Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ubject of an assignment of error. Accordingly, this Court, feeling the question to be substantial, has given it due consideration. In his order the deputy noted that Hartford contended that authority for the procedure followed by Bituminous was F.S. § 440.42, F.S.A., prior to amendment in 1957, but the deputy was of the opinion the controlling statute was Sec....

...These requisites, set forth in the statute, not having been met, there was no authority for the commission to assume jurisdiction of the controversy between the carriers under that statute. The only other possible authority for the commission's assumption of jurisdiction, Hartford argued, lay in the provisions of Sec. 440.42(3), F.S.A. Hartford further argued that the law applicable to this cause *136 was that effective on the date of the second accident, March 11, 1957, and since Sec. 440.42(3) had not yet been enacted at the time of the second accident the commission could not proceed to take jurisdiction of this matter under that statute. Sec. 440.42(3) which became effective on July 1, 1959 (this 1959 amendment merely added to the original subsection, which became effective July 1, 1957, provision for the case where one of the two carriers voluntarily commenced payment of compensation or...

...As we view the matter the applicable statutory provisions are those in effect when the controversy between the two carriers arose, not those in effect at the time the second accident occurred. The controversy arose July 23, 1959 when Bituminous gave notice to Hartford and requested a hearing before the commission. Sec. 440.42(3), as amended in 1959, was effective on the date the controversy arose....

...ubsequent enactment in effect when Bituminous gave notice of the controversy arising from the discharge of the obligations related to such prior, second accident. The deputy reasoned that whether jurisdiction was granted under Sec. 440.20(8) or Sec. 440.42(3), the commission was empowered to order apportionment only subsequent to the date of the filing of claim for such (the notice of July 23, 1959 in this case). As above stated we have determined that Sec. 440.20(8) is not applicable here, but we are in full accord with the deputy's construction of Sec. 440.42(3)....

...In summary, we have determined that the deputy commissioner correctly assumed jurisdiction to determine this controversy between the two carriers, although he erroneously found authority to do so under the provisions of Sec. 440.20(8) rather than Sec. 440.42(3), F.S.A....

...On the cross-appeal, INA urges that the deputy erred in finding that coverage on the date of the accident was afforded by INA and in awarding reimbursement to Risk. We affirm, as competent substantial evidence supported the deputy's finding of "dual coverage" pursuant to Section 440.42(2), Florida Statutes, which provides that in such cases "it shall be presumed that only that policy with the later effective date shall be in force and that the earlier policy terminated upon the effective date of the latter." The evid...

...ocedural prejudice. See Duncan, 383 So.2d at 247. Finally, we note that if the Deputy should rule in favor of the claimant on remand, he should also determine the respective responsibilities and duties of the two insurance carriers in this case. See § 440.42(3), Fla....

...These decisions recognize that an underlying purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Law is to place on industry the burden of paying for all injuries and damages of occupational cause. Thus, pursuant to Pearson and Proctor , rather than claiming non-compensability in cases such as this, an E/C may instead find a remedy in section 440.42(4), Florida Statutes, which governs the division of liability between employers where, as here, two or more workplace injuries combine to cause the claimant’s need for benefits....

...ng cause so as to place a percentage of responsibility for the need for treatment and disability on Employer/Carrier # 2." The JCC appears to have confused the standard for determining compensability with the standard for determining responsibility. Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1995), provides the procedure for resolving disputes between carriers regarding responsibility for compensation....

...jurisdiction to adjudicate such controversy." Prior to 1994, this Court held that the JCC must consider the actual extent to which each accident has contributed to a compensable disability in determining contribution between multiple carriers under section 440.42....

...In 1994, the Florida legislature substantially amended the workers' compensation laws. One of these amendments included a new burden of proof standard for a claimant to prove compensability: major contributing cause. See § 440.09, Fla. Stat. (1995). However, the legislature did not include section 440.42 in its amendments. See Ch. 93-415, Laws of Fla. The question on appeal in this case is whether the 1994 amendments changed the standard for determining contribution under section 440.42(3) to a major contributing cause standard....

...on of the statute. See State v. Hall, 641 So.2d 403, 405 (Fla.1994); White v. Johnson, 59 So.2d 532, 533 (Fla.1952) (legislative inaction indication of its acceptance of prior construction of statute). As the legislature did not substantially change section 440.42 in its 1994 amendments, we assume that it approved this Court's previous *1143 construction of the applicable standard for reimbursement and contribution between multiple carriers....

...t has a higher burden of proof). Thus, the first step is determining whether the injury is compensable under the major contributing cause standard in section 440.09(1). The next step is determining liability between multiple employers/carriers under section 440.42(3). As we conclude that the legislature did not intend to apply the major contributing cause standard to section 440.42(3), the JCC must evaluate any reimbursement or contribution claim under the pre-existing standard. "The determinative factor in placing liability under Section 440.42(3) is whether the second compensable accident causes injury which is independent from or an exacerbation of the first compensable accident. Section 440.42(3) thereafter allows the deputy [JCC] to divide liability according to each carrier's responsibility." See U.S....

...Morrow, 164 Or. App. 628, 993 P.2d 179, 182-83 (1999); Multifoods Specialty Distribution v. McAtee, 164 Or.App. 654, 993 P.2d 174, 176-77 (1999). III. The majority opinion assigns unwarranted significance to the Legislature's decision not to repeal section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1993), and misplaces reliance on cases decided under section 440.42(3) concerning accidents that occurred before January 1, 1994. Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: When there is any controversy as to which of two or more carriers is liable for the discharge of the obligations and duties of one or more employers with respect to a claim for compensation, remed...

...(Emphasis supplied.) Absent "lack of knowledge or notice," which is not alleged here, this provision does not contain any even arguably substantive rule for allocating liability. In relying on cases decided before the "major contributing cause" provisions took effect, the majority opinion *1148 misapprehends the reach of section 440.42(3), and relies on superseded substantive law. Section 440.42(3) is a purely procedural provision. Section 440.42(3) remains a necessary part of the Workers' Compensation Law, despite the changes that took effect on January 1, 1994. If, for example, the second employer in the present case had paid the benefits owed Mr. Guzman before the judge of compensation claims determined that the first employer was responsible, section 440.42(3) would have provided a procedure for the second employer to obtain reimbursement for (applying the "major contributing cause" provisions to employer responsibility) one hundred percent of the benefits the second employer had provided....

...NOTES [1] This Court, in a footnote, has stated that apportionment is the correct term to use in dividing liability for permanent benefits. Forklifts of Central Fla. v. Beringer, 560 So.2d 1362, 1362 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Contribution, or reimbursement, is the appropriate term when dividing responsibility under section 440.42(3)....

...No similar provision is made for attorney’s fees. . In contrast, Florida’s Workers' Compensation Law requires every workers’ compensation insurance policy to include coverage for attorney's fees entered against the insured employer under section 440.34, Florida Statutes (2008). Specifically, section 440.42(1), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that ”[e]very policy or contract of insurance issued under authority of this chapter shall contain ......

...Stat., indicates that medical benefits are not apportionable, this provision governs disputes between a claimant and an employer/carrier, and does not apply to disputes between multiple carriers. Rowe and Mitchell v. Rodgers, 378 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 1 DCA 1979). Disputes between carriers are governed by § 440.42(3), Fla....

...*830 1st DCA 1985), for the proposition that the deputy is prohibited by section 440.15(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), from apportioning medical benefits between the two employers and their carriers. Numerous decisions of this court construing sections 440.02(18) and 440.42(3) of the workers' compensation statutes as they existed prior to the 1979 amendments have held that a deputy is authorized to apportion medical benefits between carriers....

...Prior to 1979, section 440.02(18), defining "accident," provided in part that compensation for temporary disability and medical benefits was not subject to apportionment. [1] The 1979 amendments moved the language prohibiting apportionment to section 440.15(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1983). [2] Prior to 1979 section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1977), provided that the deputy commissioner had jurisdiction to determine disputes between carriers concerning the proper allocation of disability and medical benefits....

...Each of the above cases construed this statutory language to mean that the prohibition against apportionment in section 440.02(18) was limited to disputes between an employee and his employer and carrier and that in situations involving a dispute between two carriers the deputy was empowered by section 440.42(3) to apportion benefits between the carriers according to each one's responsibility....

...*831 Accordingly, we hold that the 1979 amendments transferring the statutory language prohibiting apportionment from section 440.02(18) to section 440.15(5) did not alter the prior substantive law with respect to the authority of a deputy commissioner to apportion medical benefits between carriers under section 440.42(3), and that the statutory provisions as construed in Rowe & Mitchell v....

...§ 440.41 (1967), F.S.A., authorizes the Industrial Commission to substitute a carrier for an employer. In order to exercise this authority it would be essential that the Commission have the power in an appropriate case to decide who the carrier is. Fla. Stat. § 440.42(3) (1967), F.S.A., allows the Industrial Commission to settle a dispute between two or more contesting insurance carriers....

...ally determined liable can demonstrate that it has been prejudiced by lack of knowledge or notice of its potential liability, such reimbursement shall be only with respect to payments made after it had knowledge or notice of its potential liability. Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1982)....

...Where a compensable injury is followed by another compensable injury, and merger is inapplicable, the claimant's compensation should be apportioned between the carriers based on the extent to which each accident contributed to the claimant's disability and need for medical care. § 440.42(3), Fla....

...(Emphasis added.) The quoted statute governs issues between the employee and his employer/carrier. Disputes between carriers concerning "the obligations and duties of one or more employers", or between self-insured employers *1282 on the same subject, are governed rather by Section 440.42(3), which provides in part: When there is any controversy as to which of two or more carriers is liable for the discharge of the obligations and duties of one or more employers with respect to a claim for compensation, remedial treatme...

...ts, only the employer/carrier responsible for the accident which constitutes the major contributing cause of the claimant's injuries is required to provide compensation or benefits. We agree that section 440.09(1)(b) does not apply here. Section *16 440.42(4), Florida Statutes (2003), [3] not section 440.09(1)(b), controls the case under review. We held in B & L Services, Inc. v. Coach USA, 791 So.2d 1138, 1142-43 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), that section 440.42(3) [now section 440.42(4)] governs the division of liability between carriers when two or more compensable accidents combine to cause the claimant's need for benefits....

...1st DCA 2003); and Handy-Man/Knep, Inc. v. Weinstein, 802 So.2d 1186, 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). In B & L Services, Inc., 791 So.2d at 1143, we explained: As we conclude that the legislature did not intend to apply the major contributing cause standard to section 440.42(3), the JCC must evaluate any reimbursement or contribution claim under the preexisting standard. "The determinative factor in placing liability under Section 440.42(3) is whether the second compensable accident causes injury which is independent from or an exacerbation of the first compensable accident. Section 440.42(3) thereafter allows the deputy [JCC] to divide liability according to each carrier's responsibility." See U.S....

...om a prior compensable accident or an idiopathic condition, the claimant has sustained a compensable accident if the accident has aggravated the preexisting condition. Under the facts of the instant case, we are not required to reach this issue. [3] Section 440.42(4) provides: When there is any controversy as to which of two or more carriers is liable for the discharge of the obligations and duties of one or more employers with respect to a claim for compensation, remedial treatment, or other be...

...The orthopedist's continued treatment of claimant was initially paid by Bechtel/Commercial Union. The doctor indicated that his continuing care related to both the effects of the 1984 accident, and the contributing effect of the subsequent industrial accidents. Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes, authorizes the deputy to allocate responsibility and order reimbursement between multiple carriers....

...resulting from his unemployment. [3] We need not reach the issue of CBI's obligation to pay appellant benefits related to the second injury, as CBI was not made a party to this proceeding and the parties have not addressed this issue on appeal. See § 440.42(3), Fla....

...Since failure of Michigan Mutual to pay those bills brought on this litigation we assume it does. In passing we note that since there was no claim pending during the time Michigan Mutual voluntarily paid for medical treatment rendered claimant through May 1960, this carrier has no right to claim reimbursement therefor. See Section 440.42(3) and City of Lakeland v....

...1964, 164 So.2d 803; City of Lakeland v. Catinella, supra; and Mandel v. Pratt, Fla. 1960, 117 So.2d 413. Pending further proceedings in this cause the claimant should not be denied medical benefits required by either the 1956 or 1958 episodes. Under Section 440.42(3), F.S.A....

...employee with such notice within 120 days after the initial provision of benefits. See id.; see also Moore v. CTL Distrib., Inc., 790 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Here, Steel denied the claim as soon as Claimant formally sought benefits. Finally, section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes, controls the division of liability between carriers for benefits due under Chapter 440. See Forklifts of Cent. Fla. v. Beringer, 560 So.2d 1362, 1363 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). "The determinative factor in placing liability under Section 440.42(3) is whether the second compensable accident causes injury which is independent from or an exacerbation of the first compensable accident. Section 440.42(3) thereafter allows the [JCC] to divide liability according to each carrier's responsibility." B & L Servs., Inc. v. Coach USA, 791 So.2d 1138, 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (quoting U.S. Elec. Co. v. Sisk Elec. Serv., Inc., 417 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)). Where liability is divided among two or more carriers pursuant to section 440.42(3), attorney's fees should be apportioned accordingly. See B & L Servs., Inc., 791 So.2d at 1143. Therefore, section 440.42(3) can be applied only when each of the contending employer/carriers is liable to the claimant for a portion of the benefits which have been determined under other provisions of chapter 440. See Cruise Quality Painting v. Paige, 564 So.2d 1190, 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language of section 440.42(3), Conibear is only entitled to contribution from Steel if Steel is liable to Claimant for payment of benefits....

...acerbation of the injuries sustained while in the employ of Cruise Quality Painting and therefore any and all benefits that may be properly owed are the sole responsibility of Cruise Quality Painting... ." Relevant to the resolution of this issue is Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1987), which provides in pertinent part: When there is any controversy as to which of two or more carriers is liable for the discharge of the obligations and duties of one or more employers with respect to a claim...

...d carrier. We agree with the parties that there is an apparent disparity in the interpretations of this court's opinions in the cases cited by Cruise Quality and the result reached in *1196 Hinkle. [4] However, because of the unequivocal language of Section 440.42(3), we conclude that the result reached in Hinkle is correct and to whatever extent the decisions in the cited cases, and any other cases, might appear to preclude this result, to eliminate any further confusion we hereby recede from a...

...Before embarking on an analysis of this particular point, we seize the opportunity to clarify an apparent misunderstanding in terminology. Although generally referred to as "apportionment" in the many cases cited by the parties, the remedy available to carriers under section 440.42(3) is more appropriately viewed as reimbursement in the nature of contribution, but may, as well, include the allocation of responsibility or liability between the carriers for the payment of compensation due a claimant under other provisions of the law....

...[5] However, a subsequent employer/carrier's liability to the claimant pursuant to section 440.15(5)(a) for temporary disability and medical benefits due to a subsequent injury cannot be offset or diminished by such right to reimbursement. Thus, the remedy afforded carriers under section 440.42(3) should not be confused with substantive apportionment as that term is contemplated in section 440.15(5)(a), providing that "[c]ompensation for temporary disability, medical benefits, and wage-loss benefits shall not be subject to ap...

...1st DCA 1980), where we observed that then section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1977), "governs issues between the employee and his employer/carrier. Disputes between carriers concerning `the obligations and duties of one or more employers,' or between self-insured employers on the same subject, are governed rather by Section 440.42(3)." (e.s.) [6] Even earlier, in City of Lakeland v. Catinella, 129 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1961), the supreme court interpreted the 1959 version of section 440.42(3) — which, for purposes of this issue, has remained essentially unchanged to the present time — and observed: The subject statute is in no way directly concerned with the question of the compensability of a claim or, from the claima...

...the Workmen's Compensation Act, Ch. 440, F.S.A. (e.s.) 129 So.2d at 136. Both Catinella and Russell House Movers, Inc. v. Nolin, 210 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1968), the case relied on for the inapplicability of section 440.02(18) in Rowe, make it plain that section 440.42(3) can be applied only when each of the contending employer/carriers' liability for the benefits in question has been determined under other provisions of chapter 440....

...previous permanent condition, compensable or otherwise. On the other hand, as previously held by this court in City of Fernandina Beach v. School Board of Nassau County, 488 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), we have construed the statutory language of section 440.42(3) to allow the judge to order "apportionment" between carriers, i.e....

...benefits as well. Additionally, that case holds section 440.15(5) to ... require the carrier at risk at the time of the accident to either controvert the claim as noncompensable or to pay all temporary disability and medical benefits due before MMI. Section 440.42(3) then permits the carrier paying such benefits (either voluntarily or in compliance with [an] order) to seek reimbursement from another carrier found to be liable for all or part of the benefits paid. (e.s.) [7] *1198 However, contrary to the implication attributed to City of Fernandina Beach v. School Board of Nassau County and the other cases mentioned above, nowhere in section 440.42(3) is it mandated that the judge is required to withhold ruling under that section until maximum medical improvement is reached....

...WENTWORTH, J., concurs specially with written opinion. WENTWORTH, Judge, concurring. I agree with the majority opinion's summary of decisions, the consequent need to qualify terminology in earlier opinions precluding any allocation between carriers under section 440.42(3) prior to MMI from a subsequent injury, and the propriety of affirming the equal allocation of TTD benefits between the carriers on the factual findings and supporting record in this case....

...I believe that same circumstance, or its necessary alternative that permanent disability from the first injury could not be fixed before the second, is a proper inference in most of the numerous opinions reciting Rowe's overbroad statement that "[d]isputes between carriers ... are governed rather by Section 440.42(3)"(e.s.), and that "[s]ection *1199 440.02(18) ......

...." The latter section was, of course, amended to end apportionment of temporary benefits between claimant and carrier, but inter-carrier disputes over liability of each for benefits and consequent reimbursement claims may be governed by that section and numerous others in addition to (not rather than) section 440.42(3)....

...Such etiological responsibility comports with Rowe and Mitchell v. Rodgers, supra ." 379 So.2d 1024, 1025. (emphasis in original). [6] Recently, in Forklifts of Central Florida v. Beringer, 560 So.2d 1362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), at note 2, this court made the same observation, concluding that whereas section 440.42(3) provides that a carrier may be entitled to reimbursement from the carrier finally determined liable for all or any part of the obligations and duties to the claimant arising under other provisions of Chapter 440, [t]his does not mea...

...issues as to ultimate liability. However, as urged by the Department of Labor and Employment Security in its brief filed at the request of this court during its en banc consideration of the issues, it should be emphasized that any controversy under section 440.42(3) should not affect the benefits to which the claimant would be entitled....

...The department contends, and we agree, that this rule is the fairest means of assuring that the claimant receives those benefits to which he is entitled. Any dispute between carriers at risk arising by virtue of the jurisdictional mechanism and remedy provided by section 440.42(3) should not be used to delay payment of benefits otherwise due the claimant....

...Regarding the first injury, Liberty Mutual compensated the claimant at the rate of $130.00 per week. Shortly thereafter, claimant began working for Sisk Electric Service, Inc., where he was injured a second time. St. Paul voluntarily compensated claimant, pursuant to Section 440.42, Florida Statutes, at the rate of $190.00 per week, based on claimant's higher average weekly wage, but sought reimbursement under that section against Liberty Mutual at the subsequent hearing brought by the claimant....

...be merely an exacerbation of the first injury. Accordingly, the deputy ruled that appellants were solely responsible for the payment of "all benefits" due claimant and ordered reimbursement of those payments made by St. Paul under the provisions of Section 440.42(3)....

...the statutory liability of appellant were gratuitous. We agree. The deputy's order was premised on this Court's affirmance of his previous order but reflects his misinterpretation of that mandate. The previous order awarded reimbursement pursuant to Section 440.42(3)....

...claimant. Any compensation exceeding that amount voluntarily paid to the claimant by the second carrier is merely a gratuity. Belam Florida Corporation v. Dardy, 397 So.2d 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The determinative factor in placing liability under Section 440.42(3) is whether the second compensable accident causes injury which is independent from or an exacerbation of that from the first compensable accident. Section 440.42(3) thereafter allows the deputy to divide liability according to each carrier's responsibility....

...Unlike Neff, Bell Rentals, and other cases allowing apportionment of medical benefits, in Hayward and in this case the compensable accidents occurred subsequent to August 1, 1979 and the 1979 law prohibiting apportionment of temporary disability and remedial medical benefits applies. While 440.42(3) grants the deputy commissioner (deputy) jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies between carriers as to responsibility for payment of benefits, the deputy must follow the law in making his decision....

...Florida Supreme court on causation, and I believe them both to have been incorrectly decided. Hayward involved a claim by the employer/carrier (e/c) on the risk at the time of the employee's second accident for reimbursement, under the provisions of Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes, from the first e/c for all benefits paid by it to the employee-claimant....

...injury was caused by a new accident, which independently caused the final disability. As we stated in U.S. Electric Co. v. Sisk Electric Service, Inc., 417 So.2d 738, 739 *507 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982): "The determinative factor in placing liability under Section 440.42(3) [the statute permitting apportionment of medical benefits between carriers], is whether the second compensable accident causes injury which is independent from or an exacerbation of that from the first compensable accident. Section 440.42(3) thereafter allows the deputy to divide liability according to each carrier's responsibilities." In Sisk, no apportionment of medical benefits was required because the court sustained the deputy's finding that the second injury was m...

...first, and therefore the first e/c on the risk was solely responsible for the payment of all benefits to claimant. Although Sisk — like Hayward — involved an insurer's claim for reimbursement against another insurer, pursuant to the provisions of section 440.42(3), and the present case involves a direct claim by an employee for temporary disability compensation and medical benefits, which are not subject to apportionment, section 440.15(5)(a), the same evidentiary rule of causation, announced in Sisk, applies also in the present case....

...The majority's opinion suggests that the rule permitting apportionment of medical benefits is no longer applicable after the 1979 amendment to Section 440.15(5), Florida Statutes. The majority, however, apparently overlooks the continuing effect of Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (first added by chapter 57-225, § 3, Laws of Florida), which is still extant, and provides generally that in the event of a controversy between two or more carriers as to their obligations with respect to a claim...

...rsy. Although it is true, as stated by the majority, that the accident which occurred in Neff v. Britto was governed by the pre-1979 law, in my judgment the result would be the same if the accident had occurred following the 1979 amendments, in that section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes, was unaffected by the amendments. The distinction between a dispute involving two carriers' responsibilities to pay a claim for medical benefits, authorized by section 440.42(3), and a dispute between a claimant and one e/c for benefits was carefully explained by this court in Neff v....

...le employer/carriers. Seasons from Sarasota v. O'Day, 379 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Here, the dispute is between two employer/carriers as to each one's responsibility for payment of claimant's medical treatment of his psychiatric condition and Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1977), is the relevant statute. Under Section 440.42(3), the deputy commissioner is empowered to apportion the medical benefits awarded between the employer/carriers according to each one's responsibility....

...claim involving only an injured worker and an e/c. See also Russell House Movers, Inc. v. Nolin, 210 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1968). Certainly the transfer of the apportionship bar from section 440.02(18) to section 440.15(5)(a) in 1979 had no more effect on section 440.42(3), permitting apportionment between carriers, than had the preclusion provision before 1979....

...y the legislative intent that the bar affects only claims between the claimant and an e/c, and not disputes between multiple carriers. U.S. Electric Co. v. Sisk recognized, even after the 1979 amendments, that apportionment of medical benefits under section 440.42(3) may be permitted in a proper case....

...1979, and later on September 13, 1979. Although the court sustained the deputy's finding that the second injury was not the result of a new accident, but rather an exacerbation of the former, it observed that if a new injury had occurred, "[s]ection 440.42(3) ......

...tion of the principles stated in Hayward Trucking, Inc. v. Aetna Insurance Company to the case at bar is misplaced, because that case involved a claim for reimbursement by one carrier against another, and as such, was controlled by the provisions of section 440.42(3), which, as stated, permits, in a proper case, apportionment of medical benefits paid....

...The JCC, in an amended order of March 11, 1991, stated the position of the carrier's before the JCC: Home Insurance appeared in this cause and asserted their prior settlement with the Claimant as their defense, and in addition, sought a claim against the Employer/F.I.G.A. pursuant to F.S. 440.42....

...A final amendment to the order was issued on April 15, 1991, that "FIGA will reimburse Home Insurance Company 1/2 of all compensation benefits paid by Home Insurance Company per the settlement previously entered into between Home Insurance Company and the claimant and said reimbursement will be pursuant to F.S. 440.42." FIGA also was responsible to pay one-half of future PTD benefits....

...In addition, there had been no apportionment prior to the settlement to indicate that Home was responsible for anything less than 100 percent of the permanent total disability benefits. Further, the settlement document specifically mentions a pending reimbursement claim against FIGA pursuant to section 440.42, Florida Statutes (a provision which only deals with responsibilities between carriers rather than responsibility as to the claimant), and does not address further pending claims on behalf of the claimant....

...half of all compensation benefits is inconsistent with this finding. If the settlement only reflects one-half of the PTD benefits due to the claimant, then Home only met its own obligations and was not entitled to reimbursement from FIGA pursuant to section 440.42, Florida Statutes....

...The Deputy then entered a second, contradictory Order, whereby he decided to determine the validity of the contract. This procedure was unorthodox, and in this case, erroneous. There was no statutory authority for the Deputy to adjudicate the controversy between Northwestern and Mr. Schoch. We recognize that § 440.42(3), Fla....

...Schoch be a "carrier," which is an entity or person who is authorized to insure an employer, or alternatively, a qualified self-insured. See § 440.02(7), Fla. Stat. (1977). No evidence was presented showing that Mr. Schoch is a carrier. Therefore, § 440.42(3), Fla....

...le employer/carriers. Seasons from Sarasota v. O'Day, 379 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Here, the dispute is between two employer/carriers as to each one's responsibility for payment of claimant's medical treatment of his psychiatric condition and Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1977), is the relevant statute. Under Section 440.42(3), the deputy commissioner is empowered to apportion the medical benefits awarded between the employer/carriers according to each one's responsibility....

..., a review of the comprehensive scheme contained within chapter 440 indicates the contrary. The JCC's Duties and Limitations A JCC has the authority to determine if a workers' compensation policy is in effect, has been properly cancelled pursuant to section 440.42(3), or whether it covers a particular individual....

...1st DCA 2006); see also McArthur, 35 So.3d at 107. The remedy sought and obtained by Zenith here, is not available under chapter 440. Except in one limited situation, chapter 440 contemplates or permits the cancellation or expiration of policies only after timely notice. See § 440.42(3), Fla....

...ly notwithstanding employer's apparent misrepresentation). The only factual circumstance that allows for a "retroactive" *157 cancellation of a policy is where there is duplicative or dual coverage, and both policies carry the same "effective date." § 440.42(3), Fla....

...d by an employer, chapter 440 provides a double-barreled remedy that allows a carrier to cancel an employer's policy and collect greatly enhanced retroactive premiums and damages, even in the absence of an injury or accident. See §§ 440.381(6)(a), 440.42(3), Fla....

...o which each accident contributed to the claimant's need for medical care and disability benefits. Sauer Indus. Contracting Inc. v. Ditch, 547 So.2d 276, 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Atkins Const. Co. v. Wilson, 509 So.2d 1185, 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes....

...he amount of weight carried up the ladder. For these reasons, we find that claimant's job activities with Wal-Mart did increase the likelihood of a knee failure. Therefore, we conclude that the JCC erred in failing to apportion liability pursuant to Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes....

...s benefits between a claimant and an employer/carrier, it does not apply to liability disputes between carriers. See, Rowe & Mitchell v. Rodgers, 378 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (construing Section 440.02(18), Florida Statutes (1977), similarly). Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1981), authorizes the deputy to adjudicate inter-carrier liability disputes and, if necessary, to order one carrier to reimburse another....

...Galloway’s, Inc., 794 So.2d 710 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), concluded that Zenith, by providing treatment to Claimant after the 2001 accident, “revived” the statute of limitations on the 1999 claim administered by SRS. Analysis We begin our analysis by recognizing that section 440.42(4), Florida Statutes (2001), allows a carrier that has voluntarily provided benefits to file a claim for contribution against another carrier who is liable for the discharge of the obligations of one or more employers with respect to a claim for compensation, treatment, or other benefits. See § 440.42(4), Fla. Stat. (2001). We have held, however, a carrier can obtain contribution pursuant to section 440.42(4) only if the carrier from which contribution is sought is liable to the claimant for payment of benefits....

...Galloway's, Inc., 794 So.2d 710 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), concluded that Zenith, by providing treatment to Claimant after the 2001 accident, "revived" the statute of limitations on the 1999 claim administered by SRS. Analysis We begin our analysis by recognizing that section 440.42(4), Florida Statutes (2001), allows a carrier that has voluntarily provided benefits to file a claim for contribution against another carrier who is liable for the discharge of the obligations of one or more employers with respect to a claim for compensation, treatment, or other benefits. See § 440.42(4), Fla. Stat. (2001). We have held, however, a carrier can obtain contribution pursuant to section 440.42(4) only if the carrier from which contribution is sought is liable to the claimant for payment of benefits....

...time of the prior compensable accident. We construe section 440.15(5) to require the carrier at risk at the time of the accident to either controvert the claim as noncompensable or to pay all temporary disability and medical benefits due before MMI. Section 440.42(3) then permits the carrier paying such benefits (either voluntarily or in compliance with a deputy commissioner's order) to seek reimbursement from another carrier found to be liable for all or part of the benefits paid....

...o which each accident contributed to the claimant's need for medical care and disability benefits. Sauer Indus. Contracting Inc. v. Ditch, 547 So.2d 276, 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Atkins Const. Co. v. Wilson, 509 So.2d 1185, 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes....

...eview the order of the judge of compensation claims denying their motion to disqualify attorney Andrew Richard from representing The Home Insurance Company in an action in which Home Insurance is seeking reimbursement from the University pursuant to section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...The trial judge disagreed and dismissed the case with prejudice, resulting in this appeal. The basic issue before us is whether the trial court properly ruled that the question could be resolved by the Industrial Claims Court on the basis of statute. Appellant asserts that Florida Statute § 440.42(3) (1967) defines and limits the judicial authority of the Industrial Claims Court, and interprets it as requiring a controversy between two or more carriers involved in a claim for workmen's compensation....

...notice of its potential liability. Accordingly, as this case involves a dispute between only one carrier and an employer, the corporate employee contends that the Industrial Claims Court does not have jurisdiction over the situation sub judice under § 440.42(3)....

...l Claims Court. This latter section permits the substitution of an insurance carrier for an employer, who is not self-insured, so that the carrier discharges the obligations of an employer in a workmen's compensation claim. Appellant reasons that if 440.42(3) does not apply to the instant case, then 440.41 cannot be employed to give the Industrial Claims Court jurisdiction....

...They develop an expertise that equips them to handle effectively matters relating to workmen's compensation. This is so even though in a different posture similar problems might properly be referred to a court of equity or law. Id. at 371-72. The same Court also said the following: Fla. Stat. § 440.42(3) (1967) F.S.A....

...Schaeffer operated in June 1988, when he discovered that complete reconstruction of the anterior cruciate ligament, originally injured in January 1985, had become necessary. Skip's/Traveler's provided all medical care, as well as compensation benefits, after the October 1987 injury. Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes, provides that [w]hen there is any controversy as to which of two or more carriers is liable for the discharge of the obligations and duties of one or more employers with respect to a claim for compensation, remedial treatment, or other benefits under this chapter, ....

...Therefore, the limitations period had not run as to Green when Skip's/Traveler's filed its reimbursement claim in March 1989, and we need not decide the effect on Skip's claim had the statute run as to Green. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the merits of the section 440.42(3) reimbursement claim filed by Skip's/Traveler's....

...t sought medical treatment for her condition. [1] The proceedings were consolidated and the JCC ordered that Alice's be added as an indispensable party. A hearing was held on the claims for benefits and Travelers' claim for reimbursement pursuant to section 440.42, Florida Statutes, for medical and other benefits paid to Claimant on behalf of Roz Fischer's....

...is found to be compensable under the repetitive trauma theory, the JCC should have apportioned liability between the subsequent carriers. We reverse and remand for further proceedings because the JCC misapplied the law applicable to this dispute. Subsection 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1987), establishes the procedure for obtaining reimbursement in a dispute between carriers over the obligation for payment of benefits to a claimant where one of the carriers voluntarily makes payments in discharge of a liability owed to the claimant....

...ave jurisdiction to order such reimbursement.... Although Claimant had not reached MMI as of the date of the final hearing as provided by subsection 440.15(5) [2] for apportionment of permanent benefits in disputes between claimants and carriers, subsection 440.42(3) vests the JCC with jurisdiction to hear Travelers' claim for reimbursement from the other carriers for all or part of compensation paid to Claimant and to allocate responsibility or liability among the carriers found to be *130 responsible for paying compensation to Claimant. Cruise Quality Painting v. Paige, 564 So.2d 1190, 1196-97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Flagship Nat'l Bank of Broward County v. Hinkle, 479 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). In Paige, this court explained: nowhere in section 440.42(3) is it mandated that the judge is required to withhold ruling under that section until maximum medical improvement is reached.8 Rather, the clear wording of the statute grants the judge jurisdiction to determine any controversy betwe...

...On 5 August 1983, Pisseri filed a claim for benefits for the 1981 incident against the City and its current carrier, the Hartford Insurance Company. Hartford denied the claim, alleging that Pisseri's injury was the result of his earlier accident. Further, pursuant to Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes, Hartford filed a claim for reimbursement against Continental for any benefits it had or would have to pay to Pisseri....

...y, through the notice of hearing. See, Allman v. Meredith Corp., 451 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Therefore, the deputy had jurisdiction to adjudicate whether Hartford or Continental was to be responsible for payment of Pisseri's claim pursuant to Section 440.42(3)....

...1142. In that opinion, we stated that "the first step is determining whether the injury is compensable under the major contributing cause standard in section 440.09(1). The next step is determining liability between multiple employers/carriers under section 440.42(3)." Id....

...industrial accident. The judge of compensation claims wrote, “Practically speaking, I do not see an[y] evidence on how Dr. Golovac can prescribe medication only for the C5-6, level without treating the C4-5 level as well.” Purportedly relying on section 440.42(4), Florida Statutes (2005), and citing Pearson v....

...Bd., 831 So.2d 212, 213 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). At *1218 the time of the 1993 accident, medical bills were not subject to apportionment. See § 440.15(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991) (“Compensation for ... medical benefits ... shall not be subject to apportionment.”). Section 440.42 and Pearson have no application here....

...uld justify reducing reimbursement only by 12.5% (25% of 50%), and many, if not all, of the reductions in reimbursement exceeded this percentage. Given our disposition of the appeal, we need not address this contention or pause to "do the math.” . Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1991), is substantially identical to Section 440.42(4), Florida Statutes (2005), which provides: When there is any controversy as to which of two or more carriers is liable for the discharge of the obligations and duties of one or more employers with respect to a claim for compensation,...

...3d DCA 1980), found that under general principles of law applicable in Florida an award of prejudgment interest is proper on recovery of out-of-pocket amounts paid by one party for which another party has been found liable. The JCC noted the argument by North River that because Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes — the statute which provides for reimbursement to one carrier from another for amounts that should have been paid by the other carrier — does not specifically mention interest as being recoverable by the carrier seeking reimbursement, an award of prejudgment interest is not permissible....

...of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retrospective law, or the general rule against retrospective operation of the statutes. 129 So.2d at 136 . (Emphasis added.) Thus, under existing law predating the enactment of section 440.42(3), Planet Reliance would have been entitled to maintain an action for recovery of compensation payments made by it which were determined to be the obligation of North River....

...May Plumbing Co., 474 So.2d 212 (Fla.1985) (distinction between liquidated and unliquidated claims abandoned), and Alvarado v. Rice, 614 So.2d 498 (Fla.1993) (prejudgment interest allowed from the date payment was made or actual loss occurred). Turning again to the language of section 440.42(3), we observe that the statute speaks of the liabilities for discharge by a carrier of “the obligations and duties of one or more employers with respect to a claim for compensation, remedial treatment, or other benefits under this c...

...On their way back to the job site, claimant and his business associate were involved in an automobile accident. The E/C raise several issues on appeal. First, E/C contend that there was dual coverage and that, therefore, benefits should have been awarded under the policy with the later effective date, citing section 440.42(2), Florida Statutes (1985)....

August notice of cancellation to deny coverage. Section 440.42(2), Florida Statutes, provides that: No contract

...Allocation of responsibility between multiple carriers should be based upon extent to which the accident contributes to any resulting disability or need for medical care and may be made on an equal basis when two compensable accidents with different carriers at risk equally contribute to resulting conditions. Section 440.42(3) Florida Statutes authorizes the Judge of Compensation Claims to allocate responsibility and order reimbursement between multiple carriers....

...Within a few days Porter consulted the physician who had been treating him for his other ailments. He continued consulting various doctors and had hospital attention for a period of months. Finally, on January 5, 1961, Porter filed his claim against Venning and Ward. In response to the claim Venning and Ward, pursuant to Section 440.42, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., asserted that the back injury which Porter then claimed, resulted from the accident while he was employed by Franklin....

WENTWORTH, Senior Judge. This is an appeal from an order of a judge of compensation claims granting a claim for reimbursement pursuant to section 440.42(2), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...hich was the carrier at risk on December 18, 1992, claimant’s date of accident. FCF assumed the medical and indemnity liability as it pertains to the claimant, Inelda Smith’s claim, and filed a claim for reimbursement pursuant to Florida Statute Section 440.42....

...I find the original Certificate of Insurance which was erroneously dated December 18, 1992 was ineffective to create coverage, and that the revised Certificate of Insurance listing December 31, 1992 as the effective date of the FCF policy is in accordance with the intent of FCF and Cushman. Florida Statute 440.42(2), states: When duplicate or dual coverage exists by reason of two different carriers having issued policies of insurance to the same employer securing the same liability, it shall be presumed that only that policy with the later effective da...

..... *578 Since the binder for insurance signed by Cushman was not signed until 2 days after the accident in question, and the binder was not approved by FCF until 23 days after the date of accident, no duplicate or dual coverage existed pursuant to F.S. 440.42, State Farm Fire & Casualty v....

...Stewart Co. v. Dobson, 153 Fla. 693, 15 So.2d 481 (1943). The Evans rule has also been applied within the context of division of liability between multiple insurers on the risk at the time of two separate industrial accidents, pursuant to the provisions of Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...edent, that coverage for all lines of insurance be awarded USF&G, was not fulfilled and no notice of assumption was published; (2) because of Florida Farm Bureau’s letter of assumption, which purported to be effective July 1, 1978, pursuant to Section 440.42(2), USF&G’s notice of termination was effective as of July 1, 1978, to cancel the policy which had expired in February 1978, and all subsequent binders; (3) because of the letter of assumption and USF&G’s effective termination by letter of July 31, 1978, dual coverage was eliminated and Florida Farm Bureau could not effectively terminate coverage in less than thirty *839 days, under Section 440.42(2)....

...While we are aware of one Florida case in which it was stated that a binder is not a policy of insurance, Frank v. Traveler’s Indemnity, 310 So.2d 418 (Fla.3d DCA 1975), that case is distinguishable from the instant case. 2 In our opinion, the statutory presumption of Section 440.42(2) 3 could be applied to the competing binders in this case, with the result that the last binder, given by USF&G, having in a sense the later effective date, would be presumed in force....

...Fidelity & Casualty Company v. Britt, 393 So.2d 41 (FIa.3d DCA 1981). . In Traveler’s, the agent had binding authority, but no authority to issue a complete policy, and the accident occurred after the 60-day period of the binder had elapsed. . Section 440.42(2) provides, in pertinent part: However, when duplicate or dual coverage exists by reason of two different carriers having issued policies of insurance to the same employer securing the same liability, it shall be presumed that only that policy with the later effective date shall be in force and that the earlier policy terminated upon the effective date of the latter. Kincade v. Harmel Constructors, Inc., 3 FCR 298 (1958), cited by appellees, was decided under a version of § 440.42 which did not contain this presumption regarding dual coverage.

...The attorney for petitioner relies heavily on the fact that at the time of the accident Hartford had on file with the commission a certificate of insurance covering the crucial period which had not been can-celled in accordance with the requirements of § 440.42(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...See Fla. R. App. P. 9.100(h). Romero and the OJCC argue that the JCC retains jurisdiction over Romero’s discovery requests, either because Petitioner’s voluntary dismissal was without prejudice and a PFB could be refiled, or pursuant to section 440.42(4), Florida Statutes (2013) (conferring on the JCC jurisdiction over a controversy “as to which of two or more carriers is liable for the discharge of the obligations and duties of one or more employers with respect to a claim for...

...1st DCA 1980) (permitting JCC to award attorney’s fees for appearance at two depositions after worker filed claim; subsequent dismissal of claim did not divest JCC of jurisdiction to award fee already earned by attendance at depositions). Section 440.42(4) does not confer jurisdiction on the JCC, because that statute applies only to disputes over carriers’ relative coverage responsibilities after underlying liability has been conceded or otherwise established. See, e.g., Medpartners/Diagnostic Clinic Med. Group, P.A. v. Zenith Ins. Co., 23 So. 3d 202, 204 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“[A] carrier can obtain contribution pursuant to section 440.42(4) only if the carrier from which contribution is sought is liable to the claimant for payment of benefits.”); Jeffrey’s Steel v. Conibear Equip., Inc., 854 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (“[S]ection 440.42(3) [now renumbered as (4)] can be applied only when each of the contending employer/carriers is liable to the claimant for a portion of the benefits which have been determined under other provisions of chapter 440.”). The defendant...

...In 1994, after the fateful visit to the chiropractor, the second carrier accepted Mr. Smith administratively as permanently totally disabled. Then (in a prior proceeding) the second carrier sought contribution from the first and third carriers. The judge of compensation claims ruled that the second carrier was entitled under section 440.42(3), Flori-da Statutes (1987), to contributions of thirty percent from the first carrier and of twenty percent from the third carrier....

liability between the carriers, pursuant to Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes. See, Hayward Trucking

determination of liability, as required by section 440.42(3). AFFIRMED. WENTWORTH and WIGGINTON, JJ„

disability and medical benefits due before MMI. Section 440.-42(3) then permits the carrier paying such benefits

for adjustment of claims between carriers. Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1977), provides in part:

...Heinley later filed another notice of injury alleging carpal tunnel syndrome, this time alleging a date of accident of August 3, 1992. Seeking to shift liability to Chubb, AIIC initiated the present proceedings by filing a motion for contribution, reimbursement, and/or exoneration under section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1991), denying any responsibility for payment of Ms....

...se” for persons in Ms. Heinley’s occupation lacks the requisite record support. Her malady must, therefore, be attributed to repetitive trauma. Where repetitive trauma or exposure suffered in the course and scope of employment results in injury, section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1991), confers authority on the judge of compensation claims to apportion medical benefits “in situations involving a dispute between two carriers.” Flagship Nat’l Bank of Broward County v....

...1st DCA 1981). In these circumstances, moreover, “there can be alio- *884 cation of temporary benefits between carriers.” Schmitt, 597 So.2d at 939 . See Roz Fischer’s Beauty Unlimited v. Mathis, 644 So.2d 127, 129 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)(holding that subsection 440.42(3) vests the judge of compensation claims with jurisdiction to allocate liability for temporary benefits among carriers in a carpal tunnel syndrome case); Nunez, 592 So.2d 1158 ; Cruise Quality Painting v....

workers’ compensation insurance in accordance with § 440.42(2), Florida Statutes, the policy was in effect

PER CURIAM. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida (Blue Cross) appeals an order of the deputy commissioner dismissing its claim for reimbursement pursuant to Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1979), for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm. Section 440.42(3) provides that “[w]hen there is any controversy as to which of two or more carriers is liable for the discharge of the obligations and duties of one or more employers with respect to a claim for ......

...authorized under s. 440.38 to insure under this chapter. ...” It is undisputed that Blue Cross is not authorized under that section. Therefore, the deputy was correct in his determination that he had no jurisdiction to consider Blue Cross’ claim under section 440.42(3)....

parties should be aware of the provisions of section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1993), and section 440

cancellation or expiration of a policy as set out in section 440.42(2) shall be mailed to the division in accordance

carriers and request for reimbursement pursuant to section 440.42(3). Based on medical testimony that 90% of

...See Karell, 668 So.2d at 228 . Nowhere does the court confine the JCC’s jurisdiction to section 440.192. Our court in International Piling, Inc., citing Rich , held that the JCC has jurisdiction to decide coverage disputes between a carrier and an employer under section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1967)....

...The employee was injured in the course of his employment. He filed a workmen’s compensation claim against Manpower and its insurer, Transamerica, which was settled for the lump sum of $23,072.65. Manpower and Transamerica then commenced an action against Shell under Section 440.42, Florida Statutes (1975), contending that Shell was the injured man’s employer under the statute and so should reimburse Manpower and Transamerica for the amounts they had paid to the employee....

...his lack of jurisdiction, we find that his Compensation Order adjudicated neither the issue of a written nor an oral indemnification agreement. The Judge of Industrial Claims was concerned with determining who was the injured man’s employer under Section 440.42, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...t which was raised in the appellants’ complaint is not res judicata, and we reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the complaint. REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ANSTEAD and DAUKSCH, JJ., concur. . Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1975), provides: When there is any controversy as to which of two or more carriers is liable for the discharge of the obligations and duties of one or more employers with respect to a claim for compensation, remed...

...cle V, Section 4(2), Florida Constitution. The subject matter of the suit in the circuit court did not concern the validity of a state statute or construction of a controlling provision of the constitution. Rather, it concerned the interpretation of Section 440.42(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and its application to the facts at hand....

determinative factor in placing liability under Section 440.42(3) is whether the second compensable accident

...State Farm Ins. Co., 496 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Swanigan v. Dobbs House, 442 So.2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). However, the JCC must reconsider her erroneous conclusion of law that League would be liable only for payments made after it had notice. Section 440.42, Florida Statutes, codifies a right of contribution between carriers “when one of the carriers ......

...y determined liable can demonstrate that it has been prejudiced by lack of knowledge or notice of its potential liability, such reimbursement shall be only with respect to payments made after it had knowledge or notice of its potential liability.” § 440.42(3), Fla....

...to cause his then-current need for compensation benefits. On appeal, the claimant argued that section 440.09(1)(b) did not apply because his injuries were caused solely by multiple employment accidents. 951 So.2d at 15. We agreed and determined that section 440.42(4), Florida Statutes, which "governs the division of liability between carriers when two or more compensable accidents combine to cause the claimant's need for benefits," controlled the case....

...for all injuries and damages of occupational cause. 43 So.3d at 797. We further noted that, pursuant to our two previous opinions, rather than claiming non-compensability in a case as that presented in Staffmark, an E/C may instead find a remedy in section 440.42(4)....

...Nor were we confronted with such a situation in Pearson or Proctor. There was no issue in any of those cases as to whether the previous injuries had been deemed compensable. Moreover, Claimant's interpretation of Staffmark would render meaningless our determination that an E/C may find a remedy in section 440.42(4)....

...951 So.2d at 16 (emphasis added). By contemplating a remedy for an E/C under that statute, we recognized that compensability of the previous injury was necessary. Under Claimant's interpretation, the E/C in this case would have no remedy pursuant to section 440.42(4) because Claimant did not seek benefits through the workers' compensation system for her previous injuries....

...Here, for example, if Claimant had in fact received workers' compensation benefits for her previous industrial accidents, our rule would preclude E/C from obtaining apportionment, even where it is undisputed that the previous industrial accidents resulted in a preexisting condition. By conflating section 440.15(5)(b) with section 440.42(4), Florida Statutes, our court has confused the concept of apportionment, which only involves an employer and a claimant, with allocation of benefits, which involves multiple employers disputing their share of liability....

...City of Hialeah, 514 So.2d 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), that Hoy’s workers’ compensation insurance policy had been effectively canceled prior to June 6, 1984. In order for Florida Farm Bureau to have effectively canceled the policy, it was necessary for it to notify Hoy pursuant to section 440.42, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The deputy commissioner founded her denial of the claim upon the legal presumption that where two separate carriers have issued insurance policies to the same employer, it shall be presumed that only that policy with the later .effective date shall be in force. Section 440.42(2), Fla.Stat....

...The record in this instance, however, will not support a finding of dual coverage on the date of accident. State Farm’s non-binding application for insurance was approved on May 26, 1976, some six days subsequent to the accident. The deputy commissioner’s application of § 440.42(2), Fla.Stat., was therefore inappropriate....

raised in Peninsular was whether, pursuant to section 440.42(2), Florida Statutes (1969) (which is substantively

...*830 1st DCA 1985), for the proposition that the deputy is prohibited by section 440.15(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), from apportioning medical benefits between the two employers and their carriers. Numerous decisions of this court construing sections 440.02(18) and 440.42(3) of the workers’ compensation statutes as they existed prior to the 1979 amendments have held that a deputy is authorized to apportion medical benefits between carriers....

...Each of the above cases construed this statutory language to mean that the prohibition against apportionment in section 440.02(18) was limited to disputes between an employee and his employer and carrier and that in situations involving a dispute between two carriers the deputy was empowered by section 440.42(3) to apportion benefits between the carriers according to each one’s responsibility....

...*831 Accordingly, we hold that the 1979 amendments transferring the statutory language prohibiting apportionment from section 440.02(18) to section 440.15(5) did not alter the prior substantive law with respect to the authority of a deputy commissioner to apportion medical benefits between carriers under section 440.42(3), and that the statutory provisions as construed in Rowe & Mitchell v....

...Because we find that the deputy commissioner has jurisdiction to determine the claim for emergency relief, we do not reach the merits of claimant’s entitlement except to note that any overpayment made by GAB pursuant to an order of the deputy would be subject to the reimbursement terms of § 440.42(3)....

...Right-O-Way’s position was that it was not a general contractor and, therefore, not a statutory employer. On September 25,1989, the judge of compensation claims entered an order finding that ESIF did not give 30 days’ notice of cancellation of insurance coverage required pursuant to § 440.42(2), Fla.Stat....

...The issue presented here is whether a notice of termination of workers’ compensation insurance coverage that is postmarked March 7, 1988, and states that coverage will be terminated on April 4,1988, is void because it does not comply with the 30-day notice requirement set out in §§ 440.42(2) and 440.185(7), Fla.Stat. (1987), and Rule 38 F-6.008(l), F.A.C., or whether coverage continues until 30 days after the postmark date at which time it terminates, despite the earlier stated date of termination. Sec. 440.42(2), Fla.Stat....

...cancellation has been sent to the division and to the employer in accordance with the provisions of subsection 440.185(7). Sec. 440.185(7), Fla.Stat., (1987), in pertinent part, states: Notice of cancellation or expiration of a policy as set out in s. 440.42(2) shall be mailed to the division in accordance with the rules promulgated by the division under chapter 120....

...ensation insurance coverage effective immediately. A workers’ compensation claim was subsequently made for an injury that occurred in December 1984. The deputy determined that although the purported “immediate” cancellation did not comply with § 440.42(2), Fla.Stat., coverage did expire 30 days after notice of cancellation. This court followed Peninsular Fire Ins. Company v. King, supra, and reversed, stating that the failure to comply with 440.42(2), Fla.Stat., rendered the insurer's notice of cancellation “ineffective, so as to maintain coverage under the policy of insurance.” 496 So.2d at 233 (emphasis added). Young and Peninsular make clear that where the cancellation date stated in the *397 notice is not 30 days or more from the date the notice is mailed, the notice is void because it fails to comply with § 440.42(2), Fla.Stat....

(carrier 2) sought reimbursement, pursuant to section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes, from the carrier on the

...24, 1971, on the basis that the policy had been cancelled. The lower court found that the policy had not been cancelled in accordance with statutory and policy provisions and therefore the policy was in effect at the time of the accident. We agree. Section 440.42(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that at least thirty-days notice must be given before the effective date of cancellation....

investigate the accident promptly. Applying Section 440.42(3) F.S. (1978) the commissioner placed the

...ncellation of the policy was not mailed to the Division until February 26, 1985, following the date of the accident. Under such circumstances, the policy cannot be considered canceled until after the occurrence of the claimant’s industrial injury. Section 440.42(2), Florida Statutes, (1983), disallows the expiration or cancellation of a workers’ compensation insurance policy “until at least 30 days have elapsed after a notice of cancellation has been sent to the division and to the employer — ” To the same effect, see Fla.Admin.Code Rule 38F-6.008(1)....

...This statement is premature, since there has been no finding of MMI. Stewart v. Resort Inns of Am., 513 So.2d 1334, 1335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). We REVERSE and REMAND this case with directions to the JCC to make further findings and/or to clarify the order on appeal. MINER and WEBSTER, JJ., concur. . Section 440.42(3) confers jurisdiction upon the JCC to adjudicate a controversy as to which of two carriers is liable for a claim of compensation....

SHIVERS, Judge. Acme Oil Company and Hill, Richards Inc. (formerly Self Insured Services, Inc.) appeal a final order denying reimbursement of workers’ compensation benefits from State Farm Insurance Company under Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...However, the cause was remanded to the deputy commissioner to allow State Farm the opportunity to relieve itself from its responsibility of reimbursement by demonstrating prejudice by lack of notice or knowledge of its potential liability for compensation and medical benefits pursuant to Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1981). The action for reimbursement is governed by Section 440.42, Florida Statutes (1981), which states: If the carrier finally determined liable can demonstrate that it has been prejudiced by lack of knowledge or notice of its potential liability, such reimbursement shall be only with respect to payments made after it has knowledge or notice of its potential liability....

...Auto-Owners Insurance Company v. American States Insurance Company, 402 So.2d 560, 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In that case, the imputed knowledge of the carrier had the effect of reversing the deputy’s finding that reimbursement was not proper under Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes....

...We conclude that State Farm was not prejudiced by the lack of actual notice of its potential liability because State Farm had both imputed and actual notice. State Farm’s imputed knowledge of the accident and its potential liability requires State Farm to reimburse Hill, Richards under Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes for the full amount....

...If the insured does not act, the finance company must mail the insurer a request for cancellation with the copy to the insured at his last known mailing address. The insurer then has the responsibility of complying with all other statutory, regulatory and contractual restrictions, e. g. Sections 440.42(2) and 440.185(7) Florida Statutes (1979) requiring notice to the Worker’s Compensation Bureau....

...This it failed to do. The bare testimony of Wich-man is not competent substantial evidence to prove the existence of a power of attorney between the insured and the premium finance company. His testimony indicates *727 that American Casualty complied with Section 440.42(2) and 440.185(7) but there is no evidence that the requirements of Section 627.848 were met by INAC....