Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 790.19
CopyCited 261 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 445
...d attempt did shoot at him with a shotgun contrary to Florida Statute
782.04 and
777.04. (Emphasis added.) In contrast, the charge on aggravated battery properly alleges an intentional, unwanted touching using a shotgun which caused bodily harm. [4] §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 137 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2007 WL 1215452
..."use or threat of physical force or violence."
912 So.2d at 379; see also Hudson v. State,
800 So.2d 627, 628-29 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding that the crime of shooting into or throwing deadly missiles into a building, whether occupied or unoccupied (§
790.19, Fla.Stat.(1997)), does not, by definition, involve physical force or violence against an individual and therefore cannot be a qualifying felony under the VCC statute)....
CopyCited 130 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 116, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 148, 2009 WL 217976
...The issue before us involves double jeopardy specifically whether dual convictions for discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1000 feet of a person in violation of section
790.15(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2003), arising from the same criminal episode, violate double jeopardy....
...saction only when the statute itself provides for an offense with multiple degrees." Paul,
934 So.2d at 1176 (Cantero, J., specially concurring). Second, by applying this simple test to this case we conclude that dual convictions under
790.15(2) and section
790.19 do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy....
...Valdes was charged with three counts of attempted second-degree murder with a firearm and one count each of discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1000 feet of a person in violation of section
790.15(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2003)....
...rimary evil.'" Valdes,
970 So.2d at 419 (citing Paul,
934 So.2d at 1175). The court acknowledged the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Lopez-Vazquez, in which the Fifth District concluded that convictions under sections
790.15(2) and
790.19, arising from the same criminal episode, violate double jeopardy....
...ing the victim in the arm."
931 So.2d at 232. The Fifth District concluded that the offenses of discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1000 feet of a person in violation of section
790.15(2) and shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section
790.19 shared the same core offense of battery....
...is the sole method of determining whether multiple punishments are double-jeopardy violations.") (footnote omitted). Gordon,
780 So.2d at 19-20 (footnote omitted). In this case there is no clear statement of legislative intent to authorize or to prohibit separate punishments for violations of sections
790.15(2) and
790.19....
...Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute. 3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense. §
775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (2003). It is undisputed that sections
790.15(2) and
790.19 each contain an element that the other does not....
...Shooting from a vehicle in violation of section
790.15(2) requires proof of two elements: (1) the defendant knowingly and willfully discharged a firearm from a vehicle; and (2) the discharge occurred within 1000 feet of any person. §
790.15(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). In contrast, section
790.19 requires proof of the following three elements: (1) the defendant shot a firearm; (2) he or she did so at, within, or into a vehicle of any kind that was being used or occupied by any person; and (3) he or she did so wantonly or maliciously. §
790.19, Fla....
...The Proper Test for Double Jeopardy under Section
775.021(4)(b)(2) In Valdes and Lopez-Vazquez, the Third and Fifth Districts applied the "primary evil" test, as set forth in the Gordon, Florida, and Paul line of cases, to determine whether a defendant's dual convictions under sections
790.15(2) and
790.19, arising out of the same episode, violate double jeopardy....
...we adopt today, dual convictions for the two offenses at issue in this case, discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1000 feet of a person in violation of section
790.15(2), Florida Statutes, and shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes, do not satisfy the second statutory exception because the two offenses are found in separate statutory provisions; neither offense is an aggravated form of the other; and they are clearly not degree variants of the same offense....
...(2) Any occupant of any vehicle who knowingly and willfully discharges any firearm from the vehicle within 1,000 feet of any person commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. §
790.15, Fla. Stat. (2003). Section
790.19 provides in pertinent part:
790.19 Shooting into or throwing deadly missiles into dwellings, public or private buildings, occupied or not occupied; vessels, aircraft, buses, railroad cars, streetcars, or other vehicles....
..., caboose, cable railway car, street railway car, monorail car, or vehicle of any kind which is being used or occupied by any person, ... shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or
775.084. §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 56 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...tence for the use of a firearm, [2] appellant filed a motion to correct the sentence pursuant to rule 3.800, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. [3] The motion was denied. Appellant was charged with shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes, a second degree felony punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years....
...2072,
23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). The trial court's denial of appellant's 3.800 motion is affirmed without prejudice to his right to file an appropriate 3.850 motion to vacate the judgment and sentence. AFFIRMED. COBB, FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 34 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...ing was held on the alleged violations of the probation order, following which the court revoked the prior order of probation and sentenced appellant to ten years in the state penitentiary under the conviction of March 4, 1969, for violation of F.S. Section 790.19, F.S.A....
CopyCited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...rm, a better description of which is to the State Attorney unknown, which said motor vehicle was then and there being used and occupied by Robert Brostek." A motion to dismiss the information on the ground that the statute defining such offense viz. Section 790.19 F.S.A....
...ieve a flat trajectory (the facts upon which the trial court adjudged the defendant to be guilty) is forbidden by the statute. That is all the law requires. Affirmed. ROBERTS, C.J., and ERVIN, CARLTON, ADKINS, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] "790.19 Shooting Into or throwing deadly missiles into dwellings, public or private building, occupied or not occupied; vessels, aircraft[,] buses, railroad cars, street ears or other vehicles....
CopyCited 24 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 28 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 369, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 11062
...ch independently defeat Farm Fresh’s argument. The first is that in the case of the FLSA the Administrator must provide the written administrative interpretation in order to qualify for relief under section 259. 29 U.S.C. § 259 (b); see 29 C.F.R. § 790.19 (b); National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Jerry Hill, Public Defender, and Michael E. Raiden, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corces, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. OTT, Judge. Ruben Green was convicted of shooting into a building, contrary to section 790.19, *587 Florida Statutes (1983)....
CopyCited 20 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 601299
...aggravated battery with a firearm. The trial court's first instinct was correctthis was a case for the jury to decide and the jury's verdict should be upheld. NOTES [1] §§
777.04,
782.07; Fla. Stat. (1993). [2] §
784.045, Fla. Stat. (1993). [3] Section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1993) provides, in relevant part: Whoever, wantonly or maliciously ......
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 467
...the first-degree murder felonies.] Section
782.04(4), Florida Statutes (1983). I would approve the district court below on the ground that third-degree felony murder based on the underlying felony of shooting at, within, or into an occupied vehicle (section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1983)) is not a lesser included offense of either premeditated or first-degree felony murder. First, there was no evidence introduced to support a theory of first-degree felony murder. None of the ten enumerated felonies of first-degree murder are arguably present. Second, if the statutory elements of section
790.19 and the ten enumerated felonies under first-degree felony murder are tested in accordance with section
775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1983), Blockburger test, then section
790.19 is a separate offense from all of the ten enumerated felonies and cannot be a lesser included offense of first-degree murder....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2008 WL 1819421
...The apartment was filled with haze and smelled of gunpowder. The officers found a .38 caliber revolver, gun cleaning materials, and ammunition, as well as bullet holes and bullet fragments in the floor molding. Kettell later admitted to his ex-wife that he fired the shots. He was charged with violating section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2003), which provides, in pertinent part, that "[w]hoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into ....
...He then retrieved a gun and several times threatened to shoot himself and her. He shot into the floor and then into the wall of the room where the baby was sleeping. When his wife rushed into the room to protect the child, he followed her and again fired into the wall. He was charged with violating section 790.19, as well as with aggravated assault and battery. The jury found him guilty on all counts, but the trial court granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the charge of violating section 790.19....
...In its brief opinion, the court addressed the issue as follows: Holtsclaw's attorney argues this statute did not apply because Holtsclaw owned the trailer and either (1) the shots were made without an intent to injure anyone; or (2) the shots were not directed at anyone. None of these reasons constitute defenses to section
790.19, by its own language, nor does case law so construe it. As we said in Skinner v. State,
450 So.2d 595, 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), review denied,
470 So.2d 702 (Fla.1985): [We] hold that section
790.19 ....
...State,
450 So.2d 595, 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). As we have explained, we cannot accept the view that the language at issue constitutes a correct and clear statement of the law. The Holtsclaw court undoubtedly sought to express the view that an offense under section
790.19 may be established without showing that the defendant shot at someone....
...fulfilled simply by showing that someone shot into a building without proving that the shooting was done wantonly or maliciously. Kettell,
950 So.2d at 507. Thus, disagreeing with Holtsclaw about the proof required to establish the intent element of section
790.19, the court held the instruction erroneous; and because the instruction concerned an element of the crime, it reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 507-08. B. Resolving the Conflict The district court opinions essentially conflict over whether proof of the first two elements of section
790.19 (shooting a firearm at, within, or into a building) is sufficient to establish the third (doing so wantonly or maliciously). Understanding why Holtsclaw is incorrect first requires us to (1) review the history of the district courts' interpretations of section
790.19 and then (2) explain how Holtsclaw misinterpreted these decisions to remove the statute's intent requirement....
...Proof that a defendant was shooting at a person was insufficient. Over two decades later, a judge on one district court, and a panel of another, took issue with Golden. In Johnson v. State,
436 So.2d 248, 248 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), the panel affirmed without opinion the defendant's conviction under section
790.19....
...That is, "`[w]antonly' does not require that the building be the target." Id. Then, in Skinner v. State,
450 So.2d 595, 595-96 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), the Fifth District, with Judge Cowart now writing for the majority, used the phrasing that the court in Holtsclaw later quoted. The court held that section
790.19 "is violated by a person who intentionally shoots at, within, or into a building for the primary purpose, or with the specific intent, of shooting at a person in or near the building, as well as by a person who shoots at, within, or into the building per se." Id....
...t defense: that the shooting was not wanton or malicious. As already noted, the court in Holtsclaw quoted the "per se" language in Skinner to *1067 hold that the defendant's claims (lack of malicious or wanton intent) did not "constitute defenses to section
790.19, by its own language."
542 So.2d at 438. Thus, the court held that under the statute it is no defense that the act of shooting was not malicious or wanton. Such a holding effectively renders section
790.19 a per se crime....
...That was not Holtsclaw's defense, and it is not Kettell's. The reasoning in Holtsclaw also disregards the plain language of the statute, which requires that the prohibited act be done "wantonly or maliciously." As noted above, the standard jury instruction for section 790.19 defines maliciously and wantonly as follows: "Wantonly" means consciously and intentionally, with reckless indifference to consequences and with the knowledge that damage is likely to be done to some person....
...done to some person" (for acting "wantonly") or that injury or damage will or may be caused to another person or the property of another person (for acting "maliciously"). See Smith v. State,
679 So.2d 30, 31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) ("A conviction under section
790.19 requires that the perpetrator act `wantonly' or `maliciously' in throwing the projectile toward an occupied or unoccupied building....
...The Error Was Harmful Having concluded that the special instructions given at trial were erroneous statements of the law, we now turn to the State's contention that any error was harmless. [3] We disagree. Noting that the trial court gave both the standard jury instruction applicable to section
790.19 as well as the erroneous special instructions, the Second District concluded that "in full context, the best that can be said of them is that they are contradictory and therefore confusing and misleading." Kettell,
950 So.2d at 507....
...The instruction impermissibly removed, or at least reduced, the State's burden to prove malicious or wanton intent beyond a reasonable doubt. The court's faulty instructions on the intent element were thus material to the jury's consideration of whether Kettell violated *1069 section 790.19....
...State,
937 So.2d 277, 282 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that fundamental error occurred where the jury was given contradictory instructions, one correct and the other incorrect). III. CONCLUSION We hold that the wanton or malicious intent element of the crime defined by section
790.19, Florida Statutes, is not established solely by evidence that a defendant fired a shot at, within, or into a building....
...or any boat, vessel, ship, or barge lying in or plying the waters of this state, or aircraft flying through the airspace of this state shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 150216
...f Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, the state correctly argues that, independent of the two attempted second degree murder convictions, the conviction for possession of a weapon in the commission of a felony could stand based on violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1985)....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 111339
...COBB and ANTOON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] There was apparently a 2:00 a.m. cut-off time on beer sales. [2] Agnihotri was apparently out back, checking on a shed, when Smithson first entered the store. [3] §§
775.087(2)(a) and
812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993). [4] §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 75720
...In summary, each of Kelly's convictions are affirmed except as to Count VIII for the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. This cause is remanded for re-sentencing. Affirmed in part; Reversed in part; Remanded. ORFINGER and SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §
777.04(1) and §
782.04(1)(a), Florida Statutes, 1987. [2] §
790.19, Florida Statutes, 1987....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1993 WL 219841
...for the court to make certain findings before imposing adult sanctions on a juvenile. Although the facts of the instant case concern section 39.111, the rationale of this opinion also applies to section 39.059. [2] §
812.13, Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2013 WL 646089, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 3782
...predicate offenses underlying Turner’s ACCA enhancement in turn.
A. Aggravated Assault and Shooting into an Occupied Building
Turner’s convictions under Florida law for aggravated assault, Fla. Stat.
§
784.021, and shooting into an occupied building, Fla. Stat. §
790.19, arose from
the same incident; therefore, if either conviction constitutes a violent felony, it can
serve as one of the three predicate offenses for purposes of the ACCA....
....
threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” § 924(e)(2)(B)(i),
and Turner’s conviction for aggravated assault thus qualifies as a violent felony for
purposes of the ACCA. 6
Turner’s conviction for shooting into an occupied building also qualifies as a
violent felony. Florida Statute section 790.19 provides that “[w]hoever, wantonly
or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any [deadly] missile ....
....
17
Case: 10-12094 Date Filed: 02/22/2013 Page: 18 of 28
within, or in any public or private building, occupied or unoccupied . . . shall be
guilty of a felony.” For purposes of section 790.19, “‘wantonly’ means ....
...heart of what the ACCA was designed to encapsulate. See Alexander,
609 F.3d at
1257 (“The firing of a weapon poses a risk that a bystander will be injured by a
stray bullet.”). These considerations compel the conclusion that a violation of
Florida Statute section
790.19, as a categorical matter, falls within ACCA’s
definition of a violent felony.
Even if it did not qualify under the traditional categorical approach,
Turner’s conviction for shooting into an occupied building would still constitute a
violent felony under the modified categorical approach....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...cause damage to property. The crimes are not the same and there is no error on this point. Appellant having failed to demonstrate error, the judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED. COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §
806.13, Fla. Stat. (1979). [2] §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 40978, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 190
...(a),
775.087(2)(a)l, and
775.087(2)(a)2, Florida Statutes (2010); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of sections
790.23 and
775.087(2)(a)l, Florida Statutes; shooting a deadly weapon into an occupied conveyance in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes; and battery in violation of section
784.03, Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 31059895
...threat of physical force or violence against an individual. See Hudson v. State,
800 So.2d 627, 628-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (on motion for rehearing granted) (analyzing the non-enumerated felony of shooting or throwing a deadly missile in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes)....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 390280
...ound appellant guilty of two identically worded counts of throwing a deadly missile into a dwelling and one count of aggravated assault on its occupant. We affirm the judgment entered on the jury's verdict. Appellant argues that under the wording of section 790.19, Florida Statutes, proscribing the throwing of "any" missile into a private building, the two discrete acts should be treated as a single offense on the authority of such cases as Wallace v....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 798726
...ns" the juror questioning procedure was a harmless error). The state properly concedes that the trial court erred in imposing a three-year minimum mandatory sentence for the charge of shooting or throwing a deadly missile. Bradford was charged under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1997), "Shooting into or throwing deadly missiles into dwellings, public or private buildings, occupied or not occupied; vessels, aircraft, buses, railroad cars, streetcars, or other vehicles." As the court held in Samuels v....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Katherine V. Blanco, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. FRANK, Judge. In this case the appellant, a juvenile, was charged by petition with throwing a missile at an occupied vehicle in violation of Section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1983), and aggravated assault with a motor vehicle in violation of Section
784.021, Florida Statutes (1983)....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 36 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 270, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 1345, 2011 WL 2375217
...After a review of the conflict issue, we find our decision in Valdes controlling. In Valdes, we considered whether dual convictions for discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1000 feet of a person in violation of section
790.15(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2003), arising from the same criminal episode, violated double jeopardy....
...[3] Ultimately, we concluded that "the only offenses that fall under subsection (4)(b)2., are those that constitute different degrees of the same offense, as explicitly set forth in the relevant statutory sections." Id. at 1077. As this holding was applied to Valdes' convictions under sections
790.19 and
790.15, we found that the violations did "not satisfy the second statutory exception because the two offenses are found in separate statutory provisions; neither offense is an aggravated form of the other; and they are clearly not degree variants of the same offense." Valdes,
3 So.3d at 1077....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 3408, 2009 WL 1066117
...threat of physical force or violence against an individual. See Hudson v. State,
800 So.2d 627, 628-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (on motion for rehearing granted) (analyzing the non-enumerated felony of shooting or throwing a deadly missile in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes)....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 557586
...estimony on a minor point. Appellant argues that the point is important because, if the jury believed that Appellant first struck the victim with the rock and it bounced off her body before smashing the window, then Appellant could not have violated section
790.19, according to In Interest of J.G.,
655 So.2d 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). That case held that the intent to strike a person could not be transferred into the specific intent to damage certain property required by the criminal mischief statute. Id. at 1285. We deem J.G. inapposite. Opinions interpreting section
790.19, Florida Statutes, have resolved that a person who "intentionally shoots at, within, or into a building for the primary purpose, or with the specific intent, of shooting at a person in or near the building" has violated section
790.19....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 1192222
...was occupied, or that there was the use or threat of physical force against the victim. In addition, the use or threat of physical force against any individual is not a necessary element of the charged offense because throwing a deadly missile under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1998), constitutes a crime whether the building is occupied or unoccupied....
...Reversed and remanded for resentencing. SORONDO, J., concurs. SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge (specially concurring). I agree with reversal on the separate ground that, no matter what the underlying facts or jury finding, and thus without considering Apprendi, the crime proscribed by section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1997), [2] is not a forcible felony as defined *629 by section
776.08, Florida Statutes (1997), [3] because it includes shooting or throwing at unoccupied buildings, and thus does not, by statutory definition, necessarily involve physical force or violence against an individual....
...I cannot help but note that much time and effort could have been saved if the state had simply confessed error in the first place. NOTES [1] In fairness to the trial judge, it should be pointed out that Apprendi was decided after Hudson was sentenced in this case. [2] 790.19 Shooting into or throwing deadly missiles into dwellings, public or private buildings, occupied or not occupied; vessels, aircraft, buses, railroad cars, streetcars, or other vehicles.Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or i...
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 464
...We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and approve in part and quash in part Vause. The state indicted Vause for first-degree premeditated murder (section
782.04, Florida Statutes (1979)), shooting at or into an occupied vehicle (section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1979)), and use of a firearm during commission of a felony (section
790.07, Florida Statutes (1979))....
...We approve the remainder of Vause. It is so ordered. BOYD, C.J., and ALDERMAN and EHRLICH, JJ., concur. SHAW, J., concurs in result only with an opinion. ADKINS, J., concurs in result only. OVERTON, J., dissents. SHAW, Justice, concurring in result only with opinion. I agree that section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1979), is not a lesser included offense of section
782.04, Florida Statutes (1979), and section
790.07, Florida Statutes (1979), is not a lesser included offense of
790.19. I agree also that the conviction and sentence for violating section
790.19 are proper....
...Multiple convictions and sentences are proper where the lesser crime (to homicide) is a separate offense under Blockburger and does not itself cause the death, as, for example, in sexual battery, robbery or burglary. See my concurring opinion in State v. Enmund,
479 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1985). NOTES [1] The full text of section
790.19 reads as follows:
790.19 Shooting into or throwing into or throwing deadly missiles into dwellings, public or private buildings, occupied or not occupied; vessels, aircraft, busses, railroad cars, streetcars, or other vehicles....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 153723
...Affirmed as modified. BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ., concur. COPE, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the treatment of the aggravated assault charge but would affirm the adjudication for throwing a deadly missile, proscribed by section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1987)....
..."throw an object at the car," and "heard [the object] hit [the car]." The witness need not be able to identify the object in flight in order to sustain the adjudication. Whatever E.J. threw was hard enough to dent the victim's vehicle and, had it struck the occupants, would have produced great bodily harm. See § 790.19, Fla....
...State,
341 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), the boxcars were unoccupied and thus were outside the statute. In D.B.C. v. State,
341 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), there was no factual basis on which to draw a conclusion whether a "missile, ... stone or other hard substance," §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 91788
...NOTES [1] Johnson v. Wainwright,
463 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1985); Knight v. State,
394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981). [2] Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744,
87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400,
18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). [3] §§
782.04(1)(a)1,
777.04(4)(a),
775.087, Fla. Stat. [4] §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. COWART, Judge. We agree with Ballard v. State,
447 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), and hereby *596 express direct conflict with Golden v. State,
120 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960), and now expressly hold that section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1983), is violated by a person who intentionally shoots at, within, or into a building for the primary purpose, or with the specific intent, of shooting at a person in or near the building, as well as by a person who shoots at, within, or into the building per se....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 1766734
...ting him with a .380 pistol and did in the process, use, carry, or possess a weapon, to-wit: a .380 caliber pistol, in violation of Sections
782.04 and
777.04, Florida Statutes. Count two alleged the crime of shooting into a building, a violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1997)....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 1827265
...The comments in this case did not vitiate the entire trial. We therefore affirm the conviction. Paul also challenges his enhanced sentence for shooting into an occupied building. He claims that a conviction of shooting into a dwelling in violation of section
790.19 does not constitute a predicate offense for enhanced sentencing under the Prison Releasee Reoffender statute. §
775.082(9)(a), Fla. Stat. Section
790.19, Florida Statutes, criminalizes shooting deadly missiles as follows: Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance which would produce death or great bodily harm, at, within, or in any public or private building, occupied or unoccupied, . . . shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree. §
790.19, Fla....
...ching which would not necessarily involve "the use or threat of physical force or violence" within the meaning of the statute. Hearns also cites to Hudson v. State,
800 So.2d 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). There, the Third District held that a violation of section
790.19 for shooting into a building did not constitute a forcible felony for purposes of enhanced sentencing under the VCC statute, because the use or threat of physical force against any individual was not a necessary element of the offense....
...Id. at 47 (emphasis added). Thus, in Thomas we did not look exclusively to the statutory elements of the crime. This is contrary to Hearns by which we are now bound. Therefore, Paul is not subject to PRR sentencing on a conviction for a violation of section 790.19 on remand....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 581, 2013 WL 3466806, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 1429
...Based upon this standard, the Court in Valdes held that dual convictions for discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1000 feet of a person, in violation of section
790.15(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and shooting into an occupied vehicle, in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2003), did not violate double jeopardy....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 1041
...ony. See Long v. State,
494 So.2d 213 (Fla. 1986); State v. DiGuilio,
491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986). Therefore, we reject appellant's claim of entitlement to a new trial on this ground. The appellant also contends that he cannot be convicted under both section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1987) (shooting into an occupied vehicle) and section
790.07(2), Florida Statutes (1987) (use of a firearm during commission of the felony of shooting into an occupied vehicle) based upon evidence that he fired one time into an occupied vehicle....
...ent that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial. The offense of use of a firearm to shoot into an occupied vehicle [1] requires no proof different from that required in regard to the offense under section 790.19 of shooting into an occupied vehicle....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2013 WL 6687247, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 670
...istrict’s decision in Crapps v. State,
968 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The certified conflict involves an issue of statutory construction: whether shooting into an occupied vehicle under section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), qualifies for prison releas-ee reoffender (PRR) sentencing under the forcible felony catch-all provision of the PRR statute, section
775.082(9)(a)l.o, Florida Statutes (2001)....
...of physical force or violence against an individual, and therefore, qualifies as a forcible felony under the catch-all provision of the PRR Statute. We disapprove the opinion in the conflicting case of Crapps . Paul Charles Paul was convicted under section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), for shooting into an occupied vehicle. Paul,
59 So.3d at 194 . Persons convicted under section
790.19 may be subjected to penalties under section
775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), the “prison releasee reof-fender” (PRR) statute, which specifies that a defendant who commits “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of ph...
...of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), it lacked merit and had already been rejected on direct appeal. Id. The Fourth District concluded that “this offense necessarily includes the use of force or violence against an individual. To commit a violation of section 790.19, a vehicle must be occupied.” Id....
...not required to ignore the elements of the particular provision of the statute under which appellant is charged.” Id. The Fourth District distinguished Paul’s case from previous cases which involved shooting into a building, reasoning that under section 790.19 a building may be occupied or unoccupied and a conviction under that provision of the statute does not necessarily require the use of force against an individual. Id. The Fourth District recognized and certified direct conflict with the decision of the First District in Crapps , on the issue of whether the offense of shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes, necessarily includes the use or threat of force against an individual. Id. Crapps Alander Crapps was convicted of throwing a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2005), which contained the same language as the 2001 version of the statute at issue in Paul....
...The First District did not state its rationale for this conclusion. However, its parenthetical explanations of the cited cases offer some insight. The parenthetical ex *1061 planation of Hudson v. State,
800 So.2d 627, 628-29 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) states that the Third District held “that the crime proscribed by section
790.19 is not a forcible felony because it includes shooting or throwing at unoccupied buildings and, thus, does not, by statutory definition, necessarily involve physical force or violence against an individual!)]” Crapps,
968 So.2d at 628 (emphasis added)....
...er the Hearns test because force against an individual is not a necessary element of at least one portion of the statute. ANALYSIS The certified conflict issue before this Court is whether, as a matter of law, shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), qualified for enhanced sentencing under the forcible felony catch-all provision of the PRR statute, i.e....
...sidered in determining whether an offense qualifies as a forcible felony, regardless of the particular circumstances involved.
961 So.2d at 212 . In order for this Court to apply the Hearns analysis, we must first determine the statutory elements of section
790.19. Section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2001) reads: Shooting into or throwing deadly missiles into dwellings, public or private buildings, occupied or not occupied; vessels, aircraft, buses, railroad cars, streetcars, or other vehicles.— Whoever, wanton...
...ip, or barge lying in or plying the waters of this state, or aircraft flying through the airspace of this state shall *1062 be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s. 775.088, or s.
775.084. At first glance, section
790.19 appears to be a conjunctive statute, where all elements merge to form one offense, because all offenses are listed in a single paragraph without the use of punctuation or subsections to indicate the legislative intent. If the statute were conjunctive in nature, then a violation of section
790.19 would never be considered a forcible felony, as a cursory reading of the statute may demonstrate circumstances where a physical threat of force to an individual would not be necessarily involved, such as shooting into an unoccupied building or shooting a vessel lying in the water....
...is a disjunctive statute, which punishes multiple offenses, each with distinct elements. In State v. Reddick,
568 So.2d 902, 903, n. 2 (Fla.1990), this Court cited the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases in stating that, pursuant to section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1985), the offense of “[sjhooting into a dwelling ... has three elements: (1) the defendant shot a firearm, (2) into a public or private building, (3) wantonly or maliciously.” This Court subsequently interpreted section
790.19 as one which includes multiple offenses, each containing distinct elements, in the case of Valdes v. State,
3 So.3d 1067 (Fla.2009). In Valdes , the defendant was convicted of shooting into an occupied vehicle, in violation of section
790.19. Id. at 1068 . In upholding the defendant’s conviction, we noted that pursuant to section
790.19 a conviction for shooting into an occupied vehicle “requires proof of the following three elements: (1) the defendant shot a firearm; (2) he or she did so at, within, or into a vehicle of any kind that was being used or occupied by any person; and (3) he or she did so wantonly or maliciously.” Id. at 1071 . Therefore, we have previously concluded that section
790.19 is comprised of distinct and separate offenses, with each offense containing unique elements which must be proven in order to secure a conviction of that particular offense. Paul argues that even if section
790.19 proscribes a number of separate offenses, the “used or occupied” modifiers for vehicles are alternative definitions much like the “occupied or unoccupied” modifiers for buildings....
...in the parking lot while the driver shops. However, a closer reading of the statutory-language combined with the legislative history of the statute and this Court’s previous interpretations of the statute indicate otherwise. Legislative History of Section 790.19 This statutory section dates back to 1881, when the “Senate and Assembly” passed an act “for the better Protection of Passengers on Railroad Cars and the Employees of Railroad Companies.” Ch....
...The 1974 amendment also inserted “or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance” to the actions prohibited. Id. The statute has remained unchanged since then and has been a single paragraph since its consolidation in 1906. We can glean several things from this history of section 790.19....
...This Court explained that “the shooting must be such as to endanger the lives or safety of those who may be in or using the car.” Id. See also Hamilton v. State,
30 Fla. 229 ,
11 So. 523 , 524 (1892) (finding that both of the 1892 revisions to section
790.19 indicated a legislative objective to punish acts that endanger the lives of people who may be on the locomotive or in the car)....
...Where the Legislature does not define the words used in a statute, this Court first examines the plain language of the statute in order to detex-mine the parameters of a specific element of an offense. See Marrero v. State,
71 So.3d 881, 886 (Fla.2011). The Legislature did not define the word “use” in section
790.19. Therefore, it is “‘appi'opi'iate to refer to dictionary definitions when construing [section
790.19]’ in order to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of [‘use’].” School Bd....
...This definition would result in the statute being broader than the Legislature intended. Under this definition, vehicles would always be in use because someone would always have the “privilege or benefit” of using them. And thus, shooting into both occupied and unoccupied vehicles would be punishable under section 790.19....
...If the Legislature intended for “used” to signify a vehicle that is unoccupied, it would seem a simpler task to use the same modifier for vehicles that was used just a few lines earlier in the designation for buildings. In holding that the offense of shooting into a vehicle under section
790.19 necessarily involves the threat of physical force or violence to an individual, we disapprove the apparent reasoning of the First District in Crapps,
968 So.2d 627 (Fla....
...e statute under which [the defendant] is charged.”
59 So.3d at 194 . A forcible felony analysis for the crime of shooting into a building would not be useful to the offense of shooting into a vehicle as the offense of shooting into a vehicle under section
790.19 requires the presence of an individual and the offense of shooting into a building under the same statute does not. Thus, in light of our clarification of the elements for each offense listed in section
790.19, the First District’s holding in Crapps cannot stand....
...e or force to an individual.
968 So.2d at 628 . As we find that the offenses of shooting into a building and shooting into a vehicle are separate and distinct crimes for purposes of the Hearns statutory elements test, we find that a conviction under section
790.19 for shooting into an occupied vehicle is a basis for PRR sentencing pursuant to the forcible felony catch-all provision, as the statute necessarily involves the use or threat of physical force to an individual....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 2270289
...h includes any felony involving "the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual," identical to the catch-all PRR provision at issue herein. Hudson was convicted of throwing a deadly missile into a hotel lobby, in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1997), which prohibits shooting or throwing a deadly missile into a structure, whether occupied or unoccupied....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...a felony offense in the adult division of the circuit court. Pursuant to section 39.04(2)(e)(4), Florida Statutes (1979), [1] the State Attorney filed an information against him, charging him with shooting into an occupied residence in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1554
...itlement to the relief sought, we reverse his convictions and sentences for attempted second degree murder, §
777.04, Fla. Stat. (1983); §
782.04, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1984), shooting or throwing a deadly missile into an occupied building or vehicle, §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb, shall be murder in the third degree... . Shooting into an occupied vehicle (of which the defendant was also convicted) is a felony. § 790.19, Florida Statutes (1979)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 8
...ecord would have sustained two attempted murder convictions. People v. Rothrock, 21 Cal. App.2d 116, 68 P.2d 364 (1937). But having been found guilty of only firing one shot in a dwelling, Callaghan could have been convicted of only one violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1983)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...The jury also found appellant guilty of the charged offense of throwing a missile at an occupied vehicle. Both offenses were predicated upon appellant's single act of hurling a brick which passed through the window of an automobile and struck an individual seated therein. Section 790.19, Florida Statutes, which prohibits throwing a missile at, within, or in an occupied vehicle, expressly requires that the prohibited act be done "wantonly or maliciously." Relying on Golden v....
...y to establish a battery under §
784.03, Florida Statutes, are mutually exclusive elements such that both statutes may not be violated by a single act. In Johnson v. State,
436 So.2d 248 (Fla.5th DCA 1983) (Cowart concurring), it was indicated that §
790.19 might apply to one who acts "with reckless disregard of the potential deadly consequences," and that: The words `wantonly or maliciously' relate to a mental element and describe the condition or attitude of mind which must accompany the prohibited act. But the statute does not require that the defendant's malevolent attitude be that of a specific intent . .. to harm the object involved. As so construed, §
790.19 might thus be violated by one who has no malevolence toward a vehicle or structure itself, but acts with a wanton or malicious attitude directed toward an individual within or near the vehicle or structure....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1996 WL 168618
...4.045(1)(a)2 (deadly weapon) or on aggravated assault or on shooting at or into an occupied vehicle, the prohibition against enhancement on the basis of a necessary element of the offense was violated. Shooting at an occupied vehicle in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1993), is the only predicate offense of which Mr....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 4899179
...maliciously shot and threw any missile or hurled or projected a stone or other hard substance that would produce death or great bodily harm at a vehicle of any kind that was being used or occupied by someone, a second-degree felony, in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2007)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 774
...Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Gary W. Tinsley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. ORFINGER, Judge. This appeal is from a judgment of conviction for shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1983), following a jury trial....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 1649020
...the defendant from killing the victim or the defendant failed to do so; and 2) the act was imminently dangerous to another and demonstrated a depraved mind without regard for human life. Shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section *234 790.19, Florida Statutes (2005), requires proof of three elements: 1) Vazquez shot a firearm; 2) he did so at, within, or into a vehicle of any kind that was being used or occupied by any person; and 3) the act was done wantonly or maliciously....
...o do so; and, 2) that the act was imminently dangerous to another and demonstrated a depraved mind without regard for human life. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) § 6.4., at 1744 (emphasis added). We believe that the primary evil addressed by sections
790.19 and
790.15, which proscribe shooting into an occupied vehicle and shooting from a vehicle, is the endangerment of the safety of those who may be struck by the discharge from the firearm....
...ection are supplemental to all other provisions of law relating to the possession, use, or exhibition *236 of a firearm." M.P.,
682 So.2d at 82 (alteration in original) (quoting §
790.22(7), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994)). Since neither section
790.15 nor section
790.19 contains any similar language indicating that the provisions are supplemental to the other provisions of law, we do not find any inconsistency between our decision, which holds that convictions under two statutes in chapter 790 constit...
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...One bullet was also fired through the open window on the driver's side and passed through the vehicle and broke the window at the front passenger's side. Appellant was charged, tried and convicted of an aggravated assault on Ricky Joiner and also a violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1981), which makes it a felony crime to wantonly or maliciously shoot any firearm at, within or in any vehicle which is being used or occupied by any person....
...Golden fired his pistol at Jernigan several times both before and after entering the house. Bullets struck both the exterior and interior of the house and one bullet struck Jernigan during his flight for safety. Golden was charged, tried and convicted of assault with intent to kill and a violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1957 amended Ch....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Brown, Asst. Public Defender, Tampa, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. LEHAN, Judge. Defendant appeals from his conviction for shooting into an occupied dwelling in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1981), contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 2447859
...running away from him. Likewise, we find no merit in the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the count for shooting or throwing a deadly missile in a building. The defendant argues that section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2004), requires that the offender shoot at someone inside a building, and the undisputed evidence established that the defendant fired from inside the building at Javier Lanuza, who was outside of the building. Section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2004), however, provides, in part that "Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into ......
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 3355061
...guilt for three counts of attempted second degree murder with a firearm; one count of discharging a firearm from a vehicle in violation of section
790.15(2), Florida Statutes (2003); and one count of shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2003)....
...5th DCA 2004). We, therefore, address the merits of the defendant's claim. The defendant claims that his convictions for shooting from a vehicle in violation of section
790.15(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2003), violate double jeopardy, as the offenses arose out of the same criminal episode....
.... (2) Any occupant of any vehicle who knowingly and willfully discharges any firearm from the vehicle within 1,000 feet of any person commits a felony of the second degree. . . . The defendant was convicted under section
790.15(2) of this statute. Section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2003), provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
790.19 Shooting into or throwing deadly missiles into dwellings, public or private buildings, occupied or not occupied; vessels, aircraft, buses, railroad cars, streetcars, or other vehicles.Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or i...
...If any of the exceptions apply, double jeopardy bars convictions for both offenses. Florida,
894 So.2d at 945. It is clear, and defense counsel concedes, that under the Blockburger test, as codified in section
775.021(4)(a), section
790.15(2), discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1,000 feet of any person, and section
790.19, shooting or throwing a deadly missile at, within, or into any building, vehicle, aircraft or vessel, each contain an element distinct from the other. Section
790.15(2) requires the willful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle within 1,000 feet of a person. Section
790.19 requires not mere willfulness, but malice, and does not require that any person be within the structure or near the structure at the time....
...Subsection (4)(b)(1), which concerns offenses that "require identical elements of proof," does not apply here. As previously discussed, pursuant to section
790.15(2), the State was required to prove that Valdes *419 fired the weapon from a vehicle within 1,000 feet of another person. Pursuant to section
790.19, the State was required to prove that when Valdes discharged the firearm, he did so with malice, and that he fired at, within, or into a building or vehicle....
...mitted in the course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity . . . to determine legislative intent.' §
775.021(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997).") (omission in original). A thorough examination of sections
790.15 and
790.19 reveals completely different core offenses intending to punish different evils....
...The core offense, therefore, is the discharge of the firearm into the public domain, not battery, and the primary evil is the potential for someone in the public domain to be injured or killed without any malice or intent to inflict bodily harm. In contrast, the core offense of section
790.19 is the shooting or throwing of any *421 deadly missile into or at a building or vehicle with malice. Where section
790.15 punishes firing a gun into the air with no evil intent and seeks to prevent even innocent revelers celebrating the new year from discharging a gun in public, section
790.19 punishes those who fire or hurl deadly objects at or into buildings and vehicles with the intent to cause fear or to inflict injury to a person. What the Legislature is attempting to protect in enacting section
790.19 is the safety and peace of mind of people in this state within their homes, vehicles, and other buildings. The evil that section
790.19 punishes is not thoughtless or otherwise innocent conduct, but malicious acts which destroy our sense of safety within structures and vehicles. Thus, throwing a rock from an overpass at a passing vehicle carries the same penalty as shooting a firearm into a house, building, or vehicle under section
790.19....
...Section
790.15 elevates the crime of discharging a firearm in public from a first degree misdemeanor to a second degree felony if, when the offender discharges the firearm, he does so from a vehicle within 1,000 feet of another person. On the other hand, a violation of section
790.19 is a second degree felony, even if no person is within the structure or vehicle when the object is thrown at or into the structure or vehicle at the time, because it is not just the potential to cause injury that section
790.19 addresses, but the evil intent....
...and injuring someone during the commission of a felony are sufficiently distinct that they warrant separate punishment." Id. No double jeopardy exists in the instant case because section
790.15 punishes the discharge of a firearm in public, whereas section
790.19 punishes the intent to injure or to cause fear. Moreover, section
790.15 protects people outside in public places, whereas section
790.19 protects people in their homes, vehicles, or other structures....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 44488
...PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ. FERGUSON, Judge. Under the rationale of Carawan v. State,
515 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1987), discharging a firearm in public, section
790.15, Florida Statutes (1987), is the same offense as shooting a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle, section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1987)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...was improperly convicted and sentenced for two separate offenses because "the facts proved [at trial constitute] only one criminal act... ." [1] The respondent was convicted and sentenced for shooting a gun into an occupied dwelling, in violation of Section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1973), and for assault with intent to commit murder, in violation of Section 784.06, Florida Statutes (1973)....
...nd the window area. The convictions and sentences imposed by the trial judge were lawful. The case is remanded with instructions to reinstate the judgment and sentence imposed by the trial court for shooting into an occupied dwelling in violation of Section 790.19....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2013 WL 28257
...The government suggests that we should affirm Petite’s sentence regardless of what we decide
about Florida’s vehicle flight statute, because Petite has another qualifying prior conviction --
throwing deadly missiles into a building in violation of Fla. Stat. § 790.19 -- that can take the
place of the vehicular flight conviction....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 73783
...State,
653 So.2d 457, 459 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. John Andrew Knight was charged by amended information with aggravated assault with a firearm, see §
784.021, Fla.Stat. (1991), and shooting at or into a building, see §
790.19, Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 130218
...[2] Under the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, first-degree murder (section
782.04(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985)) has three elements: (1) The victim is dead, (2) the defendant caused the death, (3) the killing was premeditated. Shooting into a dwelling (section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1985)) also has three elements: (1) The defendant shot a firearm, (2) into a public or private building, (3) wantonly or maliciously....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...2), Fla. Stat. (1993), which is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year. See §
775.082(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993). See also R.B. v. State,
633 So.2d 542 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Throwing a deadly missile is a second-degree felony, see §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 43383
...1st DCA 1987), which directly and expressly conflicts with decisions of this Court. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The petitioner, Anthony, was charged with the second degree felony of shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1985)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2014 WL 3362166
...§ 1326(a) and (b)(1), appeals from the District Court’s application of a
16-level guideline enhancement pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines
(USSG) § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). We must decide whether Mr. Estrella’s conviction
under Fla. Stat. § 790.19 for wantonly or maliciously throwing, hurling, or
projecting a missile, stone, or other hard substance at an occupied vehicle
constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of the USSG § 2L1.2 enhancement.
After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we hold that it is not.
I....
...Estrella’s punishment, however, derives from a sentence
enhancement based on a transgression that took place years before he pleaded
guilty to illegal reentry. On July 7, 2004, the State of Florida alleged that Mr.
Estrella “did, in violation of Florida Statute 790.19, wantonly or maliciously throw,
hurl or project a missile, stone or other hard substance, which would produce death
or great bodily harm, at a vehicle being used or occupied by a person.” He
2
...
...04,
although the record of conviction before the sentencing court and before this Court
on appeal includes neither the judgment of conviction nor the transcript of any plea
colloquy.
The fact of Mr. Estrella’s conviction under Fla. Stat. § 790.19, as well as a
description of his alleged conduct, was included in the Presentence Investigation
Report (PSR) prepared to assist the District Court with Mr. Estrella’s sentencing
for his illegal reentry conviction. The PSR concluded that the § 790.19 conviction
qualified as a crime of violence under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), and
recommended that the District Court impose the corresponding 16-level
enhancement.
Mr. Estrella objected to the proposed enhancement. He argued that his
violation of § 790.19 is not a crime of violence within the meaning of USSG
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because the statute does not have an element requiring the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another....
...1265 (2010) (the quantum-of-force requirement), and (2) has
no element requiring that the force used, attempted, or threatened be directed
against a person (the against-a-person requirement).
The District Court based the enhancement on Mr. Estrella’s prior conviction
under Fla. Stat. § 790.19, which provides:
Whoever wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws
any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance which
would produce death or great bodily harm, at, within, or in an...
...d or occupied by
any person, (iii) a vehicle being used or occupied by any person, etc.; (4) a boat,
vessel, ship, or barge lying in or plying the waters of this state; or (5) an aircraft
flying through the air space of this state. See Fla. Stat. § 790.19....
...ens to be occupied
without actually shooting, attempting to shoot, or threatening to shoot another
person.” Id.; cf. United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez,
467 F.3d 492, 495 (5th
4
Florida has also considered whether a violation of Fla. Stat. §
790.19 meets the state’s
definition of a crime of violence....
...the courts unless they contradict the plain meaning of the text of the Guidelines.”
(quotation marks omitted)). This is true even if the statute’s elements can also be
satisfied if the defendant targets a person.
There is no question that Fla. Stat. § 790.19’s requirement that force be
directed against an occupied vehicle means it will in fact capture both force
directed at the property and force directed at the occupant....
...14 Page: 24 of 28
the element can be satisfied if the jurors agree only that the vehicle was occupied at
the time of the defendant’s offensive conduct. See Fla. Std. Jury Intr. (Crim.)
10.13; Paul,
129 So. 3d at 1062 (noting that Fla. Stat. §
790.19’s type-of-structure-
targeted element can be satisfied by proof that the defendant’s conduct targeted “a
vehicle of any kind that was being used or occupied by any person”).
And, as we next discuss, there is no mens rea requirement in Fla. Stat.
§
790.19 that might translate the requirement that force be directed against an
occupied vehicle into a requirement that force be directed against the occupant, as
was the case in Curtis....
...ment does not
elevate this conviction to a crime of violence.
B. THE MENS REA ELEMENT
The remaining element that might elevate the offense to a USSG § 2L1.2
crime of violence is the mens rea element. Fla. Stat. § 790.19 requires proof that
the defendant directed force against an occupied vehicle “wantonly or
maliciously.” See Paul, 129 So....
...person or the
property of another person.” Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Kettell,
980
So. 2d 1061, 1067 (Fla. 2008) (reprinting the Florida Standard Jury Instructions
definitions for wantonly and maliciously and noting that Fla. Stat. §
790.19
requires the State to prove the mens rea element “in accordance with the
definitions of those terms”).
An element that can be satisfied by proof that “injury or damage may be
caused to ....
...of 28
IV. CONCLUSION
Adhering to the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions analyzing the
categorical and modified categorical approaches, we must conclude that Mr.
Estrella’s conviction under Fla. Stat. § 790.19 for wantonly or maliciously
throwing, hurling, or projecting a missile, stone, or other hard substance at an
occupied vehicle is not a crime of violence under USSG § 2L1.2....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 62889
...ry maximum of forty years. Dyer v. State,
629 So.2d 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). Accordingly, although we affirm his convictions, we reverse and remand for resentencing. ALTENBERND and LAZZARA, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §
782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (1993). [2] §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 40
...Gen., for appellee. Before HENDRY, HUBBART and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ. PER CURIAM. Steven Busch appeals his conviction of aggravated battery with a firearm and *1077 shooting into an occupied building in violation of section
784.045, Florida Statutes (1981), and section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1981)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Steven R. Jacob, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Before BARKDULL, SCHWARTZ and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ. DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge. Palacio was charged with three felonies: (1) shooting at an unoccupied vehicle, in violation of Section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1977); (2) attempted first degree murder with a firearm, in violation of Sections
782.04 and
777.04(1), Florida Statutes (1977); and (3) unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in the commission of the aforesaid felonies, in violation of Section
790.07(2), Florida Statutes (1977)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 41188
...He argues that all three counts arise out of the same episodic rash of violence directed at his wife, Suzanne, and therefore violate his double jeopardy rights. [1] The state cross appeals the trial court's dismissal (JNOV) of one *438 count of shooting into a public or private building in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1987)....
...or any boat, vessel, ship, or barge lying in or plying the waters of this state, or aircraft flying through the airspace of this state shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. §
790.19, Fla....
...Holtsclaw's attorney argues this statute did not apply because Holtsclaw owned the trailer and either (1) the shots were made without an intent to injure anyone; or (2) the shots were not directed at anyone. None of these reasons constitute defenses to section
790.19, by its own language, nor does case law so construe it. As we said in Skinner v. State,
450 So.2d 595, 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), rev. denied,
470 So.2d 702 (Fla. 1985): [We] hold that section
790.19 ......
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2017 WL 4393245
throwing a deadly missile at an occupied vehicle, see §
790.19, Fla. Stat. (2013), and criminal mischief ($200
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 105619
...schief under section
806.13, Florida Statutes and culpable negligence under section
784.05, Florida Statutes) and thereafter an information was filed in the circuit court charging the defendant with shooting into an occupied dwelling, a felony under section
790.19, Florida Statutes, and also in separate counts the same two misdemeanors charged in the information pending in the county court....
...al mischief (§
806.13) and culpable negligence (§
784.05)) were not necessarily lesser included offenses of the felony charged in the information in the circuit court in Johnson. The felony charge in Johnson was shooting into an occupied dwelling (§
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 2386435
...Here, we are dealing with two separate offenses contained within two separate statutes. The fact that they are both part of the same chapter is of no consequence in my view. Section
790.15(2) punishes the discharge of a firearm from a vehicle within 1000 feet of any person. Section
790.19 relates to shooting or throwing a deadly missile into a building or conveyance. Neither is a statutory degree variant of the other. They are entirely different crimes. NOTES [1] §
790.15(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). [2] §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 8230, 2010 WL 2330247
...or Appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard M. Fishkin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. NORTHCUTT, Judge. A jury convicted Dennis Shelden of shooting within or into a building, a second-degree felony. See § 790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 81722
...1548,
103 L.Ed.2d 852 (1989); Segars. Under these circumstances, Berry's argument lacks merit. Third, Berry argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for manslaughter, §
782.07, Fla. Stat. (1987), and for shooting within an occupied dwelling. §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2015 WL 479969
...§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).
This particular enhancement is triggered when, among other things, a
defendant has been convicted of a crime of violence prior to his deportation. The
district court found that Defendant’s prior conviction for a violation of Florida
Statute § 790.19 was a conviction for a crime of violence within the meaning of the
enhancement....
...After our own review, we agree and remand for resentencing.
I. Background
In August 2004, Defendant, a Mexican citizen, was convicted in a Florida
state court of throwing a deadly missile, in violation of Florida Statute § 790.19.
Subsequently, Defendant was deported to Mexico, but he later illegally reentered
the United States....
...Based on a total
offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of VI, the PSR calculated a
guideline range of 77-96 months’ imprisonment.
Prior to and during his sentencing hearing, Defendant objected to the 16-
level crime of violence enhancement. Defendant argued that his prior Florida
§ 790.19 conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence within the meaning of
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)....
...Discussion
On appeal, Defendant argues, and the government concedes, that our recent
decision in United States v. Estrella,
758 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2014), requires a
conclusion that the district court erred in applying the 16-level enhancement
because Defendant’s prior §
790.19 conviction was not a crime of violence for
purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).
A....
... Case: 14-10230 Date Filed: 02/06/2015 Page: 5 of 12
We review de novo whether a defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a
crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. Estrella,
758 F.3d at 1244.
Pursuant to Florida Statute §
790.19:
Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or
throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard
substance which would produce death or great bodily harm, at,
within, or in any public...
...d or
occupied by any person, or any boat, vessel, ship, or barge lying
in or plying the waters of this state, or aircraft flying through
the airspace of this state shall be guilty of a felony of the second
degree.
Fla. Stat. § 790.19.
Estrella was also an illegal reentry case, in which Estrella’s prior § 790.19
conviction was based on an assault that he directed at an occupied vehicle.
Likewise in this case, the PSR indicates that defendant Estrada’s assault was also
targeted at an occupied automobile. In Estrella, we first examined whether
§ 790.19 had as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another, which is required before a statute can be
deemed a crime of violence for purposes of § 2L1.2....
...If the statute were deemed,
indivisible, however, the inquiry was over and the particular conviction could not
be considered a crime of violence for purposes of enhancing the defendant’s
sentence. Estrella,
758 F.3d at 1245-47.
In examining §
790.19, we concluded that it was a divisible statute; that is, it
“effectively create[s] several different crimes.” Id....
...United States,
544 U.S. 13,
125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005).
7
Case: 14-10230 Date Filed: 02/06/2015 Page: 8 of 12
Summarizing, Estrella held that a conviction under Florida Statute §
790.19
is not categorically a crime of violence for purposes of application of the 16-level
crime-of-violence enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). But that is not the end
of the analysis because Estrella also concluded that §
790.19 is a divisible statute
and hence use of the modified categorical test is appropriate....
...those documents identify the particular mens rea element upon which the prior
conviction of the defendant in this case rested. But the government has conceded
that the only Shepard-approved document here is the information charging
Defendant with § 790.19, which information charges that Defendant “wantonly or
maliciously” threw a deadly missile at an occupied vehicle. As Defendant’s nolo
contendere plea was to an information charging him in the disjunctive with
wantonly or maliciously committing a particular act in violation of § 790.19 (not
with “wantonly and maliciously” doing so), we are likewise unable to determine
on which mens rea element Defendant’s conviction was based....
...ion that a 16-level enhancement
applies pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) and instead to apply an 8-level
enhancement for a prior aggravated felony, pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), based on
Defendant’s prior Florida conviction for a violation of § 790.19....
...U.S.C. §16 provides a broader
definition of the target of the physical force, indicating that the latter need only be
directed against the person “or property” of another. Id.
There is no question that Defendant’s conviction for § 790.19 meets the
definition of an aggravated felony, as described above....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...s. The sole point on appeal is whether the judge erred in imposing a mandatory three year minimum imprisonment under §
775.087. The seven year sentence imposed by the trial court is not excessive in that the maximum sentence for this offense, under Section
790.19, Florida Statutes, is fifteen years....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 518592
...tions as to the length of the sentence he would receive if he pleaded guilty. We affirm Balkaran's sentence, but write to order a modification of a condition of his probation. Balkaran was charged with shooting at or within a vehicle in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 20130, 2010 WL 5391473
...AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. TORPY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See §§
775.087(1),
775.087(2)(a)(2),
775.087(2)(a)(3),
777.04,
782.04, Fla. Stat. (2007). [2] See §§
775.087(2) &
784.045(1)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. (2007). [3] See §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Appellant was charged by petition as follows: "that ... is a delinquent child because: On the 6th day of February, 1976, the said child did then and there wantonly and maliciously throw a missile, to-wit: rocks, at railroad cars of the SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD CO., contrary to Section 790.19, Florida Statutes." The factual circumstances involved in this delinquency proceeding are quite similar to those recited in J.T.K....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 13453, 2014 WL 4249749
...Accordingly, we find that, under the tipsy coachman doctrine, the admission of the statements was not error. AFFIRMED. EVANDER, J„ and HARRIS, C.M., Senior Judge, concur. . §
790.235, Fla. Stat. (2012). Taylor was also charged with shooting into an occupied vehicle under section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2012)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1996 WL 457242
...neral, West Palm Beach, for appellee. STEVENSON, Judge. Appellant, Leonard Smith, appeals the conviction and sentence imposed after he was tried by jury and found guilty of throwing a deadly missile or stone into an occupied building in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1993)....
...f two of the state's key witnesses. We cannot agree with the state that this error was harmless. The proposed testimony went to possible motive the witnesses may have had to exaggerate or even completely fabricate their testimony. A conviction under section 790.19 requires that the perpetrator act "wantonly" or "maliciously" in throwing the projectile toward an occupied or unoccupied building....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 1785872
...on. The 15 year prison sentence Perez received is therefore legal. AFFIRMED; REMANDED for Correction of Scoresheet. THOMPSON, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. NOTES [1] §
782.04(1)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (1995) [2] §
812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). [3] §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2017 WL 1534812, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 5899
...A jury convicted Mr. Butner on count one, attempted second-degree murder, section
782.04, Florida Statutes (2012); on count two, aggravated assault with a firearm, section
784.021, Florida Statutes (2012); and on count three, shooting within a building, section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2012)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Gen., for appellee. Before ERVIN, C.J., and MILLS, BOOTH, SMITH, SHIVERS, WENTWORTH, JOANOS, THOMPSON, WIGGINTON, NIMMONS, ZEHMER and BARFIELD, JJ. On Rehearing En Banc April 25, 1985. BOOTH, Judge. Appellant stands convicted of throwing deadly missiles, contrary to Section 790.19, Florida Statutes, which provides: Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance which would produce death or great bodily harm, at, within, or in any public or private building, occupied or unoccupied .....
...2d DCA 1982), this court held that the mere throwing of an orange at a school bus without proof of either striking the bus or any person was insufficient to constitute a crime. Yet, we pointed out that under the proper circumstances, an orange could be a missile under section 790.19. Here, a jury could properly conclude that throwing a grapefruit with sufficient force to break the windshield of a moving truck was an act which "would produce death or great bodily harm." Under Section 790.19, Florida Statutes, it is the nature and capability of the missile, as disclosed by the evidence, to produce death or great bodily harm that is controlling....
...bably would have done so. [2] Appellant also contends the trial court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction based on the holding in Golden v. State,
120 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960), a case which seems to require that, for a conviction under Section
790.19, the party throwing the object must have intended to hit the building rather than an individual....
...If that is in fact the holding of the Golden case, it is a case from which this Court now recedes for the reasons stated in Ballard v. State,
447 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), and Skinner v. State,
450 So.2d 595 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). In Skinner, the court disagreed with Golden v. State, supra , and expressly held that: Section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1983), is violated by a person who intentionally shoots at, within, or into a building for the primary purpose, or with the specific intent, of shooting at a person in or near the building, as well as by a person who *778 shoots at, within, or into the building per se....
...We agree with the trial court that on a motion to dismiss the element of wantonly shooting at or into a building is not negated by the pleaded facts that defendant fired at a man who was in front of the building. "Wantonly" does not require that the building be the target. We hold that Section
790.19 should not, and need not, be interpreted to reverse a conviction under that statute because of evidence that defendant aimed a missile at, and intended to hit, the guard. This view is supported by Polite v. State,
454 So.2d 769, 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), wherein this Court receded from Golden v. State, supra , in a case involving a conviction under the same statute, Section
790.19, for the offense of throwing a missile at an occupied vehicle, holding: In the circumstances of the present case appellant's convictions for both battery and throwing a missile at an occupied vehicle could therefore be predicated on the single act of hurling a brick which struck an individual within the vehicle....
...t the window of the control room, breaking it. In Golden v. State , the defendant shot at the victim inside the victim's house, resulting in the discharge striking the house. In reversing Golden's conviction for shooting into a dwelling, contrary to Section 790.19, Florida Statutes, this court stated: The statute now under consideration make [sic] it a criminal offense for anyone to maliciously or wantonly shoot at or into any dwelling or other house....
...opinion in Golden v. State,
120 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). The parties were notified, furnished a copy of the panel decision, and have filed supplemental briefs. After consideration by the entire Court, the panel opinion on the interpretation of Section
790.19, Florida Statutes, and the receding from Golden v....
...3d DCA 1969), the opinion describes the charge as follows: By an information the appellant was charged in a first count with throwing toward and upon an occupied vehicle "a certain missile which was capable of producing death or great bodily harm, to-wit: a fire bomb" in violation of Section 790.19, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...The significant point on this appeal is whether the throwing of a grapefruit at a passing tanker truck, thereby shattering its windshield and superficially cutting the driver, constitutes the crime of throwing a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle. The statute under which appellant was charged reads as follows: 790.19 Shooting into or throwing deadly missiles into dwellings, public or private buildings, occupied or not occupied; vessels, aircraft, buses, railroad cars, streetcars, or other vehicles....
...2d DCA 1982), this court held that the mere throwing of an orange at a school bus without proof of either striking the bus or any person was insufficient to constitute a crime. Yet, we pointed out that under the proper circumstances, an orange could be a missile under section 790.19....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 17639
...maliciously shot and threw any missile or hurled or projected a stone or other hard substance that would produce death or great bodily harm at a vehicle of any kind that was being used or occupied by someone, a second-degree felony, in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2007)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 677217
...Kettell, Sr., appeals his second-degree felony conviction for shooting at, within, or into a building. Because the trial court gaveover Kettell's objection an erroneous instruction concerning the elements of the offense, we reverse the conviction. Section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2003), provides: "Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into ....
...The instruction thus indicates that shooting at, within, or into a building is an act that "standing alone"that is, without reference to the intent to cause *507 damage or injuryis sufficient to satisfy the intent element of the offense. This is not a correct statement of the law. To prove a violation of section 790.19, it must be established that the act is done wantonly or maliciously....
...State,
450 So.2d 595, 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). As we have explained, we cannot accept the view that the language at issue constitutes a correct and clear statement of the law. The Holtsclaw court undoubtedly sought to express the view that an offense under section
790.19 may be established without showing that the defendant shot at someone....
...r solvent, and a pouch of ammunition. Fortunately, no one was hurt. Apparently, Mr. Kettell was not shooting at anyone. Our record does not suggest, however, that he fired the shots accidentally. The police arrested Mr. Kettell and charged him under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2003): Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance which would produce death or great bodily harm, at, within, or in any pu...
...The State, however, requested two additional instructions based on Holtsclaw v. State,
542 So.2d 437 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). The Holtsclaw facts are strikingly similar to those before us. Mr. Holtsclaw shot his gun six times into the floor and walls of his trailer. Id. at 438. He appealed his conviction, arguing that section
790.19 was inapplicable because (1) he owned the trailer, and (2) he either did not intend to harm anyone or did not aim at anyone. Id. The Fifth District rejected these defenses. "`[S]ection
790.19 ....
...State,
447 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Thus, according to Holtsclaw, the statute does not require an intent to harm or shoot at anyone. The mere shooting in the building, if done with the requisite wantonness or maliciousness, is enough to violate section
790.19....
...Kettell responded that he did not know why, but it did not matter because nobody could prove it. More basic, however, the trial court properly instructed the jury on each element of the crime. The trial court listed the three elements required to secure a conviction under section 790.19....
...The statute recognizes no defense that a defendant fired into his own dwelling or that he was not shooting or intending to shoot at anyone. The use of the "per se" language from Holtsclaw does no more than recognize that these defenses do not exist under section 790.19....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 3478, 2011 WL 890879
...We affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s untimely and successive postcon-viction motion. Although appellant raised a claim of an illegal sentence in his motion, which could have been considered under Rule 3.800(a), that claim was rejected on direct appeal and lacks merit. Appellant was convicted under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), of shooting into an occupied vehicle and sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR)....
...violence against an individual”). Applying the strict statutory elements analysis required by State v. Hearns,
961 So.2d 211 (Fla.2007), this offense necessarily includes the use of force or violence against an individual. To commit a violation of section
790.19, a vehicle must be occupied. This case is distinguishable from Paul v. State,
958 So.2d 1135, 1136-38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), and Hudson v. State,
800 So.2d 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), which involved shooting into a building. Under section
790.19, a building may be occupied or unoccupied....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 670
...Separate convictions and sentences therefore are valid for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault with a firearm. Shooting into a conveyance requires "wantonly or maliciously" shooting "at, within, or into," an occupied vehicle something that "would produce death or great bodily harm." § 790.19, Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 8602, 2006 WL 1501084
...y aid the trier of fact in its search for truth). The jury had the opportunity to find that Filomeno acted in self-defense, but chose not to do so. AFFIRMED. TORPY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. . §§
782.04(2),
775.087(1) & (2), Fla. Stat. (2002). . §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 9504, 2009 WL 1971633
...ctions that the trial court strike the award. The trial court may re-impose such costs upon appropriate motion and proof. CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; AWARD OF COSTS REMANDED. TORPY, LAWSON and COHEN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §
790.15(2), Fla. Stat. (2006); §
790.19, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 1643906
...The summary judgment order states that the taxi driver reported Thorn to have thrown full beer cans at traffic, along with Steve Brown. The judge reasoned that there was probable cause to arrest both Thorn and Brown for throwing a deadly missile in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes....
...The problem with the analysis is that it is not supported by the record. The taxi driver testified that he identified the beer can thrower as Brown, not Thorn, and told Officer Stinson that the man he wanted was inside the house. Thus there was no probable cause to arrest Thorn for throwing a deadly missile under section 790.19....
...rrest and wrongful detention. VII. For the stated reasons, the summary judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. NOTES [1] This could constitute throwing deadly missiles in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes, a second degree felony....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 9 Fla. L. Weekly 1776, 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 14498
...y of a defense witness as a discovery sanction without conducting an adequate inquiry into the surrounding circumstances; we therefore reverse the order appealed. Appellant was charged with throwing a missile into an occupied vehicle in violation of § 790.19, Florida Statutes....
...severe sanctions for, appellant’s discovery violation. A post-trial inquiry being insufficient to cure the error, 2 we accordingly reverse the judgment and sentence appealed and remand the cause for a new trial. SMITH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . Section 790.19, Florida Statutes, provides that: Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, ......
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...ved mind without
regard for human life so as to support a conviction for attempted
second-degree murder in violation of section
782.04(2), Florida
Statutes; (2) Appellant wantonly or maliciously threw a deadly
missile into a building in violation of section
790.19, Florida
Statutes; and (3) Appellant wantonly or maliciously shot into a
building in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes.
Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion for
judgment of acquittal.
AFFIRMED.
JAY, WINSOR, and M.K....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2016 WL 1452299, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 5611
...In that case, the defendant threw a brick through the window of the patio door at the rear of a home and then went around to the front and threw another brick through a front window. Id. He was charged with two counts of throwing a deadly missile into a dwelling, pursuant to section 790.19, Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2013 Fla. LEXIS 2885, 2013 WL 1457839
...istrict’s decision in Crapps v. State,
968 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The certified conflict involves an issue of statutory construction: whether shooting into an occupied vehicle under section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), qualifies for prison releas-ee reoffender (PRR) sentencing under the forcible felony catch-all provision of the PRR statute, section
775.082(9)(a)l....
...of physical force or violence against an individual, and therefore, qualifies as a forcible felony under the catch-all provision of the PRR Statute. We disapprove the opinion in the conflicting case of Crapps . Paul Charles Paul was convicted under section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), for shooting into an occupied vehicle. Paul, 59 So.3d at 194. Persons convicted under section
790.19 may be subjected to penalties under section
775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), the “prison releasee reof-fender” (PRR) statute, which specifies that a defendant who commits “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of ph...
...iminal Procedure 3.800(a), it lacked merit and had already been rejected on direct appeal. Id. The Fourth District concluded that “this offense necessarily includes the use *1191 of force or violence against an individual. To commit a violation of section 790.19, a vehicle must be occupied.” Id....
...not required to ignore the elements of the particular provision of the statute under which appellant is charged.” Id. The Fourth District distinguished Paul’s case from previous cases which involved shooting into a building, reasoning that under section 790.19 a building may be occupied or unoccupied and a conviction under that provision of the statute does not necessarily require the use of force against an individual. Id. The Fourth District recognized and certified direct conflict with the decision of the First District in Crapps , on the issue of whether the offense of shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes, necessarily includes the use or threat of force against an individual. Id. Crapps Alander Crapps was convicted of throwing a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2005), which contained the same language as the 2001 version of the statute at issue in Paul....
...The First District did not state its rationale for this conclusion. However, its parenthetical explanations of the cited cases offer some insight. The parenthetical explanation of Hudson v. State,
800 So.2d 627, 628-29 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) states that the Third District held “that the crime proscribed by section
790.19 is not a forcible felony because it includes shooting or throwing at unoccupied buildings and, thus, does not, by statutory definition, necessarily involve physical force or violence against an individual^]” Crapps,
968 So.2d at 628 (emphasis added)....
...der the Heams test because force against an individual is not a necessary element of at least one portion of the statute. ANALYSIS The certified conflict issue before this Court is whether, as a matter of law, shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), qualified for enhanced sentencing under the forcible felony catch-all provision of the PRR statute, i.e....
...nsidered in determining whether an offense qualifies as a forcible felony, regardless of the particular circumstances involved.
961 So.2d at 212 . In order for this Court to apply the Heams analysis, we must first determine the statutory elements of section
790.19. Section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2001) reads: Shooting into or throwing deadly missiles into dwellings, public or private buildings, occupied or not occupied; vessels, aircraft, buses, railroad cars, streetcars, or other vehicles.— Whoever, wanton...
...el, ship, or barge lying in or plying the waters of this state, or aircraft flying through the airspace of this state shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. At first glance, section
790.19 appears to be a conjunctive statute, where all elements merge to form one offense, because all offenses are listed in a single paragraph without the use of punctuation or subsections to indicate the legislative intent. If the statute were conjunctive in nature, then a violation of section
790.19 would never be considered a forcible felony, as a cursory reading of the statute may demonstrate circumstances where a physical threat of force to an individual would not be necessarily involved, such as shooting into an unoccupied building or shooting a vessel lying in the water....
...is a disjunctive statute, which punishes multiple offenses, each with distinct elements. In State v. Reddick,
568 So.2d 902, 903, n. 2 (Fla.1990), this Court cited the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases in stating that, pursuant to section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1985), the offense of “[sjhooting into a dwelling ... has three elements: (1) the defendant shot a firearm, (2) into a public or private building, (3) wantonly or maliciously.” This Court subsequently interpreted section
790.19 as one which includes multiple offenses, each containing distinct elements, in the case of Valdes v. State,
3 So.3d 1067 (Fla.2009). In Valdes , the defendant was convicted of shooting into an occupied vehicle, in violation of section
790.19. Id. at 1068 . In upholding the defendant’s conviction, we noted that pursuant to section
790.19 a conviction for shooting into an occupied vehicle “requires proof of the following three elements: (1) the defendant shot a firearm; (2) he or she did so at, within, or into a vehicle of any kind that was being used or occupied by any person; and (3) he or she did so wantonly or maliciously.” Id. at 1071 . Therefore, we have previously concluded that section
790.19 is comprised of distinct and separate offenses, -with each offense containing unique elements which must be proven in order to secure a conviction of that particular offense. Paul argues that even if section
790.19 proscribes a number of separate offenses, the “used or occupied” modifiers for vehicles are alternative definitions much like the “occupied or unoccupied” modifiers for buildings....
...in the parking lot while the driver shops. However, a closer reading of the statutory language combined with the legislative history of the statute and this Court’s previous interpretations of the statute indicate otherwise. Legislative History of Section 790.19 This statutory section dates back to 1881, when the “Senate and Assembly” passed an act “for the better Protection of Passengers on Railroad Cars and the Employees of Railroad Companies.” Ch....
...The 1974 amendment also inserted “or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance” to the actions prohibited. Id. The statute has remained unchanged since then and has been a single paragraph since its consolidation in 1906. We can glean several things from this history of section 790.19....
...This Court explained that “the shooting must be such as to endanger the lives or safety of those who may be in or using the car.” Id. See also Hamilton v. State,
30 Fla. 229 ,
11 So. 523 , 524 (1892) (finding that both of the 1892 revisions to section
790.19 indicated a legislative objective to punish acts that endanger the lives of people who may be on the locomotive or in the car)....
...Where the Legislature does not define the words used in a statute, this *1195 Court first examines the plain language of the statute in order to determine the parameters of a specific element of an offense. See Marrero v. State,
71 So.3d 881, 886 (Fla.2011). The Legislature did not define the word “use” in section
790.19. Therefore, it is “ ‘appropriate to refer to dictionary definitions when construing [section
790.19]’ in order to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of [‘use’].” School Bd....
...This definition would result in the statute being broader than the Legislature intended. Under this definition, vehicles would always be in use because someone would always have the “privilege or benefit” of using them. And thus, shooting into both occupied and unoccupied vehicles would be punishable under section 790.19....
...If the Legislature intended for “used” to signify a vehicle that is unoccupied, it would seem á simpler task to use the same modifier for vehicles that was used just a few lines earlier in the designation for buildings. In holding that the offense of shooting into a vehicle under section
790.19 necessarily involves the threat of physical force or violence to an individual, we disapprove the apparent reasoning of the First District in Crapps,
968 So.2d 627 (Fla....
...he statute under which [the defendant] is charged.” 59 So.3d at 194. A forcible felony analysis for the crime of shooting into a building would not be useful to the offense of shooting into a vehicle as the offense of shooting into a vehicle under section 790.19 requires the presence of an individual and the offense of shooting into a building under the same statute does not. Thus, in light of our clarification of the elements for each offense listed in section 790.19, the First District’s holding in Crapps cannot stand....
...e or force to an individual.
968 So.2d at 628 . As we find that the offenses of shooting into a building and shooting into a vehicle are separate and distinct crimes for purposes of the Hearns statutory elements test, we find that a conviction under section
790.19 for shooting into an occupied vehicle is a basis for PRR sentencing pursuant to the forcible felony catch-all provision, as the statute necessarily involves the use or threat of physical force to an individual....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...s in
Dwelling” with “A [Missile] [Stone] [Hard Substance] [At] [Within] [Into] [In]
A[n] [Building] [Vehicle] [Vessel] [Aircraft].” The word “dwelling” is removed
because it is not referenced in the elements of the offense as defined in section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2018)....
... APPENDIX
10.13 SHOOTING OR THROWING MISSILES IN DWELLING
A [MISSILE] [STONE] [HARD SUBSTANCE] [AT] [WITHIN]
[INTO] [IN] A[N] [BUILDING] [VEHICLE] [VESSEL]
[AIRCRAFT]
§
790.19, Fla._Stat.
To prove the crime of (crime charged), the State must prove the
following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
Give 1a and/or 1b as applicable.
1....
...Lesser Included Offenses
SHOOTING OR THROWING MISSILES IN DWELLING A
[MISSILE] [STONE] [HARD SUBSTANCE[[AT] [WITHIN] [INTO]
[IN] A[N] [BUILDING] [VEHICLE] [VESSEL] [AIRCRAFT] —
790.19
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1968 Fla. App. LEXIS 5004
SWANN, Judge. The appellant, Mead, was tried without a jury and found guilty of unlawfully, feloniously and wantonly shooting a deadly missile into a used or occupied public building in violation of Fla.Stat. § 790.19, F.S.A....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 21137
“throwing a deadly missile” in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1979), which reads as follows:
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 17182
...lly authorizes the sentence imposed in this case. State v. Holmes,
360 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1978); Hicks v. State,
362 So.2d 173 (Fla.lst DCA 1978). AFFIRMED. FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr. and SHARP, JJ., concur. . Discharging a firearm in an occupied dwelling. §
790.19, Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 2399, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 10568
...and his two-year general term of probation resulting from that conviction and from a conviction for criminal mischief. We reject Fortune’s first point challenging his conviction for throwing a deadly missile at an occupied vehicle in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1985)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...(2015);
aggravated battery causing great bodily harm while carrying a firearm and discharging a
firearm causing great bodily harm (count two), see §§
775.087(1)(b), (2)(a)(3),
784.045(1)(a)(1); shooting at, within, or into a vehicle (count three), see §
790.19, Fla.
Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 15758
...unning away from him. Likewise, we find no merit in the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the count for shooting or throwing a deadly missile in a building. The defendant argues that section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2004), requires that the offender shoot at someone inside a building, and the undisputed evidence established that the defendant fired from inside the building at Javier Lanuza, who was outside of the building. Section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2004), however, provides, in part that ‘Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into ......
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...s in
Dwelling” with “A [Missile] [Stone] [Hard Substance] [At] [Within] [Into] [In]
A[n] [Building] [Vehicle] [Vessel] [Aircraft].” The word “dwelling” is removed
because it is not referenced in the elements of the offense as defined in section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2018)....
... APPENDIX
10.13 SHOOTING OR THROWING MISSILES IN DWELLING
A [MISSILE] [STONE] [HARD SUBSTANCE] [AT] [WITHIN]
[INTO] [IN] A[N] [BUILDING] [VEHICLE] [VESSEL]
[AIRCRAFT]
§
790.19, Fla._Stat.
To prove the crime of (crime charged), the State must prove the
following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
Give 1a and/or 1b as applicable.
1....
...re.
Lesser Included Offenses
SHOOTING OR THROWING MISSILES IN DWELLING A
[MISSILE] [STONE] [HARD SUBSTANCE[[AT] [WITHIN] [INTO]
[IN] A[N] [BUILDING] [VEHICLE] [VESSEL] [AIRCRAFT] —
790.19
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
... degree murder is codified in section
782.04, Florida Statutes. Compare with
Valdes v. State,
3 So. 3d 1067, 1077-78 (Fla. 2009) (finding dual convictions
of discharging a firearm from a vehicle in violation of section
790.15(2) and
shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section
790.19 did not satisfy
the second exception because the two offenses are found in separate
statutory provisions, and observing: “This is in contrast to sections
790.15(1),
790.15(2), and
790.15(3), which are explicitly degree variants of the same
offense.”) (footnotes omitted); Velazco v....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...The police submitted the
tracker into evidence under the case number used for Collins’s
shattered window.
The State charged Garcia with aggravated stalking with a
credible threat, in violation of section
784.048(3), Florida Statutes
(2018), and with throwing a deadly missile into a building, in
violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 3118542
...Appellant, Alander Crapps, appeals his judgment and sentence and argues that the trial court improperly sentenced him as a prison releasee reoffender ("PRR") because, he contends, the offense of throwing a deadly missile into an occupied vehicle, as proscribed in section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2005), is not a qualifying offense for PRR classification under section
775.082(9)(a)1....
...State,
958 So.2d 1135, 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (holding that the appellant, who was convicted of shooting a deadly missile into a dwelling, did not qualify as a PRR); Hudson v. State,
800 So.2d 627, 628-29 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding that the crime proscribed by section
790.19 is not a forcible felony because it includes shooting or throwing at unoccupied buildings and, thus, does not, by statutory definition, necessarily involve physical force or violence against an individual); see also State v....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 17282
ALDERMAN, Chief Judge. The defendant appeals his conviction for shooting into a building in violation of Section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1975)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 11583, 1995 WL 642673
...The State erroneously asserts that the correct scoresheet for use in Hills’ case is 9. The category 9 scoresheet is for use with “[a]ll other felony offenses,” that is, other than those felonies enumerated in other scoresheets. Throwing a deadly missile into a dwelling is a violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1991)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 12611
...3(2), Fla.Stat. (1993), which is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year. See §
775.082(4)(a), Fla.Stat. (1993). See also R.B. v. State,
633 So.2d 542 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Throwing a deadly missile is a second-degree felony, see §
790.19, Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 2596, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 5185, 1988 WL 125605
...State,
515 So.2d 161 (Fla.1987), 2 that this “single act” could constitutionally give rise to no more than a single conviction. We agree only in part. It is settled under the Carawan rationale that the offenses of throwing a deadly missile into an occupied conveyance, §
790.19, Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 14871, 2000 WL 1700200
BLUE, Acting Chief Judge. R.J.J. appeals his adjudication of delinquency for throwing a deadly missile at a vehicle in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1995)....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 8637, 1990 WL 175098
...State,
474 So.2d 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299 ,
52 S.Ct. 180 ,
76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); Section 7, Chapter 88-131, Laws of Florida; Section
782.04, Florida Statutes (1987); Section
790.07(2), Florida Statutes (1987); Section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1987); Section
924.33, Florida Statutes (1987).
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1969 Fla. App. LEXIS 5797
PER CURIAM. By an information the appellant was charged in a first count with throwing toward and upon an occupied vehicle “a certain missile which was capable of producing death or great bodily harm, to wit: a fire bomb,” in violation of § 790.19 Fla.Stat., F.S.A. In a second count the appellant was charged with setting afire and burning a designated vehicle of value exceeding $25, in violation of § 806.03 Fla.Stat., F.S.A. Section 790.19 deals with throwing (at or in places including an occupied vehicle) any missile which could produce death or great bodily harm....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 5503, 1996 WL 279230
...g the sentence under the guidelines. See Baker v. State,
466 So.2d 1144 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985), approved
483 So.2d 423 (Fla.1986) (inherent component of a crime being already built into sentencing guideline range will not justify a departure sentence). Section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1993), which makes it unlawfiil to shoot a firearm at, within or into a building, specifically provides as follows: Whoever wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile or hurls or proje...
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 6127, 1992 WL 109958
...As the state concedes, the sole point meriting discussion concerns the trial court’s incorrect designation of the crimes the defendant committed. The trial court classified the crime of shooting into an occupied vehicle as a first degree felony, when in fact it is a second degree felony. Section 790.19, Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 14858
OWEN, Chief Judge. Appellant was convicted of both counts of a two-count information charging (1) unlawfully shooting a firearm within an occupied building, §
790.19 F.S., and (2) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, §
790.23 F.S....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 7083, 2006 WL 1235167
...He argues that the enhancement amounts to an illegal sentence because the firearm enhancement statute, section
775.087(1), Florida Statutes (2001), does not apply to felonies in which the use of a “weapon or firearm” is an essential element. The conviction for shooting a deadly missile is based on section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), which provides in pertinent part: Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance which would produce death or great bod...
...1st DCA 1998), which came to the same conclusion for sentencing points. Before Bradford , the first district held in Horn v. State,
677 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), that the use of a firearm wás a necessary element of shooting at an occupied vehicle in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1993)....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 7012, 2006 WL 1331508
...attery, as a lesser included offense, with a firearm.” §
784.045(l)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (1999). As to Count Two, the jury indicated on the verdict form that Santana was also “guilty of shooting or throwing [a] deadly missile, the crime charged.” §
790.19, Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 662, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 1238, 1989 WL 20107
...ck swerved and slammed on his brakes. Bobby was thrown from the pickup and regained consciousness seventeen days later in a hospital. The state charged Bobby Jones with aggravated battery, §
784.045, Fla.Stat. (1985), and throwing a deadly missile, §
790.19, Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 3878, 2001 WL 280477
...In its order denying relief, the trial court noted that under the applicable statute, section
775.084, a defendant was required to have only one of the specified qualifying offenses. The trial court found that Bonner’s qualifying offense was throwing a deadly missile into a vehicle, a violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1991). However, a conviction for violation of section
790.19 is not one of the offenses that may be used to qualify a defendant as a habitual violent felony offender....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 767, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 13061
FRANK, Judge. In this case the appellant, a juvenile, was charged by petition with throwing a missile at an occupied vehicle in violation of Section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1983), and aggravated assault with a motor vehicle in violation of Section
784.021, Florida Statutes (1983)....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 13872
or occupied by a person(s)” in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1981).2 Appellant filed
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 7422, 2000 WL 770507
CASANUEVA, Judge. Antonio Broome appeals his convictions for aggravated assault, a third degree felony violation of section
784.021, Florida Statutes (1995); shooting at a dwelling, a second degree felony violation of section
790.19; and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a second degree felony violation of section
790.23....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Argued: Mar 4, 2025
...tes and, in 2008, was con-
victed of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. He was again
removed in 2009. In 2021, he was arrested in the United States for
driving on a suspended license and for violating Florida Statute §
790.19....
...He was charged with unlawful reentry under §
1326(a).
Each defendant moved to dismiss their respective indict-
ment, asserting that § 1326 violates the Fifth Amendment’s guar-
antee of equal protection.3 Relying on the Arlington Heights
2 Fla. Stat. § 790.19 says: “Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, with-
in, or into, or throws or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance
which would produce death or great bodily injury ....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 10088, 2004 WL 1530822
...Count one of the Information charged that, on July 18, 2002, Blue did “throw a certain missile, or hurled or projected a stone or other hard substance, to-wit: TRAILOR [sic] HITCH, which would produce death or great bodily harm, at, within or into a building, contrary to section 790.19, Florida Statutes.......
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 9768, 2010 WL 2634427
...unt pursuant to section
775.087, Florida Statutes (2007). Grable filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct sentencing error arguing that his sentence for shooting into a building was illegal because that offense, under section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2007), is not a listed offense for which *990 the minimum mandatory sentence can be imposed under section
775.087(2)(a)(1)....
...State,
793 So.2d 117, 118 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The trial court recognized and the State properly concedes that Grable's sentence for shooting into a building is illegal. The minimum mandatory sentence provision in section
775.087(2)(a)(1) does not apply to a conviction under section
790.19....
...State,
457 So.2d 534, 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). We also note that the sentence of twenty years' imprisonment for shooting into a building is illegal because the offense is a second-degree felony punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years. See §§
790.19,
775.082(3)(c)....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...812.13.” Id.
§
948.06(8)(c)6.
Here, the defendant’s scoresheet listed a prior conviction for robbery,
an enumerated qualifying offense under
948.06(8)(c)6. The defendant was
on probation for throwing a deadly missile into a vehicle, which is a second
degree felony. §
790.19, Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1970 Fla. App. LEXIS 6978
erred in instructing and reading to the jury F.S.
790.19 F.S.A. and whether the verdict of the jury was
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 11530
glass door and screen enclosure of the bedroom. Section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1981), provides: Shooting
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1969 Fla. App. LEXIS 6241
...assault. The question of lesser included offenses has been adequately treated by the Florida Supreme Court in Brown v. State, Fla. 1968,
206 So.2d 377 . It is not necessary for the State to prove an assault in order to prove that appellant violated Section
790.19, F....
...cle. Likewise, we hold that assault is not a lesser included offense based upon the accusatory pleadings and the evidence of this case. For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed. HOBSON, J., and ALLEN, J., (Ret.) concur. . Florida Statutes, § 790.19, F.S.A....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...had been deported several times and returned to the United States. After careful review, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND In 2004, Defendant, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted in Florida state court of throwing a deadly missile, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 790.19 ....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 14723
an occupied dwelling in violation of Fla.Stat. §
790.19. The judgment and sentence on count one is affirmed
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 1010, 1991 WL 15459
DELL, Judge. The state charged Thomas Gonedes, Jr. with throwing a missile into a structure in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1990), aggravated assault and two counts of criminal mischief....
...He contends that the trial court erred in finding him competent to stand trial because he was not afforded the right to counsel at the competency hearings. He also contends that the trial court erred when it adjudicated him guilty of throwing a missile under section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1990). We will only address appellant’s second point on appeal since we find it dispositive. Section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1990) provides in pertinent part: Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance which would produce death or great bodily harm, at, within, or in any public or private building, occupied or unoccupied ......
...ling a missile?” Based on this record, the trial court’s question must be answered in the negative since the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the state’s charge that appellant acted wantonly or maliciously in violation of section 790.19 and section 806.-13, Florida Statutes (1990)....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 836, 1994 WL 37029
LAWRENCE, Judge. Reeves appeals his conviction of violating section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1991), for wantonly or maliciously shooting a firearm into an occupied building on May 3, 1992, evidencing prejudice based on the sexual orientation of the victim. Under section
775.085, Florida Statutes (1991) commonly known as “Florida’s Hate Crimes Statute,” the penalty for violating section
790.19 was reclassified from a second degree felony to a first degree felony....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 2700, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 17178
...The state appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing the information charging the appellant, David Allen Johnson, with a felony and two misdemeanors based upon the same criminal event. Johnson was arrested on September 30, 1984, for the felony offenses of shooting into an occupied dwelling, an act violative of section
790.19, Florida Statutes, and using a firearm while committing a felony, conduct condemned under section
790.07(1), Florida Statutes....
...es, and culpable negligence in violation of section
784.05, Florida Statutes. Thereafter, on December 27, 1984, the state also filed an information in the trial court charging Johnson not only with shooting into a dwelling, a felony punishable under section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1983), but also with the acts constituting the two misdemeanor charges pending in the county court....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 16144
...follows: “that . . . is a delinquent child because: On the 19th day of January, 1976, the said child did then and there wantonly and maliciously throw a missile, to-wit: stones, at railroad cars of the SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD CO. contrary to Section 790.19, Florida Statutes.” Section 790.19, Florida Statutes, provides as follows: “Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance which would produce death or great bodily harm, at, wit...
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 16145
SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD CO., contrary to Section
790.19, Florida Statutes.” The factual circumstances
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 20589, 2011 WL 6373021
...4th DCA 2007). Paul involved shooting into a building, a crime which did not qualify for PRR sentencing. However, in Paul v. State,
59 So.3d 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), we held that shooting a deadly missile into a vehicle would qualify for PRR sentencing, because section
790.19 required the vehicle to be occupied.
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 16612, 2000 WL 1853658
...See DeAngelo v. State,
616 So.2d 440, 442 (Fla.1993)(A court should not grant a motion for judgment of acquittal unless “there is no view of the evidence which the jury might take favorable to the opposite party that can be sustained under the law.”). Section
790.19, Florida Statutes, which proscribes throwing a deadly missile at or into a vehicle, states, in pertinent part: Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other ha...
...facie case. See, e.g., J.W.B. v. State,
419 So.2d 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)(holding that it was error for the trial judge to find that the throwing of an orange at a school bus, without proof of either striking the bus or any person, was a crime under section
790.19); compare Wilton v....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...track the language
of section
790.161(3), Florida Statutes (2018).
Finally, instruction
10.13 is amended to include “shot a firearm that would
produce death or great bodily harm” as an optional element based upon case law
interpreting section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2018)....
...This instruction was adopted in 1992 and amended in 2019.
10.13 SHOOTING OR THROWING A [MISSILE] [STONE] [HARD
SUBSTANCE] [AT] [WITHIN] [INTO] [IN] A[N] [BUILDING] [VEHICLE]
[VESSEL] [AIRCRAFT]
§
790.19, Fla....
...vidual
within or near the vehicle or structure.
Lesser Included Offenses
SHOOTING OR THROWING A [MISSILE] [STONE] [HARD
SUBSTANCE[[AT] [WITHIN] [INTO] [IN] A[N] [BUILDING]
[VEHICLE] [VESSEL] [AIRCRAFT] — 790.19
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....
...NO.
None
Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1
Criminal Mischief
806.13 12.4
Discharging firearm in
790.15 10.6
public
Comments
*According to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, §
790.19, Fla....
...of the crime. The First District Court of Appeal held in Horn v. State,
677 So. 2d
- 12 -
320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), that the use of a firearm was a necessary element of
shooting at an occupied vehicle in violation of §
790.19, Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 7068
for throwing a deadly missile, proscribed by section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1987). Mrs. Gutierrez testified
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2011 WL 6184469
...On the record before us, we con-elude that the probate court’s order is based on incorrect legal reasoning. We reverse and remand for the probate court to reconsider its order. 1 In early 2004, the State charged Mr. Linn with throwing a deadly missile at or into a building. See § 790.19, Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 9366, 1990 WL 199167
...atory. Appellant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed in all other respects. Sentence PARTIALLY VACATED, convictions and sentence as modified are AFFIRMED. HARRIS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . §§
782.04(2) and
777.04(4)(d), Fla.Stat. (1989). . §
790.19, Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 21843
of shooting into a building in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes (1981). We affirm the judgment
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1722, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 9339
...He was convicted of burglary (Section
810.02, Florida Statutes) and grand theft (Section 812.-014, Florida Statutes) of NAPA Auto Parts Store based on his involvement as an aider and abettor. He also pled nolo contendere to the charge of accessory to shooting into an occupied dwelling (Section
790.19, Florida Statutes, Section
777.03, Florida Statutes)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1973 Fla. App. LEXIS 7746
OWEN, Chief Judge. Appellant shot her paramour with a pistol as he was packing to leave their jointly occupied apartment. She was convicted of culpable negligence (F.S. Section
784.05, F.S.A.), and shooting within an occupied dwelling (F.S. Section
790.19, F.S.A.), and appeals her judgment and sentence....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...The State cites to Nicholson v. State,
757 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), in support
of its position. In Nicholson, the defendant was charged with two counts of throwing any
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missile into a dwelling in violation of section
790.19, Florida Statutes, after he threw one
brick through the back window of the victim's home and then ran to the other side of the
house and threw another brick through another window....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 9 Fla. L. Weekly 1698, 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 13977
...s murder in the third degree and constitutes a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s. 775.-084. . §
782.04(l)(a)(l), Fla.Stat. (1983). . §
782.04(2), Fla.Stat. (1983). . §
782.07, Fla.Stat. (1983). . §
790.19, Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 12663, 2005 WL 1943202
...Although most of the claims were properly denied, the trial court erred in summarily denying one of the claims. After the appellant entered negotiated pleas of nolo contendere to seven offenses, including three counts of the second degree felony offense proscribed by section 790.19, Florida Statutes, the trial court adjudged the appellant guilty of the seven offenses and imposed prison sentences for each....
...o recognize and advise him that, absent a voluntary waiver such as through a negotiated plea, see, e.g., Novaton v. State,
634 So.2d 607 (Fla.1994), double jeopardy principles would preclude his conviction and sentence for more than one violation of section
790.19, thus reducing his potential sentences from a total of 65 years for all seven offenses to a total of 35 years for the remaining five offenses....
CopyPublished | Florida 6th District Court of Appeal
...atutes
1
Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967).
(2023) (Count 1), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of section
790.23, Florida Statutes (2023) (Count 2), and shooting into a building in violation
of section
790.19, Florida Statutes (2023) (Count 3)....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 473004
...eriod. See Ayo v. State,
708 So.2d 692 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). This proceeding involves the denial of the original 3.850 motion. [2] §
782.07(1),
775.087(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). [3] §
782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). [4] §
790.23, Fla. Stat. (1997). [5] §
790.19, Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 904, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 1920, 1989 WL 33979
PER CURIAM. Defendant Myron Morales appeals his convictions for shooting into an occupied vehicle, § 790.19, Fla.Stat....
