Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 784.048
S784.048 3 - AGGRAV STALKING - FOLLOW HARASS CYBERSTALK CRED THREAT TO PERSON - F: T
CopyCited 492 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 30400, 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 470, 1999 WL 1036607
...For example, Florida's statute criminalizes any repeated following, whether or not accompanied by a threat: "Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree . . . ." Fla. Stat. 784.048(3) (West 1992)....
CopyCited 130 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 8294, 2007 WL 1063337
...Humphrey, as discussed infra, the court did not make a finding as to whether there
was probable cause to arrest Holmberg.
3
The Offense Report filed by Deputy Terry refers to the offense of aggravated stalking
under Florida Statutes section 784.048(3)....
CopyCited 41 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 329427
...t of section
784.041, Florida Statutes, (1997), and generally patterned after the standard instructions on battery and aggravated battery. [3: A New Instruction for the Crime of Aggravated Stalking] AGGRAVATED STALKING (Victim under 16 years of age) §
784.048(5) Fla....
..."Harass" means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose. ________ Lesser Included Offenses Category One: Stalking Category Two: None _______ Comment This instruction is based on the text of section 784.048, Florida Statutes, (1997), and generally patterned after the standard *696 instructions on stalking and aggravated stalking....
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 162755
...Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and COPE and GODERICH, JJ. COPE, Judge. John L. Pallas appeals his conviction and sentence for aggravated stalking. We affirm. Defendant was charged with aggravated stalking in violation of subsection 784.048(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury, commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. §
784.048(3), Fla....
...Consequently, the portion of the statute applicable to defendant is that part which punishes someone who "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly ... harasses another person, and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury." § 784.048(3), Fla....
...sts. (c) "Credible threat" means a threat made with the intent to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily injury to, a person. Id. § 784.048(1)(a)-(c)....
...We have no difficulty in concluding that the statute gives fair notice of the proscribed activity, and is not void for vagueness. Defendant contends that in the statutory phrase, "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person," § 784.048(3), Fla....
...s." From this faulty premise defendant argues that the statute is therefore vague as regards the term "harasses." We agree with the trial court that "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly" does in fact modify the word "harasses." The language of subsection 784.048(3), in conjunction with the definitions, is reasonably clear and specific. *1361 Defendant also argues that the statutory definition of "harasses," id. § 784.048(1)(a), is vague....
...gure of speech such as "You'll get yours!" In setting forth these examples, the defendant relies on the erroneous interpretation of the statute discussed earlier in this opinion. The conduct of the defendant must be willful, malicious, and repeated. § 784.048(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1992). There must be a course of conduct which would cause substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person in the position of the victim. Id. § 784.048(1)(a)....
...The conduct must serve no legitimate purpose. Id. Furthermore, the statute also provides, "Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of `course of conduct.' Such constitutionally protected activity includes picketing or other organized protests." Id. § 784.048(1)(b). Finally, for aggravated stalking under subsection 784.048(3), there must also be a credible threat made with the intent to place the victim in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury. Id. § 784.048(1)(c), (3)....
...The court concluded that the claim of overbreadth "is not real and substantial judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Id. Likewise in the present case the statute is not overbroad. Defendant also challenges the portion of subsection 784.048(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...This portion of the statute does not suffer from real and substantial overbreadth judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. at 615,
93 S.Ct. at 2917; State v. Elder,
382 So.2d at 690. We reject the defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of subsection
784.048(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...88, 98,
31 So.2d 52, 57 (1947). The term "follows" is severable. Assuming arguendo "follows" were found to be constitutionally infirm, the remedy would be to narrow the construction of the statute by invalidating "follows" but leaving the remainder of subsection
784.048(3) intact....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 242403
...Akers stated she will testify and wants to prosecute. Mrs. Akers states she is in fear of defendant and believes when he is released he will become violent with her. Bouters was charged with aggravated stalking, a third-degree felony, in violation of section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...y overbroad and vague, and then pled nolo contendere. The district court, in a brief opinion, ruled the statute constitutional, and Bouters now asks this Court to quash the district court's opinion. II. THE APPLICABLE LAW Florida's stalking statute, section 784.048, reads as follows: 784.048 Stalking; definitions; penalties....
...of the third degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. *237 (5) Any law enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant, any person he or she has probable cause to believe has violated the provisions of this section. §
784.048, Fla....
...The statute proscribes a particular type of criminal conduct defined at length in the statute. The conduct must be willful, malicious, and repeated, and form "a course of conduct" which would "cause [] substantial emotional distress" in a reasonable person in the same position as the victim (as explained below). See § 784.048, Fla....
...In the present case, Bouters claims that the statutory definition of "harasses" is impermissibly vague. Under the statute, "[h]arasses" means "to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." § 784.048, Fla....
...Accordingly, I would analyze this case entirely under the Florida Constitution in keeping with the doctrine of primacy announced in Traylor v. State,
596 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1992). I also write separately to stress that the only statute at issue in this case is subsection
784.048(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992), dealing with aggravated stalking. The validity of subsections
784.048(2) and (4), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...Aggravated stalking is in the nature of an aggravated form of assault, and it is arguable that the latter is even a necessarily lesser included offense of the former. [3] That being the case, overbreadth is not a tenable argument for invalidity, and vagueness is arguable only if the refinements added by subsection 784.048(3) are themselves vague....
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 1838948
...Stat. (2005) (battery); §
784.041, Fla. Stat. (2005) (felony battery). Several are inconsistent with the concept of domestic violence, see §
784.082, Fla. Stat. (2005) (assault or battery by person who is being detained in a prison, jail, etc.); §
784.048, Fla....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 85176
...must have been within 6 months of the filing of the petition." See §
784.046(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999). Violence means "any assault, battery, sexual battery, or stalking by a person against any other person." See §
784.046(1)(a), Fla.Stat. (1999). Section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that anyone who "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person" commits the crime of stalking. The term "harass" is defined as a series of acts over a period of time "directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." See §
784.048(1)(a), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 154126
...On June 23, 1993, Johnson pled no contest to the state's petition for rule to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. Based upon Johnson's conduct in contacting Green and entering her residence, the state on May 28, 1993, filed an information charging him with aggravated stalking under section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (1993), which provides in pertinent part: (1) As used in this section: (a) "Harasses" means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose....
...The only elements necessary to prove the contempt offense were knowledge of the injunction and a willful violation of that injunction. He was also charged with a second offenseaggravated stalking. The statutory elements of aggravated stalking under section 784.048(4) are knowledge of an injunction and knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly following or harassing the beneficiary of the injunction....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 457135
...Gen., Miami, Joan Fowler, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant. Alan H. Schreiber, Public Defender, Stacey J. Pastel and Diane M. Cuddihy, Asst. Public Defenders, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The trial court has held that section 784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
...GUNTHER, WARNER and POLEN, JJ., concur. ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND/OR CERTIFICATION We deny appellee's September 8, 1994 motion for rehearing. However, we grant in part appellee's motion to certify the following questions as involving issues of great public importance: 1. DOES SECTION 784.048(2) OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES VIOLATE DUE PROCESS ON THE BASIS THAT IT FAILS TO PLACE CITIZENS ON NOTICE OF PROSCRIBED CONDUCT AND IT FAILS TO PROVIDE MINIMAL GUIDELINES TO PREVENT ARBITRARY AND DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT? 2. DOES SECTION 784.048(2) VIOLATE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ON THE BASIS THAT IT FAILS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PROTECTED AND UNPROTECTED CONDUCT OR SPEECH? REHEARING DENIED; QUESTIONS CERTIFIED.
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 33 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 864, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 2049, 2008 WL 4736377
...The instructions as set forth in the appendix [2] shall be effective when this opinion becomes final. It is so ordered. QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and CANADY, JJ., concur. POLSTON, J., did not participate. APPENDIX 8.7(b) AGGRAVATED STALKING (Injunction Entered) § 784.048(4), Fla....
...e purpose. "Maliciously" means wrongfully, intentionally, and without legal justification or excuse. Lesser Included Offenses ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- AGGRAVATED STALKING (Injunction Entered)
784.048(4) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Stalking
784.048(2) 8.6 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Violation of injunction for protection
741.31(4) 8.16...
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 94307
...Gen., Tallahassee, and Michael J. Neimand, Asst. Atty. Gen., Parker D. Thomson, and Carol A. Licko, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Miami, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The appellant, Scott Bouters, was charged with the offense of aggravated stalking pursuant to section 784.048(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2017 WL 632740, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2747
...t. For example, Florida’s anti-stalking statute defines prohibited harassment as “a course of conduct direct *1321 ed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” Fla. Stat. § 784.048 (l)(a)....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 911774
...ing argument. The state suggests that while this may not have been a fatal attraction, it *1147 certainly was a fateful obsession. We affirm. The standard jury instructions for criminal cases do not define maliciously in the approved instruction for section 784.048(4)....
...could not have been obtained without the assistance" of the omission. The record demonstrates that the court did instruct the jury that the state was required to prove maliciously beyond a reasonable doubt. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 8.7(b). Section 784.048 does not contain any special definition of the term maliciously. As we have previously noted, the drafters of Standard Jury Instruction 8.7(b) did not specially define the term maliciously presumably because the drafters of section 784.048(4) did not do so....
...s "malice in fact"). Reed v. State,
837 So.2d 366, 368 (Fla.2002). Legal malice means "wrongfully, intentionally, without legal justification or excuse," while actual malice means "ill will, hatred, spite, an evil intent." Id. [4] Taking the text of section
784.048(4) as a whole, and considering its context and the discernible purposes of the legislature, we conclude that the plain meaning of the statutory term maliciously is legal malice: i.e. "wrongfully, intentionally, without legal justification." We reach this conclusion because the essence of this entire subsection is to criminalize the stalker who violates a court order prohibiting the contact with the subject. Section
784.048(4) punishes the person who continues to contact the subject in spite of a court order barring such contact in other words, wrongfully, intentionally and without legal justification....
...broken and pure. He did what he did because he was desperate to have her remain in his life. This strategy was probably his only hope of evading a conviction. It allowed him to exploit the lack of a formal, standardized definition of maliciously in section 784.048(4)....
...(Crim.)
10.13 (§
790.19, shooting or throwing missiles in a dwelling); 12.4 (§
806.13, criminal mischief); 16.1 (§
827.03(2) aggravated child abuse). In the instructions for only two statutes has the Committee failed to define the terms. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 8.7 (§
784.048, aggravated stalking); and 29.12 (§
877.08(2), vending machine tampering or damaging)....
...It is far preferable to have a standardized instruction on this element of the crime used throughout the state than to have ad hoc and differing formulations in each trial where the issue is presented. It strikes us that justice would be better served by a standardized instruction for section 784.048(4) defining maliciously to mean "wrongfully, intentionally, and without legal justification," for that is surely the sense in which the legislature used the term in this statute....
.... court-imposed prohibition of conduct toward the subject person . . ., knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly . . . harasses, . . . another person commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree,. . . ." [e.s.] § 784.048(4), Fla....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 948886, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 3493
...Kevin Touhey appeals a final judgment of injunction for protection against stalking entered in favor of Frank Seda. Mr. Touhey contends that there was insufficient evidence of stalking to support the injunction. We agree and reverse. Newly-enacted section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2012), provides injunctive relief from stalking....
..., which applies to injunctions for protection against repeat violence, sexual violence, and dating violence. 2 Stalking is defined as the “willful[ ], malicious[ ], and repeated[ ] following], harassing], or cyberstalk[ing] [of] another person.” § 784.048(2). “ ‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a *1204 specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(a); see also § 784.048(l)(b) (defining “ ‘[cjourse of conduct’ ” as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose”), (d) (defining “ ‘Myberstalk’ ” as “engag...
...Touhey’s current business relationship was somewhat disputed, it appears that they were in the process of dissolving their business relationship. Thus, Mr. Touhey had a legitimate purpose for attempting to contact Mr. Seda, as Mr. Touhey participated, to some extent, in Mr. Seda’s business. See § 784.048(l)(a); cf....
...Because there was insufficient evidence that Mr. Touhey stalked Mr. Seda, we reverse the injunction for protection against stalking and remand with instructions to the circuit court to dismiss Mr. Seda’s petition. Reversed and remanded. CASANUEVA and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur. . Section 784.0485 became effective October 1, 2012, "creating] a cause of action for an injunction for protection against stalking.” See ch....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2005 WL 1475338
...ject to prosecution. Wyche,
619 So.2d at 237. We do not agree with the Second District's reliance on our decisions in Reynolds v. State,
842 So.2d 46 (Fla.2002); L.B. v. State,
700 So.2d 370 (Fla.1997); or Bouters v. State,
659 So.2d 235 (Fla.1995). Section
784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp.1992), Florida's stalking statute, which was the subject of Bouters, did not have the flaw we find in section
843.085(1)....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 2167866
...Repeat violence is now defined as follows: (b) "Repeat violence" means two incidents of violence or stalking committed by the respondent, one of which must have been within 6 months of the filing of the petition, which are directed against the petitioner.... §
784.046(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis added). As defined in section
784.048, Florida Statutes (2006), stalking requires the State to prove that a person committed repeated acts of following or harassment. Subsection (1) defines "harass" as "to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." §
784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). "Course of conduct" is "a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose." §
784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis added). Subsection (2) then provides that any person who "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows [or] harasses ... another person commits the offense of stalking...." §
784.048(2), Fla....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Albert ,
123 So.3d 663 , 664 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). But the question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to justify imposing an injunction is a question of law that we review de novo. Wills v. Jones ,
213 So.3d 982 , 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). Section
784.0485(1), Florida Statutes (2016), "create[s] a cause of action for an injunction for protection against stalking." The "petition for an injunction for protection against stalking may be filed in the circuit where the petitioner currently or temporarily resides, where the respondent resides, or where the stalking occurred." §
784.0485(1)(f), Fla. Stat. As defined in section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2016), stalking occurs when a person "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person[.]" (Emphasis added.) "Harass" is defined in section
784.048(1)(a) to mean "engag[ing] in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose." (Emphasis added.) In its turn, "course of conduct" is defined as "a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose." §
784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...petition, which are directed against the petitioner or the petitioner's immediate family member.' " Wyandt v. Voccio ,
148 So.3d 543 , 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (emphasis added); see also David v. Textor ,
189 So.3d 871 , 874-75 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (" Section
784.0485, Florida Statutes (2014), allows an injunction against stalking, including cyberstalking....
...s from cases analyzing allegations of stalking in the context of section
784.046, which applies to injunctions for protection against repeat violence, sexual violence, and dating violence.") (footnote omitted). However, nowhere in the definitions of section
784.048 is stalking defined as a multiple of itself. Stalking is defined simply as "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly" following, harassing, or cyberstalking another person-not repeatedly stalking another person. §
784.048(2), Fla. Stat. Equally important, section
784.0485 makes no reference to the provisions of the repeat violence statute; does not mandate "guidance" from the repeat violence provisions; and, independent of the requirements of section
784.046, creates a "cause of action for an injunction for protection against stalking." §
784.0485(1), Fla. Stat.; see M. Kimberly Martyn, Representing Battered Spouses, Florida Dissolution of Marriage , § 21.78 (Fla. Bar CLE 12th ed. 2015) ("Effective October 1, 2012, a fifth type of protective injunction exists for protection against stalking. F.S. §
784.0485(1)....
...ction. Were we to adopt such an interpretation, Appellant could have threatened or followed Appellee four times before the circuit court could issue a protective injunction.") (emphasis in the original). Therefore, based on the statutory language of section 784.0485, and the definitions set forth in section 784.048, we hold that the injunction provisions of section 784.0485 only require the petitioner to prove a single incident of stalking....
...Copeland accused Mr. Pickett of driving past her house on multiple occasions-presumably to prove harassment-the evidence only suggested a single incident of his passing by, which falls short of a malicious "course of conduct" serving "no legitimate purpose." § 784.048(1)(a), (b) & (2), Fla....
...is similar to the current cause[ ] of action for [an] injunction[ ] against repeat violence.' " Id. (quoting Fla. S. Crim. Justice Comm., SB 950 (2012), Staff Analysis (Jan. 24, 2012)). We are not persuaded by the referenced staff analysis to abandon our view that the term "stalking" as used in section 784.0485 should be read in the singular....
...[and] where the [statutory] language is clear, courts need no other aids for determining legislative intent." Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp. ,
908 So.2d 360 , 375-76 (Fla. 2005) (Cantero, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The language is clear in section
784.0485 ; the words of the statute are sufficient....
...Copeland to pull over into a parking lot, Mr. Pickett got out of his vehicle and used his cell phone to videotape her arrest. However, for purposes of the definition of harassment, "course of conduct" "does not include constitutionally protected activity[.]" § 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 272282
...The issue in this case is whether the defendant's conductwhich involved making complaints about the victim to various law enforcement agencies, the Cities of Stuart and Vero Beach, and the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles constituted the crime of aggravated stalking within the meaning of section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2000)....
...It also described conduct that occurred prior to the issuance of the injunction for protection; these activities were relevant, pursuant to the statute, to prove Curry's malicious intent. Based on facts set forth above, the jury convicted Curry of aggravated stalking. The aggravated stalking statute, section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2000), provides: Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat violence pursuant to s....
...r that person's property, knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. Section
784.048(1)(a) defines "harass" as engaging "in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." Section
784.048(1)(b) defines "course of conduct" as a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however *741 short, evidencing a continuity of purpose....
...00), which provides that a statute defining a criminal offense "shall be strictly construed" and that when the statutory "language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused." The stalking statute, section 784.048, was enacted by Chapter 92-208, Laws of Florida....
...nds or former boyfriends, by ensuring that victims did not have to be injured or threatened with death before stopping a stalker's harassment. See James T. Tucker, Note, Stalking the Problems With Stalking Laws: The Effectiveness of Florida Statutes Section 784.048, 45 FLA....
...As a matter of law, such contacts cannot amount to "harassment" within the meaning of the criminal statute. A report to an arm of government, concerning a matter within the purview of the agency's responsibilities, serves a "legitimate purpose" within the meaning of section 784.048(1)(a), regardless of the subjective motivation of the reporter....
...s that compels the finding that no criminal violation occurred in this case. Under the stalking statute, Curry's complaints and reports to governmental entities did not constitute a "course of conduct," an aspect of the definition of harassment. See § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000). Harassing involves engaging in a "course of conduct" directed at a specific person. See § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000). "Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of `course of conduct.'" § 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...One function of the criminal law is to channel conduct into socially acceptable forums for asserting grievances. Where a person has complained to an arm of the government about another, there is not the immediate threat to personal security that arises when an emotional, angry complainant delivers his grievances directly. Section 784.048 should not be read to criminalize conduct which makes the government the intermediary between stalker and stalkee....
...Curry's conduct in this case was clearly knowing, willful, and repeatedand it may even be thought by some as weird and obsessive, with more than a tinge of spite to itbut it did not qualify as a violation of the anti-stalking statute. Viewed objectively, Curry's conduct had a "legitimate purpose" under section 784.048(1)(a); also, it did not amount to a "course of conduct," defined by section 784.048(1)(b), because it excludes "constitutionally protected activity." The trial court erred in denying Curry's motion for judgment of acquittal....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 42 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1224, 2014 WL 443977, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 1436
...and circumstances to form the basis upon which relief is sought. Repeat violence is defined as two incidents of stalking or violence. The act of stalking consists of “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly” following or harassing another person. § 784.048(2). The term “harass” is defined as engaging in a series of acts over a period of time “directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(2)....
...However, the appellees failed to introduce evidence that specific blog posts were being used “to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, images, or language ... directed at a specific per *1092 son, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(d); see also Murphy v....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 2648
...The defendant and his wife were separated. During the pendency of contested divorce proceedings, the circuit court issued a domestic violence injunction after the defendant attempted suicide. On August 18, 1997, the defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated stalking under section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes....
...The Information charges that defendant "did, after an injunction for protection or after any other court imposed prohibition of conduct toward any person or that person's property, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow or harass [his wife] contrary to Florida Statute 784.048(4)." [1] The essence of this charge is that defendant harassed his wife after an injunction of some kind is said to have been entered in their pending dissolution of marriage proceeding....
...An injunction is required by law to be in writing, [2] but in all of this criminal file there is not even a hint as to what this alleged injunction forbade him from doing, much less a copy of any injunction itself. Moreover the essential fact for which an injunction under section 784.048 may issue is repeat violence against a person....
...What he did do during a time of deep depression was attempt to take his own life when he supposedly learned of infidelity by his wife. Whether that is what led to the supposed injunction we will never know in this appeal, for there is no injunction in our record. The State Attorney charged defendant with a violation of section 784.048(4) after the wife called police during the midst of their divorce case and reported what she said were violations of this mythical injunction....
...One such avowal took place on the same day as a hearing in the pending divorce. In any case, nothing stated in the police report, which I gather constitutes the probable cause affidavit, remotely comes close to the letter of what the statute forbids. Section 784.048(1) defines harassment as "a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate *1098 purpose." Apart from a reference to an injunction, there is nothing i...
...his very un Solomonic second guessing of what the judge on the scene realized that simple justice requires. I for one will have no part of this kind of selective "letter-of-the-law" adherence to rules over justice. I therefore dissent. NOTES [1] See § 784.048, Fla....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 256219
...Thomson and Carol A. Licko, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Miami, for respondent. SHAW, Justice. We have for review Pallas v. State,
636 So.2d 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), wherein the district court upheld the constitutionality of Florida's anti-stalking statute, section
784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17860, 2002 WL 31103994
...48] alleging that Malmsberry had violated the terms of his supervised release as follows: On or about February 4, 2001, Shawn Malmsberry committed the offense of Aggravated Stalking [as to Susan Bollinger and Jason Bollinger in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.048(3)] in Osceola County, Florida.......
...A state criminal jury trial against Malmsberry ended on February 5, 2002. Florida v. Shawn Lee Malmsberry, No. CR01-309A, Docket No. 60, Exhibit 1. An Osceola County jury found defendant Malmsberry not guilty of Count One, Aggravated Stalking [of Susan Bollinger] With a Credible Threat [Fla. Stat. § 784.048(3)], as well as not guilty of the lesser included offense of stalking....
...ay revoke supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The quantum of proof is not guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. B. The Elements of the Florida Law Violations The parties agree that the applicable law is as follows. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 784.048(3), any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury, commits the offense of aggravated stalking....
...With regard to the statement to Angelia Lanham, Malmsberry admitted to U.S. Probation Officer Lester that he had made the statement to someone, but that he was just "blowing off steam," and did not mean it. Docket No. 75 at 83, 143. In conclusion, Malmsberry committed Aggravated Stalking in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.048(3) by stalking Susan Bollinger, and her son, Jason Bollinger....
...that Malmsberry violated the conditions of his supervised release. Specifically, Malmsberry 1.) violated the general condition that he not commit another state crime by the Aggravated Stalking of Susan and Jason Bollinger in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.048(3) on or about February 4, 2001; 2.) violated the general condition that he not commit another state crime by committing Battery on Cindy Brown in violation of Fla....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 32 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 113, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 559, 2007 WL 924203
...New language is indicated by underlining, and deleted language is struck through. The instructions as set forth in the appendix shall be effective when this opinion becomes final. It is so ordered. LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ. concur. APPENDIX 8.6 STALKING § 784.048(2), Fla....
...ge by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, *497 directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose. ----------------------------------------- STALKING784.048(2) ----------------------------------------- CATEGORY CATEGORY FLA....
...----------------------------------------- None ----------------------------------------- Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1 ----------------------------------------- Comment This instruction was approved in 1995 [
657 So.2d 1152] and amended in 2007 to include cyberstalking. 8.7(a) AGGRAVATED STALKING §
784.048(3), Fla....
...target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily injury to, a person. Lesser Included Offenses --------------------------------------------------- AGGRAVATED STALKING
784.048(3) --------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY CATEGORY FLA. INS. ONE TWO STAT. NO. --------------------------------------------------- Stalking
784.048(2) 8.6 --------------------------------------------------- Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1 --------------------------------------------------- Assault
784.011 8.1 --------------------------------------------------- Improper exhibition of dangerous weapon
790.10 10.5 --------------------------------------------------- Comment This instruction was approved in 1995 [
657 So.2d 1152] and amended in 2007 to incorporate cyberstalking. 8.7(b) AGGRAVATED STALKING (Injunction Entered) §
784.048(4), Fla....
...The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily injury to, a person. Lesser Included Offenses ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- AGGRAVATED STALKING (Injunction Entered)
784.048(4) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Stalking
784.048(2) 8.6 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Violation...
...e
784.047 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Comment This instruction was adopted in 1995 [
657 So.2d 1152] and amended in 2007. 8.8 AGGRAVATED STALKING (Victim under 16 years of age) §
784.048(5), Fla....
...l emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose. Lesser Included Offenses ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- AGGRAVATED STALKING (Victim under 16 years of age)
784.048(3)(5) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Stalking,
784.048(2) 8.6 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- None Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Violation of injunction for protection against domestic violence
741.31(4) 8.18 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Comment This instruction is based on the text of section§
784.048(5), Florida Statutes Fla....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 183645
..., an aggravated assault *1133 under section
784.021 of the Florida Statutes ("because it was committed with a deadly weapon and/or with an intent to commit a felony, burglary under Florida Statute
810.02"), and stalking and aggravated stalking under section
784.048 of the Florida Statutes....
...The court concluded that Aresty had established stalking under the statute. The Statutes The trial court correctly found that assault and battery did not occur, though pled. Aresty rested his evidence of "violence" and his legal theory upon acts of *1134 "stalking" under sections
784.046 and
784.048 of the Florida Statutes (2007). In this instance, Aresty alleged that Shocki harassed him as defined in paragraph
784.048(1)(a), i.e., engaging in "a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." Paragraph (b) of the same statute further defines "course of conduct" as...
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 466711
...Tringali, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant challenges his conviction and sentence for aggravated stalking. Because the state failed to offer substantial, competent evidence as to every element of the offense, we reverse. The crime of aggravated stalking is defined in section 784.048(3), Florida Statutes (1995), as follows: Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person, and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily harm, commits the offense of aggravated battery....
...and the victim was appellant's wife, Vonda. According to the statute, "`Harasses' means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional *340 distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." § 784.048(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). The statute also furnishes a definition of "course of conduct." "`Course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose." § 784.048(2)....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 544551
...ed in section
741.28 or has reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming the victim of any act of domestic violence." §
741.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). The definition of "domestic violence" includes "any . . . stalking." Section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2005), defines stalking as the "willful[], malicious[], and repeated[] follow[ing], harass[ing], or cyberstalk[ing of] another person." Section
784.048(1)(a) defines "harass" as engaging "in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." "The stalking statute was designed to protect women...
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 562786
...or stalking. §
784.046(1)(b). Springer did not allege an incident of violence against her; thus, for the injunction to have been valid, Poindexter must have committed at least two acts of stalking against her. The definition of "stalking," found in section
784.048(2), is "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ing or] harass [ing] another person." Because Poindexter was incarcerated for life, there was no way he could physically follow Springer; therefore, he must have harassed her to meet the definition of stalking. Turning, then, to the definition of harassment, we note that it means "to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." §
784.048(1)(a)....
...nally protected activity is not included in "course of conduct" in other words, harassment cannot be predicated on constitutionally protected activity; and (2) a "series of acts over a period of time" is required to establish a course of conduct. § 784.048(1)(b)....
...ed letter threatening suit, and (4) the envelope containing three letters to attorneys questioning Springer's ethics. Without a doubt, the first two acts are constitutionally protected activity and therefore exempt from the definition of harassment. § 784.048(1)(b); see also Curry v....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 406587
...ence or stalking committed by the respondent, one of which must have been within 6 months of the filing of the petition, which are directed against the petitioner or the petitioner's immediate family member. (emphasis added) "Stalking" is defined in section 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (1997) as follows: (2) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the offense of stalking.... "Harass" is defined in section 784.048(1)(a) as: (1)(a) "Harass" means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose....
...ublic or semi-public place, may nevertheless rise to the level of invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion. In Bouters v. State,
659 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1995), the Florida Supreme Court concluded that conduct which amounts to stalking under section
784.048 is not protected by the First Amendment: While the First Amendment confers on each citizen a powerful right to express oneself, it gives the [citizen] no boon to jeopardize the health, safety, and rights of others....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 328527
...avated stalking when, in fact, appellant pled no contest to the lesser offense of stalking. [1] We therefore remand for the purpose of correcting this error. We affirm as to the constitutional issue. *1064 Appellant argues that the stalking statute, section 784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
...465 (Fla.Brevard County Ct. June 27, 1993). Based upon the authorities cited and the reasons expressed in Pallas v. State , we reject appellant's constitutional challenge. However, we certify, as being of great public importance, the following question: IS SECTION 784.048, FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 594729
...ant should not be held in indirect criminal contempt [2] for committing several acts alleged to be in violation of the injunction. [3] On October 3, 1993, the state filed an information charging the defendant with aggravated stalking in violation of section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (1993)....
...sault with intent to kill offense did not. Thus, these crimes were different offenses and the subsequent prosecution did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. We now examine the charges before us. Miranda was charged with aggravated stalking under section 784.048(4)....
...rass the Petitioner, either directly or indirectly, at any time or place whatsoever. Respondent shall not enter on or about Petitioner's place of employment located at ... or wherever the Petitioner may be employed in the Tenth Judicial Circuit. [4] Section 784.048, in pertinent part, provides: (1) As used in this section: (a) "Harasses" means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose....
...t had previously been prosecuted for battery and for violation of an injunction for protection, which two offenses were the foundation for the contempt charge. All of the elements of these two charges would be proved in the contempt prosecution. [6] Section 784.048(1)(a). [7] Section 784.048(1)(b).
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 22657989
...Florida's "repeat violence statute," provides that a trial court may issue an injunction when a respondent commits two incidents of violence or an incident of stalking directed against the petitioner or the petitioner's immediate family. Section
784.046(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001). [2] *1204 Stalking is further defined by section
784.048, Florida Statutes (2001), as any person who willfully, maliciously and repeatedly follows or harasses another person. "Harass" means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose. §
784.048, Fla. Stat. (2001). "Course of conduct" is defined as a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. §
784.048, Fla....
...NOTES [1] A term frequently used in Patrick O'Brian's maritime series. PATRICK O'BRIAN. MASTER AND COMMANDER (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., Haddin Craftsmen 1970). The term means simply to pursue without backing off. [2] Florida has recently added cyberstalking as an additional means of stalking. See § 784.048, Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 256217
...Gen., Miami, and Parker D. Thomson and Carol A. Licko, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Miami, for respondent. SHAW, Justice. We have for review State v. Kahles,
644 So.2d 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), wherein the district court held Florida's anti-stalking statute, section
784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 851267
...n which witnesses testified, rather than simply the words reported in the transcript. This is a "thin" case. However, we think the essential elements of the crime charged were sufficiently established to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal. Section
784.048(3) defines aggravated stalking with a credible threat as follows: Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury, commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony in the third degree, punishable as provided in section s
775.082,
775.083, or 785.084, Fla. Stat. In addition, the term "harass" is defined by section
784.048(1)(a) as: To engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose....
...ionally upset by D.L.D.'s behavior. Even if a subjective standard were applicable, a person need not be reduced to tears and hysteria in order to be considered "substantially emotionally distressed." AFFIRMED. COBB and HARRIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.048, Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 177, 2016 WL 64743
...District Court
in Nevada, a suit which continues. Pulse countered by filing a business
tort suit against David in California in June 2014, which eventually was
dismissed.
In July 2014, Textor filed an ex parte petition for protection pursuant
to sections
784.046 and
784.0485, Florida Statutes (2014), which concern
cyberstalking....
...bring David within the
jurisdiction of the court. Because we conclude that the conduct alleged in
the petition is not cyberstalking and the injunction violates the First
Amendment, we reverse and do not further address the issue of
jurisdiction.
Section
784.0485, Florida Statutes (2014), allows an injunction against
stalking, including cyberstalking. The statute must be read in conjunction
with section
784.046(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), which requires at least
two incidences of stalking to obtain an injunction. See Wyandt v. Voccio,
148 So. 3d 543, 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). Additionally, section
784.048
defines stalking, including cyberstalking:
3
(a) “Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed
at a specific person which causes substantial emotional...
...images, or language by or through the use of electronic
mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific
person, causing substantial emotional distress to that
person and serving no legitimate purpose.
§ 784.048(1), Fla....
...“‘[P]rior restraints on speech and
publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on
First Amendment rights.’” Concerned Citizens for Judicial Fairness, Inc. v.
Yacucci,
162 So. 3d 68, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n
v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976)). Section
784.048 itself recognizes the
First Amendment rights of individuals by concluding that a “course of
conduct” for purposes of the statute does not include protected speech.
1The reasonable person standard is applied to a person in the position of the
party, in this case an adult businessman. See Pallas v. State,
656 So. 2d 1358,
1363 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Thus, the standard is case specific.
5
§
784.048(1)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 75001
...On the burglary charge, Marinelli was found guilty of the lesser included offense of trespass in a structure. Marinelli was acquitted of criminal mischief. Marinelli argues on appeal that his two convictions of misdemeanor stalking, for actions occurring over the same period of time, violated double jeopardy. [1] Section 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (1993), describes misdemeanor stalking as the willful, malicious, and repeated following or harassing of another person. Inherent in the concept of stalking is that the actions comprise a "course of conduct," which is defined as "a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose." § 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 1661486
...Rastatter of Glass & Rastatter, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. TAYLOR, J. Appellant, Cary Portner, was charged by information with aggravated stalking, in violation of section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (1999)....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 1133133
...There is nothing in the rule or case law, however, which supports such interpretation. Indeed, aggravated stalking, the charged offense expunged in Anderson, requires a "pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing continuity of purpose." § 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 13212, 2016 WL 4539610
...Just the way you guys are acting in this courtroom; I can feel it. The trial court entered permanent injunctions against both men and explained that the injunctions were “forever.” Klemple now appeals the injunction entered against him and argues that there was insufficient evidence to support it. We agree. Section 784.0485 creates “a cause of action for an injunction for protection against stalking.” § 784.0485(1), Fla. Stat. (2015), Stalking is the offense of “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly following], harassing], or cyber-stalk[ing] another person.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). ' “Harass,” in turn, “means' to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(a); see also § 784.048(l)(b) (defining “course of conduct” as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose”)....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 13735, 2011 WL 3820162
...evidence that his actions amounted to stalking. We agree and reverse. Section
784.046 provides injunctive relief from repeat violence for “two incidents of violence or stalking.” Willful, malicious, and repeated harassment constitutes stalking. §
784.048(2). Mr. Jackson testified *1204 that he received threatening phone calls and text messages from Mr. Jones. However, these particular threats would not have caused a reasonable person substantial emotional distress. See §
784.048(l)(a) (defining “harassment” as “a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose”); Slack v....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2016 WL 1718866, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 6546
...Scott testified that his emails discussed many people within NAPPS or connected to NAPPS and were not directed at Mr. Blum. The trial court granted the injunction without findings or conclusions. The order is a form order with no conditions specific to the facts of this case. 1 *504 Section 784.0485(1), Florida Statutes (2014), provides that “[fjor the purposes of injunctions for protection against stalking under this section, the offense of stalking shall include the offense of cyber-stalking.” Section 784.048(l)(d) defines cyberstalking as “engaging] in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific...
...rson, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.” Harassment is “a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress ... and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(a)....
...In Horowitz v. Horowitz,
160 So.3d 530, 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), this court stated: Mr. Horowitz’s Facebook posts do not meet the statutory definition of cyber-stalking for two reasons. First, the posts were not “directed at a specific person.” §
784.048(l)(d)....
...ng behavior.”). The videos do not constitute evidence of the communication of “words, images, or language ... directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person.” See Chevaldina,
133 So.3d at 1091 -92 (quoting §
784.048(l)(d))....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 515305
...Gen., Miami, for appellant. James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Deborah K. Brueckheimer, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellees. PER CURIAM. Appellant, State of Florida, appeals the trial court order declaring Florida's Stalking Statute, section 784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
...We agree with our colleagues of the other District Courts of Appeal and find the challenged statute constitutional and, therefore, reverse and remand. However, we certify, as being of great public importance, the same question certified in Varney: IS SECTION 784.048, FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 313697
...046(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2000). There was no incident of violence other than the one that occurred on April 24. The events of April 26 do not constitute "violence" as defined by section
784.046(1)(a); there was no stalking as the term is used in section
784.048, Florida Statutes (2000)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1996 WL 368409
...Nielan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant. James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Susan A. Fagan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. COBB, Judge. The state appeals from an order granting a motion to dismiss a charge of aggravated stalking, section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes, on grounds that the prosecution is barred by double jeopardy principles....
...The defendant, John Francis Jones, was charged in Circuit Court Case No. 95-978 by amended information filed on July 21, 1995 with one count of aggravated stalking in that he: between the 1st day of May, 1995 and the 16th day of May, 1995, in said County and State, did, in violation of Florida Statute
784.048(4), knowingly, willfully, maliciously and repeatedly follow or harass Carol Jones after an injunction for protection under Florida Statute
741.30 had been duly issued and served. Meanwhile, in Circuit Court Case No. 95-852, the defendant had been charged by information filed on May 24, 1995 with aggravated stalking in that he: on the 30th day of April, 1995, in said County and State, did, in violation of Florida Statute
784.048(4), knowingly, willfully, maliciously and repeatedly follow or harass Carol Jones after an injunction for protection under Florida Statute
741.30 had been duly issued and served....
...The defendant, relying on Dell'Orfano v. State,
616 So.2d 33 (Fla.1993) claimed that aggravated stalking is a continuing crime and that the offense charged should have been brought in a single prosecution. The trial court agreed and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. We reverse. Section
784.048(4), Florida Statutes defines "aggravated stalking": *1338 Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat violence pursuant to s....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 2141830
...At that hearing, testimony was received from both Ms. Melcher and Mr. Smith. Without further discussion, we affirm the trial court's determination that Mr. Smith's statements to Ms. Melcher on August 5, 2006, constituted harassment and qualified as an act of stalking as defined in section 784.048(2)....
...r. Smith was no longer on the premises. We note that at the hearing Ms. Melcher testified that Mr. Smith pointed his finger at her and shook his head only one time. This act did not constitute stalking because the statute requires repeated acts. See § 784.048(2)....
...He was loud and just short of being Disorderly." Mr. Smith had no interaction with Ms. Melcher during this event. Because Mr. Smith was interacting with a police officer rather than Ms. Melcher, his action must meet the definition of aggravated harassment as set forth in section 784.048(3), in order to be considered an act of violence directed toward Ms. Melcher. Section 784.048(3) states: Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person, and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury of the pe...
...NOTES [1] The petition also included allegations concerning actions of Mr. Smith on September 11, 2006, at Ms. Melcher's place of employment. In its oral ruling, the trial court did not discuss these actions and apparently concluded the acts did not support a finding that an incident of violence had occurred. [2] Section 784.048(2) defines stalking: "Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking. . . ." See also § 784.048(1)(a): "`Harass' means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose."
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 634149
...Because a double jeopardy violation constitutes fundamental error, it may be raised for the first time on appeal. Marinelli v. State,
706 So.2d 1374, 1375 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). The State charged Eichelberger with three counts of aggravated stalking pursuant to section
784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2002)....
...Each count alleged that Eichelberger used a different form of contact or attempted contact to stalk the victim. Count one alleged that he used the telephone, count two alleged that he used mail or written correspondence, *360 and count three alleged that he came within five hundred feet of the victim's residence. Section 784.048(4) provides as follows: Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat violence pursuant to s....
...r that person's property, knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. Section
784.048(1)(a) defines the term "harass" as engaging "in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." Section
784.048(1)(b) defines the term "course of conduct" as "a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose," excluding constitutionally protected activity....
...We noted that "[i]nherent in the concept of stalking is that the actions comprise a `course of conduct,' which is defined as `a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose."' Id. (quoting § 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2011 WL 1501049
...or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death.” §
784.046(l)(a), Fla. Stat. Stalking has been interpreted to mean “repeated acts of following or harassment.” Lukacs v. Luton,
982 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see also §
784.048(2), Fla....
...arasses another person” commits the crime of stalking). Harassment is defined as a series of acts over a period of time “directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a); Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 3930370, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 15112
...“Do *479 mestic violence” under section
741.28(2), Florida Statutes (2011), includes the offense of “stalking” as one of the enumerated forms of domestic violence, which is the only offense that could possibly apply to the facts at bar. That term, as used in section
784.048, Florida Statutes (2011), includes willful, malicious, and repeated harassment, and defines “harass” in sub-paragraph (l)(a) as “to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” Stalking also includes cyber-stalking, defined in section
784.048(l)(d) as the communication of “words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legi...
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 1891323, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 7355
...nst the petitioner or petitioner’s immediate family member.” §
784.046(l)(b). A person is guilty of “stalking” for purposes of this statute if he “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person.” §
784.048(2). And “harass” is defined as “to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(l)(a). A “course of conduct” is a *717 “pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.” §
784.048(l)(b)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 1452169
...would either cause or induce the witness to testify untruthfully or not to testify at all. It is the nature of the contact between the defendant and the victim that distinguishes the crime of tampering with a witness from the crime of stalking under section 784.048, Florida Statutes (2005)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 1828070
...Section
784.046 provides that a person may obtain an injunction for protection in cases involving repeat violence. Repeat violence is defined as two incidents of stalking or violence. [1] §
784.046(1). A person commits the act of stalking when they "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly" follow or harass another person. §
784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). The term "harass" is *426 defined in section
784.048(1) as engaging in a series of acts over a period of time "directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." In determining if an incident causes substantial emot...
...of stalking, two incidents of which are required for issuance of an injunction for repeat violence. The definition of stalking requires that a person "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow [ ], harass [ ], or cyberstalk [ ] another person." § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). Kling does not allege that he was followed or cyberstalked by Slack. The definition of harass requires that a person engage in a course of conduct involving a series of acts over a period of time. § 784.048(1)(a), (b)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 2783463, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 9394
...Thomas did testify that Alderman had “stalked” her, and stalking is considered “violence” for purposes of section
784.046. See §
784.046(l)(a). But stalking occurs when a person “'willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyber-stalks another person.” §
784.048(2). “ ‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(l)(a)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 4147113
...nal trier of fact could find that the elements of the crime have been established beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain the conviction. See Pagan v. State,
830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002). The crime of stalking is defined in section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2007), as follows: Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly ......
...another person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree.... "`Harass' means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such a person and serves no legitimate purpose." § 784.048(1)(a), Fla....
...of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of `course of conduct.' Such constitutionally protected activity includes *654 picketing or other organized protests." § 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...We recognize that offensive speech, alone, does not subject the speaker to criminal sanctions. Here, T.B. does not argue that his conduct is constitutionally protected or served a legitimate purpose. However, we note our supreme court's holding that conduct which amounts to stalking under section 784.048"whether by word or deed"is not protected by the First Amendment....
...Rather, [t]he statute proscribes a particular type of criminal conduct defined at length in the statute. The conduct must be willful, malicious and repeated, and form "a course of conduct which would "cause[] substantial emotional distress" in a reasonable person in the same position as the victim ... See § 784.048, Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 637683
...Ann Lyman Steffens, Clearwater, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Brenda S. Taylor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See State v. Tremmel,
644 So.2d 102 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). As in Tremmel, we certify the following question: IS SECTION
784.048, FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 2697, 2011 WL 722605
...sault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, or false imprisonment." §
784.046(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). "Stalking" occurs when a person "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person." §
784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). "Harassment" is "a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress . . . and serves no legitimate purpose." §
784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). "Cyberstalking" entails harassment by means of electronic communications. See §
784.048(1)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 133942
...NOTES [1] The record indicates that Terry was interviewed by several news organizations culminating, perhaps, with a paid appearance on the television program "Inside Edition." The events were publicized as an instance of "stalking," an activity which has subsequently become the focus of a criminal statute. § 784.048, Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 328526
...The state concedes that this scoring was improper and recommends a remand on this point. We note that the sentence is also improper as the special condition contravenes case law. See, State v. Davis,
630 So.2d 1059 (Fla. 1994). We find the remaining issue in this appeal to be without merit. Appellant argues that section
784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
...State,
638 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) citing Pallas v. State,
636 So.2d 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), and other decisions. Accordingly, we affirm on this issue, and, as we did in Varney, certify as being of great public importance, the following question: IS SECTION
784.048, FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 13999, 2010 WL 3655514
...which are directed against the petitioner or the petitioner's immediate family member." §
784.046(1)(b). A person commits the act of stalking when the person "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person." §
784.048(2). The statute defines "harass" as "to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." §
784.048(1)(a). A "course of conduct" is a "pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose." §
784.048(1)(b)....
...Cordeiro and his failure to make them have respect for her are not acts of violence, stalking, or harassment within the statutory definition. Furthermore, a single incident would not support a finding of harassment which requires a course of conduct comprised of a series of acts. See §
784.048(1)(a), (b); Poindexter,
898 So.2d at 207....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...And she asked the trial court to
have her own stalking petition granted against Mr. Fowlkes. In
her view, Mr. Fowlkes and others were conspiring against her.
“A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows,
harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of
stalking.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. “Harass” means “to engage in a
course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes
substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no
legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 3040291
...Tarpley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. SILBERMAN, Judge. Keith Coverdale appeals his judgment and sentence for aggravated stalking. We reverse and remand for a new trial. The State charged Coverdale with aggravated stalking in violation of section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2003), allegedly occurring on or between May 2, 2003, and March 25, 2004....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida
...fter his arrest. Id. at 115-16. Despite Benoit's protestations of innocence, the officers arrested him for: (1) willfully violating the Injunction in violation of Florida Statute section
741.31(4)(a)(5) ; (2) stalking in violation of Florida Statute section
784.048(2) ; and (3) violating the terms of his probation in violation of Florida Statute section
948.06....
...by [t]elephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with the petitioner directly or indirectly, unless the injunction specifically allows indirect contract through a third party[,] commits a misdemeanor of the first degree." See id. §
741.31(4)(a)(5). Further, Florida Statute section
784.048 provides that "[a] person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses 17 , or cyberstalks 18 another person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree." See id. §
784.048....
...However, a plaintiff must demonstrate the absence of probable cause in order to prevail on a false arrest claim under Section 1983. Id. " 'Harass' means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose." See Fla. Stat. § 784.048 (1)(a)....
...be communicated, words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose." See Fla. Stat. § 784.048 (1)(d). " 'Course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose." Id. § 784.048(1)(b)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 1358974
...maliciously and repeatedly follow or harass ... Sylvia Seraphin and made a credible threat with the intent to place Sylvia Seraphin in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury...." This charge tracks the statutory definition of aggravated stalking. § 784.048(3), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 6850, 2015 WL 2129218
...5th DCA 2015), this court recently summarized the law applicable to a trial court’s final judgment of injunction for protection against stalking as follows: A person commits the act of stalking by “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly following] harassing], or cyber-stalk[ing] another person.... ” See § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). “‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” Id. § 784.048(l)(a). “ ‘Course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.” Id. § 784.048(l)(b); see also Lukacs v....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 111341
...Koshel contends that the trial court erred in holding that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(m), a speedy trial provision, was inapplicable to Koshel's case based on his pre-trial waiver of speedy trial. We affirm. Koshel was charged with two counts of aggravated stalking pursuant to section 784.048, Florida Statutes (1993)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 11101, 2010 WL 2976936
...party frequently called law enforcement officers to complain about the other party merely for harassment purposes. However, the crime of "harassment" does not include filing reports and complaints to law enforcement agencies as a matter of law under section 784.048(1)(b), Florida Statutes, because constitutionally protected activities such as petitioning the government for redress are exempted from the definition. "A report to an arm of government, concerning a matter within the purview of the agency's responsibilities, serves a `legitimate purpose' within the meaning of section 784.048(1)(a), regardless of the subjective motivation of the reporter." Curry v....
...Springer,
898 So.2d 204 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Because reporting a violation of law or an existing injunction, even with malicious intent towards the supposed violator, does not constitute harassment, it also cannot qualify as stalking for purposes of section
784.048, or domestic violence under section
741.28, Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 480, 2015 WL 196210
...Gerhardt’s petition for injunction for protection against stalking followed, and the nonjury trial was held on May 14, 2014. A person commits the act of stalking by “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ing] harassing], or cyber-stalkfing] another person.... ” See § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). “ ‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” Id. § 784.048(1)(a). ‘“Course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.” Id. § 784.048(1)(b); see also Lukacs v....
...2d DCA 2007) (citing Ravitch v. Whelan,
851 So.2d 271, 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)). We have no trouble concluding that the April 22, 2014 e-mail from Laserinko to Gerhardt would cause a reasonable person to suffer the “substantial, emotional distress” required by section
784.048....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 43521
...felony. Black relied upon aggravated stalking as the forcible felony to justify Adams' use of deadly force in self-defense. [1] Feltz's conduct prior to the shooting and at the time of the event could be found to be aggravated stalking as defined in section 784.048(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2013 WL 6305187
...The statute on which this part of the instruction is based does not explicitly refer to “lewd or lascivious” behavior. Instead, the statute simply refers to section
800.04, Florida Statutes, which covers crimes committed in the presence of a minor under the age of 16. See §
784.048(7), Fla....
...784.021 (lYa) is charged
790.10 10.5 Assault
784.011 8.1 Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1 Improper Exhibition of dangerous weapons or ■firearms 796A0 m-5 Discharging firearms in public
790.15 10.6 Comment This instruction was approved in 1981 and amended in 2013. 8.6 STALKING §
784.048(2), Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Stalking, the State must prove the following element beyond a reasonable doubt: (Defendant) willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly [followed] [harassed] [or] [cyberstalked] (victim). Definitions. §
784.048(l)(a), Fla. Stat. “Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which that causes substantial emotional distress to that in such person and serves no legitimate purpose. §
784.048(l)(b), Fla....
...raiijj CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. None Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1 *760 Comment This instruction was approved in 1995 [
657 So.2d 1152 ] and amended in 2007 [
953 So.2d 495 ] to include cyberstalking and 2013. 8.7(a) AGGRAVATED STALKING §
784.048(3), Fla....
...Give if applicable. The present incarceration of the person making the threat is not a bar to prosecution. Lesser Included Offenses *761 sig-sgrTsrsTsiTiirTBSiBr ¡■¡if ifi-ilil 1 :!|É iiÉli-, ípjfípjp CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. Stalking
784.048(2) 8.6 Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1 Assault
784.011 8.1 Improper exhibition of dangerous weapon
790.10 10.5 Comment This instruction was approved in 1995 [
657 So.2d 1152 ] and amended in 2007 [
953 So.2d 495 ], to incorporate cyber-stalking and 2013 to incorporate the change in law effective October 1, 2012, 8.7(b) AGGRAVATED STALKING (Injunction Entered) §
784.048(4), Fla....
...e purpose. “Maliciously” means wrongfully, intentionally, and without legal justification or excuse. Lesser Included Offenses *762 ijai (fnj uhcüübHEhíeréd) -#w4ií78>4g;4)^8^4]|i¡:W CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. Stalking
784.048(2) 8.6 Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1 Violation of injunction for protection against domestic violence
741.31(4) 8.16 Violation of injunction for protection against repeat, sexual, or dating violence
784.047 8.19 Violation of injunction for protection against stalking or cvherstalkine
784.0487(41 8.24 Comments See Seese v....
...4th DCA 2007), for the definition of maliciously. This instruction was adopted in 1995 [
657 So.2d 1152 ] and was amended in 2007 [
953 So.2d 495 ], and 2008 [
995 So.2d 476 ], and 2013. 8.88.7(c) AGGRAVATED STALKING (Victim under 16 years of age) §
784.048(5), Fla....
...at person and serving no legitimate purpose. Lesser Included Offenses *763 sítfMjire&’li Asfiy , ft*®™.■¡is,!wi «mb miM "spa, wrak sawuBOT fiteli pjp E|i|i f¡ls:i|,'®l»'¥iíiii CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. Stalking
784.048(2) 8.6 Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1 Violation of injunction for protection against domestic violence
741.31(4) 8.18 Violation of injunction for protection against repeat, sexual, or dating violence
784.047 8.19 Violation of injunction for protection against stalking or cvberslalking
784.0487(4) 8.24 Comment This instruction is based on-the-text-of section-
784.048(5)j ■ -Florida ■ Statutes (1997), and generally patterned after-the-standard instructions — on—stalking ■■ -and aggravated stalking-.- This instruction was adopted in 2000 [
765 So.2d 692 ] and amended in 2007 [
958 So.2d 4951 to incorporate cyber-stalking, and 2013. 8.7(d) AGGRAVATED STALKING (Defendant previously sentenced for sex offense and was prohibited from contacting victim) §
784.048(7), Fla....
...of dangerous weapons or firearms 7-9040 444 Discharging firearms in public
790.15 10.6 Comment This instruction was adopted in 1997 [
697 So.2d 84 ] and amended in 2013. 8.24 VIOLATION OF INJUNCTION FOR PROTECTION AGAINST [STALKING] [CYBERSTALKING] §
784.0487(4), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 706170
...Public Defender, Clearwater, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Dell H. Edwards, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. RYDER, Acting Chief Judge. Robert Perez challenges the trial court's order upholding the constitutionality of section 784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
...1st DCA 1994); Pallas v. State,
636 So.2d 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Bouters v. State,
634 So.2d 246 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), review granted,
640 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 1994). We affirm, but certify, as being of great public importance, the following question: IS SECTION
784.048, FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 242388
...Gen., Miami, for respondent. SHAW, Justice. We have for review State v. Koshel,
636 So.2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA), wherein the district court relied on Bouters v. State,
634 So.2d 246 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), to reverse a trial court order finding Florida's stalking statute, §
784.048, Fla....
...KOGAN, Justice, specially concurring. I concur subject to the reservations I expressed in Bouters v. State,
659 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1995) (Kogan, J., specially concurring), and those stated below. While I have no quarrel with the majority's holding as to subsection
784.048(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...ion Rescue v. Women's Health Center,
626 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Madsen v. Women's Health Center, ___ U.S. ___,
114 S.Ct. 2516,
129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994). Nevertheless, it is obvious that the analysis of subsections
784.048(3) and (4) do not necessarily apply to subsection
784.048(2)....
...It is doubtful whether the latter statute is a species of assault, and the bare "follow-or-harass" requirement certainly is not an indirect contempt. For these reasons, I do not view the majority opinion here or in Bouters as disposing of whatever constitutional issues surround subsection 784.048(2)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 4465521, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 16465
...rtment together and he had never repaid the money to her. Paquette contends that Alter’s text messages constituted stalking. We disagree. A person is guilty of stalking when he or she maliciously, willfully, and repeatedly harasses another person. § 784.048(2). Harassment is defined as engaging “in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(a)....
...Here, Alter testified that the text messages concerned a loan she had made to Paquette, and Paquette testified that several messages asked him to repay money. As in Ravitch , because Alter testified that she was seeking the repayment of a loan, it cannot be said that the text messages served “no legitimate purpose.” See § 784.048(l)(a)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1999 WL 731668
...He did not give proper attention to this document prior to affixing his signature. (d) On June 6, 1998, a second affidavit was executed by Mr. Brown, again charging Ms. Brown with harassing *962 communications in violation of Section
365.16, and stalking in violation of Section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 31373812
...We conclude the circuit court applied the correct law [1] to determine that stalking is a continuing course of conduct crime for which the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the alleged course of conduct ended. Mr. Rodriguez-Cayro was charged on September 27, 2000, with misdemeanor stalking pursuant to section 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2000), for events occurring between December 1, 1995, and September 26, 2000....
...Section
775.15(4), Florida Statutes (2000), provides in relevant part that "[a]n offense is committed either when every element has occurred or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant's complicity therein is terminated." Section
784.048, Florida Statutes (2000), the statute prohibiting stalking, evinces a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct. Section
784.048(2) states that "[a]ny person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the offense of stalking." Moreover, the definition of "harass" in section
784.048(1)(a) states: "To engage in the course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." Section
784.048(1)(b) defines "course of conduct" as "a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose." [2] Because the legislature has clearly defined stalking as a "continuing course of conduct" crime, see Toussie v....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 31295183
...Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. This is a timely appeal of the denial of a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The appellant pled nolo contendere to aggravated stalking under section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (1999), in exchange for a sentence of 31.5 months of incarceration....
...2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The appellant's allegations fulfill both prongs. First, he demonstrated that his counsel's performance was deficient by alleging that counsel told him the offense was a second-degree felony even though aggravated stalking under section
784.048(4) is a third-degree felony, and his maximum exposure was thus five years, rather than 15 years....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 2724089
...Because the trial court's finding that appellant stalked and harassed appellee's minor child by repeatedly engaging in certain acts is not supported by competent, substantial evidence, the permanent injunction against repeat violence is REVERSED. See § 784.048(2), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
section
741.28(2). Stalking is defined under section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2017), as "willfully
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 645484
...Neimand, Asst. Atty. Gen., Parker D. Thomson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Carol A. Licko, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction and sentence for aggravated stalking. Appellant argues that section 784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
...State,
636 So.2d 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)), and Gilbert v. State,
639 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Accordingly, we affirm on this issue, and, as we did in Varney and Gilbert, certify as *1036 being of great public importance, the following question: IS SECTION
784.048, FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2015 WL 2089078
...conduct
towards Appellee Virginia Robertson, his ex-wife. Appellant argues there
was not sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings. We
disagree with Appellant’s arguments and, accordingly, affirm the entry of
the injunction.
Section 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2013), criminalizes “[a] person
who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks
another person.” To harass, is “to engage in a course of conduct directed
at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that
person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat
(2013). This “course of conduct” includes “a series of acts over a period of
time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.” §
784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...And, a third
night. These repeated actions are sufficient to cause emotional distress in
a reasonable person.
There was competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that Appellant had stalked Appellee under the terms of section
784.048, Florida Statutes (2013)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 1103692
...We reject Cazeau's contention that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal. We agree, though, that the jury instructions given were inadequate, requiring reversal, and we write to address this issue. Cazeau was charged with aggravated stalking in violation of section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides as follows: Any person who, after an injunction for protection against ......
...re to serve the injunction on the defendant. We take this opportunity to clarify that the case does not stand for the proposition that the State need not prove that the defendant had knowledge of the injunction in order to sustain a conviction under section 784.048(4)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
..._____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Columbia County.
Paul S. Bryan, Judge.
May 13, 2019
PER CURIAM.
We reverse the final judgment of injunction for protection
against stalking. See § 784.0485(1), Fla. Stat. (creating stalking
injunction). Stalking requires that a person “willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks
another person.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. Harass means to “engage
in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes
substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no
legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla....
...we do, we cannot
conclude that the alleged incidents rise to the level of justifying
an injunction against stalking. To justify this kind of injunction,
the conduct must be bad enough to produce substantial emotional
distress in a reasonable person. § 784.048(1)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 399630
...er sister in the same complex. The evidence further showed that Barnes was weeping and upset by his presence, and that she was afraid for her safety and that of her children. Appellant was convicted under the following provision of the stalking law, section 784.048, Florida Statutes (1995), which states: *1260 (4) Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat violence pursuant to s....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Paulson looking at her utility meters
and watching her sunbathe was sufficient for the issuance of an
injunction for protection against stalking. The court issued a
judgment of injunction to be in effect for one year. 1
Analysis
Section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2016), provides for an
injunction for protection against stalking. Stalking occurs when a
person “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or
cyberstalks another person.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). To
“harass” means “to engage in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that
person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla.
Stat. A “course of conduct” is “a pattern of conduct composed of a
series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences
a continuity of purpose.” § 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...the trial
court in teasing out a thread of truth from a jumbled patchwork of
conflicting narrative,” Pickett,
236 So. 3d at 1146, we agree with
Mr. Paulson.
2 See e.g., David v. Textor,
189 So. 3d 871, 874-75 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2016) (stating section
784.0485 “must be read in conjunction
with section
784.046(1)(b)”); Richards v. Gonzalez,
178 So. 3d 451,
453 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“[T]o define ‘repeated following,
harassing, or cyberstalking,’ guidance can be derived from section
784.046.”); Wyandt v. Voccio,
148 So. 3d 543, 544 (Fla. 2d DCA
2014) (“We analyze [section
784.0485] with guidance from section
784.046.”); Touhey v....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 554677
...In doing so, it analyzed the definition *805 of "harasses" which the statute defined as "to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." Bouters,
659 So.2d at 238 (quoting §
784.048, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 1557, 2009 WL 485024
...A special instruction the trial court added to the (then) standard instruction effectively read an element out of the statutory definition, appellant maintains, and we agree. We reverse the aggravated stalking conviction and sentence on that basis. Mr. Miller was charged with aggravated stalking in violation of section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2007), which provides, in relevant part: Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat violence, sexual violence, or dating violence pursuant to s....
...The statute requires more than simple disregard of an injunction. The statute does contemplate “disregard” in the sense of acting knowingly and willfully, despite a judicial prohibition, but it also contemplates “malicious” harassment. See § 784.048(4), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 461391
...that "simple" stalking and aggravated stalking each contain one element that the other does not and so are different under the Blockburger test. An analysis of the offenses under Blockburger reveals that appellant is correct. Stalking, as defined in section 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2002), is committed when a person "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person." Aggravated stalking, as defined by section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2002), is committed by "[a]ny person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat violence or dating violence pursuant to s....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 706166
...Gen., Tallahassee, and Michael J. Neimand, Miami, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Parker D. Thomas and Carol A. Licko, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Miami, for appellee. RYDER, Acting Chief Judge. Terry Michael Huffine challenges the trial court's order upholding the constitutionality of section 784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
...1st DCA 1994); Pallas v. State,
636 So.2d 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Bouters v. State,
634 So.2d 246 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), review granted,
640 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 1994). We affirm, but certify, as being of great public importance, the following question: IS SECTION
784.048, FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 3613775
...stalking, battery, and resisting without violence. Without discussion, we affirm the convictions for aggravated assault with a firearm, simple assault, battery and resisting arrest without violence. As to the aggravated stalking charge, we reverse. Section 784.048, Florida Statutes (2003), defines aggravated stalking as conduct by one who "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses [1] ....
...n "some occasions with a gun in his hand, on another occasion with a knife in his hand, and other instances with no weapon currently in his possession." The State's reliance on armed threats is misplaced because they cannot constitute stalking under section 784.048....
...Fort lived together and had a ten year relationship that included two children. NOTES [1] "Harass" means "a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." § 784.048(1)(a). "Course of Conduct" means "a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose." § 784.048(1)(b). [2] "Credible threat" is a "threat made with the intent to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety . . . against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily injury to, a person." § 784.048(1)(c)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 12304, 2011 WL 3359610
...guilty of aggravated stalking and making harassing telephone calls, and the subsequent orders finding him guilty of violating his probation are to be vacated and a new *754 adjudicatory hearing is to be held. 5 REVERSED and REMANDED. SAWAYA and TORPY, JJ., concur. . § 784.048(5), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 21766249
...must have been within 6 months of the filing of the petition." See §
784.046(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002). Violence means "any assault, battery, sexual battery, or stalking by a person against any other person." See §
784.046(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). Section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that anyone who "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person" commits the crime of stalking. The term "harass" is defined as a series of acts over a period of time "directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." See §
784.048(1)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2016 WL 1660617, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 6299
...Not all reports are valid; but many are for valid
reasons. Thus, it bears noting that the statutory definition of harassment is
“engag[ing] in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes
substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.”
§ 784.048(1)(a), Fla....
...e an amazing job being on
1
The definition of “domestic violence” includes “stalking,” section
741.28, Florida
Statutes, which is defined elsewhere as “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly . . .
harass[ing] . . . another person.” See §
784.048(3), Fla. Stat. Harassment is
“engag[ing] in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes
substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” Id.
§
784.048(1)(a). A “course of conduct” is defined as a “series of acts over a period
of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.” Id.
§
784.048(1)(b).
7
guard over this young lady who is now 37 years old, for all those years wanting
and doing what they could to protect Ms....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 242402
...Atty. Gen., and Parker D. Thomson and Carol A. Licko, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Miami, for respondent. SHAW, Justice. We have for review Varney v. State,
638 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), wherein the district court certified the following question: Is section
784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
...It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., concur. KOGAN, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs. KOGAN, Justice, dissenting. The certified question is overbroad because it asks this Court to address the entirety of section
784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992), when the only subsection at issue here is subsection
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992). In other words, Varney was convicted of "simple stalking," not aggravated stalking or stalking in violation of an injunction for protection. Varney v. State,
638 So.2d 1063, 1063 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see §§
784.048(2-4), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1992). I thus would rephrase the question as follows: Is subsection
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...oral argument, and I would order new *235 briefing and place the case on the oral argument calendar. ANSTEAD, J., concurs. NOTES [1] The State begins its brief with the following remark: "The strict issue before the Court is the constitutionality of Section 784.048(3), Florida Statutes as applied to the action of Petitioner." This statement is reiterated elsewhere in the brief....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 242390
...Gen., Miami, and Parker D. Thomson and Carol A. Licko, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Miami, for respondent. SHAW, Justice. We have for review Gilbert v. State,
639 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), wherein the district court certified the following question: Is section
784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
...It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. KOGAN, J., concurs specially with an opinion. KOGAN, Justice, specially concurring. The certified question is overbroad because the sole statute at issue here is subsection 784.048(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992). For that reason, I would rephrase the question as follows: Is subsection 784.048(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 1827447
...al authorities as to preclude a conviction of Mr. Menefee for his harassing and threatening conduct, and we, therefore, affirm. Mr. Menefee was charged by amended information with aggravated stalking with credible threat in violation of section *571 784.048(3), Florida Statutes (2004)....
...sible for the enforcement of their own criminal laws. We turn now to the policy and object of the state statute that Mr. Menefee was convicted of violating to determine whether enforcement of it violates the doctrines of implied conflict preemption. Section 784.048, Florida Statutes, was enacted "to protect victims, their families and friends from the needless torment" caused by the "knowing and willful course of conduct by any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury. . . ." 1992 Fl. ALS 208; 1992 Fla. Laws ch. 208; 1992 Fla. HB 97. More specifically, section 784.048(3), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that: Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person, and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of...
...unishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. "Harass" is defined as "means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." §
784.048(1)(a), Fla....
...Additionally, a "credible threat" is "a threat made with the intent to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily injury to, a person." See § 784.048(1)(c), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 5589, 2015 WL 1740907
...unction for protection against
stalking entered in favor of Tara Michelle Kersey. Because competent, substantial
evidence does not support the required two incidents of stalking for injunctive relief, we
reverse the final judgment.
Section
784.0485, Florida Statutes (2013), provides for an injunction
against stalking, including cyberstalking, and that statute is analyzed with guidance from
the statute governing injunctions against repeat violence, section
784.046....
...t of stalking by competent, substantial
evidence. See Touhey v. Seda,
133 So. 3d 1203, 1204 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
Stalking occurs when a person "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person." §
784.048(2). " 'Harass' means to
engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial
emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose." §
784.048(1)(a).
Cyberstalking involves a course of conduct through "electronic mail or electronic
communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to
that person and serving no legitimate purpose." §
784.048(1)(d)....
...ffair Kersey had with Leach's
husband, Dr. Leach. After Leach learned of the affair, she contacted Kersey by phone
and by messages and "friend" requests on Facebook. The evidence does not show that
these contacts "serve[d] no legitimate purpose." §
784.048(1)(a), (d); see also Alter v.
-2-
Paquette,
98 So. 3d 218, 220 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (stating that when text messages
sought "repayment of a loan, it cannot be said that the text messages served 'no
legitimate purpose' " (quoting §
784.048(1)(a)))....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 39 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 627, 2014 Fla. LEXIS 3068, 2014 WL 5285851
...lascivious molestation of a person older than twelve but younger than sixteen by an
offender over the age of eighteen under section
800.04(5)(c)2., Florida Statutes
(2006); and (2) aggravated stalking of a minor under sixteen years of age under
section
784.048(5), Florida Statutes (2006)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 322255
...Gen., Tampa, for appellant. James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Deborah K. Brueckheimer, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The State of Florida appeals the trial court's order granting appellee's motion to dismiss in which it determined that section 784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 1758985, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 7947
...riminal episode. Robinson v. State,
829 So.2d 984, 985 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The state’s amended information against Preston charged burglary with battery, and two counts of aggravated stalking, one based upon a violation of court order contrary to section
784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2009), and one based upon making a credible threat contrary to section
784.048(3), Florida Statutes (2009)....
...ictims. Appellant was convicted of simple battery which was enhanced to a felony because of a prior misdemeanor battery. He qualified as a prison releasee reoffender and was sentenced to five years each on the three convictions to run consecutively. Section 784.048(1) of the stalking statute contains the definitions of “harass,” “course of conduct,” and “credible threat.” “Harass” means engaging “in a course of *994 conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(a). “Course of conduct” is “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.” § 784.048(l)(b). A “credible threat” is “a threat made with the intent to cause the person who is a target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily injury to, a person.” § 784.048(l)(c). Section 784.048(3) provides in pertinent part: (3) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses or cyberstalks another person and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury of the person or the person’s child, sibling, spouse, parent, or dependent commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree ... Section 784.048(4) provides in pertinent part: (4) Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat violence, sexual violence, or dating -violence pursuant to s....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...testified *1134 that she felt as if she was being stalked, D.A.S.'s single appearance on her front porch, albeit uninvited, did not suffice. Stalking occurs when a person "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person." § 784.048(2) (emphasis added); see Smith v....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2015 WL 968481
...ition, which are directed against the petitioner or the petitioner’s immediate family member.” §
784.046(l)(b). A person is guilty of stalking if he “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyber-stalks another person.” §
784.048(2). “Harass” is defined as “to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(1)(a). A “course of conduct” is a “pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.” §
784.048(l)(b)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...touches or strikes another person against the will of the other” or “[i]ntentionally
causes bodily harm to another person.” §
784.03(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Stalking occurs
when a person “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or
cyberstalks another person.” §
784.048(2), Fla. Stat. “Harass” means “to engage
in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial
emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(1)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 21458675
...lating the permanent injunction must be reversed. We do not conclude, however, that failure to serve appellant with the permanent injunction dooms his conviction for aggravated stalking. Appellant was convicted of aggravated stalking in violation of section 784.048(4)....
...able as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. Under the statute, "`harass' means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." §
784.048(1)(a)....
...nd any other matters determined at the hearing. [6] Accordingly, we affirm denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal as to the aggravated stalking charge. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED. HAZOURI and MAY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 784.048(4), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49482, 2008 WL 2557381
...However, unlike the terms "legitimate business" and "annoy," which are not defined in any of Florida's penal statutes, the term "harassment" is defined as "engag[ing] in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." § 784.048( l )(a), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 31 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 505, 2006 Fla. LEXIS 1475
who is being detained in a prison, jail, etc.); §
784.048, Fla. Stat. (2005) (stalking), or the concept
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 338, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 1139, 1995 WL 410690
testimony and not for any other purpose. STALKING F.S.
784.048(2) Before you can find the defendant guilty
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 91
...We review a trial court’s order granting a permanent injunction for competent substantial evidence. O’Neill v. Goodwin,
195 So.3d 411, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). To find stalking, there must be “willful, malicious, and repeated following, harassing, or cyberstalking of another person.” §
784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). “‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(l)(a), “[C]ourts have generally held that contact is legitimate when there is a reason for the contact other than to harass the victim.” O’Neill,
195 So.3d at 413 ....
...respondent could be heard in the background. Under a “reasonable person” standard, this too was insufficient to cause “substantial emotional distress” to support a finding of stalking. The calls cannot be deemed “willful or malicious” as § 784.048(2) requires....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 305227, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 1021
...pport such a finding, we are constrained to reverse and remand with directions to vacate the permanent injunction. We do so, however, without prejudice to Alfred filing a timely and viable petition for injunction for protection against stalking. See § 784.0485, Fla. Stat. (2013). 1 Reversed and remanded. . Section 784.0485 created a cause of action for an injunction for protection against stalking. Section 784.048(2) defines “stalking” as "[a] person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking -" Section 784.048(l)(a) provides: ‘Harass’ means "to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which *775 causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” Section 784.048(l)(d) provides: ‘Cyberstalk’ means to engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a spe...
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 69271
...Joseph J. Registrato, Tampa, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, State of Florida, appeals the trial court order which granted appellee's motion to dismiss the aggravated stalking charges against him and which declared Florida's Stalking Statute, section 784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
...herefore, reverse and remand. We decline to rule on whether the statute is unconstitutional as applied to appellee since the trial court did not address that issue. We certify, however, as being of great public importance, the following question: IS SECTION 784.048, FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19269, 2015 WL 685705
...that would likely cause substantial emotional distress to the listener”, but is afraid that she will violate Florida’s stalking law if she does. (Doc. 15 at 8-9). Thus, she has filed a facial challenge to the constitutionality of Florida’s stalking statute, Fla. Stat. § 784.048 ....
...At oral argument, Defendants’ counsel stated that Burroughs was also accused of showing up at McLaurn’s home, waving a gun around, and making threatening statements. As a result of this investigation, on March 21, 2012, State Attorney Angela Corey charged Burroughs with one count of stalking in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.048 (2)....
...While Burroughs never received a statement of particulars, she alleges the charge against her was based, at least in part, on text messages she sent to McLaurn. (Doc. 15 at 6). . Burroughs filed a complaint against Corey and Jacksonville Sheriff John Rutherford, asserting that § 784.048(2) infringes on her First Amendment right to free speech....
...However, the language could be deemed to serve no legiti *1204 mate purpose and could be considered wrongful and without justification. (Doc. 15 at 9). Therefore, she is fearful that she will be arrested if she communicates the language in person or through electronic media. (Doc. 15 at 9). Burroughs seeks a declaration that § 784.048(2) is facially unconstitutional and preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting its enforcement. (Doc. 15 at 11). Defendants assert that the complaint should be dismissed because § 784.048 is constitutional....
...THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FLORIDA’S STALKING STATUTE A. The Statute 3 “A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyber-stalks another person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree. ...”•§ 784.048(2). The same behavior, with the addition of a credible threat, constitutes aggravated stalking, a third degree felony. § 784.048(3). Stalking committed after an injunction or other court-imposed prohibition of conduct toward the subject person or their property is also aggravated stalking. § 784.048(4). Harassment occurs when a person engages “in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(a)....
...A course of conduct is “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose. The term does not include constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other organized protests.” § 784.048(l)(b)....
...caused to be communicated “words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(d). 4 *1205 B. The Standard Burroughs argues that § 784.048 is fatally overbroad and therefore facially invalid....
...Strict scrutiny applies where the statute deals with a pure content-based restriction on speech. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc.,
529 U.S. 803, 813 ,
120 S.Ct. 1878 ,
146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000). Strict scrutiny may apply to an as-applied challenge to §
784.048. See United States v. Cassidy,
814 F.Supp.2d 574, 584-85 (D.Md.2011) (applying strict scrutiny in an as-applied challenge to the federal stalking statute). However, as a whole, §
784.048 is not primarily a direct restriction on speech....
...ng rare scenarios where picketing or similar protesting activity is unprotected speech and causes substantial emotional distress. D. Other Courts’ Holdings on Stalking Statutes The Florida Supreme Court has already addressed the facial validity of §
784.048 in Bouters,
659 So.2d 235 . There, the Supreme Court treated the statute as a whole in considering a challenge to §
784.048(4)....
...Bouters,
659 So.2d at 238 . 8 The court found that the conduct described in the statute is criminal and therefore unprotected by the First Amendment. Id. at 237 . As such, the statute was not over-broad. Id. As Bouters dealt with the statute as a whole, rather than just §
784.048(4), the Florida Supreme Court merely cited to Bouters in upholding the constitutionality of §
784.048(2) in a companion case....
...d by that holding. Virginia v. Hicks,
539 U.S. 113, 121-22 ,
123 S.Ct. 2191 ,
156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003). Therefore, since the Florida Supreme Corut in Bouters treated the stalking statute as a whole, the question in this case is whether the entirety of §
784.048, not just §
784.048(2), is over-broad....
...nment has the power to prevent. Id. The restriction of these kinds of speech has never been thought to present a First Amendment problem. United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460, 468-69 ,
130 S.Ct. 1577 ,
176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010). Burroughs admits that §
784.048(3) does not restrict constitutionally protected speech because it only applies to credible threats. (Doc. 21 at 6). 13 Burroughs also concedes that the “follow” prong of §
784.048(2) regulates almost exclusively conduct, not speech. (Doc. 21 at 7). Burroughs argues, however, that the “harass” prong of §
784.048(2) regulates a substantial amount of protected speech, and the “cyberstalking” provision almost exclusively regulates protected speech. (Doc. 21 at 7-8). Both, harassment and cyberstalking require the defendant to engage in a “course of conduct”, which expressly excludes “constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other organized protests.” §
784.048(l)(b). While Burroughs states that the statute nevertheless prohibits protected speech, the only support given is a generalized statement that the speech at issue in §
784.048(2) is not unprotected. (Doc. 21 at 9). As Burroughs provides no specific examples of constitutionally protected speech that would also violate §
784.048, this Court is left to imagine such hypothetieals....
...ther conducted for a legitimate purpose or constitutionally protected activity under the savings clause. While there may well be a rare scenario where a defendant is prosecuted under the statute for protected conduct, 17 Burroughs has not shown that § 784.048 has a substantial number of unconstitutional applications, especially when compared to the statute’s plainly legitimate coverage....
...However, any conduct prohibited under the cyberstalking clause was already covered by the harassment clause. The cyberstalking clause requires "a course of conduct ... directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(d)....
...Fankell,
520 U.S. 911, 916 ,
117 S.Ct. 1800 ,
138 L.Ed.2d 108 (1997). . Importantly, Burroughs did not bring a claim asserting that the statute is void for vagueness. . Since that time, the statute has been amended to proscribe cyberstalking. Compare §
784.048 (1996) with §
784.048 (2010)....
...ear to mean the same thing. See Alvarez,
132 S.Ct. at 2549 (requiring the government show its restriction on speech is actually necessary to achieving a compelling interest to pass exacting scrutiny). . Burroughs mistakenly refers to this section as §
784.048(4). (Doc. 21 at 6). . Because Burroughs has not brought an as-applied challenge to §
784.048, the Court need not decide whether her alleged conduct violated the statute or whether the statute would be unconstitutional as applied to that scenario....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...that "simple" stalking and aggravated stalking each contain one element that the other does not and so are different under the Blockburger test. An analysis of the offenses under Blockburger reveals that appellant is correct. Stalking, as defined in section 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2002), is committed when a person "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person." Aggravated stalking, as defined by section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2002), is committed by "[a]ny person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat violence or dating violence pursuant to s....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 18383, 2015 WL 8291622
...It may be that she was simply
unsure at what point in the process she could "tell her side of the story," so to speak, as
a pro se litigant.
-2-
A petitioner may obtain an injunction to prevent stalking under section
784.0485, Florida Statutes (2014). Section 784.048(2), in turn, provides: "A person who
willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person
commits the offense of stalking . . . ." Pertinent here, section 784.048(1)(a) defines the
term "harass" as "to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which
causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose."
Thus, to be entitled to injunctive relief under her petition, Ms....
...In the case at bar, while we might defer to the court's
determinations that Ms. Roach's course of conduct was willful, malicious, and
unjustified, we cannot ignore the complete absence of evidence as to whether that
conduct caused Ms. Brower substantial emotional distress under section 784.048(1)(a).
Ms....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 757921
...My reluctance also stems from the sense that had an ordinary citizen approached Mr. Augustin without basis on twelve occasions, asked to search him for no reason, and then chased him when he fled, the police would probably arrest that ordinary citizen for illegal stalking. See § 784.048, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 3409618
...In the instant case, the Record is clear that a battery, or a "sexual assault," as termed by the trial court, occurred, constituting the first "violent" incident. In light of the facts before the Court, the second "violent" incident must be a stalking. Pursuant to section 784.048(2), "[a]ny person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking...." § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). "Harass" is defined as: "engag[ing] in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). Moreover, "`Course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose." § 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 11870, 2008 WL 3153932
...We agree that aggravated stalking can encompass acts that, in and of themselves, might fall short of prosecutable conduct. However, this does not mean that illegal acts cannot also form the basis for an *592 aggravated stalking conviction. Support for this conclusion is found in the plain terms of the statute. Section 784.048(3), Florida Statutes (2006), defines aggravated stalking as: Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cy-berstalks another person, and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury of the person ......
...sts. (c) “Credible threat” means a threat made with the intent to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily injury to, a person. § 784.048(1)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 12107, 2017 WL 3642025
...l evidence does not support a
finding of stalking, we reverse the injunction.
1 Although Johnson sought, and the court granted, an injunction for protection
against "stalking violence," the contents of the petition track those required by section
784.0485(3)(b), Florida Statutes, pertaining to stalking, not violence....
...twenty-minute altercation qualified as two separate incidents of harassment, warranting
an injunction. Specifically, the trial court found that Packal harassed Johnson by: (1)
verbally threatening her and her family while demonstrating his firearm, and (2) shoving
Garcia.
Section 784.0485(1), Florida Statutes (2016), establishes a cause of action for an
injunction for protection against stalking....
...victim of stalking because respondent has . . . ."
2
1203, 1204 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)). "A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking." §
784.048(2), Fla. Stat (2016). "'Harass' means to engage in a course of conduct directed
at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves
no legitimate purpose." Id. § 784.048(1)(a) (emphasis added). "'Course of conduct' means
a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short,
which evidences a continuity of purpose." Id. § 784.048(1)(b).
Here, the two acts cited by the trial court amount to one continuous course of
conduct, establishing only one instance of harassment....
...This was a sufficient temporal break to allow [the respondent] time
to pause, reflect, and form a new intent before the second attack."). This single instance
cannot support a finding of stalking, which requires evidence of repeat harassment. See
§ 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. Further, even if we find that Packal's actions constitute two
separate instances of harassment, Packal shoving Garcia does not qualify as harassment
of Johnson. See id. § 784.048(1)(a).2 Accordingly, we reverse the injunction.
REVERSED.
SAWAYA and TORPY, JJ., concur.
2 Although Packal's conduct towards Garcia may constitute an act of violence,
Johnson did not present it as such, and the described...
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 14893, 2006 WL 2548229
...First, admissions of a party are exceptions to the hearsay rule. See §
90.803(18)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). Second, this testimony was not elicited to demonstrate Chacon’s bad character but to prove the crimes charged, that is, that he intended to harm the victim and her family, and that he violated section
784.048....
...ffense under section
775.084 because section
776.08 lists burglary generally as a qualifying offense); see also Delsol v. State,
837 So.2d 428, 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (same). Chacon’s convictions and sentences are, therefore, affirmed. Affirmed. . Section
784.048 includes harassment within the definition of stalking and defines harassment as "engage[ing] in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005); see also §
784.048(3), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...overlooking the “substantial emotional distress” and “no legitimate
purpose” guideposts provided by the statutory text while broadly defining
the term “harass” to include almost anything that a neighbor finds
annoying about another neighbor’s conduct. See § 784.048(1)(a), Fla....
...However, the Legislature did not include this type of peaceful
conduct, even when it annoys a neighbor, in its proscription against
stalking by harassment. Instead, the Legislature expressly excluded
conduct that would not cause “substantial emotional distress” or has some
“legitimate purpose.” See § 784.048(1)(a), Fla....
...hed his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Analysis
A person commits the misdemeanor offense of stalking if he or she
“willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks
another person.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2017). As used in this statute,
the term “‘[h]arass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person
and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla....
...3d at 664-65)).
The statutory phrase “‘[c]ourse of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct
composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which
evidences a continuity of purpose[, and] . . . does not include
constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other organized
protests.” § 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...se of conduct” necessary to
support the defendant’s conviction because the statute requires multiple
qualifying acts “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly” directed against the
neighbors in “a series of acts over a period of time.” See § 784.048(1)(a),
(b), Fla....
...(2017).
An important guidepost included in the stalking statute which was
overlooked by the majority in Johnstone I and here again in Johnstone II is
the requirement that the harassing course of conduct cause “substantial
emotional distress.” See § 784.048(1)(a), Fla....
...stalking statute which
was overlooked by the majority in Johnstone I and here again in Johnstone
II is the requirement that the State prove the defendant had “no legitimate
purpose” for any of the qualifying acts directed at either neighbor. See §
784.048(1)(a), Fla....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 2008).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
...n card in cases involving homicide (pursuant to Chapter 782 , Florida Statutes), a sexual offense (pursuant to Chapter 794 , Florida Statutes), an attempted murder or sexual offense (pursuant to Chapter 777 , Florida Statutes), stalking (pursuant to section
784.048 , Florida Statutes), or domestic violence (pursuant to section
25.385 , Florida Statutes)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 481, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 1553, 1995 WL 559928
SHAW, Justice. We have for review Ratcliffe v. State,
651 So.2d 1205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), wherein the district court affirmed an order of the trial court upholding the constitutionality of section
784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp.1992), Florida’s anti-stalMng statute....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 427, 1999 Fla. LEXIS 1557
Section
365.16, and stalking in violation of Section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes. These alleged offenses
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 498404
...Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Michael J. Neimand, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, Parker D. Thomson and Carol A. Licko, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Miami, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, Neil Rosen, was convicted of aggravated stalking pursuant to section 784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 13826
...nal trier of fact could find that the elements of the crime have been established beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain the conviction. See Pagan v. State,
830 So.2d 792, 803 (Fla.2002). The crime of stalking is defined in section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2007), as follows: Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly ......
...another person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree.... “‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such a person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(a), Fla....
...e, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’ Such constitutionally protected activity includes *654 picketing or other organized protests.” § 784.048(l)(b), Fla....
...We recognize that offensive speech, alone, does not subject the speaker to criminal sanctions. Here, T.B. does not argue that his conduct is constitutionally protected or served a legitimate purpose. However, we note our supreme court’s holding that conduct which amounts to stalking under section 784.048 — -“whether by word or deed” — is not protected by the First Amendment....
...Rather, [t]he statute proscribes a particular type of criminal conduct defined at length in the statute. The conduct must be willful, malicious and repeated, and form “a course of conduct which would “cause[ ] substantial emotional distress” in a reasonable person in the same position as the victim ... See § 784.048, Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 16468, 2006 WL 2819643
...We affirm finding that the court did not abuse its discretion in entering the injunction. See Abravaya v. Gonzalez,
734 So.2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Lopez v. Lopez,
922 So.2d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). The record supports the entry of the injunction in this case. §
784.048, Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 18986, 2012 WL 5350163
...... directed against the petitioner or the petitioner’s immediate family member.” (Emphasis added.) A person commits the act of stalking by “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly following], harassing], or cy-berstalkfing] another person.” § 784.048(2) (emphasis added). Harassment is defined as “a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(a); see also Jones v....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 16186, 2015 WL 6554462
...Debra Lippens appeals the trial court’s injunction for' protection against stalking, barring her from seeing her daughter. We find that the trial court erred in granting the injunction because the evidence presented does not meet the legal requirement to support an injunction pursuant to section 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2014)....
...Powers obtained an injunction on behalf of Daughter to prevent Lippens from stalking Daughter. The relevant statute provides that “[a] person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking.” § 784.048(2), Fla....
...There is no claim of following or cyberstalking here, “Harass” under that statute “means to. engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which .causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate. purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...For example, Florida’s statute criminalizes any repeated following, whether or not
accompanied by a threat: “Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or
harasses another person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree . . . .”
Fla. Stat. § 784.048(3) (West 1992).
81
were intended to harass, humiliate, or intimidate....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...For example, Florida's statute criminalizes any repeated following, whether or not accompanied by a threat:
"Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the
offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree...." Fla. Stat. § 784.048(3) (West 1992).
51
interpretation is that following or staring "can betray romantic or sexual attraction." (Maj....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...The police researched the tracker and learned it could be
traced by a smartphone application. The police submitted the
tracker into evidence under the case number used for Collins’s
shattered window.
The State charged Garcia with aggravated stalking with a
credible threat, in violation of section
784.048(3), Florida Statutes
(2018), and with throwing a deadly missile into a building, in
violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...Deputy Sheriff McKinney of the Polk County Sheriff’s Office
headed up the investigation into R.S.’s death. On October 14, 2013, without a
warrant, he arrested K.C.R. for felony aggravated stalking of a minor under 16
years of age. See Fla. Stat. § 784.048(5) (“A person who willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks a child under 16 years of age
commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree ....
...at 586 (“It requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal
activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”) (quotation marks omitted). All
in all, it’s “not a high bar.” Wesby,
138 S. Ct. at 586.
McKinney arrested K.C.R. for an alleged violation of Florida Statutes
§
784.048(5)....
...child under 16 years of age
18
Case: 17-14525 Date Filed: 10/21/2019 Page: 19 of 48
commits the offence of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree . . . .” Fla.
Stat. § 784.048(5)....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 15330, 2015 WL 6022287
...favor of Debra Lynn Scott, pursuant to section
784.046(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2015). Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that no competent, substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s finding of stalking, as defined by section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2015)....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 15188, 2015 WL 5973843
...crest for many years.
Each has a history of alleging incidents of harassment and unneighborly behavior
against the other. Although each has obtained temporary ex parte civil injunctions
for protection against the other under the stalking statute, section 784.0485, Florida
Statutes (2014), their petitions for final judgments of injunction after a hearing
have, in prior incidents, been dismissed for failure to appear or upon a finding of
no just cause.
The petition in the present case was filed in April 2014....
...taunting her.” She alleged that this had occurred the day after a six-month stay
away order applicable to his probation had expired. According to the Miami-Dade
Clerk’s case information system, Mr. Richards’ stay away order was entered in a
1 Section 784.0485(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2014), specifically directs the court
clerk to assist petitioners in the completion of their forms....
...Gonzalez’s automobile or within twenty feet of her residence next door to his.
This appeal followed. As they did below, the parties are representing themselves
in this appeal.
Analysis
Stalking is the willful, malicious, and repeated following, harassing, or
cyberstalking of another person. § 784.048(2), Fla....
...“‘Harass’ means
{ "pageset": "S06
to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which
causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate
purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a); see also § 784.048(1)(b) (defining “‘[c]ourse of
conduct’” as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of
time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose”) .
“Courts apply a reas...
...There was no
testimony that the alleged plastic water bottle was thrown at a window of the car.
No bottle was found by Ms. Gonzalez, though she testified that Mr. Richards
immediately hopped in his car and sped away after the alleged incident.
Conclusion
Applying the requirements of sections 784.048 and 784.0485, Florida
Statutes (2014), and the “reasonable person standard” to the conduct described at
the final hearing (as opposed to the petition), we are constrained to reverse the
final judgment and vacate the injunction....
...If some form of consensual mediation or counselling3 is unavailing and
future petitions eventuate, the parties might consider seeking legal assistance, paid
or pro bono, to focus their legal theories and presentation of evidence.
Reversed; injunction vacated.
2 § 784.0485(1)(d), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...stalking requirements is identical and in fact interchangeable
although other requirements of the various injunctions are
substantially different.
“Stalking” is when one “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat.
“‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that
person and serves no legitimate purpose,” section 784.048(1)(a),
and cyberstalking is harassing through electronic communication,
see section 784.048(1)(d).
“Substantial emotional distress” is an objective standard,
Bouters v....
...1st DCA 2015) (“A reasonable
woman who had an eighteen month affair with another woman’s
husband might well expect to hear the scorn of an angry wife.”);
Biggs v. Elliot,
707 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (following and
repeatedly telephoning the victim did constitute stalking within
the statutory definition of section
784.048, Florida Statutes (1995);
and stating “whether the conduct meets the statutory requirement
is a question of fact for the trier of fact”).
A dating violence injunction requires “violence”—and most of
the acts the Legisl...
...includes “stalking” within the “violence” definition and
prohibition. See §
784.046(1)(a), Fla. Stat.; Branson,
143 So. 3d at
1072-73.
Stalking only requires “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follow[ing], harass[ing], or cyberstalk[ing] another person.”
§
784.048(2), Fla....
...For purposes of domestic and nondomestic
violence statutes, stalking is violence.” Steven Scott Stephens,
Injunction For Protection—Stalking, in 23 Fla. Practice, Fla.
Family Law § 14:14 (West 2018) (citing Branson,
143 So. 3d at
1072-1073); see also §
784.0485(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2011 WL 5375025, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 17784
...Accordingly, the State failed to prove an essential element of the burglary charge relating to the September 6th incident. Torres also claims that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal on the stalking charge. Section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2007), provides, "Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082 or s.
775.083." §
784.048(2), Fla....
...*1067 However, the critical question is whether Torres' actions were directed specifically at the victim. "`Harass' means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." § 784.048(1)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...The second is actual
malice, which “means ‘ill will, hatred, spite, an evil intent.” Id. (footnote
omitted) (quoting Reed,
837 So. 2d at 368).
We analyzed the proper application of malice in Seese.
955 So. 2d at
1149-50. Seese involved the use of “maliciously” in section
784.048(4),
Florida Statutes (2004)....
...That statute provides: “Any person who, . . . after
any . . . court-imposed prohibition of conduct toward the subject person .
. . , knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly . . . harasses . . .
another person commits the offense of aggravated stalking . . . .”
§ 784.048(4), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...“But the question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient
to justify imposing an injunction is a question of law that we review de
novo.” Krapacs v. Bacchus, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1913, at *2 (Fla. 4th DCA
Aug. 12, 2020) (quoting Pickett v. Copeland,
236 So. 3d 1142, 1144 (Fla.
1st DCA 2018)).
Under section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2019), “[a] person who
willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks
another person commits the offense of stalking . . . .” Further, the statute
defines “harass” as a “means to engage in a course of conduct directed at
a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that
person and serves no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
(2019). This statute specifically exempts constitutionally protected
activities. See §
784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...“Mere irritation, annoyance, embarrassment, exasperation,
aggravation, and frustration, without more, does not equate to ‘substantial
emotional distress.’” Johnstone,
298 So. 3d at 669 (Klingensmith, J.,
dissenting) (quoting §
784.048(1), Fla....
...Aresty,
994 So.
2d 1131, 1134 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“[N]oise, profanity, and claims of
vandalism to property do not always warrant injunctive relief under the
stalking and repeat violence statutes.”)). As this court has repeated on
many occasions, section
784.048 “does not allow the trial court to enter
injunctions simply ‘to keep the peace’ between parties who, for whatever
reason, are unable to get along and behave civilly towards each other.”
Klemple v....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 17330, 2005 WL 2897039
...n violation of the ex post facto clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions. We agree. We therefore grant the petition, reverse Des-moke’s sentence, and remand for resen-tencing. Desmoke was charged with aggravated stalking pursuant to section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2001)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...victim’s location creates a threat of physical danger that exposure of
his or her name alone does not generally pose. 8 And even though
8. Of course, a victim may be illegally defamed or threatened
even if his or her physical location is unknown. See, e.g.,
§ 784.048(1)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...806 (1975).
A jury convicted Mr. Davis of burglary with an assault or battery, in
violation of section
810.02, Florida Statutes (2013), false imprisonment, in violation of
section
787.02, Florida Statutes (2013), and stalking, in violation of section
784.048,
Florida Statutes (2013)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 17233, 2002 WL 31626164
...Smalley appeals a judgment convicting him of aggravated stalking. We affirm. However, we remand in order for the trial court to correct a scrivener’s error on the judgment. The judgment refers to section 748.049, Florida Statutes (2001). Mr. Smalley was convicted of violating section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2001)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...In June 2016, Sermon petitioned for an injunction for protection against
stalking, alleging that Dixon had repeatedly sought out and threatened Sermon, putting
Sermon in fear for her life. After granting a temporary injunction pursuant to section
784.0485(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2015), the trial court held a hearing to determine
whether a permanent injunction was warranted....
...Sermon had told her that Sermon did not live at the house but
lived in Jacksonville. After hearing her testimony and questioning Mr. Sermon, the trial
court granted a fifty-year permanent stalking injunction against Dixon.
Pursuant to section 784.0485, a person may obtain an injunction for
protection against stalking. "A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows,
harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking . . . ." §
784.048(2). Relevant to our analysis is that " '[h]arass' means to engage in a course of
conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that
person and serves no legitimate purpose."1 § 784.048(1)(a).
Dixon argues that the evidence does not support the injunction because,
among other reasons, her conduct was directed not at Sermon but at Mr....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...The injunction obtained by
the victim—entitled “Final Judgment of Injunction for Protection Against
Stalking Violence”—was admitted into evidence and indicates on its face that
it was issued after the “petition for injunction for protection against stalking
violence under section 784.0485, Florida Statutes, and other papers filed
in this Court have been reviewed.” (Emphasis added.)
1
To prove the crime of stalking, the State must prove a defendant “willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ed], harasse[d] or cyberstalk[ed]” the
victim. See § 784.048(2), Fla....
...protection against repeat violence, sexual violence, or dating violence
pursuant to s.
784.046, or an injunction for protection against domestic
violence pursuant to s.
741.30,” had been entered against the defendant for
the benefit of the victim. See §
784.048(4), Fla....
...The State’s theory
and argument also formed the basis for the relevant instruction on the law
provided by the trial court to the jury:
COUNT ONE
AGGRAVATED STALKING
(Injunction Entered)
§ 784.048(4), Fla....
...on
against repeat violence, sexual violence, or dating violence, issued pursuant
to section
784.046. Again, however, the only injunction introduced into
evidence in support of these charges was the injunction against stalking,
issued pursuant to section
784.0485.
Dilver properly preserved this issue, arguing in his motion for judgment
of acquittal that the State failed to prove any of the three counts because the
State expressly based its allegations, proof and argument on the “fact” that
each count involved a violation of an “injunction against repeat violence,”
pursuant to section
784.046, while the evidence at trial established the
issuance of an injunction against stalking (section
784.0485).
An injunction against repeat violence (section
784.046) and an
injunction against stalking (section
784.0485) are two distinct types of
injunctions arising from separate causes of action, the violation of which can
result in different and distinct penalties....
...2 The trial court denied Dilver’s
motion for judgment of acquittal.
2
For example, the crime of aggravated stalking as charged in the Information
(stalking committed after entry of an injunction for protection against repeat
violence), is a third-degree felony. See § 784.048(4)....
...misdemeanor), Dilver was sentenced to 364 days in the county jail to be
served concurrently with each other and concurrently with the sentence on
Count One. 3
and the crime of violating an injunction for protection against stalking, are
both first-degree misdemeanors. See §§ 784.048(2) and 784.0487(4)(a),
Fla....
...3d 673 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020), and we hold that the trial court erred in
denying Dilver’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
Dilver contended (both in the trial court and here on appeal) that an
injunction for protection against stalking under section
784.0485 is not the
same as an injunction for repeat violence or dating violence under section
784.046, or an injunction for domestic violence under section
741.30.
Indeed, the State has conceded this point, and has further and commendably...
...7
741.30), an essential element for aggravated stalking as charged in Count
One of the Information.
Simply stated, proof of the issuance and existence of an injunction for
protection against stalking under section
784.0485 was legally insufficient to
establish the charge of aggravated stalking under section
784.048(4) which
requires proof of the issuance and existence of an injunction issued for
protection against repeat violence or dating violence (pursuant to section
784.046) or domestic violence (pursuant to section
741.30).
This same infirmity applies with respect to Counts Two and Three,
each charging a violation of an injunction against repeat violence. Again, the
only injunction introduced by the State was the injunction against stalking,
issued pursuant to section
784.0485....
...en all of the elements of, this lesser
8
included offense. Thus, the State posits, this court should reverse the
judgment and sentence for aggravated stalking and remand for entry of
judgment for stalking (section 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2019)) and for a
new sentencing hearing on that judgment....
...ily lesser-included) 4 offense of
aggravated stalking: establishing the elements for the crime of aggravated
stalking necessarily establishes the elements for the crime of stalking. See
Fla. Std. J. Inst. (Crim.) 8.7(b), Aggravated Stalking Under § 784.048(4)
(listing Stalking under § 784.048(2) as a Category One necessarily lesser-
included offense).
Had the trial court properly granted Dilver’s motion for judgment of
acquittal as to Count One, it would have resulted in a reduction of the offense
from aggravated stalking (as charged) to stalking, as the record amply
demonstrates the State established the elements for stalking under section
784.048(2), and that the jury, by its guilty verdict on the charge of aggravated
4
There are two categories of lesser-included offenses—necessary lesser
offenses (also known as Category One) and permissive lesser offenses (also
known as Category Two)....
...the judgments and sentences on Counts One, Two and Three; enter a
judgment of acquittal on Count Two and Count Three; enter a judgment of
guilt as to Count One for the reduced (and necessarily lesser-included)
11
offense of stalking under section 784.048(2); and hold a new sentencing
hearing on this judgment for Count One as reduced....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 16826, 2009 WL 3763047
...We treat the order on appeal as one taken from the denial of a motion to correct illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.800(a). The State commendably concedes the possibility Del Rio's total concurrent sentences for the third-degree felonies or aggravated stalking, § 784.048(3), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 4940, 1997 WL 228682
SHAHOOD, Judge. Appellant appeals from judgment of conviction and sentence under the aggravated stalking statute, section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (1995), for violating an order of probation and an order in a domestic relations case proscribing any contact with his former wife, including telephone calls....
...denied, — U.S. -,
116 S.Ct. 245 ,
133 L.Ed.2d 171 . Appellant claims that he should have been prosecuted under the misdemeanor statute prohibiting harassing telephone calls, section
365.16, rather than under the felony statute for aggravated stalking, section
784.048(4)....
...Appellant argues that the stalking statute is a general statute, while the harassing telephone call statute is a more specific statute. Thus, while it is illegal to make repeated harassing telephone calls under section
365.16, those same harassing telephone calls could not be used as the act of harassment under section
784.048(4)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 227, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 685, 1995 WL 256222
SHAW, Justice. We have for review Saiya v. State,
641 So.2d 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), wherein the district court rejected a constitutional challenge to the validity of section
784.048(4), Florida Statutes (1993), Florida’s anti-stalking statute, based on several cases including Bouters v....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 227, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 684, 1995 WL 256216
SHAW, Justice. We have for review Blount v. State,
641 So.2d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), wherein the district court relied on Bouters v. State, 634 *
127 So.2d 246 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), to affirm a trial court order finding Florida’s stalking statute, section
784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp.1992), constitutional....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 256225
...Gen., Miami, for respondent. *129 SHAW, Judge. We have for review Folsom v. State,
638 So.2d 591 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), wherein the district court relied on Bouters v. State,
634 So.2d 246 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), to uphold the constitutionality of Florida's anti-stalking statute, section
784.048, Florida Statutes (1993)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 228, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 680, 1995 WL 256212
SHAW, Justice. We have for review State v. Daniels,
639 So.2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), wherein the district court relied on Bouters v. State,
634 So.2d 246 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), to reverse a trial court order finding Florida’s stalking statute, §
784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 227, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 681, 1995 WL 256221
SHAW, Justice. We have for review Polson v. State,
636 So.2d 605 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), wherein the district court relied on Bouters v. State,
634 So.2d 246 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), to affirm a trial court order finding Florida’s stalking statute, §
784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp.1992), constitutional....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2017 WL 2350136, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 7832
...petition, which are directed against the petitioner or the petitioner’s immediate family member.” §
784.046(1)(b). Stalking is defined as *869 “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly5’ following, harassing, or cyberstalking another person. §
784.048(2)....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 6018
...ich witnesses testified, rather than simply the words reported in the transcript. This is a “thin” case. However, we think the essential elements of the crime charged were sufficiently established to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal. Section
784.048(3) defines aggravated stalking with a credible threat as follows: Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury, commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony in the third degree, punishable as provided in section s
775.082,
775.083, or 785.084, Fla. Stat. In addition, the term “harass” is defined by section
784.048(l)(a) as: To engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose....
...otionally upset by D.L.D.’s behavior. Even if a subjective standard were applicable, a person need not be reduced to tears and hysteria in order to be considered “substantially emotionally distressed.” AFFIRMED. COBB and HARRIS, JJ., concur. . § 784.048, Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 7977, 2016 WL 3010493
...502015DR011874.
Siobhan Helene Shea of Siobhan Helene Shea Appellate Practice, Palm
Beach, for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Patricia A. Fye appeals the summary denial of her petition for
injunction against stalking, which she sought against her former husband,
Bryan S. Bennett, pursuant to section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2015).
Fye’s petition was denied without a hearing based on a finding that Fye
failed to allege specific facts and circumstances to establish that she was
the victim of stalking....
...on. As a condition of
his probation, Bennett agreed to cooperate with the entry of a permanent
injunction against stalking. Fye also alleged that Bennett was seen
outside of her home and office on several occasions over the past several
months.
Section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2015), creates a civil cause of
action, which allows a victim of stalking to seek an injunction for
protection. “A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows,
harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking[.]”
§ 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). To “harass” is defined as “engag[ing] in a
course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial
emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. A “course of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of
conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short,
which evidences a continuity of purpose.” § 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...agreement, including his agreement to cooperate with the entry of a
permanent injunction against stalking, we conclude that Fye’s petition was
facially sufficient. We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on Fye’s petition pursuant to section
784.0485(4), Florida Statutes.
Reversed and remanded.
WARNER, GROSS and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2016 WL 3011787, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 7964
...Even if the evidence presented was sufficient, we
nonetheless would reverse because the trial court did not give Appellant
an opportunity to present his case.
Ms. Schack filed a Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Stalking
against Appellant pursuant to section 784.0485 of the Florida Statutes.
After finding that the allegations in the petition were insufficient to warrant
a temporary injunction, the court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether Ms....
...“This includes allowing relevant testimony of pertinent, noncumulative
witnesses who are present and cross-examination of the parties.” Id.
Appellant was not given any such opportunity.
Further, the evidence presented by Ms. Schack at the hearing was
plainly insufficient to support the injunction. Section 784.0485 creates “a
cause of action for an injunction for protection against stalking.” §
784.0485(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). Stalking is the offense of “willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ing], harass[ing], or cyberstalk[ing]
another person.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). “Harass,” in turn, “means
to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes
substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate
purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a); see also § 784.048(1)(b) (defining “course of
conduct” as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period
of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose”).
In order to be entitled to an injunction for stalking, the petitioner must
allege and prove two separate instances of stalking....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...See Paulson v. Rankart,
251 So. 3d 986, 988 n. 1 (Fla.
1st DCA 2018).
3
II.
We recently explained the framework for entering an
injunction for protection against stalking pursuant to section
784.0485, Florida Statutes:
Stalking occurs when a person “willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another
person.” §
784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). To “harass”
means “to engage in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person which causes substantial emotional
distress to that person and serves no legitimate
purpose.” §
784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. A “course of
conduct” is “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of
acts over a period of time, however short, which
evidences a continuity of purpose.” §
784.048(1)(b), Fla.
Stat....
...We therefore
REVERSE the final injunction for protection against stalking.
B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and KELSEY and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.
3 We do not disagree with Stone’s argument that he walks
around his neighborhood, put dog waste in a trash can, and
avoided getting hit by a bus for legitimate purposes under section
784.048.
5
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 6988, 2004 WL 1103975
...The petition alluded to an incident involving Cohen’s ex-girlfriend; however she is not an “immediate family member” within the meaning of the statute. Similarly, the petition’s vague reference to threats over the phone did not amount to a “course of conduct” sufficient to constitute stalking. See § 784.048(l)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 298936
...and Michael J. Neimand, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, and Parker D. Thomson and Carol A. Licko, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Miami, for respondent. SHAW, Judge. We have for review Huffine v. State,
648 So.2d 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), wherein the district court certified: Is section
784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 716044, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 3541
...testified *1134 that she felt as if. she was being stalked, D.A.S.’s single appearance on her front porch, albeit uninvited, did not suffice. Stalking occurs when a person “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person.” § 784.048(2) (emphasis added); see Smith v....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 3211, 1995 WL 132256
PER CURIAM. The appellant challenges the constitutionality of section 784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp.1992), the “anti-stalking statute.” We have previously held this statute to be constitutional....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 2848, 1996 WL 125760
...However, we agree with May’s argument that the trial court erred in ordering him to “stay away from victim and victim’s family and other witnesses in this ease” after his release from jail. Stalking is a first-degree misdemeanor punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year. § 784.048(2), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 3974, 2014 WL 1047119
...1: (1) the defendant willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly, followed, harassed, or cyberstalked the victim; and (2) the defendant made a credible threat to the victim with the intent to place the victim in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury. § 784.048(3), Fla. Stat. (2011). “Harass” is defined as “to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). “Course of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose ....” § 784.048(l)(b), Fla....
...A “credible threat” includes a “verbal or nonverbal threat, or a combination of the two, ... which places the person who is the target of the threat in reasonable fear for his or her safety ... , and which is made with the apparent ability to carry out the threat to cause such harm ....” § 784.048(l)(c), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...on. See §
741.30(6)(a), Fla. Stat.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to VACATE the
injunction.
JAY, SOUD, and PRATT, JJ., concur.
2 Harassment can be an element of stalking, but the court did
not find stalking in this case. See §
784.048(2), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 9565, 2010 WL 2594661
...nal injunction when he continued to harass the victim. We agree, reverse his conviction for aggravated stalking, and remand for entry of a judgment of conviction for simple stalking. The State charged Canavan with aggravated stalking in violation of section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2007), based on allegations that he harassed his former wife after entry of a final injunction against domestic violence....
...To convict Ca-navan of this offense, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ca-navan continued to harass the victim despite knowledge of the injunction upon which the charge was premised. See State v. Johnson,
676 So.2d 408, 411 (Fla.1996) (stating that “[t]he statutory elements of aggravated stalking under section
784.048(4) are knowledge of an injunction and knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly following or harassing the beneficiary of the injunction”)....
...Simple stalking is a category one, lesser-included offense of aggravated stalking. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 8.7(b). To prove simple stalking, the State must prove that the defendant willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly followed, harassed, or cyberstalked the victim. § 784.048(2); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 8.6. To prove aggravated stalking, the State must prove the same conduct, plus the existence of an injunction and the defendant’s knowledge that the injunction had been entered against him. See § 784.048(4); Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 9991, 2016 WL 3534032
...Analysis “A trial court’s order granting a permanent injunction is reviewed for competent substantial evidence.” Thoma v. O’Neal,
180 So.3d 1157, 1159 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). Courts have the authority to enjoin stalking and/or cyberstalking under section
784.0485, Florida Statutes (2015)....
...ts the offense of stalking ....” § 784,048(2), Fla. Stat (2015). “ ‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(a)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...front door where the camera is located with a document.
The court finds that there is sufficient evidence to
support the entry of a repeat violence injunction for a period
of two years.
This appeal followed.
Section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2017), provides for injunctive relief
from stalking. The pertinent statutory definitions are found in section 784.048.
Stalking is defined as the "willful[ ], malicious[ ], and
repeated[ ] follow[ing], harass[ing], or cyberstalk[ing] [of]
another person." § 784.048(2). " 'Harass' means to engage
in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which
causes substantial emotional distress to that person and
serves no legitimate purpose." § 784.048(1)(a); see also §
784.048(1)(b) (defining " '[c]ourse of conduct' " as "a pattern
of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of
time, however short, which evidences a continuity of
purpose") ....
...Caterino's conduct may have been willful and malicious, at least with
regard to her entering upon the property the first time to remove the permit, in order to
constitute stalking by harassment the conduct must have caused substantial emotional
distress. See § 784.048(1)(a)....
...3d at 989 n.3 (noting that the filing of complaints to authorities does not
constitute harassment); Curry v. State,
811 So. 2d 736, 741 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) ("As a
matter of law, [filing numerous complaints and reports to government agencies] cannot
amount to 'harassment' within the meaning of [section
784.048(1)(a)]. A report to an
arm of government, concerning a matter within the purview of the agency's
responsibilities, serves a 'legitimate purpose' within the meaning of section
784.048(1)(a), regardless of the subjective motivation of the reporter.")....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 10065, 2013 WL 3198126
...iminal activity, the prong that criminalizes “benefiting, promoting, or furthering the interests of a criminal gang ... to intimidate or harass other persons ” prohibits identifiable criminal conduct on its face. Id. (emphasis added); see, e.g., § 784.048, Fla....
...State,
58 So.3d 329, 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). . We note that the language of section
874.11 would not necessarily have to limit the intimidation or harassment of others for the purpose of benefiting or promoting the gang to the specific individuals identified by section
784.048 in order to overcome this facial challenge and constitute a statute that is narrowly tailored to prevent an identifiable crime....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...First, he argues his
actions served a legitimate purpose in advocating against restrictive
legislation adversely affecting sex offenders. Second, he claims that his
social media activities do not constitute “a course of conduct directed at a
specific person” as required by section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2016).
And third, Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s subjective fear does not
satisfy the objective “reasonable person” standard required by the statute.
Petitioner claims that: Respondent’s actions a...
...Respondent is a convicted child molester with a domestic violence
injunction previously issued against him. She also asserts that
Respondent’s post containing pictures of her home and its address have
placed her and her children in fear for their safety.
“Section
784.0485 . . . allows an injunction against stalking, including
cyberstalking.” David v. Textor,
189 So. 3d 871, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
Section
784.048, Florida Statutes (2016), defines stalking, which by its
express language includes both harassment and cyberstalking: “[a] person
who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks
another person commits the offense of stalking.” §
784.048(2), Fla....
...Stat.
(2016). “A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows,
harasses, or cyberstalks another person and makes a credible threat to
5
that person commits the offense of aggravated stalking.” § 784.048(3), Fla.
Stat. (2016) (emphasis added).
Section 784.048(1) provides definitions for the terms utilized within
that section:
(a) “Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed
at a specific person which causes substantial emotional
distress to that person an...
...To access, or attempt to access, the online accounts or
Internet-connected home electronic systems of another
person without that person’s permission, causing substantial
emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate
purpose.
§ 784.048(1), Fla....
...The
question that remains, however, is whether those posts were directed at
her. Decisions by our sister courts in the Second and Third Districts on
whether “a course of conduct [is] directed at a specific person” have been
interpreted to exempt social media messages from qualifying as the type
of conduct covered by section 784.048, Florida Statutes....
...its plain and obvious meaning.”
Holly v. Auld,
450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc.
v. McRainey,
137 So. 157, 159 (1931)).
We believe such a narrow interpretation, which exempts social media
messages from coverage under section
784.048, does not align with the
plain language of that statute. The plain words of the statute do not
require that the communications be intended for transmission to the
victim. Section
784.048 only requires that the course of conduct be
directed at a specific person, not necessarily directed to a specific person.
While the statute defines “course of conduct,” it does not define the term
“directed at.”...
...to cause to
be communicated, words, images, or language . . . directed at a specific
9
person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving
no legitimate purpose.” Id. at 1091-92 (quoting § 784.048(1)(d), Fla....
...amount[ed] to an actual and credible threat of violence”); Chevaldina,
133
So. 3d at 1091–92 (“the appellees failed to introduce evidence that specific
blog posts were being used” in violation of Florida’s cyberstalking law,
10
section
784.048(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2012))....
...Each party in this case is a vocal advocate for opposite positions
on sex offender laws. Despite Petitioner’s complaints, Respondent’s
11
Tallahassee protest was by all accounts peaceful—even if unpleasant to
Petitioner in its scope and message—and non-violent. See § 784.048(1)(b),
Fla....
...2d at 165 (stating that the general harassment of petitioner and/or her
children was insufficient to constitute domestic violence). The law requires
that before an injunction such as this can be granted there must be legal,
articulable acts of harassment, stalking, or credible threats pursuant to
section 784.048....
...ts Respondent from
posting anything related to Petitioner, even statements that would
unquestionably constitute pure political speech. 3
In sum, not only did Respondent’s actions fail to meet the requirements
of stalking under Florida Statute 784.048, the trial court’s injunction also
improperly restrained Respondent’s exercise of his constitutional rights.
For these reasons, we reverse the injunction.
Reversed.
LEVINE, C.J., GROSS, DAMOORGIAN, GERBER, CONNER, FORST, and KUNTZ,...
...I write separately only to
emphasize a point not raised until the majority opinion’s conclusion: “[W]e
do not hold that an elected official can never be the victim of stalking.”
Maj. op. at 18.
None of the four statutes currently addressing stalking – sections
784.048,
784.0485,
784.0487, and
784.049, Florida Statutes (2019) –
exclude an elected official from being the victim of stalking or from seeking
an injunction for protection against stalking. Further, while section
784.048(1)(b) provides the term “course of conduct,” as used in the
stalking statutes, “does not include constitutionally protected activity such
as picketing or other organized protests,” that exclusion should not be read
to suggest...
...stalking under the
foregoing statutes.
As the majority opinion indicates, “[t]he law requires that before an
injunction such as this can be granted there must be legal, articulable acts
of harassment, stalking, or credible threats pursuant to section 784.048.
Here, Respondent’s actions do not rise to that level.” Maj....
...fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her family members or
individuals closely associated with the person, and which is made with the
apparent ability to carry out the threat to cause such harm,” thus
qualifying as a “credible threat” under section 784.048....
...official facing such a threat with the protections which the law permits.
CONNER and FORST, JJ., concur.
MAY, J., dissenting.
21
We join in the majority’s decision to recognize that social media can
qualify as the type of conduct covered by section 784.048, Florida
Statutes....
...In our view, the majority did not give the trial court that discretion.
An injunction may issue when a person stalks another individual. See
§748.048, Fla. Stat. “A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of
stalking . . . .” § 784.048(2), Fla....
...4th DCA 2016)
to suggest the petitioner must prove two instances of stalking. See Maj. op. at 6-
7. However, the statute does not require two incidents of stalking. Rather it
requires “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ing], harass[ing], or
cyberstalk[ing],” which constitutes stalking. § 784.048(2), Fla....
...llful,
malicious, and repeated harassment sufficient to satisfy the statute.
A “‘[c]ourse of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of a series
of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity
of purpose.” §784.048(1)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 368743
...Licko, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Miami, for respondent. SHAW, Justice. We have for review Perez v. State,
648 So.2d 784 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), wherein the district court certified a question concerning the constitutionality of Florida's anti-stalking statute, section
784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1995 WL 368414
...Andrew Higgins and Ernie Bennett seek review of the district court decision reported as State v. Tremmel,
644 So.2d 102 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), wherein the court certified a question concerning the constitutionality of Florida's anti-stalking statute, section
784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
stalking after an injunction, in violation of section
784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2021). A jury convicted
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...4th DCA 2009) (quoting Jenkins,
963 So. 2d at 313)
(emphases added). “On appeal, the trial court’s order is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard.” Davis v. State,
796 So. 2d 1222, 1225
(Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
The trial court determined that Appellant had violated section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2018), which provides in pertinent part that
“[a] person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly ....
....
another person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first
degree . . . .” The statute defines “harass” as “engag[ing] in a course of
conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional
distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a),
Fla....
...urt noted that the ruling
“includes, but is not limited to these [] acts described by the testimony.”
4
not include constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other
organized protests.” § 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...use injury to include
behavior that is ‘without just cause or excuse.’” Khan v. Deutschman,
282
So. 3d 965, 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (quoting Malicious, Black’s Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). This court has held that “[t]aking the text of
section
784.048(4) as a whole, and considering its context and the
discernible purposes of the legislature, we conclude that the plain meaning
of the statutory term maliciously is legal malice: i.e....
...So regarding the record of findings by the trial court, we are
constrained to review the application of law to only those incidents of
conduct articulated by the trial judge in finding a pattern of conduct
constituting stalking behavior. 3 See Thoma,
180 So. 3d at 1160.
Under section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2018), “[a] person who
willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks
another person commits the offense of stalking . . . .” Further, the statute
defines “harass” as a “means to engage in a course of conduct directed at
a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that
person and serves no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(1)(a). This statute
specifically exempts constitutionally protected activities. See §
784.048(1)(b).
“[C]ourts have generally held that contact is legitimate when there is a
reason for the contact other than to harass the victim.” O’Neill v....
...In fact, nothing in the record suggests that appellant
ever threatened the Shockleys with harm. Mere irritation, annoyance,
embarrassment, exasperation, aggravation, and frustration, without more,
does not equate to “substantial emotional distress.” See § 784.048(1).
To satisfy this prong of the stalking statute, the court must find that
the defendant’s conduct caused distress which is greater than just an
ordinary feeling of discomfort....
...See Zelaya v.
State,
87 So. 3d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). But such revocations
must have a sufficient legal and factual basis, and this record shows there
was not. Unlike the majority, I would not elevate this neighborhood
squabble into the ambit of section
784.048(2)....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 248266
...[2] The trial court's decision is contrary to our opinion in Bouters v. State,
634 So.2d 246 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. COBB, W. SHARP and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §
784.048(2), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
injunction for protection against stalking[.]” Section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2019), states that stalking
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 3673881, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 11388
...section
741.28(2). We thus look to the statute that proscribes stalking to determine the
essential elements of that offense.
Stalking occurs when a person "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follows, harasses, or cyberstalks" another. §
784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2011). Cf.
§
784.048(3) (aggravated stalking occurs when a person "willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person and makes a credible threat
to that person" (emphasis added))....
...images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail
or electronic communication, directed at a specific person,
causing substantial emotional distress to that person and
serving no legitimate purpose.
§ 784.048(1)(d).
Mr....
...See, e.g., Steven Scott Stephens,
1
The only case relied upon by Mr. Branson that actually addressed
cyberstalking concluded that the subject acts did not fall within the definitional language
of the offense that is set forth in section 784.048(1)(d)....
...a recent offense of stalking, the elements of which might not have been provable under
the facts of the case.
-4-
"Injunction for protection—Stalking," in Fla. Family Law § 14:14 (23 West's Fla. Practice
Series 2012 ed.). Cf. § 784.0485(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...is going to enter an order of injunction prohibiting [Appellant] from
having any contact with [Appellee] or his family.” This appeal
followed.
In 2012, the Legislature created a cause of action for an
injunction for protection against stalking. See § 784.0485(1), Fla.
Stat. (2012). “Stalking” is defined as “willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly follow[ing], harass[ing], or cyberstalk[ing] another
2
person.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2018). “Harass” means “to
engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which
causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no
legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). “Course of
conduct” means “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts
over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity
of purpose.” § 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...“Cyberstalk” means
to “engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be
communicated, words, images, or language by or through the use
of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a
specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that
person and serving no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(d), Fla.
Stat. (2018).
To be entitled to an injunction under section 784.0485, a
petitioner must prove by competent, substantial evidence a single
incident of stalking....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 2812958
...violence in section
784.046 includes stalking. Here, there was competent, substantial evidence of stalking. "Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking...." §
784.048(2). Harrass "means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose." §
784.048(1)(a). A course of conduct "means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose...." §
784.048(1)(b)....
...Thus, the record reflects competent, substantial evidence of a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, directed at a specific person such that it "cause[d] substantial emotional distress in such person and serve[d] no legitimate purpose." § 784.048(1)(a)-(b)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
reasonable-person standard we must apply. See §
784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat.; see also Bouters v. State,
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...Once served with the injunction, Baruti filed a motion to vacate
and/or dissolve the final judgment, which was denied. This appeal followed.
We review entry of an injunction against stalking for competent,
substantial evidence. See Packal v. Johnson,
226 So. 3d 337, 338 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2017). Under section
784.048, “[a] person who willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the
offense of stalking[.]” §
784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2021). “‘Harrass’ means to
engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes
substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate
purpose.” §
784.048(1)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Because the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the injunction, we reverse.
Ms. Abercrombie and Ryan Nenneman dated for several months.
More than a year and a half after their relationship ended, Mr.
Nenneman petitioned for a stalking injunction against Ms. Abercrombie
pursuant to section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2023)....
...Abercrombie now appeals.
Ms. Abercrombie raises multiple arguments but we primarily
address only one. Ms. Abercrombie argues—and we agree—that the
evidence is insufficient to establish that her conduct caused substantial
emotional distress.1 Under section 784.0485(6)(a), a court may enter an
injunction "when it appears to the court that the petitioner is the victim
of stalking." Under section 784.048(2), a person commits stalking if she
or he "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or
cyberstalks another person." And under section 784.048(1)(a), "harass"
means "to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person
which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no
legitimate purpose." In this case, to be entitled to a stalking injunction,
Mr....
...Abercrombie's petitions for
sexual violence injunctions against Mr. Nenneman and any police report
she filed in conjunction therewith cannot be considered harassment or
stalking. The evidence did not show that these actions "serve[d] no
legitimate purpose" so they could not support a stalking injunction. 3 See
§ 784.048(1)(a); DiTanna v....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...DVCE-20-
000510.
John J.R. Skrandel of Jerome F. Skrandel, PL, North Palm Beach, for
appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
FORST, J.
Appellant Vicki Paige Ahern challenges the final judgment of injunction
for protection against stalking issued pursuant to section 784.0485(1),
Florida Statutes (2019)....
...is a question of law that we review de novo.” Krapacs v. Bacchus,
301 So.
3d 976, 978 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (quoting Pickett v. Copeland,
236 So. 3d
1142, 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)).
Courts have the authority to enjoin stalking and/or
cyberstalking under section
784.0485, Florida Statutes
(2015). “A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the
offense of stalking ....” §
784.048(2), Fla. Stat (2015). “‘Harass’
means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person which causes substantial emotional distress to that
person and serves no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(1)(a).
O’Neill, 195 So....
...on First
Amendment rights.’” Concerned Citizens for Judicial Fairness,
Inc. v. Yacucci,
162 So.3d 68, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting
Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 559,
96 S.Ct. 2791,
49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976)). Section
784.048 itself recognizes the
First Amendment rights of individuals by concluding that a
“course of conduct” for purposes of the statute does not
include protected speech. §
784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...ence or imminent danger
that satisfy the statute.”), and cases cited therein.
As noted above, “[a] person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of
stalking . . . .” § 784.048(2), Fla....
...Nor can we conclude that Appellant “repeatedly . . . harass[ed]”
Appellee. “‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person
and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...instructions as proposed by the Committee and authorize them for publication and
use. All of the instructions are updated to include the amended definition for
“cyberstalk” based upon chapter 2019-167, section 31, Laws of Florida, which
amended section 784.048(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2019)....
...Liaison, Office of the State Courts Administrator, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
-3-
APPENDIX
8.6 STALKING
§ 784.048(2), Fla....
...Stat.
To prove the crime of Stalking, the State must prove the following
element beyond a reasonable doubt:
(Defendant) willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly [followed] [harassed]
[or] [cyberstalked] (victim).
Definitions.
§ 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
“Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves
no legitimate purpose.
§ 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...The term does not include constitutionally protected activity such as
picketing or other organized protests.
Patterson v. State,
512 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
“Willfully” means knowingly, intentionally and purposely.
Give if applicable.
§
784.048(1)(d), Fla....
...connected home electronic systems of another person without that person’s
permission,] causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving
no legitimate purpose.
Lesser Included Offenses
STALKING — 784.048(2)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....
...following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. (Defendant) willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly [followed]
[harassed] [or] [cyberstalked] (victim); and
2. (Defendant) made a credible threat to (victim).
Definitions.
§ 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
“Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves
no legitimate purpose.
§ 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...The term does not include constitutionally protected activity such as
picketing or other organized protests.
Patterson v. State,
512 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
“Willfully” means knowingly, intentionally and purposely.
Give if applicable.
§
784.048(1)(d), Fla....
...person,] [or] [to access or attempt to access the online accounts or Internet-
connected home electronic systems of another person without that person’s
permission,] causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving
no legitimate purpose.
§ 784.048(1)(c), Fla....
...threat had the actual intent to carry out the threat.
Give if applicable.
The present incarceration of the person making the threat is not a bar
to prosecution.
Lesser Included Offenses
AGGRAVATED STALKING —
784.048(3)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO.
Stalking
784.048(2) 8.6
Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1
Assault
784.011 8.1
Improper exhibition of
790.10...
...3d 755], and 2020. to incorporate the
change in law effective October 1, 2012.
-6-
8.7(b) AGGRAVATED STALKING
(Injunction Entered)
§ 784.048(4), Fla....
...a court had imposed a prohibition of conduct on
(defendant) toward (victim) or (victim’s property).
3. (Defendant) knew that the [injunction] [court-imposed prohibition
of conduct] had been entered against [him] [her].
Definitions.
§ 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
“Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves
no legitimate purpose.
§ 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...The term does not include constitutionally protected activity such as
picketing or other organized protests.
Patterson v. State,
512 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
“Willfully” means knowingly, intentionally and purposely.
Give if applicable.
§
784.048(1)(d), Fla....
...State,
955 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
“Maliciously” means wrongfully, intentionally, and without legal
justification or excuse.
Lesser Included Offenses
AGGRAVATED STALKING (Injunction Entered) —
784.048(4)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO.
Stalking
784.048(2) 8.6
Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1
Violation of injunction for
741.31(4) 8.168
protection against domestic
violence
Violation of injunction for
784.047 8.19
protection against repeat,
sexual, or dating violence
Violation of injunction for
784.0487(4) 8.24
protection against stalking or
cyberstalking
Comments
See Seese v....
...2d 495], 2008 [
995 So. 2d 476], and 2013 [
131 So. 3d 755], and
2020.
-8-
8.7(c) AGGRAVATED STALKING
(Victim under 16 years of age)
§
784.048(5), Fla....
...1. (Defendant) willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly [followed]
[harassed] [or] [cyberstalked] (victim); and,
2. At the time of (defendant’s) actions, (victim) was under 16 years of
age.
Definitions.
§ 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
“Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves
no legitimate purpose.
§ 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...The term does not include constitutionally protected activity such as
picketing or other organized protests.
Patterson v. State,
512 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
“Willfully” means knowingly, intentionally and purposely.
Give if applicable.
§
784.048(1)(d), Fla....
...permission,] causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving
no legitimate purpose.
-9-
Lesser Included Offenses
AGGRAVATED STALKING (Victim under 16 years of age) —
784.048(5)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO.
Stalking
784.048(2) 8.6
Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1
Violation of injunction
741.31(4) 8.18
for protection against
domestic violence
Violation of injunction
784.047 8.19
for protection against
repeat, sexual, or dating
violence
Violation of injunction
784.0487(4) 8.24
for protection against
stalking or cyberstalking
Comment
This instruction was adopted in 2000 [765 So....
...2d 692] and amended in 2007
[
953 So. 2d 495], and 2013 [
131 So. 3d 755], and 2020.
8.7(d) AGGRAVATED STALKING
(Defendant previously sentenced for sex offense
and was prohibited from contacting victim)
§
784.048(7), Fla....
...As part of that sentencing, (defendant) was ordered to have no
contact with (victim).
3. After the sentencing, (defendant) willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly [followed] [harassed] [or] [cyberstalked] (victim).
- 10 -
Definitions.
§ 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
“Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves
no legitimate purpose.
§ 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...The term does not include constitutionally protected activity such as
picketing or other organized protests.
Patterson v. State,
512 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
“Willfully” means knowingly, intentionally and purposely.
Give if applicable.
§
784.048(1)(d), Fla....
...4th DCA 2007).
“Maliciously” means wrongfully, intentionally, and without legal
justification or excuse.
Lesser Included Offenses
AGGRAVATED STALKING (Defendant previously sentenced for sex
offense and was prohibited from contacting victim) —
784.048(7)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO.
Stalking
784.048(2) 8.6
Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1
Violation of injunction
741.31(4) 8.18
for protection against
domestic violence...
...- 11 -
Violation of injunction
784.047 8.19
for protection against
repeat, sexual, or dating
violence
Violation of injunction
784.0487(4) 8.24
for protection against
stalking or cyberstalking
Comment
This instruction was adopted in 2013 [131 So....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Albert,
123 So. 3d 663,
664 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). But the question of whether the evidence
is legally sufficient to justify imposing an injunction is a question
of law that we review de novo. Wills v. Jones,
213 So. 3d 982, 984
(Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
Section
784.0485(1), Florida Statutes (2016), “create[s] a
cause of action for an injunction for protection against stalking.”
The “petition for an injunction for protection against stalking may
be filed in the circuit where the petitioner currently or temporarily
resides, where the respondent resides, or where the stalking
occurred.” §
784.0485(1)(f), Fla. Stat. As defined in section
784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2016), stalking occurs when a person
“willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or
cyberstalks another person[.]” (Emphasis added.) “Harass” is
defined in section
784.048(1)(a) to mean “engag[ing] in a course of
conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial
emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate
purpose.” (Emphasis added.) In its turn, “course of conduct” is
defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a
period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of
purpose.” §
784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...ition, which
are directed against the petitioner or the petitioner’s immediate
family member.’” Wyandt v. Voccio,
148 So. 3d 543, 544 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2014) (emphasis added); see also David v. Textor,
189 So. 3d
871, 874-75 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (“Section
784.0485, Florida
Statutes (2014), allows an injunction against stalking, including
cyberstalking....
...ases analyzing
allegations of stalking in the context of section
784.046, which
applies to injunctions for protection against repeat violence, sexual
violence, and dating violence.”) (footnote omitted).
However, nowhere in the definitions of section
784.048 is
stalking defined as a multiple of itself. Stalking is defined simply
as “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly” following, harassing, or
cyberstalking another person—not repeatedly stalking another
person. §
784.048(2), Fla. Stat. Equally important, section
784.0485 makes no reference to the provisions of the repeat
violence statute; does not mandate “guidance” from the repeat
violence provisions; and, independent of the requirements of
section
784.046, creates a “cause of action for an injunction for
protection against stalking.” §
784.0485(1), Fla....
...Stat.; see M.
Kimberly Martyn, Representing Battered Spouses, Florida
Dissolution of Marriage, §21.78 (Fla. Bar CLE 12th ed. 2015)
(“Effective October 1, 2012, a fifth type of protective injunction
3
exists for protection against stalking. F.S. 784.0485(1)....
...is similar to the current cause[] of
action for [an] injunction[] against repeat violence.’” Id. (quoting
Fla. S. Crim. Justice Comm., SB 950 (2012), Staff Analysis (Jan.
24, 2012)). We are not persuaded by the referenced staff analysis
to abandon our view that the term “stalking” as used in section
784.0485 should be read in the singular....
...[and] where the [statutory]
language is clear, courts need no other aids for determining
legislative intent.” Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp.,
908 So. 2d 360, 375-76 (Fla. 2005) (Cantero, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). The language is clear in section
784.0485; the
words of the statute are sufficient.
Second, our reading of the full staff analysis only serves to
confirm our present conclusion, to the extent that the analysis
expressly recognized the need for an injunction specificall...
...ion. Were we to
adopt such an interpretation, Appellant could have threatened or
followed Appellee four times before the circuit court could issue a
protective injunction.”) (emphasis in the original). Therefore,
based on the statutory language of section 784.0485, and the
definitions set forth in section 784.048, we hold that the injunction
provisions of section 784.0485 only require the petitioner to prove
a single incident of stalking.
Turning to the facts of this case, it was incumbent on Ms.
Copeland to prove stalking by competent, substantial evidence.
Thoma v....
...Copeland accused Mr.
Pickett of driving past her house on multiple occasions—
presumably to prove harassment—the evidence only suggested a
single incident of his passing by, which falls short of a malicious
“course of conduct” serving “no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(1)(a), (b) & (2), Fla....
...Copeland to pull over into a
parking lot, Mr. Pickett got out of his vehicle and used his cell
phone to videotape her arrest. However, for purposes of the
definition of harassment, “course of conduct” “does not include
constitutionally protected activity[.]” § 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 175, 2004 WL 57378
...Third, Seitz argues that the court had no jurisdiction to revoke the three consecutive probation terms that had not yet commenced. 3 Seitz contends that he could not have violated terms of probation that had not yet begun to run. Contrary to Seitz’ first argument, section 784.048, Florida Statutes (2001) does not require contact, direct or indirect, with the victim....
...State,
388 So.2d 1345, 1347-48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Thus it was permissible to revoke the consecutive terms which had not yet commenced. The order revoking Seitz’ probation is affirmed. . Four consecutive terms of probation of 364 days each. . A violation of section
784.048, Florida Statutes (2001)....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...Bushell of Bushell Law, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Marc A. Silverman of Frank, Weinberg & Black, P.L., Plantation, for
appellee.
PER CURIAM.
We reverse the final judgment of injunction for protection against
stalking issued pursuant to section 784.0485(1), Florida Statutes (2020),
concluding that appellant’s repeated threats of litigation did not rise to the
level of causing substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person.
The evidence presented concerned appellant’s displeasure with a
woman’s testimony in another person’s injunction case....
...FORST, J., dissenting.
“Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except as otherwise
provided herein.” Art. I, § 23, Fla. Const. Florida’s anti-stalking law,
section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2020), “create[s] a cause of action for
an injunction for protection against stalking” by a nongovernmental actor.
Thus, the Florida Constitution protects an individual’s “right to be let
alone” from the...
...against stalking is reviewed for competent substantial evidence. O’Neill v.
Goodwin,
195 So. 3d 411, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
3
Courts have the authority to enjoin stalking and/or
cyberstalking under section
784.0485, Florida Statutes
(2015). “A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the
offense of stalking ....” §
784.048(2), Fla. Stat (2015).
“‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at
a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress
to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(1)(a).
Id.
A....
...toward the victim, as detailed above, which the trial court found to be
credible, presented competent substantial evidence that Appellant’s
course of conduct directed at the victim “cause[d] substantial emotional
distress to that person.” See § 784.048(1)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Argued: Jun 25, 2024
...B.
By contrast, at the time of McDonough’s second arrest, this
time for cyberstalking, the City did have probable cause to believe
that he had committed the crime. Cyberstalking is defined by Fla.
Stat. § 784.048(1)(d) as conduct communicating “words, images, or
language” to a particular person through email or other electronic
communication, “causing substantial emotional distress to that
person and serving no legitimate purpose.” The statute omits
“constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other
organized protests” from its ambit. Id. § 784.048(1)(b)....
...The statute defines a “course of conduct” as
“a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of
time, however short,” and McDonough argues that his three posts
should count as only one act. Fla. Stat. § 784.048(1)(b).
Florida courts have considered a similar issue—but not until
four years after McDonough’s arrest....
...As of 2016, without the benefit of
Krapacs, we cannot say that the City’s view that McDonough’s
three separate posts constituted “a pattern of conduct composed of
a series of acts over a period of time, however short,” was objectively
unreasonable. Fla. Stat. § 784.048(1)(b) (emphasis added)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
741.28(2), Fla. Stat., which is defined in section
784.048(2) to encompass when a person “willfully, maliciously
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
KHOUZAM, Judge. *1152 We affirm the judgment and sentence but remand for the trial court to correct a scrivener's error. Rondan Keith was charged in the information with violating section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2016), but was adjudicated guilty in the judgment of violating section 784.048(7)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, for Appellee.
KHOUZAM, Judge.
We affirm the judgment and sentence but remand for the trial court to
correct a scrivener's error. Rondan Keith was charged in the information with violating
section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2016), but was adjudicated guilty in the judgment
of violating section 784.048(7)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
KHOUZAM, Judge. *1152 We affirm the judgment and sentence but remand for the trial court to correct a scrivener's error. Rondan Keith was charged in the information with violating section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2016), but was adjudicated guilty in the judgment of violating section 784.048(7)....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...For example,
Florida’s anti-stalking statute defines prohibited harassment as “a course of
conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to
that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” Fla. Stat. § 784.048(1)(a).
Likewise, Florida employees are forbidden from engaging in sexual harassment,
which is defined as “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature from any person di...
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 1325, 1995 WL 59553
GUNTHER, Judge. Appellant, Hussein Altingeyik, defendant below, appeals an order denying his motion to declare section 784.048, Florida Statutes (1993), unconstitutional....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 113, 1993 Fla. LEXIS 172, 1993 WL 32299
...92-141, § 1, Laws of Fla. (adding definitions of proscribed ammunition to §
790.31, Fla.Stat.); ch. 92-155, § 3, Laws of Fla. (creating §
812.15, Fla.Stat., regarding unauthorized reception of cable services); and ch. 92-208, § 1, Laws of Fla. (creates §
784.048, Fla.Stat., regarding stalking).
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...resented in this case,
I would grant the defendant’s motion for certification to the supreme court
of the following two questions of great public importance:
1. DOES AN ACTION SERVE “NO LEGITIMATE PURPOSE”
WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 784.048(1)(A),
FLORIDA STATUTES, WHEN THE ACTION IS NOT
ENTIRELY BEREFT OF A VALID PURPOSE?
2. DOES AN ACTION CAUSE “SUBSTANTIAL EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS” WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION
784.048(1)(A), FLORIDA STATUTES, IF A REASONABLE
OBSERVER WOULD NOT SUFFER SIGNIFICANTLY
GREAT SUFFERING, DANGER, OR DESPERATE NEED AS
A RESULT OF THE ACTION?
* *...
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 18404, 2015 WL 8295056
...Bollea,
129 So. 3d 1196, 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (citation
omitted).
1The Victim is an African-American female who worked at an abortion clinic
described in the flyer as “located in a poor, black neighborhood.”
2
Section
784.0485(1), Florida Statutes (2014), creates “a cause of action
for an injunction for protection against stalking.” §
784.0485, Fla. Stat.
(2014). “A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows,
harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking.”
§
784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). To “harass” is defined as “engag[ing] in a
course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial
emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014).
Section
784.048(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), defines “course of
conduct” as
a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period
of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of
purpose....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 16258, 1999 WL 1111755
...to support them: (1) “[s]ince the entry of the domestic violence injunction the Husband has violated the injunction by following the Wife, including an incident at the Hope Shelter, which meets the definition of stalking found in Florida Statutes Section 784.048”; (2) “[t]he Husband has continued to try to control the Wife and the circumstances relating to their child, even after this action was brought, particularly during supervised visitations with the child”; and, (3) “the Husband...
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...ATKINSON, Judge.
Brittany Budlove appeals an April 8, 2022, order granting the
petitions of the five appellees—William Johnson, Joenetta Johnson,
Susanne Campbell, Tanya Lewis, and Rafaela McCoy—for protection
against stalking pursuant to sections 784.0485 and 784.048, Florida
Statutes (2021).1 We affirm the entry of all five injunctions for stalking
and reject without discussion Budlove's argument that there was
1 The five cases are consolidated for the purposes of the opinion.
2
insufficient evidence for the trial court to impose the injunctions against
her pursuant to sections 784.0485 and 784.048....
...While
the Florida Legislature has found that individuals should under some
circumstances be entitled to an injunction against harassment even
when that harassment unquestionably limits a person's speech, see, e.g.,
6
§§ 784.0485(1) ("For the purposes of injunctions for protection against
stalking under this section, the offense of stalking shall include the
offense of cyberstalking."); 784.048(1)(d)1 (" 'Cyberstalk' means ....
...through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed
at or pertaining to a specific person . . . ."), courts are not permitted to
enjoin a course of conduct to the extent that it encompasses
constitutionally protected activity, see § 784.048(1)(b) (specifying that the
"[c]ourse of conduct" constituting cyberstalking "does not include
constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other organized
protests")....
...Nothing in
this opinion does, or should be construed to, so narrowly confine the
trial court's discretion upon remand.
Our concurring colleague also points out that some case law relied
upon in the majority opinion predates the most recent amendment to
section 784.048, which added the phrases "directly or indirectly" and
"pertaining to" to the definition of cyberstalking....
..."Upon notice and hearing, when it appears to the court
that the petitioner is the victim of stalking, the court may grant such
relief as the court deems proper, including an injunction . . . [r]estraining
the respondent from committing any act of stalking." § 784.0485(6)(a)1.3
However, in fashioning such a remedy, the court is necessarily restrained
by the statutory definition of stalking, and because the statute
3 The statute also allows for injunctions "[o]rdering the respondent
to participate in treatment, intervention, or counseling services,"
"[r]eferring a petitioner to appropriate services," and "[o]rdering such
other relief as the court deems necessary for the protection of a victim of
stalking, including . . . directives to law enforcement agencies."
§ 784.0485(6)(a)2-4.
11
specifically states that stalking includes cyberstalking, the court also
must fashion a remedy within the statutory definition of cyberstalking.
Section 784.048(1)(d)1 defines cyberstalking as
[t]o engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause
to be communicated, directly or indirectly, words, images, or
language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic
communication, directed at or pertaining to a specific person
....
...causing substantial emotional distress to that person and
serving no legitimate purpose.[4]
(Emphasis added.)
A course of conduct is defined in the statute as "a pattern of
conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however
short, which evidences a continuity of purpose." § 784.048(1)(b).
Importantly, the statute specifically states that "[t]he term does not
include constitutionally protected activity." Id.
Accordingly, in order to be entitled to entry of an injunction based
on an allegation of cyberstalking, a...
...been communicated to the respondent AND that the communication of
the particular words, images, or language caused the respondent
substantial emotion distress AND that there was no legitimate purpose
behind the communication of the particular words, images, or language.
See § 784.048(1)(b), (d)1. Furthermore, once a petitioner has met this
burden, the remedy fashioned by the trial court may include enjoining
the respondent from further acts of stalking (including cyberstalking) but
4 Section 784.048(1)(d)2 provides an alternate definition of
cyberstalking that is not applicable to the instant case.
12
may not include enjoining the respondent from engaging in
"constitutionally protected acti...
...nable person standard.' "
(alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Blum,
191 So. 3d 502, 504 (Fla.
2d DCA 2016))).
With regard to Budlove's argument that her posts do not amount to
cyberstalking because they were not directed at petitioners, section
784.048 was amended in 2021 to add the bolded words in the following
definition of "cyberstalking": " 'Cyberstalk' means ....
...[t]o engage in a
course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated,
directly or indirectly, words, images, or language by or through the use
of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at or pertaining
to a specific person . . . ." See ch. 2021-220, § 1, Laws of Fla.; see also §
784.048(1)(d)1.
Although Budlove cites and quotes the 2021 version of the statute
in her briefs before this court, she ignores the language added by the
2021 amendment and cites only preamendment case law for the
proposition that because she...
...3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). Furthermore, the cases that
Budlove cites to support her contention all involve preamendment
versions of section 784.048, none of which included communications
pertaining to an individual in the definition of "cyberstalking."
But Budlove also argues that she had a First Amendment right to
publish the posts that she previously made on her social me...
...rough
e: (a) Substantial emotional distress, (b) Directed at Appellee, (c) No
legitimate purpose, (d) First Amendment rights, and (e) Cyberstalking
overall. Under point d, Budlove quotes David,
189 So. 3d at 875, for the
proposition that ''[s]ection
784.048 itself recognizes the First Amendment
rights of individuals by concluding that a 'course of conduct' for
purposes of the statute does not include protected speech.'' I interpret
this as clearly arguing that the entry of the injunction violate...
...2d DCA 2020).
However, as to the remedy fashioned by the trial court in crafting
the language of these injunctions, I agree with Budlove—and with the
majority opinion—that the plain language of the injunctions improperly
encompasses some "constitutionally protected activity." See §
784.048(1)(b) ("The term [course of conduct used in the definition of
cyberstalking] does not include constitutionally protected activity."); see
also Smith v....
...On appeal, David argued that "the
conduct alleged in Textor's ex parte petition for the injunction does not
constitute cyberstalking, and the injunction violates the First
Amendment."
189 So. 3d at 873.
18
The Fourth District, analyzing the 2014 preamendment version of
section
784.048, concluded that the trial court erred in finding the
existence of cyberstalking....
...may be resolved on other grounds."), the Fourth District proceeded to the
First Amendment issue and tied the statutory phrase "words, images, or
language . . . directed at a specific person" in the definition of
cyberstalking found in the 2014 version of section 784.048(1)(d)1 to its
constitutional analysis....
..." '[P]rior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and the least
tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights.' " Concerned Citizens for Judicial Fairness, Inc. v.
Yacucci,
162 So. 3d 68, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Neb.
Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976)). Section
784.048 itself recognizes the First Amendment rights of
individuals by concluding that a "course of conduct" for
purposes of the statute does not include protected speech. §
784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...solely of communications
pertaining to the petitioners that were not sent directly to them. If the
majority is convinced that communications pertaining to but not directed
at the petitioner are excluded from the definition of "course of conduct"
in section
784.048(1)(b) because they are "constitutionally protected
activity"—and then necessarily excluded from the definitions of
cyberstalking in section
784.048(1)(d) and stalking in section
784.085(1)—then how can the majority find no error in the trial court's
determination that petitioners were the victims of previous acts of
stalking based on communications that only pertained to petiti...
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...ATKINSON, Judge.
Brittany Budlove appeals an April 8, 2022, order granting the
petitions of the five appellees—William Johnson, Joenetta Johnson,
Susanne Campbell, Tanya Lewis, and Rafaela McCoy—for protection
against stalking pursuant to sections 784.0485 and 784.048, Florida
Statutes (2021).1 We affirm the entry of all five injunctions for stalking
and reject without discussion Budlove's argument that there was
1 The five cases are consolidated for the purposes of the opinion.
2
insufficient evidence for the trial court to impose the injunctions against
her pursuant to sections 784.0485 and 784.048....
...While
the Florida Legislature has found that individuals should under some
circumstances be entitled to an injunction against harassment even
when that harassment unquestionably limits a person's speech, see, e.g.,
6
§§ 784.0485(1) ("For the purposes of injunctions for protection against
stalking under this section, the offense of stalking shall include the
offense of cyberstalking."); 784.048(1)(d)1 (" 'Cyberstalk' means ....
...through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed
at or pertaining to a specific person . . . ."), courts are not permitted to
enjoin a course of conduct to the extent that it encompasses
constitutionally protected activity, see § 784.048(1)(b) (specifying that the
"[c]ourse of conduct" constituting cyberstalking "does not include
constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other organized
protests")....
...Nothing in
this opinion does, or should be construed to, so narrowly confine the
trial court's discretion upon remand.
Our concurring colleague also points out that some case law relied
upon in the majority opinion predates the most recent amendment to
section 784.048, which added the phrases "directly or indirectly" and
"pertaining to" to the definition of cyberstalking....
..."Upon notice and hearing, when it appears to the court
that the petitioner is the victim of stalking, the court may grant such
relief as the court deems proper, including an injunction . . . [r]estraining
the respondent from committing any act of stalking." § 784.0485(6)(a)1.3
However, in fashioning such a remedy, the court is necessarily restrained
by the statutory definition of stalking, and because the statute
3 The statute also allows for injunctions "[o]rdering the respondent
to participate in treatment, intervention, or counseling services,"
"[r]eferring a petitioner to appropriate services," and "[o]rdering such
other relief as the court deems necessary for the protection of a victim of
stalking, including . . . directives to law enforcement agencies."
§ 784.0485(6)(a)2-4.
11
specifically states that stalking includes cyberstalking, the court also
must fashion a remedy within the statutory definition of cyberstalking.
Section 784.048(1)(d)1 defines cyberstalking as
[t]o engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause
to be communicated, directly or indirectly, words, images, or
language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic
communication, directed at or pertaining to a specific person
....
...causing substantial emotional distress to that person and
serving no legitimate purpose.[4]
(Emphasis added.)
A course of conduct is defined in the statute as "a pattern of
conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however
short, which evidences a continuity of purpose." § 784.048(1)(b).
Importantly, the statute specifically states that "[t]he term does not
include constitutionally protected activity." Id.
Accordingly, in order to be entitled to entry of an injunction based
on an allegation of cyberstalking, a...
...been communicated to the respondent AND that the communication of
the particular words, images, or language caused the respondent
substantial emotion distress AND that there was no legitimate purpose
behind the communication of the particular words, images, or language.
See § 784.048(1)(b), (d)1. Furthermore, once a petitioner has met this
burden, the remedy fashioned by the trial court may include enjoining
the respondent from further acts of stalking (including cyberstalking) but
4 Section 784.048(1)(d)2 provides an alternate definition of
cyberstalking that is not applicable to the instant case.
12
may not include enjoining the respondent from engaging in
"constitutionally protected acti...
...nable person standard.' "
(alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Blum,
191 So. 3d 502, 504 (Fla.
2d DCA 2016))).
With regard to Budlove's argument that her posts do not amount to
cyberstalking because they were not directed at petitioners, section
784.048 was amended in 2021 to add the bolded words in the following
definition of "cyberstalking": " 'Cyberstalk' means ....
...[t]o engage in a
course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated,
directly or indirectly, words, images, or language by or through the use
of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at or pertaining
to a specific person . . . ." See ch. 2021-220, § 1, Laws of Fla.; see also §
784.048(1)(d)1.
Although Budlove cites and quotes the 2021 version of the statute
in her briefs before this court, she ignores the language added by the
2021 amendment and cites only preamendment case law for the
proposition that because she...
...3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). Furthermore, the cases that
Budlove cites to support her contention all involve preamendment
versions of section 784.048, none of which included communications
pertaining to an individual in the definition of "cyberstalking."
But Budlove also argues that she had a First Amendment right to
publish the posts that she previously made on her social me...
...rough
e: (a) Substantial emotional distress, (b) Directed at Appellee, (c) No
legitimate purpose, (d) First Amendment rights, and (e) Cyberstalking
overall. Under point d, Budlove quotes David,
189 So. 3d at 875, for the
proposition that ''[s]ection
784.048 itself recognizes the First Amendment
rights of individuals by concluding that a 'course of conduct' for
purposes of the statute does not include protected speech.'' I interpret
this as clearly arguing that the entry of the injunction violate...
...2d DCA 2020).
However, as to the remedy fashioned by the trial court in crafting
the language of these injunctions, I agree with Budlove—and with the
majority opinion—that the plain language of the injunctions improperly
encompasses some "constitutionally protected activity." See §
784.048(1)(b) ("The term [course of conduct used in the definition of
cyberstalking] does not include constitutionally protected activity."); see
also Smith v....
...On appeal, David argued that "the
conduct alleged in Textor's ex parte petition for the injunction does not
constitute cyberstalking, and the injunction violates the First
Amendment."
189 So. 3d at 873.
18
The Fourth District, analyzing the 2014 preamendment version of
section
784.048, concluded that the trial court erred in finding the
existence of cyberstalking....
...may be resolved on other grounds."), the Fourth District proceeded to the
First Amendment issue and tied the statutory phrase "words, images, or
language . . . directed at a specific person" in the definition of
cyberstalking found in the 2014 version of section 784.048(1)(d)1 to its
constitutional analysis....
..." '[P]rior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and the least
tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights.' " Concerned Citizens for Judicial Fairness, Inc. v.
Yacucci,
162 So. 3d 68, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Neb.
Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976)). Section
784.048 itself recognizes the First Amendment rights of
individuals by concluding that a "course of conduct" for
purposes of the statute does not include protected speech. §
784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...solely of communications
pertaining to the petitioners that were not sent directly to them. If the
majority is convinced that communications pertaining to but not directed
at the petitioner are excluded from the definition of "course of conduct"
in section
784.048(1)(b) because they are "constitutionally protected
activity"—and then necessarily excluded from the definitions of
cyberstalking in section
784.048(1)(d) and stalking in section
784.085(1)—then how can the majority find no error in the trial court's
determination that petitioners were the victims of previous acts of
stalking based on communications that only pertained to petiti...
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...ATKINSON, Judge.
Brittany Budlove appeals an April 8, 2022, order granting the
petitions of the five appellees—William Johnson, Joenetta Johnson,
Susanne Campbell, Tanya Lewis, and Rafaela McCoy—for protection
against stalking pursuant to sections 784.0485 and 784.048, Florida
Statutes (2021).1 We affirm the entry of all five injunctions for stalking
and reject without discussion Budlove's argument that there was
1 The five cases are consolidated for the purposes of the opinion.
2
insufficient evidence for the trial court to impose the injunctions against
her pursuant to sections 784.0485 and 784.048....
...While
the Florida Legislature has found that individuals should under some
circumstances be entitled to an injunction against harassment even
when that harassment unquestionably limits a person's speech, see, e.g.,
6
§§ 784.0485(1) ("For the purposes of injunctions for protection against
stalking under this section, the offense of stalking shall include the
offense of cyberstalking."); 784.048(1)(d)1 (" 'Cyberstalk' means ....
...through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed
at or pertaining to a specific person . . . ."), courts are not permitted to
enjoin a course of conduct to the extent that it encompasses
constitutionally protected activity, see § 784.048(1)(b) (specifying that the
"[c]ourse of conduct" constituting cyberstalking "does not include
constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other organized
protests")....
...Nothing in
this opinion does, or should be construed to, so narrowly confine the
trial court's discretion upon remand.
Our concurring colleague also points out that some case law relied
upon in the majority opinion predates the most recent amendment to
section 784.048, which added the phrases "directly or indirectly" and
"pertaining to" to the definition of cyberstalking....
..."Upon notice and hearing, when it appears to the court
that the petitioner is the victim of stalking, the court may grant such
relief as the court deems proper, including an injunction . . . [r]estraining
the respondent from committing any act of stalking." § 784.0485(6)(a)1.3
However, in fashioning such a remedy, the court is necessarily restrained
by the statutory definition of stalking, and because the statute
3 The statute also allows for injunctions "[o]rdering the respondent
to participate in treatment, intervention, or counseling services,"
"[r]eferring a petitioner to appropriate services," and "[o]rdering such
other relief as the court deems necessary for the protection of a victim of
stalking, including . . . directives to law enforcement agencies."
§ 784.0485(6)(a)2-4.
11
specifically states that stalking includes cyberstalking, the court also
must fashion a remedy within the statutory definition of cyberstalking.
Section 784.048(1)(d)1 defines cyberstalking as
[t]o engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause
to be communicated, directly or indirectly, words, images, or
language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic
communication, directed at or pertaining to a specific person
....
...causing substantial emotional distress to that person and
serving no legitimate purpose.[4]
(Emphasis added.)
A course of conduct is defined in the statute as "a pattern of
conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however
short, which evidences a continuity of purpose." § 784.048(1)(b).
Importantly, the statute specifically states that "[t]he term does not
include constitutionally protected activity." Id.
Accordingly, in order to be entitled to entry of an injunction based
on an allegation of cyberstalking, a...
...been communicated to the respondent AND that the communication of
the particular words, images, or language caused the respondent
substantial emotion distress AND that there was no legitimate purpose
behind the communication of the particular words, images, or language.
See § 784.048(1)(b), (d)1. Furthermore, once a petitioner has met this
burden, the remedy fashioned by the trial court may include enjoining
the respondent from further acts of stalking (including cyberstalking) but
4 Section 784.048(1)(d)2 provides an alternate definition of
cyberstalking that is not applicable to the instant case.
12
may not include enjoining the respondent from engaging in
"constitutionally protected acti...
...nable person standard.' "
(alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Blum,
191 So. 3d 502, 504 (Fla.
2d DCA 2016))).
With regard to Budlove's argument that her posts do not amount to
cyberstalking because they were not directed at petitioners, section
784.048 was amended in 2021 to add the bolded words in the following
definition of "cyberstalking": " 'Cyberstalk' means ....
...[t]o engage in a
course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated,
directly or indirectly, words, images, or language by or through the use
of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at or pertaining
to a specific person . . . ." See ch. 2021-220, § 1, Laws of Fla.; see also §
784.048(1)(d)1.
Although Budlove cites and quotes the 2021 version of the statute
in her briefs before this court, she ignores the language added by the
2021 amendment and cites only preamendment case law for the
proposition that because she...
...3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). Furthermore, the cases that
Budlove cites to support her contention all involve preamendment
versions of section 784.048, none of which included communications
pertaining to an individual in the definition of "cyberstalking."
But Budlove also argues that she had a First Amendment right to
publish the posts that she previously made on her social me...
...rough
e: (a) Substantial emotional distress, (b) Directed at Appellee, (c) No
legitimate purpose, (d) First Amendment rights, and (e) Cyberstalking
overall. Under point d, Budlove quotes David,
189 So. 3d at 875, for the
proposition that ''[s]ection
784.048 itself recognizes the First Amendment
rights of individuals by concluding that a 'course of conduct' for
purposes of the statute does not include protected speech.'' I interpret
this as clearly arguing that the entry of the injunction violate...
...2d DCA 2020).
However, as to the remedy fashioned by the trial court in crafting
the language of these injunctions, I agree with Budlove—and with the
majority opinion—that the plain language of the injunctions improperly
encompasses some "constitutionally protected activity." See §
784.048(1)(b) ("The term [course of conduct used in the definition of
cyberstalking] does not include constitutionally protected activity."); see
also Smith v....
...On appeal, David argued that "the
conduct alleged in Textor's ex parte petition for the injunction does not
constitute cyberstalking, and the injunction violates the First
Amendment."
189 So. 3d at 873.
18
The Fourth District, analyzing the 2014 preamendment version of
section
784.048, concluded that the trial court erred in finding the
existence of cyberstalking....
...may be resolved on other grounds."), the Fourth District proceeded to the
First Amendment issue and tied the statutory phrase "words, images, or
language . . . directed at a specific person" in the definition of
cyberstalking found in the 2014 version of section 784.048(1)(d)1 to its
constitutional analysis....
..." '[P]rior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and the least
tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights.' " Concerned Citizens for Judicial Fairness, Inc. v.
Yacucci,
162 So. 3d 68, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Neb.
Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976)). Section
784.048 itself recognizes the First Amendment rights of
individuals by concluding that a "course of conduct" for
purposes of the statute does not include protected speech. §
784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...solely of communications
pertaining to the petitioners that were not sent directly to them. If the
majority is convinced that communications pertaining to but not directed
at the petitioner are excluded from the definition of "course of conduct"
in section
784.048(1)(b) because they are "constitutionally protected
activity"—and then necessarily excluded from the definitions of
cyberstalking in section
784.048(1)(d) and stalking in section
784.085(1)—then how can the majority find no error in the trial court's
determination that petitioners were the victims of previous acts of
stalking based on communications that only pertained to petiti...
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...ATKINSON, Judge.
Brittany Budlove appeals an April 8, 2022, order granting the
petitions of the five appellees—William Johnson, Joenetta Johnson,
Susanne Campbell, Tanya Lewis, and Rafaela McCoy—for protection
against stalking pursuant to sections 784.0485 and 784.048, Florida
Statutes (2021).1 We affirm the entry of all five injunctions for stalking
and reject without discussion Budlove's argument that there was
1 The five cases are consolidated for the purposes of the opinion.
2
insufficient evidence for the trial court to impose the injunctions against
her pursuant to sections 784.0485 and 784.048....
...While
the Florida Legislature has found that individuals should under some
circumstances be entitled to an injunction against harassment even
when that harassment unquestionably limits a person's speech, see, e.g.,
6
§§ 784.0485(1) ("For the purposes of injunctions for protection against
stalking under this section, the offense of stalking shall include the
offense of cyberstalking."); 784.048(1)(d)1 (" 'Cyberstalk' means ....
...through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed
at or pertaining to a specific person . . . ."), courts are not permitted to
enjoin a course of conduct to the extent that it encompasses
constitutionally protected activity, see § 784.048(1)(b) (specifying that the
"[c]ourse of conduct" constituting cyberstalking "does not include
constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other organized
protests")....
...Nothing in
this opinion does, or should be construed to, so narrowly confine the
trial court's discretion upon remand.
Our concurring colleague also points out that some case law relied
upon in the majority opinion predates the most recent amendment to
section 784.048, which added the phrases "directly or indirectly" and
"pertaining to" to the definition of cyberstalking....
..."Upon notice and hearing, when it appears to the court
that the petitioner is the victim of stalking, the court may grant such
relief as the court deems proper, including an injunction . . . [r]estraining
the respondent from committing any act of stalking." § 784.0485(6)(a)1.3
However, in fashioning such a remedy, the court is necessarily restrained
by the statutory definition of stalking, and because the statute
3 The statute also allows for injunctions "[o]rdering the respondent
to participate in treatment, intervention, or counseling services,"
"[r]eferring a petitioner to appropriate services," and "[o]rdering such
other relief as the court deems necessary for the protection of a victim of
stalking, including . . . directives to law enforcement agencies."
§ 784.0485(6)(a)2-4.
11
specifically states that stalking includes cyberstalking, the court also
must fashion a remedy within the statutory definition of cyberstalking.
Section 784.048(1)(d)1 defines cyberstalking as
[t]o engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause
to be communicated, directly or indirectly, words, images, or
language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic
communication, directed at or pertaining to a specific person
....
...causing substantial emotional distress to that person and
serving no legitimate purpose.[4]
(Emphasis added.)
A course of conduct is defined in the statute as "a pattern of
conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however
short, which evidences a continuity of purpose." § 784.048(1)(b).
Importantly, the statute specifically states that "[t]he term does not
include constitutionally protected activity." Id.
Accordingly, in order to be entitled to entry of an injunction based
on an allegation of cyberstalking, a...
...been communicated to the respondent AND that the communication of
the particular words, images, or language caused the respondent
substantial emotion distress AND that there was no legitimate purpose
behind the communication of the particular words, images, or language.
See § 784.048(1)(b), (d)1. Furthermore, once a petitioner has met this
burden, the remedy fashioned by the trial court may include enjoining
the respondent from further acts of stalking (including cyberstalking) but
4 Section 784.048(1)(d)2 provides an alternate definition of
cyberstalking that is not applicable to the instant case.
12
may not include enjoining the respondent from engaging in
"constitutionally protected acti...
...nable person standard.' "
(alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Blum,
191 So. 3d 502, 504 (Fla.
2d DCA 2016))).
With regard to Budlove's argument that her posts do not amount to
cyberstalking because they were not directed at petitioners, section
784.048 was amended in 2021 to add the bolded words in the following
definition of "cyberstalking": " 'Cyberstalk' means ....
...[t]o engage in a
course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated,
directly or indirectly, words, images, or language by or through the use
of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at or pertaining
to a specific person . . . ." See ch. 2021-220, § 1, Laws of Fla.; see also §
784.048(1)(d)1.
Although Budlove cites and quotes the 2021 version of the statute
in her briefs before this court, she ignores the language added by the
2021 amendment and cites only preamendment case law for the
proposition that because she...
...3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). Furthermore, the cases that
Budlove cites to support her contention all involve preamendment
versions of section 784.048, none of which included communications
pertaining to an individual in the definition of "cyberstalking."
But Budlove also argues that she had a First Amendment right to
publish the posts that she previously made on her social me...
...rough
e: (a) Substantial emotional distress, (b) Directed at Appellee, (c) No
legitimate purpose, (d) First Amendment rights, and (e) Cyberstalking
overall. Under point d, Budlove quotes David,
189 So. 3d at 875, for the
proposition that ''[s]ection
784.048 itself recognizes the First Amendment
rights of individuals by concluding that a 'course of conduct' for
purposes of the statute does not include protected speech.'' I interpret
this as clearly arguing that the entry of the injunction violate...
...2d DCA 2020).
However, as to the remedy fashioned by the trial court in crafting
the language of these injunctions, I agree with Budlove—and with the
majority opinion—that the plain language of the injunctions improperly
encompasses some "constitutionally protected activity." See §
784.048(1)(b) ("The term [course of conduct used in the definition of
cyberstalking] does not include constitutionally protected activity."); see
also Smith v....
...On appeal, David argued that "the
conduct alleged in Textor's ex parte petition for the injunction does not
constitute cyberstalking, and the injunction violates the First
Amendment."
189 So. 3d at 873.
18
The Fourth District, analyzing the 2014 preamendment version of
section
784.048, concluded that the trial court erred in finding the
existence of cyberstalking....
...may be resolved on other grounds."), the Fourth District proceeded to the
First Amendment issue and tied the statutory phrase "words, images, or
language . . . directed at a specific person" in the definition of
cyberstalking found in the 2014 version of section 784.048(1)(d)1 to its
constitutional analysis....
..." '[P]rior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and the least
tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights.' " Concerned Citizens for Judicial Fairness, Inc. v.
Yacucci,
162 So. 3d 68, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Neb.
Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976)). Section
784.048 itself recognizes the First Amendment rights of
individuals by concluding that a "course of conduct" for
purposes of the statute does not include protected speech. §
784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...solely of communications
pertaining to the petitioners that were not sent directly to them. If the
majority is convinced that communications pertaining to but not directed
at the petitioner are excluded from the definition of "course of conduct"
in section
784.048(1)(b) because they are "constitutionally protected
activity"—and then necessarily excluded from the definitions of
cyberstalking in section
784.048(1)(d) and stalking in section
784.085(1)—then how can the majority find no error in the trial court's
determination that petitioners were the victims of previous acts of
stalking based on communications that only pertained to petiti...
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...ATKINSON, Judge.
Brittany Budlove appeals an April 8, 2022, order granting the
petitions of the five appellees—William Johnson, Joenetta Johnson,
Susanne Campbell, Tanya Lewis, and Rafaela McCoy—for protection
against stalking pursuant to sections 784.0485 and 784.048, Florida
Statutes (2021).1 We affirm the entry of all five injunctions for stalking
and reject without discussion Budlove's argument that there was
1 The five cases are consolidated for the purposes of the opinion.
2
insufficient evidence for the trial court to impose the injunctions against
her pursuant to sections 784.0485 and 784.048....
...While
the Florida Legislature has found that individuals should under some
circumstances be entitled to an injunction against harassment even
when that harassment unquestionably limits a person's speech, see, e.g.,
6
§§ 784.0485(1) ("For the purposes of injunctions for protection against
stalking under this section, the offense of stalking shall include the
offense of cyberstalking."); 784.048(1)(d)1 (" 'Cyberstalk' means ....
...through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed
at or pertaining to a specific person . . . ."), courts are not permitted to
enjoin a course of conduct to the extent that it encompasses
constitutionally protected activity, see § 784.048(1)(b) (specifying that the
"[c]ourse of conduct" constituting cyberstalking "does not include
constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other organized
protests")....
...Nothing in
this opinion does, or should be construed to, so narrowly confine the
trial court's discretion upon remand.
Our concurring colleague also points out that some case law relied
upon in the majority opinion predates the most recent amendment to
section 784.048, which added the phrases "directly or indirectly" and
"pertaining to" to the definition of cyberstalking....
..."Upon notice and hearing, when it appears to the court
that the petitioner is the victim of stalking, the court may grant such
relief as the court deems proper, including an injunction . . . [r]estraining
the respondent from committing any act of stalking." § 784.0485(6)(a)1.3
However, in fashioning such a remedy, the court is necessarily restrained
by the statutory definition of stalking, and because the statute
3 The statute also allows for injunctions "[o]rdering the respondent
to participate in treatment, intervention, or counseling services,"
"[r]eferring a petitioner to appropriate services," and "[o]rdering such
other relief as the court deems necessary for the protection of a victim of
stalking, including . . . directives to law enforcement agencies."
§ 784.0485(6)(a)2-4.
11
specifically states that stalking includes cyberstalking, the court also
must fashion a remedy within the statutory definition of cyberstalking.
Section 784.048(1)(d)1 defines cyberstalking as
[t]o engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause
to be communicated, directly or indirectly, words, images, or
language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic
communication, directed at or pertaining to a specific person
....
...causing substantial emotional distress to that person and
serving no legitimate purpose.[4]
(Emphasis added.)
A course of conduct is defined in the statute as "a pattern of
conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however
short, which evidences a continuity of purpose." § 784.048(1)(b).
Importantly, the statute specifically states that "[t]he term does not
include constitutionally protected activity." Id.
Accordingly, in order to be entitled to entry of an injunction based
on an allegation of cyberstalking, a...
...been communicated to the respondent AND that the communication of
the particular words, images, or language caused the respondent
substantial emotion distress AND that there was no legitimate purpose
behind the communication of the particular words, images, or language.
See § 784.048(1)(b), (d)1. Furthermore, once a petitioner has met this
burden, the remedy fashioned by the trial court may include enjoining
the respondent from further acts of stalking (including cyberstalking) but
4 Section 784.048(1)(d)2 provides an alternate definition of
cyberstalking that is not applicable to the instant case.
12
may not include enjoining the respondent from engaging in
"constitutionally protected acti...
...nable person standard.' "
(alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Blum,
191 So. 3d 502, 504 (Fla.
2d DCA 2016))).
With regard to Budlove's argument that her posts do not amount to
cyberstalking because they were not directed at petitioners, section
784.048 was amended in 2021 to add the bolded words in the following
definition of "cyberstalking": " 'Cyberstalk' means ....
...[t]o engage in a
course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated,
directly or indirectly, words, images, or language by or through the use
of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at or pertaining
to a specific person . . . ." See ch. 2021-220, § 1, Laws of Fla.; see also §
784.048(1)(d)1.
Although Budlove cites and quotes the 2021 version of the statute
in her briefs before this court, she ignores the language added by the
2021 amendment and cites only preamendment case law for the
proposition that because she...
...3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). Furthermore, the cases that
Budlove cites to support her contention all involve preamendment
versions of section 784.048, none of which included communications
pertaining to an individual in the definition of "cyberstalking."
But Budlove also argues that she had a First Amendment right to
publish the posts that she previously made on her social me...
...rough
e: (a) Substantial emotional distress, (b) Directed at Appellee, (c) No
legitimate purpose, (d) First Amendment rights, and (e) Cyberstalking
overall. Under point d, Budlove quotes David,
189 So. 3d at 875, for the
proposition that ''[s]ection
784.048 itself recognizes the First Amendment
rights of individuals by concluding that a 'course of conduct' for
purposes of the statute does not include protected speech.'' I interpret
this as clearly arguing that the entry of the injunction violate...
...2d DCA 2020).
However, as to the remedy fashioned by the trial court in crafting
the language of these injunctions, I agree with Budlove—and with the
majority opinion—that the plain language of the injunctions improperly
encompasses some "constitutionally protected activity." See §
784.048(1)(b) ("The term [course of conduct used in the definition of
cyberstalking] does not include constitutionally protected activity."); see
also Smith v....
...On appeal, David argued that "the
conduct alleged in Textor's ex parte petition for the injunction does not
constitute cyberstalking, and the injunction violates the First
Amendment."
189 So. 3d at 873.
18
The Fourth District, analyzing the 2014 preamendment version of
section
784.048, concluded that the trial court erred in finding the
existence of cyberstalking....
...may be resolved on other grounds."), the Fourth District proceeded to the
First Amendment issue and tied the statutory phrase "words, images, or
language . . . directed at a specific person" in the definition of
cyberstalking found in the 2014 version of section 784.048(1)(d)1 to its
constitutional analysis....
..." '[P]rior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and the least
tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights.' " Concerned Citizens for Judicial Fairness, Inc. v.
Yacucci,
162 So. 3d 68, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Neb.
Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976)). Section
784.048 itself recognizes the First Amendment rights of
individuals by concluding that a "course of conduct" for
purposes of the statute does not include protected speech. §
784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...solely of communications
pertaining to the petitioners that were not sent directly to them. If the
majority is convinced that communications pertaining to but not directed
at the petitioner are excluded from the definition of "course of conduct"
in section
784.048(1)(b) because they are "constitutionally protected
activity"—and then necessarily excluded from the definitions of
cyberstalking in section
784.048(1)(d) and stalking in section
784.085(1)—then how can the majority find no error in the trial court's
determination that petitioners were the victims of previous acts of
stalking based on communications that only pertained to petiti...
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Statton managed Dr. Paylan's
2020 campaign for political office.
2
1247, 1249 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)). As explained below, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion.
Florida courts may enjoin stalking under section
784.0485, Florida
Statutes (2021). Such relief is appropriate when "[a] person . . . willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another
person." §
784.048(2); accord Alter v. Paquette,
98 So. 3d 218, 220 (Fla.
2d DCA 2012) ("A person is guilty of stalking when he or she maliciously,
willfully, and repeatedly harasses another person." (citing §
784.048(2),
Fla. Stat. (2011))). "[H]arass" is "a course of conduct directed at a
specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that
person and serves no legitimate purpose." §
784.048(1)(a); see also
Johnstone v....
...Paylan's stalking petition foundered on several bases.
3
I. A Course of Conduct is Lacking
The alleged stalking incidents Dr. Paylan relied on were remote and
isolated. They do not constitute a "course of conduct" demonstrating "a
continuity of purpose." See § 784.048(1)(b) (" 'Course of conduct' means
a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time,
however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.")....
...Prakash Patel,
testified that "three years ago," in January 2019, Mr. Statton texted him
about seeing Drs. Patel and Paylan speaking in Dr. Paylan's office
parking lot. Apparently, Mr. Statton and Drs. Patel and Paylan were
friends at one time.
2 Section 784.048(1)(b) defines "course of conduct" as "a series of
acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of
purpose." (Emphasis added.) However, the statute does not allow for
aggregation of temporally distant acts.
5
Dr....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...amend his petition to allege them. While the violation of the temporary
injunction may have been relevant to the scope of any injunction, the trial
court relied on the conduct to support the granting of the injunction, over
the objection of Sutton. 1
Section
784.048, Florida Statutes (2020) defines stalking as the
“willful[ ], malicious[ ], and repeated[ ] follow[ing], harass[ing], or
cyberstalk[ing of] another person.” DiTanna,
323 So. 3d at 201 (quoting
Lopez v. Lopez,
922 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)). Section
784.048(1) also defines harassing, a component of stalking, as follows: “(a)
‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and
serves no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(1)(a), Fla....
...(2020). “In turn,
the statute defines a ‘course of conduct’ as ‘a pattern of conduct composed
of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a
continuity of purpose.’” DiTanna,
323 So. 3d at 201 (quoting §
784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...However,
an act of cornering the individual in an elevator while yelling and
screaming at him could be a qualifying incident.
306 So. 3d at 111. As
that was the only one of the many instances alleged in the petition to
support an injunction against stalking, we reversed the injunction noting
that section
784.048 “does not allow the trial court to enter injunctions
simply ‘to keep the peace’ between parties who, for whatever reason, are
unable to get along and behave civilly towards each other.” Id....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...We reverse because there was a lack of competent substantial evidence presented to support an injunction against-stalking. The parties , previously worked in different departments at the Kennedy Space Center. Jacobs filed a petition for injunction for protection against stalking pursuant to section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2016), alleging that she received harassing letters anonymously sent through the mail over the course of the last year, her work space was vandalized with a....
...g Jacobs’ and her boyfriend’s social'media pages and acquired personal information about Jacobs and her daughter. Stalking is the offense of “willfully, maliciously, and' repeatedly following], harassing], or cyberstalk[ing] another person.” § 784.048(2), Fla....
...willfully and maliciously harassed. The term “harass” is defined in this statute as to “engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Appellant, Nickesha Reid, appeals a permanent injunction for protection
against stalking that was entered against her. Appellant argues, and we agree, that
the injunction is not supported by competent, substantial evidence and must be
reversed. See § 784.048(2), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 20859, 2006 WL 3689145
...His argument fails because the scoresheet calculation gives the lowest permissible sentence in months; the court is permitted to sentence the defendant to any time period between the lowest permissible sentence and the statutory maximum. See §
921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2000). Aggravated stalking is a third-degree felony, §
784.048(4), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 19102, 2004 WL 2892613
...We reach the same result in this case. On remand, the trial court must allow Mr. Aguirre-Garcia to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial on the remaining charges. Reversed and remanded. WHATLEY and CANADY, JJ„ Concur. . See §
784.045(2), Fla. Stat. (2002). . See §
784.048(4), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...the word “lineup” in appropriate places and “photo” before the word “lineup”
where the instruction solely refers to a photo lineup.
Next, the Committee proposes deleting instruction 8.8 because there are two
standard instructions that pertain to section 784.048(5), Florida Statutes (2018),
aggravated stalking of a victim under 16 years of age—criminal jury instructions
8.7(c) and 8.8....
...3d 132] and amended in
2013 [
122 So. 3d 302], and 2018 [
238 So. 3d 192], and 2018.
-7-
8.8 AGGRAVATED STALKING
(Victim under 16 years of age)
§
784.048(5), Fla....
...onic communication,
directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that
person and serving no legitimate purpose.
Lesser Included Offenses
AGGRAVATED STALKING (Victim under 16 years of age) —
784.048(5)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO.
Stalking
784.048(2) 8.6
Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1
Violation of injunction
741.31(4) 8.18
for protection against
domestic violence
Comment
-8-
This instruction is based on the text of section
784.048(5), Florida
Statutes (1997), and generally patterned after the standard instructions on
stalking and aggravated stalking.
This instruction was adopted in 2000 [
765 So.2d 692] and amended in
2007 [953 So....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
position—substantial emotional distress. See §
784.048(1)(a), (2), Fla. Stat. (2016); Leach v. Kersey
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...3d 1057, 1058 (Fla.
1st DCA 2023).
Analysis
Injunctions against domestic violence and against stalking
require proof of stalking. To obtain her injunction against stalking,
Kristen had to prove that she was the victim of stalking.
§ 784.0485(1)(a), Fla....
...fact interchangeable although other requirements of the various
injunctions are substantially different.” (footnote omitted)).
“Stalking” occurs when a person “willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another.” § 784.048(2),
Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...3d 1057, 1058 (Fla.
1st DCA 2023).
Analysis
Injunctions against domestic violence and against stalking
require proof of stalking. To obtain her injunction against stalking,
Kristen had to prove that she was the victim of stalking.
§ 784.0485(1)(a), Fla....
...fact interchangeable although other requirements of the various
injunctions are substantially different.” (footnote omitted)).
“Stalking” occurs when a person “willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another.” § 784.048(2),
Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Copeland,
236 So. 3d 1142, 1143–
44 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). But we review the sufficiency of the
evidence for such an injunction de novo. See id. at 1144; Brennan
v. Syfrett,
369 So. 3d 320, 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023).
2
Section
784.0485(1), Florida Statutes, creates a civil cause of
action for injunctive relief from stalking. Paragraph (6)(a) further
provides that “[u]pon notice and hearing, when it appears to the
court that the petitioner is the victim of stalking, the court may
grant such relief as the court deems proper . . . .” §
784.0485(6)(a),
Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied). Stalking occurs when a person
“willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or
cyberstalks another person[.]” §
784.048(2), Fla....
...2 “‘Course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of
a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which
evidences a continuity of purpose. The term does not include
3
that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla.
Stat.
In this case, Hoover attended his daughter’s Crestview High
School orientation, where parents were to “walk the schedule” of
their children....
...All four encounters—Peak argued—were evidence of
“stalking.” Peak’s main contention was that C.P. suffered
emotional distress every time she came into contact with Hoover.
Thus, Peak claimed that Hoover was “harassing” C.P. and the
family. See § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (defining “harass” as
engaging in “a course of conduct directed at a specific person which
constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other
organized protests.” § 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...Because no competent, substantial evidence is present in the
record that Hoover “repeatedly harassed” C.P. or her family while
at the Crestview High School orientation, we turn to whether
Hoover “repeatedly followed” Peak’s family. See § 784.048(2), Fla.
Stat.
B
In the petition, Peak alleged that Hoover “followed” C.P.
during the orientation and caused her distress....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...“Whether the evidence is
legally sufficient to support issuance of the injunction is a legal question
subject to de novo review.” Brungart v. Pullen,
296 So. 3d 973, 976 (Fla.
2d DCA 2020) (quoting Schultz v. Moore,
282 So. 3d 152, 154 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2019)).
Section
784.0485(1), Florida Statutes (2021), creates “a cause of action
for an injunction for protection against stalking.” A person commits
stalking when the person “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows,
harasses, or cyberstalks another person.” §
784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2021).
“Harass” means “to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and
serves no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2021). “Course
of conduct,” in turn, means “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of
acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of
purpose.” §
784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...“It takes two
incidents of harassment to satisfy the requirements for an injunction
against stalking.” Carter v. Malken,
207 So. 3d 891, 892 (Fla. 4th DCA
2017).
A finding of harassment requires a showing of “substantial emotional
distress.” §
784.048(1)(a), Fla....
...icient to cause
substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person); Auguste v. Aguado,
282 So. 3d 937, 937–38 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).
Another required element of harassment is that the course of conduct
“serves no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(1)(a), Fla....
...When viewed together
with the drive-bys, Rosaly’s use of a drone supports the issuance of an
injunction. The record reveals no legitimate purpose for Rosaly’s course
of conduct.
The use of a drone can contribute to causing a person substantial
emotional distress under section
784.048(1)(a).
The Florida legislature amended section
934.50, Florida Statutes, in
2015 to prohibit certain conduct involving drones....
...Fla. Stat. (2021).
While appellee might be entitled to initiate an action under section
934.50, given the potential for invasion of privacy, we conclude that use of
a drone is conduct that could contribute to substantial emotional distress
under section
784.048(1)(a) of the stalking statute....
...night for months, and continu[ing] such monitoring even after she moved”).
4
We reverse that portion of the final judgment involving time-sharing
and no contact with the parties’ minor children.
Section 784.0485 does not provide authority for making a custody
determination in a final judgment for protection against stalking. Compare
§ 784.0485(6)(a), Fla....
...cases to award “such other relief as the court deems necessary for the
protection of a victim” of stalking, “including injunctions or directives to
law enforcement agencies, as provided in this section.” But that statutory
language is contained in both sections
784.0485 and
741.30, so the
provision in the stalking statute cannot be interpreted as encompassing a
child custody determination, particularly where that provision does not
reference Chapter 61 or the best interests of the children. If the legislature
had intended section
784.0485 to allow for custody determinations, it
could have said so, as it did in section
741.30.
In addition, Appellee did not file a petition on behalf of her children
seeking exclusive time sharing....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...ecessary under section
948.06(8)(e),
Florida Statutes (2021).
Gonzalez was on probation in six separate cases for various charges,
including armed home invasion robbery under section
812.135, Florida
Statutes, and aggravated stalking under section
784.048(4), Florida
Statutes....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 444, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 1392, 1995 WL 500401
SHAW, Justice. We have for review Altingeyik v. State,
649 So.2d 943 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), wherein the district court upheld the constitutionality of Florida’s anti-stalking statute, section
784.048, Florida Statutes (1993), based on State v....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1993).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
...the alleged commission of any crime. Should officers be involved in attempting to sort out participants in a maylay and be misled by potential witnesses or other parties to the dispute, this would be an available mechanism to assist law enforcement. Section 784.048 , F.S....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 8198, 1995 WL 455460
...ntempt adjudication. We agree with the recent analysis of this issue by the Second District Court and answer that question in the affirmative. See State v. Miranda,
644 So.2d 342 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Appellant also challenges the constitutionality of section
784.048, Florida Statutes (1993), on the basis that the stalking statute is both void for vagueness and violates the *666 overbreadth doctrine of the First Amendment....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...ll be
reviewed by the competent substantial evidence test.”). Legal sufficiency of
the evidence to justify an injunction is reviewed de novo. Picket,
236 So. 3d
at 1144 (citing Wills v. Jones,
213 So. 3d 982, 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)).
Section
784.0485(1), Florida Statutes (2020), creates “a cause of
action for an injunction for protection against stalking.” As defined by section
7
784.048(2), “[a] person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows,
harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking . . .
.” See Washington v. Brown,
300 So. 3d 338, 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (“We
interpret section
784.0485 with reference to the definitions found in section
784.048, which makes stalking under certain conditions a criminal offense,
and refer to section
784.046 (providing for protective injunctions for victims
of repeat violence) and the cases interpreting that statute for guidance.”)....
...requirements for harassment and cyberstalking. Both harassment and
cyberstalking require a “course of conduct” that is “directed at a specific
person”6 causing “substantial emotional distress to that person” that “serves
no legitimate purpose.” See § 784.048(1)(a) and (d), Fla....
...Schack,
192 So. 3d 625, 628 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2016) (quoting Touhey v. Seda,
133 So. 3d 1203, 1204 (Fla. 2d DCA
2014)).
On appeal, Ozyesilpinar argues that the evidence presented below
was insufficient to satisfy the legal definition of stalking in section
784.048.
We agree.
As an initial matter, the trial court’s finding that some of the alleged
incidents were for a legitimate purpose is supported by competent
substantial evidence. See Logue v. Book,
297 So. 3d 605, 614 (Fla. 4th DCA
2020), review denied, SC20-1063,
2021 WL 276145 (Fla. Jan. 27, 2021) (“A
784.048 as follows: “To engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or
to cause to be communicated, directly or indirectly, words, images, or
language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic
communication, directed at or pertaining to a specific person ....
...3d DCA 2020) (reversing a stalking injunction where “the
transcripts for the two evidentiary hearings reflect that, aside from
determining that Santiago had engaged in ‘stalking-like’ and ‘creepy’
behavior, the lower court neither referred to section 784.048, nor made any
express findings with respect to any of the statutory elements for stalking set
forth therein”); Hutsell v....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 12451, 2016 WL 4382557
...esulting in physical injury or death, by a person against any other person.” §
784.046(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). “Stalking” is defined as “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly followfing], harassing], or cyberstalk[ing] another person.” §
784.048(2), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...nta Cruz, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SCALES, MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Logue v. Book,
297 So. 3d 605, 611–12 (Fla. 4th DCA
2020) (explaining that “directed at a specific person” under section
784.048(1) “can include communications with third parties” including “social
media postings that are not sent directly to an individual [but] may
nonetheless be directed at an individual in a number of ways, including ....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...First, he argues his
actions serve a legitimate purpose in advocating against restrictive
legislation adversely affecting sex offenders. Second, he claims that his
social media activities do not constitute “a course of conduct directed at a
specific person” as required by section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2016).
And third, the appellant asserts that the appellee’s subjective fear does not
satisfy the objective “reasonable person” standard required by the statute.
The appellee claims that: the appellant’...
...is a convicted child molester and has had a domestic violence injunction
previously issued against him; his actions have placed her and her
children in fear for their safety by advertising her home address; and, the
trial court properly entered the injunction.
“Section 784.0485 ....
...allows an injunction against stalking, including
cyberstalking.” David v. Textor,
189 So. 3d 871, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
“A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or
cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking . . . .” §
784.048(2), Fla....
...There is no doubt that the appellant’s posts were aimed at the appellee.
However, our court and the Second and Third Districts have interpreted
“a course of conduct directed at a specific person” to exempt social media
messages from qualifying as the type of conduct covered by section
784.0485, Florida Statutes....
...freedom of speech and
expression.
U.S. v. Alvarez,
567 U.S. 709, 729–30 (2012).
Florida case law has mandated that threats via social media be directed
to the individual—not by content, but by delivery—to fall within the
purview of section
784.0485....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...On one occasion, upon learning of the
posts, Bacchus stepped out of a meeting and spent the next four hours
un-tagging herself from them as Krapacs continued to re-tag her.
Bacchus sought to stop this behavior by filing a petition for an
injunction, alleging Krapacs was cyberstalking her as defined by section
784.048(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2018), through her social media posts.
The trial court granted a temporary injunction against Krapacs pending a
final hearing....
...sufficient to justify imposing an injunction is a question of law that we
review de novo.” Pickett v. Copeland,
236 So. 3d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2018).
“[C]yberstalking is harassment via electronic communications.” Scott
v. Blum,
191 So. 3d 502, 504 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). Section
784.0485(1),
Florida Statutes (2018), defines it as “engag[ing] in a course of conduct to
communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, images, or
language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic
communication, directed at a specific person causing substantial
emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.” §
784.048(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis added).
Under section
784.048(1)(b), a “course of conduct” is defined as “a
pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time,
however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.” However, “[t]he
term does not include constitution...
...causes substantial emotional distress.”
(citations omitted).
Krapacs’ actions do not qualify as cyberstalking because they did not
constitute a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over time
evidencing a continuity of purpose. See § 784.048(1)(d), Fla....
...e were being used “to
communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, images, or
language . . . directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional
distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.” Id. at 1091-
92 (quoting § 784.048(1)(d), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Barnard and statements heard by him, in each case
relating to lawsuits and conduct in a courtroom or courthouse.
The respondent, Mr. Font, is identified in the petition as the managing
partner of a law firm, “Font & Nelson, LLC,” in Fort Lauderdale. Mr. Font’s law
1 Sections 784.048 (“Stalking; definitions; penalties.”) and 748.0485 (“Stalking;
injunction; powers and duties of court and clerk; petition; notice and hearing;
temporary injunction; issuance of injunction; statewide verification system;
enforcement.”)...
...insurance claims and fee splitting with non-lawyers” in an insurance case in which
Mr. Font represented the insurer. BLO denies that these allegations have any basis
in fact.
5
In keeping with the statutory procedure in section 784.0485, a temporary
injunction for protection against stalking violence was issued on the day the
petition was filed, and the matter was scheduled for an evidentiary hearing and
consideration of a final judgment of injunction some fifteen days later....
...we
7
construe all reasonable inferences from those allegations in favor of [plaintiff].”
Greene v. Times Publ’g Co.,
130 So. 3d 724, 728 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).4
A. Key Terms
Section
784.048(1) provides the pertinent definitions for “harass,” “course
of conduct,” “credible threat,” and “cyberstalk.” The statute defines the first
degree misdemeanor offense of “stalking”5 and the third degree felo...
...“aggravated stalking.”6 These are the definitions and offenses which establish the
predicate requirements for an injunction for protection against stalking or
cyberstalking. The procedure for prosecuting a cause of action for such an
injunction is detailed in section 784.0485.
The following excerpts from the definitions in section 748.048(1) are
applicable in the present case (with emphasis provided):
4 Mr....
...and limited period of time, pending
consideration at a hearing after notice to the respondent. The trial court’s dismissal
of the petition upon consideration of Mr. Font’s motion to dismiss presents an
issue of law subject to de novo review.
5 § 784.048(2).
6 § 784.048(3)....
...element, “a credible threat.” Id.
8
“‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no
legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a)....
...nually or chronically,” “plague,”
“bedevil,” or “badger.”7
“‘Course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of
acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of
purpose.” § 784.048(1)(b).
“‘Credible threat’ means a verbal or nonverbal threat, or a combination of
the two, including threats delivered by electronic communication or implied by a
pattern of conduct, which places the person who is the targ...
...individuals closely associated with the person, and which is made with the
apparent ability to carry out the threat to cause such harm. It is not necessary to
prove that the person making the threat had the intent to actually carry out the
threat.” § 784.048(1)(c).
7 Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, Unabridged 1031 (1986).
9
“‘Cyberstalk’ means to engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or
to cause to be communicated, words, images, or language by or through the use of
electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person, causing
substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.”
§ 784.048(1)(d).
The term “substantial emotional distress” is evaluated under a reasonable
person standard rather than a subjective standard....
...what you would like me to decide based on your pleadings”).
It must also be noted that the petition is misleading (whether intentionally or
not) in its use of the term “order of protection” in paragraph 4.d. of the petition
regarding “previous protection.” Section 784.0485(3)(d) requires that the petition
include, if applicable, information pertaining to any other “order of protection
issued against [the respondent] previously or from another jurisdiction, if known.”...
...Raulerson “that he
will cause her to lose her bar license and livelihood and reputation,” and his
repeatedly filing the affidavit of a former BLO client (as purported evidence of
insurance fraud by that client and BLO) could involve unprofessional behavior or
8 As used in section 784.0485, “the offense of stalking shall include the offense of
cyberstalking.” § 784.0485(1)....
...electronic service of subpoenae, even frivolous subpoenae, by one lawyer on
another is apparent and was properly recognized by the trial court. Such conduct,
as alleged in the present case and if proven, may be many things, but it is not
“cyberstalking” under section 784.048(1)(d).
The petition acknowledges that much of the alleged conduct involves
violations of Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 4-3.1 proscribing frivolous actions,
4-3.2 regarding dilatory practices by a lawyer in litigation, and 4-3.4(d) proscribing
frivolous discovery requests....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...We find no legal error or abuse of discretion, and affirm.
Aggravated Stalking
Aggravated stalking occurs when a person “willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks
another person and makes a credible threat to that person.”
§ 784.048(3), Fla. Stat. (2016). To “harass” is “to engage in a
course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes
substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no
legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a). “‘Course of conduct’ means a
pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of
time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.”
§ 784.048(1)(b)....
...To “cyberstalk” is “to engage in a course of
conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words,
images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or
electronic communication, directed at a specific person, causing
substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no
legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(d)....
...2009) (repeating general
rule that a relevant statement offered for a purpose other than its
truth is not hearsay). Appellant’s acts—text messages, physical
approach, and the mere fact of the two phone calls in addition to
their content—constituted a “course of conduct” for purposes of
the stalking statute. § 784.048(1)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 4469, 2003 WL 1738388
...sed that an injunction or other specified court order is in effect. Concluding that such knowledge is an element of the offense and that the trial court fundamentally erred in failing to so instruct the jury, we reverse the appellant’s conviction. Section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part that it is unlawful for any person under injunction for protection of another person against domestic violence to willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow or harass such other person....
...essential element. But the supreme court, in applying a double jeopardy analysis pursuant to Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299 ,
52 S.Ct. 180 ,
76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), has concluded that “[t]he statutory elements of aggravated stalking under section
784.048(4) are knowledge of an injunction, and knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly following or harassing the beneficiary of the injunction.” State v....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...“But the
question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to justify imposing an
injunction is a question of law” reviewed de novo. Cash v. Gagnon,
306
So. 3d 106, 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (quoting Krapacs v. Bacchus,
301 So.
3d 976, 978 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)).
Section
784.048, Florida Statutes (2020), defines stalking as the
“willful[ ], malicious[ ], and repeated[ ] follow[ing], harass[ing], or
cyberstalk[ing of] another person.” DiTanna,
323 So. 3d at 201 (quoting
Lopez v. Lopez,
922 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)). Section
784.048(1) defines the components of stalking as follows:
(a) “Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed
at a specific person which causes substantial emotional
distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.
“In turn, the statute defines a ‘course of conduct’ as ‘a pattern of conduct
composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which
evidences a continuity of purpose.’” DiTanna,
323 So. 3d at 201 (quoting
§
784.048(1)(b), Fla....
...ARTAU, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the appellant failed to object to the
admissibility of the supplemental affidavit which described several
incidents constituting either the “following” or “harassing” forms of
stalking as defined in section 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2020)....
...motional
distress” and serves “no legitimate purpose.” See Klemple v. Gagliano,
197
So. 3d 1283, 1285-86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (explaining the different
elements required to prove stalking under the “following” and
“harassment” prongs of section
784.048); see also Santiago v....
...“willful,
malicious and repeated ‘following[,]’” it is the “harassing” and
“cyberstalking” forms of stalking that must amount to conduct that causes
“substantial emotional distress” and serves “no legitimate purpose”
(quoting § 784.048(1)(a) & (1)(d)1.–2., Fla....
...orts
the result, but the trial court failed to explain its reasoning”).
Moreover, the statute creating a cause of action for an injunction
against stalking does not require a trial court to provide any reasons for
its finding of stalking. See § 784.0485(6)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...See Klein v. Manville,
363 So. 3d 1163, 1168–69
(Fla. 6th DCA 2023); Pickett v. Copeland,
236 So. 3d 1142, 1144–
46 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (holding that more than one act is required
to constitute a course of conduct under the definition of stalking in
section
784.048(1)(b), Florida Statutes, but the victim does not
have to be stalked repeatedly to meet the statutory definition).
LEWIS, BILBREY, and LONG, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 3871, 1998 WL 171508
...Affirmed. A domestic violence injunction was entered against appellant. He now challenges the injunction, contending that his conduct in following and repeatedly telephoning the victim did not constitute “stalking” within the statutory definition of section
784.048, Florida Statutes (1995), so as to permit the issuance of an injunction under section
741.30, Florida Statutes (1995). Section
784.048 has been upheld as constitutional against challenges of overbreadth and vagueness....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Furthermore, the trial court did not consider uncharged conduct
as a basis for revoking Altman’s probation, and it did not err in denying
Altman’s request to be resentenced by a different judge.
Factual and Procedural History
Altman was charged with aggravated stalking in violation of section
784.048 (case no....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 4665, 2015 WL 1443223
...images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail
or electronic communication, directed at a specific person,
causing substantial emotional distress to that person and
serving no legitimate purpose.
§ 784.048(1)(d), Fla....
...She did not present any evidence that
Mr. Horowitz actually installed the keylogger.
Mr. Horowitz's Facebook posts do not meet the statutory definition of
cyberstalking for two reasons. First, the posts were not "directed at a specific person."
§ 784.048(1)(d)....
...arned her to change her
passwords because he was tracking everything she was doing, and informed her that
he was also following her").
Second, Mrs. Horowitz failed to show that the posts caused her
"substantial emotional distress." § 784.048(1)(d)....
