Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

You're probably overthinking it. Call a lawyer.

Call Now: 904-383-7448
Florida Statute 784.085 - Full Text and Legal Analysis
Florida Statute 784.085 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
Link to State of Florida Official Statute
F.S. 784.085 Case Law from Google Scholar Google Search for Amendments to 784.085

The 2025 Florida Statutes

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 784
ASSAULT; BATTERY; CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE
View Entire Chapter
784.085 Battery of child by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling certain fluids or materials.
(1) It is unlawful for any person, except a child as defined in this section, to knowingly cause or attempt to cause a child to come into contact with blood, seminal fluid, or urine or feces by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling such fluid or material.
(2) Any person, except a child as defined in this section, who violates this section commits battery of a child, a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) As used in this section, the term “child” means a person under 18 years of age.
History.s. 85, ch. 2000-139.

F.S. 784.085 on Google Scholar

F.S. 784.085 on CourtListener

Amendments to 784.085


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 784.085
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S784.085 - BATTERY - OVER 18 YOA CAUSE UND 18 CONTACT W BODY FLUIDS - F: T

Cases Citing Statute 784.085

Total Results: 17  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

United States v. Johnson, 528 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2008).

Cited 41 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 11520, 2008 WL 2221844

...Our conclusion here is consistent with our recent decision in United States v. Young, No. 07-14780 ___ F.3d ___ (11th Cir. May 19, 2008). That case involved the issue of whether the Florida crime of using fluids to commit battery of a child, Fla. Stat. § 784.085, is a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G....
Copy

Sammir A. Poveda v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 692 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2012).

Cited 41 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2012 WL 3655293, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18159

...lawfully admitted for permanent residence under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193 (1997). In 2007, a Florida court convicted Poveda of the offense of battery on a child by bodily fluids, see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.085(1), and soon afterward, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against him, see 8 U.S.C....
Copy

VKE v. State, 934 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 2006).

Cited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 1838948

...(2005) (felony battery). Several are inconsistent with the concept of domestic violence, see § 784.082, Fla. Stat. (2005) (assault or battery by person who is being detained in a prison, jail, etc.); § 784.048, Fla. Stat. (2005) (stalking), or the concept of rape, see § 784.085, Fla....
Copy

United States v. Young, 527 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2008).

Cited 18 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2008 WL 2080963

...statutory definition of the prior offense.” United States v. Llanos-Agostadero, 486 F.3d 1194, 1196-97 (11th Cir. 2007) (construing § 2L1.2(b)(1) enhancement). III. Young pled guilty to violating Florida Statute § 784.085, “Battery of a Child by Throwing, Tossing, Projecting, or Expelling Certain Fluids or Materials,” which is a felony punishable by up to five years in prison. Fla. Stat. § 784.085 1; Fla....
...According to the statute, it is “unlawful for any person... to knowingly cause or attempt to cause a child to come into contact with blood, seminal fluid, or urine or feces by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling such fluid or material.” Fla. Stat. § 784.085. 1 Regarding the battery conviction, at the age of 19, Young engaged in sexual intercourse with a 13-year-old girl. 4 According to Florida law, a battery occurs when a...
...Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003)). V. After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that a conviction for violating Florida Statute § 784.085, “Battery of a Child by Throwing, Tossing, Projecting, or Expelling Certain Fluids or Materials,” is a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender enhancement....
...The use of physical force against another is an element of the statute. The statute at issue, while nominally entitled a battery, requires the violator to cause the child to come into contact with bodily fluids, by “throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling” the fluids. Fla. Stat. § 784.085....
Copy

Hopkins v. State, 105 So. 3d 470 (Fla. 2012).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 551, 2012 WL 4009511, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 1799

...her to harmonize the statutes and to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Fla. Dep’t of State v. Martin, 916 So.2d 763, 768 (Fla.2005). For this analysis, we discuss three other battery statutes contained in chapter 784. See §§ 784.076, 784.085, 784.078, Fla....
...d to juveniles — the Legislature, in enacting section 784.082, decided against being so restrictive by using the word “person.” See ch. 95-267, § 57, *475 Laws of Fla. In addition, the Legislature excepted children from being prosecuted under section 784.085, which states that “any person, except a child ... [who] knowingly cause[s] or attempts] to cause a child to come into contact with” certain fluids or materials thereby commits a battery of a child, a third-degree felony. § 784.085(1),(2), Fla....
Copy

Jimmy Pierre v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 879 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2018).

Cited 3 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

...uding that Pierre was removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal based on his felony conviction for battery of a child by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling blood, seminal fluid, urine, or feces, in violation of Florida Statute § 784.085. After review and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the BIA did not err in concluding that (1) Pierre was removable, because his conviction was a crime of child abuse within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2...
...removal if he was convicted of a CIMT. The primary dispute in this case is 3 Case: 16-15898 Date Filed: 01/18/2018 Page: 4 of 23 whether Pierre’s conviction under Fla. Stat. § 784.085 falls within the definitions of “crime of child abuse” and “crime involving moral turpitude.” II....
...ited States as an asylee from Haiti. 1 On August 15, 2005, his status was adjusted to that of legal permanent resident. On December 18, 2009, Pierre pled guilty in Florida state court to one count of battery of a child, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.085. Pierre was sentenced to five years’ probation. Florida Statute § 784.085 is entitled “Battery of child by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling certain fluids or materials.” Fla. Stat. § 784.085....
...Under the statute, battery of a child occurs when a person “knowingly cause[s] or attempt[s] to cause a child to come into contact with blood, seminal fluid, or urine or feces by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling such fluid or material.” Id. § 784.085(1). Notably, for both the completed crime (causing actual contact) and the attempt crime (attempting to cause contact), the statute requires that the defendant commit the overt act of throwing, tossing, projecting or expelling the bodily fluids or feces....
...elements mentioned in a statute . . . [and] is a crime of child abuse.” 2 Pierre was also initially charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), as an alien convicted of two CIMTs, based on the same battery conviction under Fla. Stat. § 784.085. That charge was withdrawn. 5 Case: 16-15898 Date Filed: 01/18/2018 Page: 6 of 23 Pierre next appeared before an IJ on April 25, 2013....
...constitutes maltreatment of a child or that impairs a child’s physical or mental well-being, including sexual abuse or exploitation.” See Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. 503, 517 (BIA 2008). The IJ acknowledged that Fla. Stat. § 784.085 criminalizes both attempted battery of a child and actual battery of a child....
...application for cancellation of removal, arguing that Pierre was ineligible for that relief. The government argued that Pierre did not meet the statutory requirement of seven years’ continuous presence in the United States, because his conviction under Fla. Stat. § 784.085 was a CIMT, which triggered the “stop time rule” of the INA....
...him time to respond to the government’s motion to pretermit. E. The BIA’s August 9, 2016 Decision On August 9, 2016, the BIA dismissed Pierre’s appeal. The BIA first concluded that a battery of a child conviction under Fla. Stat. § 784.085 “categorically constitutes a crime of child abuse within the meaning of [the INA].” 9 Case: 16-15898 Date Filed: 01/18/2018 Page: 10 of 23 The BIA pointed out that a...
...statute falls within the generic definition of child abuse, as it describes an act that “impairs a child’s physical or mental well-being.” See Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. at 517. The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s determination that § 784.085 constitutes a CIMT....
...Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516-17, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1163-64 (2009); Perlera-Escobar v. Exec. Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 1990). B. Crime of Child Abuse We first address whether a battery on a child conviction under Fla. Stat. § 784.085 constitutes a crime of child abuse within the meaning of the INA. The INA does not define “child abuse.” See Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec....
...2009)). “Under the categorical approach, we consider only the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the offense, rather than the specific facts underlying the defendant’s case.” Gelin, 837 F.3d at 1241. Under Florida Statute § 784.085, a criminal battery of a child occurs when a person “knowingly cause[s] or attempt[s] to cause a child to come into contact with blood, seminal fluid, or urine or feces by throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling such fluid or material.” Fla. Stat. § 784.085(1)....
...ld to come into contact with these particular bodily fluids or feces, by the overt act of throwing, tossing, projecting, or expelling the fluids or feces—constitutes a crime of child abuse. As an initial matter, a battery conviction under § 784.085 requires an overt act....
...As explained above, the statutory language makes clear that the difference between the completed crime and the attempt is only that in the attempt, the child victim does not actually come into contact with bodily fluids or feces. In other words, a defendant violates the attempt prong of § 784.085 if, for example, 15 Case: 16-15898 Date Filed: 01/18/2018 Page: 16 of 23 he tosses blood or feces at a child and misses....
...that a New York conviction under N.Y.P.L. 16 Case: 16-15898 Date Filed: 01/18/2018 Page: 17 of 23 C. Crime Involving Moral Turpitude We next determine whether § 784.085 describes a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of the INA. Like child abuse, the term “moral turpitude” is not defined in the INA....
...Similarly, if a statute “requires an intentional act targeted at vulnerable victims,” that requirement “further demonstrates that a violation of the statute is morally turpitudinous.” Id. at 1246. Pierre’s battery of a child conviction under § 784.085 means that, at a minimum, he knowingly projected blood, seminal fluid, urine, or feces at a child. Fla. Stat. § 784.085(1); see Thomas, 531 So....
...18 Case: 16-15898 Date Filed: 01/18/2018 Page: 19 of 23 conduct . . . . measured by common understanding and practice.” Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68, 74 (Fla. 2000) (quotations omitted). Thus, although § 784.085 does not expressly tie the knowing mental state to each element of the crime, it is apparent that a defendant cannot be convicted under § 784.085 unless he knew that he was (1) projecting (2) bodily fluids or feces (3) at a child....
...man.” Cano, 709 F.3d at 1053. We agree with the BIA that this conviction categorically constitutes a CIMT. We note Pierre’s argument that the act of expelling urine on a child’s jellyfish sting, in order to alleviate the pain, would violate the letter of § 784.085, but would not be base or vile and thus would not be a CIMT....
...To do this, the party “must at least point to his own case or other cases in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for which he argues.” Id. Pierre has pointed to no instance in which the state of Florida has prosecuted a person under § 784.085 for urinating on a jellyfish sting, or indeed for any realistic conduct that would not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude. 4....
...1987). Here, as part of his claim for relief from removal, Pierre had the burden to show he was eligible for cancellation of removal. Further, the Notice to Appear charged that Pierre was removable due to his conviction for battery of a child in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.085, which is the same crime that made him ineligible for removal....
...pretermit, and thus has not established a due process violation. Frech, 491 F.3d at 1281. Whether the government had filed its motion timely or late, the IJ necessarily would have had to consider whether Pierre’s battery on a child conviction under § 784.085 was a CIMT in order to determine his eligibility for cancellation of removal....
...that the IJ would have concluded differently if Pierre had been allowed to file an opposition. Indeed, the IJ made clear that denying the government’s motion would mean “ignor[ing] the law.” The BIA reached the same conclusion, finding that § 784.085 describes a CIMT....
...rms of relief, and thus was not deprived of due process. Resendiz-Alcaraz, 383 F.3d at 1272. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we conclude that a battery of a child conviction under Florida Statute § 784.085 is categorically a crime of child abuse and a CIMT....
Copy

Rafael Jacob Stoffel v. State of Florida, 247 So. 3d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).

Cited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal

...Thus, either the act of fondling the nine- year old’s breasts was a lewd molestation or it was no crime at all, because a non-lewd touching of a child by a parent cannot constitute a battery, absent evidence of physical injury or other factors not alleged or proven here. See § 784.085, Fla....
Copy

V.K.E. v. State, 934 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 2006).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 31 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 505, 2006 Fla. LEXIS 1475

(2005) (stalking), or the concept of rape, see § 784.085, Fla. Stat. (2005) (battery of a child by throwing
Copy

Felts v. State, 941 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 18288, 2006 WL 3078936

...ttery on a minor in violation Section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes, one count of lewd and lascivious molestation of a child under twelve years in violation of section 800.04(5)(b), and one count of battery of a child by bodily fluids in violation of section 784.085....
...Defendant filed a Rule 3.850 motion for post conviction relief alleging four grounds, one of which has merit. The State confesses that defendant is correct that the count regarding battery of a child by bodily fluids constitutes a third-degree felony. § 784.085(2), Fla....
Copy

State v. S.C., 762 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).

Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 8756, 2000 WL 959508

him with aggravated battery in violation of section 784.0085(l)(a)(2) Florida Statutes (1997). The information'
Copy

Brittany Budlove v. Tanya Lewis (Fla. 2d DCA 2023).

Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal

...I also agree with the majority that, as written, the injunctions restrain Budlove from future conduct that is constitutionally protected activity. However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion as to what communications the trial court's injunctions can and cannot enjoin Budlove from making. Section 784.085(1), Florida Statutes (2021), "create[s] a cause of action for an injunction for protection against stalking" and states that "[f]or the purposes of injunctions for protection against stalking under this section, the offense of stalking shall include the offense of cyberstalking." To be entitled to the issuance of such an injunction, "[t]he sworn petition shall allege the existence of such stalking and shall include the specific facts and circumstances for which relief is sought." § 784.085(3)(a)....
...the injunctions should be reversed because they "enjoin Budlove from engaging in constitutionally protected speech by making public statements not sent directly to appellees." (Emphasis added.) In order to be entitled to entry of an injunction under section 784.085(3)(a), the sworn petition must allege the prior existence of stalking, and in order for the court to grant injunctive relief under section 784.085(6)(a), it must find "that the petitioner is the victim of stalking." In the instant case, all of the 22 allegations of cyberstalking alleged in the petitions seeking these injunctions describe...
...at the petitioner are excluded from the definition of "course of conduct" in section 784.048(1)(b) because they are "constitutionally protected activity"—and then necessarily excluded from the definitions of cyberstalking in section 784.048(1)(d) and stalking in section 784.085(1)—then how can the majority find no error in the trial court's determination that petitioners were the victims of previous acts of stalking based on communications that only pertained to petitioners? I do not think the majority can...
Copy

Brittany Budlove v. Jonetta Johnson (Fla. 2d DCA 2023).

Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal

...I also agree with the majority that, as written, the injunctions restrain Budlove from future conduct that is constitutionally protected activity. However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion as to what communications the trial court's injunctions can and cannot enjoin Budlove from making. Section 784.085(1), Florida Statutes (2021), "create[s] a cause of action for an injunction for protection against stalking" and states that "[f]or the purposes of injunctions for protection against stalking under this section, the offense of stalking shall include the offense of cyberstalking." To be entitled to the issuance of such an injunction, "[t]he sworn petition shall allege the existence of such stalking and shall include the specific facts and circumstances for which relief is sought." § 784.085(3)(a)....
...the injunctions should be reversed because they "enjoin Budlove from engaging in constitutionally protected speech by making public statements not sent directly to appellees." (Emphasis added.) In order to be entitled to entry of an injunction under section 784.085(3)(a), the sworn petition must allege the prior existence of stalking, and in order for the court to grant injunctive relief under section 784.085(6)(a), it must find "that the petitioner is the victim of stalking." In the instant case, all of the 22 allegations of cyberstalking alleged in the petitions seeking these injunctions describe...
...at the petitioner are excluded from the definition of "course of conduct" in section 784.048(1)(b) because they are "constitutionally protected activity"—and then necessarily excluded from the definitions of cyberstalking in section 784.048(1)(d) and stalking in section 784.085(1)—then how can the majority find no error in the trial court's determination that petitioners were the victims of previous acts of stalking based on communications that only pertained to petitioners? I do not think the majority can...
Copy

Brittany Budlove v. Rafaela Mccoy (Fla. 2d DCA 2023).

Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal

...I also agree with the majority that, as written, the injunctions restrain Budlove from future conduct that is constitutionally protected activity. However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion as to what communications the trial court's injunctions can and cannot enjoin Budlove from making. Section 784.085(1), Florida Statutes (2021), "create[s] a cause of action for an injunction for protection against stalking" and states that "[f]or the purposes of injunctions for protection against stalking under this section, the offense of stalking shall include the offense of cyberstalking." To be entitled to the issuance of such an injunction, "[t]he sworn petition shall allege the existence of such stalking and shall include the specific facts and circumstances for which relief is sought." § 784.085(3)(a)....
...the injunctions should be reversed because they "enjoin Budlove from engaging in constitutionally protected speech by making public statements not sent directly to appellees." (Emphasis added.) In order to be entitled to entry of an injunction under section 784.085(3)(a), the sworn petition must allege the prior existence of stalking, and in order for the court to grant injunctive relief under section 784.085(6)(a), it must find "that the petitioner is the victim of stalking." In the instant case, all of the 22 allegations of cyberstalking alleged in the petitions seeking these injunctions describe...
...at the petitioner are excluded from the definition of "course of conduct" in section 784.048(1)(b) because they are "constitutionally protected activity"—and then necessarily excluded from the definitions of cyberstalking in section 784.048(1)(d) and stalking in section 784.085(1)—then how can the majority find no error in the trial court's determination that petitioners were the victims of previous acts of stalking based on communications that only pertained to petitioners? I do not think the majority can...
Copy

Brittany Budlove v. Susanne Campbell (Fla. 2d DCA 2023).

Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal

...I also agree with the majority that, as written, the injunctions restrain Budlove from future conduct that is constitutionally protected activity. However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion as to what communications the trial court's injunctions can and cannot enjoin Budlove from making. Section 784.085(1), Florida Statutes (2021), "create[s] a cause of action for an injunction for protection against stalking" and states that "[f]or the purposes of injunctions for protection against stalking under this section, the offense of stalking shall include the offense of cyberstalking." To be entitled to the issuance of such an injunction, "[t]he sworn petition shall allege the existence of such stalking and shall include the specific facts and circumstances for which relief is sought." § 784.085(3)(a)....
...the injunctions should be reversed because they "enjoin Budlove from engaging in constitutionally protected speech by making public statements not sent directly to appellees." (Emphasis added.) In order to be entitled to entry of an injunction under section 784.085(3)(a), the sworn petition must allege the prior existence of stalking, and in order for the court to grant injunctive relief under section 784.085(6)(a), it must find "that the petitioner is the victim of stalking." In the instant case, all of the 22 allegations of cyberstalking alleged in the petitions seeking these injunctions describe...
...at the petitioner are excluded from the definition of "course of conduct" in section 784.048(1)(b) because they are "constitutionally protected activity"—and then necessarily excluded from the definitions of cyberstalking in section 784.048(1)(d) and stalking in section 784.085(1)—then how can the majority find no error in the trial court's determination that petitioners were the victims of previous acts of stalking based on communications that only pertained to petitioners? I do not think the majority can...
Copy

Brittany Budlove v. William Johnson (Fla. 2d DCA 2023).

Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal

...I also agree with the majority that, as written, the injunctions restrain Budlove from future conduct that is constitutionally protected activity. However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion as to what communications the trial court's injunctions can and cannot enjoin Budlove from making. Section 784.085(1), Florida Statutes (2021), "create[s] a cause of action for an injunction for protection against stalking" and states that "[f]or the purposes of injunctions for protection against stalking under this section, the offense of stalking shall include the offense of cyberstalking." To be entitled to the issuance of such an injunction, "[t]he sworn petition shall allege the existence of such stalking and shall include the specific facts and circumstances for which relief is sought." § 784.085(3)(a)....
...the injunctions should be reversed because they "enjoin Budlove from engaging in constitutionally protected speech by making public statements not sent directly to appellees." (Emphasis added.) In order to be entitled to entry of an injunction under section 784.085(3)(a), the sworn petition must allege the prior existence of stalking, and in order for the court to grant injunctive relief under section 784.085(6)(a), it must find "that the petitioner is the victim of stalking." In the instant case, all of the 22 allegations of cyberstalking alleged in the petitions seeking these injunctions describe...
...at the petitioner are excluded from the definition of "course of conduct" in section 784.048(1)(b) because they are "constitutionally protected activity"—and then necessarily excluded from the definitions of cyberstalking in section 784.048(1)(d) and stalking in section 784.085(1)—then how can the majority find no error in the trial court's determination that petitioners were the victims of previous acts of stalking based on communications that only pertained to petitioners? I do not think the majority can...
Copy

Ariel Marcelo Bastias v. U.S. Attorney Gen. (11th Cir. 2022).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

...precedent to conclude at Chevron step one that 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) is ambiguous, so we must proceed to step two and defer to the BIA’s interpretation so long as it’s reasonable. In Pierre, we considered whether a conviction for child battery under Fla. Stat. § 784.085 was a “crime of child abuse” under the same provision of the INA at issue here, 8 U.S.C....
Copy

Ariel Marcelo Bastias v. U.S. Attorney Gen. (11th Cir. 2022).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

...precedent to conclude at Chevron step one that 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) is ambiguous, so we must proceed to step two and defer to the BIA’s interpretation so long as it’s reasonable. In Pierre, we considered whether a conviction for child battery under Fla. Stat. § 784.085 was a “crime of child abuse” under the same provision of the INA at issue here, 8 U.S.C....

This Florida statute resource is curated by Graham W. Syfert, Esq., a Jacksonville, Florida personal injury and workers' compensation attorney. For legal consultation, call 904-383-7448.