Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...In order to be convicted as principal for a crime physically committed by another, the defendant *965 must intend that the crime be committed and must do some act to assist the other person in actually committing the crime. Staten v. State, 519 So.2d 622, 624 (Fla.1988); see also § 777.011, Fla.Stat....

...Under Florida law, any person who "aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures" an "offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such." § 777.011, Fla....

...A "public place" is any place intended or designed to be frequented or resorted to by the public. A "vulgar and indecent manner" means in such manner as to be offensive to common decency, lewd or obscene. (6) 3.01(a) PRINCIPALS—WHEN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT HIRED BY DEFENDANT [Amended] F.S. 777.011 If the defendant paid or promised to pay another person or persons to [commit] [attempt to commit] a crime, the defendant is a principal and must be treated as if [he][she] had done all of the things the person who was promised or received the money did if 1....

...at 68]. 4 Savaiko claimed in her search warrant affidavits that the laws violated were Florida Statutes § 794.023, sexual battery by multiple perpetrators; § 794.011(2), sexual battery on a child under twelve years of age by an offender under 18 years of age; § 777.03, accessory after the fact; § 777.011, aiding and abetting commission of a crime; § 415.513, failing to report child abuse or neglect; § 827.05, negligent treatment of children. 5 There was some discussion at oral argument, and some mention in the magistrate judge's r...

...uaranteed Trent's acquittal on the first-degree murder charge. A jury could still find Trent guilty of the capital offense as an accessory before the fact if, along with helping Freund kill Walker, he intended that Freund kill Walker. See Fla. Stat. § 777.011 (1983)....

...hat there was a preconceived plan to murder the occupants of the house. Nonetheless any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as there was sufficient evidence to convict Chamberlain of the first-degree felony murder of all three victims. [11] Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2003), provides: Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is commit...

...The note in the margin is being removed because the committee believes that this instruction should be given any time the defendant testifies. Feminine pronouns have been added to this and the other proposed instructions to avoid gender bias. [Page A-1] *1179 MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS 3.01 PRINCIPALS (Amended) F.S. 777.011 If two or more persons help each other [commit] [attempt to commit] a crime and the defendant is one of them, the defendant is a principal and must be treated as if [he] [she] had done all of the things the other person or persons did if the defendant: 1....

...1988) Note to Omit last sentence when felony murder is charged. Judge Explanation of amendments: This instruction is from page 32a of the manual. The note to judge is obsolete in light of State v. Dene . [Page A-2] *1180 3.01(a) PRINCIPALS — WHEN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT HIRED BY DEFENDANT (Amended) F.S. 777.011 If the defendant paid or promised to pay another person or persons to [commit] [attempt to commit] a crime, the defendant is a principal and must be treated as if [he] [she] had done all of the things the person who received the money did if: 1....

...First, we address petitioner's contention that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support her convictions as a principal. Under our law, both the actor and those who aid and abet in the commission of a crime are principals in the first degree. See § 777.011, Fla....

...ry and murder. Or, as the Hartford court hypothesized, the person who actually committed a murder could be treated less harshly than the person who provided the gun and destroyed it after the murder. 159 Mich. App. at 301, 406 N.W.2d at 279. Reading section 777.011 against its common law background, we do not believe the legislature intended such a result....

...Accordingly, we disapprove the decision below and remand to the district court to vacate petitioner's convictions as an accessory after the fact. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH and KOGAN, JJ., concur. SHAW, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] Section 777.011 provides: Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to be...

...Since there was no direct evidence establishing whether it was Copeland or appellant who actually wielded the murder weapon, the jury could have simply concluded that one of them fired the fatal shots and that the other aided and abetted the murder. § 777.011, Fla....

...produce an acquittal. We agree. Regardless of whether Heath stabbed Sheridan in the throat while he was still alive or only after he was dead, Heath could still be convicted as a principal of either premeditated murder or first-degree felony murder. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1989), discusses the concept of a first-degree principal to a crime: Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such...

...vents as unreasonable."); Bedford v. State, 589 So.2d 245, 250-51 (Fla.1991) ("Because each of Bedford's several versions of events was inconsistent with the others, the jury reasonably could have concluded that each of these accounts was untrue."). Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2000), [9] provides: Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is co...

...ictim. However, I conclude that there was clearly sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the victim's death by blunt trauma and strangulation was caused by premeditated acts which the defendant aided and abetted within the proscription of section 777.011, Florida Statute (1993)....

...The majority conjectures that the hearsay statements possibly "could bolster Carpenter's theory regarding his reduced degree of culpability." Majority op. at 1203. However, Carpenter's reduced degree of culpability, if any, would still subject Carpenter to first-degree murder liability by operation of section 777.011....

...Interestingly, here, the majority finds the other introduced evidence and jury instructions support a first-degree murder conviction under a felony-murder theory but still finds harmful error. The majority fails to distinguish Voorhees on this point. [21] See § 777.011, Fla....

...d such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such, whether he or she is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offense. § 777.011, Fla....

...The trial court also instructed the jury regarding the Florida law of principals, which holds accountable, as a principal in the first degree, any person who aids in the commission of any criminal offense, regardless of whether that person was present at the commission of the offense. Fla. Stat. § 777.011. The trial court gave the Florida Standard Jury Instruction then in effect regarding principal liability: If two or more persons help each other commit a crime and the Defendant is one of them, the Defendant is...

...The instructions of the trial court correctly stated the law and, therefore, did not deprive Jamerson of due process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, 112 S. Ct. at 482. Jamerson was prosecuted as a principal in the first degree. See Fla. Stat. § 777.011....

...State, 196 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1967), and DeLaine v. State, 230 So.2d 168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970), cert. discharged, 262 So.2d 655 (Fla. 1972), where the defendants did not participate in the sexual battery but were present and aided and abetted in the commission of the crime. § 777.011, Fla....

...ubstantive offense. Hutchinson v. State, 315 So.2d 546, 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). As such, evidence that a person aided and abetted another in the commission of an offense, although sufficient to convict the person as a principal in such offense under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1977), is insufficient to convict either person of a conspiracy to commit the subject offense....

...fense which is the object of the conspiracy, thereby lending unnecessary confusion to the crime of conspiracy contrary to the teaching of Goldberg. Such acts of aiding and abetting clearly make each actor a principal in the substantive offense under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1977), but cannot, without more, also make each actor a principal in the crime of conspiracy to commit such offense under Section 777.04(3), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...he triggerman and because of the plea bargains between the accomplices and the State. From the evidence presented, the jury could have believed the appellant's story that he was not the triggerman and still have convicted him of first degree murder. § 777.011, Fla....

...562.13 acting in the scope of his employment, to have in his possession alcoholic beverages... . A social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to a minor has aided or abetted in the commission of a misdemeanor and is therefore a principal in the first degree under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...However, the question for the court was whether Sigler, the escapee, could be guilty of concealing, assisting, or giving aid to himself. See Sigler I, 805 So.2d at 35. In finding that Sigler could be guilty of third-degree murder based on harboring himself, the district court reasoned that under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1997), both the person who aids and abets in the commission of the crime and the person who otherwise procures the commission of the crime are principals in the first degree....

...ar. These circumstances were sufficient to convince the jury that the criminal acts were the result of a common scheme. These facts support the jury's conclusion that, even if Hall did not pull the trigger, he was a principal to the crime of murder. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1977), states that [w]hoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is co...

...the murder; and Ferrell confessed to a cellmate that he was a party to the premeditated murder and that they robbed the victim of drugs and money. We find this evidence sufficient to support both convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. As provided by section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1995): Principal in first degree.—Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such...

...equally guilty for having aided and abetted James in the shooting. In the commission of a crime, both the actor and one who aids and abets him are principals in the first degree and may be charged and convicted of the crime. Both are equally guilty. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...onsummate the sale. See Gibson v. State, 315 So.2d 523 (Fla.2d DCA 1975); Britton v. State, 336 So.2d 663 (Fla.1st DCA 1976). The state contends that appellant is guilty of possessing the marijuana by virtue of having aided and abetted Rovenick. See § 777.011, Fla....

...ucted him to remain there. Petitioner's participation in the crime consisted of driving Ramirez to the scene, waiting nearby until summoned by Ramirez, then driving the get-away vehicle. *901 Both were charged with burglary under sections 810.02 and 777.011, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...but Potts nevertheless sought review in this Court on that issue only. Petitioner makes two arguments to which we will respond. Potts was charged under the aider-abettor statute which makes all participants in a crime principals in the first degree. § 777.011, Fla....

...State, 659 So.2d 457, 459 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). A conviction for aiding and abetting requires the State to prove (1) the defendant's intent that the crime be committed; and (2) the defendant's performance of some act to assist in the commission of the crime. See § 777.011, Fla.Stat....

...(Emphasis supplied.) The second is contained in Chaudoin v. State, 362 So.2d 398, 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). In the commission of a crime, both the actor and one who aids and abets him are principals in the first degree and may be charged and convicted of the crime. Both are equally guilty. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Newkirk v. State, 222 So.2d 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Douglas v. State, supra . This case graphically demonstrates the desirability and the necessity in this type of situation for the State Attorney to charge the defendant not only as a principal under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1979), but, in the alternative, as an accessory after the fact pursuant to Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ubstantive offense. Hutchinson v. State, 315 So.2d 546, 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). As such, evidence that a person aided and abetted another in the commission of an offense, although sufficient to convict the person as a principal in such offense under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1977), is insufficient to convict either person of a conspiracy to commit the subject offense....

...tructively possessing the contraband? Through the law of principals, it is quite possible for an accused to aid, abet, counsel, hire, or otherwise procure the delivery of contraband without having actual or constructive possession of the contraband. § 777.011, Fla....

...Appellant and his brother were both arrested and charged by information with the armed robbery of the drug store. The uncontradicted testimony established that appellant was not the actual perpetrator of the robbery. Accordingly, he can only be convicted as a principal in the first degree as an aider and abettor. § 777.011, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...790, 795 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). [4] Id., 336 U.S. at 446, 69 S.Ct. at 720, 93 L.Ed. at 796. [5] Harno, Intent and Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 624 (1941). [6] This is similar to the vicarious liability imposed by statute on aiders and abettors. § 777.011, Fla....

...First, by overriding the Dixon distinction between first- and second-degree felony murder which had resurrected the extinct distinctions between principals of the first degree, principals of the second degree, and accessories before the fact, it restored section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1975 and thereafter) as controlling law on charging and convicting principals....

...Second, it eliminated the offense of second-degree felony murder established by Dixon based on the absence of the accused from the murder scene. Third, it established an entirely *269 new offense which had not theretofore existed in Florida under which all principals, as defined in section 777.011, whether present or absent, are culpable for any killings which are committed during the felony by innocent bystanders, police officers, victims, or other persons not committing the felony....

...1979), overruled in part, State v. Lowery, 419 So.2d 621 (Fla. 1982), the accused was charged and convicted of first-degree felony murder under section 782.04 (Fla. 1975). The evidence at trial showed that she was a principal of the first degree under section 777.011 although not present at the crime scene....

...On appeal, however, the district court relied on our decisions in Dixon and Adams, which had interpreted the dissimilar predecessor statute, and held that Hite could not be convicted of first-degree felony murder because she had not been present at the crime scene. This was error because Hite was a principal under section 777.011....

...During the robbery, the cofelon murdered the victim with the gun. At trial the jury was instructed on second-degree felony murder as a lesser included offense of first-degree felony murder. This was error because Lowery as a cofelon was a principal under section 777.011 and equally as culpable as his cofelon who actually did the killing....

...It is clear from the facts that the murder here was committed by one or both of respondent's two cofelons. Consequently, having objected to the lesser included instruction, respondent may not be convicted of second-degree felony murder. We summarize our holdings as follows. First, section 777.011 is controlling and a principal does not have to be at the scene of the crime....

...CENT VICTIM IS NOT ONE OF THE PRINCIPALS IN THE COMMISSION OF THE FELONY, SUCH AS A BYSTANDER OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, BUT RATHER SOMEONE ELSE? Dene, 512 So.2d at 1156. [2] Codified as § 776.011, Fla. Stat. (1971), and subsequently renumbered as § 777.011, Fla....

controlled substance, see Fla. Stat. § 777.011, qualifies as a “controlled substance offense

...[2] In this case, the State prosecuted Banks as a principal to the crime. To be guilty as a principal for a crime physically committed by another, one must intend that the crime be committed and do some act to assist the other person in actually committing the crime. See Staten v. State, 519 So.2d 622, 624 (Fla.1988); § 777.011, Fla.Stat....

...him and the other appellants, we find it appropriate to address this argument first. In the commission of the crime, both the actor and the one who aids and abets him are principals in the first degree and may be charged and convicted of the crime. § 777.011, Fla....

...e year minimum sentence was imposed when petitioner, who may have actively participated in the robbery without himself actually carrying a firearm or other deadly weapon, nevertheless, was vicariously guilty (as a principal in the first degree under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1981)) of armed robbery because a co-perpetrator carried a firearm or other deadly weapon as prohibited by section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...led, hired, or otherwise procured the commission of the murder. If such fact is proven then the accused can be considered a principal of the first degree "whether he is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offense." § 777.011, Fla....

...While it is true that the evidence may be insufficient to show that Brown was the actual "triggerman," the totality of the evidence supports the state's theory that Brown ordered the death of the victim in an execution-style murder, and was therefore guilty, as a principal, of premeditated *112 murder, pursuant to section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...d such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such, whether he or she is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offense. § 777.011, Fla....

...a dispute in the evidence as to which of the three participants actually had possession of the single gun employed in the robbery, if any one of them carried the firearm during the commission of the crime, all of them are guilty as principals under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...id some word which was intended to and which did incite, cause, encourage, assist or advise the other person or persons to actually commit the crime. To be a principal, the defendant does not have to be present when the crime is committed." See also § 777.011, Fla....

...The trial court did find, however, that appellant had violated another condition of his probation, Condition No. 4, which prohibited appellant from possessing any weapon. Both findings are in error. As to the first charge, principal in the first degree to aggravated battery, the pertinent law is found in section 777.011, Florida Statutes: Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempt...

...ind another door because they were suspicious, "Shoot them, Al." Al shot. The gunmen returned the fire and retreated, along with appellant. These events caused appellant to be charged with armed burglary because as a "principal in the first degree," Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1981), she aided those armed men to commit the burglary....

...The burglary was complete when they entered the home with the intent to commit an offense while therein. She was also charged with shooting at or into an occupied building and was properly convicted of that crime, just as she was properly convicted of the armed burglary, because under section 777.011, Florida Statutes, she was a principal in the first degree by aiding the burglars in their deeds....

...presumes the existence of premeditation, just as it does under the felony murder rule." (citations omitted). However it is reasoned, there is a crime of attempted first degree murder, or attempted "felony murder," and this appellant was guilty under section 777.011 because she aided in the commission of it....

...Newkirk v. State, 222 So.2d 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); Douglas v. State, supra . This case graphically demonstrates the desirability and the necessity in this type of situation for the State Attorney to charge the defendant not only as a principal under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1979) but, in the alternative, as an accessory after the fact pursuant to Section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...stood back at least fifteen feet and watched Delgado remove jalousie glasses from the window of the apartment. The evidence before the court is less than that necessary to prove that G.C. aided and abetted in the attempted burglary. In order for one person to be guilty of a crime physically committed by another under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1979), it is necessary that he not only have a conscious intent that the criminal act shall be done, but further requires that pursuant to that intent he do some act or say some word which was intended to and which...

...tary manslaughter). Evidence that Michel had procured Joseph's aid in driving his truck to Miami, while he was sitting in the passenger seat, appears sufficient to sustain his conviction for principal in the first degree to vehicular homicide, under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1995): 777.011....

...to sell the methaqualudes was entirely too ambiguous to reflect any dominion and control over them. We are not called upon to determine whether her offer to sell would have been sufficient to sustain a conviction as an aider and abettor, pursuant to Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1979) as the defendant was not charged with the sale of methaqualudes....

...iring the defendant to report to a Probation Education Growth Program, and if directed by the probation officer, that the defendant attend an Adult Education Program, and 12, requiring the defendant to pay for a First Step fee. [8] 3.01 PRINCIPALS F.S. 777.011 If the defendant helped another person or persons [commit] [attempt to commit] a crime, the defendant is a principal and must be treated as if [he][she] had done all the things the other person or persons did if 1....

constructively present at the commission of such offense. § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added). Although

...See Salvatore v. State, 366 So.2d 745, 749 (Fla. 1978); Manning v. State, 93 So.2d 716, 719 (Fla. 1957); Thomas v. State, 202 So.2d 883, 884 (Fla.3d DCA 1967). In Potts v. State, 430 So.2d 900 (Fla. 1982), however, our supreme court held that under section 777.011, Florida Statutes, the aider and abettor statute: [I]t is sufficient at the trial of the aiderabettor only to show that a crime was committed....

...[1] As an aider and abettor of his daughter's sexual activity with other males, Anderson was a principal in the first degree and could have been additionally charged, convicted and punished as though he had perpetrated the sexual batteries himself. See § 777.011; Clifford v....

...effort to obtain credit, the dealer is a principal as it has provided the customer the - 13 - knowledge and assistance necessary to mislead the lender in evaluating the creditworthiness of the purchaser. See § 777.011, Fla....

...One who participates with another in a common criminal scheme is guilty of all crimes committed in furtherance of that scheme regardless of whether he or she physically participates in that crime. Jacobs v. State, 396 So.2d 713, 716 (Fla. 1981); see § 777.011, Florida Statutes (2004) ("Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, ......

...Daudt was convicted of both sale and possession but on appeal his conviction of sale was upheld, but his conviction of possession was reversed. This was because Daudt was charged not as the actual perpetrator of the two crimes but only as an aider and abettor under section 777.011, Florida Statutes, which statute provides that a person who aides, abets or procures another person to commit a criminal offense can be convicted of that offense whether he is or is not present at the commission of that offense....

...victim and because appellant was not personally present at the robbery. Accordingly, we affirm appellant's convictions and sentences for conspiracy and robbery, but we reverse her conviction for felony-murder. OTT and DANAHY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 777.011, Fla....

...Since Willingham did not "carry or use" a gun during the sale offense, then the only basis for the jury finding that he used a firearm is under the principal theory as an aider and abettor to his accomplice Marshall, which was instructed by the trial court. See § 777.011, Fla....

...Section 782.04, therefore, does not violate equal protection. Affirmed. It is so ordered. SUNDBERG, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON, ENGLAND and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., dissents. NOTES [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. (1972). [2] McEver v. State, 352 So.2d 1213 (Fla.2d DCA 1977). [3] Currently § 777.011, Fla....

...No evidence was presented on behalf of either defendant, and the case went to the jury on trespass. The jury returned verdicts of guilty as to both defendants. As to Horton, the theory of the State's case was that he was guilty as an aider and abettor under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...This case concerns the more troublesome issue of Mr. Leet's criminal responsibility. Ms. Collins did not testify at Mr. Leet's trial. It is noteworthy that Mr. Leet was not charged as a principal concerning the aggravated child abuse by Ms. Collins. See § 777.011, Fla....

...The committee on standard jury instructions reported to the supreme court that the old instruction contained requirements that the defendant "intend to participate actively or by sharing in an expected benefit" and that the defendant "knew what was going to happen," but that the statute defining principals, section 777.011, Florida Statutes, did not require those elements....

...The new SJI was, as explained by the supreme court, purely an improved explanation of the statute, offered at the behest of the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions: "The committee recommends an amendment to instruction 3.01, entitled `Principals,' based on section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1993) (page 32a of the manual)....

...[2] The McGahee court had also pointed out that in 1973 the legislature amended section 794.01 to extend it to sodomy and the supreme court found the amended statute not unconstitutionally vague in Washington v. State, 302 So.2d 401 (Fla.1974). [3] § 777.011, Fla....

...The Roby opinion also cites Jacobs v. State, 184 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966), for the holding that one charged with aiding and abetting may upon proof be found guilty of actual commission of the crime, and vice versa. In the latter event, because an aider and abettor is, under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1985) (formerly section 776.011), a principal, said the Jacobs court, the accused may be found guilty as charged....

...Any person who violates this provision with respect to: 1. A controlled substance named or described in s. 893.03(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d), (2)(a), or (2)(b) is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082, 775.083, and 775.084. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...her pulled the trigger with a "premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed," Fla. Stat. § 782.04(1)(a) (1973) or, that he was a principal to the crime of first degree murder even if he did not physically pull the trigger. Fla.Stat. § 777.011 (1977) states: [w]hoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to b...

...However, because the State asserted, subsequent to the close of its case, that appellant was a principal to forgery, the question then becomes whether or not the State offered sufficient evidence to prove that appellant was indeed a principal. Pursuant to section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1999), a "principal in the first degree" is defined as: [w]hoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to...

...ed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such, whether he is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offense." § 777.011, Fla....

...eight and credibility of the evidence. Id. at 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781; Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 1987). The fact that the evidence gives some support to the defendant's theory of innocence does not warrant granting habeas relief. Id. Section 777.011 (1989) of the Florida Statutes provides as follows: Principal in the first degree: Whoever commits any criminal offense against the State ......

...attempted perpetration of the crime of Robbery, did cause great bodily harm to Glen Moore, a human being, by intentionally kicking and striking him repeatedly which could have caused the death of the said Glen Moore, contrary to F.S. 782.04(1)(a), F.S. 777.011, F.S....

...een acquitted, it shall not be scored. [e.s.] In Harris v. State, 513 So.2d 169 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), the court approved the assessment of victim injury points against a defendant whose co-defendant actually caused the injury. The court observed that section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1989), explicitly allows vicarious attribution of the responsibility for the injury to the co-defendant....

of first-degree murder as a principal under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2008), on the theory that

...Since Fox was not an actual perpetrator of the robbery, the state necessarily proceeded against her upon the theory that one who "aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed" is a principal in the first degree. § 777.011, Fla....

...1988), the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged the general rule that "[i]n order to be convicted as a principal for a crime physically committed by another, one must intend that the crime be committed and do some act to assist the other person in actually committing the crime." See also Fla. Stat. § 777.011 (1985); Collins v....

...1st DCA 1985); United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.1982). Reversed and Remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate the judgments and sentences and to dismiss the subject charges. BOOTH, C.J., and SHIVERS, J., concur. NOTES [1] Under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1983), persons who aid, abet, counsel, hire, or otherwise procure a crime to be committed may be charged as principals in the first degree, regardless of whether they were actually or constructively present at the commission of the crime....

...[his] fancy." There is evidence, if believed, sufficient for the jury to conclude that Smith directed the execution of Crawford to eliminate her as a witness to her battery at the hands of the Outlaws. This makes him responsible for her murder. See § 777.011, Fla....

...As we saw it then, the issue was whether defendant could have been found guilty of the underlying felony of harboring an escaped prisoner, namely himself. We concluded that he could have been found so guilty as an aider and abettor in his accomplice's perpetration of the crime of harboring defendant as an escapee. See § 777.011, Fla....

...3d DCA 1981)("Presence at the scene, without more, is not sufficient to establish either intent to participate or act of participation."). The theory the State selected to hold defendant responsible for the criminal act of the actual shooter was "principal liability" under section 777.011 of the Florida Statutes (2000). Under statutory principal liability in Florida, a principal can include not only the actual actor responsible for the crime, but also, in some cases, a non-participant to the actual act. The statute reads as follows in full: 777.011 Principal in first degree.— Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such, whether he or she is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offense. § 777.011, Fla....

...;" and (2) the defendant "[must] do some act to assist the other person in actually committing the crime." Staten, 519 So.2d at 624 (citing Ryals v. State, 112 Fla. 4, 150 So. 132 (1933)). It also is settled that the "criminal offense" referenced in section 777.011 is the criminal offense for which the defendant is sought to be convicted—in this case, the attempted murder of Ed Cody—rather than any underlying offense that may be associated with or have precipitated the charged offense....

...And he said, and I will never forget these words. He said, ["]I will put him in a wheelchair.["] That was the only words he spoke. (Emphasis added.) Q: Who said that, the driver? A: The driver. Then he fired twice. I didn't hear the gunshots, but could smell the gunpowder. Applying section 777.011 to this crime, the attempted murderer was the shooter; the woman who exhorted the shooter to shoot was a principal....

...However, a casual examination of these cases confirms instead that reversal is required. For example, in Staten v. State, 519 So.2d 622, 624 (Fla.1988), supra majority at 1107-08, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Susan Staten as a principal in the first degree within the meaning of section 777.011 of the Florida Statutes for the commission of the crime of robbery where, contrary to the facts supporting the charged crime in the instant case, "there was direct testimony that [she] was present on numerous occasions when the crime...

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. August 13, 1985. Carl S. McGinnes, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. John W. Tiedemann, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Howard appeals his conviction and sentence for sexual battery under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1983), and his sentences for attempted sexual battery and sexual battery....

counseled, hired, or otherwise procured, (section 777.011), said criminal offense to be committed. For

...fendant to be guilty of the crime of robbery with a firearm. We find no error in the instruction. First, if any one participant in a robbery carried a firearm during the commission of the crime, all of the participants are guilty as principals under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...human being "[w]hen committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate" certain enumerated felonies. Included as a qualifying felony is the "[m]urder of another human being." § 782.04(1)(a)(2)( o ). Additionally, section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2002), provides that "[w]hoever ......

...the court reversed a conviction for battery, concluding that the mere presence of the defendant with another youth was insufficient to support a battery conviction. The state responds that R.M. could have been convicted as an aider and abettor under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1993), which provides: Principal in first degree....

...Instead, he followed his brother's directive and drove to the bike trail. T.B. thereby acquired the requisite knowledge and manifested his intent to participate in and assist his brother's act of forcibly confining or restraining the victim without lawful authority and against her will. Pursuant to section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1997), T.B.'s acts constitute aiding and abetting the commission of the crime of false imprisonment under section 787.02(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...The felony murder rule, along with the "principals" statute, is meant to make all participants equally accountable for their criminal acts. Section *170 782.04(4), Florida Statutes, (1985) proscribes the murder to which appellant pleaded nolo contendere. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes, (1985) says anyone who aids and abets, etc., in the commission of a crime is to be punished as if he did the killing....

...did then and there commit a battery upon [the victim] by actually and intentionally touching or striking [her] against her will and the commission of this offense evidences prejudice based on ... sexual orientation... of [the] victim ... contrary to F.S. 784.041, F.S. 777.011 and F.S....

...Crittendon's conviction does not rest on proof that he himself shot the fatal bullet into Orlando's head. Crittendon was an aider of the other three, including the one who fired the shot. As an aider Crittendon was properly charged and convicted as a principal in the first degree, § 777.011, F.S....

...State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.1991) ( Jones I ). [2] We also agree with the trial court's conclusion that Wainwright would be convicted of sexual battery as a principal were the jury to believe that Wainwright did not personally sexually batter Gayheart. § 777.011, Fla....

...the victim immediately after the shooting which occurred in defendant's immediate presence. Thus, the state persuasively argues, defendant was not only properly convicted but was also properly sentenced as though the victim had been shot by him. See § 777.011; Sons v....

...ttal on charges of felony murder by aggravated child abuse. Appellant was charged under two theories. First, felony murder, with aggravated child abuse as the underlying felony. Second, the state argued that Appellant was guilty as a principal under section 777.011, Florida Statutes....

...Nonetheless, all three of the remaining defendants were, like Williams, sentenced to the mandatory 3 years, minimum jail sentence, under § 775.087(2) Fla. Stat. (1975). It was error to do so under this statute. The State argues that the jury instruction, and sentence, was proper under § 777.011 Fla....

in the first degree to the murder. Fla.Stat. § 777.011.5 If the jury *771found that Hall had a premeditated

...uted that Williams drove the car from the apartment while Findley, holding the gun, forced the victim to perform oral sex, raped her, and fondled her breasts. Williams became a principal in the crime of sexual battery by aiding and abetting Findley. § 777.011, Fla....

...We affirm. Horner correctly contends that conspiracy is a separate and distinct crime from the offense which is the object of the conspiracy, and that evidence of participation in an offense, although sufficient to *139 convict a person as a principal, see § 777.011, Fla....

trial. WARNER and LEVINE, JJ., concur. . Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2010), provides, Whoever

..."In order to be convicted as principal for a crime physically committed by another, the defendant must intend that the crime be committed and must do some act to assist the other person in actually committing the crime." Terry v. State, 668 So.2d 954, 964-65 (Fla. 1996) (citing § 777.011, Fla....

...CONNOLLY, JR., did unlawfully and feloniously kill a human being, to wit: JOHN B. CALLAHAN, from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or any human being, by shooting the said JOHN B. CALLAHAN with a firearm, in violation of s. 782.04(1), s. 775.087 and s. 777.011, Florida Statutes, to the evil example of all others in like cases offending and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. To understand the murder of John B....

...Rather, the reclassification was based solely on the defendant’s own actual and personal possession of a totally separate firearm during his involvement in the commission of the homicide. The defendant was convicted as a principal of the second degree murder of Callahan, see § 777.011, Fla....

...the defendant had a firearm at all the meetings where he met with Bulger and Flemmi. Thus, there was no vicarious enhancement, only a proper reclassification based on the defendant’s personal 5 Although the murder occurred in 1982, we cite to section 777.011, Fla....

...ther before or during the offense and whether present or not present at the scene, are all “principals in the first degree,” and they are treated the same and are equally culpable under the law. Staten, 519 So. 2d at 624 (Fla. 1988); see also § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2005) (renumbered in 1977 from section 776.011 to section 777.011). Section 777.011 provides as follows: Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is...

...Thus, based on the dissent’s position, even if another individual (“Perp. #2”) held the victim at gunpoint while his accomplice (“Perp. #1”) shot and killed the victim, only Perp. #1 would be subject to reclassification. The dissent’s position is contrary to section 777.011 (the law of principals) and section 775.087(1) (the law regarding reclassification of offenses). Section 777.011 mandates that perpetrators and aiders and abettors are all “principals” and “may be charged, convicted and punished as such.” Florida law does not identify some of the participants of the offense as “perpetrators” and ot...

...the defendant carries, displays, etc. a firearm. Section 775.087(1) does not limit its application to “the actual perpetrator,” nor would it make sense to do so since actual perpetrators and aiders and abettors are all “principal[s] in the first degree.” § 777.011....

...�actual perpetrators” and aiders and abettors nearly sixty years ago. Perpetrators, who were always statutorily referred to as “principals in the first degree,” and aiders and abettors are now all “principal[s] in the first degree,” and section 777.011 provides that each may be “charged, convicted, and punished” the same....

...to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such, whether he or she is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offenses.” § 777.011. 47  The second premise is wrong because, while it is true that the offense committed by Bulger, Flemmi, Martorano, and the defendant did not become a second degree murder until the vict...

...though each was armed with a firearm when they carried out their agreed-upon roles in the homicide. What the dissenters fail to recognize is that all three perpetrators 49 were principals in the first degree to the homicide; section 777.011 requires that they all be treated the same (“may be charged, convicted, and punished as such”); and section 775.087(1) permits reclassification of each of the principal’s convictions if he personally used, threatened to use, carried, etc....

...The statutes establishing the elements of second degree murder and the law governing principals and accomplices specifically contemplate that the acts committed by a co-defendant during the commission of the felony may be committed at any time and any place. Neither section 777.011, the statute pertaining to principals, nor section 782.04(2), the statute pertaining to second degree murder, requires that the defendant be present or that he commit the last act that led to the victim’s demise. Section 777.011, the principal statute, holds the defendant legally responsible as a principal, whether or not he is present when the crime is committed, if he “did some act”—not the last act—“or said some word which was intended to and which did incite, cause, encourage, assist, or advise the other person or persons to actually commit or attempt to commit the crime.” See also State v. Dene, 533 So. at 270 (holding that, pursuant to section 777.011, a principal does not have to be at the 50 scene of the crime); State v. Lowery, 419 So. 2d 621, 623-24 (Fla. 1982) (holding that Lowery was as equally culpable as a principal under section 777.011, as his co- felon who actually did the killing, although he was not present when his co-felon murdered the victim). Similarly, for the defendant to be properly convicted of second degree murder, the State was required to pro...

...(3) Is of such a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference to human life. The defendant does not dispute that there was competent substantial evidence to support his conviction for second degree murder. It is equally clear that neither section 777.011 nor section 782.04(2) requires the defendant to be present when the shooting occurs or during the “last act” that caused the victim’s demise....

...notion that section 775.087(1) should only apply to principals who are present when the last act or last element of a crime is committed, or when the firearm is used in furtherance of the crime. To do so violates the clear and unambiguous language of sections 777.011 (the principal statute), 775.087(1) (the reclassification statute), and 782.04(2) (the second degree murder statute)....

...weapon three weeks prior to the murder does not change the fact that [he] had to have possessed the actual murder weapon at the time of the murder for the reclassification of second degree murder with a firearm under §§ 775.087 and 777.011, Fla....

...The State submitted evidence at trial that Connolly met a few times with co-defendants Bulger, Flemmi and Martorano in New York and/or Boston over several weeks preceding the murder. This evidence comprised the basis for the State’s charge of conspiracy to commit first-degree 11 §777.011, Fla....

...to wit: JOHN B. CALLAHAN, from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or any human being, by shooting the said JOHN B. CALLAHAN with a firearm, in violation of s. 782.04(1), s. 775.087, and s. 777.011, Florida Statutes ....

...agree, conspire, combine, or confederate [with one another] to commit a criminal offense, to wit: Murder in the first degree with a firearm upon JOHN B. CALLAHAN, in violation of s. 782.04(1), s. 777.04(3), s. 775.087, and s. 777.011, Florida Statutes ....

...for vicariously possessing the only weapon charged in count 1 and actually used in the murder. Connolly could properly have been convicted as a principal of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder pursuant to section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1981).22 But a defendant’s conviction may not be reclassified for a co- defendant’s possession of a firearm during a felony. Rodriguez, 602 So. 2d at 1270. In Rodriguez, 23 the Florida Supreme Court construed the language of section 775.087(1) and answered this certified question in the negative: “Does the 22 Section 777.011 reads: Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committ...

...or attempted to use a weapon related to the commission of the charged crime, it is error for the trial court to enhance the defendant’s sentence based on a co-defendant’s use of a firearm. 4) Connolly’s conviction as a principal pursuant to section 777.011, would have been legally permissible (if not time-barred), but reclassification of his conviction is not. But for the expiration of the statute of limitation, Connolly could have been convicted of second-degree murder as a Principal in the first degree, pursuant to 89 section 777.011, which provides, 777.011 Principal in first degree.—Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is com...

...e. But the Florida Supreme Court explicitly rejected the idea that a defendant could be subject to reclassification under subsection 775.087(1) as a principal. Rodriguez, 602 So. 2d 1270. On the facts before us, the criminal offense referenced in section 777.011 is the criminal offense for which the State sought to convict Connolly in Count 1....

...committed the murder. B. The Relevant Statutes To answer the dispositive question, we must construe the relevant language of the reclassification statute, section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1981), and its interplay with the principal statute, section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1981). The reclassification statute (section 775.087(1)) provides in pertinent part: 775.087....

...for which the 101  person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: (a) In the case of a felony of the first degree, to a life felony. (Emphasis added.) The principal statute (section 777.011) provides: 777.011....

...State, 314 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). In 1957, the Florida Legislature eliminated such distinctions (except for accessory after the fact, which still exists, see § 777.03, Fla. Stat. (1981); Staten v. State, 519 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1988)). Under section 777.011, all participants who either commit the offense themselves, or who aid, abet counsel, hire or otherwise procure such offense to be committed by another, are all considered principals in the first degree and are equally criminally responsible for the acts of their co-principals....

...ed or is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such, whether he or she is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offense. § 777.011, Fla....

...firearm “during the commission of the felony” requires his actual or constructive presence. We must therefore separate the issue of presence for culpability as a principal from the issue of presence for reclassification purposes. Under the principal statute (§ 777.011), a person may be found guilty if he either: 35 The standard jury instruction on principals, Fla....

...felony. Our case differs from Turner only in the fact that the state charged appellant in language indicating that he personally committed the burglary and the assault. Yet, the information referred to the statute on principals in the first degree, section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1977), [1] and the record reflects that appellant's involvement was limited to participation in the planning of the crime and the transportation of his confederate to and from the building which was burglarized....

...State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971); Hardison v. State, supra ; Thompson v. State, 374 So.2d 91 (Fla.2d DCA 1979). Therefore, we set aside the judgment and sentence and remand for a new trial. GRIMES, A.C.J., and OTT and DANAHY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] 777.011 Principal in first degree....

...Here, the underlying felonies of battery or aggravated battery are not enumerated predicate felonies. Rather, defendants were prosecuted under the law of principals under which both the actor and those who aid and abet in the commission of a crime are liable as principals in the first degree. See § 777.011, Fla.Stat....

...at 362 (footnotes omitted and some citations omitted); see also Daudt, 368 So.2d at 53-54 (one who acted as "lookout" during sale not guilty of possessing marijuana by virtue of having aided and abetted sale). Here, as in L.J., the evidence established that D.M. was aiding and abetting A.E. in the sale of cocaine. See § 777.011, Fla....

...in this case since Mr. Larman's active participation in the robbery was not in dispute. JUDGMENT and SENTENCE AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN, C.J., and DAUKSCH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 782.04(1)(a)2, Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] § 777.04(3), Fla. Stat. (1995). [3] § 777.011, Fla....

...oss-examination." CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 612.2 at 54 (2002 ed.). The subject matter of Napier's direct examination was the commission of the burglary depicted on the videotape. Stotler was charged as a principal to Napier's crimes. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2001) "treats those who aid, abet, or counsel another to commit a crime the same as if they had committed the crime themselves." State v....

...At the conclusion of a jury trial, Clifford was found guilty as charged of attempted first degree murder, kidnapping, and two counts of sexual battery. As to all offenses, Clifford was charged and found guilty as a principal of the first degree according to section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...y should not be scored against him for his sexual battery convictions because he did not personally perpetrate the offenses. We disagree. Clifford was charged with and convicted of two counts of sexual battery in violation of sections 794.011(3) and 777.011, Florida Statutes (1983). Although Clifford was not the actual perpetrator of the sexual batteries, he was a principal of the first degree because he aided and abetted his codefendant's commission of these offenses. See § 777.011. According to section 777.011, therefore, Clifford could be charged, convicted, and punished as though he had perpetrated the sexual batteries himself....

...5th DCA 1987), a case decided after Clifford was sentenced sub judice, our sister court held that victim injury was properly scored in a murder case when the defendant was not the person who shot the victim. The Harris court stated that the principal statute, section 777.011, is intended to make all participants equally accountable for their criminal acts....

...State, 353 So.2d 948 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Ferguson v. State, 321 So.2d 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). This cause must be reversed for an additional reason. Appellant was charged and convicted as a principal in the first degree for aiding and abetting under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1979)....

Hernandez as a principal in the first degree, see § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2002), making him liable for any

to driving the vehicle after the robbery. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes, provides that a principal

...him on the ground that Kelly having been acquitted under Count I, the State was estopped to try him as a principal in the first degree to the same offense. We agree. Appellant was charged as a principal in the first degree under the provisions of F.S. 777.011 (1977)....

...State v. Rodriguez, 602 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 1992), may lend support to his position but additional analysis is required. *577 It appears that the answer to the question should depend on whether section 775.0845 enhances the offense or enhances the penalty. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes, provides that whoever aids in the commission of an offense, even if he is not present, is a principal of the first degree to such offense....

...a dispute in the evidence as to which of the three participants actually had possession of the single gun employed in the robbery, if any one of them carried the firearm during the commission of the crime, all of them are guilty as principals under section 777.011 ......

...Here, we have three people, one vicariously, participating in a robbery and attempted carjacking in which masks were worn. If by wearing the masks, the two actual perpetrators committed a distinct, substantive offense of the first degree, then it appears that section 777.011 would make their absent accomplice guilty of the same....

principal theory under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2009). See § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2009) ("Whoever

...to sustain conviction for second degree murder). If the direct testimony at trial had shown that Andreu handed Price the gun to give to Collins, we would not hesitate to affirm Andreu's conviction on the theory that he was a principal to the crime. § 777.011, Fla....

...While Andreu's behavior on the day of the incident was questionable, the evidence at trial did not establish that he intended that a crime be committed and did some act that assisted Collins in actually committing the crime. That being the case, his conviction cannot stand. § 777.011, Fla....

The law of principal in the first degree, section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2011), defines that status

...307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The circumstances above outlined distinguish this case from Daudt v. State, 368 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1979), and others cited by appellants, and clearly justify Smith's conviction as an aider and abettor. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes....

...Both an agreement and an intention to commit an offense are necessary elements of this crime." Ramirez v. State, 371 So.2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). "[E]vidence that a person aided and abetted another in the commission of an offense, although sufficient to convict the person as a principal in such offense under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1977), is insufficient to convict either person of a conspiracy to commit the subject offense." Id....

...[4] The appeals of the defendant and several codefendants were consolidated with the appeal of Wallace Johnson and affirmed without opinion under Johnson v. State, 892 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). [5] The 1995 version of the principal statute provided: 777.011 Principal in first degree.— Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attem...

...Here, we have three people, one vicariously, participating in a robbery and attempted carjacking in which masks were worn. If by wearing the masks, the two actual perpetrators committed a distinct, substantive offense of the first degree, then it appears that section 777.011 would make their absent accomplice guilty of the same....

...ct as a distinct, substantive offense." The legislature did so in 1997. See section 775.0845, Fla. Stat. (1997). In view of this decision, I assume the Legislature will have to again amend section 775.0845, Florida Statutes, and state expressly that section 777.011, Florida Statutes, applies to section 775.0845....

...ed of incriminating evidence afterward. As such, the State's theory was that Gale was a principal. In order to convict on this theory, the evidence must prove that the defendant aided, abetted, counseled, hired or otherwise procured the offense. See § 777.011, Fla....

...t William Moses Wilson at close range, took his wallet from his trousers, and left him to bleed to death. The prosecution proceeded on the theory that her involvement in preparations for a robbery made her a principal to Moses Williams' robbery, see § 777.011, Fla....

...It is clear from the facts that the murder here was committed by one or both of respondent's two cofelons. Consequently, having objected to the lesser included instruction, respondent may not be convicted of second-degree felony murder. We summarize our holdings as follows. First, section 777.011 is controlling and a principal does not have to be at the scene of the crime....

...] Dixon [283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973)] distinction between first and second-degree felony murder which had resurrected the extinct distinctions between principals of the first degree, principals of the second degree, and accessories before the fact, it restored section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1975 and thereafter) as controlling law on charging and convicting principals....

...Second, it eliminated the offense of second-degree felony murder established by Dixon based on the absence of the accused from the murder scene. Third, it established an entirely new offense which had not theretofore existed in Florida under which all principals, as defined in section 777.011, whether present or absent, are culpable for any killings which are committed during the felony by innocent bystanders, police officers, victims, or other persons not committing the felony....

...is two steps removed from the actual commission of the substantive offense.... As such, evidence that a person aided and abetted another in the commission of an offense, although sufficient to convict the person as a principal in such offense under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1977), is insufficient to convict either person of a conspiracy to commit the subject offense......

...§ 782.04(1)(a)(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2002). A defendant is guilty of an offense as a principal if he “aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed.” § 777.011, Fla....

...For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for resentencing. We affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence for Armed Robbery, finding sufficient evidence in the record to support the defendant's participation in the offense as a principal. See § 777.011, Fla.Stat....

...Sasser as a principal. To succeed on a principal theory, the State was required to prove that Mr. Sasser aided, abetted, counseled, hired, or otherwise procured another to commit the offense of simultaneous possession of the gill net and the mullet. See § 777.011, Fla....

of cannabis as charged in the information. Section 777.-011, Florida Statutes, provides: Principal in

crime. Reid’s argument is not persuasive. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes, eliminates the distinctions

defendant’s participation in the crime satisfied section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1989). The State need not

crime. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.5(a); § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2007); Valdez v. State, 504 So.2d

...Appellant's next point concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for perjury. At trial, the state proceeded on a principal theory, alleging that appellant convinced two women to make false statements that created an alibi for him at the time of the sexual battery. The principal statute, section 777.011, Florida Statutes, reads in pertinent part as follows: Principal in first degree....

...the money. The money, after A's commission, is forwarded to S. In neither of the above examples can R in example one, nor B in example two, be convicted of possession of an illegal drug. Obviously, both are guilty of aiding and abetting a sale under section 777.011, Florida Statutes, and conspiracy to sell illegal drugs. However, as to possession, neither had actual possession of the drug, nor did either have the ability to possess the drug constructively. Further, neither helped commit the crime of possession of the drug under a principal theory. See § 777.011, Fla....

defendants were charged as principals under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1993). The State alleged

...[4] § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2009) ("The provisions of this code and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused."). [5] § 777.011, Fla....

...dant and Rodriguez were arrested. The evidence was sufficient to go to the jury. See Douglas v. State, 627 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); L.J. v. State, 578 So.2d 360 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Fernandez v. State, 639 So.2d 658, 659-60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); § 777.011, Fla....

...Stat.; 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Fla. Stat.) Thereafter the defendant's counsel agreed to the State's motion for the trial court to vacate that plea in order for, or to permit, the defendant to be charged as a principal to first degree murder (§ 782.04(1)(a)1 and/or § 777.011, Fla....

...NOTES [1] § 777.03 and § 812.13(1) and (2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989). [2] The colloquy between defense counsel and the trial court indicates the following: THE COURT: You're asking me to vacate the plea and set it aside? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Granted... . [3] § 782.04(1)(a)1 and/or § 777.011, Fla....

...She admits having committed the burglary, having committed the robbery, and having hit the victim. She testified that the victim had been tied up. She aided and abetted the participants. Even if the others with her were the ones who physically killed the victim, she is equally guilty as a matter of law. See Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...in order to carry out the intention to abduct Kornegay's former girlfriend. We cannot agree. Before a person may be convicted as a principal in the first degree under the theory of aiding and abetting another in the commission of a crime pursuant to Section 777.011, Florida Statutes, "it is necessary that he [the person charged as a principal] not only have a conscious intent that the criminal act be done, but further requires that pursuant to that intent he do some act or say some word which wa...

...He appeals and urges that he cannot be convicted of such a crime, when the only evidence shows that the firearm was possessed by a co-perpetrator of the crime, citing Earnest v. State, 351 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1977). We affirm. Pursuant to the terms of Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1975), even though the defendant may only have been an abettor and aider he could be convicted as a principal in the first degree....

909 So.2d 951, 952 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); see also § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2008) (defining principal as a person

...Section 782.04(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes, defines felony murder as "[t]he unlawful killing of a human being . . . [w]hen committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate" one of the felonies enumerated in the statute, which includes robbery. Section 777.011 provides for the culpability of principals to a felony: Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and su...

...e benefit thereof, with the intent to permanently deprive or defraud the same true owner, to-wit: Evrocin Company, Inc., a Florida corporation, of its property or the use and benefit thereof, contrary to F.S. 812.021(1)(b), F.S. 812.021(2)(a), and F.S. 777.011; and COUNT II that NORMAN BIEDERMAN, between the 1st day of July, A.D....

...enefit thereof, with the intent to permanently deprive or defraud the said true owner, to-wit: Evrocin Company, Inc., a Florida corporation, of its property or of the use and benefit thereof, contrary to F.S. 812.021(1)(b), F.S. 812.021(2)(a), and F.S. 777.011; [2] III that NORMAN BIEDERMAN and DAVID TUPPER, between the 5th day of July, A.D....

...he said Barnes-Hind Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a Delaware corporation, of its property, or to appropriate the same to the use of the taker or any other person, as part of a common scheme or plan, contrary to F.S. 812.021(1)(a), F.S. 812.021(2)(a), and F.S. 777.011....

...2d DCA 1988). In Clifford, the defendant was tried as a principal for aiding and abetting in two sexual batteries and given victim injury points although someone other than the defendant actually perpetrated the offenses. The court noted that under section 777.011, the statute governing punishment for a principal, Clifford could be punished as though he had perpetrated the sexual *875 batteries himself....

instruction 3.01, entitled “Principals,” based on section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1993) (page 32a of the manual)

charged Marks and Borgan as principals under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1989). That statute treats

...principal to the actions of Jackson, Cole, and Nixon. A defendant is guilty as a principal if he “aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed.” § 777.011, Fla....

crime of lewd and lascivious molestation, section 777.011 of the Florida Statutes (1999) authorizes the

cocaine, § 893.135(5), Fla. *292Stat. (2007); § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2007).1 We find no merit to Charles’

commission of such offense. Florida Statutes § 777.011. In short, like its equivalent federal aiding

firearm, which, under Florida law, Fla. Stat. § 777.011, includes aider-and-abettor liability. After the

to trigger the operation of the statute. See § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (1997). Clark did not construe section

...§ 782.04(1)(a)(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2002). A defendant is guilty of an offense as a principal if he “aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed.” § 777.011, Fla....

Revels to burglarize the victim’s home 1 Section 777.011, Florida Statutes, states,“[w]hoever commits

the above constitutes a third degree felony. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2003), which is charged

was a principal in that offense pursuant to section 777.011, Florida Statutes. As stated in Jacobs v. State

State, 182 So.2d 273 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1966); Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1983); 14 Fla.Jur.2nd, Criminal

defendant intended to participate in the crime.”); § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2017). WOLF, BILBREY, and WINOKUR

Staten v. State, 519 So.2d 622, 624 (Fla.1988); § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (1989).

that it relied on the principal theory under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2019), to convict Defendant

establish his guilt as an aider and abettor under section 777.-011, Florida Statutes (1981). We agree that the

and abetted in the commission of such crime. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes; State v. Roby, 246 So.2d

principal in the first degree pursuant to section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1993) — and the written

guilty only as an aider and abettor under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1977). Thus, the issue is

...obliged to continue representation if so ordered by a tribunal. To permit or assist a client or other witness to testify falsely is prohibited by section 837.02, Florida Statutes (1991), which makes perjury in an official proceeding a felony, and by section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1991), which proscribes aiding, abetting, or counseling commission of a felony....

...There was no evidence that C.D. ever planned or intended to take the jewelry or that she did any act or made any statement which was intended to "incite, cause, encourage, assist or advise" the other girl to commit the crime. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.5(a); § 777.011, Fla....

...State, 985 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), for the following proposition: [E]vidence that a person aided and abetted another in the commission of an offense, although sufficient to convict the person as a principal in such offense under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1977), is insufficient to convict either person of a conspiracy to commit the subject offense. Id....

abettor in the crime of armed robbery, per Section 777.-011, Florida Statutes (1979), he was sentenced

procured, hired, or aided Dr. Sievers’ killing. § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2019). Wright’s testimony

present at the commission of such'offense. § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2010); see also Charles v. State

...Brannic therefore has the burden to show that the State could not establish her liability under a principal theory: specifically that Brannic had a conscious intent that the robbery be done and did some act which was intended to assist the other people in committing it. See § 777.011, Fla....

be a “principal.” In defining “principal” section 777.011, Florida Statutes, states: Whoever commits

activity, which made him a principal under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2000). After the State presented

not have been convicted as principals under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2011), for offenses involving

guilty as principals in the first degree. See § 777.011, Fla.Stat. (1993); Staten v. State, 519 So.2d

codefendant in his act of sexual battery. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1991), specifically categorizes

whether such an instruction would be proper. See § 777.011, Fla.Stat. (1985); Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Crim.)

in an official proceeding a felony, and by section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1991), which proscribes

violation of section 810.02(1) and (3), and section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1995), and dealing in stolen

guilt as a principal.; *503 Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2009), sets forth who may

...For similar reasons, the State’s circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to prove Grandison intended that the items found in the vehicle be used to commit burglary. As previously observed, neither DNA nor fingerprint evidence connects § 777.011, Fla....

Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310 (Fla.1991); § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2002); cf. Clines v. State, 912 So

official proceeding a felony and by Florida Statute § 777.011, which proscribes aiding, abetting, or counseling

aided and abetted in the commission of the crime. § 777-011, Fla.Stat. (1991).4 Therefore, we reverse Lovette’s

first degree murder as an aider and abetter. § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (1981). He already received something

first degree pursuant to section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1981). Section 777.011 provides in pertinent

principal pursuant to section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2022) 2, or 2 Section 777.011, Florida Statutes

than the defendant or his accomplice. Under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes, of course, a defendant is

PRINCIPALS F.S. 777.011 If the defendant helped another person

criminal conspiracy." Further, Fla. Stat. § 777.011 states: Whoever commits any criminal

another person to commit the crime. TR. 832; see § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (1999); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim

the defendant not only as a principal under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1979) but, in the alternative

procures such offense to be committed[.]” See § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2022). Here, the State did not charge

being a principal in the first degree under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1997).

Appellant could be found guilty as a principal. See § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2016). The jury found the Appellant

court on this point we have taken into account section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1987), which provides: 777

...of the crime of Robbery, did cause great bodily harm to Glen Moore, a human being, by intentionally kicking and striking him repeatedly which could have caused the death of the said Glen Moore, contrary to F.S. 782.04(1)(a), F.S. 777.011, F.S. 777.04(1) and F.S....

attempted. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. 3.5(a); see also § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2001). The jury found Mr. Santoro

See Staten v. State, 519 So.2d 622 (Fla.1988); § 777.011, Fla.Stat. (1993). W. SHARP, GOSHORN and THOMPSON

prove that Herard was the actual shooter. See § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2008) (one who “aids, abets, counsels

proceeding a felony;, and by Florida Statute § section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1991), which proscribes

a substantive crime may be convicted under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1977), of a greater crime

as an accessory before the fact un*463der section 777.011,2 on the one hand, and being an accessory after

...Lastly, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to all three counts where the State introduced sufficient, competent evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See § 775.087, Fla. Stat. (2004) (addressing use of firearm during commission of felony); § 777.011, Fla....

...In conclusion, as the contentions raised by the defendant fail to demonstrate reversible error, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences. Affirmed. NOTES [1] The defendant and co-defendant were also charged as principals of the crimes under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2004).

and abetting A.E. in the sale of cocaine. See § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (1997). Under the law as summarized

abetted James as would be necessary under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1981), in order for Gary

he cannot be convicted as principal under section 777.011, Florida Statutes, for first-degree murder

*1345principal, of premeditated murder, pursuant to section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1985). See, e.g., Antone

or constructive possession of the contraband. § 777.011, Fla.Stat. (1983). The case at hand is illustrative

The statement of particulars provided: 1 § 777.011 – Principal in the first degree. 2 Florida

Court in Earnest did not in any way abrogate § 777.011, Florida Statutes (1975), dealing with principals

occurrence jurisdiction might be satisfied. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2023), provides that any

occurrence jurisdiction might be satisfied. Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2023), provides that any

was suitably charged on the principles of Section 777.011 as embodied in Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim

criminal liability as a principal is outlined in section 777.011, Florida Statutes as follows: Whoever

status as a principal in the first degree under section 777.011 Fla.Stat. (1977). Appellant has submitted for

person as a principal in such offense under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1977), is insufficient to

in the operations as an aider and abettor. Section 777.011, Fla. Stat. (1975). The actual importation

been convicted as an aider and abettor under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1993), which provides: Principal

appellant as a principal to the drug transaction, section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1987), and possession of

crime physically committed by another under Section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1979), it is necessary that

v. State, 896 So.2d 718, 716 (Fla.1981); see § 777.011, Florida Statutes (2004) (“Whoever commits any

found guilty as a principal. See § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2016).

Williams v. State, 261 So.2d 855 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); § 777.011, Fla.Stat. (1991). A significant factor leading

would nonetheless be guilty as a principal. See § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2001). Affirmed.

...e else. State v. Dawson, 681 So.2d 1206, 1207 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). We also point out that (although not argued in the trial court), if it is assumed that C.C.'s statement to the police was true, he would nonetheless be guilty as a principal. See § 777.011, Fla....

introducing the cannabis into the prison grounds. § 777.011. So, although the state entitled its information

findings of guilt as to aggravated battery. See § 777.011, Fla.Stat. (1991). The finding that M.U. committed

defendant’s alleged acts were contrary to section 777.011 which defines a principal in the first degree

where the defendant could be convicted under section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1995), as a principal along

(emphasis added). The instruction implements section 777.011, Florida Statutes, which provides: Principal

Appellant’s conviction as a principal under section 777.011, Florida Statutes. Based on our decision, we

participation in the charged offenses as a principal. See § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (1997); Andrews v. State, 693 So.2d

principal to the- crime of - burglary. See § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2013); C.L.A. v. State,

against Farris hinged on the law of principals, section 777.011, Florida Statutes (2022). That section states

authority and against her will. Pursuant to section 777.011, Florida Statutes (1997), T.B.’s acts constitute

Florida Statutes (1957), later renumbered section 777.011,5 which eliminated any distinction between

procures [any criminal offense] to be committed....” § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2002). We find no merit to the remaining