Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Porth, an orthopedic surgeon, diagnosed vasculitis, and he thought that this condition was a delayed but direct result of exposure to noxious gases at work. In 1980, the Deputy entered his Order, finding in part that the claimant's bronchial asthma and vasculitis were occupational diseases. *1119 Under § 440.151, Fla....

...ust be substantially higher in the occupation than in usual occupations; and (4) if the disease is an ordinary disease of life, the incidence of such a disease must be substantially higher in the particular occupation than in the general public. See § 440.151(1)(a) and (2)....

...Duncan, 383 So.2d 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In determining whether the claimant has satisfied the preceding statutory requirements, there is no presumption that the claim for compensation comes within the provisions of the occupational disease statute. See § 440.151(1)(e)....

...dily indicate that no respiratory problems were experienced by other employees in the past or present. See Potter, 391 So.2d at 323. While it is clear that the claimant's illnesses are not occupational diseases within the highly restrictive terms of § 440.151, Fla....

...McLean, Fla., 72 So.2d 275, we reversed an award in claimant's favor against Mundy for compensation for an occupational disease on the ground that Mundy was not the employer "in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease," Section 440.151(5), Fla....

...ble occupational disease. The distinction is important because in occupational disease cases, it is the date of disability which commences the running of the statute of limitations. American Beryllium Co. v. Stringer, 392 So.2d 1294 (Fla. 1980); and Section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1985) ("the disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease ......

...mployment" *1233 and excludes "all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed, unless the incidence of the disease is substantially higher in the particular trade, occupation, process or employment than for the general public." § 440.151(2), Fla....

...In providing compensation for aggravation of preexisting conditions under Section 440.02(18), the legislature has not imposed upon claimants seeking compensation for such conditions the same strictures it has upon claimants asserting disability caused by occupational diseases. Compare Section 440.151....

...ly, the E/C), appeal an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) finding claimant, Charles Wise, to be permanently and totally disabled (PTD) as a result of his chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), an occupational disease pursuant to section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...fter March 13, 1995. Dr. Messina testified that both smoking and ongoing, unprotected AN exposure caused claimant's COPD, but he could not allocate the responsibility of each. The JCC concluded that Wise is PTD as the result of occupational disease. Section 440.151(1)(a) provides that the disability of an employee as the result of an occupational disease "shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident," regardless of any other provisions of chapter 440....

...The statute further requires a showing that the claimant contracted the disease from an employment condition and that claimant's occupation presented a particular hazard of such disease. The E/C challenges the JCC's rejection of its argument that Wise's injury must not only satisfy the criteria of section 440.151(1)(a), but must also satisfy the "arising out of" definition in section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which the E/C contends applies to all compensation cases....

...injury." Dr. Messina testified that Wise's lung disease resulted more from his smoking than his chemical exposure; therefore, the E/C contends that Wise failed to establish causation. We cannot agree. Based upon our reading of the plain language of section 440.151(1)(a), we conclude that so long as an occupational disease fits within the criteria enumerated therein, such disease constitutes a compensable injury, and that Wise was not required to prove that AN exposure was the major contributing cause of his disability. Our conclusion is supported by section 440.151(1)(c), which provides that in cases where the combination of occupational disease and a noncompensable condition results in disability, compensation must be apportioned between such causes and reduced by the amount attributed to the noncompensable condition....

...It is well-settled in occupational disease cases that the date of accident is determined by the date of disability, and disability is defined as the date the claimant became incapable of performing work in the last occupation in which he was exposed to the hazards of the disease. See § 440.151(1)(a), Fla....

...Here, Morehead's condition is addressed in *932 the AMA Guides, but it is evaluated only in terms of medical impairment without regard to the wage loss which may result from disability. The statute on occupational diseases provides that workers' compensation shall be paid for disablement. § 440.151, Fla. Stat. (1985). Section 440.151(3) reads: (3) Except as hereinafter otherwise provided in this section, "disablement" means the event of an employee's becoming actually incapacitated, partially or totally, because of an occupational disease, from performing his work...

...As to the claim for permanent partial disability the deputy found that the occupational disease of petitioner reached its stage of permanency while he was in the employ of Clifford Plastering Company. The deputy stated that the petitioner was permanently disabled and that except for the provisions of Section 440.151(3), liability for petitioner's permanent disability would attach to Clifford. Section 440.151(3) defines disablement as "the event of an employee's becoming actually incapacitated, partially or totally, because of an occupational disease, from performing his work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed to the hazar...

...ut not necessarily for the reasons stated in his order." While we accept the deputy's findings of fact as based on competent, substantial evidence in accord with logic and reason, we nevertheless disagree with the interpretation which he placed upon Section 440.151(5) F.S.A....

...t the finding of severe decrease in pulmonary function directly related to and caused by the exposure of claimant to motor vehicle fumes and were the criteria for finding occupational disease caused by exposure properly supported by the evidence? Subsection 440.151(2), Florida Statutes (1977), provides: Whenever used in this section the term `occupational disease' shall be construed to mean only a disease which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particu...

...In the instant case, there was medical testimony regarding a permanent anatomical impairment (but no percentage rating) and there was a specific finding that there was a loss of wage earning capacity. One final consideration in reviewing an award based on occupational disease is that Section 440.151(3), Florida Statutes (1977), defines "disablement" as "the event of an employee's becoming actually incapacitated, partially or totally, because of an occupational disease, from performing his work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease......

...atively. The only issue to be resolved was whether Claimant's permanent impairment for hypertension, standing alone, constituted a "disability," so as to qualify for coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act as an occupational disease pursuant to section 440.151, Florida Statutes....

...An exception to the actual "injury by accident" requirement allows an employee's disease or medical condition to be "treated as the happening of an injury by accident" if he is able to establish he has an occupational disease. It is under the occupational disease provisions of section 440.151, Florida Statutes, that Claimant seeks coverage....

...Here, Claimant's ability to satisfy the "four prong test" [1] that comprises part of the statutory requirements is not at issue, because the parties stipulated to the applicability of the presumption under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes. However, Claimant must still satisfy the other statutory requirements. In reviewing section 440.151, and the applicable case law interpreting the statute, three points emerge as significant. One, we do not look beyond section 440.151 to define its relevant terms. See Watkins Eng'rs & Constructors v. Wise, 698 So.2d 294 (Fla.1st DCA 1997) (holding occupational disease provision language of section 440.151, is "plain," and "so long as an occupational disease fits within the criteria enumerated therein, such disease constitutes a compensable injury") (emphasis added). A claimant either meets the requirements for coverage under section 440.151, or he does not. This court has previously refused to incorporate other subsections of the Act to add to or supplement the clearly delineated requirements set forth in section 440.151....

...Plating, Inc. v. Weiby, 394 So.2d 1117 (Fla.1st DCA 1981) (reversing JCC's finding that bronchial asthma and vasculitis were occupational diseases). Even where a condition of employment causes a permanent disease, failure to meet the statutory requirements of section 440.151 means the claimant would not be entitled to compensation or benefits under the Act....

...nt, since he had not suffered "disablement," his disease was not an occupational disease under the Act). At issue here is whether Claimant's hypertension resulted in " disablement or death . . . from an occupational disease as hereinafter defined ." § 440.151, Fla. Stat. Since section 440.151 defines disablement, this statutory language means hypertension (or any other disease or medical condition where employment is the major contributing cause) will not qualify as an occupational disease unless Claimant meets the statute's definition of disablement. The Meaning of Disablement The dissent acknowledges disablement must be established before Claimant can be covered by the Act. However, the dissent fails to use the statutory definition of "disablement" provided in section 440.151....

...incapacitated, partially or totally, because of an occupational disease, from performing her or his work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease; and `disability' means the state of being so incapacitated." § 440.151(3), Fla....

...The question then becomes "deprived of the capacity or natural power to do what"? The statute provides the answer. A claimant must be deprived of the capacity or natural power to "perform[] . . . his work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease." § 440.151(3), Fla....

...Although there are many significant differences in workers' compensation law, with various amendments to the Act occurring at least nine times from the 1979 amendments through the 1993 amendments, there is no difference in the occupational disease provision language of section 440.151, nor is there any difference in our case law defining what disablement means in that section. During each of these time-periods, section 440.151(1) provided coverage for an occupational disease only when it resulted in disablement or death, and section 440.151(3) defined "disablement" as actual incapacity to perform "work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed." Case law has consistently interpreted this language as defining disablement or disability to require incapacity causing actual wage-loss....

...s of earnings ). No loss of earnings means no disability. No disability means no occupational disease. In the third time-period utilized by the dissent, after the 1993 amendments, the case law continues to define disablement or disability as used in section 440.151 as requiring actual wage-loss....

...Clearly, this court found the disablement necessary to establish an occupational disease was an incapacity to work, which results in actual wage-loss. To obtain coverage under the Act, a claimant proceeding under the occupational disease provisions must establish "disablement." Disablement as used in section 440.151 has consistently, through each of the dissent's time-periods, been defined in only one way....

...permanent impairment benefits, this court recognized that difference. The dissent's premise is that, since permanent impairment benefits under section 440.15(3) do not require a claimant to establish disability, then disability may be presumed under section 440.151 any time a claimant has a permanent impairment. In other words, the dissent reasons, Claimant can use the benefit provisions of section 440.15(3), to satisfy the coverage requirements of section 440.151....

...When employees have been symptomatic and ill enough with occupational diseases to have to miss work, they have thereby suffered "disablement," defined by statute as "an employee's becoming actually incapacitated, partially or totally, because of an occupational disease, from performing *736 her or his work . . ." § 440.151(3), Fla....

...(2002); or, since October 1, 2003, a "disability," statutorily defined as "incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." § 440.02(13), Fla. Stat. (2003); see also § 440.151(1)(a), Fla....

...WEBSTER, J., dissenting. The majority concludes that a permanent impairment for hypertension does not constitute a "disability" for purposes of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2002), unless there is evidence of actual wage loss. In doing so, it relies on section 440.151, Florida Statutes (2002), which provides that "the disablement ....

...t' means the event of an employee's becoming actually incapacitated, partially or totally, because of an occupational disease, from performing her or his work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease. . . ." § 440.151(1)(a) & (3), Fla....

...According to the majority, this "can logically only support a wage-loss requirement for disability." Maj. Op. at 730-31. Regardless of whether all of this is true, it is irrelevant for purposes of this case. A fundamental flaw in the majority's analysis is its assumption that the 2002 version of section 440.151 applies....

...Orange County Fire/Rescue, 819 So.2d 158, 160 (Fla.1st DCA 2002). In this case, the date of disability was April 2, 2004, when claimant reached maximum medical improvement with a permanent physical impairment. Accordingly, this case is governed by the 2003 version of section 440.151 (effective October 1, 2003), which does not contain the definition of "disablement" relied upon by the majority but, rather, merely refers to section 440.02(13) which provides that "`[d]isability' means incapacity because of the injur...

...l constructions unless a contrary intent is expressed in the new version). It is the presumption of disability created by a section 440.15(3) permanent impairment that satisfies the "disablement" requirement of the occupational disease provisions of section 440.151(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), and the "disability" requirement of the compensability presumption of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2003). The majority's conclusion that a permanent impairment is not a disability for purposes of either section 440.151(1)(a) or section 112.18(1) without a showing of an actual loss of earning capacity makes sense only under the old wage-loss system which no longer exists....

...Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp., 398 So.2d 902 (Fla.1st DCA 1981). The four prong test has been legislatively expanded for any date of accident after October 1, 2003. [2] There is no legislative history supporting the conclusions reached by the dissent. However, since section 440.151 is clear and unambiguous, we cannot look beyond its plain language or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent....

...nymous with the date of accident or, in the occupational disease context, the date of disability. [4] Effective October 1, 2003, the Legislature amended the statute to define "disablement" to mean "disability" as set forth in section 440.02(13). See § 440.151(3), Fla....

...tion 112.18(1), Florida Statutes. Coronary artery disease is an occupational illness when suffered by a firefighter meeting the requirements of section 112.18(1). See Sledge v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 497 So.2d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Under section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes, the carrier on risk at the time of the last injurious exposure "shall alone be liable" when "compensation is payable for an occupational disease." In this case, the claimant's performance of his firefighting duti...

...estimony or finding of a permanent hearing loss resulting from the ear infection. Furthermore, these infections have been successfully treated and cured, so that it cannot be contended that claimant is suffering from an "occupational disease," under Section 440.151, Florida Statutes....

...aired ability to resist water-borne infection in his ears. I would therefore affirm the award of 10% permanent partial disability compensation, even assuming that ordinary physical impairment standards apply to disablement from occupational disease. § 440.151(3), Florida Statutes....

...of employment with it. On this issue, we affirm the Commission's order. This case is an occupational disease case and is governed by the occupational disease section of the workmen's compensation *1296 statute. An occupational disease, according to section 440.151(2), Florida Statutes (1969), is "a disease which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to" a particular employment....

...An employee of such an occupation becomes disabled when he becomes "actually incapacitated, partially or totally, because of an occupational disease, from performing his work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease." Section 440.151(3), Florida Statutes (1969). "[T]he disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease ... shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident... ." Section 440.151(1), Florida Statutes (1969)....

...Stipulating as to the corresponding average weekly wage and compensation rate amounts, the parties disagreed as to whether the pertinent time for such computations related to the date of claimant's last injurious exposure to asbestos in 1974, or the commencement of disability in 1985. Section 440.151(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1974), provides that "disablement ......

...shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident...." Section 440.14, Florida Statutes (1974), states that "the average weekly wages of the injured employee at the time of the injury shall be taken as the basis upon which to compute compensation... ." Since section 440.151(1)(a) establishes disablement as the injury in instances of occupational disease, the commencement of such disability is the pertinent time for the average weekly wage determination pursuant to section 440.14....

...can Beryllium court relied on statutory language which remains the same today. This case is an occupational disease case and is governed by the occupational disease section of the workmen's compensation statute. An occupational disease, according to section 440.151(2), Florida Statutes (1969), is "a disease which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to" a particular employment....

...An employee of such an occupation becomes disabled when he becomes "actually incapacitated, partially or totally, because of an occupational disease, from performing his work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease." Section 440.151(3), Florida Statutes (1969). "[T]he disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease *587 ... shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident...." Section 440.151(1), Florida Statutes (1969)....

...The judge of compensations claims did not determine when (or if) Mr. Hoppe became disabled. The claimant is entitled to a hearing on his allegations that he filed within two years of his "injury," defined as the time he became "actually incapacitated, partially or totally, because of an occupational disease." § 440.151(3), Fla.Stat....

...that an accident happen "suddenly." See e.g., Meehan v. Crowder, 28 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1946); S.H. Kress & Co. v. Burkes, 153 Fla. 868, 16 So.2d 106 (1944). Meanwhile, the legislature amended chapter 440 to provide for occupational disease claims. See § 440.151, Fla. Stat. (1945). This new provision created several distinctions between occupational diseases and injuries from traditional accidents. Among other differences, an occupational disease must be related to a particular trade, occupation, etc. See § 440.151(2). And in occupational disease cases the resulting "disablement or death" is treated as an "injury by accident." See § 440.151(1)(a)....

...Davis of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, P.A., St. Petersburg, for appellees. MILLS, Judge. In this workers' compensation appeal, Mrs. Hodgen contends that her husband's fatal heart attack should have been compensable as an occupational disease pursuant to Section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Commercial Union argues that the statutory reference to "last injurious exposure" must be interpreted to give effect to the term "injurious" in relation to a disability or need for medical care which is causally related to that exposure, in conjunction with prior exposure. Section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes (1979), states: Where compensation is payable for an occupational disease, the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease, and the insurance carrier, if a...

...The second solution, assigning liability to the carrier on the risk at the time of the last injury, has been termed the last injurious exposure rule. Id. at 17-112. It should be noted that Florida has by statute adopted that rule as to occupational disease cases only. See Section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Robert Williams, of Boyd, Jenerette, Staas, Joos, Williams, Felton & Wirtz, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellees. MILLS, Judge. Two issues are presented in this workers' compensation appeal. The first concerns the "last injurious exposure" requirement *691 of section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes. [1] The second concerns the constitutionality of the 350-week provision of section 440.151(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...In 1984, he was diagnosed as having malignant pleural mesothelioma, a disease caused by inhalation of asbestos fibers. After this diagnosis, the employee filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits against Harry Harmon Insulation pursuant to the occupational disease statute, section 440.151, Florida Statutes....

...1973, while he worked for Harry Harmon Insulation. The employer/carrier (e/c) admitted the employee was last exposed to asbestos while working for Harry Harmon Insulation in 1973, but contended the exposure was not "injurious" within the meaning of section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes. The e/c also contended it was not liable for benefits because the employee did not actually contract the disease while working for the employer in 1973. Moreover, the e/c asserted that death benefits were barred by the 350-week limitation in section 440.151(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...njurious." Although the deputy denied the claim on the ground that Harry Harmon Insulation was not the employer at the time of the employee's last injurious exposure, he also found that death benefits were barred by the 350-week limitation period of section 440.151(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...d. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the pronouncements of our Supreme Court in Mundy v. McLean, 72 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1954), and Conner v. Riner Plastering Co., 131 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1961). In Conner, the court observed: The obvious intent of [section 440.151(5)] was to fix liability on employers in such a way as to render it unnecessary in cases of occupational diseases to make the nearly impossible determination as to which employment or employments contributed in what measure to the disease....

...equirement as stated in Conner. We believe the better view is that so long as the exposure in question, independent of other causes, could over extended time lead to development of the disease, then that exposure is "injurious" within the meaning of section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes....

...lopment of malignant pleural mesothelioma, the deputy erred in denying the claim based on the conclusion that the last injurious exposure did not occur in 1973. We now turn to the question of the constitutionality of the time limitation contained in section 440.151(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...The claimant argues that the provision denies her access to the courts contrary to article I, section 21, Florida Constitution. For purposes of this challenge, however, we cannot discern any meaningful distinction between the operation of the statute in question and the operation of section 440.16(1), Florida Statutes. Section 440.151(1)(a) requires, for death benefits to be payable, that death result from an occupational disease within 350 weeks of the last exposure....

...and thereby due process of law. The Florida Supreme Court agreed. Newton v. McCotter Motors, Inc., 475 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1021, 106 S.Ct. 1210, 89 L.Ed.2d 323 (1986). For the reasons stated in McCotter Motors, we conclude section 440.151(1)(a) does not unconstitutionally deny the claimant access to the courts....

...The deputy therefore did not err in finding the claim for death benefits barred by the statute. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. WENTWORTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes (1973), provides: Where compensation is payable for an occupational disease, the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease, and the insurance carrier, if...

...n case of disability from any dust disease the only employer and insurance carrier liable shall be the last employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the disease for a period of at least sixty days. [2] Section 440.151(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1973), provides: Where the employer and employee are subject to the provisions of the workmen's compensation law, the disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease as hereinafter d...

...hronic bronchitis. She found Duncan to be temporarily totally disabled for a certain period due to the occupational disease and concluded that Duncan suffers a 30% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole as a result of the disease. Under § 440.151(1)(a), Florida Statutes, for a claimant to be compensated for an "occupational disease," the disease *247 must have been actually contracted while the claimant was engaged in the nature of employment in which he was engaged under the employer against whom he is claiming....

...The first is found in section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (2000), where "accident" is defined, in pertinent part, as "an unexpected or unusual event or result that happens suddenly." Id. The second situation is when an employee suffers disablement, resulting from an occupational disease. See § 440.151(1)(a), Fla....

...*32 The Workers' Compensation Act covers occupational diseases, provided that the "disease has resulted from the nature of the employment in which the employee was engaged ..., was actually contracted while so engaged, and the nature of the employment was the major contributing cause of the disease." § 440.151(1)(a), Fla....

...ment of the condition. To be sure, under section 112.18 disability is necessary to establish compensability of any condition or impairment of health "caused by ... hypertension." See Sedacca at 729. But once compensability is established, nothing in section 440.151, or elsewhere in chapter 440, conditions the receipt of medical benefits on continued disability, or limits payment of medical benefits to only the period of disability....

...Thomas, 657 So.2d 927, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (rejecting assertion by employer/carrier that disability giving rise to section 112.18 presumption must be permanent). Indeed, the occupational disease is treated as if it were "an injury by accident." § 440.151(1)(a), Fla....

...exposure to employment conditions played a minor causative role. Following two evidentiary hearings, the judge of compensation claims (JCC) decided Farthing had satisfactorily established that he suffered from an occupational disease, as defined in section 440.151, Florida Statutes (2000), which requires a claimant to satisfy all of the prongs of the following test: (1) the disease must be actually caused by employment conditions that are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular occupatio...

...se standard in that this court held, because COPD was an occupational disease, claimant was not required to prove that the employment was the major contributing cause of the disease, [2] due to the unique provisions applicable to such diseases under section 440.151....

...No studies were presented showing that the incidence of COPD in his particular occupation, tradesworker/maintenance foreman, was higher than in the public at large. It is clear that claimant failed to meet his burden to prove the disease with which he is afflicted met the standards required by section 440.151....

...PADOVANO and LEWIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] City of Cooper City v. Farthing, 898 So.2d 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). [2] In 2003, the legislature amended the statute, which now requires medical proof that the employment be the major contributing cause of the disease. § 440.151(1)(a), Fla....

...nd (4) if the disease is an ordinary disease of life, the incidence of such disease must be substantially higher in the particular occupation than in the general public. See Lake v. Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp., 398 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); § 440.151(2), Fla....

...Similarly, it has expressly provided that "occupational diseases" which result in disability or death are to be treated as "injur[ies] by accident," and has then specified what conditions must be met in order for the "occupational disease" to have arisen out of the employment. § 440.151(1)(a), Fla....

...of the cranium. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 750 (27th ed. 1988). [5] Disparate treatment or test for compensability, depending upon the nature of the injury, is not unusual and has been provided for in a number of situations. See, e.g., § 440.151, Fla....

...ng within the scope and course of employment. Given this deficiency of proof, the claimant failed to show that the fulminant meningococcemia was actually caused by employment conditions that are characteristic of and peculiar to his occupation. See, § 440.151, F.S....

...higher in claimant's occupation than in other occupations. Lake v. Irwin Yacht, 398 So.2d at 904. The judge of compensation claims ruled that claimant's condition was not an ordinary disease of life. We do not find support for this conclusion. *779 Section 440.151(2), Florida Statutes (1989), provides in pertinent part: The term "occupational disease" shall be construed to......

...The Florida Workers' Compensation Act does not consider the contraction of an occupational disease to be an "accident," though the statute provides that an occupational disease shall be treated as an injury by accident, provided certain conditions are met. § 440.151(1)(a), F.S....

...ty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fuchs Baking Co., 577 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). II. Section 440.185(1), Florida Statutes (2000), requires a claimant to report an injury within thirty days after the date of, or the initial manifestation of an injury. Section 440.151(6) extends the period of time to report an occupational disease to ninety days....

...Because a claimant’s burden of proving major contributing cause (MCC) by medical evidence, is fully met where the presumption contained in section 112.18(1) is applied, the Employer, in rebutting the presumption must likewise disprove occupational causation by medical evidence. See § 440.151(1), Fla....

...that claimant could nonetheless recover on an exposure theory. It is with this conclusion that Florida Power takes exception. Although agreeing with the judge that cryptococcal meningitis is not a disease compensable as an occupational disease under section 440.151, Florida Power maintains the judge nonetheless erred by applying the exposure theory of accident here where the facts demonstrate that such theory is inapplicable....

...While a prolonged exposure may sometimes produce an occupational disease, the doctrines are not identical, see e.g., Lake v. Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp., 398 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and the characterization of an injury as an occupational *113 disease has significant consequences. Occupational diseases are governed by section 440.151, Florida Statutes, and the statute creates several distinctions between occupational diseases and other injuries. Section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes, establishes that the employer and carrier at risk when the claimant is last injuriously exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease shall alone be liable for the payment of compensation, without any contribution from a prior employer or carrier....

...ould be solely responsible for all of the benefits. GAB argues that Travelers should be responsible for all of the benefits because it was the carrier at the time of the claimant's last injurious exposure before the initial period of disability. But section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes, does not limit a subsequent carrier's liability in this matter....

...amp Oil Co. v. Tucker, 395 So.2d 265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Like the present case, Sunshine Truck involved different carriers at risk and multiple exposures which produced an occupational disease with multiple periods of disability. In Sunshine Truck, section 440.151(5) was applied to each carrier insofar as it was at risk at the time of the last injurious exposure with regard to each period of disability....

...The earlier carrier was thus responsible for the benefits which accrued in connection with its period of risk, and the subsequent carrier was responsible for the benefits which accrued in connection with the subsequent injurious exposures when it was the carrier at risk. In accordance with Sunshine Truck, to properly apply section 440.151(5) in the circumstances of the present case, GAB should be responsible for the benefits which were awarded for the period of time after the claimant's injurious exposures subsequent to February 19....

...particular substances or conditions inherent in the environment of the employment. Such risks fall readily within the increased-risk test and are considered work-connected in all jurisdictions. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 7 et seq. Section 440.151(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that disablement or death from an "occupational disease" is compensable if the disease is one which "has resulted from the nature of the employment in which the employee was engaged under such...

...ached a particular hazard of such disease that distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations, or the incidence of such disease is substantially higher in the occupation in which the employee was so engaged than in the usual run of occupations." Section 440.151(2) further defines "occupational disease" as one "which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation, process, or employment," excluding "all ordinary diseases of life to w...

...presumption with testimony that Mr. Walters’s heart disease was attributable to viral gastroenteritis. The same order also said that the appellant had not proven that viral gastroenteritis was an occupational disease in the manner contemplated by section 440.151, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...If the presumption applies, the claimant is under no obligation to establish occupational causation redundantly by adducing evidence beyond what was necessary to give rise to the presumption in the first place. Specifically, there is no requirement to put on proof meeting the requirements of section 440.151, Florida Statutes (2009), (titled “Occupational diseases”), unless and until the section 112.18 presumption is rebutted....

...The judge of compensation claims erroneously imported into this Heart and Lung Statute case the legal requirements claimants must meet to demonstrate entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits for other “occupational diseases” as provided for in section 440.151, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...Disability, for purposes of workers’ compensation, is defined by statute as “incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” § 440.02(13), Fla. Stat. (2009); see also § 440.151(3) (defining “disablement,” for purposes of determining compensation for occupational diseases, as “disability as described in s....

...ame incapable of performing work in the last occupation in which he was exposed to the hazards of the disease. Accordingly, detection of an occupational disease does not necessarily coincide with the date of disablement from the disease. Id. (citing § 440.151(1)(a), Fla....

...`[D]isablement' "means the event of an employee's becoming actually incapacitated, partially or totally, because of an occupational disease, from performing her or his work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease. . . ." § 440.151(3), Fla....

...rk beginning on November 3, 1997. Therefore, the order awarding benefits based on a November 3, 1997, date of accident is AFFIRMED. ALLEN and BENTON, JJ., concur; WEBSTER, J., dissents with opinion. WEBSTER, J., dissenting. The issue here is whether section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1991), may be read as contemplating the possibility of multiple accident dates based on periodic exacerbations of an occupational disease which the undisputed evidence establishes is incurable....

...It is undisputed that claimant was first diagnosed with hepatitis C in 1992. The employer and servicing agent accepted the claim as a compensable occupational disease, authorizing treatment and paying temporary total disability benefits for relatively brief periods in late 1992 and early 1993. Pursuant to section 440.151, claimant became disabled in late 1992, when he became "incapacitated . . . from performing his work in the last occupation in which injuriously exposed to the hazards of [the] disease." See § 440.151(3), Fla....

...In Florida, the system of workers' compensation is entirely a creature of statute. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sitko, 496 So.2d 920, 921 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Thus, we must look to the pertinent statute for the answer to the issue raised. That statute is section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1991), which is entitled "Occupational diseases." I find nothing in that section manifesting a clear intent to provide for the possibility of multiple accident dates in a case such as this....

...1st DCA 2002), on which the majority relies to support its conclusion, shed no light on the issue because there is nothing in either case to suggest that the issue of the possibility of multiple accident dates in a case of this kind was either raised or actually decided. Because I can find no support in section 440.151 for the result reached by the majority, respectfully, I dissent....

...(2003) ("`Disability' means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury."). City of Mary Esther v. McArtor, 902 So.2d 942, 944 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). [3] Section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1997), provides in pertinent part: (1)(a) Where the employer and employee are subject to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law, the disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational diseas...

...ty of 20% of the body as a whole. Notwithstanding, the Commission in a split-decision reversed, declaring Dr. Cirlin's testimony inconclusive and that claimant did not satisfy his burden of proof for an occupational disease as required by Fla. Stat. § 440.151, F.S.A....

...e necessary to support the Judge of Industrial Claims' finding that the claimant sustained a compensable occupational disease. In this connection, we recognize as we did in Norman v. Morrison Food Services, 245 So.2d 234 (Fla. 1971), that Fla. Stat. § 440.151, F.S.A., requires a greater degree of proof to sustain a compensation order for an occupational disease in comparison to other types of workmen's compensation claims....

...sease caused appellant’s disability figures importantly in our analysis. By statute, “‘the disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease . . . shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident. . . .’ Section 440.151(1), Florida Statutes (1969).” Hoppe v....

...Consequently, Claimant is not entitled to the statutory presumption contained in section 112.181(2), Florida Statutes (2002). Occupational Disease Claimant's alternate theory of compensability was that hepatitis C is an occupational disease pursuant to section 440.151(2), Florida Statutes....

...) if the disease is an ordinary disease of life, the incidence of such disease must be substantially higher in the particular occupation than in the general public. Lake v. Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp., 398 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); see also § 440.151(2), Fla....

...Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.1980), and the language of the insurance policies, language not significantly different from that relied on by Debtor here. See, also, the legislative pronouncement in Fla.Stat. § 440.151(5) adopting the last injurious exposure theory of trigger with respect to occupational diseases, including dust diseases, under the Workers' Compensation Law....

...Patterson of Patterson & Traynham, Tallahassee, for appellee. THOMPSON, Judge. The employer challenges a worker's compensation Order, contending that the Deputy Commissioner ("the Deputy") erred in determining that the claimant's illness was an occupational disease within the meaning of § 440.151, Florida Statutes....

...ublic is exposed, and that the employment showed a peculiar hazard *323 of such disease in excess of that posed by other forms of employment. He determined that the claimant had an occupational disease and ordered payment of the benefits claimed. Subsection 440.151(2), Fla....

...losis with the possible exception of one person who had had active tuberculosis about 20 years before. She also testified that 12 other employees had contact with the same patients she did and none contracted tuberculosis. Under the provisions of Subsection 440.151(1)(e), Fla....

...Zilioli, and that it was getting progressively worse. Noting the similarity between the repeated trauma and occupational disease theories of recovery in workers' compensation law, the JCC determined that the last injurious exposure rule set forth in section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes (1989) [1] should be applicable....

...ng injury, the JCC ruled that Aetna should provide her the necessary remedial treatment. On appeal, Aetna argues that the JCC should not have relied upon the last injurious exposure rule to determine liability between the carriers. Aetna argues that section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1989), provides a more restrictive test for an occupational disease than the test for repetitive trauma set forth in Festa v. Teleflex, Inc., 382 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Because of the more restrictive test for an occupational disease, Aetna argues, the legislature provided a more lenient method of proving employer/carrier liability in section 440.151(5), once the claimant has established that his injury meets the conditions of an occupational disease....

...suffered by firefighters, among other protected classes, who meet certain prerequisites. At the time of the enactment of the “heart-lung” bill in 1965, workers’ compensation law provided for an occupational diseases cause of action pursuant to section 440.151, Florida Statutes. Under section 440.151, a claimant was under the obligation to produce medical testimony to support the ultimate conclusion that the disease was related to employment, and could not prevail on an argument based '■ on facts or inference alone. The enactment of section 112.18 offered a claim option that allowed qualifying employees to bridge this causation gap. 3 Prior to enactment of the “heart-lung” statute, an occupational disease claim under section 440.151 enjoyed no presumption in favor of the claimant, and the statute was silent with respect to an *187 evidentiary burden of persuasion....

...uld be presumed to have occurred within the course and scope of employment. - (Emphasis added.) Thus, section 440.26 provided an evidentia-ry standard equivalent to that of “clear and convincing evidence” to rebut its presumption. 6 Of interest, section 440.151 specifically excluded the presumption of section 440.26 from application in occupational disease cases....

...ce a claimant gives rise to the presumption by satisfying the pre-requisites of section 112.18, occupational causation is established; therefore, there is no requirement on the part of the claimant to put on further proof meeting the requirements of section 440.151, Florida Statutes, as it relates to a “trigger.” See Walters v....

...Neither party raised a' Daubert objection to the expert medical testimony, or requested an EMA pursuant to section 44Q.13(9)(c), Florida Statute. The JCC did not, sua sponte, appoint an EMA. .Section 112.18 claims are considered de facto occupational disease claims and are, thus, governed by legal standards of section 440.151, Florida Statutes; e.g....

...f proof and burden of evidentiary persuasion (i.e. competent evidence), case law has provided further guidance, as will be discussed later in this opinion. . Section 440.26 was repealed in 1990, al- - though the section continued to be referenced in section 440.151(l)(e) until the 2003 amendments to Chapter 440....

...l disease. The fact that appellant did not object to the treating physician’s statement that carpal tunnel syndrome, the claimant’s injury in this case, is often an occupational disease did not satisfy the claimant's burden of proof set forth in section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1987)....

BROWNING, J. The order of the judge of compensation claims, in which the appellee/claimant was found to have satisfied each of the elements required for entitlement to compensation under the “occupational disease” test, is AFFIRMED. See § 440.151(1)-(3), Fla....

...enefits, penalties and interest. Appellants argue that the record does not contain competent, substantial evidence to support the judge of compensation claims’ findings that Claimant sustained a disabling occupational disease within the meaning of section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1987), by reason of his suffering from chromate sensitivity and resulting allergic reactions caused by contact with concrete during the course of his work for appellant school board....

...ly establish that Claimant does in fact suffer from chromate sensitivity. After very careful study of the extensive record in this case, we conclude that the medical testimony is legally sufficient to support the award for chromate sensitivity under section 440.151 without performing the requested patch test....

...ry. On this record, the judge of compensation claims was entitled to find that the history given by Claimant was truthful. Moreover, it is not legally necessary that a Claimant present evidence of a positive patch test to satisfy the requirements of section 440.151 so long as the medical evidence is otherwise legally sufficient to establish causation, as it is in this case....

...Although not an issue raised by the parties directly, in this court’s opinion the crux of this appeal turns on whether Hamilton has established the necessary elements to recover under either the theory of exposure or the theory of occupational disease. See, Section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...ier to compensate claimant for 50% permanent partial disability giving as its reasons therefor the following: “It would appear at first blush that the Deputy intended to find that the claimant was permanently totally disabled within the meaning of Section 440.151 [F.S.A.]....

...He became symptomatic in January 1984 and was diagnosed in March 1984 as having malignant pleural mesothelioma. There is competent substantial evidence supporting the deputy commissioner’s finding that the claimant’s illness was an occupational disease within the meaning of Section 440.151, Florida Statutes 1 and that claimant’s exposure to asbestos while employed by Keene from 1966 through 1972 was a contributing factor in causing his illness....

...last exposure. 3 We reject that contention since a fair reading of the statute indicates that the 350-week period is applicable only to death claims. AFFIRMED. ZEHMER, J., and McCORD, GUYTE P., Jr., (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur. . The version of Section 440.151 which is applicable in this case is that found in Florida Statutes, 1971, inasmuch as that was the law in effect at the time of the claimant’s last injurious exposure. See Hyatt v. Armstrong Cork Co., 121 So.2d 793 (Fla.1960). . Section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes (1971) provides in part: “(5) Where compensation is payable for an occupational disease, the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease, and the insuran...

...case of disability from any dust disease the only employer and insurance carrier liable shall be the last employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the disease for a period of at least sixty days.” . Section 440.151(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1971) provides: "(a) Where the employer and employee are subject to the provisions of the workmen’s compensation law, the disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease as hereina...

aggravated antibody response to insect serum, Section 440.151, or even if claimant’s present susceptibility

BENTON, Judge. The present case turns on the sometimes elusive distinction between a “repetitive trauma injury” and an “occupational disease” as defined by section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...petition seeking contribution from AIIC. It alleged that AIIC was responsible for all benefits because AIIC was on the risk on the last day Ms. Heinley was “injuriously exposed to the hazards of [what Chubb alleged was an occupational] disease.” § 440.151(5), Fla....

...(1991). While conceding that repetitive trauma at work had caused Ms. Heinley’s condition, and that apportionment might be appropriate, AIIC denied Chubb’s assertion that carpal tunnel syndrome was an “occupational disease” within the meaning of section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1991), liability for , which would fall on AIIC alone....

...or .employment, and to exclude all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed, unless the incidence of the disease is substantially higher in the particular trade, occupation, process, or employment than for the general public. § 440.151(2), Fla....

...e that claimant has not sufficiently established a relationship between the contact dermatitis and her employment. Evidence, which would be adequate to establish other types of compensation claims, will not meet the requirements of Florida Statutes, § 440.151, F.S.A., relating to occupational disease, which statute is in pertinent part as follows: “Occupational diseases.— “(1) (a) Where the employer and employee are subject to the provisions of the workmen’s compensation law, the disabl...

...chen simplex chronicus) which is neither caused by nor has it been aggravated by the conditions of her employment. It is further my opinion that she does not have a compensable disease.” The foregoing evidence is inadequate, under Florida Statutes § 440.151, F.S.A., and the cases heretofore cited, to establish that claimant’s contact dermatitis is an occupational disease....

...The Full Commission correctly held that claimant had failed to prove a sufficient causal relationship. Despite the inadequacies of the record, however, the majority of the Court is disposed to afford the claimant additional opportunity to meet the requirements of Florida Statutes § 440.151, F.S.A., relating to occupational disease....

...ion in an occupational disease claim, then every such claim would of necessity be work connected since in every case with few exceptions the claimant testified to a contact with some substance which may be found at their employer’s.” . Fla.Stat. § 440.151(2), F.S.A. . Fla.Stat. § 440.151(1) (a), F.S.A.

occupational disease theory is derived from section 440.151, Florida Statutes, which pi’ovides a doctrinal

core principles of occupational disease under section 440.151, Florida Statutes. We begin with a distinguishing

...1st DCA 1986) (finding heart disease compensable as occupational disease in cases where section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, applies). An essential element of a claim based on an occupational disease is that the disease results in disability. See § 440.151(1)(a), Fla....

...The petitioner contends that the Judge of Industrial Claims erred in finding that notice of the occupational disease with respect. to which compensation was claimed was not timely given. Claims for occupational diseases are controlled by Fla.Stat. § 440.151, F.S.A., which provides in part: “(l)(e) The presumptions in favor of claimants established by § 440.26 of this workmen’s compensation law shall not apply to a claim for compensation for an occupational disease under this section....

...It is well-settled in occupational disease cases that the date of accident is determined by the date of disability, and disability is defined as the date the claimant became incapable of performing work in the last occupation in which he was exposed to the hazards of the disease. See § 440.151(l)(a), Fla....

...ent substantial evidence rule”. Only a question of law is presented. We are here dealing with an occupational disease, as the Deputy found, and the case is therefore governed by a specific section of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, namely F.S.A. § 440.151, insofar as the same is applicable to the facts of this case....

...Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.1980), and the language of the insurance policies, language not significantly different from that relied on by Debtor here. See, also, the legislative pronouncement in Fla.Stat. § 440.151(5) adopting the last injurious exposure theory of trigger with respect to occupational diseases, including dust diseases, under the Workers’ Compensation Law....

...puncturing and subsequent infection of the digits of her hands, which infection resulted in the dermatitis. Thus, the dermatitis was the result of an injury to the hands, not the result of a disease attributable to claimant’s occupation. Second, F.S. 440.151(2), F.S.A., defines an occupational disease as one which “is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation, process or employment, and to....

...tion of the AWW at a date after the accident is not stated in the decision and the panel relied on decisions involving repetitive trauma or occupational disease. As the JCC observed: It is clear that in cases of occupational disease as defined in FS 440.151, the AWW is properly calculated using the "date of disability" as the "date of accident." The authority for this conclusion is found in the language of FS 440.151, as explained in Cote....

...Shook, 425 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Festa v. Teleflex, Inc., 382 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Moreover, in occupational disease cases, AWW calculations are based on the date of "disablement," which is statutorily defined as the date of injury. See § 440.151(1)(a), Fla....

Insulation, 511 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (section 440.151(a), Florida Statutes, which limits death benefits

occupational disease in the manner contemplated by section 440.151, Florida Statutes. Id. This Court reversed

occupational disease within the purview of Fla.Stat. § 440.151, F.S.A., which provides that disablement resulting

treated as an occupational disease pursuant to Section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1979). This we decline to

...Mutual Insurance Trust (FMIT), is the workers' compensation carrier responsible for paying benefits for an occupational disease suffered by an employee of Polk County. We conclude that the trial court erred because it did not apply the provisions of section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes (1999), [1] that clearly make FMIT responsible for this claim....

...injurious or harmful exposure to the occupational disease are responsible for providing workers' compensation benefits even if the disease manifests itself years later when the worker is employed in some other industry. The relevant Florida statute, section 440.151, entitled "Occupational Diseases," is somewhat lengthy. For purposes of the issue on appeal, the critical subsection of section 440.151 is subsection (5)....

..."alone" is liable for the workers' compensation claim. Likewise, the statute clearly provides that the insurance carrier "on the risk when such employee was last so exposed" shall be the carrier that is "alone" liable to pay the claim. III. Applying Section 440.151(5) to Determine the Insurer Responsible for the Employee's Claim for Benefits In this case it is undisputed that Ms....

...was on the risk and that the second insurance carrier was liable for all payments thereafter and in the future. Id. at 266-67. There is nothing inconsistent with that holding and our holding today. Indeed, the Sunshine Truck Plaza opinion discusses section 440.151(5) and explains: This language is plainly intended to mean that the liability of the carrier on the risk when the claimant is last exposed to the hazards of the disease is not limited to injury from that exposure alone, but should pay...

...The First District further explained the Sunshine Truck Plaza decision in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Crittenden, 596 So.2d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). In Crittenden, the court discussed the sometimes confusing distinction between an illness during employment and an occupational disease as defined in section 440.151. Id. at 112-13. It explained: Occupational diseases are governed by section 440.151, Florida Statutes, and the statute creates several distinctions between occupational diseases and other injuries. Section 440.151(5), Florida Statutes, establishes that the employer and carrier at risk when the claimant is last injuriously exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease shall alone be liable for the payment of compensation, without any contribution from a prior employer or carrier....

...It also explained the limited context of the holding in Sunshine Truck Plaza by stating: Like the present case, Sunshine Truck involved different carriers at risk and multiple exposures which produced an occupational disease with multiple periods of disability. In Sunshine Truck, section 440.151(5) was applied to each carrier insofar as it was at risk at the time of the last injurious exposure with regard to each period of disability....

...Polk County and FMIT also suggest that the last exposure rule only applies in cases involving long-term exposure to conditions that cumulatively result in a disease. While it is certainly true that the rule applies in such cases, the definition of an occupational disease in section 440.151(2) is not so limited....

...she worked at Polk County General Hospital. If that were not the case, Polk County would not have been found responsible in the underlying workers' compensation claim. *388 Accordingly, we conclude that this case is resolved by the clear language of section 440.151(5)....

...the Supreme Court noted that the applicable Workers’ Compensation Act “was silent on the effect of false representations on the status of the employee in cases like this....” Id. at 406 . Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the provisions of section 440.151(b), which precluded payment of benefits to employees who falsely represent in writing that the employee had not previously been disabled or compensated due to an occupational disease, demonstrate a legislative determination that an em...

...Medical Personnel Pool of North Central Fla., 647 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); and Adams v. Prestressed Sys. Indus., 625 So.2d 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Further, and more significantly, the workers’ compensation law in effect when Martin was decided included in section 440.151(b) a statutory provision substantially similar to section 440.15(5)(a), from which statute the Martin court gleaned the legislative intent on which to base its holding....

“[O]ccupational disease theory is derived from section 440.151, Florida Statutes, which provides a doctrinal

...bilateral bron-chopneumonia, (c) cardimegaly [sic] with left ventricular hypertrophy and right ventricular dilatation as a direct result of asbestos exposure as documented by the autopsy protocol dated April 3, 1988. 8. Workers’ Compensation Law F.S. 440.151 establishes that compensability of diseases that are incurred as a risk of and in the course of employment, treating a resulting disablement or death as “the happening of an injury by accident.” 9....

...m the record why the JCC accepted the opinion of Dr. Newburg. The order is, therefore, deficient in failing to articulate why the overwhelming medical evidence was not accepted. Curry v. Miami Dolphins, 522 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). 5 Finally, section 440.151(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1989), states: The presumptions in favor of claimants established by s....

...Foreman that the claimant had worked in phosphate mines or had asbestos exposure. No evidence was presented to indicate when such exposure had taken place or which portion of the question was responded to. .The doctrine of last injurious exposure as set forth in § 440.151(5), F.S....

result, happening suddenly.” However, in 1945, Section 440.151, F.S.A. was added to the statutory law, which

...The time of injury for an occupational disease is the date of an employee’s becoming actually in *795 capacitated. The claimant was not totally incapacitated by the occupational disease of asbestosis, as is required before compensation can be paid under section 440.151(6) (c), until August 12, 1953. Claim was filed on September 1, 1953, and notice given to the employer on September 9, 1953. As stated above, the two year period for filing a claim is satisfied and the requirement of notice within ninety days to the employer under section 440.151 (7) is also fulfilled.” In 1957, having paid claimant $5,000, the carrier terminated payments of compensation to him....

...Respondents raise the additional queries: (1) If the question stated in Point One was adjudicated in the employee’s *796 favor in the 1954 proceeding, can it be re-adjudicated at the present time? (2) Assuming that the employee’s benefits are to be measured by the law in effect at the time of his disability, does § 440.151(6) (c), Florida Statutes 1953, F.S.A., permit payment of compensation benefits in excess of $5,350? We accept the question stated by the majority of the Commission, being substantially in accord with that stated by petitioner, as being the primary question presented....