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Florida Statute 784.048 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 784.048 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVI
CRIMES
Chapter 784
ASSAULT; BATTERY; CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 784.048
784.048 Stalking; definitions; penalties.
(1) As used in this section, the term:
(a) “Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.
(b) “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose. The term does not include constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other organized protests.
(c) “Credible threat” means a verbal or nonverbal threat, or a combination of the two, including threats delivered by electronic communication or implied by a pattern of conduct, which places the person who is the target of the threat in reasonable fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her family members or individuals closely associated with the person, and which is made with the apparent ability to carry out the threat to cause such harm. It is not necessary to prove that the person making the threat had the intent to actually carry out the threat. The present incarceration of the person making the threat is not a bar to prosecution under this section.
(d) “Cyberstalk” means:
1. To engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, directly or indirectly, words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at or pertaining to a specific person; or
2. To access, or attempt to access, the online accounts or Internet-connected home electronic systems of another person without that person’s permission,

causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.

(2) A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(3) A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person and makes a credible threat to that person commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(4) A person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat violence, sexual violence, or dating violence pursuant to s. 784.046, or an injunction for protection against domestic violence pursuant to s. 741.30, or after any other court-imposed prohibition of conduct toward the subject person or that person’s property, knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(5) A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks a child under 16 years of age commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(6) A law enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant, any person that he or she has probable cause to believe has violated this section.
(7) A person who, after having been sentenced for a violation of s. 794.011, s. 800.04, or s. 847.0135(5) and prohibited from contacting the victim of the offense under s. 921.244, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks the victim commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(8) The punishment imposed under this section shall run consecutive to any former sentence imposed for a conviction for any offense under s. 794.011, s. 800.04, or s. 847.0135(5).
(9)(a) The sentencing court shall consider, as a part of any sentence, issuing an order restraining the defendant from any contact with the victim, which may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined by the court. It is the intent of the Legislature that the length of any such order be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations by the perpetrator, and the safety of the victim and his or her family members or individuals closely associated with the victim.
(b) The order may be issued by the court even if the defendant is sentenced to a state prison or a county jail or even if the imposition of the sentence is suspended and the defendant is placed on probation.
History.s. 1, ch. 92-208; s. 29, ch. 94-134; s. 29, ch. 94-135; s. 2, ch. 97-27; s. 23, ch. 2002-55; s. 1, ch. 2003-23; s. 3, ch. 2004-17; s. 3, ch. 2004-256; s. 17, ch. 2008-172; s. 2, ch. 2012-153; s. 31, ch. 2019-167; s. 1, ch. 2021-220.

F.S. 784.048 on Google Scholar

F.S. 784.048 on Casetext

Amendments to 784.048


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 784.048
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S784.048 2 - STALKING - FOLLOW HARASS CYBERSTALK ANOTHER - M: F
S784.048 3 - AGGRAV STALKING - FOLLOW HARASS CYBERSTALK CRED THREAT TO PERSON - F: T
S784.048 4 - AGGRAV STALKING - FOLLOW HARASS CYBERSTALK AFTER INJUNCTION - F: T
S784.048 5 - AGGRAV STALKING - OF CHILD UNDER 16 YOA - F: T
S784.048 7 - AGGRAV STALKING - STALKING VICTIM AFTER NO CONTACT ORDER - F: T



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

KLENK, v. RANSOM,, 270 So. 3d 1272 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . ." § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. . . . ." § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. Pickett v. . . . the conduct must be bad enough to produce substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person. § 784.048 . . .

J. STONE, v. A. MCMILLIAN,, 270 So. 3d 510 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . ." § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . . ." § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . ." § 784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. . . . put dog waste in a trash can, and avoided getting hit by a bus for legitimate purposes under section 784.048 . . .

LEE, v. STATE, 268 So. 3d 904 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . ." § 784.048(3), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . . ." § 784.048(1)(a). " 'Course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over . . . a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose." § 784.048(1)(b). . . . person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose." § 784.048 . . . addition to their content-constituted a "course of conduct" for purposes of the stalking statute. § 784.048 . . .

KEITH, v. STATE, 264 So. 3d 1151 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Rondan Keith was charged in the information with violating section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2016 . . . ), but was adjudicated guilty in the judgment of violating section 784.048(7). . . .

HUTSELL, v. HUTSELL,, 263 So. 3d 266 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Stat., which is defined in section 784.048(2) to encompass when a person "willfully, maliciously, and . . . Regarding harassment, Florida law defines "harass" in section 784.048(1)(a) to mean "engag[ing] in a . . .

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 259 So. 3d 743 (Fla. 2018)

. . . proposes deleting instruction 8.8 because there are two standard instructions that pertain to section 784.048 . . . 302], and 2018 [238 So.3d 192], and 2018. 8.8 AGGRAVATED STALKING (Victim under 16 years of age) § 784.048 . . . Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED STALKING (Victim under 16 years of age) 784.048(5) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY . . . Stalking 784.048(2) 8.6 Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Violation of injunction 741.31(4) 8.18 for protection against . . . domestic violence Comment This instruction is based on the text of section 784.048(5), Florida Statutes . . .

R. N. a v. STATE, 257 So. 3d 507 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Seese involved the use of "maliciously" in section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2004). . . . ." § 784.048(4), Fla. Stat. We explained that we take the text of the statute "as a whole." . . .

ROBINSON, v. ROBINSON,, 257 So. 3d 1187 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Stalking is defined under section 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2017), as "willfully, maliciously, and . . . [her] which cause[d] substantial emotional distress to [her] and serve[d] no legitimate purpose." § 784.048 . . . Husband to Wife's brother, which is legally insufficient to constitute "cyberstalking" under section 784.048 . . .

VENN, v. M. FOWLKES, III,, 257 So. 3d 622 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . ." § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. . . . ." § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .

BENOIT, v. CITY OF LAKE CITY, FLORIDA, a L., 343 F. Supp. 3d 1219 (M.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . Further, Florida Statute section 784.048 provides that "[a] person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly . . . See id. § 784.048. . . . Stat. § 784.048(1)(a). " 'Cyberstalk' means to engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause . . . Stat. § 784.048(1)(d). " 'Course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts . . . Id. § 784.048(1)(b). . . .

MITCHELL, v. N. BROGDEN,, 249 So. 3d 781 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat.; see also Bouters v. . . .

PAULSON, v. RANKART,, 251 So. 3d 986 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . ." § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . . ." § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . ." § 784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. . . .

J. PICKETT, v. C. COPELAND,, 236 So. 3d 1142 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . As defined in section 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2016), stalking occurs when a person "willfully, . . . "Harass" is defined in section 784.048(1)(a) to mean "engag[ing] in a course of conduct directed at a . . . a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose." § 784.048 . . . However, nowhere in the definitions of section 784.048 is stalking defined as a multiple of itself. . . . passing by, which falls short of a malicious "course of conduct" serving "no legitimate purpose." § 784.048 . . .

AKIN, v. R. JACOBS,, 230 So. 3d 1292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . .” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . . person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048 . . . Jacobs suffered from emotional distress, let alone substantial emotional distress as required by section 784.048 . . .

REID, v. SAUNDERS,, 230 So. 3d 1288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 784.048(2), Fla. . . .

ASHFORD- COOPER, v. RUFF L., 230 So. 3d 1283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 784.048(1)(a), (2), Fla. Stat. (2016); Leach v. . . .

J. DAVIS, DOC v. STATE, 230 So. 3d 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . imprisonment, in violation of section 787.02, Florida Statutes (2013), and stalking, in violation of section 784.048 . . .

DIXON, v. SERMON,, 230 So. 3d 609 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking .... ” § 784.048 . . . person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048 . . .

PACKAL, v. D. JOHNSON,, 226 So. 3d 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . .” § 784.048(2), Fla. . . . Id. § 784.048(l)(a) (emphasis added). “’Course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of a series . . . Id. § 784.048(l)(b). . . . See § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. . . . See id. § 784.048(1)(a). Accordingly, we reverse the injunction. REVERSED. . . .

J. KRIEBEL, v. PIEDRAHITA,, 219 So. 3d 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . . § 784.048(2). . . .

MCNEIL, v. STATE, 215 So. 3d 55 (Fla. 2017)

. . . regardless of adjudication, a violation of s. 784.011, s. 784.021, s. 784.03, s. 784.041, s. 784.045, s. 784.048 . . .

Dr. WOLLSCHLAEGER v. GOVERNOR, FLORIDA, 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 784.048(l)(a). . . .

CARTER, v. MALKEN,, 207 So.3d 891 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . .” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(a), “[C]ourts have generally held that contact is legitimate when there is a reason for . . . The calls cannot be deemed “willful or malicious” as § 784.048(2) requires. See Slack v. . . .

KLEMPLE, v. GAGLIANO,, 197 So. 3d 1283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 784.048(2), Fla. . . . .” § 784.048(l)(a); see also § 784.048(l)(b) (defining “course of conduct” as “a pattern of conduct composed . . .

AUSTIN, v. ECHEMENDIA,, 198 So. 3d 1058 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .

PORTER, v. GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA,, 667 F. App'x 766 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . ; (6) Florida Statute § 859.01, poisoning food and water, a criminal statute; (7) Florida Statute § 784.048 . . .

O NEILL, v. GOODWIN,, 195 So. 3d 411 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 784.048(l)(a). . . .

A. FYE, v. S. BENNETT,, 193 So. 3d 994 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits thé offense of stalkingL]” § 784.048 . . . person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048 . . . a series of a,cts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.” § 784.048 . . .

DAVID, v. SCHACK,, 192 So. 3d 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . .” § 784.048(1)(a); see also § 784.048(1)(b) (defining “course of conduct” as “a pattern of conduct composed . . .

A. SCOTT, v. A. BLUM,, 191 So. 3d 502 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Section 784.048(l)(d) defines cyberstalking as “engaging] in a course of conduct to communicate, or to . . . specific person which causes substantial emotional distress ... and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048 . . . First, the posts were not “directed at a specific person.” § 784.048(l)(d). . . . See Chevaldina, 133 So.3d at 1091-92 (quoting § 784.048(l)(d)). . . .

B. WILLS v. JONES,, 213 So. 3d 982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose:’ § 784.048 . . . See § 784.048(3), Fla. Stat. . . . Id. § 784.048(l)(a). . . . Id. § 784.048(l)(b). . . .

BURROUGHS, v. COREY,, 647 F. App'x 967 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 784.048, fails based on the particular record in this case and the limited nature of the arguments . . .

UNITED STATES v. JEAN,, 636 F. App'x 767 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . Florida Statutes § 784.048(3) provides that “[a] person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows . . . Stat. § 784.048(3). . . . Stat. § 784.048(1) and (3). . . .

A. DAVID, v. TEXTOR,, 189 So. 3d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Additionally, section 784.048 defines stalking, including cyberstalking: (a) “Harass” means to engage . . . person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose. § 784.048 . . . Section 784.048 itself recognizes the First Amendment rights of individuals by concluding that a “course . . . of conduct” for. purposes of the statute does not include protected speech. § 784.048(l)(b), Fla. . . .

ROACH, v. BROWER,, 180 So. 3d 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Section 784.048(2), in turn, provides: “A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, . . . Pertinent here, section 784.048(l)(a) defines the term “harass” as “to engage in a course of conduct . . . Brower substantial emotional distress under section 784.048(l)(a). Ms. Brower never testified. . . .

THOMA, v. O NEAL,, 180 So. 3d 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . Section 784.048(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), defines “course of conduct” as a pattern- of conduct . . .

A. NEPTUNE, v. LANOUE,, 178 So. 3d 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 784.048(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .

LIPPENS, v. POWERS,, 179 So. 3d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . evidence presented does not meet the legal requirement to support an injunction pursuant to section 784.048 . . . and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking.” § 784.048 . . . person which .causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate. purpose.” § 784.048 . . .

MARTELLO, v. SCOTT,, 177 So. 3d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s finding of stalking, as defined by section 784.048 . . .

RICHARDS, v. GONZALEZ,, 178 So. 3d 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . . § 784.048(2), Fla. . . . .” § 784.048(l)(a); see also § 784.048(l)(b) (defining “ ‘[c]ourse of conduct’ ” as “a pattern of conduct . . . Condmlon Applying the requirements of sections 784.048 and 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2014), and the . . .

KINGLAND ESTATES, LTD. v. DAVIS,, 170 So. 3d 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . the Florida Statutes; and, e. cyberstalking and exploiting an elderly person in violation of sections 784.048 . . .

PLUMMER, v. FORGET,, 164 So. 3d 109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . , maliciously, and repeatedly following] harassing], or cyber-stalk[ing] another person.... ” See § 784.048 . . . Id. § 784.048(l)(a). “ ‘Course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over . . . Id. § 784.048(l)(b); see also Lukacs v. . . .

S. ROBERTSON, v. S. ROBERTSON,, 164 So. 3d 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Section 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2013), criminalizes “[a] person who willfully, maliciously, and . . . person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048 . . . “a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose.” § 784.048 . . . to support the trial court’s finding that Appellant had stalked Appellee under the terms of section 784.048 . . .

LEACH, v. KERSEY,, 162 So. 3d 1104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 784.048(2). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(a). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(d). . . . The evidence does not show that these contacts “serve[d] no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l)(a), (d) . . . repayment of a loan, it cannot be said that the text messages served ‘no legitimate purpose’ ” (quoting § 784.048 . . .

HOROWITZ, v. P. HOROWITZ,, 160 So. 3d 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . . § 784.048(l)(d), Fla. Stat. (2018). Mrs. . . . First, the posts were not “directed at a specific person.” § 784.048(l)(d). . . . Horowitz failed to show that the posts caused her “substantial emotional distress.” § 784.048(l)(d). . . .

CORRIE, v. KEUL,, 160 So. 3d 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. . . . .” § 784.048(l)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .

McNEIL, v. STATE, 162 So. 3d 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . any sanction imposed for a violation of s. 784.011, s. 784.021, s. 784.03, s. 784.041, s. 784.045, s. 784.048 . . . regardless of adjudication, a violation of s. 784.011, s. 784.021, s. 784.03, s. 784.041, s. 784.045, s. 784.048 . . .

McDONOUGH, v. CARVER, v., 159 So. 3d 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 784.048(2). . . . .” § 784.048(1)(a). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(b). . . .

A. STANLEY, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 594 F. App'x 610 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 784.048(4). He appeals from the district court’s denial of his federal habeas petition. . . .

BURROUGHS, v. COREY,, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (M.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . . § 784.048. . . . Stat. § 784.048(2). (Doc. 15 at 4). . . . However, as a whole, § 784.048 is not primarily a direct restriction on speech. . . . , not just § 784.048(2), is over-broad. . . . Compare § 784.048 (1996) with § 784.048 (2010). . . .

LASERINKO, v. GERHARDT,, 154 So. 3d 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ing] harassing], or cyber-stalkfing] another person.... ” See § 784.048 . . . Id. § 784.048(1)(a). . . . Id. § 784.048(1)(b); see also Lukacs v. . . . would cause a reasonable person to suffer the “substantial, emotional distress” required by section 784.048 . . .

UNITED STATES v. DAVIS, 65 F. Supp. 3d 1352 (M.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . Convicted of a misdemeanor violation s. 784.048, s. 810.14, s 847.011, s. 847.013, s. 847.0135, or s. . . .

STATE v. A. MOSLEY,, 149 So. 3d 684 (Fla. 2014)

. . . Florida Statutes (2006); and (2) aggravated stalking of a minor under sixteen years of age under section 784.048 . . .

WYANDT, v. VOCCIO,, 148 So. 3d 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See §§ 784.046(l)(a),(b), 784.048-.0485, Fla. Stat. (2012). . . .

BRANSON, v. RODRIGUEZ- LINARES,, 143 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . . § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . Cf § 784.048(3) (aggravated stalking occurs when a person “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows . . . person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose. § 784.048 . . . subject acts did not fall within the definitional language of the offense that is set forth in section 784.048 . . .

M. ALDERMAN, v. A. THOMAS,, 141 So. 3d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .” § 784.048(2). “ ‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which . . . causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l) . . .

SPIPNIEWSKI, v. STATE, 134 So. 3d 563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . . § 784.048(3), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

TOUHEY, v. SEDA,, 133 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .” § 784.048(2). “ ‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which . . . causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(l) . . . (a); see also § 784.048(l)(b) (defining “ ‘[cjourse of conduct’ ” as “a pattern of conduct composed of . . . See § 784.048(l)(a); cf. . . .

CHEVALDINA, v. R. K. FL MANAGEMENT, INC., 133 So. 3d 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . . § 784.048(2). . . . .” § 784.048(2). . . . person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048 . . .

SCHUTT, v. M. ALFRED,, 130 So. 3d 772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Section 784.048(2) defines “stalking” as "[a] person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows . . . , harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of stalking -" Section 784.048(l)(a) provides . . . Section 784.048(l)(d) provides: ‘Cyberstalk’ means to engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 131 So. 3d 755 (Fla. 2013)

. . . See § 784.048(7), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . Definitions. § 784.048(l)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 784.048(l)(b), Fla. Stat. . . . Stalking 784.048(2) 8.6 Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Violation of injunction for protection against domestic . . . Stalking 784.048(2) 8.6 Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Violation of injunction for protection against domestic . . .

UNITED STATES v. ALONZO- GARCIA,, 542 F. App'x 412 (5th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 784.048(2) (defining the offense of stalking to include “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows . . .

FIGUEROA- SANTIAGO, v. STATE, 116 So. 3d 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . (emphasis added); see, e.g., § 784.048, Fla. . . . for the purpose of benefiting or promoting the gang to the specific individuals identified by section 784.048 . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORMS, 113 So. 3d 781 (Fla. 2013)

. . . AGAINST STALKING (AFTER NOTICE) The Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Stalking under Section 784.048S . . .

GOUDY, v. Jo DUQUETTE,, 112 So. 3d 716 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . .” § 784.048(2). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(a). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(b). . . .

UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON,, 707 F.3d 655 (6th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 784.048(l)(a)). . . .

HERNANDEZ, v. SILVERMAN,, 100 So. 3d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . See §§ 741.28(2), 784.048(2), (l)(a), (l)(d), Fla. . . .

JOHNS, v. G. PENZOTTI,, 100 So. 3d 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . .” § 784.048(2) (emphasis added). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(a); see also Jones v. . . .

ALTER, v. G. PAQUETTE,, 98 So. 3d 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . . § 784.048(2). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(a). . . . See § 784.048(l)(a). . . .

B. YOUNG, v. D. YOUNG,, 96 So. 3d 478 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . That term, as used in section 784.048, Florida Statutes (2011), includes willful, malicious, and repeated . . . Stalking also includes cyber-stalking, defined in section 784.048(l)(d) as the communication of “words . . .

PRESTON, v. STATE, 134 So. 3d 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . and two counts of aggravated stalking, one based upon a violation of court order contrary to section 784.048 . . . (4), Florida Statutes (2009), and one based upon making a credible threat contrary to section 784.048 . . . Section 784.048(1) of the stalking statute contains the definitions of “harass,” “course of conduct,” . . . The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily injury to, a person.” § 784.048(l . . . Section 784.048(4) provides in pertinent part: (4) Any person who, after an injunction for protection . . .

C. S. D. A. S. v. T. S. P. A. M. P., 82 So. 3d 1132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . .” § 784.048(2) (emphasis added); see Smith v. . . .

TORRES, v. STATE, 82 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Section 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2007), provides, “Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly . . . stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.” § 784.048 . . . person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048 . . .

JONES, v. A. JACKSON,, 67 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . . § 784.048(2). Mr. . . . See § 784.048(l)(a) (defining “harassment” as “a course of conduct directed at a specific person that . . .

H. L. D. JR. A v. STATE, 83 So. 3d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . . § 784.048(5), Fla. Stat. (2008). . § 365.16(l)(b), (d), Fla. Stat. (2008). . Rule 8.140. . . .

POWER, v. BOYLE, v. v. v., 60 So. 3d 496 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Luton, 982 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see also § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. . . . person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048 . . .

MURPHY, v. REYNOLDS,, 55 So. 3d 716 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . .” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . See § 784.048(l)(d), Fla. Stat. (2009). Ms. . . .

POLANCO, v. S. CORDEIRO,, 67 So. 3d 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . .” § 784.048(2). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(a). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(b). In Poindexter v. . . . See § 784.048(1)(a), (b); Poindexter, 898 So.2d at 207. That Mr. . . .

OLIN, v. ROBERTS,, 42 So. 3d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . include filing reports and complaints to law enforcement agencies as a matter of law under section 784.048 . . . purview of the agency’s responsibilities, serves a ‘legitimate purpose’ within the meaning of section 784.048 . . . violator, does not constitute harassment, it also cannot qualify as stalking for purposes of section 784.048 . . .

M. CANAVAN, v. STATE, 38 So. 3d 885 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . The State charged Canavan with aggravated stalking in violation of section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes . . . .2d 408, 411 (Fla.1996) (stating that “[t]he statutory elements of aggravated stalking under section 784.048 . . . defendant willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly followed, harassed, or cyberstalked the victim. § 784.048 . . . See § 784.048(4); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 8.7(b). . . .

DEL RIO, v. STATE, 22 So. 3d 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . possibility Del Rio’s total concurrent sentences for the third-degree felonies or aggravated stalking, § 784.048 . . .

BAUDER, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS OF FLORIDA, A., 333 F. App'x 422 (11th Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 784.048(5). . . .

MILLER, v. STATE, 4 So. 3d 732 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Miller was charged with aggravated stalking in violation of section 784.048(4), Florida Statutes (2007 . . . See § 784.048(4), Fla. . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 995 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2008)

. . . APPENDIX 8.7(b) AGGRAVATED STALKING (Injunction Entered) § 784.048(4), Fla. Stat. . . . Lesser Included Offenses AGGRAVATED STALKING (Injunction Entered) — 784.048(4) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY . . . Stalking 784.048(2) 8.6 Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Violation of injunction for protection against domestic . . .

T. B. a v. STATE, 990 So. 2d 651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . The crime of stalking is defined in section 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2007), as follows: Any person . . . person that causes substantial emotional distress in such a person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048 . . . Such constitutionally protected activity includes picketing or other organized protests.” § 784.048(l . . . However, we note our supreme court’s holding that conduct which amounts to stalking under section 784.048 . . . See § 784.048, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1992). The conduct must “serve ... no legitimate purpose.” Id. . . .

WEIGHTMAN, v. STATE, 990 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 784.048(3), Florida Statutes (2006), defines aggravated stalking as: Any person who willfully . . . The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily injury to, a person. § 784.048(1) . . .

WEISZ o b o WEISZ, v. CLAIR,, 989 So. 2d 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . .” § 784.048(2). . . . .” § 784.048(l)(a). . . . .”§ 784.048(l)(b). . . . that it “cause[d] substantial emotional distress in such person and serve[d] no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048 . . .

TOLBERT, v. D. TOLBERT,, 983 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See §§ 741.30(6), 784.048, Fla. Stat. (2006); see also Abravaya v. . . .

GRAY, v. E. KOHL, D., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (S.D. Fla. 2008)

. . . .” § 784.048(Z )(a), Fla. Stat. . . .

LUKACS, Jr. v. LUTON,, 982 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . As defined in section 784.048, Florida Statutes (2006), stalking requires the State to prove that a person . . . person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048 . . . composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.” § 784.048 . . . maliciously, and repeatedly follows [or] harasses ... another person commits the offense of stalking....” § 784.048 . . .

W. MENEFEE, Jr. v. STATE, 980 So. 2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . charged by amended information with aggravated stalking with credible threat in violation of section 784.048 . . . Section 784.048, Florida Statutes, was enacted “to protect victims, their families and friends from the . . . More specifically, section 784.048(3), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that: Any person who willfully . . . person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048 . . . See § 784.048(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . .

SHOCKI, v. ARESTY,, 994 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . felony, burglary under Florida Statute 810.02”), and stalking and aggravated stalking under section 784.048 . . . his evidence of “violence” and his legal theory upon acts of “stalking” under sections 784.046 and 784.048 . . . In this instance, Aresty alleged that Shoeki harassed him as defined in paragraph 784.048(l)(a), i.e. . . .

SMITH, v. MELCHER,, 975 So. 2d 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . on August 5, 2006, constituted harassment and qualified as an act of stalking as defined in section 784.048 . . . See § 784.048(2). . . . Melcher, his action must meet the definition of aggravated harassment as set forth in section 784.048 . . . Section 784.048(3) states: Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or . . . Section 784.048(2) defines stalking: “Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, . . .

SLACK, v. KLING,, 959 So. 2d 425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . . § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . The term “harass” is defined in section 784.048(1) as engaging in a series of acts over a period of time . . . .” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . requires that a person engage in a course of conduct involving a series of acts over a period of time. § 784.048 . . .

MILLER, v. STATE, 958 So. 2d 981 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . victim that distinguishes the crime of tampering with a witness from the crime of stalking under section 784.048 . . .

McCLISH, v. B. NUGENT,, 483 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2007)

. . . Report filed by Deputy Terry refers to the offense of aggravated stalking under Florida Statutes section 784.048 . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, 953 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2007)

. . . APPENDIX 8.6 STALKING § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. . . . in 1995 [657 So.2d 1152] and amended in 2007 to include cyberstalking. 8.7(a) AGGRAVATED STALKING § 784.048 . . . and amended in 2007 to incorporate cyberstalking. 8.7(b) AGGRAVATED STALKING (Injunction Entered) § 784.048 . . . 1995 [657 So.2d 1152] and amended in 2007. 8.8 AGGRAVATED STALKING (Victim under 16 years of age) § 784.048 . . . Lesser Included Offenses Comment This instruction is based on the text of section§-784.048(5), Florida . . .

SEESE, III, v. STATE, 955 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . jury instructions for criminal cases do not define maliciously in the approved instruction for section 784.048 . . . Section 784.048 does not contain any special definition of the term maliciously. . . . Section 784.048(4) punishes the person who continues to contact the subject in spite of a court order . . . It allowed him to exploit the lack of a formal, standardized definition of maliciously in section 784.048 . . . It strikes us that justice would be better served by a standardized instruction for section 784.048(4 . . .

EICHELBERGER, v. STATE, 949 So. 2d 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . The State charged Eichelberger with three counts of aggravated stalking pursuant to section 784.048(4 . . . Section 784.048(4) provides as follows: Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat . . . Section 784.048(l)(a) defines the term “harass” as engaging “in a course of conduct directed at a specific . . . Section 784.048(l)(b) defines the term “course of conduct” as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series . . . (quoting § 784.048(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993)). . . .

UNIVERSAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, INC. MICHAEL J. ZWEBNER, v. LYCOS, INC. d b a S. A. Jr. a k a a k a Jr. a k a a k a a k a a k a a k a a k a H., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007)

. . . . § 784.048. . . .