matter of law to constitute extortion. See id. at 405, 123 S.Ct. 1057. Turning to the case at hand, it is undisputed that Florida law, specifically Florida Statutes § 836.05, makes chargeable the crime of extortion which is punishable by imprisonment of more than one year. All parties agree that Section 836.05 is a "generic" extortion statute....

...Earl George Davis, Jr., took center stage in the Polk County Criminal Court of Record on May 4, 1970, when the county solicitor filed an information charging him with one count of robbery in violation of F.S. § 813.011, F.S.A., and another count of extortion in violation of F.S. § 836.05, F.S.A....

...olence is imminent." § 784.011, Fla. Stat. (1987). Extortion requires an intent "to extort money or any pecuniary advantage" or "to compel the person so threatened, or any other person, to do any act or refrain from doing any act against his will." § 836.05, Fla....

...The husband argues that the only reason that he made these threats was to make sure that the wife would not try to hide the level of her income in the divorce proceedings in order to secure more alimony. We have a certain amount of sympathy for that position, but the fact remains he committed the crime of extortion under Section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1983), which specifically deems it a second degree felony to threaten to expose another for *1151 the commission of any crime or offense for one's own pecuniary advantage....

...and your demands concerning [our client's] resignation and divestment of his interest in [your joint corporation]. In response to the latter, we are forwarding a copy of your correspondence to the State Attorney by copy of this letter for investigation and prosecution for criminal extortion under Florida Statutes § 836.05, a felony of the second degree punishable by a prison term of up to fifteen (15) years and a fine of up to $10,000....

...property of another with intent: (a) To deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit therefrom. *526 (b) To appropriate the property to his own or to the use of any person not entitled thereto. Under the alternative provisions of Section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1981), one commits the crime of extortion by maliciously threatening to do certain acts with the intent to extort money from the victim....

...The theft conviction is reversed, the extortion conviction is affirmed. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part. ORFINGER, C.J., concurs. COWART, J., dissents with opinion. COWART, Judge, dissenting: O'Hara was convicted of violating two criminal statutes, extortion (§ 836.05, Fla....

...ts as to common elements overlap, as when property of the value or character required for grand larceny is actually obtained (taken) from a victim by a communicated malicious threat with the wrongful intent required by both offenses. Extortion under section 836.05, Florida Statutes, does not require a taking, obtaining or using of property....

...grand theft within the burglarized structure. O'Hara was convicted of extortion for maliciously communicating a threat with the specific intent to accomplish the wrongful obtaining of money. The majority opinion states that by the extortion statute (§ 836.05, Fla....

...nduct prohibited by the theft statute in Chapter 812 in view of the fact *529 that each statute has elements the other statute does not. While both the offense of statutory grand theft (§ 812.014, Fla. Stat.) and the offense of statutory extortion (§ 836.05, Fla....

...Horner, seeks review of a judgment of conviction entered in the Criminal Court of Record for Dade County, Florida, pursuant to a jury verdict finding him guilty of the crime of extortion. A sentence of ten years' confinement in the state penitentiary followed. We affirm. Section 836.05, Fla....

...t: ____, with intent to compel the said ____, against his will, to refrain from testifying against him * * * which testimony was to be given in a criminal proceeding in which the said CHARLES E. HORNER is a defendant, in violation of Florida Statute 836.05....

...HORNER, * * did * * * verbally and maliciously threaten to expose another, to-wit: ____, to disgrace, with intent thereby to compel the said ____, against his will, to refrain from testifying against him * * * in a criminal proceeding in which the said CHARLES E. HORNER is a defendant, in violation of Florida Statute 836.05....

...astity to another, to-wit: ____, with intent thereby to compel the said ____, against his will, to refrain from testifying against him * * * in a criminal proceeding in which the said CHARLES E. HORNER is a defendant, in violation of Florida Statute 836.05, contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida." The appellant's motion to quash the information was denied and the cause went to trial before a jury....

...ontains one count in which the offense is adequately set forth. Having thoroughly scrutinized the statute and the information, we hold that the information, viewed as a whole, [1] and each of its counts, legally and properly charged an offense under § 836.05, supra....

...victim. It was there contended that the threatened offense was not one against the laws of Florida, but against the laws of Canada. In holding the information to be sufficient to withstand the attack made upon it, the Supreme Court said: "Under F.S. § 836.05, F.S.A., threats to accuse a person of an offense, or to do him any injury to his person or property may not be a crime unless the same is done `with the intent to compel the person so threatened, or any other person, to do any act against his will'....

...The information specifically alleged that the threat to cause deportation was made maliciously with the intent to extort money. "The threat to cause deportation as alleged in the information for the purpose of extorting money was sufficient to constitute a crime under F.S. § 836.05, F.S.A., because it was a threat made with intent `to compel the person so threatened * * * to do an(y) act against his will.' * * *" *858 Appellee argues that the statute applied only to threats involving individuals, and should not be so...

...The cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. CARROLL, DONALD K., C.J., and RAWLS, J., concur. NOTES [1] For authority to cross-appeal see State of Florida v. McInnes, (Fla.App. 1961) 133 So.2d 581. [2] F.S. Section 836.05, F.S.A....

...This is an appeal from the dismissal with prejudice of an amended complaint which, insofar as is now relevant, claimed the right to compensatory and punitive damages on the theory that a letter written by the appellee Castillo to the appellant Bass violated section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1983), which creates the crime of extortion....

...audulent and unethical means of obtaining payments of funds not rightfully theirs while assuring said clients that Appellees had no claim to the funds. [5] The statements in the motion to dismiss the appeal do not constitute a "threat" proscribed by section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1987). See State v. McInnes, 153 So.2d 854, 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963). For purposes of this appeal we have accepted appellee's contention that he reasonably believed there was a private right of action for section 836.05 at the time he filed his complaint....

...He contends that the trial court gave an incorrect instruction on "malice" and that the intention to extort money was not proved. The latter point is totally lacking in merit. The former issue, while more persuasive, is also lacking in merit. Appellant was charged under Section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1981), which requires a showing of a threat made maliciously and accompanied by a demand for money or other pecuniary advantage....

...110, 17 So. 359 (1895); Kohen v. H.S. Crocker Co., 260 F.2d 790 (5th Cir.1958); 25 Am.Jur.2d, Duress & Undue Influence, § 5. These principles, however, do not serve to encompass the husband's statements, for his threats could constitute extortion. See § 836.05, Fla....

...He argued, however, that he threatened her with disclosure only so that she could not claim alimony on the basis of the unreported income from her business. We held: "We have a certain amount of sympathy for [his] position, but the fact remains he committed the crime of extortion under Section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1983), which specifically deems it a second degree felony to threaten to expose another for *63 the commission of any crime or offense for one's own pecuniary advantage....

...destroys free agency of party who is thereby caused to do act or make contract not of own volition). [9] This is no accident, as his petition expressly cites Berger and alleges that the extortion here is exactly the same as the extortion there. [10] Section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1991) provides: 836.05 Threats; extortion....

...For the foregoing reasons the State's motion to dismiss the cross-appeal taken by appellee herein is denied. We now turn to the State's motion to remand this cause to the trial court for the entry of an order specifying whether the constitutionality of § 836.05, of the statutes was directly passed upon in considering and overruling appellee's motion to quash the information....

...cause remanded to the trial court for the entry of an amended order on appellee's motion to quash the amended information, with directions that such order as may be entered specify whether the court directly passes upon the constitutionality of F.S. § 836.05, F.S.A, in the rendition of its decision....

...the further proceedings of the cause. We have carefully considered appellee's motion to dismiss this appeal but find it to be without substantial merit. Remanded with directions. CARROLL, DONALD K., Chief Judge, and RAWLS, J., concur. NOTES [1] F.S. § 836.05, F.S.A....

...to contact the authorities. [2] The fact or the apprehension of immediate and impending harm was not shown. Appellant having failed to demonstrate error, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. COBB and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 836.05, Fla....

...The Baker test is satisfied, and both convictions and sentences must stand. § 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (1981). Accordingly, we quash the decision of the district court. It is so ordered. BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD and SHAW, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., dissents. NOTES [1] § 836.05, Fla....

...`racketeering activity' under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)." § 895.02(1)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. *1170 The crimes enumerated in subsection (a) of section 895.02(1) include, but are not limited to, fraud under Chapter 817 of the Florida Statutes, extortion under Section 836.05 of the Florida Statutes, bribery and misuse of a public office under Chapter 838 of the Florida Statutes, and obstruction of justice under Chapter 843 of the Florida Statutes....

...ainst Plaintiffs in the Dominican Republic pending lawsuit." (Second Amended Complaint ¶ 36.) The definition of extortion under Florida law includes the malicious threatening [11] of another with the intent to extort money or a pecuniary advantage. § 836.05, Fla....

...[11] Extortion makes it unlawful to threaten to accuse another of any crime or offense, or threaten any injury to the person, property or reputation of another, or threaten to expose another to disgrace, or to expose any secret affecting another, or to impute any deformity or lack of chastity to another. § 836.05, Fla....

PER CURIAM. Russell Harris Calamia appeals his jury conviction for extortion. Calamia contends that the court erred in instructing the jury with a definition of legal malice for the term “maliciously” in the extortion statute. § 836.05, Fla....

...On the basis that the letter was inadmissible, Calamia appealed the violation of probation to this Court, which per curiam affirmed. See Calamia v. State, 998 So.2d 622 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). The State then charged Calamia with ex *1009 tortion pursuant to section 836.05....

...with intent to compel the person so threatened, or any other person, to do any act or refrain from doing any act against his or her will, shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.775.082, s.775.083, or s.775.084. § 836.05, Fla....

...Id. at 905-06 . However, the issue in Duan was whether a threat of mental injuries is prohibited under the statute. Id. Similarly, in Dudley , the Second District affirmatively resolved the issue of whether convictions on both the extortion statute, section 836.05, and the statute criminalizing a threat of bodily harm, section 836.10, constitute a violation of double jeopardy....

...the prosecution to show that there was a malicious threat of injury against a person, which was communicated in writing for the purpose of compelling that person to commit an act or to refrain from acting against his will. 634 So.2d at 1094 (citing § 836.05, Fla....

...Calamia argues that he must have intended that the communication somehow, directly or indirectly, reach the party that Calamia is attempting to coerce. The statute requires “intent to compel the person so threatened, or any other person, to do any act or refrain from doing any act against his or her will....” § 836.05, Fla....

..., and the Second District Court of Appeal’s holding in Dudley, 634 So.2d at 1094 . We likewise certify as a question of great public importance: IS THE STATE REQUIRED TO PROVE ACTUAL MALICE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME OF EXTORTION UNDER SECTION 836.05, FLORIDA STATUTES? We find no error on the part of the trial court as to the other issues raised by Calamia....

...The defendant invited a lesser included offense instruction of attempted extortion. Upon conviction thereof he now claims that he must go free because such a crime does not exist. We affirm. We begin by agreeing that the crime of attempted extortion does not exist. Section 836.05 of the Florida Statutes (1977) reads: 836.05 Threats; extortion....

...Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. SUNDBERG, Justice. This cause comes to us by appeal from the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Matthews v. State, reported at 336 So.2d 643, because the district court initially and directly passed on the validity of Section 836.05 Florida Statutes (1973), thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court under Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution....

...If a ruling on the validity of the statute was not made in the trial court, it is difficult to understand how it was preserved for review in the District Court of Appeal. Nonetheless, the assignments of error filed by the appellant in the court below clearly raise the constitutional issue: Florida Statute § 836.05, the section under which the Defendant has been convicted, is unconstitutional as applied to your Defendant based upon the facts in this cause and is in contravention as applied *1068 in this cause to Defendant's rights under the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. The conviction is an unconstitutional application of the extortion statute, i.e., § 836.05....

...At one of these demonstrations, appellant led the crowd in the following chant: Two, four, six, eight, who shall we assassinate? Doug Raines, Doug Raines, Sheriff Untreiner, Askew, and the whole bunch of you pigs. [1] Appellant was arrested and charged with extortion, a violation of Section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1973), [2] in that he verbally and maliciously threatened injury to Sheriff Untreiner in order to compel the dismissal of Deputy Raines....

...NOTES [1] As pointed out in the opinion of the district court there was conflicting evidence as to whether the precise word "assassinate" was used by the demonstrators, but the jury's verdict binds a reviewing court to the "assassination" version of the chant urged by the State. [2] § 836.05, Fla....

...l the persons so threatened to do an act against their will, to-wit: to compel the suspension or resignation of Deputy Sheriff Doug Raines against the will of Sheriff Royal E. Untreiner and against the will of Deputy Sheriff Doug Raines, contrary to section 836.05, Florida Statutes....

...Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Donna A. Gerace and Giselle Lylen Rivera, Assistant Attorneys General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant Waynard Duan argues that his jury conviction for extortion, pursuant to section 836.05, Florida Statutes (2006), should be reversed because the statute does not apply to conduct which injures only the victim's mental well being....

...et or damage her reputation; rather, the evidence only showed the victim suffered a mental injury, or an injury to her emotional well-being. Appellant argued the victim's mental injury was insufficient to meet the elements of extortion, set forth in section 836.05, Florida Statutes....

...The jury returned a verdict finding appellant guilty of extortion as charged in the *906 information. He was sentenced to one year in prison. Appellant presently appeals his judgment and sentence. II. ANALYSIS In this appeal, appellant asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, because section 836.05, Florida Statutes, does not include threats of injury to the victim's mental or emotional well being for the purpose of extorting money or other pecuniary gain. Section 836.05, Florida Statutes, provides: Whoever, either verbally or by a written or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse another of any crime or offense, or by such communication maliciously threatens an injury to the person, pr...

...eby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatsoever, or with intent to compel the person so threatened, or any other person, to do any act or refrain from doing any act against his or her will, shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree. § 836.05, Fla....

...Moreover, the jury was instructed that "injury to the person" includes physical and mental injury, and it is impossible to tell from the verdict form on which theory the jury relied in convicting appellant. Second, the State asserts the trial court properly construed section 836.05 to include injury to the victim's mental or emotional well being. This second argument has merit. Appellant contends this court is obligated, pursuant to section 775.021, Florida Statutes, to strictly construe section 836.05 in his favor....

...Section 775.021(1) requires that the provisions of the criminal code "be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused." § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). *907 Thus, appellant contends, the trial court should have ruled that section 836.05 only contemplates a physical injury, and does not include injuries to the victim's mental or emotional well being....

...e obvious intention of the legislature. In other words, such strict construction is subordinate to the rule that the intention of the lawmakers must be given effect." State ex rel. Washington v. Rivkind, 350 So.2d 575, 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Within section 836.05, there is evidence the Legislature intended the crime of extortion to encompass threats to mental or emotional well being....

...As further evidence of the Legislature's intent, the phrase "injury to the person" is not further modified as a "bodily injury" or "physical injury" to the person, and thus includes both physical and mental injuries. It appears this is a case of first impression in Florida. Accordingly, no Florida court has ruled that section 836.05 excludes threats which cause the victim only a mental or emotional injury....

...such magnitude as to cause her severe mental anguish which would constitute injury to the person. . . . Simply stated, an injury to a person's reputation is an injury to the person."). Conclusion Therefore, we hold that Florida's extortion statute, section 836.05, does encompass injuries, such as the one in this case, where appellant threatened the victim and caused her emotional distress. As in Galusha, appellant used Mrs. Bailey's fear of her husband and his continued abuse to compel her to pay appellant $2,500. No Florida case suggests that this conduct is not included under section 836.05....

...riminal activity, or predicate acts. Fla. Stat. § 772.101, et seq. Count I alleges a "pattern of criminal activity consist[ing] of numerous incidents occurring over a period of more than two years, including: (a) extortion, as defined in Fla. Stat. § 836.05, in violation of Fla....

...The crime of extortion requires that a defendant “maliciously” threaten another “with intent thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatsoever, or with intent to compel the person so threatened, or any other person, to do any act or refrain from doing any act against his or her will.” § 836.05, Fla....

...Condition five of Parissay's probation order required that he "live and remain at liberty without violating any law...." The record supports the trial court's finding that Parissay's threats to his former wife and her present husband constituted a violation of the criminal extortion statute. See § 836.05, Fla....

...The State of Florida (“State”) filed a 37-count criminal information against the defendant. Count 1 charged the defendant with extortion, alleging that the defendant threatened to prevent the victim from trading comic books on eBay and from communicating on the internet, in violation of section 836.05, Florida Statutes (2004)....

...ll or do bodily injury to any member of the family of the person to whom such letter or communication is sent.” § 836.10 (emphasis added); cf. Calamia v. State, 125 So.3d 1007, 1012 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (interpreting Florida’s extortion statute, section 836.05, Fla....

...Jail. When a police investigation revealed that Dudley had written the letter, he was charged with making a written threat to kill or do bodily injury in violation of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (1991), count one; and extortion in violation of section 836.05, count two....

...To prove extortion in a case such as this, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to show that there was a malicious threat of injury against a person, which was communicated in writing for the purpose of compelling that person to commit an act or to refrain from acting against his will. Section 836.05, Fla.Stat....

...Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Michael J. Kotler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. PER CURIAM. On June 27, 1985, Michael Dilla was charged with kidnapping in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (1985), and extortion in violation of section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Beisner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. *1148 SHIVERS, Judge. Taylor, a juvenile at the time of the offenses, appeals from a judgment and sentence adjudicating and sentencing him as an adult on two counts of second-degree felony extortion pursuant to Section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...threat of injury to another person “with the intent thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatsoever, or with intent to compel the person so threatened . . . to do any act or refrain from doing any act against his or her will.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 836.05....

(interpreting Florida's extortion statute, section 836.05, Fla. Stat. (2009), "to mean that the

...facts that would authorize a jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff. The action against Hamic grew out of Stone’s arrest pursuant to a warrant issued by the justice of the peace upon the affidavit of Hamic charging that Stone, in violation of section 836.05, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., threatened an injury to Hamic with intent to compel him to withdraw a divorce action against his wife naming Stone as corespondent....

Week-fall with extortion, a second-degree felony. § 836.05, Fla. Stat. (1993). The information alleges that

...URIAM. This is an appeal by the defendant Jeffrey Jan Castaline from final judgments of conviction and sentences for (1) two counts of battery [§ 784.03, Fla.Stat. (1991) ]; (2) aggravated assault [§ 784.021, Fla.Stat. (1991) ]; and (3) extortion [§ 836.05, Fla....

...such evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction for extortion. The defendant did not object to the jury instruction on extortion — -and the trial court’s reading of the extortion statutes does not, as urged, amount to a fundamental error. § 836.05, Fla.Stat....

...ent of either extortion or aggravated assault. See Gonzalez v. State, 449 So.2d 882, 887 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 458 So.2d 274 (Fla.1984); Gonzalez v. State, 440 So.2d 514, 515 (Fla. 4th DCA), cause dismissed, 444 So.2d 417 (Fla.1983). Compare §§ 836.05, 784.021, Fla....

of the petitioner under the provisions of F.S. § 836.05, F.S.A. The petitioner questions the sufficiency

...ons between the Garcias’ lawyers in the wrongful death case. The Holdsworths contend those documents should be produced under the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. According to the Holdsworths, the Garcias extorted them under section 836.05, Florida Statutes....

...§ 90.502(4)(a), Fla. Stat. . First Union Nat’l Bank v. Turney, 824 So.2d 172, 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). . American Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So.2d 1249, 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). . Id. . BNP Paribas v. Wynne, 961 So.2d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). . § 836.05, Fla....

threaten” someone for certain enumerated benefits, § 836.05, Fla. Stat. (2019), and Florida courts have

...d found the phone in Sanchez-Torres’s room. Sanchez-Torres argues that the detectives committed felony extortion by threatening to arrest Ms. Torres, but extortion is to “maliciously threaten” someone for certain enumerated benefits, § 836.05, Fla....

...This is an original prohibition proceeding filed under Fla.Const. Article V, § 4(2), F.S.A., by the relator who seeks to prohibit his trial in the Criminal Court of Record of Polk County on charges filed against him under an information containing two counts of extortion under Fla.Stat. § 836.05, F.S.A., and one count of inciting to commit perjury, under Fla.Stat....

...ownward departure sentence. LEGAL ANALYSIS Tomlinson contends the trial court committed fundamental error by denying the defense request to instruct the jury that actual malice was an element of extortion under section 836.05, Florida Statutes (2020). Section 836.05 provides: Whoever, either verbally or by a written or printed communication, ....

...State,125 So. 3d 1007, 1011 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). The court certified a question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court, reading: “IS THE STATE REQUIRED TO PROVE ACTUAL MALICE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME OF EXTORTION UNDER SECTION 836.05, FLORIDA STATUTES?” Id. 1 “Although we think that the Fourth District’s analysis in Alonso is correct and legal malice is the more appropriate definition, we are compelled to follow the supreme court’s directive in Carricarte....

...State, 384 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 1980) (citations omitted). The conduct that the statute criminalizes is a malicious threat with the intent “to extort money or any pecuniary advantage” or to compel the person to do an act against his or her will. § 836.05, Fla. Stat. “[T]he extortionist need not hate his victim. That kind of malice is not contemplated by the crime of extortion.” Alonso, 447 So. 2d at 1030. In an extortion case, the defendant is driven by greed, not hatred. “Taking the text of [section 836.05] as a whole, and considering its context and the discernable purposes of the legislature,” we conclude that the statutory term “maliciously” means legal malice....

...Defense counsel did not object. The jury acquitted appellant of the kidnapping charge and found him guilty of attempted extortion. Attempted extortion is a nonexistent crime, though an attempt is embraced within the crime of extortion as defined by section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1981)....

SMITH, Judge. An Escambia County jury found that appellants Matthews and Brooks committed extortion by verbal threats of bodily injury, *644 in violation of § 836.05, F.S., 1 while leading nighttime demonstrations in February 1975 at the Escambia County jail in Pensacola....

...Admission of the evidence was not fundamental error requiring reversal in the absence of objection. Matthews’ other arguments do not persuade us. REVERSED as to Brooks, AFFIRMED as to Matthews. MILLS, Acting C. J., and CAWTHON, VICTOR M., Associate Judge, concur. . Section 836.05 provides: “Whoever, either verbally or by a written or printed communication, maliciously threatens ......

...2d 1052 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). This instruction was adopted in July 1998 and amended in 2012 [95 So. 3d 868] and 2014. 9  8.23 EXTORTION §836.05, Fla....

...n commerce required to support a prosecution for extortion under the Hobbs Act. Our decision, however, hardly vindicates Kaplan, and we note that the State of Florida remains free to prosecute Kaplan on the facts of this case. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 836.05 (defining the crime of extortion under Florida State law). Nevertheless, the evidence in this case does not support a federal prosecution under the Hobbs Act. 12 Perhaps most notably, the U.S....

...on commerce required to support a prosecution for extortion under the Hobbs Act. Our decision, however, hardly vindicates Kaplan, and we note that the State of Florida remains free to prosecute Kaplan on the facts of this case. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 836.05 (defining the crime of extortion under Florida State law). Nevertheless, the evidence in this case does not support a federal prosecution under the Hobbs Act....

...Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kaylee D. Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Anthony Doyle appeals his convictions and sentences for extortion under section 836.05, Florida Statutes (2015), and written threats to kill or do bodily injury under section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2015), arguing that the dual convictions violate double jeopardy. We agree and therefore reverse and remand for resent...

...1 The jury returned a guilty verdict on both charges. Doyle was sentenced to five years’ incarceration on each charge, with each sentence to run concurrently, followed by ten years of probation. The sole issue on appeal is whether double jeopardy precluded convictions on both charges. Section 836.05, “Threats; extortion,” provides: Whoever, either verbally or by a written or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse another of any crime or offense, or by such commun...

...threatened, or any other person, to do any act or refrain from doing any act against his or her will, shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 836.05, Fla....

...775.084. § 836.10, Fla. Stat. (2015). Doyle argues that the elements of the two offenses are inseparable and that a conviction for written threats under section 836.10 does not include any additional elements not included for an extortion conviction under section 836.05. Alternatively, he suggests that even if the crimes contain different elements, a conviction for written threats under section 836.10 is necessarily subsumed by an extortion conviction under section 836.05....

...2011) (quoting Pizzo v. State, 945 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Fla. 2006)). “The prevailing standard for 2 The State also argues that Roughton v. State, 185 So. 3d 1207 (Fla. 2016), controls in this case and that dual convictions under sections 836.05 and 836.10 do not violate double jeopardy based on the alternative conduct proscribed by each statute....

...In Roughton, the court explicitly found that both lewd or lascivious molestation and sexual battery contain a different element that the other does not, based on the alternative conduct proscribed by each statute. 185 So. 3d at 1210. As explained below, however, section 836.10 does not contain any element not found in section 836.05. 3  Written Threats to Kill or Do Extortion—Section 836.05 Bodily Injury—Section 836.10 (1) a person writes or composes a (1) the defendant made a written, printed, or verbal...

...(4) the threat was made with the intent to: (a) extort money or pecuniary advantage n/a (b) compel a person to do any act or refrain from doing an act against his/her will. Thus, extortion under section 836.05 may be committed by issuing a written threat to commit bodily harm on another, which encompasses all of the required elements of section 836.10—a written threat to kill or do bodily injury on the person threatened or a family member....

...are different because the written threat under section 836.10 may be directed toward a family member is unpersuasive. Under the second element of extortion (as listed above), extortion may be committed by threatening to injure another person. See § 836.05, Fla....

...ly. See id. § 836.10. A conviction for written threats under section 836.10 does not have any 5  Written Threats to Kill or Do Extortion—Section 836.05 Bodily Injury—Section 836.10 (1) a person writes or composes a (1) the defendant made a written, printed, or verbal...

...(4) the threat was made with the intent to: (a) extort money or pecuniary advantage n/a (b) compel a person to do any act or refrain from doing an act against his/her will. Thus, extortion under section 836.05 may be committed by issuing a written threat to commit bodily harm on another, which encompasses all of the required elements of section 836.10—a written threat to kill or do bodily injury on the person threatened or a family member....

...are different because the written threat under section 836.10 may be directed toward a family member is unpersuasive. Under the second element of extortion (as listed above), extortion may be committed by threatening to injure another person. See § 836.05, Fla....

...threat of injury is to the person receiving the threat or a member of his or her family. See id. § 836.10. A conviction for written threats under section 836.10 does not have any 5 additional elements not contained in section 836.05....

...BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDonald, shaw, grimes, kogan and HARDING, JJ., concur. *1310 APPENDIX Rule 3.988(d) Category 4: Violent Personal Crimes [[Image here]] *1311 Rule 3.988(d) Category 4: Violent Personal Crimes Section 231.06 — Assault or Battery Upon District School Board Employee Chapter 784 — Assault, Battery Section 836.05 — Threats, Extortion Section 836.10 — Written Threats to Kill or Do Bodily Injury Section 843.01 — Resisting Officer with Violence Subsection 381.411(4)(b) — Battery on HRS Employee [[Image here]] Note — Any person sentenced...

constitute a violation of the extortion statute, section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1985). Threats; extortion

...In dealing with this cause the trial and appellate courts created a unique situation. It all started in the Criminal Court of Record of Duval County by the filing of an information against George L. Mclnnes charging him with extortion in violation of Sec. 836.05, Florida Statutes 1959, and F.S....

...The defendant moved to quash the second amended information and each count of it upon various grounds not necessary now to detail. Before the judge ruled upon the motion, the defendant presented an additional ground for the attack on the third count, namely that the portions of the statute, Sec. 836.05, supra, on which this count was based were “unconstitutionally vague and hence invalid.” The restriction of the contention of unconstitutionality to the third count should be borne in mind because it is the pivot on which our decision will hinge....

...n order denying his motion to quash. In the alternative the State asked the District Court of Appeal, First District, to relinquish jurisdiction of the cause to the trial court so the latter could specify whether or not the constitutionality of Sec. 836.05, supra, had been determined inasmuch as the point had been raised as an objection to the third count but had not been mentioned in the order dis *521 posing of the motion to quash....

..., holding that the motion to dismiss was lacking in merit and relinquishing jurisdiction to the trial court with directions to amend the order on the motion to quash so as to specify whether or not that court passed directly on the validity of Sec. 836.05, supra. In compliance with the direction of the District Court of Appeal the trial judge entered an amended order reciting that he was passing directly upon the validity of Sec. 836.05, supra, and that as applied to the third count, it was not unconstitutionally vague or invalid “as contended in paragraph 22” of the defendant’s additional ground to quash....

...sh and the opinion of the District Court of Appeal that the ruling was not limited to the alleged facts in the instant case. The District Court, to repeat, asked the judge to “specify whether [he] directly passes upon the constitutionality of F.S. § 836.05, F.S.A., in the rendition of [his] decision,” while the motion to quash was on the bald basis “that the portions of Section 836.05, Florida Statutes, on which the third count of the Amended Information is grounded are unconstitutionally vague and hence invalid,” which appears to be an attack upon the statute itself for all purposes....

...Kevin Tomlinson threatened to ruin the reputation of two fellow real estate brokers unless they paid him. Must the State prove that Tomlinson made this threat with hatred for the complainants in seeking a conviction under Florida’s extortion law, section 836.05, Florida Statutes (2015)? In the decision before us, the Third District Court of Appeal said no, holding that section 836.05 requires the State to prove that the defendant made a threat “intentionally and without a lawful justification.” Tomlinson v. State, 322 So....

...That expressly and directly conflicts with the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Calamia v. State, 125 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). There, citing our decision in Carricarte v. State, 384 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 1980), the Fifth District concluded that “maliciously” in section 836.05, Florida Statutes (2009), requires proof that the defendant acted with ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil intent....

...But the next day, Tomlinson again threatened a class action and swore off any potential settlement, sending another email that asked MAR to “proceed with the grievance.” The police subsequently arrested Tomlinson and the State charged him with two counts of extortion under section 836.05. B At the time of Tomlinson’s arrest, section 836.05 provided: Whoever, either verbally or by a written or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse another of any crime or offense, or by such communication maliciously threatens an injury to the person,...

...compel the person so threatened, or any other person, to do any act or refrain from doing any act against his or her will, shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 836.05, Fla. Stat. (2015) (emphasis added). 2 The word “maliciously” is not defined in section 836.05 or chapter 836....

...legal malice”). See Dudley v. State, 634 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Alonso v. State, 447 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); see also Sanchez- 2. With a few changes immaterial to this case, this provision is now codified as section 836.05(1)....

...On appeal to the Third District, Tomlinson argued that the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury on actual malice. The Third District disagreed, finding that “[t]he extortionist need not hate” the complainant, and “ ‘[t]aking the text of section 836.05 as a whole, and considering its context and the discernable purposes of the legislature,’ ....

...Carricarte, 384 So. 2d at 1263, established that actual malice is the proper standard, even though the Fifth District thought that “legal malice is the more appropriate definition.” 125 So. 3d at 1010. Carricarte concerned a constitutional challenge to section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1977), based on vagueness and overbreadth....

...447 So. 2d at 1030, and the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Dudley, 634 So. 2d at 1094. II We have exercised our discretionary jurisdiction to resolve the express and direct conflict as to what section 836.05 requires the State to prove with regard to malice.3 Because “the merits of this 3....

...1984). -9- word had more than one accepted meaning at that time, we decide which one is the law by looking to the context in which it appears, and what history tells us about how it got there. Here, the contextual clues bearing on the meaning of “maliciously” in section 836.05 affirm the Third District’s insight that the term does not denote a hatred of the complainant. Tomlinson, 322 So. 3d at 215. Adjacent language requires the State to prove “intent . . . to extort money or any pecuniary advantage” or to make a complainant or another person “do any act or refrain from doing any act against his or her will.” § 836.05....

..., and not necessarily to hate, the complainant—that is, to act “intentionally and without a lawful justification.” Tomlinson, 322 So. 3d at 216. And then there is the history. The legislative bargain that eventually found its way into section 836.05 of our statutes was first struck in 1868....

...12 provided that legal malice came to be the standard even in this context. See Stephen, supra note 5 (“In reference to malicious mischief, and other offences . . . ‘malice’ means nothing more than doing the act intentionally without lawful justification or excuse.”). 12. English statutes similar to section 836.05 were not understood to require proof of a defendant’s ill will or hatred toward the complainant....

...cause us to think that the Legislature chose a different meaning of malicious threats to the reputation—not just the person or property—of another. See ch. 57-254, § 1, Laws of Fla. - 19 - “maliciously” at some point since section 836.05’s original enactment....

...And Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary alternatively defines “malice” as a “desire to cause pain, injury, or distress to another.” Malice, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003). - 20 - section 836.05, arguing that it was impermissibly vague and overbroad....

...which criminalized aggravated child abuse. 356 So. 2d at 314.16 But our mere citation of Gaylord in rejecting a vagueness challenge 15. Tomlinson raises similar constitutional claims here and argues that his reading of “maliciously” would save section 836.05 from constitutional concerns....

...gfully, intentionally, and without legal justification or excuse.” Ch. 2003-130, § 1, Laws of Fla. (amending § 827.03, Fla. Stat. (2002)). - 21 - does not constitute a holding that “maliciously,” as used in section 836.05, means “with ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil intent.” See Lewis v....

...If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case counts as dicta.”). In Carricarte, we were not called upon, and therefore did not answer, the question posed to us today: what the State must prove as to the defendant’s malice to obtain a conviction under section 836.05....

...traditional canons of statutory construction”); see also Conage, - 22 -  III The trial court and the Third District Court of Appeal each correctly decided that “maliciously,” as used in section 836.05, means “intentionally and without any lawful justification.” That is what the word has meant for the long history of its use in our law of extortion, even though it has, also for a long time, meant other things when used elsewhere....

...ical facilities. In the days and weeks ahead, your deputies and officers may be called upon to respond to potentially volatile situations. For this reason, we would like to note some of the statutes that may be of use in addressing these situations: Section 836.05 — Threats; extortion....

an unlawful threat, except as may fall under. § 836.05, F.S.4 In our view, forcing or attempting to force

characterizes as the lesser included offense of extortion, § 836.05, Fla.Stat. (1985), and that we should therefore

such conduct, was guilty of a violation of Section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1979), a felony of the second