CopyCited 176 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...section 627.0851, F.S.A., and the uninsured motorist protection contemplated therein. [1] This section provides that no automobile liability policy shall be issued with respect to any motor vehicle registered or garaged in Florida unless coverage is provided therein "in not less than the limits described in Section 324.021(7), F.S....
...inflict by their negligent operation of the insured owner's automobile. Reciprocally, this same class of insureds is protected by uninsured motorist coverage in the same policy from bodily injury caused by the negligence of uninsured motorists. F.S. section 324.021(7), F.S.A., of the State's Financial Responsibility Law, relating to automobile liability insurance provided by an owner of a motor vehicle to comply with the law to cover his liability to others because of the negligent operation of...
...dent (and subject to said limit for one person), and twenty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident. Similarly and reciprocally, Section 627.0851 provides for the same limits described in F.S. section 324.021(7), F.S.A., as uninsured motorist protection coverage....
...g Honda motorcycles) owned by but which are not "insured automobiles" of named insured. Uninsured motorist coverage or family protection is intended by the statute to protect the described insureds thereunder to the extent of the limits described in Section 324.021(7) "who are legally entitled to recover damages, namely those from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury" and is not to be "whittled away" by exclusions and exceptions....
...this household who are bodily injured by an uninsured motorist while in any motor vehicle insured or not, or elsewhere, as well as other persons so injured while in an insured motor vehicle. Our Sections 627.0851 and 627.0852(1) (a) 1, coupled with Section 324.021(7) cover the same class of insureds sustaining bodily injury because of the negligence of an uninsured motorist....
CopyCited 119 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1966 Fla. LEXIS 3641
...legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury * * *". The limits of such a policy of insurance are required to be the same as provided in the Motor Vehicle Responsibility Law [F.S. § 324.021(7), F.S.A.]....
CopyCited 112 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 29 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 679, 2004 Fla. LEXIS 2099, 2004 WL 2609255
...Initially, this amount may come out of an insurer's profits, but eventually the someones are the other insureds, whose premiums are increased. Of course, many Floridians are dependent upon the availability of low-limits insurance policies to meet the statutory financial responsibility requirements of section 324.021, Florida Statutes (2003)....
CopyCited 57 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 603, 1988 Fla. LEXIS 1117, 1988 WL 103832
...This demand must be made within 60 days of the arbitrators' decision. If this demand is not made, the amount of damages agreed to by the arbitrators will be binding. (Emphasis added.) The minimum limit for bodily injury liability specified by the financial responsibility law is $10,000. § 324.021(7)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 56 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 17681, 21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1001
...If the lessee or operator of the vehicle
is uninsured or has any insurance with limits less than $500,000
combined property damage and bodily injury liability, the lessor shall
be liable for up to an additional $500,000 in economic damages only
arising out of the use of the motor vehicle.
Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2)....
...These other financial arrangements, like insurance, provide
“proof of ability to respond in damages on account of crashes arising out the use of
a motor vehicle,” which is Florida law’s definition of “proof of financial
responsibility.” See Fla. Stat. § 324.021(7)....
... liability the Amendment seeks to eliminate. The exception would swallow the
rule. We will not choose such an interpretation when another one is feasible.
Appellants protest that their reading would not render the preemption clause
superfluous because regimes like Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(1)-(2), which cap the
amount of vicarious liability damages, would be preserved, while uncapped
damages would be preempted....
...etween limited and unlimited vicarious
liability.
Appellants also argue that we should construe Florida’s vicarious liability
regime as a financial responsibility law to serve statutory and public policy goals.
They urge that Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2) is a financial responsibility law
because it induces car rental companies to ensure that their lessees are adequately
11
insured, thereby serving the purpose of the financial responsibility laws, ensuring
compensation for accident victims....
CopyCited 55 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The statute requires that each such policy cover any bodily injury loss of the insured or insureds caused by the negligence of any uninsured motorist. The statute provides that such coverage shall be included in any automobile liability policy covering "any motor vehicle" in not less than the limits described in Section 324.021(7) "for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury ... resulting therefrom." However, this coverage is obviously not restricted to the limits of F.S. Section 324.021(7), F.S.A., for one vehicle when more than one automobile is covered....
...thereby. The statute admits of no authority in the insurer by a provision in the policy to limit coverage on the presumed basis that the uninsured motorist would only have covered himself with the minimum auto liability coverage required under F.S. Section 324.021(7), F.S.A....
CopyCited 44 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 33 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 493, 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20173, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 1240, 2008 WL 2678812
...netary damages, giving to "a judgment for monetary damages" its plain and obvious meaning. For example, in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Huntington National Bank,
609 So.2d 1315, 1316 n. 1 (Fla.1992), the Court applied the plain, literal meaning of section
324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), which provided: Notwithstanding any other provision of the Florida Statutes or existing case law, the lessor, under an agreement to lease a motor vehicle for 1 year or longer which requires the lessee to obtain insurance acceptable to the lessor ......
...r the operation of said motor vehicle.... In that case, Aetna argued that the statute only applied to long-term leases that were "automobile financing substitutes" because during the legislative debate preceding passage of the bill later codified as section
324.021(9)(b), the sponsor of the proposed bill described long term leases as "an alternative way of financing an automobile." Aetna,
609 So.2d at 1317....
..., under an agreement to lease a motor vehicle for 1 year or longer... shall not be deemed the owner" of the vehicle for purposes of determining financial responsibility for the operation of the vehicle or for the acts of the operator of the vehicle. § 324.021(9)(b), Fla....
...ns limits not less than $100,00[0]/$300,000 bodily injury liability and $50,000 property damage liability." Id. The statute contains no language that would restrict its application to leases which are financing substitutes, as Aetna urges. Moreover, section 324.021(9)(b) specifically states that its terms are applicable "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of the Florida Statutes or existing case law." Aetna argues that the legislative debate evidences a legislative intent that section 324.021(9)(b) only applies to long-term leases which are financing substitutes....
CopyCited 41 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 124392
...NOTES [1] The jury was instructed in accordance with Standard Jury Instruction 3.3(a) that: "A person who owns or has the right to control a vehicle and who expressly or impliedly consents to another's use of it is responsible for its operation." [2] We note, however, that section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), provides a statutory exception from vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for owners of motor vehicles leased for one year or longer if there is strict compliance with the express provisions of that statute....
CopyCited 37 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 20, 1990 Fla. LEXIS 1779, 1990 WL 252117
...A person who tailors a transaction in such a way as to gain tax benefits must accept the legal consequences which flow therefrom. We also reject GMAC's contention that the legislature intended to create an exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine by defining owner in section 324.021(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), to include lessees such as Green....
...However, in 1986 the legislature did act to eliminate long-term automobile lessors from liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine under certain circumstances by the passage of chapter 86-229, Laws of Florida. That law in its present form, as codified at section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), reads: [5] Owner/lessor....
...peration of said motor vehicle or for the acts of the operator in connection therewith; further, this paragraph shall be applicable so long as the insurance required under such lease agreement remains in effect. In upholding the constitutionality of section
324.021(9)(b), the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Folmar v. Young,
560 So.2d 798, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), stated: We conclude that section
324.021(9) constitutes an exception to the dangerous *1367 instrumentality doctrine in the case of long-term lessors....
...It is evident that the legislators recognized that under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine long-term lessors were liable for damages caused by drivers of the leased automobiles. However, they were sympathetic to some of the arguments made by GMAC in this case. By enacting section 324.021(9)(b), they were willing to provide relief under certain circumstances, but only if the leased automobile carried the requisite liability insurance....
...1978) (owner not liable when the car was in the custody of a repairman); Owen v. Wagner,
426 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (owner exonerated when the car had been stolen). [4] Prior to the enactment of chapter 86-229, Laws of Florida, this definition was found in section
324.021(9), Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 37 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 750, 1992 Fla. LEXIS 2096, 1992 WL 370406
...HARDING, Justice. We have for review Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Huntington National Bank,
587 So.2d 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified the following to be a question of great public importance: [W]hether section
324.021(9)(b) is applicable to long term leases which are not automobile financing substitutes....
...Ohio bank. Under the terms of the lease, title expressly remained with Huntington which was also described as the sole owner; Stepien had no option to purchase the vehicle; Stepien was required to obtain insurance consistent with the requirements of section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1987); [1] and the lease was to be "construed, interpreted and determined by the laws of the State of Ohio." Gail Stepien, daughter of a principal of the lessee T.J....
...es moved for summary judgment. At first the trial court held that Huntington was liable for the entire sum. However, upon rehearing, the trial court entered final summary judgment in Huntington's favor, finding Huntington exempt from liability under section 324.021(9)(b)....
...The trial court stated that any liability of Huntington stemmed from the tort claim, and thus Florida law applied. The trial court entered judgment against Aetna for $250,000 plus interest at 12% per annum. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal found that the trial court properly applied section 324.021(9)(b), affirmed the summary judgment in all respects, and certified the question to this Court. Aetna argues that section 324.021(9)(b) is only applicable to long term leases which are automobile financing substitutes....
...Because the lease at issue in this case does not constitute an alternative method for financing the car (lease contains no option to purchase, vests no ownership rights in the lessee, and returns the vehicle to the owner/lessor after four years), Aetna contends that section 324.021(9)(b) is inapplicable and that Huntington as owner/lessor is liable for the lessee's negligence under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. In support of this position, Aetna points to the legislative debate preceding passage of the bill that was codified as section 324.021(9)(b). During that debate, the sponsor of the proposed bill described long term leases as "an alternative way of financing an automobile." Huntington argues that the plain language of section 324.021(9)(b) provides that a lessor under any motor vehicle lease for one year or longer is not liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine provided that the lessee maintains the requisite minimum insurance coverage specified by the statute....
...In this case, the statute clearly states that "the lessor, under an agreement to lease a motor vehicle for 1 year or longer ... shall not be deemed the owner" of the vehicle for purposes of determining financial responsibility for the operation of the vehicle or for the acts of the operator of the vehicle. § 324.021(9)(b), Fla....
...tains limits not less than $100,00/$300,000 bodily injury liability and $50,000 property damage liability." Id. The statute contains no language that would restrict its application to leases which are financing substitutes, as Aetna urges. Moreover, section 324.021(9)(b) specifically states that its terms are applicable "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of the Florida Statutes or existing case law." Aetna argues that the legislative debate evidences a legislative intent that section 324.021(9)(b) only applies to long-term leases which are financing substitutes....
...Aetna also argues that this Court's opinion in Abdala v. World Omni Leasing, Inc.,
583 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1991), is controlling in this case, and requires that we consider *1318 the legislative history as evidence of legislative intent. In Abdala, this Court upheld the constitutionality of section
324.021(9)(b) against equal protection and due process claims.
583 So.2d at 333. In reaching that conclusion, the Court looked to the legislative history of section
324.021(9)(b) to determine that there was a rational basis for enacting the statute....
...As explained above, the clear and unambiguous language of this statute conveys a clear and definite intent that it shall apply to all "agreements to lease a motor vehicle for 1 year or longer" so long as the lease requires the lessee to obtain insurance for the limits specified. § 324.021(9)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). Finally, Aetna contends that section 324.021(9)(b) is inapplicable to this foreign lease which provides that it be "construed, interpreted and determined by the laws of the State of Ohio." We reject this contention for two reasons....
...ted by private agreements between the owner and operator. Id.; accord Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard,
112 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1959). Second, the plain language of the statute does not distinguish between foreign and domestic leases. Thus, we find that section
324.021(9)(b) applies equally to domestic and foreign leases which meet the statutory requirements. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative, and approve the decision below. It is so ordered. BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section
324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), provides: (b) Owner/lessor....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...For example, a "motor vehicle liability policy" has been defined as an owner's or operator's liability policy insurance "against loss from liability for bodily injury, death and property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle ..." Section 324.021(8), Florida Statutes (1979)....
CopyCited 34 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 24 A.L.R. 3d 1359, 1966 Fla. App. LEXIS 5660
..., which provides: "No automobile liability insurance, covering liability arising out of ownership * * * of any motor vehicle, shall be delivered * * * in this state * * * unless coverage is provided therein * * * in not less than limits described in § 324.021(7) [$10,000 for bodily injury or death of one person] * * *." Decedent's policy limits for uninsured motorist coverage was $20,000 for death or bodily injury sustained by one or more persons in one accident....
CopyCited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 15 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 405, 1990 Fla. LEXIS 965, 1990 WL 107462
...hanged today), the Court said: This section provides that no automobile liability policy shall be issued with respect to any motor vehicle registered or garaged in Florida unless coverage is provided therein "in not less than the limits described in Section 324.021(7), F.S....
CopyCited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 24 A.L.R. 3d 1343
...otor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than limits described in § 324.021(7), under provisions filed with and approved by the insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily...
...equired under this section shall not be applicable where any insured named in the policy shall reject the coverage * * *" (emphasis added). The above-quoted statute specified that the amount of coverage shall be "in not less than limits described in § 324.021(7)", F.S.A....
...otor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than limits described in § 324.021(7), under provisions filed with and approved by the insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; * * *." "324.021 Definitions; minimum insurance required....
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Section
324.151, F.S.A., makes it quite plain that a motor vehicle liability policy is issued to benefit members of the public injured personally or property-wise by the owner or operator of the motor vehicle covered by the policy to the extent of certain monetary limits prescribed in F.S. Section
324.021(7), F.S.A....
CopyCited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 122173
...Southeast Bank Leasing Co.,
637 So.2d 253 (Fla.4th DCA 1994). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We hold that for a title owner of an automobile to receive the statutory exemption from liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine provided in section
324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), the statute requires the lessee to obtain and maintain effective insurance in the stated minimum amounts....
...nstrumentality doctrine. AHFC owned the car driven by Pelley and had leased the car to Pelley (lessee), for a term of sixty months. [1] *579 The lease agreement contained a provision that the lessee had to obtain insurance in the amounts required by section 324.021(9)(b). [2] However, the required insurance was not in effect at the time of the accident. AHFC asserted the affirmative defense that it was exempt from liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine because of section 324.021(9)(b)....
...Rather, the court focused on the fact that the vehicle involved in the accident and the lessee were insured to the required statutory limits under AHFC's policy. In support of this position, the court relied on Folmar v. Young,
591 So.2d 220 (Fla.4th DCA 1991), wherein the district court upheld the constitutionality of section
324.021(9)(b) and determined that where there were two lessees, the statute did not require each lessee to secure separate insurance....
...ed in an accident. The lessor in Gedert had a contingent liability insurance policy which would apply in cases where the lessee's insurance policy had lapsed. In holding that the lessor's policy would not allow the lessor to receive the exemption of section 324.021(9)(b), the court looked to the plain language of the statute....
...surance in effect at the time of the accident, the lessor's contingency liability *580 policy would not allow the lessor to receive the benefit of the exemption. Because we conclude that there must be strict compliance with the express provisions of section 324.021(9)(b) before a title owner of a motor vehicle can receive the benefits of this statutory exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, we approve the Fourth District's decision in Gedert and quash the decision of the Second District in this case....
...While not applicable to the parties in Kraemer, the legislature in 1986 passed chapter 86-229, Laws of Florida, creating a statutory exemption from liability under the doctrine for long-term lessors in certain circumstances. This section, currently codified as section 324.021(9)(b), provides: (b) Owner/lessor....
...limited exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine "upon the satisfaction of the statutory preconditions." Id. at 334. [6] As we have repeatedly stated, the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is uniquely part of Florida's common law; thus, section 324.021(9)(b) plainly is in derogation of the common law....
...ompliance with the statute's provisions. See Florida Steel Corp. v. Adaptable Developments, Inc.,
503 So.2d 1232, 1234 (Fla.1986). Guided by these rules of construction, we conclude that a lessor's insurance policy cannot satisfy the requirements of section
324.021(9)(b) and exempt a lessor from liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
...However, that is not what the legislature did, and we, having refused to create any exception, are in no position to now second-guess the legislature's choice. OVERTON, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. There is no legal justification for the majority's interpretation of section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statute (1993)....
...ing financial responsibility for the operation of said motor vehicle or for the acts of the operator in connection therewith; further, this paragraph shall be applicable so long as the insurance required under such lease agreement remains in effect. § 324.021(9)(b) (emphasis added)....
...PERMISSIVE USER WHO HAS INSURANCE AVAILABLE AS REQUIRED BY THE LEASE AGREEMENT IS AN INSURED. FOR LESSEES AND PERMISSIVE USERS WHOSE INSURANCE AS REQUIRED BY THE LEASE AGREEMENT IS NOT IN FORCE OR DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIRED LIMIT OF FLORIDA STATUTE 324.021(9)(B), THIS POLICY SHALL SUBSTITUTE FOR THE REQUIRED INSURANCE, UP TO THE MINIMUM LIMIT STATED IN FLORIDA STATUTE 324.021(9)(B). OUR LIMIT OF LIABILITY PART IV. C. DOES NOT APPLY TO LESSEES OR PERMISSIVE USERS. [4] In fact, the limits of this policy were tendered to Ady. [5] In Abdala, we addressed the 1987 version of section 324.021(9)(b) which read: Notwithstanding any other provision of the Florida Statutes or existing case law, the lessor, under an agreement to lease a motor vehicle for 1 year or longer which requires the lessee to obtain insurance acceptable...
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 8 A.L.R. 3d 382, 1963 Fla. App. LEXIS 3571
...sult of an accident or failure to satisfy a judgment is by furnishing proof of financial responsibility, as defined in §
324.031, supra. A "motor vehicle liability policy", in order to constitute proof of financial responsibility, must conform to §§
324.021(7),
324.021(8) and
324.151(1), Fla....
...Stat.
324.031 reads as follows: "Manner of proving financial responsibility "The operator or owner of a vehicle may prove his financial responsibility by: "(1) Furnishing satisfactory evidence of holding a motor vehicle liability policy as defined in §
324.021(8) and §
324.151, or "(2) Posting with the state treasurer of a satisfactory bond of a surety company authorized to do business in this state, conditioned for payment of the amount specified in §
324.021(7), or "(3) Furnishing a certificate of the state treasurer showing a deposit of cash or securities in accordance with §
324.161, or "(4) Furnishing a certificate of self-insurance issued by the commissioner in accordance with §
324.171....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...able * * * shall be reduced by the amount paid * * * under any workmen's compensation law. * * *" The trial court in this case rejected appellant's claim of set-off under this provision. The court referred to and relied upon Sections 627.0851(1) and 324.021(7), F.S., [1] which require in substance that automobile liability insurance policies in this state shall provide uninsured motorist coverage in a minimum amount of $10,000, i.e. in an amount "not less than limits described in Sec. 324.021(7) * * * for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles....
...otor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than limits described in § 324.021(7), under provisions filed with and approved by the insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; * * *." "324.021 Definitions; minimum insurance required....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15335, 2007 WL 686625
...DISCUSSION The first question involves application of the Graves Amendment to Florida law. There appears to be agreement that the Graves Amendment preempts Florida's common law vicarious liability scheme as it pertains to lessors of motor vehicles. The dispute is whether Florida Statute § 324.021(9)(b)(2), establishing damages caps on such vicarious liability claims, creates a separate and distinct cause of action against lessors of motor vehicles which is not preempted by the Graves Amendment....
...The only parties challenging this statute's constitutionality are the Garcia and Ruiz *827 Plaintiff's. The constitutional issue arises in the event the Court first determines that the Graves Amendment preempts all of the Plaintiff's' claims against the Lessor Defendants. I. Does the Graves Amendment Preempt Florida Statute § 324.021(9)(b)(2)? In their motion for summary judgment, the Lessor Defendants argue that Florida Statute § 324.021(9)(b)(2) merely sets forth caps on damages for which a lessor of motor vehicles could be held vicariously liable under Florida law....
...Because the Graves Amendment preempts such vicarious liability claims, it must necessarily also preempt any statutes setting damages caps on such claims. The Plaintiff's, however, argue that the Graves Amendment does not erase the Lessor Defendants' liability, because Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2) is really a "financial responsibility law" that creates a separate cause of action against lessors of motor vehicles....
...liable for the lessee's negligent operation of the motor vehicle, in 1959. Susco Car Rental System v. Leonard,
112 So.2d 832 (Fla.1959). In 1999, the Florida Legislature passed a tort reform package which, among other things, created Florida Statute §
324.021(9)(b). This section created an exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for lessors of motor vehicles. As applicable to this case, §
324.021(9)(b) provides: (9) Owner, owner/lessor....
...actually recovered from the lessee, from the operator, and from any insurance or self-insurance covering the lessee or operator. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to affect the liability of the lessor for its own negligence. Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(1), (2)....
...Further, in this instance, if Gregory Davis is found to be either uninsured or has insurance with limits less than $500,000 combined property damage and bodily injury liability, the Lessor Defendants will be liable for up to an additional $500,000 in economic damages. Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2)....
...or others and their property, and to promote safety and provide financial security requirements for such owners or operators whose responsibility it is to recompense others for injury to person or property caused by the operation of a motor vehicle. Section 324.021(9)(b) is but one part of a lengthy statute entitled "Definitions, minimum insurance required," which defines terms such as "owner/lessor," "motor vehicle," and "operator." Fla. Stat. § 324.021(1), (3), and (9)....
...of ability to respond in damages for liability on account of crashes arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" in the amount of $10,000 per person or "$20,000 per accident for bodily injury, and $10,000 for property damage per accident. Fla. Stat. § 324.021(7)....
...In fact, neither party disputes the Graves Amendment's preemption of Florida's common-law dangerous instrumentality doctrine as it relates to lessors of motor vehicles. The question remains, however, whether the Graves Amendment also preempts Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2). C. Application of the Graves Amendment to Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2) Whether the Graves Amendment preempts § 324.021(9)(b) turns on an interpretation of the federal statute itself, namely, the meaning of the phrase "financial responsibility laws." "The starting point for [the] interpretation of a statute is always its language," Community for Creative Non-Violence v....
...ator of a motor vehicle to possess and have proof of minimum levels of insurance. [7] Neither party disputes this interpretation of the common meaning of the term "financial responsibility laws." [8] The Plaintiff's, however, contend that Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2) satisfies this definition....
...ility insurance requirements under State law." § 30106(b)(2). In other words, both subsections exempt state laws that impose some sort of financial responsibility i.e. insurance requirements on owners of motor vehicles. A review of Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2) shows that it does not fall within either subsection....
...The Florida Statute in question does not create insurance standards for entities that register and operate motor vehicles within Florida. Nor does it impose liability on owners of motor vehicles for failing to comply with state insurance requirements. A careful reading of § 324.021(9)(b)(2) shows that it does not impose any insurance requirements on anyone or even mention the term "financial responsibility." This section speaks solely in terms of "liability." A lessor of motor vehicles in the state of Florida could operate without any insurance whatsoever, and would never fall within the scope of § 324.021(9)(b)(2)....
...for periods of less than a year, and if you are sued under a theory of vicarious liability, the maximum amount that you will be liable for (with or without insurance) cannot exceed $350,000. The Plaintiff's place great emphasis on the provisions in § 324.021(9)(b)(2) which raise the liability caps by an additional $500,000 if the lessor leases a motor vehicle to someone who carries insurance of less than $500,000....
...Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Court is unaware of any Florida financial responsibility or insurance requirement that owners and/or operators of motor vehicles must possess insurance in the amount of $500,000 combined property and personal injury. To the contrary, § 324.021 itself defines the minimum standards for insurance in Florida: Proof of financial responsibility....
...imits for one person, in the amount of $20,000 because of bodily injury to, or death of, two or more persons in any one crash; (c) In the amount of $10,000 because of injury to, or destruction of, property of others in any one crash . . . Fla. Stat. §
324.021(7). [11] There is nothing in §
324.021(9)(b)(2) that imposes any penalties or liabilities on lessors of motor vehicles who do not maintain these minimum levels of insurance. [12] While not dispositive, Florida case law supports the Court's interpretation that §
324.021(9)(b)(2) is simply a cap on strict vicarious liability damages and nothing more. See, e.g., Lewis v. Enterprise Leasing Co.,
912 So.2d 349, 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) ("The legislature enacted section
324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes, in order to limit such liability and to shift responsibility for damages arising out of motor vehicle accidents from innocent owners and lessors of motor vehicles to those at fault."); Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Hughes,
833 So.2d 832, 838 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that §
324.021(9)(b)(2) "merely limits the liability of short-term lessors....
...The statute reduces responsibility, for damages arising from the fault of others but preserves full liability for compensatory damages caused by one's own fault. The statute merely caps the amount of damages for the vicarious liability of the lessor."); Folmar v. Young,
591 So.2d 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (concluding that §
324.021(9)(b) is an exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and is not a statutory penalty for failing to provide proof of financial responsibility). The legislative history behind the creation of §
324.021(9)(b)(2) also supports this conclusion. [13] See, e.g., Fla. Staff. An., H.B. 775, May 13, 1999 (noting that one of the purposes of §
324.021(9)(b) is to "encourage personal responsibility by shifting emphasis from compensation based primarily upon loss toward responsibility based upon fault....
...[T]he new limitations on . . . automobile owner liability both reduce responsibility for damages arising from the fault of others while preserving full liability for compensatory damages caused by one's own fault"); Fla. Staff An., H.B. 775, February 12, 1999 (Section 324.021(9)(b) "limits the vicarious liability of a motor vehicle owner or a rental company that rents or leases motor vehicles....
...551, March 17, 2005 ("A company that is a holder of a motor vehicle or equity interest in a motor vehicle title for a rental company may face fewer or less costly lawsuits because of the limits of liability that the holder will qualify for under the terms of the bill."). Thus, it is clear that § 324.021(9)(b) was intended to shift and/or limit financial liability; it does not create insurance requirements or force owners and operators of motor vehicles to maintain a certain level of insurance, and it certainly does not create a private right of action of any kind. Lastly, Plaintiff's argue that Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2) should not be preempted by the Graves Amendment for public policy reasons....
...According to the Plaintiff's, [a]ssigning ultimate financial responsibility to lessors advances the policy goal of preventing the public from bearing responsibility for the costs of motor vehicle accidents." [14] In light of both the Graves Amendment's and § 324.021(9)(b)(2)'s clear and unambiguous language, the Court need not look to public policy concerns to interpret these two statutes; it must be presumed that Congress took such policy concerns into consideration when drafting the Graves Amendment, and that it meant what it said....
...rongdoing relating to a motor vehicle accident. All of this analysis drives the conclusion that vicarious liability of motor vehicle lessors under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine is now preempted by federal law. Consequently, Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2) also is preempted....
...Accordingly, the Plaintiff's' claims against the Lessor Defendants cannot go forward. II. Is the Graves Amendment Constitutional? Having determined that the Graves Amendment preempts Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine as well as Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2), the Court must address the Plaintiff's' second argument that the Graves Amendment is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce Powers under Article I, § 8 of the United States Constitution....
...CONCLUSION This is an important case of first impression. No other federal court has analyzed the preemptive scope of the Graves Amendment, and there is a lack of persuasive Florida legal authority addressing the intersection of this Act with Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2). [19] Still, the plain language of the Graves Amendment, coupled with the plain language of Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2) clearly compel the conclusion that the Plaintiff's' claims against the Lessor Defendants are preempted....
...It is equally clear that the Graves Amendment is a permissible exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause powers. Because the Court finds that the Graves Amendment preempts all vicarious liability claims against the Lessor Defendants, including those premised on Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2), and that the Graves Amendment is a constitutional exercise of Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause, the Garcia and Ruiz Plaintiff's' claims cannot go forward against any of the Lessor Defendants....
...and against Respondents the Estate of Jose L. Garcia and the Estate of Nelson Agustin, declaring that the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, preempts, all state law vicarious liability claims against the Petitioners, including those that may be premised on Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2), as brought by the Respondents with respect to the February 2, 2005 car accident in Marion County, Florida, and therefore the Petitioners are not vicariously liable to the Respondents for any damages resulting from that accident....
...ed minimum levels of motor vehicle insurance at the time of an accident. Under this provision, an owner or operator of a motor vehicle is directly penalized for not having sufficient levels of insurance. [13] Again, given the unambiguous language of § 324.021(9)(b)(2), the Court is not required to consider its legislative history....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...This statute was enacted to place an insured under a policy of automobile liability insurance, who is injured as a result of the wrongdoing of an uninsured motorist, in the same position as if that uninsured motorist had maintained a policy of liability insurance with the minimum limits specified in § 324.021(7) of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 19 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 333, 1994 Fla. LEXIS 983, 1994 WL 275175
...is self-propelled and is of a type: a. designed for, and b. required to be licensed for use on Florida highways. The section of the policy dealing with uninsured motor vehicle coverage does not contain any other definitions of a car or motor vehicle. Section
324.021(1), Florida Statutes (1991), also known as the Financial Responsibility Act, defines motor vehicle as "every self-propelled vehicle which is designed and required to be licensed for use upon a highway." In comparison, section
627.732,...
...els. Grant also points out that the definition of motor vehicle in section
627.732, Florida Statutes (1991), pertaining to PIP coverage, defines a motor vehicle as one with four wheels. State Farm argues that the definition of motor vehicle found in section
324.021(1), Florida Statutes (1991), the Financial Responsibility Law, is the applicable definition....
...the statute, and the statutory provisions become a part of the contract." Id. at 499 (quoting Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin,
184 So.2d 229, 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966), cert. dismissed,
196 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1967)). The Financial Responsibility Law, section
324.021(1), defines a "motor vehicle" as a "self-propelled vehicle which is designed and required to be licensed for use upon a highway." We conclude that this statutory definition is consistent with the plain meaning of the term "motor vehic...
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1972 Fla. App. LEXIS 7257
...otor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than limits described in § 324.021(7), under provisions filed with and approved by the department, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sic...
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 4756388
...nt. David C. Borucke of Holland & Knight LLP, Tampa, for appellee Enterprise Leasing Company, a Florida corporation. En Banc [1] GROSS, J. The issue before the court is whether by enacting 49 U.S.C. § 30106, the Graves Amendment, Congress preempted section 324.021(9)(b)2, Florida Statutes (2007), involving short term leases of motor vehicles....
...Price's son, Jimmy Middleton, crashed the rental vehicle into the rear end of a car driven by Rafael Vargas. Vargas filed suit against Price, Middleton, and Enterprise. The only count of the complaint directed at Enterprise claimed that the company was vicariously liable as the owner of the motor vehicle, pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b)2....
...accident. Enterprise filed an amended answer and affirmative defenses, asserting that pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 30106, it had no liability. The circuit court granted Enterprise's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Graves Amendment preempted section 324.021(9)(b)2, which it determined was a vicarious liability provision and not a financial responsibility statute....
...In 1959, the Florida Supreme Court extended the doctrine to lessors, making them vicariously liable, as owners, for the lessee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. See Susco Car Rental Sys. of Fla. v. Leonard,
112 So.2d 832 (Fla.1959). Against this legal backdrop, the legislature adopted section
324.021(9)(b)2, which provides: (b) Owner/lessor.Notwithstanding any other provision of the Florida Statutes or existing case law: 2....
...e, from the operator, and from any insurance or self-insurance covering the lessee or operator. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to affect the liability of the lessor for its own negligence. Ch. 99-225, § 28, at 1421-22, Laws of Fla. Section 324.021(9)(b)2 comes within the preemption language of 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a), since it is a state law that imposes liability upon a lessor "by reason of being the owner of" a motor vehicle. Section 324.021(9)(b)2 states: The lessor, under an agreement to rent or lease a motor vehicle for a period of less than 1 year, shall be deemed the owner of the motor vehicle for the purpose of determining liability for the operation of the vehicle or the acts of the operator in connection therewith .......
...ability derived from a status as owner, rather than fault. See Kumarsingh v. PV Holding Corp.,
983 So.2d 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Vargas seeks to recover from Enterprise solely on the basis of vicarious liability. Vargas's lawsuit is preempted unless section
324.021(9)(b)2 falls within the savings clause of section 30106(b). Vargas argues that his lawsuit comes within the savings clause because section
324.021(9)(b)2 is a "financial responsibility law" under section 30106(b). We reject that argument. Although Florida has adopted "financial responsibility laws," as the term was used by Congress, section
324.021(9)(b)2 is not one of them....
...the term "proof of financial responsibility"; it is the "ability to respond in damages for liability, on account of accidents arising out of the use of a motor vehicle," in the amounts of $5,000, $10,000, or $20,000, depending on the circumstances. § 324.021(7), Fla....
...See Garcia,
510 F.Supp.2d at 830 (stating that "the common usage of the term `financial responsibility laws' means requiring an owner and/or operator of a motor vehicle to possess and have proof of minimum levels of insurance"). Given this definition of "financial responsibility," we conclude that section
324.021(9)(b)2 is not the type of law that Congress intended to exclude from preemption....
...ne is not a "financial responsibility" requirement. Garcia,
540 F.3d at 1249. First, section 30106(b)(1) exempts laws "imposing financial responsibility on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle." Section
324.021(9)(b)2 is in no way linked to this privilege; it does not require short term lessors to purchase insurance. The monetary figures in the statute are caps on liability unrelated to a lessor's ability to register a motor vehicle. Sections
324.021(7),
324.051, and
324.071, Florida Statutes (2007), implement Florida's financial responsibility scheme....
...Second, subsection 30106(b)(2) exempts state laws which "impos[e] liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law." Section 324.021(9)(b)2 is not a "financial responsibility or liability insurance requirement"; the section does not require short term lessors to purchase insurance. We agree with the analysis of the district court in Garcia concerning the interplay between this federal exclusion and section 324.021(9)(b)2: [Section 324.021(9)(b)2] does not create insurance standards for entities that register and operate motor vehicles within Florida. Nor does it impose liability on owners of motor vehicles for failing to comply with state insurance requirements. A careful reading of § 324.021(9)(b)(2) shows that it does not impose any insurance requirements on anyone or even mention the term "financial responsibility." This section speaks solely in terms of "liability." A lessor of motor vehicles in the state of Florida could operate without any insurance whatsoever, and would never fall within the scope of § 324.021(9)(b)2....
...s for periods of less than a year, and if you are sued under a theory of vicarious liability, the maximum amount that you will be liable for (with or without insurance) cannot exceed $350,000. The Plaintiffs place great emphasis on the provisions in § 324.021(9)(b)2 which raise the liability caps by an additional $500,000 if the lessor leases a motor vehicle to someone who carries insurance of less than $500,000....
...Garcia,
510 F.Supp.2d at 831 (footnotes omitted). As the district judge observed, no Florida statute requires owners or lessors of motor vehicles to "possess insurance in the amount of $500,000 combined property and personal injury. To the contrary, [section]
324.021[(7)] itself defines the minimum standards for insurance in Florida." Id. Section
324.021(9)(b)2 is thus neither a financial responsibility statute nor an insurance requirement under section 30106(b)....
...Rather, the statute is an outgrowth of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine that codifies and caps the vicarious liability imposed on lessors of motor vehicles. See Fischer v. Alessandrini,
907 So.2d 569, 570-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (recognizing that section
324.021(9)(b)2 was enacted to rectify "perceived inequities" in the dangerous instrumentality doctrine by imposing limits on the liability of lessors who rent or lease a motor vehicle for less than a year). In a case involving section
324.021(9)(b)1, we rejected the notion that that statute was a financial responsibility law or insurance requirement....
...y doctrine in the case of long-term lessors." Id.; see Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
572 So.2d 1363, 1367 (Fla. 1990) (citing Folmar with approval); Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Hughes,
833 So.2d 832, 838 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that §
324.021(9)(b)2 "merely limits the liability of short-term lessors.......
...The statute merely caps the amount of damages for the vicarious liability of the lessor."). Folmar also rejected the argument that the placement of the statute in Chapter 324, entitled "Financial Responsibility," controlled the characterization of the statute. Folmar,
591 So.2d at 222. Section
324.021(9)(b)2 was added to Chapter 324 in 1999, long after the earlier codifications of financial responsibility law....
...The section developed apart from the financial responsibility aspects of the chapter. Thus, Folmar rejected a superficial, label-based legal analysis and focused on the language of the statute in deciding the case. For these reasons, we join with those courts that have concluded that the Graves Amendment preempts section 324.021(9)(b)2....
...First, the dissent fails to adequately address what Congress meant when it used the term "financial responsibility" in section 30106(b). This failure led to the opinion nullifying the intent of the statute. The heart of the dissent's reasoning turns on the inclusion of subsection 324.021(9)(b) in a chapter entitled "Financial Responsibility," and in a section entitled "Definitions; minimum insurance required." The opinion uses these labels to muse about the intent of the drafters of the Florida statute....
...The dissent construes the Graves Amendment so broadly that vicarious liability disappears into "financial responsibility"; the exception thus swallows the rule. [6] Next, Vargas contends that Congress does not have the authority, under the Commerce Clause, to preempt Section 324.021(9)(b)2, and similar state laws imposing vicarious liability on lessors of motor vehicles....
...product that is a component of interstate travel, where vicarious liability imposes $100 million in costs on consumers. Finally, we certify the following as a question of great public importance: DOES THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, 49 U.S.C. § 30106 PREEMPT SECTION 324.021(9)(b)2, FLORIDA STATUTES (2007)? Affirmed....
...arious liability on lease/rental car Companies [8] for the fault of others, but Graves § (b)(2) does not relieve these Companies from any insurance responsibilities they have under State law. Second, the applicable Florida insurance laws, including § 324.021(9)(b), [9] eliminate the vicarious liability of these Companies when they force their Customers [10] to have liability insurance coverage, which must be backed up if necessary by the Companies' own blanket insurance....
...e statute. Thus with traditional statutory construction they hope to learn "what the meaning of is is." This instead of searching for core ideas. The striking thing about the majority's reliance on Garcia, [11] the federal appellate decision holding § 324.021(9)(b) preempted by Graves § (a), is its utter misapprehension of these statutes....
...financial responsibility for an injured victim. They apparently believe that when Congress preempted vicarious liability it also meant to relieve Companies of any role in providing security for payment of injuries. Indeed, both contend that allowing § 324.021(9)(b) to stand against preemption as a financial responsibility law would "swallow" the preemption provision....
...statute. By this process do we arrive at the meaning of is. Garcia and the majority read Graves § (b)(2) to mean just those State laws making minimum liability insurance compulsory for the registration of vehicles by Companies. [13] They argue that § 324.021(9)(b) does not in so many words directly compel Companies to procure liability insurance. To be a financial responsibility law within Graves § (b)(2), they seem to say, a State statute must directly compel the Company to purchase the insurance as a condition to register and hence operate a lease or rental vehicle. Thus § 324.021(9)(b) is not a financial responsibility law because its minimum insurance amounts are not compulsory and *626 are not tied to a Company's registration of a vehicle....
...ints out, McCarran-Ferguson removed all dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny of State insurance laws. But the analysis of Garcia and the majority depend heavily on a dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny for its conclusion. They construe Graves § (b)(2) and § 324.021(9)(b) with undue strictness and Graves § (a) with undue broadness, when the McCarran-Ferguson presumption counsels powerfully against these interpretive attitudes....
...egulations' to support a narrow interpretation of such an express command in Cipollone. That approach is consistent with both federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety. [c.o., e.s.] [25] To find § 324.021(9)(b) preempted by Graves § (b)(2), we must disregard this entire line of Supreme Court decisions....
...compatible with the purpose and substance of the Graves Amendment as the Utah and New York financial responsibility laws were with bankruptcy law in Kesler. If used here properly, Kesler analysis would reason thus. It is obvious Florida is not using § 324.021(9)(b) as a devious avoidance to retain a hidden vicarious liability of Companies....
...damages not covered by insurance. Their primary effect is not even really directed at the Companies but instead primarily to their Customers, who are the ones initially obligated to secure the financial responsibility, minimum insurance coverage. If § 324.021(9)(b) functions as its text obviously indicates, there is no adverse effect at all on preemption of vicarious liability laws in Graves § (a) because under State law the Companies will have no liability of any kind vicarious or otherwise to pay for the injuries....
...rationale for sustaining preemption of Florida laws affecting any responsibility of these Companies touching leased/rented vehicles. They do not try to ascertain genuine conflict between the actual substance and function of the Graves Amendment and § 324.021(9)(b). They do not ask how their substances are so incompatible with each other that Congress must be understood to have expressed an implied intent to preempt even the clear minimum insurance requirement in § 324.021(9)(b)....
...In Graves § (b)(2) Congress explicitly declared that it had laid no hand on minimum liability insurance requirements in such laws. And this whether or not such laws directly or only indirectly impose some responsibility on Companies for failing to meet these insurance requirements. Before the Florida Legislature enacted § 324.021(9)(b) in 1991, a Company faced full vicarious responsibility under its Common Law for all injuries caused by its vehicles....
...ding a specified minimum of coverage. If the Company does so, it avoids any vicarious liability for any accident. When a Company complies with the statute, it has no further liability or *633 responsibility. Thus instead of vicarious liability, with § 324.021(9)(b) the only liability of the Companies is a duty to secure the placement of minimum insurance specified in the statute....
...e is to "provide financial security requirements for such owners or operators whose responsibility it is to recompense others for injury to person or property caused by the operation of a motor vehicle." [27] Florida's Legislature further designated §
324.021(9)(b) with the title "minimum insurance required." [28] Then, in still another part of Chapter 324, namely §
324.032(1)(b), the Legislature provided: " A person who is either the owner or a lessee required to maintain insurance under s.
324.021(9)(b) and who operates limousines, jitneys, or any other for-hire passenger vehicles, other than taxicabs, may prove financial responsibility by furnishing satisfactory evidence of holding a motor vehicle liability policy as defined in s.
324.031." [29] [e.s.] The plain text of the Chapter and these statutes therefore express a purpose to have §
324.021(9)(b) impose a requirement on the Companies to see that insurance is maintained. In the face of this clear text, is it really possible to hold that §
324.021(9)(b) is not a financial responsibility, minimum insurance law? [30] Section
324.021(9)(b) fixes financial responsibility through a liability insurance requirement. Section
324.021(9)(b) fixes minimum insurance requirements as the basis for eliminating vicarious responsibility of the Companies....
...? *634 Why are these Florida laws not read together as an adjustment of monetary responsibility by providing security for payment of damages to persons injured by operation of Companies' vehicles? Congress knew that Florida had explicitly designated §
324.021(9)(b) to impose a financial responsibility and a liability insurance requirement on commercial entities renting or leasing vehicles for use on Florida roadways. But Congress added not a single word excluding Florida's laws from Graves § (b)(2). Folmar v. Young,
591 So.2d 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), explicitly construed §
324.021(9)(b) to be a financial responsibility law. We said: " Section
324.021(9)(b) defines the minimum automobile liability insurance requirements....
...Rather than rejecting the notion; Folmar openly embraced it. The majority also say that Folmar held that the placement of the statute in Chapter 324 has no bearing on its meaning. What the Folmar court actually said about the placement in Chapter 324 is: "Although section
324.021(9)(b) is in the financial responsibility chapter, we do not believe that the specific penalties provided for in section
324.051 apply. " [e.s.] Again their argument misstates Folmar. And Folmar is not alone. Section
324.021(9)(b) has been repeatedly construed by Florida courts to impose a minimum insurance requirement....
...s there for any insurance on these vehicles? It is only when these vehicles are rented or leased that they pose any danger to the public at large and only then is there a need for "financial responsibility" or "liability insurance." To conclude that section 324.021(9)(b)(2) does not fit within the exception of the Graves Amendment seems to me to be a very strained construction of "financial responsibility" and "liability insurance." I would therefore reverse the summary judgment....
...[2] Although we are not required to follow the Eleventh Circuit on questions of federal law, we find it to be persuasive on the preemption question presented in this case. See Carnival Corp. v. Carlisle,
953 So.2d 461, 465 (Fla. 2007); Pignato v. Great Western Bank,
664 So.2d 1011, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). [3] Section
324.021(7), Florida Statutes (2007) contains a similar definition, with different monetary amounts....
...The suspension requirement is subject to certain exceptions; one of these is that the owner or operator had in effect at the time "of the crash an automobile liability policy with respect to all of the registered motor vehicles owned by such operator or owner," containing "limits of not less than those specified in s.
324.021(7)." §
324.051(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007). Section
324.021(7) contains the $10, 000/$20,000/$10,000 minimums that establish proof of financial responsibility....
...[7] 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2005). I refer to the two subsections of § 30106 throughout as Graves § (a) and Graves § (b). [8] I use the terms Company and Companies to mean those entities in the business of leasing or renting motor vehicles in commerce. [9] § 324.021(9)(b), Fla....
...(2008). [10] By Customers I mean the lessees under long term leases and the renters under short term rental agreements. [11] Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA Inc.,
540 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir.2008). [12] Garcia,
540 F.3d at 1248; Majority Op. at 623. [13] "Section
324.021(9)(b)2 is not a `financial responsibility or liability insurance requirement;' the section does not require short term lessors to purchase insurance." Op. at 621. [14] "The `Florida legislature's endorsement of and limitations on' the vicarious liability imposed under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is not a `financial responsibility' requirement" because "[t]he monetary figures in [§
324.021(9)] are caps on liability unrelated to a lessor's ability to register a motor vehicle." Op....
...The failure of all these decisions, on which the majority so heavily relies, to consider the correct preemption and McCarran-Ferguson principles renders these appellate decisions quite unreliable as precedent on this subject. [27] §
324.011, Fla. Stat. (2008). [28] It is true that §
324.021(9)(b) is framed as a definition of owner where the Companies' vehicles are involved....
...acting legislature. But that is not true in Florida, where the Legislature itself is responsible for Chapter and Statute titles. §
11.242(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (2008). Ergo, the legislative designation of Chapter 324, and the legislative designation of §
324.021(9)(b) as well, have as much meaning as any word in the full body of text....
...Because these titles were placed there by the Legislature rather than some book editor, they have strong substantive effect as to the meaning of the statute. The Congress adopting the Graves Amendment could not possibly have been under any misapprehension that § 324.021(9)(b) would not be saved by Graves § (b)(2)....
...1st DCA 2008) (noting that only an unwise lessor "would expose itself to potential liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine by reducing insurance coverage requirements to amounts less than the statutory minimums" [e.s.]); Sontay v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems Inc.,
872 So.2d 316 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (§
324.021(9)(b) requires long-term lessees to maintain insurance); Rodriguez-Cespedes v. Creative Leasing Inc.,
728 So.2d 811 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (agreeing that plain meaning of §
324.021(9)(b) mandates that lease agreement require insurance in the stated minimum amounts); Gedert v. Southeast Bank Leasing Co.,
637 So.2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (§
324.021(9)(b) clearly requires lessee to have valid insurance on leased automobile at time of accident; otherwise liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine reverts to the lessor)....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...y arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state shall be issued or delivered unless the policy contained uninsured motorist coverage with limits not less than those described in Section 324.021(7) (limits of $10,000/$20,000)....
...r vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than the limits described in § 324.021(7), and in an amount up to 100 percent of the liability insurance purchased by the named insured for bodily injury, under provisions filed with and approved by the department, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legall...
...And, if the language in question is examined, out of context with the other language in the statute, and without consideration to the purposes of the statute, that contention appears valid: No ... insurance ... shall be ... issued ... unless coverage is provided ... in not less than the limits described in § 324.021(7), and in an amount up to 100 percent of the liability insurance purchased by the named insured for bodily injury....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 111442
...3d DCA 1990), wherein the district court certified that its decision involved a question of great public importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution, and approve the district court's decision. This case involves the constitutionality of subsection 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), which concerns a long-term motor vehicle lessor's financial responsibility for the operation of that vehicle....
...Two lessees were involved in separate automobile accidents in which Tsiknakis and Abdala were injured. Tsiknakis and Abdala sued the lessees and their respective lessors, Volvo Finance and World Omni. The trial courts granted summary judgment in favor of Volvo Finance and World Omni, finding that subsection 324.021(9)(b) operated to foreclose liability on their behalf....
...In addition, Kraemer recognized that the legislature acted to eliminate long-term lessors' liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, upon the satisfaction of specified preconditions, by the passage of chapter 86-229, Laws of Florida. That law, as codified at subsection 324.021(9)(b), stated: Notwithstanding any other provision of the Florida Statutes or existing case law, the lessor, under an agreement to lease a motor vehicle for 1 year or longer which requires the lessee to obtain insurance acceptable to...
...the requisite minimum insurance coverage. In the instant cases, no party disputes that the lessees each maintained the necessary insurance or that the leases were for periods in excess of one year. Tsiknakis and Abdala, however, both contend that subsection 324.021(9)(b) is unconstitutional for access to courts, equal protection, and due process violations. [1] We disagree. We begin by addressing Tsiknakis and Abdala's claim that subsection 324.021(9)(b) violates the access to courts provision of our constitution....
...By implication we recognized its viability. Limiting the liability of one vicariously liable does not equate to denial of access to court. On this issue we approve the holdings of Perry v. G.M.A.C. Leasing Corp.,
549 So.2d 680, 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (subsection
324.021(9)(b) "does not limit plaintiff's right to recover damages from the lessee who controls the operation of the vehicle....
...4th DCA 1990) (same). [4] The legislature can determine the circumstances permitting vicarious liability without violating the holdings of Kluger, particularly when the law is unsettled at the time of the enactment. We now turn to Tsiknakis and Abdala's claim that subsection 324.021(9)(b) is constitutionally infirm because it violates their equal protection and due process rights....
...d for a period of less than one year. They further argue that the statute discriminates against those plaintiffs suffering the most catastrophic injuries by eliminating the lessor as a source of recovery. We disagree. The legislature, by enacting subsection 324.021(9)(b), simply redefined "owner" of a motor vehicle so as to exclude a long-term lessor upon satisfaction of the statutory preconditions....
...Thus, there is a rational basis for the legislation. Accord Folmar. Nor does the statute discriminate against plaintiffs suffering the worst injuries by eliminating possible recovery from the lessor in view of the unlimited ability to recover from the lessee. We therefore hold subsection 324.021(9)(b) constitutional and approve the district court's decision. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, BARKETT, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Abdala also contends that § 324.021(9)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 18205, 2002 WL 31769176
...Because each of the sections within Chapter 99-225 naturally and logically connect with the subject expressed in the title, we hold that Chapter 99-225 does not unconstitutionally violate the single subject rule. In addition, appellant contends that section 324.021, Florida Statutes (2000), which limits the liability of short-term motor vehicle lessors, does not deny access to courts, deny the right to a jury trial, violate the equal protection clause of the Florida Constitution, or violate the due process clause of the Florida Constitution....
...and Martha Hughes, filed a wrongful death action against appellant on June 30, 2000. Appellee alleged that appellant was liable for Jordan's negligence under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Subsequently, appellant filed a Motion to Limit Damages Pursuant to Section 324.021, Florida Statutes. It asserted that it was only liable to appellee for the statutory maximum of $220,000. In appellee's response to appellant's Motion to Limit Damages Pursuant to Section 324.021, appellee argued that section 324.021 was unconstitutional. Appellee claimed that Chapter 99-225, which amended section 324.021, violated the single subject rule of the Florida Constitution. Appellee also claimed that section 324.021 denied access to courts, the right to a jury trial, as well as equal protection to the most seriously injured claimants and to the physically handicapped....
...Appellee proceeded to trial on claims raised on behalf of Martha Hughes' estate. A jury awarded appellee $176,594.36 for medical and funeral expenses as well as $180,000 in past and future pain and suffering to the survivors. Thereafter, the trial court denied appellant's Motion to Limit Damages Pursuant to Section 324.021....
...Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order declaring Chapter 99-225 unconstitutional. Although the trial court did not specifically address the following constitutional challenges in its order finding Chapter 99-225 unconstitutional, we address these challenges and determine that the trial court could not have found section 324.021, as amended by Chapter 99-225, unconstitutional on the other grounds raised by appellee in the proceedings below. III. Right of Access to Courts Appellant contends that section 324.021 does not violate a plaintiff's right to access the courts....
...Appellant contends that no clear common law right or statutory right to sue a short-term lessor under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine exists and, therefore, Kluger does not apply. Alternatively, appellant argues that even if Kluger applies, section 324.021(9)(b)2, Florida Statutes (2000), passes the reasonable alternative remedy prong of the test....
...no statutory right to recover for a municipality's negligence predating the Declaration of Rights contained in the Florida Constitution or a common law cause of action as of July 4, 1776, Kluger was not applicable). It does not follow, however, that section 324.021 restricts a party's access to court. Section 324.021(9)(b)2, Florida Statutes (2000), provides that: The lessor, under an agreement to rent or lease a motor vehicle for a period of *838 less than 1 year, shall be deemed the owner of the motor vehicle for the purpose of determining liabi...
...ssor. A plaintiff can always recover additional damages from the lessee or operator. Therefore, as the Legislature did not abolish an individual's right to sue lessors of automobiles for injuries arising out of an accident involving that automobile, section
324.021 does not violate the holding in Kluger. See Abdala,
583 So.2d at 333 (concluding that, in regards to long-term lessors, the "Legislature can determine the circumstances permitting vicarious liability without violating the holdings of Kluger" ). Thus, we conclude that section
324.021 does not limit a plaintiff's right of access to the courts. IV. Right to Trial by Jury Appellant next argues that neither the language nor the operation of section
324.021 denies appellee the right to a trial by jury. Article I, Section 22 of the Florida Constitution provides that the "right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate." Section
324.021 does not violate this section of the Florida Constitution by limiting plaintiff's right to trial by jury. Under this statute, a jury still retains the ability to fully assess all damages against those at fault. Section
324.021 merely limits a plaintiff's available damages from the owner of the vehicle....
...A plaintiff retains the ability to recover fully from the lessee or operator of the vehicle. Cf. Smith,
507 So.2d at 1088-89 (stating that a statute which limits full recovery of economic damages prevents a plaintiff from receiving the constitutional benefit of a jury trial). Accordingly, we hold that section
324.021 does not limit a plaintiff's right to trial by jury. V. Equal Protection/Due Process Appellant finally argues that appellee failed to sustain his burden of showing that section
324.021 violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Florida Constitution. It contends that the Legislature's amendments to section
324.021 are reasonably related to the amendment's objective to reform the civil justice system....
...asonable relationship to a legitimate legislative objective and is not discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive. See Chicago Title Ins. Co.,
770 So.2d at 1210; Abdala,
583 So.2d at 333. In Abdala, the supreme court addressed the constitutionality of section
324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), as it applies to long-term leases. The supreme court flatly rejected any contention that section
324.021(9)(b) violated equal protection or due process....
...
583 So.2d at 334. The court stated that the statute does not "discriminate against plaintiffs suffering the worst injuries by eliminating possible recovery from the lessor in view of the unlimited ability to recover from the lessee." Id. Similarly, section
324.021(9)(b), as it applies to short-term leases, does not discriminate against plaintiffs suffering the worst injuries. The damages cap applies to all plaintiffs. The statute does not contain any arbitrary or oppressive classifications. Furthermore, the present version of section
324.021 serves a legitimate purpose....
...ion of a motor vehicle. See §
324.011, Fla. Stat. (2000). Although the statute, as amended, reduces the vicarious liability of short-term lessors, a plaintiff can still be recompensed from the lessee or operator of the vehicle. Appellee argues that section
324.021(9)(c) is not rationally related to any legislative purpose because it arbitrarily limits the liability of car and truck rental companies, but not the liability of any other business which rents or lends a vehicle. Section
324.021(9)(c)1....
...on Judiciary, Analysis of HB 775. The statute shifts more of the liability to the actual tortfeasor. The statute also does not arbitrarily limit the liability of car and truck rental companies while excluding other commercial businesses which lend vehicles. Section 324.021(9)(c)1....
...includes within the definition of "rental company" those businesses that provide temporary vehicles to its customers up to ten days. This is a reasonable period of time. Generally, customers would not need a replacement vehicle for a period longer than ten days. Thus, appellee has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that section 324.021 violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Florida Constitution and has not overcome the presumption that the statute is constitutional. We, therefore, hold that section 324.021 does not violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the Florida Constitution....
...Conclusion Because Chapter 99-225 contains only one subject and each of its sections naturally and logically connect with the subject expressed in the title, we conclude that the *840 act does not violate the single subject rule. Furthermore, we hold that section 324.021, as amended by Chapter 99-225, is constitutional and does not violate the right of access to courts, the right to a jury trial, and the equal protection and due process clauses of the Florida Constitution....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 149, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 302
...319.22, is not liable for its negligent operation. See Aurbach; Palmer v. R.S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc.,
81 So.2d 635 (Fla.1955). The owner of a vehicle who has leased it to another under a lease for one year or longer and who has complied with all the requirements of F.S.
324.021(9)(b)1, is not liable for its negligent operation. See Ady v. American Honda Finance Corp.,
675 So.2d 577 (Fla.1996). Additional limitations upon vicarious liability are set forth in F.S.
324.021(9)(b) and
324.021(9)(c)....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...injunction restraining Larson as administrator of the Financial Responsibility Act, Chapter 324, Florida Statutes 1959, F.S.A. from enforcing the provisions of said act against him [Warren]. The complaint also prayed for a final decree adjudicating § 324.021 et seq., Florida Statutes, F.S.A., as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 12, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A....
...laintiff's driver's license and registration. November 10, 1960, the plaintiff moved for summary decree and on November 17, 1960, defendant filed a cross motion for summary decree. December 9, 1960, the chancellor entered a final decree adjudicating § 324.021 et seq., Florida Statutes, F.S.A., to be unconstitutional, in violation of the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and Section 12, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida....
...October 24, 1960, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint; November 10, 1960, plaintiff moved for summary decree and November 16, 1960, defendant filed a cross motion for summary decree. December 6, 1960, the chancellor entered final decree adjudicating § 324.021 et seq., Florida Statutes, F.S.A., to be unconstitutional as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and Section 12, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida....
...uations. We treat the constitutional question first. In order to place the issues in juxtaposition with the final decree, we recite the material part of the latter as entered on the motions for summary decree as follows: "* * * such parts of Chapter 324.021, et seq., Florida Statutes, that authorize and direct the defendant to cause the suspension of the driver's license, the revocation of the automobile registration of certificate, and the taking up of the automobile license tag of the plaintif...
...tution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and being unconstitutional, shall henceforth be null and void and of no force and effect and the defendant shall not attempt to enforce said unconstitutional provisions of said Chapter 324.021 et seq., from henceforth." *180 Chapter 324, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....
...wner. He will hereinafter be referred to as "commissioner." The commissioner may take such steps as the law requires to keep the financial responsibility of the owner of an automobile current and may exact every showing within reason to do so. See §§
324.021,
324.031,
324.042,
324.051 and
324.061, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....
...Stehlek, 262 Wis. 642, 56 N.W.2d 514; Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 A. 701, 115 A.L.R. 1367; Berberian v. Lussier, R.I., 139 A.2d 869; 5A Am.Jur., Automobiles, Section 151, pages 330-334. The final decree was directed particularly to such parts of §
324.021 et seq., Florida Statutes, F.S.A., as authorize the suspension of driver's license, automobile registration certificate and automobile license tag. These were credentials required by law for owning and operating an automobile. Their suspension was in fact a punishment for not complying with §§
324.021,
324.031,
324.051 and perhaps others....
...f a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them before the court nor is there anything to show plaintiff's appearance is a true and fair representation of the alleged class. It follows that the chancellor was in error in adjudicating § 324.021 et seq., Florida Statutes, F.S.A., to be unconstitutional as violative of Section 12, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States....
...ent to the opinion of the majority in these two consolidated cases. In the Warren case the trial court said inter alia: "1. That the only matters presented and argued to the Court are questions of law, and the first of them is whether or not Chapter 324.021, et seq., Florida Statutes violates the due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions, being respectively Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution, and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The defendant has filed no other defense and offers no other argument or position. "2. That the application of said Chapter 324.021, in this case has deprived the plaintiff of due process of law in violation of Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States....
...Therefore, it clearly appears to this Court that under the terms of the Act the plaintiff is denied due process of law. "4. The defendant also asserted that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy by virtue of Rule 4.1 Florida Appellate Rules. This position is untenable for two reasons, First: Under Chapter 324.021, et seq., the defendant cannot make a ruling he must arbitrarily cause the driver's license to be suspended....
...persedeas and the driver would be deprived of his rights during the consideration of the certiorari proceedings." In the Williams case the trial court observed: "1. That the only issues of law set up by the pleadings are: "(1) Whether or not Chapter 324.021, et seq., Florida Statutes, violates the due process clause in the State and Federal Constitutions, being respectively Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution, and Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. "(2) * * * "(3) The defendant also asserted that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy by virtue of Rule 4.1 Florida Appellate Rules. This position is untenable for two reasons, First: Under Chapter 324.021, et seq., the defendant cannot make a ruling he must arbitrarily cause the driver's license to be suspended....
...Second: Even if certiorari did apply, the practical effect would be to deprive the driver of due process, because the certiorari would not act as a supersedeas and the driver would be deprived of his rights during the consideration of the certiorari proceedings. "2. That the application of said Chapter 324.021 in this case deprived the plaintiff, and all other persons similarly situated, of due process of law in violation of Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United *186 States....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1972 Fla. App. LEXIS 7201
...otor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than limits described in § 324.021(7), under provisions filed with and approved by the department, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sic...
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...going opinion. I fear decisional confusion will result if provisions in, or endorsements of automobile liability policies containing uninsured motorist coverage are in any way permitted to vary the language of F.S. Section 627.0851, F.S.A., and F.S. Section 324.021(7), F.S.A. *9 Section 324.021(7) of the chapter relating to financial responsibility provides: "(7) PROOF OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY....
...or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and in the amount of five thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident." The endorsement in the policy under consideration tracks the language of Section 324.021(7), and is not an objectionable variance....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1965 Fla. App. LEXIS 3798
...otor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than limits described in § 324.021(7), under provisions filed with and approved by the insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily...
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1970 Fla. App. LEXIS 5373
...otor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than limits described in § 324.021(7), under provisions filed with and approved by the department, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sic...
...e and creates no liability on the part of appellee to respond for the damages suffered by appellant. The judgment appealed is accordingly affirmed. CARROLL, DONALD K., Acting C.J., and SPECTOR, J., concur. NOTES [1] F.S. § 627.0851, F.S.A. [2] F.S. § 324.021(7), F.S.A....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...y The Continental Insurance Company. While this policy was in effect he was involved in a serious accident which was the fault of a third party. The third party carried automobile liability insurance within the limits as required by Florida law. See §
324.021(7) and §
324.151(1) (a), Fla....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1976 Fla. App. LEXIS 15153
...627.727, is not a part of the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act, F.S.
627.730-627.741. [2] This definition is markedly similar to the definition of "motor vehicle" in the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act, F.S.
627.732. [3] Florida Statutes
627.730-627.741. [4] Florida Statute
324.021(1)....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...r vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than the limits described in § 324.021(7), and in an amount up to 100 percent of the liability insurance purchased by the named insured for bodily *423 injury, under provisions filed with and approved by the department, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are l...
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...otor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than limits described in § 324.021(7), under provisions filed with and approved by the insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily...
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 619, 1992 Fla. LEXIS 1797, 1992 WL 289665
...verage in violation of section
627.727(1). Budget denied all allegations of proximate cause, injury, and damage, and alleged that it fulfilled its obligation by providing Avila with compliance under the Florida Financial Responsibility Law, sections
324.021(7) and
324.171, Florida Statutes (1983)....
...ction
324.031 through a surety bond, to offer the employee uninsured motorist coverage. We found that the legislature had defined the term "motor vehicle liability policy" as "issued by any insurance company authorized to do business in this state." §
324.021(8), Fla....
...3d DCA 1988) (table). [3] Section
324.031, Florida Statutes (1989), provides in relevant part: The operator or owner of a vehicle may prove his financial responsibility by: (1) Furnishing satisfactory evidence of holding a motor vehicle liability policy as defined in s.
324.021(8) and s.
324.151; (2) Posting with the department a satisfactory bond of a surety company authorized to do business in this state, conditioned for payment of the amount specified in s.
324.021(7); (3) Furnishing a certificate of the department showing a deposit of cash or securities in accordance with s....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 59159
...cover if the offending motorist had maintained a policy of liability insurance."
252 So.2d at 234. In this case, the owner of the Suzuki motorcycle was not required to maintain liability insurance on the cycle because it is not a motor vehicle under Section
324.021(1)....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 80706
...LEHAN, Judge. In this wrongful death suit plaintiff appeals a summary judgment in favor of defendant who was the lessor of the automobile, the negligent operation of which was the alleged cause of the damages claimed. The basis for the summary judgment was section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), which provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of the Florida Statutes or existing case law, the lessor, under an agreement to lease a motor vehicle for 1 year or longer which requires the lessee t...
...red the lessee to obtain the insurance specified in the statute which, in fact, the lessee had obtained. Plaintiff, citing Smith v. Dept. of Insurance,
507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987), and Kluger v. White,
281 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), contends on appeal that section
324.021(9)(b) infringes upon his right to access to the courts in violation of article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution by effectively placing a cap upon his damages and depriving him of his right to sue the lessor. We affirm. Unlike the statutes involved in Smith and Kluger, section
324.021(9)(b) does not place a cap upon damages....
...be deemed to be the `owner' under the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. Instead, looking to the purpose of the Act, the courts `place the liability upon the person in a position ... to allow or prevent the use of the vehicle... .'"). Indeed, section 324.021(9)(b) may be viewed as enhancing the recoverability of damages from lessees by calling for minimum insurance requirements to be imposed upon lessees....
...tablished. That is, it appears that the parameters of the common law right of action against the owner of a motor vehicle under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine had not been fully established in Florida in this regard prior to the enactment of section 324.021(9)(b), and that that section established those parameters for the first time....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1970 Fla. LEXIS 2848
...Such insurance as offered is required to provide at least the same minimum limits of coverage as the statute requires motorist to maintain in the form of automobile liability insurance when they come under the financial responsibility law. See F.S. Section 324.021(7), F.S.A....
...ing an automobile liability insurance policy and through his negligence had been involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in injury or death to any of said insured's protected group of persons. Section 627.0851(1), read in connection with F.S. Section 324.021(7), F.S.A., does not permit any reduction by any means in minimum uninsured motorist coverage. The limits thereunder as prescribed in Section 324.021(7) are ten thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident, and twenty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident....
...in his uninsured motorist coverage, or otherwise reduce the coverage or its limits by negotiation. The coverage according to Section 627.0851(1) is to be prefixed in the automobile liability insurance policy "in not less than the limits described in Section 324.021(7) * * * for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles * * *." The persons protected by this insurance are those legally entitled to r...
...Stated another way, if an insured with an automobile liability policy under financial responsibility negligently drives his car into an uninsured motorist's car, his insurer would be liable to the injured riders of the uninsured motorist's car to the extent of coverage of Section 324.021(7). Reciprocally, if an uninsured motorist negligently collides his car with said insured's car, the uninsured motorist coverage is the same for the injured riders in the insured's car as Section 324.021(7) provides....
...When one secures automobile liability insurance in order to comply with the requirements of the financial responsibility law to cover members of the general public he may negligently injure or kill, he is not permitted to reduce the coverage below the statutory limits of Section 324.021(7)....
...Heretofore, no reduction of coverage by "other insurance," "excess insurance," or by limiting the number of lawful occupants by reason of age or kinship to be covered in the insured's automobile or by any other means, has been permitted to reduce the monetary limits of uninsured motorist coverage provided by F.S. Section 324.021(7), F.S.A....
...provides the public generally, including uninsured motorists. True, a purchaser of an automobile liability insurance policy can reject uninsured motorist coverage, but if he accepts it he does so to the full extent of the coverage prescribed in F.S. Section 324.021(7), F.S.A....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 117, 1992 Fla. LEXIS 243, 1992 WL 27891
...Section
324.031 provides four methods for proving financial responsibility. The statute reads as follows: The operator or owner of a vehicle may prove his financial responsibility by: (1) Furnishing satisfactory evidence of holding a motor vehicle liability policy as defined in s.
324.021(8) and s.
324.151, or (2) Posting with the department a satisfactory bond of a surety company authorized to do business in this state, conditioned for payment of the amount specified in s.
324.021(7), or (3) Furnishing a certificate of the department showing a deposit of cash or securities in accordance with s....
...with s.
324.171. §
324.031, Fla. Stat. (1983). Lipof contends that as the "owner or operator" of the vehicle he chose to use the agreement as a "motor vehicle liability policy," pursuant to section
324.031(1). Section
324.031(1) refers to sections
324.021(8) and
324.151, Florida Statutes (1983), which define the requirements for a "motor vehicle liability policy." Section
324.021(8) defines "motor vehicle liability policy" as "issued by any insurance company authorized to do business in this state." Although section
624.03 defines "insurer" broadly, the language of section
324.021(8) limits motor vehicle liability policies to those policies issued by insurance companies. Florida Power is not an insurance company authorized to do business in the state. Thus, the agreement cannot be characterized as a "motor vehicle liability policy" within the meaning of sections
324.021(8) or
324.031....
...Section
324.031(2) provides that posting a surety bond is a means of proving financial responsibility. Agreeing to provide Lipof's compliance with section
324.031 through the surety bond with Safeco is not the same as "issuing" an insurance policy under section
324.021(8)....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 8382, 1991 WL 164398
...Aetna, the victim's uninsured motorist [UM] insurer, argues that under Ohio law, which should decide the issue, Huntington National Bank, an Ohio bank which was the lessor of the at-fault vehicle under a long term lease, should pay the entire amount. Huntington in turn argues that Florida law, viz. section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes, governs and the UM carrier should pay it....
...Title expressly remained in the lessor, who was specifically described in the lease as the sole owner, and the lessee had no option to purchase the vehicle at the end. The lease required the lessee to maintain identical insurance and in the exact limits prescribed by section 324.021(9)(b)....
...s favor. The trial judge explained: The court specifically finds that any liability of [the lessor or lessee] stems from plaintiff's tort claim. Florida law applies. Huntington is entitled to any defenses available under Florida law. Florida Statute § 324.021(9)(b) is constitutional, and applies to this case....
...Section 6 of the Restatement directs us to the relevant policies of the forum and the competing state in this interest analysis. We determine those relevant policies from the rule of law that each state seeks to apply. In this case, the UM carrier argues that Florida and the policies which underlie section 324.021(9)(b) should give way to Ohio which has no similar statute and thus no similar policy to apply....
...Actually Florida has a general, common law rule making long term lessors of motor vehicles vicariously responsible for injuries caused during a lessee's negligent operation of the vehicle, Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
572 So.2d 1363 (Fla. 1990), but section
324.021(9)(b) relieves some of them of this vicarious liability if they comply with the statute....
...Harding, 107 Ohio St. 501, 140 N.E. 338 (1923). There is no vicarious liability in Ohio merely for being the lessor of a motor vehicle. Ross v. Nutt, 177 Ohio St. 113, 203 N.E.2d 118 (1964). Yet Aetna argues that Ohio has not adopted a rule similar to Florida's section 324.021(9)(b), an omission which evidences an Ohio policy not to apply such a statute to the lessors of automobiles in Ohio....
...When the rules and policies of the competing states are thus examined, we find that there is no real conflict because in neither state is the lessor vicariously liable under the circumstances here involved. The conflict raised by the UM carrier is thus a false one. The trial court therefore properly applied section 324.021(9)(b). Aetna's constitutional arguments as to the validity of section 324.021(9)(b) now appear to have been settled by the Florida supreme court's decision in Abdala v....
...Although the court had analyzed that statute in Kraemer as being based on the use of such leases primarily as a long term financing arrangement, in this case it clearly served no such function. While we might have thus questioned the application of section 324.021(9)(b) where long term financing of the purchase of an automobile is not involved, the language of the opinion in Abdala appears to sweep more broadly. We therefore think it appropriate to certify to the supreme court as a question of great public importance whether section 324.021(9)(b) is applicable to long term leases which are not automobile financing substitutes....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 415209
...ECAL's long-term lessee. The trial court entered summary judgment after determining that GECAL, who was the original lessor's assignee, was entitled to the financial protections accorded to the owner/lessor of a long-term leased vehicle, pursuant to section 324.021(9), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996). We affirm. Section 324.021(9) provides financial immunity to long-term lessors whose leases comply with the statutory requirements....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 91909
...rpose of Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. In the alternative, Bush argues that if it is considered a lessor-owner, then the lease is for more than one year; and it argues that because the insurance policies on the automobile comply with section 324.021 (9)(b), Florida Statutes, it is exempt from liability, pursuant to that statutory provision....
...Gallo asserts that the agreement between Bush, the Johnigeans, and ServPro was a lease, as the vehicle, tag, and title remained in Bush's name, and Bush retained a great level of control over the vehicle. Gallo further argues that the insurance policy maintained on the vehicle did not comply with section 324.021(9), Florida Statutes (1989)....
...ificant payment at the end of the lease prior to the transfer of the title. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the trial court's determination that the lease in this case was actually a lease under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1989) reads as follows: Owner/lessor....
...said motor vehicle or for the acts of the operator in connection therewith; further, this paragraph shall be applicable so long as the insurance required under such lease agreement remains in effect. (Emphasis added). The purpose of the adoption of section 324.021(9)(b) was to provide relief from liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for the long term lessor, "but only if the leased automobile carried the requisite liability insurance." Kraemer v....
...Weekly D111, ___ So.2d ___ (Fla. 4th DCA Jan. 12, 1994); Trevisol v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,
583 So.2d 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), rev. denied,
595 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1992). *741 The question before us is whether the single-limit policies on the subject vehicle comply with section
324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes....
...r than a split-limit policy for the insured, [3] the policy does not necessarily provide equivalent coverage for other parties who are injured in the same accident. We are, therefore, unable to conclude that Bush is exempt from liability pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 1590013
...Moxon of Swope, Rodante, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee. KELLY, Judge. John Fischer challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to limit the amount of the judgment entered against him in this action arising out of an automobile accident. Fischer's motion was filed pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b)(3), Florida Statutes (1999), which limits the financial liability of a motor vehicle owner when the owner is a "natural person" whose vehicle is involved in a collision while on loan to a permissive user....
...Fischer had lent the truck to his son, Allen Fischer, who in turn lent it to Salerno. Tammie Alessandrini, as personal representative of Dean Alessandrini's estate, brought suit against Fischer and Salerno. In that action, Fischer argued that any judgment entered against him should be limited pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b)(3), which provides: The owner who is a natural person and loans a motor vehicle to any permissive user shall be liable for the operation of the vehicle or the acts of the operator in connection therewith only up to $100,000 per...
...reduced by amounts actually recovered from the permissive user and from any insurance or self-insurance covering the permissive user. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to affect the liability of the owner for his or her own negligence. Section 324.021(9)(b)(3) is part of the Florida Financial Responsibility Law (sections 324.01-324.251) and is one of several statutory modifications of Florida's common law dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
...Florida is apparently the only state that imposes strict vicarious liability on the owner of an automobile who entrusts it to another, and the doctrine has drawn its fair share of criticism. The real and perceived inequities created by the doctrine prompted the legislature to amend section 324.021 to add subsection (9)(b)(1), which eliminated the doctrine's application to long-term automobile lessors *571 provided that the lessee maintained insurance in an amount specified by the statute....
...essors who rent or lease a motor vehicle for less than a year and owners who are natural persons who lend their car to any permissive user. See Lynn v. Feldmeth,
849 So.2d 481 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of section
324.021(9)(b)(3). The trial court determined that Fischer was not entitled to the limit provided for in section
324.021(9)(b)(3) because his truck was not a "motor vehicle" for the purposes of that section. Section
324.021(1) defines "motor vehicle" as follows: (1) MOTOR VEHICLE.Every self-propelled vehicle which is designed and required to be licensed for use upon a highway, including trailers and semitrailers designed for use with such vehicles, exc...
...as defined in section
627.732(1) and Fischer had complied with the requirements of sections
627.730-627.7405, the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, his truck was not a "motor vehicle" for the purpose of the Financial Responsibility Law, including section
324.021(9)(b)(3). In reaching its conclusion that Fischer's truck was not a "motor vehicle," the trial court ignored the introductory sentence immediately preceding the definitions contained in section
324.021....
...That introduction states that "words and phrases when used in this chapter shall, for the purpose of this chapter, have the meanings respectively ascribed to them in this section, except in those instances where the context clearly indicates a different meaning." § 324.021. It is clear from the context that when the legislature used the term "motor vehicle" in section 324.021(9)(b)(3), it did not intend to exclude from the operation of that section all motor vehicles that complied with Florida's no-fault law....
...The language relied upon by the trial court was added to the statute in 1977 as part of the Florida Insurance and Tort Reform Act of 1977. That amendment harmonized the Financial Responsibility Law with the Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law. It was not until 1999 that the legislature enacted section 324.021(9)(b)(3) to limit vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
...To read that section to exclude from its limitation of liability the class of motor vehicles that comply with the no-fault statute would thwart the legislature's goal rather than advance it. Accordingly, we conclude that Fischer's truck is a "motor vehicle" for the purposes of section 324.021(9)(b)(3). As an alternate basis for ruling that Fischer was not entitled to limit his liability, the trial court looked to the portion of section 324.021(9)(b)(3) that states that liability is limited when "[t]he owner......
...f an automobile owner's vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. This result is consistent with what the legislature sought to accomplish. We therefore reject the trial court's interpretation of the statute and conclude that section 324.021(9)(b)(3) expressly provides for a limit on the judgment against Fischer....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70471, 2007 WL 2788609
...Thus, a lessor was subject to strict vicarious liability for the negligence of its lessee and other permissive users. Hertz Corp. v. Jackson,
617 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Fla.1993). However, the Florida Legislature set specific limits on the liability of lessors in Fla. Stat. §
324.021(9)(b)(2)....
...ty doctrine as applied to short-term motor vehicle lessors. Accord Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA. Inc., No. 5:06-cv-220-Oc-10GRJ,
510 F.Supp.2d 821, 833-34,
2007 WL 686625, at *9 (M.D.Fla. Mar.5, 2007). The liability caps set forth in Fla. Stat. §
324.021(9)(b)(2) do not fall within any exception to the Graves Amendment, nor do they provide a separate right of action....
...As Defendant states in its motion: "being required to have a certain amount of insurance, or of providing proof of being able to respond to a certain amount of damages, does not equate to being vicariously liable for negligence of a lessee." (Doc. 27 at 9.) Thus, the Graves Amendment preempts Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b) (2), and Defendant cannot be vicariously liable based solely on its ownership of the vehicle....
...Constitutionality of the Graves Amendment 1. The Avoidance Canon Plaintiffs urge application of the "avoidance canon" of statutory construction, stating "to the extent that the Graves Amendment is susceptible to two interpretations, one which would preserve Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2)....
...NOTES [1] Plaintiffs assert that subsection (b)(2) preserves the duty of lessors to respond in damages post-accident. (Doc. 31 at 10.) Plaintiffs cite Fla. Stat. § 324.02 l(9)(b)(2) as the source of this duty. ( Id. at 17.) As discussed previously, Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2) does not create any new duty, but rather limits the application of the common law dangerous instrumentality doctrine upon lessors of motor vehicles.
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 156222
...The Anderson I case imposed liability upon the owner based largely on the fact that the traffic statutes placed various duties on "owners." Similar Florida Statutes now define the term "owner" to include conditional vendees and lessees. See §§
316.003(26) and
324.021(9), Fla....
...ty, it does so merely to assure an appropriate amount of insurance to protect the public, not to create unlimited personal liability. After the long-term lease was executed in this case, but almost a year before the accident, the legislature amended section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), to provide that a long-term lessor is not an "owner" for purposes of financial responsibility so long as certain levels of insurance are maintained by the lessee....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 17985
...in the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act. §§
627.730-627.741, Fla. Stat. (1977). Standard Marine Insurance Company, supra . The questioned policy in this action involves a much broader definition of a highway vehicle and is consistent with Section
324.021(1), Florida Statutes (1977)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74634, 2007 WL 2915903
...Defendant Drouin moves to dismiss the Petition for Declaratory Judgment on the grounds that (A) the federal statute under which Plaintiffs request declaratory judgment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, is unconstitutional; (B) the immunity created by 49 U.S.C. § 30106 does not apply to lawsuits brought pursuant to Florida statute § 324.021 because of an exceptibn in the federal law; and (C) this Court should decline to exercise its discretion to entertain the declaratory judgment action in favor of allowing the issues to be litigated in the Defendant's suit against Plaintiffs. See generally, Def. Mot. Florida Statute 324.021 states: Owner/lessor....
...actually recovered from the lessee, from the operator, and from any insurance or self-insurance covering the lessee or operator. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to affect the liability of the lessor for its own negligence. Fla. Stat. 324.021(9)(b)(2)....
...v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc.,
116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir.1997). III. Defendant's Claim is Not Made Pursuant to a Financial Responsibility Law Defendant claims that the claim articulated in the Complaint is made under Florida Statute
324.021, which Defendant argues is a "financial responsibility" law falling within the exception in 49 U.S.C....
...Therefore, Defendant continues, the immunity from liability created by 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) does not apply to Plaintiffs. Def. Mot. at 5. As support for this contention, Defendant cites unpublished orders from three Florida state courts which held Florida Statute 324.021 to be a "financial responsibility" law. Def. Mot. at 6-8; Def. Mot. Ex. 1-3. Defendant argues that since there is no "Florida authority recognizing the effectiveness of the immunity provision in a lawsuit against a car rental company subject to section 324.021," the Motion should be granted. Def. Mot. at 8. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant's tort claims could not be made pursuant to Florida Statute 324.021, as that statute does not impose vicarious liability, but limits the liability created by "other provisions of Florida law." Pl....
...Defendant replies, without citation to any source, that it is irrelevant whether the vicarious liability created by Florida law is "imposed by statute or common law." Def. Reply at 2. Defendant asserts that "the combination of common law the common law dangerous instrumentality doctrine and Florida Statute section
324.021(9)" falls under the exception in 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b). Id. at 2-3. Florida case law leads this Court to conclude otherwise. In Fischer v. Alessandrini, a Florida district court distinguished the Doctrine, which created the cause of action, from Florida Statute
324.021, which that court described as a legislative check on the Doctrine, "limit[ing] the liability of lessors who rent or lease a motor vehicle for less than a year."
907 So.2d 569, 570 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005). Florida Statute
324.021 does not create a cause of action....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 8579
...a long-term "Closed End Vehicle Lease Agreement and Disclosure Statement" was liable under the Florida Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine. The trial judge entered a final summary judgment holding that the lessor was immune from liability *799 under section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), which exempts a lessor if the lease is for a year or longer, and requires the lessee to obtain certain insurance coverage. We affirm. Section 324.021(9) defines the minimum automobile liability insurance requirements....
...Auld,
450 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1984). Here, the plain meaning of the statute is that each lease agreement requires insurance in the stated minimum amounts. We find no language indicating that each lessee must secure separate insurance coverage. The next argument is that section
324.021(9) exempts the lessor only from sanctions for failing to meet the financial responsibility laws related to a motor vehicle covered by liability insurance. The plaintiffs again cite section
324.021(9)....
...forth in section
324.051. Such an argument requires this court once again to construe the foregoing statute, and we must look not only at the plain language of the statute, but also its history. Carawan v. State,
515 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1987). Although section
324.021(9) is in the financial responsibility chapter, we do not believe that the specific penalties provided for in section
324.051 apply. Section
324.051 clearly concerns sanctions against individuals in automobile accidents who do not have insurance coverage. We believe that the financial responsibility discussed in section
324.021(9) concerns financial responsibility imposed by the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, not statutory penalties for failing to provide proof of financial responsibility. Moreover, there would have been no need to enact section
324.021(9)(b) to require $100,000/$300,000 coverage if its only purpose was to exempt lessors from section
324.051 which requires $10,000/$20,000 coverage. *800 We conclude that section
324.021(9) constitutes an exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in the case of long-term lessors....
...rom floor debate). [1] In conclusion, the legislature by this amendment was attempting to limit liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for long-term lessors. The plain language of the statute and the legislative history indicate that section
324.021(9) was enacted to limit the liability of lessors under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, and we so hold. It is also argued that the statute is unconstitutional as violative of article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution, which provides for the right of access to the courts. Although several circuit courts have held that section
324.021(9) is unconstitutional, the Second District in Perry v. G.M.A.C. Leasing Corp.,
549 So.2d 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), recently held that the statute was not unconstitutional. The reasoning of the court was that section
324.021(9) does not place a cap on damages....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76399, 2007 WL 2875388
...§ 30106, which Plaintiffs argue preempts Florida's laws creating vicarious liability for car rental and leasing companies. Pl. Mem. in Supp. of Sum. J. Mot. ("Pl. Mem.") at 2. Defendant opposes summary judgment on the grounds that (a) Defendant's claim against Plaintiffs is made pursuant to Florida Statute § 324.021(9)(b), which Defendant claims is a financial responsibility statute and an exception to the preemption of 49 U.S.C....
...§ 30106 bars Huchon's claim, the statute is unconstitutional, as it is outside the power allocated Congress by the Commerce Clause. A) Defendant's Claim is Not Made Pursuant to a Financial Responsibility Law Defendant claims that the claim articulated in the Complaint is made under Florida Statute 324.021. Florida Statute 324.021 states: Owner/lessor....
...ts actually recovered from the see, from the operator, and from any insurance or self-insurance covering the lessee or operator. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to affect the liability of the lessor for its own negligence. Fla. Stat. 324.021(9)(b)(2)....
...Therefore, Defendant continues, the immunity from liability created by 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a) does not apply to Plaintiffs in this case. Id. As support for this contention, Defendant cites unpublished orders from several Florida state courts which held Florida Statute 324.021 to be a "financial responsibility" law. Def. Mot. at 6-7. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant's tort Claims could not be made pursuant to Florida Statute 324.021, as that statute does not impose vicarious liability, but limits the liability created by "other provisions of Florida law." Pl....
...s liability upon the owner of A motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts that motor vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage to another." Id. at 4, quoting Aurbach v. Gallina,
753 So.2d 60, 62 (Fla.2000). Defendant admits that "§
324.021(9)(b)(2) was enacted in part to limit what otherwise would be a lessor's unlimited liability exposure under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine." Def. Resp. at 9. Defendant argues, however, that the Florida statute "is distinct from the common, law dangerous instrumentality doctrine . . . because liability is limited and further because §
324.021(9)(b)(2) directly links an owner-lessor's "liability" to whether an injured victim will have access to an insurance policy covering the negligent lessee or operator of the vehicle." Id. at 10. Defendant is correct that, according to Florida case law, the Doctrine is distinguished from Florida Statute §
324.021, which one Florida district court described as a legislative check on the Doctrine, "limit[ing] the liability of lessors who rent or lease a motor vehicle for less than a year." Fischer v. Alessandrini,
907 So.2d 569, 570 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005). Florida Statute §
324.021 limits and places conditions on vicarious liability, but does not create a cause of action....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1993 WL 406624
...udget was required to obtain a certificate of self-insurance from the Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles. One of the conditions for obtaining such certificate, was the furnishing *978 of evidence of financial responsibility as provided in section 324.021(7)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 574907
...See §
627.737, Fla. Stat. (2000). [5] The legislature has modified the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for the benefit of the large car rental and leasing companies, but it has never reduced the burden this doctrine places upon the typical Florida family. See §
324.021(9), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 708181
...As the supreme court noted in Aurbach, there are very few exceptions to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The legislature has created a statutory exception for automobiles leased under long-term leases if the lessee meets certain insurance requirements. See § 324.021(9)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...legally liable therefor. The statute affords a number of ways for the owner or operator to prove his financial responsibility, one of which is "furnishing satisfactory evidence of holding a motor vehicle liability policy" (§
324.031) as defined in §
324.021(8) and §
324.151....
...out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle or motor vehicles, within the United states or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits, exclusive of interest and costs with respect to each such motor vehicle as is provided for under §
324.021(7)." The terms of the omnibus clause of the present policy are very similar to, but not identical with, §
324.151....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 550790
...Therefore, we reverse the final declaratory judgment insofar as it holds that Phillips may not recover uninsured motorist benefits under the USAA policy unless his damages exceed $2.1 million. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded for further proceedings. FULMER, A.C.J., and WHATLEY, J., Concur. NOTES [1] Section 324.021(1), Florida Statutes (1995)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...a motor vehicle for rent or lease shall be primary unless otherwise stated in bold type on the face of the rental or lease agreement. Such insurance shall be primary for the limits of liability and personal injury protection coverage as required by ss.
324.021(7) and
627.736....
...ompany's name if the lessor's insurance is not to be primary. Reliance contends that the last sentence of subsection (1) requires the lessor to provide primary coverage for only $10,000, the minimum amount of liability insurance required by sections
324.021(7) and
627.736, Florida Statutes....
...ss the burden is properly shifted. We construe this statute as an attempt by the legislature to make certain that in a lease situation, one of the parties will be responsible for compliance with the personal injury protection coverage as required by Section
324.021(7), Florida Statutes, and the financial responsibility requirements of
627.736....
...The plain language of the statute simply does not support Maryland's contention that Reliance's coverage is primary to the full extent of its policy limits. The statute clearly states: "Such insurance shall be primary for the limits and liability of personal injury protection as required by Section
324.021(7) and
627.736." (emphasis added) Therefore, we hold that Reliance has primary liability under Section
627.7263, Florida Statutes, limited to $10,000 and accordingly we reverse the final summary judgment in favor of Maryland and remand with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of Reliance....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 140740
...HARRIS, C.J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] The Fourth District pointed out that Chapter 324, Florida Statutes, our financial responsibility law, defines "motor vehicle" as "every self-propelled vehicle which is designed and required to be licensed for use upon a highway... ." § 324.021(1), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...We find that these definitions could not have been contemplated by the policy, because the policy specifically includes unregistered vehicles within the definition of motor vehicles when such vehicles are used on public roads. Further, the Financial Responsibility Law, Section 324.021, Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 110841
...ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC LETTS, Judge. We grant the motion for rehearing en banc and in conformity with the very recent Supreme Court decision in Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation,
572 So.2d 1363 (Fla. 1990). In Kraemer, the Supreme Court made it clear that section
324.021(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1989) "did not reflect an intent to exonerate lessors from liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine." However, the Supreme Court went on to say that section
324.021(9)(b) did act to eliminate long-term automobile lessors from such liability under facts and circumstances which are applicable sub judice. The instant lease was dated August, 1987, after the enactment of Section
324.021(9)(a), (b), and the insurance required under the statute did, in fact, remain in effect....
...under a long-term "Closed End Vehicle Lease Agreement and Disclosure Statement" was liable under the Florida Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine. The trial judge entered a final summary judgment holding that the lessor was immune from liability under section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), which exempts a lessor if the lease is for a year or longer, and requires the lessee to obtain certain insurance coverage. We affirm. Section 324.021(9)(b) defines the minimum automobile liability insurance requirements....
...Auld,
450 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1984). Here, the plain meaning of the statute is that each lease agreement requires insurance in the stated minimum amounts. We find no language indicating that each lessee must secure separate insurance coverage. The next argument is that section
324.021(9)(b) exempts the lessor only from sanctions for failing to meet the financial responsibility laws related to a motor vehicle covered by liability insurance. The plaintiffs again cite section
324.021(9)(b)....
...forth in section
324.051. Such an argument requires this court once again to construe the foregoing statute, and we must look not only at the plain language of the statute, but also its history. Carawan v. State,
515 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1987). Although section
324.021(9)(b) is in the financial responsibility chapter, we do not believe that the specific penalties provided for in section
324.051 apply. Section
324.051 clearly concerns sanctions against individuals in automobile accidents who do not have insurance coverage. We believe that the financial responsibility discussed in section
324.021(9)(b) concerns financial responsibility imposed by the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, not statutory penalties for failing to provide proof of financial responsibility. Moreover, there would have been no need to enact section
324.021(9)(b) to require $100,000/$300,000 coverage if its only purpose was to exempt lessors from section
324.051 which requires $10,000/$20, 000 coverage. We conclude that section
324.021(9)(b) constitutes an exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in the case of long-term lessors....
...rom floor debate). [2] In conclusion, the legislature by this amendment was attempting to limit liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for long-term lessors. The plain language of the statute and the legislative history indicate that section
324.021(9)(b) was enacted to limit the liability of lessors under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, and we so hold. It is also argued that the statute is unconstitutional as violative of article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution, which provides for the right of access to the courts. Although several circuit courts have held that section
324.021(9) is unconstitutional, the Second District in Perry v. G.M.A.C. Leasing Corp.,
549 So.2d 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), recently held that the statute was not unconstitutional. The reasoning of the court was that section
324.021(9) does not place a cap on damages....
...he decision of the trial court. Initially, I note that we are in the unusual position of having already had the panel opinion in this case quoted at length by the Supreme Court in Kraemer to explain the purpose of the legislature's enactment *225 of section 324.021(9)(b)....
...In Kraemer the Supreme Court emphatically rejected the contention that long-term owner lessors should be judicially excepted from the application of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The Court also rejected the contention that the legislature had excepted long-term lessors by enacting section 324.021(9)(a) which defines lessees as owners for financial responsibility purposes....
...In doing so the Supreme Court noted: However, in 1986 the legislature did act to eliminate long-term automobile lessors from liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine under certain circumstances by the passage of chapter 86-229, Laws of Florida. That law in its present form, as codified at section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), reads: Owner/lessor....
...* * * * * * It is evident that the legislators recognized that under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine long-term lessors were liable for damages caused by drivers of the leased automobiles. However, they were sympathetic to some of the arguments made by GMAC in this case. By enacting section 324.021(9)(b), they were willing to provide relief under certain circumstances, but only if the leased automobile carried the requisite liability insurance....
...It is significant that even if the statute were applicable to this case, it would not help GMAC because the liability insurance on the automobile had lapsed when the accident occurred. Kraemer,
572 So.2d at 1366-67. This language is clear in construing section
324.021(9)(b) as excepting "long-term automobile lessors from liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine under certain circumstances... ." Id. at 1366. Subsequently, in Raynor, the Supreme Court characterized its opinion in Kraemer: The Court also concluded, contrary to the district court's decision in Perry, that it was evident that by enacting section
324.021(9)(b), which provides relief for long-term lessors under certain circumstances, the Florida legislature recognized that under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine long-term lessors were liable for damages caused by drivers of leased automobiles. Raynor,
574 So.2d at 1094. It is apparent that the Supreme Court has accepted the construction of section
324.021(9)(b) contained in this court's panel opinion of February 6, 1990....
...DELL, Judge, dissenting: The clear separation of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine from the financial responsibility law and established principles of statutory construction compel my dissent from the majority's holding. The instant case factually falls within the purview of section 324.021(9)(b)....
...ss the statute is explicit in this regard. 30 Fla.Jur.Statute, Sec. 130. Inference and implication cannot be substituted for clear expression. Dudley v. Harrison, McCready & Co.,
127 Fla. 687,
173 So. 820 (1937). Id. at 364. (Emphasis added) Neither section
324.021(9)(a) nor (b) contain a clear expression by the legislature that it intended to modify the dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
...In fact, the title of the act amending the financial responsibility law states: An act relating to motor vehicle liability insurance; creating the "Motor Vehicle Insurance Reform Act of 1988"; ... . Ch. 86-229, Laws of Florida. I recognize that since the amendment also provides for the application of section 324.021(9)(b), "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of the Florida Statutes or existing case law ...", an argument can be made that the legislature, by its reference to "existing *227 case law," intended to encompass cases that relate to the common law dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
...at 1153-54 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). I find little support in the excerpts from the legislative discussions cited by the majority opinion in support of the holding that "[t]he plain language of the statute and the legislative history indicate that section 324.021(9) was enacted to eliminate the liability of lessors under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine......
...erential treatment. The supreme court's recent decisions in Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation,
572 So.2d 1363 (Fla. 1990) and Raynor v. De La Nuez,
574 So.2d 1091 (Fla. 1991), do not, in my opinion, lay to rest the question of whether section
324.021(9)(b) exempts lessors of vehicles for more than one year from liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
...I agree with the majority's observation that the supreme court stated in both Kraemer and Raynor that [i]n 1986 the legislature did act to eliminate long-term automobile lessors from liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine under certain circumstances by the passage of [section
324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes]. Kraemer at 1366; see also Raynor at 1092. Nevertheless, I note that neither case required an interpretation of section
324.021(9)(b) and that the supreme court did not address the statute's constitutional validity. I also respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that Perry v. GMAC Leasing Corporation,
549 So.2d 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) provides support for their conclusion that section
324.021(9)(b) is constitutional. It seems apparent from the supreme court's decisions in Kraemer and Raynor that notwithstanding the provisions of section
324.021(9)(a), the owner of a leased motor vehicle for more than one year remains liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
...tax purposes, recognizes. Id. at 682. The naked title discussion contained in Perry must also fail in view of *230 the supreme court's opinion in Kraemer. Since both of the primary reasons discussed in Perry as the court's bases for concluding that section 324.021(9) is constitutional conflict with Kraemer, I respectfully suggest that Perry does not support the constitutionality of section 324.021(9)(b)....
...White , which cannot be dismissed summarily with the result that one class of vehicle owners obtains preferential status. The summary judgment in favor of appellee should be reversed. STONE, Judge, dissenting. I concur with that portion of Judge Dell's dissenting opinion recognizing that section 324.021(9)(b) must fail constitutionally on the authority of Kluger v....
...since no protest was lodged by the appellants. [3] However, an argument can be made that the statute fails to eliminate the need for duplicate insurance coverage. Would it be prudent for a lessor, on the contingency that the lessee will comply with section 324.021(9)(b), to refrain from acquiring and maintaining liability insurance? Obviously, any lapse in the lessee's coverage automatically shifts the financial burden to the lessor....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 8817, 2011 WL 2268559
...Since the stricken counts impose no additional liability but merely allege a concurrent theory of recovery, the desirability of allowing these theories is outweighed by the prejudice to the defendants. Id. at 1220 (citations omitted). Clooney was decided prior to the 1999 enactment of section 324.021(9)(b)3., Florida Statutes, which limits the noneconomic damages awardable against a vehicle owner for damages caused by the negligence of a permissive user. That provision concludes with a sentence that states: "Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to affect the liability of the owner for his or her own negligence." § 324.021(9)(b)3., Fla. Stat. (2006). Before section 324.021(9)(b)3....
...ity doctrine was liable to the same extent as the negligent permissive driver. Imposing direct liability against the owner for negligent entrustment in that situation would not increase the owner's liability. The situation changed with the advent of section 324.021(9)(b)3....
...Thus, a negligent entrustment claim could subject the owner to additional liability. The liability of an owner found directly liable for negligent entrustment would still be restricted to his or her percentage of fault under comparative negligence principles, but it would not be limited by section 324.021(9)(b)3. In the present case, the jury awarded a total of $5 million [1] in noneconomic damages in favor of Mobley and against Javier, Joel, and Maria Trevino. Maria and Joel's vicarious liability was capped at $100,000 in accordance with section 324.021(9)(b)3....
...The only matter to be tried is the direct liability, if any, of Maria and Joel Trevino. If they are found directly liable for negligent entrustment, Maria and Joel Trevino's liability will be restricted to their percentage of fault under comparative negligence principles, but it will not be limited by section 324.021(9)(b)3....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 299790
...a motor vehicle for rent or lease shall be primary unless otherwise stated in bold type on the face of the rental or lease agreement. Such insurance shall be primary for the limits of liability and personal injury protection coverage as required by ss.
324.021(7) and
627.736....
...e duty to provide insurance was governed by statute. That clause read: "This rental agreement requires the valid and collectible liability and personal injury protection insurance of the renter or driver to be primary for their policy limits as per ss.
324.021(7) and
627.7263." [2] (Emphasis added)....
...motor vehicle for rent or lease is primary unless otherwise stated in at least 10-point type on the face of the rental or lease agreement. Such insurance is primary for the limits of liability and personal injury protection coverage as required by ss.
324.021(7) and
627.736....
...in at least 10-point type: "The valid and collectible liability insurance and personal injury protection insurance of any authorized rental or leasing driver is primary for the limits of liability and personal injury protection coverage required by ss.
324.021(7) and
627.736, Florida Statutes." (Emphasis added in § 1 to reflect amendments; § 2 rewritten entirely)....
...PERSON OPERATING THIS MOTOR VEHICLE WITH THE RENTER'S CONSENT SHALL BE PRIMARY. RENTER IS CONTRACTING THAT THEIR INSURANCE IS TO BE PRIMARY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAID STATUTE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY AS REQUIRED BY FLORIDA STATUTE 324.021(7)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1996 WL 46591
...In so doing, it equated uninsured motorist coverage with "family protection."
252 So.2d at 233. In contrast to the era of Mullis, an automobile now insured under a Florida no-fault policy is generally not a "motor vehicle" for purposes of financial responsibility. §
324.021(1), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 18371, 2008 WL 5100530
...The issues raised in this appeal have been thoroughly addressed and decided in three reported federal court decisions, all holding that the Graves Amendment preempts Florida's state law (which would otherwise impose strict vicarious liability on rental car owners up to the liability limits set forth in section 324.021(9)(b)2., Florida Statutes) and that this legislation is a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1992 WL 386376
...[1] The supreme court quashed this court's first opinion, concluding that GMAC still could be held liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine even though the beneficial ownership to a vehicle owned by GMAC had been transferred to a long-term lessee. This case requires this court to consider the application of section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...nder such lease agreement remains in effect, shall not be deemed the owner of said motor vehicle for the purpose of determining financial responsibility for the operation of said motor vehicle or for the acts of the operator in connection therewith. § 324.021(9)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1986). The term "financial responsibility for the operation of said motor vehicle or for the acts of the operator in connection therewith" in section 324.021(9)(b) means "liability [as owner] under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine." Kraemer v....
...Nationwide tendered $100,000 to Kraemer based upon the fact the policy was never canceled properly and the policy remained in full force and effect on the day of the accident. This event seems inconsistent with the following language of the supreme court in its Kraemer opinion: "It is significant that even if the statute [section 324.021(9)(b)] were applicable to this case, it would not help GMAC because the liability insurance on the automobile had lapsed when the accident occurred." Kraemer v....
...policy and tendered its policy limits of $100,000, we conclude we must address whether GMAC acquired immunity from liability by Nationwide's admission of liability and tender of policy limits. Even though this lease was made prior to the passage of section 324.021(9)(b), GMAC still receives the benefit of immunity from further liability if it has complied with the provisions of the statute on the day of the accident....
...We conclude that Nationwide's admission that its policy was in effect on the day of the accident and the tender to Mrs. Kraemer's personal representative of $100,000 from Nationwide permits GMAC, as a long-term lessor, to claim immunity from liability pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...we conclude that GMAC, as to the facts of this case, has complied with the statute and is entitled to immunity from further liability. We affirm the trial court, concluding that GMAC is immune from further liability by virtue of its compliance with section 324.021(9)(b)....
...LEHAN, Chief Judge, dissents with opinion. LEHAN, Chief Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The next five paragraphs of this dissenting opinion summarize my reasons. In my view the majority opinion, by disregarding the nonfulfillment of a plain statutory condition of section 324.021(9)(b), is not only in direct conflict with established Florida case law but also constitutes improper judicial legislation contrary to the vitally important constitutional separation of powers doctrine under which the judicial branch defers to the legislative branch. In addition, the majority opinion relies for the fulfillment of the other condition of section 324.021(9)(b) upon what is, as explained below, wholly insufficient evidence. To relieve a long term automobile lessor of financial responsibility, i.e., from liability as owner under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, section 324.021(9)(b) has two *487 basic conditions: first, that the lease require the lessee to obtain a certain minimum level of liability insurance coverage, and, second, that that level of coverage be in effect....
...In affirming the summary judgment, the majority opinion may also seem to have found those two statutory conditions to have been fulfilled. But in affirming, the majority opinion in actuality has the effect of judicially engrafting onto the statute an exception to the condition of section 324.021(9)(b) that the lease require the lessee to obtain a certain minimum level of liability insurance coverage. Under that exception which is effectively created by the majority opinion, that condition is disregarded when the other condition of section 324.021(9)(b) that the level of insurance coverage required by the statute be in effect has been fulfilled....
...is the basis upon which I would reverse. The lack of fulfillment of that same statutory condition concerning what the lease must require was the basis on which the Fourth District Court of Appeal recently reversed a similar summary judgment in which section 324.021(9)(b) had been applied....
...of by a reversing opinion as short as the two-paragraph reversing opinion of the Fourth District in Trevisol. Trevisol, which is further described and discussed below, simply followed the separation of powers doctrine in abiding by the conditions of section
324.021(9)(b). Whether the Condition of Section
324.021(9)(b) That a Certain Minimum Level of Liability Insurance Coverage Be in Effect Was Fulfilled in Light of the Supreme Court's Statement Indicating That It Was Not. As indicated above, the trial court implicitly ruled, and the majority has held, that the minimum level of liability insurance coverage specified in section
324.021(9)(b) as a condition to relieving a lessor of liability as owner of an automobile was in effect. However, as the majority opinion has recognized, the Florida Supreme Court in the prior appeal in this case stated otherwise: "It is significant that even if the statute [section
324.021(9)(b)] were applicable to this case, it would not help GMAC because the [Nationwide Insurance Company] liability insurance on the automobile had lapsed when the accident occurred." Kraemer,
572 So.2d at 1367....
...These arguments involve the insurance information form referred to in the majority opinion which contained an alleged agreement between GMAC and Nationwide that the insurance coverage required by the lease was in effect which, it is argued by appellees, fulfilled the requirements of section 324.021(9)(b)....
...owner of the automobile for the purpose of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, which the supreme court decided in the affirmative. The corollary position of appellees is that the issue of whether the requisite coverage was in effect pursuant to section
324.021(9)(b) was not before the supreme court, was not argued in the supreme court (which is noted in footnote 5 of Kraemer,
572 So.2d at 1366), and was first directly in issue in the trial court upon remand from the supreme court....
...1st DCA 1991) (admissions of one party in response to another party's request for admissions are not binding upon those who are not parties to the discovery). Those admissions provided the only basis relied upon in GMAC's motion for summary judgment for relieving GMAC of financial responsibility under section 324.021(9)(b)....
...Appellant argues to the effect that the tender to appellant, as well as the alleged agreement between GMAC and Nationwide for $100,000 coverage, was incident to an improper arrangement between GMAC and Nationwide to invoke for GMAC the limitation of liability protection of section 324.021(9)(b) and thereby protect GMAC from much greater liability and, at the same time, protect Nationwide from a claim made against Nationwide by GMAC if the statutory protection was not obtained....
...[4] But, as indicated in the opening paragraphs of this dissenting opinion, this aspect of the case, i.e., whether the statutorily required coverage was in effect, need not be decided because there is another and much simpler basis on which the summary judgment should be reversed. On this basis section 324.021(9)(b) does not apply to help GMAC even if as much as $300,000 Nationwide bodily injury coverage under the foregoing alleged agreement was in effect, as will now be explained. The Condition of Section 324.021(9)(b) That the Lease Require a Certain Minimum Level of Liability Insurance Coverage Was Not Fulfilled. As indicated above, the trial court implicitly ruled that the condition of section 324.021(9)(b) that the lease must require a certain minimum level of liability insurance coverage was fulfilled....
...te had been tendered to Mrs. Kraemer. However, it is clear that that statutory condition was not only un fulfilled but has been disregarded by the majority opinion, apparently as a newly established judicial exception to the requirements of sections 324.021(9)(b)....
...2d DCA 1985) ("The parties stipulated that, under a single-limit policy, there may effectively be no bodily injury coverage if a large property damage claim is paid first."). Thus, it seems clear that since the lease did not require the minimum coverage which section
324.021(9)(b) specifies that the lease must require, that section does not relieve GMAC of liability as the owner of the automobile in this case. See Abdala,
583 So.2d at 332 (the statute applies "upon the satisfaction of specified preconditions... ."); Trevisol (a lease requiring less coverage than that required by section
324.021(9)(b) does not comply with the statute)....
...1986) ("[A]ny statute in derogation of the common law requires strict compliance with its provisions by one seeking to avail himself of its benefits."). The majority apparently has been persuaded by appellees' argument that under the lease in this case there was a choice of providing for the minimum coverage required by section 324.021(9)(b) and that that choice was exercised under the above-referenced alleged agreement between GMAC and Nationwide....
...The majority recognizes, as appellees argue, that since the statute was not enacted, nor was Abdala decided, until after the lease in this case had been entered into, GMAC could not be expected to have tracked in the lease the exact coverage requirements of the statute. However, as indicated above, section 324.021(9)(b) does not contain exceptions to its conditions. Section 324.021(9)(b) conditions its release of the lessor from liability upon "an agreement to lease ......
...opinion is in conflict with Trevisol, The Burke Co., Moretrench, and the other cases cited above. The majority opinion thereby in my view constitutes improper judicial legislation, i.e., a judicial statutory amendment through effective deletion from section 324.021(9)(b) of a condition to that section which the legislature had properly enacted....
...121(9)(b) inapplicable, the Fourth District of course did not care that, or if, $50,000 property damage, in the words of the majority opinion in the case at hand, "did not happen." The point in Trevisol was, as is the point in the case at hand, that section 324.021(9)(b) did not apply because the lease simply did not require the minimum coverage which the statute requires that the lease require....
...lishing ambivalent criteria for the construction of those relationships." Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp.,
427 So.2d 266, 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Recognizing that interpretations of other such leases which do not track the coverage requirements of section
324.021(9)(b) may be in issue in future cases, it is respectfully suggested that there be certified to the Florida Supreme Court as of great public importance the following question: SHOULD SECTION
324.021(9)(b) BE CONSTRUED TO EXEMPT A LONGTERM LESSOR FROM LIABILITY WHEN THE LEASE IN ISSUE PERMITS THE LESSEE TO OBTAIN LESS INSURANCE COVERAGE THAN THAT WHICH THAT SECTION REQUIRES THE LESSEE TO OBTAIN WHEN THE LEASE ALSO PERMITS THE LESS...
...d by the supreme court itself in response to a motion for rehearing or clarification pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330, which was not filed. That might be considered doubtful because Abdala, which established the applicability of section 324.021(9)(b) to leases antedating that statute, was not decided until well after the time Kraemer was decided....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...g Honda motorcycles) owned by but which are not "insured automobiles" of named insured. Uninsured motorist coverage or family protection is intended by the statute to protect the described insureds thereunder to the extent of the limits described in Section 324.021(7) "who are legally entitled to recover damages, namely those from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury" and is not to be "whittled away" by exclusions and exceptions....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 5263719
...e, Enterprise Leasing Company, with respect to a tort claim brought by the appellant, Cynthia West, arising from the alleged negligence of the lessee of a motor vehicle owned by Enterprise. At issue here are (a) whether liability imposed pursuant to section
324.021(9)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (2006), with respect to vehicles rented or leased for less than one year is subject to preemption by the Graves Amendment and (b) whether adoption of the Graves Amendment was a proper exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Recently, in Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc.,
540 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir.2008), the Eleventh Circuit considered the same issues and concluded that the Graves Amendment preempts liability under section
324.021(9)(b)(2) and that the adoption of the Graves Amendment was a proper exercise of power under the Commerce Clause....
...2008) (table); Bechina v. Enterprise Leasing Co.,
972 So.2d 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). In brief, with respect to the preemptive scope of the statute, we agree with Garcia that "[t]he Graves Amendment takes aim at precisely" lawsuits of the type contemplated by section
324.021(9)(b)(2)that is, "those imposing [vicarious] liability against a rental car company for the negligent acts of its lessee." Garcia,
540 F.3d at 1246. We also agree that as a vicarious liability provision, section
324.021(9)(b)(2) is not a law "imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards" within the meaning of the savings clause of the Graves Amendment....
...irm the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Enterprise Leasing Company. As did the Fourth District in Vargas, we certify the following question as one of great public importance: DOES THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, PREEMPT SECTION 324.021(9)(B)(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (2007)? Affirmed; question certified....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13136, 2003 WL 1870953
...ded down before October 1, 1981. Boner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). [51] This court reaches this conclusion despite the Defendants' assertion that Hi Performance is immune from liability pursuant to Fla. Stat. §
324.021(9)(1), which provides that: (b) Ownwe/lessor Nothwithstanding any otrher provision of the Flrida Statutes or existing case law: 1....
...s obtained by the ] lessor, the combined coverage for bodily injury liability and property damage liability shall contain limits of not less than $1 million and may be provided by a lessor blanket policy First Hi Performance did not allege Fla. Stat § 324.021(9)(b) as a defense in its Answer and Affirmative Defenses....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 36 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 187, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 951, 2011 WL 1496474
...al in Vargas v. Enterprise Leasing Co.,
993 So.2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). In its decision, the district court ruled upon the following question certified to be of great public importance: *1039 DOES THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, PREEMPT SECTION
324.021(9)(b)2, FLORIDA STATUTES (2007)? Id. at 624. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision of the district court holding that the Graves Amendment does preempt section
324.021(9)(b)2, Florida Statutes (2007), and affirming the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Enterprise Leasing Company....
...Price's son, Jimmy Middleton, crashed the rental vehicle into the rear end of a car driven by Rafael Vargas. Vargas filed suit against Price, Middleton, and Enterprise. The only count of the complaint directed at Enterprise claimed that the company was vicariously liable as the owner of the motor vehicle, pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b)2....
...accident. Enterprise filed an amended answer and affirmative defenses, asserting that pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 30106, it had no liability. The circuit court granted Enterprise's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Graves Amendment preempted section 324.021(9)(b)2, which it determined was a vicarious liability provision and not a financial responsibility statute....
...The district court, in a six-to-four en banc decision, affirmed the trial court's ruling and certified the above question. In reaching its decision, the majority framed the issue as follows: "the issue before the court is whether by enacting 49 U.S.C. § 30106, the Graves Amendment, Congress preempted section
324.021(9)(b)2, Florida Statutes (2007), involving short term leases of motor vehicles." Vargas,
993 So.2d at 616....
...or liability insurance requirements under State law. 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2006). The district court observed that the Graves Amendment has two operative provisionsa preemption clause in part (a), and a savings clause in part (b)and reasoned that section 324.021(9)(b)2 is preempted by part (a) unless the Florida statute qualifies as a "financial responsibility law" under part (b)....
...term was used in statutes in Florida and across the country, to denote a minimum level of compulsory insurance or its equivalent, which was a condition of licensure and registration." Vargas,
993 So.2d at 621. The district court then determined that section
324.021(9)(b)2 is not a financial responsibility law and is not the type of law that Congress intended to exclude from preemption: First, section 30106(b)(1) exempts laws "imposing financial responsibility on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle." Section
324.021(9)(b)2 is in no way linked to this privilege; it does not require short term lessors to purchase insurance. The monetary figures in the statute are caps on liability unrelated to a lessor's ability to register a motor vehicle. Sections
324.021(7),
324.051, and
324.071, Florida Statutes (2007), implement Florida's financial responsibility scheme....
...Second, subsection 30106(b)(2) exempts state laws which "impos[e] liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law." Section
324.021(9)(b)2 is not a "financial responsibility or liability insurance requirement"; the section does not require short term lessors to purchase insurance. Vargas,
993 So.2d at 621. The court concluded as follows: "Section
324.021(9)(b)2 is thus neither a financial responsibility statute nor an insurance requirement under section 30106(b)....
...Rather, the statute is an outgrowth of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine that codifies and caps the vicarious liability imposed on lessors of motor vehicles." Vargas,
993 So.2d at 622. Based on this conclusion, the district court held that the Graves Amendment preempts section
324.021(9)(b)2 and affirmed the trial court's order granting summary judgment for the rental car company....
...Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 203-04,
103 S.Ct. 1713,
75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983). As more fully explained below, we conclude that the present case falls into the third category and agree with the district court that section
324.021(9)(b)2, Florida Statutes (2007) conflicts with and thus is preempted by the Graves Amendment. Section
324.021(9)(b)2 provides as follows: 2....
...by amounts actually recovered from the lessee, from the operator, and from any insurance or self-insurance covering the lessee or operator. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to affect the liability of the lessor for its own negligence. § 324.021(9)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (2007). Section 324.021 provides definitions of terms used in chapter 324, Florida Statutes (2007). Section 324.021(9)(b) defines the term "owner/lessor" and addresses three categories of owner/lessors: (1) owners/lessors who lease a vehicle for one year or longer under a lease with certain insurance requirements ("long-term lessors"), (2) owners/l...
...Under these provisions, long-term lessors "shall not be deemed the owner of said motor vehicle for the purpose of determining financial responsibility for the operation of said motor vehicle or for the acts of the operator in connection therewith." § 324.021(9)(b)1, Fla....
...itionally, if the lessee or the operator of the vehicle is uninsured or has insurance with less than $500,000 combined property damage and bodily injury liability, the short-term lessor is liable for up to an additional $500,000 in economic damages. § 324.021(9)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (2007). Those in the third category, natural persons, "shall be liable for the operation of the vehicle or the acts of the operator in connection therewith" up to the same amounts and under the same conditions as short term lessors. § 324.021(9)(b)3, Fla....
...ht to eliminate vicarious liability for a specific category of owner/lessors that under Florida's reforms remained, to an extent, exposedthose "engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles." 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1). Under section 324.021(9)(b)2, an owner/lessor who is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles and who leases a motor vehicle for less than a year is "deemed the owner of the vehicle," thus exposing that owner/lessor to vicarious liability under existing Florida law. This clearly conflicts with the preemption clause of the Graves Amendment. The parties opposing preemption in this case argue that section 324.021(9)(b)2 is exempted because it is a "financial responsibility law" and thus falls under the savings clause of the Graves Amendment. These parties essentially contend that because section 324.021(9)(b)2 has the effect of making an owner/lessor vicariously liable for additional amounts of damages (over and above the initial cap on damages) if its lessee is uninsured or underinsured, thus encouraging the owner/lessor to ensure t...
...se) and may enforce the requirement of insurance or its equivalent by suspending licenses or registrations, or imposing other penalties, for the failure to meet such requirements (under provision (b) of the savings clause). Garcia,
540 F.3d at 1249. Section
324.021(9)(b)2 does not require insurance or its equivalent as a condition of licensing or registration....
...It also does not require an owner/lessor to meet any financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under state law, and the liability contemplatedi.e., vicarious liability for damages caused by the negligence of lesseesdoes not flow from any failure to meet such requirements. Rather, as explained above, section 324.021(9)(b)2 preserves Florida common law vicarious liability by deeming short-term *1043 (less than one year) lessors to be "owners" for vicarious liability purposes, while limiting their exposure to damages for such claims. Therefore, it conflicts with and is thus preempted by the Graves Amendment. Petitioners in this case also contend that even if section 324.021(9)(b)2, Florida Statutes (2007), is preempted, the Graves Amendment itself violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution....
...Enterprise Leasing Co.,
993 So.2d at 623-24; see also Garcia,
540 F.3d at 1249-53. III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision of the district court. We hold that the Graves Amendment preempts section
324.021(9)(b)2, Florida Statutes (2007), and is constitutional. It is so ordered. CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, and POLSTON, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. PARIENTE, J., recused. LABARGA, J., dissenting. Because I conclude that section
324.021(9)(b)2, Florida Statutes (2007), imposes financial responsibility requirements, I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that the statute is preempted by the Graves Amendment. Section
324.021(9)(b)2 can be fairly interpreted as a financial responsibility statute, and such an interpretation is appropriate even in the absence of an express mandate of bodily injury liability and property damage insurance or similar coverage. Preliminarily, one needs to look no further than the title of chapter 324, Florida Statutes, to reach the conclusion that section
324.021(9)(b)2 is a financial responsibility statute....
...Florida Statutes, is "to promote safety and provide financial security requirements for such owners or operators whose responsibility it is to recompense others for injury to person or property caused by the operation of a motor vehicle." Moreover, section 324.021, which contains the subsection at issue, is entitled "Definitions; minimum insurance required ." (Emphasis added.) Section 324.021(9)(b)2 provides that "[t]he lessor ....
...shall be deemed the owner of the motor vehicle for the purpose of determining liability for the operation of the vehicle or the acts of the operator in connection therewith." In this case, Enterprise, as the lessor, is deemed the owner of the motor vehicle rented by Price and driven by Middleton. Section 324.021(9)(b)2 places Enterprise on clear notice that it is responsible for bodily injury compensation up to $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident, as well as up to $50,000 for property damage....
...What is more, the statute explains that should the lessee or motor vehicle operator fail to maintain insurance with, at a minimum, combined limits of $500,000 for bodily injury and property damage, Enterprise is additionally responsible for up to that amount in economic damages. The clear import of section
324.021(9)(b)2 is that the owner/lessor must maintain a sufficient level of financial responsibility to compensate a party injured by one of its motor vehicles. Moreover, based on the language in sections
324.032(1)(b) and (2), Florida Statutes, it is readily apparent that section
324.021(9)(b)2 is to be read as a financial *1044 responsibility statute....
...These sections read:
324.032 Manner of proving financial responsibility; for-hire passenger transportation vehicles.Notwithstanding the provisions of s.
324.031: . . . . (1)(b) A person who is either the owner or a lessee required to maintain insurance under s.
324.021(9)(b) and who operates limousines, jitneys, or any other for-hire passenger vehicles, other than taxicabs, may prove financial responsibility by furnishing satisfactory evidence of holding a motor vehicle liability policy as defined in s.
324.031. (2) An owner or a lessee who is required to maintain insurance under s.
324.021(9)(b) and who operates at least 300 taxicabs, limousines, jitneys, or any other for-hire passenger transportation vehicles may provide financial responsibility by complying with the provisions of s....
...324.171 as determined by the Office of Insurance Regulation of the Financial Services Commission, including claims liabilities in an amount certified as adequate by a Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society. §
324.032, Fla. Stat. (2007). Section
324.032 clearly states that section
324.021(9)(b) compels certain owners to maintain insurance. The certain owners affected by the financial responsibility requirement contained in section
324.021(9)(b)2 are lessors who rent or lease motor vehicles for a period of less than one year and who enter into a rental agreement that does not require that the lessee obtain minimum insurance coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident for bodily injury and $50,000 for property damage. I agree with the conclusion reached by Judge Farmer in his dissenting opinion: Section
324.021(9)(b) fixes financial responsibility through a liability insurance requirement. Section
324.021(9)(b) fixes minimum insurance requirements as the basis for eliminating vicarious responsibility of the Companies....
...ecurity for the payment of damages to victims of accidents. Hence vicarious liability could be abolished but not the role of the Companies to make certain an existing mechanism to provide security for the payment of damages." Id. at 632. In enacting section 324.021(9), the Florida Legislature provided for such a mechanism which cannot reasonably be interpreted as anything other than a financial responsibility requirement. Accordingly, because section 324.021(9)(b)2 is a financial responsibility *1045 statute, the savings clause in the Graves Amendment protects it from preemption....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...irements of the Financial Responsibility Law. Furthermore, in 1973 Section 325.19(7), Florida Statutes (1975), was enacted to require every person presenting his motor vehicle for compulsory inspection to produce evidence of insurance as provided in Section 324.021....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 4998729
...Appellant argued the Graves Amendment could not provide immunity to Dollar Thrifty for three reasons. First, appellant argued the Graves Amendment expressly provides that it does not preempt state financial responsibility laws, and appellant claimed section 324.021(9)(b)2, Florida Statutes (2003), is such a law....
...After a hearing, the trial court issued an order on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on the federal immunity issue. The court granted Dollar Thrifty's motion for partial summary judgment and denied appellant's motion. The court found that the issue was whether section
324.021(9)(b)(2) is a "financial responsibility law" and thereby excepted from preemption under the Graves Amendment. Based on the decision of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc.,
510 F.Supp.2d 821, 825 (M.D.Fla.2007), aff'd,
540 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir.2008), the trial court found that section
324.021(9)(b)(2) was not a financial responsibility law because it did not impose liability on car rental companies for failing to meet financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under state law....
...The facts of this case are virtually identical to the facts in Vargas v. Enterprise Leasing Co.,
993 So.2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), just decided by this court. In Vargas, this court, sitting en banc, followed Garcia and held that the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, preempted section
324.021(9)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (2007), involving rental or leases of a motor vehicle for a period of less than one year. As in Vargas, we affirm the trial court's ruling and certify the following as a question of great public importance: Does the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, preempt section
324.021(9)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (2007)? Affirmed....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 2468, 1993 WL 63490
...PERSON OPERATING THIS MOTOR VEHICLE WITH THE RENTER'S CONSENT SHALL BE PRIMARY. RENTER IS CONTRACTING THAT THEIR INSURANCE IS TO BE PRIMARY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAID STATUTE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY AS REQUIRED BY FLORIDA STATUTE
324.021(7)." We conclude that this provision fully complies with Section
627.7263 because (a) it clearly states in bold type that the lessee is contracting that his/her insurance carrier will be the primary liability insurance carrier on the rented a...
...a motor vehicle for rent or lease shall be primary unless otherwise stated in bold type on the face of the rental or lease agreement. Such insurance shall be primary for the limits of liability and personal injury protection coverage as required by §
324.021(7) and §
627.736....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 470840
...Under Pardo and Stanfill, the circuit court was required to follow Morgan. The circuit court, accordingly, failed to apply the correct law. Instead of following Morgan the circuit court concluded that Progressive was required to provide the PIP coverage under section 324.021(9)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (2002)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 21396011
...The Plaintiffs brought wrongful death actions and an action for personal injury against Budget as the vicariously liable vehicle owner under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. After the filing of the Complaints, Budget informed the Plaintiffs that pursuant to Section 324.021(9)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (1999), which limits the liability of short term lessors for motor vehicles, its maximum liability to the Plaintiffs was $800,000.00, and offered to tender that amount. However, the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, contending that Section 324.021(9)(b)(2) was unconstitutional because it violated their right of access to courts, trial by jury, equal protection, due process, and the single-subject rule under the Florida Constitution. Both parties filed Motions for Summary Judgment on the constitutionality of Chapter 99-225, Laws of Florida, and Section 324.021(9)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (1999). The trial court entered an Order which granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, concluding that Chapter 99-225, Laws of Florida, in which Section 324.021(9)(b)(2) is comprised, "in its entirety violates the single-subject requirement of Article III, § 6 of the Florida Constitution because it embraces more than one subject." This appeal follows....
...d to be invalid beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 3 (citing Kinner,
398 So.2d at 1363). Budget contends that the trial court erred in finding that Chapter 99-225, Laws of *581 Florida, violates the single-subject rule. Budget further argues that Section
324.021(9)(b)(2) itself violates no provision of the Florida Constitution....
...In Enterprise Leasing, the First District reversed a trial court's determination that Chapter 99-225 was unconstitutional, concluding that Chapter 99-225 does not violate the single-subject rule. See id. at 834-36. Moreover, the Court also held that Section 324.021 does not violate (1) a plaintiff's right of access to courts, (2) a plaintiff's right to trial by jury, and (3) the equal protection and due process clauses of the Florida Constitution....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1478
...MacDonald was the named insured; however, his wife signed and returned a rejection form to St. Paul declining the opportunity to obtain UM coverage beyond $10,000/$20,000, the minimum required BI coverage. In 1975, the legislature increased the minimum BI liability limits to $15,000/$30,000, effective July 1, 1975. § 324.021(7), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1991 WL 6563
...In Perry, the defendant, G.M.A.C. Leasing Corporation, was the lessor of an automobile, the negligent operation of which was alleged to be the cause of the damages claimed. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the basis of section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), which creates an exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for long-term lessors if certain liability insurance limits are maintained by the lessee....
...of time after which the property is to be returned to the owner. At 1365-66. The decision in Kraemer also rejected GMAC's contention that the legislature intended to create an exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine by defining owner in section 324.021(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), to include lessees such as Green....
...se liability insurance, it did not reflect an intent to exonerate lessors from liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The Court also concluded, contrary to the district court's decision in Perry, that it was evident that by enacting section 324.021(9)(b), which provides relief for long-term lessors under certain circumstances, the Florida legislature recognized that under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine long-term lessors were liable for damages caused by drivers of leased automobiles....
...Garay and de la Nuez were responsible for maintenance of the vehicle, for obtaining the licenses and registrations, and for paying all taxes with respect to the vehicle. They were also required to obtain liability insurance. [5] The parties agree that section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...This is clearly shown in Chapter 324, which permits the posting of a liability policy to establish proof of financial responsibility; pertinent parts are as follows: Sec.
324.031(1) "Furnishing satisfactory evidence of holding a motor vehicle liability policy as defined in §
324.021(8) and §
324.151, or * * *" Sec.
324.021(8) provides: "* * * Any owner's or operator's policy of liability insurance furnished as proof of financial responsibility pursuant to §
324.031, insuring said owner and/or operator against loss from liability for bodily injury, death and property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in not less than the limits described in §
324.021(7), and conforming to the requirements of §
324.151, issued by any insurance company authorized to do business in this state." Also, a portion of Sec....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 107, 1993 Fla. LEXIS 169, 1993 WL 32053
...The appellants concede that this "`one accident' rule is still law as to personally owned vehicles." However, they maintain that by operation of section
627.7263 Grant, as the operator of a leased vehicle, was required to comply with the requirements of section
324.021(7), Florida Statutes (1987)....
...ents. We cannot agree. Subsection (1) of section
627.7263, Florida Statutes (1987), provides in relevant part that the insurance policy providing liability coverage for the lessor of a motor vehicle is primary for the limits of liability required by section
324.021(7) unless otherwise stated in bold type on the face of the rental or lease agreement....
...isions of subsection (1) and shall provide a space for the name of the lessee's insurance company if the lessor's insurance is not to be primary. We do not read this statute to require the lessee of a motor vehicle to comply with the requirements of section 324.021(7)....
...a motor vehicle for rent or lease shall be primary unless otherwise stated in bold type on the face of the rental or lease agreement. Such insurance shall be primary for the limits of liability and personal injury protection coverage as required by ss.
324.021(7) and
627.736....
...g the lessee of the provisions of subsection (1) and shall provide a space for the name of the lessee's insurance company if the lessor's insurance is not to be primary. [2] No insurance company name or policy number was written in these blanks. [3] Section 324.021(7), Florida Statutes (1987), defines "Proof of Financial Responsibility" as, in pertinent part: That proof of ability to respond in damages for liability on account of accidents arising out of the use of a motor vehicle: (a) In the am...
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1993 WL 130549
...See also 14 Am.Jur.2d Carriers § 895, at 332 (1964); Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr., Oscar S. Gray, 5 The Law of Torts § 26.11 (2d ed. 1986) (railroad or bus line chartered by the legislature is liable for its lessee's negligence which injures passengers or third persons). Compare § 324.021(9)(b) (automobile lessor is absolved of liability for lessee's negligence if certain statutory conditions are complied with)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 784545
...ount complaint for vicarious liability, negligent entrustment, and a derivative claim on behalf of the minor children. Avis moved to dismiss the negligent entrustment count for failure to state a cause of action which was granted by the trial court. Section 324.021(9), Florida Statutes, effectively limits the vicarious liability of a short-term automobile lessor. Sontay moved for partial summary judgment asking the trial court to find Chapter 99-225, Laws of Florida, which contained section 324.021(9), unconstitutional as violative of the single-subject rule. Sontay further argued that section 324.021(9) violated access to the courts, equal protection, due process, and the right to a jury trial. The trial court held that Chapter 99-225 and section 324.021(9) were constitutional....
...4th DCA 2003), in which we aligned ourselves with the first and third districts that have already rejected such an argument. See Enter. Leasing Co. v. Hughes,
833 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Budget Rent-A-Car Sys. v. Eddie Bennett,
847 So.2d 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). Sontay argues that section
324.021(9) is unconstitutional as violative of (1) a plaintiff's right of access to courts, (2) a plaintiff's right to trial by jury, and (3) the equal protection and due process clauses of the Florida Constitution....
...shes their right of access to the courts without affording a commensurate benefit or expressing an overpowering public necessity for this limitation. In Abdala v. World Omni Leasing, Inc.,
583 So.2d 330, 333 (Fla.1991), the supreme court approved of section
324.021(9)(b)1, which eliminated the vicarious liability of long-term lessors provided the lessee maintains certain levels of insurance coverage. Limiting the liability of one vicariously liable does not equate to denial of access to court. On this issue we approve the holdings of Perry v. G.M.A.C. Leasing Corp.,
549 So.2d 680, 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (subsection
324.021(9)(b) "does not limit plaintiff's right to recover damages from the lessee who controls the operation of the vehicle....
...Nor does it place a cap upon those damages."), review denied,
558 So.2d 18 (Fla.1990), and Folmar *319 v. Young,
560 So.2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)(same). Id. We find Abdala to be controlling and are thus unpersuaded by Sontay's attempt at distinguishing it. Although section
324.021(9)(b)1 requires long-term lessees to maintain certain levels of insurance whereas section
324.021(9)(b)2 makes no such requirement of short-term lessees, the end result is balanced. The vicarious liability of long-term lessors can be completely eliminated because section
324.021(9)(b)1 requires long-term lessees to maintain insurance. On the other hand, because section
324.021(9)(b)2 does not require short-term lessees to maintain insurance, it imposes vicarious liability on the short-term lessor, at an extent greater than the minimum insurance coverage required of long-term lessees. Likewise, the first district in Hughes held that section
324.021(9)(b)2 "merely limits the liability of short-term lessors....
...Because limiting vicarious liability does not equate to the denial of access to courts, we decline to address Sontay's argument as to the lack of an expressed public necessity for the legislation. See Kluger v. White,
281 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1973). Sontay next argues that section
324.021(9)(b)2 violates his constitutional right to a trial by jury....
...However, Smith dealt with a damage cap with regard to the actual wrongdoer. Capping the liability of the faultless owner, while leaving the unlimited liability of the wrongdoer intact, does not deprive a plaintiff of the constitutional benefit of a jury trial. See Hughes,
833 So.2d at 838. Sontay's final argument is that section
324.021(9)(b)2 violates his rights to due process and equal protection....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 669193
...vehicle which was being operated negligently by a third party. The complaint alleged that GMAC was the owner of the motor vehicle. GMAC filed an answer which denied that it owned the motor vehicle and asserted in its Third Defense that, pursuant to section 324.021, Florida Statutes, it was immune from liability. Section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), provides: (b) Owner/lessor....
...General Motors Acceptance Corporation,
613 So.2d 483 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), review denied,
624 So.2d 266 (Fla. 1993), this court was faced with a vehicle lease giving a lessee the same alternative insurance provisions as found in this case. That lease was written before the effective date of section
324.021(9)(b)....
...1991), concluded that GMAC was immune from liability because it complied with the provisions of the statute on the day of the accident. The Kraemer court specifically limited its holding to the facts of that case, and one of the facts was that GMAC developed the liability insurance limits before the effective date of section 324.021(9)(b)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1102
...motor vehicle for rent or lease shall be primary unless otherwise stated in bold type on the face of the rental or lease agreement. Such insurance shall be primary for the limits of liability and personal injury protection coverage as required by ss
324.021(7) and
627.736 [emphasis added]....
...The supreme court found this coverage inured to the lessee's permittee. In 1976, four years after the supreme court's ruling in Roth, the legislature amended the state's Financial Responsibility Law by decreasing the amount of liability insurance an owner of a motor vehicle must carry to $10,000. See section 324.021(7), Florida Statutes (1983)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 30 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 836
...o renewed his motion for a directed verdict. The trial court denied all of the motions, commenting that the jury verdict as a whole did not shock the conscience of the court. The parties agreed to reduce the judgment against Brown in accordance with section 324.021(9)(b)3., Florida Statutes, which limits damages if liability is based entirely on the ownership of a vehicle. See § 324.021(9)(b)3., Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 2434159
...ties do not dispute that Ms. Wills obtained the required coverage and her insurance policy was valid and in effect at the time of the accident. In its answer to Ms. Edwards' suit, C.A. Motors raised the affirmative defense that recovery is barred by section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (2006)....
...ne for title owners of vehicles on long-term lease. See generally Ady v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp.,
675 So.2d 577, 580 (Fla.1996) (discussing history of statutory exception to dangerous instrumentality doctrine). Beginning in 1987, the presently numbered section
324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes, broadly limited vehicle lessors' liability in cases involving long-term leases where lessees procure their own insurance coverage....
...The insurance meeting such requirements may be obtained by the lessor or lessee, provided, if such insurance is obtained by the lessor, the combined coverage for bodily injury liability and property damage liability shall contain limits of not less than $1 million and may be provided by a lessor's blanket policy. § 324.021(9)(b)(1), Fla....
...ctly comply with the statute for C.A. Motors to claim protection as a non-owner of the accident vehicle for the purpose of determining liability. See Ady,
675 So.2d at 580 (holding that "there must be strict compliance with the express provisions of section
324.021(9)(b) before a title owner of a motor vehicle can receive the benefits of this statutory exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine"); see generally Fla....
...n of the statute, which omitted the alternative in the present version permitting a lessee to obtain a policy covering bodily injuries and property damage. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Davis,
664 So.2d 1025, 1026-28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (construing §
324.021(9)(b), Fla....
...Our review, however, is constrained by the text of the lease. In the absence of any contract language limiting the dealership's modification power solely to conform to future changes to the law, we cannot conclude that the lease agreement, as written, strictly complies with section 324.021(9)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 7625, 1993 WL 100148
...(Emphasis added.) Chapter 324, Florida Statutes (1991), known as the Financial Responsibility Law, requires persons operating motor vehicles to maintain a minimum amount of insurance. It defines a motor vehicle as: "Every self-propelled vehicle which is designed and required to be licensed for use upon a highway... ." § 324.021(1), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1679, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 14971
...5th DCA 1982). We also found in Prinzo that the definitions provided under the No-Fault Act (section
627.732(1)), the Traffic Control Law (section
316.003(2) and (21)), the Motor Vehicle Licenses Law (section 320.21(1)) and the Financial Responsibility Law (section
324.021(1)) should be read in pari materia, which compels the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to characterize a moped as a motor vehicle or self-propelled vehicle....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 43, 1994 WL 6715
...Klion of Wicker, Smith, Tutan, O'Hara, McCoy, Graham & Lane, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. GUNTHER, Judge. The plaintiff appeals a final judgment finding, inter alia, that the contingent liability policy obtained by Southeast Bank Leasing Co. (Southeast/lessor) satisfies the statutory requirement of Florida Statute 324.021(9)(b). We reverse. This case involves a long-term automobile lease as contemplated by section 324.021(9)(b)....
...Gedert maintains that, although the trial court correctly ruled that Southeast is vicariously liable for any negligence caused by Grannum, the trial court erred in finding Southeast's contingent liability policy satisfied the statutory requirements of section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1989). According to Gedert, since the lessee's policy had lapsed at the time of the accident, the statutory requirement that the less ee have insurance in effect was not satisfied, and Southeast is not exempt from liability under section 324.021(9)(b). The issue on appeal is whether a lessor's contingent liability policy exempts it from vicarious liability under section 324.021(9)(b), when at the time of the accident, the insurance policy which the lessee is required to maintain under the lease agreement has lapsed. Section 324.021(9)(b) provides: (b) Owner/lessor....
...nnum, is required to obtain under the terms of the automobile lease agreement. Although it is undisputed that Grannum's policy was cancelled when the accident occurred, Southeast contends its contingent liability policy satisfied the requirements of section 324.021(9)(b)....
...In contrast, the lessee in this case had no insurance and therefore had no insurance policy limits to tender. Thus, we conclude Kraemer is factually distinguishable and does not support Southeast's position. We agree with Gedert's contention that Southeast's interpretation of section 324.021(9)(b) contradicts the plain language of the statute....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 967, 2009 WL 277435
...r of the car driven by the person allegedly at fault in this accident. Mr. Rosado claimed that DaimlerChrysler was liable because it had failed to ensure that the vehicle was covered by insurance to the limits of liability described in section *1202 324.021(9)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2002), at the time of the accident....
...essors and rental car companies from vicarious liability imposed under state law under some circumstances. This appears to be the first case in which a court has addressed the application of the Graves Amendment to a long-term automobile lease under section 324.021(9)(b)(1). The Amendment's application, however, has been addressed at length in reference to rental cars under section 324.021(9)(b)(2)....
...Parham, and DaimlerChrysler. The claim against DaimlerChrysler *1203 alleged that it was vicariously liable for Mr. Parham's negligent operation of the car under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine because it had failed to comply with the insurance requirements of section 324.021(9)(b)(1)....
...Rosado argues that the Graves Amendment does not limit DaimlerChrysler's liability in this context because this federal statute contains two exceptions to the reach of its preemption. This is the issue that cannot be resolved without additional analysis. III. THE GRAVES AMENDMENT PREEMPTS SUBSECTION 324.021(9)(b)(1) Subsection 324.021(9)(b) is a definitional provision within chapter 324 of the Florida Statutes, which is entitled "Financial Responsibility." It states: (9) OWNER; OWNER/LESSOR. .......
...by amounts actually recovered from the lessee, from the operator, and from any insurance or self-insurance covering the lessee or operator. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to affect the liability of the lessor for its own negligence. § 324.021(9)(b)....
...We recognize, as the dissent argues, that the uniqueness of Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine makes the application *1206 of the Graves Amendment more questionable in Florida. From a practical perspective, the dissent may accurately explain the purpose and function of section 324.021(9)(b)(1), but we conclude that the statute's plain language requires the ruling that we reach today. However, we certify to the supreme court the following question of great public importance: DOES THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, PREEMPT SECTION 324.021(9)(b)(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2002)? Affirmed....
...VILLANTI and LAROSE, JJ., Concur. ALTENBERND, J., Concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion. ALTENBERND, Judge, Concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the majority that the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, is not unconstitutional and that section 324.021(9)(b)(1) is not excepted from this federal preemption statute by virtue of the exception stated in subsection (b)(1) of the Graves Amendment. On the other hand, I conclude that section 324.021(9)(b)(1), when examined in conjunction with Florida's unique dangerous instrumentality doctrine, is effectively a statute imposing liability for failure to meet liability insurance requirements....
...Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 403 (2007). If one examines the history of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and the efforts of the rental and car leasing companies to obtain a special exemption from that doctrine, it becomes more clear that section 324.021(9)(b)(1) is the equivalent of the above-quoted hypothetical statute....
...for the lessee's negligent operation of the motor vehicle, in 1959. Susco Car Rental System v. Leonard,
112 So.2d 832 (Fla.1959). Garcia,
510 F.Supp.2d at 827. There is, incidentally, no question in my mind that, without the legislative enactment in section
324.021(9)(b), the Florida law related to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine would be preempted by the Graves Amendment....
...hese large corporations subject to unlimited judgments for the damage and injury caused by their cars in Florida. III. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE IN 1986 IN FLORIDA ADDRESSING THE LIABILITY OF LONG-TERM LESSORS In 1986, the Florida Legislature created section 324.021(9)(b) to exempt lease car companies from the dangerous instrumentality doctrine so long as the lessee maintained certain levels of liability insurance....
...The "penalty" for failure to maintain the insurance was a return to unlimited liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. See Ady,
675 So.2d at 581 (holding lessor was not entitled to the statutory exemption from the dangerous instrumentality doctrine where lessee failed to satisfy the requirement of section
324.021(9)(b))....
...leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law." In Florida, the liability was imposed by common law and the statute provides an insurance option to avoid that liability. If a leasing company fails to meet the liability insurance requirements in section 324.021(9)(b)(1), then Florida common law as explained in Ady and earlier cases will impose liability on that business. In combination, the common law and section 324.021(9)(b)(1) fits squarely within exception (b)(2) of the Graves Amendment....
...ability rules among the states for lease and rental car companies that operate throughout the country while allowing the states to impose liability on lease car companies that do not provide the insurance designated by state law. It seems to me that section 324.021(9)(b)(1), in conjunction with Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine, accomplishes precisely that purpose in Florida, and I see no basis to rule that Congress has preempted this sound state law....
...pplication of Graves Amendment (49 U.S.C.A. § 30106) Governing Rented or Leased Motor Vehicle Safety and Responsibility, 29 A.L.R. Fed.2d 223, § 11 (2008) (collecting cases). [5] In this case, for example, the LaMondue Law Firm is not protected by section 324.021(9)(b) and as lessee and bailee of the car presumably remains liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 9, 1992 Fla. LEXIS 2123
...icy must be construed to provide the greater coverage. §
627.412, Fla. Stat. (1989); Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
252 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1971). Therefore, the answer to the certified question will resolve all remaining issues in the case. Section
324.021(7), Florida Statutes (1989), sets the general minimum requirements of liability coverage for motor vehicles at $10,000 for injuries to one person and $20,000 for injuries resulting from one accident. However, section
324.021(7)(d) provides that nonpublic-sector buses shall carry insurance in the amount specified in section
627.742....
...on the bus because it assumes multiple claims and such a requirement ensures adequate coverage for each pupil. Because the regulation does not set a minimum insurance limit for injury to one person, Travelers asserts that the $10,000 requirement of section 324.021(7) controls....
...We conclude that the Suazos' interpretation is correct. First, we do not believe the Florida Highway Patrol would establish a minimum insurance limit per occurrence without also establishing a minimum limit per person. It would be illogical to allow the per-person limit to be controlled by section 324.021(7) which is applicable to noncommercial motor vehicles but not to buses and commercial motor vehicles. In fact, section 324.021(7) is rendered inapplicable to nonpublic-sector buses by subsection (d) thereof....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1969 Fla. App. LEXIS 6512
...otor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than limits described in § 324.021(7), under provisions filed with and approved by the insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily...
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...tions. Reliance Mutual Life Insurance Company of Illinois v. Booher,
166 So.2d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); Zipperer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
254 F.2d 853 (5th Cir.1958). There is no dispute that the policy in question complied with section
324.021, Florida Statutes (1979), which required insurance in the amount of $10,000.00 per person and $20,000.00 per occurrence....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 15 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 2055
...In Fowler, the supreme court held that the automobile liability insurer for the owner of an automobile must provide a $10,000 primary layer of automobile liability coverage to protect both the owner and the operator because the automobile was a motor vehicle for purposes of statutory financial responsibility. See § 324.021(1), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida
...h suspend the license and registration and any nonresident’s operating privilege of any person against whom such judgment was rendered, except as hereinafter otherwise provided in this section, and in §
324.141.” F.S. § 324.-121, F.S.A. . F.S. §
324.021(10), F.S.A....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 2447873
...Barthelemy's three surviving children, who are the co-personal representatives of the estate of Ms. Barthelemy, brought a wrongful death lawsuit against Enterprise and Ms. Yermak. The co-personal representatives sought a declaratory judgment that section *351 324.021(9)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (2004), entitles them to $300,000.00 because Ms....
...auses injury. See Hertz Corp. v. Jackson,
617 So.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Fla.1993). Florida is the only state which imposes strict vicarious liability against innocent motor vehicle owners who entrust their vehicles to another. Id. The legislature enacted section
324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes, in order to limit such liability and to shift responsibility for damages arising out of motor vehicle accidents from innocent owners and lessors of motor vehicles to those at fault....
...4th DCA 2004)(quoting Enterprise Leasing Co. S. Cent. v. Hughes,
833 So.2d 832, 839 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)); see also Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary HB 775 (1999), Staff Analysis (final June 2, 1999) at 21 (stating that the legislative intent of the bill which amended section
324.021 included the goals of reducing payments by innocent third parties and shifting emphasis toward responsibility based upon fault). Section
324.021(9)(b) provides, in part: The lessor, under an agreement to rent or lease a motor vehicle for a period of less than 1 year, shall be deemed the owner of the motor vehicle for the purpose of determining liability for the operation of th...
...arbitration provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act, to apply separately to each wrongful death beneficiary, rather than in the aggregate to all claimants. However, section
766.207(7)(b) uses different language and serves a different purpose than section
324.021(9)(b), and the two sections are distinguishable. One distinguishing factor is that section
766.207(7)(b) contains an ambiguity not present in section
324.021(9)(b), as it provides for a $250,000.00 maximum per incident, but then describes how damages are to be calculated by referring to a claimant, who is defined as any person who has a cause of action arising from medical negligence. St. Mary's,
769 So.2d at 967-68. Another distinguishing factor is that section
766.207(7)(b), regarding medical malpractice, limits the recovery of noneconomic damages from directly liable defendants while section
324.021(9)(b), regarding the liability of motor vehicle owners, limits the recovery of noneconomic damages from vicariously liable defendants. As noted above, the caps provided in section
324.021(9)(b) limit the vicarious liability of innocent rental car companies and owners. Nothing prevents the injured party from seeking additional damages from the negligent driver as there is no cap on the negligent driver's direct liability. Enterprise Leasing,
833 So.2d at 838. Thus, the limitation of section
324.021(9)(b) is effectively not an absolute bar to recovery beyond *352 the amount of the cap, as the limitation of section
766.207(7)(b) is an absolute bar, because even if a plaintiff cannot recover against a motor vehicle owner, he or she can still recover against the driver. Given these distinctions, the reasoning of St. Mary's does not apply to section
324.021(9)(b). Instead, case law interpreting the liability limits included in automobile insurance policies provides us with persuasive guidance in interpreting section
324.021(9)(b)....
...Thus, we concluded in Geico that, while there were three plaintiffs (the estate of the deceased and two surviving parents), the insurer's total financial responsibility was limited to $100,000.00 per accident [1] for the one decedent. Geico,
730 So.2d at 784. In accordance with this case law and the wording of section
324.021(9)(b), we conclude that the "$100,000 per person ......
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 16968, 2008 WL 4756385
...The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of a long term lessor of a motor vehicle in a suit by a party claiming injuries in an accident involving the lessee of the leased vehicle. We affirm the summary judgment on the ground that the lessor was entitled to judgment under section 324.021(9)(b)1, Florida Statutes (2007). Because it is not necessary to the decision in this case, we do not reach the question of whether the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, preempts section 324.021(9)(b)1, an issue considered in the circuit court....
...In this case, the lessee failed to maintain the liability insurance specified in the lease. However, the lessor maintained a blanket policy of liability insurance covering its fleet of leased automobiles with expressed limits of $1 million. That policy satisfied the requirements of Florida law under section 324.021(9)(b)1....
...I would not grant rehearing en banc. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the decision on preemption in the previous panel opinion was unnecessary. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of Ford Credit solely on the basis that the Graves Amendment preempted § 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (2007)....
...4th DCA Oct. 31, 2008) (en banc), released concurrently with the opinions in the present case. I concur in affirming the summary judgment in this case because the record from the trial court shows without factual dispute that Ford Credit complied with § 324.021(9)(b) and was thereby relieved of any liability for plaintiff's injuries....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 152939
...Morris Alignment Serv., Inc.,
444 So.2d 926, 929 (Fla. 1983). Moreover, statutes should be construed to effect the obvious intent of the legislature. Van Pelt v. Hilliard,
75 Fla. 792,
78 So. 693 (1918); Curry v. Lehman,
55 Fla. 847,
47 So. 18 (1908). Section
324.021(7), Florida Statutes (1989), which establishes the general minimum liability coverage for motor vehicles, provides in subsection (d) that nonpublic-sector buses must have coverage in the amount specified in section
627.742....
...0 for one person and $300,000 for two or more persons, or (b) an insurance policy for liability "in a sum not less than $300,000." The Suazos conclude, therefore, that section
627.742 requires coverage greater than the $10,000 limit set generally by section
324.021(7) for automobiles....
...While we appreciate the responses of those agencies to the troubling questions presented, it is obvious that they were unable to show us a well-lit route out of the quandary. [2] See General Accident Ins. Co. v. Southern Ins. Co.,
563 So.2d 186 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), where the court, referring to section
324.021(7), coverage for commercial motor vehicles and nonpublic-sector buses, lamented the "confusing barrage of possibly applicable statutes" and held that the trial court's finding of only $10,000 coverage pursuant to section
324.021(7) was erroneous....
...In reaching this result the court wrote "[i]f we err here, it is on the side of requiring more, rather than less, insurance coverage, in order to carry out Florida's public policy of protecting the motoring public on our public streets and highways." Id. at 187. (Citations omitted). [3] § 324.021(7) PROOF OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ......
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...On appeal, the Arajes argue that the trial court reversibly erred by failing to allow amendment of their affirmative defenses to include accord and satisfaction, give a requested jury instruction, and reduce the jury verdict against Mr. Araj pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2011)....
...Because we reverse for a new trial, we decline to address whether the trial court erred in failing to allow amendment of the Arajes' affirmative defenses. There is no reason to not allow such an amendment on remand. Likewise, we do not address whether section 324.021(9)(b)3....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 7171, 2011 WL 1878009
...Congress then passed the Graves Amendment which, for any case filed after August 10, 2005, provided that a long term lessor of a vehicle may not be held vicariously liable for a lessee's negligence, unless there is negligence on the part of the lessor. [1] Nonetheless, Daimler and DCFS concluded that, pursuant to subsection 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes, the fact that the driver did not have the proper insurance made DCFS the "owner" of the *71 vehicle with unlimited vicarious liability under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
...Daimler informed the circuit court that the Florida Supreme Court had stayed review of Rosado v. DaimlerChrysler Financial Services Trust,
1 So.3d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); in that case the second district held that the Graves Amendment preempts subsection
324.021(9)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2002), regarding long-term automobile leases....
...Rosado was stayed pending the the Supreme Court's review of this court's decision Vargas v. Enterprise Leasing Co.,
993 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). [3] The trial court granted appellees' motion to dismiss, ruling, among other things, that the Graves Amendment applied and preempted subsection
324.021(9)(b)(1), so that DCFS was not vicariously liable for the accident....
...aged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under state law." Not until 2008 did this court determine that, for short-term vehicle leases, subsection
324.021(9)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2007), was not a "financial responsibility or liability insurance requirement" within the meaning of the section 30106(b)(2). See Vargas,
993 So.2d at 618, approved by
2011 WL 1496474. The first case to hold that the Graves Amendment preempts subsection
324.021(9)(b)1., dealing with a long term motor vehicle lease, was Rosado v....
...
715 So.2d at 345 (emphasis in Pope). In this case, no legislative enactment or administrative regulation imposed a duty running from appellees to the lessor DCFS to see that the lessee acquired a certain level of insurance. The insurance levels discussed in subsection
324.021(9)(b)1....
...are not mandatory; if a lease "requires the lessee" to obtain insurance with "not less than" $100,000/$300, 000/$50,000 in coverage, and "insurance meeting these requirements is in effect," then the lessor avoids the operation of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. § 324.021(9)(b)1....
...Second, Arrigo failed to verify that the lessee had in fact complied with the lease requirements. Third, Arrigo potentially breached its agreement with DCFS by assigning a lease that placed the assignee at risk. Fourth, DCFS failed to verify that Arrigo was assigning it a lease where the parties had complied with subsection 324.021(9)(b)1....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 8761, 2010 WL 2425948
...PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Karling v. Budget Rent A Car System, Inc.,
2 So.3d 354 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). We certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question as one of great public importance: DOES THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, PREEMPT SECTION
324.021(9)(B)(2.), FLORIDA STATUTES (2007)? QUESTION CERTIFIED....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 3357518, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 10754
...In doing so, we conclude that the vehicle driven by Snyder, a golf cart that had been modified, inter alia, to exceed a speed of twenty miles per hour, fell within the statutory definition of a “low speed vehicle” and, as such, was a “motor vehicle” as defined in section 324.021....
...s is extremely limited. See §
316.212, Fla. Stat. For purposes of Florida’s Financial Responsibility Law, a “motor vehicle” is defined as “every self-propelled vehicle which is designed and required to be licensed for use upon a highway_” §
324.021(1), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2002 WL 1585616
...Where the section of an insurance policy dealing with uninsured motor vehicle coverage does not contain a definition of motor vehicle, courts may be compelled to seek a definition elsewhere. Grant v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
638 So.2d 936, 937 (Fla.1994). Section
324.021(1), Florida Statutes (1999), the Financial Responsibility Law of 1955, defines the term motor vehicle as "every self-propelled vehicle which is designed and required to be licensed for use upon a highway." We agree with Progressive's argument that this is the applicable definition. See Grant,
638 So.2d 936 (applying definition of motor vehicle under section
324.021(1) where section of policy dealing with uninsured motor vehicle coverage did not contain definition of motor vehicle); Auto-Owners Ins....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1987 WL 1093
...The leasing agency had an insurance policy with Continental Insurance Co. Continental settled with the injured party for $60,000. Continental conceded that the rental agreement did not properly shift the burden of primary insurance coverage and it was responsible for the first $10,000 of damages. §
324.021(7) and §
627.7263, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...ny resident- of -the same household, if such vehicle is not an ‘insured automobile’ ”). Arnica argues that the UM exclusion does not violate the intent of the UM statute because the FRL does not require liability insurance for a golf cart. See § 324.021(1), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 3375, 2009 WL 275188
...The appellant, Joseph "Roy" Francis, has moved the court to certify in accordance with rule 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, that its decision passes upon the following question of great public importance: DOES THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, 49 U.S.C § 30106, PREEMPT SECTION 324.021(9)(B)(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (2007)? As this is the same question certified by this court in Karling v....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...The lease required the lessee to obtain insurance acceptable to the lessor which contained limits not less than $100,000/$300,000 bodily injury liability and $50,000 property damage liability. The lessee purchased the liability insurance as agreed. Effective August 6, 1986, [1] section 324.021(9)(b), [2] Florida Statutes, provides that: Owner/lessor....
...After settling with the lessee and lessee's insuror and executing a release, appellant instituted an action against GMAC as owner of the leased vehicle. GMAC asserted two defenses, one that the general release executed by appellant included language effectively releasing GMAC [3] and two, that section 324.021(9)(b) barred recovery from GMAC. The trial court entered a final summary judgment in favor of GMAC which the appellant appeals. Appellant argues that section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes, cannot be applied *1111 to appellant because the lease agreement was executed (July 4, 1985) prior to the effective date of the statute (August 6, 1986) and that to apply the statute would impair GMAC's contra...
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 14627, 2012 WL 3758626
...hicle to any permissive user shall be liable for the operation of the vehicle or the acts of the operator in connection therewith only up to $100,000 per person and up to $300,000 per incident for bodily injury and up to $50,000 for property damage. § 324.021(9)(b)3., Fla. Stat. (1999) 4 (emphasis added). Section 324.021(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), defines “owner” as the “person who holds the legal title of a motor vehicle.” (Emphasis added)....
...atutes (2005), 5 he remained a co-owner of the car by virtue of holding legal title at the time of the collision. Thus, he was legally liable for the acts of his co-owner while she was operating the car, at least to the statutory limits set forth at section 324.021(9)(b)3....
...Taylor-Christensen, by affixing their signatures to these important legal documents, expressed their collective intent that they would share a property interest in this car. By statute, Appellee was a co-owner because he held legal title to the car. §§
316.008(26),
322.01(30),
324.021(9)(a), Fla....
...SAWAYA, J., dissents, with opinion in which PALMER, J., concurs. JACOBUS, J., recuses. . We grant en banc review to maintain uniformity in this Court’s decisions. . The fifth affirmative defense is apparently based on the limitation of liability set forth in section 324.021(9)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2005)....
...We express no opinion on the applicability of this statute because it has not yet been addressed below. . See 49 U.S.C. § 30106 . . The same language was in effect at the time of this 2005 accident. . Appellant’s claim is based on the common law dangerous instrumentality doctrine. She did not assert liability based on section 324.021(9)(b)3., Florida Statutes, which imposes liability on an owner who permits another to use his or her vehicle....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
which asserted immunity from liability under section
324.021(9)(c)3.a., Florida Statutes (2020). We dismiss
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 14507
...Section
316.646, along with chapter 324 dealing with financial responsibility for owners and operators of motor vehicles, and the.no fault law in sections
627.730 through
627.7405, create a comprehensive system for requiring insurance for certain vehicles under Florida law. Section
324.021(9)(b)2. limits the potential liability of lessors of motor vehicles (defined in section
324.021(1), to include motorcycles for the purpose of that section, but to not include mopeds),' but does not require lessors or lessees to maintain any coverage beyond what is mandated by other provisions of Florida law....
...more persons in a crash. §
324.023, Fla. Stat. Owners and operators of motor vehicles involved in a crash must also maintain bodily injury coverage in the amount of at least $10,000 per person and $20,000 per crash to avoid a license suspension. §§
324.021(7) and (8),
324.031, and
324.051(2), Fla. Stat. .After á motorcycle has been in a crash, the owner or operator must provide proof of bodily injury coverage in the amount of at least $10,000 per person and $20,000 per crash to avoid a license suspension. §§
324.021(7) and
324.051(2), Fla, Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 14107
...plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred from the date
the offer was served.
-2-
judgments were the result of a $600,000 statutory cap on Stephen's liability pursuant to
section 324.021(9)(b)(3), Florida Statutes (2005). That section limits a car owner's
liability in suits arising out of automobile accidents. § 324.021(9)(b)(3).
The Saterbos appealed the final judgment to this court, and in the appeal,
Markuson filed a motion for appellate attorneys' fees based on his proposal for
settlement that had been made to both of the Saterbos....
...for settlement failed to strictly comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. The
trial court also concluded that the proposal was ambiguous and lacked particularity
because it failed to account for the fact that Stephen's liability was capped pursuant to
section 324.021(9)(b)(3)....
...the statutory cap would
not have applied in this circumstance." Thus, even in the absence of an official
determination that the cap applied (e.g., through the entry of a summary judgment on
the affirmative defense), the parties were apparently aware that section
324.021(9)(b)(3) likely applied to cap Stephen's liability.
The Saterbos argue that Erik needed further clarification "as to what would
happen if he were to accept the proposal since Stephen would not be obligated to pay...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 Fla. LEXIS 1890, 2002 WL 31027350
...Stat., is not hable for its negligent operation. See Aurbach v. Gallina, supra; Palmer v. R.S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc.,
81 So.2d 635 (Fla.1955). The owner of a vehicle who has leased it to another under a lease for one year or longer, and who has complied with ah the requirements of §
324.021(9)(b)l, Fla. Stat., is not liable for its neghgent operation. See Ady v. American Honda Finance Corp.,
675 So.2d 577 (Fla.1996). Additional limitations upon vicarious liability are set forth in §§ 324,021(9)(b) and
324.021(9)(c), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 15700, 2002 WL 31422823
...At the time of the accident, the lease had been in effect for fifteen months. Sidney Mass, as legal guardian of Michelle Mass, sued Helms and BOA alleging liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. BOA defended on the ground that it was exempt from liability under *713 section 324.021(9)(b)(l), Florida Statutes (1999), as it had leased the vehicle for one year or longer and had complied with all statutory requirements. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the basis that because the lease was terminable at any time upon 80 days’ notice with no substantial penalty for early termination, the lease was not a long-term lease protected by section 324.021....
...The trial court denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and granted BOA’s cross-motion. Plaintiff appeals. Entry of summary judgment was proper, as the BOA lease was clearly for thirty-six months — a term of more than one year — and in fact had been in effect for fifteen months when the accident happened. Section 324.021(9)(b)(l) simply requires that there be “an agreement to lease a motor vehicle for 1 year or longer ...” There is no statutory requirement for a penalty for early termination of the lease, and we decline to amend the statute judicially....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...(2022), limiting liability to
a vessel operator unless the owner is present, §
327.32, Fla. Stat. (2022),
limiting the liability of a lessor of an automobile subject to registration for
operation on public roads, depending on the duration of the lease, §
324.021(9)(b)1., 2., Fla. Stat. (2022), and, finally, limiting the liability of
owners who are natural persons and lend their car to any permissive user, §
324.021(9)(b)3., Fla....
...ility for Medical Malpractice, 64
Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1309 (Nov. 1964) (“[T]he contradictory term ‘willful and
wanton’ negligence, vaguely denotes quasi-intentional conduct that is
qualitatively different from [mere] negligence.”); see also § 324.021(9)(b)3.,
Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...On appeal, the Arajes argue that the trial court reversibly erred by failing to allow amendment of their affirmative defenses to include accord and satisfaction, give a requested jury instruction, and reduce the jury verdict against Mr. Araj pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2011)....
...Because we reverse for a new trial, we decline to address whether the trial court erred in failing to allow amendment of the Arajes' affirmative defenses. There is no reason to not allow such an amendment on remand. Likewise, we do not address whether section 324.021(9)(b)3....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
...otor vehicle, shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than limits described in § 324.021(7), under provisions filed with and approved by the insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...INE?[ 3]
Id. at 374. For the reasons we explain below, the answer is no, and
the Second District was correct to say so.
2. The current maximum liability for a person who owns a
vehicle under the circumstances presented here is $600,000. See
§ 324.021(9)(b)3., Fla....
...l and social security
disability payment setoffs, the parties agreed to a net judgment of
-7-
$18,906,429.19. The parties also agreed to reduce Keith Lambert’s
judgment to $600,000, the statutory maximum under section
324.021(9)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2015)....
...bility to the public.”
Leonard,
112 So. 2d at 837 (citing ch. 324, Fla. Stat. (1955)).
- 20 -
Eventually, however, the Legislature began limiting vicarious
liability under the doctrine. In 1986, it enacted section
324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1986), to shield long-term motor
vehicle lessors from vicarious liability under the doctrine:
[T]he lessor, under an agreement to lease a motor vehicle
for one year or longer ....
...t
reform package” known as the Tort Reform Act. Vargas v. Enter.
Leasing Co.,
60 So. 3d 1037, 1041 (Fla. 2011); see generally George
N. Meros, Jr. & Chanta Hundley, Florida’s Tort Reform Act: Keeping
- 21 -
Section
324.021(9)(b) limits liability against certain non-
operators, including vehicle owners, who are vicariously liable
under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
...1991) (“There is no statutory right to sue a long-term
lessor of an automobile for damages an individual suffers as a
result of the operation of that automobile.”).
The statute defines a vehicle’s owner as “[a] person who holds
the legal title of a motor vehicle.” § 324.021(9)(a), Fla....
...Congress would
later further limit vicarious liability under the doctrine for those
“engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor
vehicles” through the Graves Amendment. 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1)
(2006); see Vargas,
60 So. 3d at 1041-42.
- 22 -
§
324.021(9)(b)3....
...only arising out of the use of the motor vehicle.” Id. Essentially,
the statute prevents an automobile owner who was not directly at
fault for causing an injury from being treated the same as the
operator who caused the injury.
The Legislature, in enacting section 324.021(9)(b), directly
addressed compensation under the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine, laying out protections for individuals who, unlike the
negligent operator, were only indirectly responsible for causing the
harm....
...at 502, 504 (explaining that the
Court’s application of the beneficial ownership exception, also
- 23 -
known as the “bare legal title” exception, is “consistent with
Florida’s statutory scheme, in that vehicle ownership is determined
through legal title” (citing § 324.021(9)(a), Fla....
...- 29 -
B
The Legislature has acted to limit liability under the doctrine
so that owners and lessors are not as financially responsible as the
permissive user who caused the harm. See §
324.021(9)(b);
Kraemer,
572 So. 2d at 1367 (noting that the Legislature
“recognized” the reach of vicarious liability under the doctrine and
“enact[ed] . . . section
324.021(9)(b) . . . to provide relief”). There is
no basis to contravene the financial liability regime in section
324.021(9)(b), or to permit its evasion through artful pleading when
more than one family member has the right to direct the use of an
automobile. Yet that is exactly what we would do, were we to
answer the certified question in the affirmative: we would allow an
end-run around section
324.021(9)(b) anytime family members
shared a car, even if the automobile’s titleholder were found
vicariously liable to the maximum extent provided by statute.
“[A] statute is not an alien intruder in the house of the
common law...
...field and has clearly indicated its ability to deal with such a policy
question, the more prudent course is for this Court to defer to the
legislative branch.”).
15. The Legislature did not repeal or curtail the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine when it amended section 324.021, Florida
Statutes....
...Precluding vicarious liability for family
member bailees when the titleholder concedes vicarious liability will
make the remedy “illusive,” or at most inadequate, in many cases.
See S. Cotton Oil Co.,
86 So. at 632.
While limiting liability within reason, section
324.021(9)(b),
Florida Statutes, can work with the common law to assign vicarious
liability to all those with a property interest in a car who are
indirectly responsible for injuries arising from the negligent
operation of the car....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 11108, 1994 WL 637497
...a motor vehicle for rent or lease shall be primary unless otherwise stated in bold type on the face of the rental or lease agreement. Such insurance shall be primary for the limits of liability and personal injury protection coverage as required by ss.
324.021(7) and
627.736....
...e on appeal. The conclusion that, absent compliance with section
627.7263, the owner’s insurer is responsible for primary coverage is mandated by application of the state’s financial responsibility laws, as outlined in sections
324.151(l)(a) and
324.021(7), Florida Statutes....
...p, maintenance, or use of [the owner’s named vehicle].” (Emphasis added.) 3 Section
627.7263 initially provides that the lessor’s insurance is to be primary “for the limits of liability and personal injury protection coverage as required by ss.
324.021(7) and
627.736.” 4 This statement recognizes the general rule discussed above that the owner’s insurance shall be primary....
...STEVENSON, J., dissents with opinion. . Although the language of the statute has been modified since it was first enacted, the language of the current statute is identical to that of the 1985 statute. . Ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per sections
324.151(l)(a) and
324.021(7), Florida Statutes (1985). . Although the Fowler court was interpreting the 1981 version of section
324.151(l)(a), the statute has only been amended once since then and this modification is not significant to the immediate discussion. . Section
324.021(7) establishes the required amount of financial responsibility regarding liability coverage....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 4072, 1991 WL 71550
...Sylvia and Myron McCloud appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of ap-pellee, Winter Park Leasing, Inc., the own *299 er/lessor of a motor vehicle leased for a term not to exceed six months. The trial court entered summary judgment based upon section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1989). We reverse. The vehicle was leased for less than one year. Thus, section 324.021(9)(b) does not apply....
...The court also stated that the manner in which the parties structured a transaction for tax purposes did not warrant the creation of a wholesale exemption to a dangerous instrumentality doctrine for long-term lessors. Therefore, the statutory designation of the owner, as provided in section 324.021(9)(a), does not change the owner’s liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 2117874, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 7688
...The Estate of Eduardo Villanueva (the Estate) filed a cross-appeal. We affirm without comment the issues raised on direct appeal and two of the four issues raised on cross-appeal. However, we reverse and remand for further proceedings on the cross-appeal issue wherein the trial court improperly applied section 324.021(9)(b)(3), Florida Statutes (2002), to limit Youngblood’s liability for noneconomic damages at $100,000....
...The trial court determined that the non-economic damage portion of the $78,000 of the pretrial settlements was $74,462, which the trial court deducted from the $190,000 jury award for noneconomic damages. The trial court capped those damages at $100,000 by applying section 324.021(9)(b)(3)....
...uced the amount by the $5,000 PIP payout, for a total amount of $505.75 in economic damages. These calculations are reflected in the final judgment entered by the trial court. The trial court based its decision to cap noneconomic damages by applying section 324.021(9)(b)(3) which provides: The owner who is a natural person and loans a motor vehicle to any permissive user shall be liable for the operation of the vehicle or the acts of the operator in connection therewith only up to $100,000 per p...
...(Emphasis added.) In the judgment, the trial court found that although “there was not a direct ‘loan’ from the vehicle owner to the vehicle operator,” Youngblood was still liable for the acts of Aponte under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, and therefore, in its opinion, section 324.021(9)(b)(3) still applied....
...Similarly here, although Youngblood did not transfer title to the vehicle and he did not intend to retake possession, assuming a sale were to occur, under the logic of Ortiz , this scenario does not constitute the type of “loan,” directly or indirectly, that would activate the provisions of section 324.021(9)(b)(3)....
...the vehicle to his personal use. Therefore, giving the statutory words their plain meaning and factoring in the jury’s finding of no theft or conversion, Aponte’s possession of the vehicle could only emanate from a commercial consignment. Hence, section 324.021(9)(b)(3) is not applicable, and the trial court erred in applying it to cap non-economic damages at $100,000....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 7267, 2005 WL 1163011
...The trial court granted Dollar’s motion for remittitur and reduced the future pain and suffering award to $200,000; the court further reduced the jury verdict by $10,000 in PIP benefits that the plaintiff received from an insurance carrier; finally, the court reduced the jury verdict to $100,000 pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2003)....
...The court entered a final judgment for $100,000 in damages and $19,473.91 in costs. Dollar argues that the $10,000 in PIP benefits should have been set off against the $100,000 award required by the statutory cap. However, the applicable statute does not require the set-off against the $100,000 statutory limit. Section 324.021(9)(b)2....
...ute authorizes damages against a lessor in excess of $100,000. The trial court correctly applied the set-off in this case. Finally, we decline the appellee’s invitation to certify a question to the supreme court concerning the constitutionality of section 324.021(9)....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 5808, 2000 WL 628232
...At the time of the accident, the leased vehicle was under the authority and control of AAA Wheelchair Wagon Service. On November 8, 1995, Joseph served a demand letter on Lehman claiming injuries as a result of the accident. Lehman responded that it was not the owner of the vehicle under § 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes .(1999), and included a copy of the lease agreement and certificate of liability insurance....
...3d DCA 1997) (attorney’s fees warranted where lawsuit deemed to be frivolous because there was no possible legal or factual basis for negligence). Lehman provided Joseph with the lease agreement and a certificate of insurance and claimed exemption from liability under § 324.021. Therefore, Joseph was under notice that Lehman was in strict compliance with § 324.021. Joseph argues that § 324.021 requires that the liability insurance remain in effect through' the lease period, and since Lehman did not provide actual verification of insurance, it was still liable as an owner....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 5276, 1998 WL 236230
...az, who died as the result of a head-on collision with a pickup truck leased from G.E. G.E. defended on the basis that it was not the truck’s owner for the purpose of determining financial responsibility for its operation as G.E. had complied with section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1995); which immunizes vehicle lessors from liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine if certain conditions are met. The trial court concluded that G.E. met those conditions and granted summary judgment for G.E. We conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law and reverse. Section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1995) provided: “Owner/lessor — Notwithstanding any other provision of the Florida Statutes or existing ease law, the lessor, under an agreement to lease a motor vehicle for 1 year or longer which requires...
..., would have been limited to $100,-000, leaving coverage in the amount of $100,-000 available to Mrs. Diaz’ estate. The Legislature most certainly knows the difference between types of insurance coverage. As it existed at the time of the accident, Section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1995) provided immunity only for split limit policies in the amount of $100,000/$300,000 or greater, with no provision for single limit policies. In 1996, the Legislature amended section 324.021(9)(b) 2 to add an immunity based on insurance purchased by the lessee with a single limit of not less than “$500,000 combined property damage liability and bodily injury liability.” 3 The policy that G.E....
CopyPublished | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70887, 2010 WL 1982923
...able for the damages that the other authorized drivers negligently cause to third parties."); Susco Car Rental System v. Leonard,
112 So.2d 832, 835-36 (Fla. 1959) (extending primary liability under this doctrine to car rental companies); Fla. Stat. §
324.021(9)(b)(2) (imposing vicarious liability on car rental companies, up to certain amounts, for the negligence of their lessees)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 1666, 1991 WL 27644
...le to Steven Greene, the lessee. Manucor argued that because it was not the owner of the vehicle, it could not be held liable for the lessee’s negligence under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, or in the alternative, that it was immune under section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986), from the type of liability Chorzelewski attempted to impose....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1991 WL 4309
...pparently either on the theory that 1) as a long-term lessor the Bank had only naked legal title and inadequate control over the vehicle to make it vicariously liable for its operation, or 2) the Bank could not be held liable vicariously pursuant to section 324.021(9), Florida Statutes, the statute in effect at the time of the accident....
...certain liability insurance coverage. Folmar does not control this case because the accident herein occurred approximately two years prior to the 1986 amendment adding subsection (b), and the suit was filed more than one year prior to the amendment. Section 324.021(9)(a), formerly section 324.021(9), cannot be relied on for the decision below because it does not create an exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine by defining owner to include long-term lessees....
...General Motors Acceptance Corporation,
572 So.2d 1363, 1366 (Fla.1990), wherein the court rejected the arguments being made here by Norquoy when it said: We also reject GMAC’s contention that the legislature intended to create an exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine by defining owner in section
324.021(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), to include lessees such as Green....
...iability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine under certain circumstances by the passage of chapter 86-229, Laws of Florida. (Footnote omitted.) In commenting on our Folmar decision the supreme court noted that, in adopting subsection (b) of section 324.021: [t]he legislators recognized that under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine long-term lessors were liable for damages caused by drivers of the leased automobiles....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 2310, 1992 WL 38529
PER CURIAM. We hold in accordance with the Florida Supreme Court that section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), is constitutional....
...In addition, we hold that Gables Lincoln Mercury, Inc. acted as a leasing agent for the lessor, Ford Motor Credit Company. Therefore, the trial court was correct when it granted final summary judgment in favor of Ford Motor Credit Company pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 816, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 13134
...Although the legislature neglected to define motor vehicle under this section, we find that the definitions provided under the No-Fault Act (section
627.732(1)), the Traffic Control Law (section
316.003(2) and (21)), the Motor Vehicle Licenses Law (section
320.01(1)) and the Financial Responsibility Law (section
324.021(1)) should be read in pari materia, which compels the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to characterize a moped as a motor vehicle or self-propelled vehicle....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...The plaintiff in a personal injury action appeals a summary judgment
in which the trial court determined that the owner of the vehicle involved
in the accident was limited to $100,000 in liability. He argues the court
erred in determining the coverage available under section 324.021(9)(b)(3),
Florida Statutes, and limiting the vehicle owner’s liability....
...of
any kind by any individual or entity in connection with the subject matter
of the incident described in the complaint. He also asserted that he was
entitled to all benefits, restrictions, safeguards, protections, and
limitations contained within section 324.021, Florida Statutes.
The vehicle owner moved for summary judgment on count one, which
the trial court granted....
...insurance availability requirement or it is treated as payment
toward the owner’s additional liability above the $350,000
actually paid by other policies, the total amount of $250,000
paid by the owner’s policy meets his maximum liability under
Section 324.021(9)(b)(3), Fla....
...Accordingly, Final Judgment shall be
entered in favor of [the vehicle owner] only.
3
It entered the final judgment in favor of the vehicle owner. The plaintiffs
now appeal.
The plaintiffs argue the trial court incorrectly interpreted section
324.021(9)(b)(3) to allow the vehicle owner’s Allstate policy to apply to both
him and the driver, thereby limiting the vehicle owner’s liability....
...motor vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage
to another.’” Rippy v. Shepard,
80 So. 3d 305, 306 (Fla. 2012) (quoting
Aurbach v. Gallina,
753 So. 2d 60, 62 (Fla. 2000)). However, an owner’s
vicarious liability is limited by section
324.021(9)(b)(3). Richbell v.
Toussaint,
221 So. 3d 764, 768 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).
Section
324.021(9)(b)3, Florida Statutes, provides:
The owner who is a natural person and loans a motor vehicle
to any permissive user shall be liable for the operation of the
vehicle or the acts of the operator in connection there...
...This brings the driver’s
total personal injury coverage to $700,000—well over the $500,000
threshold required by the statute to limit the vehicle owner’s liability.
The trial court correctly granted the vehicle owner’s motion for
summary judgment. The vehicle owner’s liability was limited to $100,000
under section 324.021 based upon the available coverage in excess of
$500,000....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 2571, 24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 647
...uperior theory predicated upon Creative’s ownership of the van. Below, after Creative denied liability, both sides moved for summary judgment. Rodriguez cited to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. 1 Creative claimed the exemption contained in section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), which provides: Owner/lessor....
...Neither the lease agreement, the vehicle lease order, the business use form, nor the insurance certification contained the 100/300/50 insurance requirement. There was testimony that during negotiations an officer of Creative had told an officer of Southern that it was Creative’s policy to require section 324.021’s 100/300/50 minimum insurance to be maintained by its lessees and that this policy was also in Creative’s training manual. By April 15, 1993, Southern had secured a liability policy with 100/300/50 coverage. The instant accident occurred some months later. The trial judge concluded that while there had not been actual compliance with section 324.021(9)(b), there had been substantial compliance, and granted summary judgment in lessor’s favor....
...2 The Supreme Court concluded that notwithstanding that insurance was available, absent strict compliance with the statute, the lessor could not qualify for the exemption sought. The court observed: As we have repeatedly stated, the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is uniquely part of Florida’s common law; thus, section 324.021(9)(b) plainly is in derogation of the common law....
...iance with the statute’s provisions. See Florida Steel Corp. v. Adaptable Developments, Inc.,
503 So.2d 1232, 1234 (Fla.1986). Guided by these rules of construction, we conclude that a lessor’s insurance policy cannot satisfy the requirements of section
324.021(9)(b) and exempt a lessor from liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
...able to the lessor which contains limits not less than $100,00/$300,000 bodily injury liability and $50,000 property damage liability.” As stated in Abdala v. World Omni Leasing, Inc.,
583 So.2d 330, 334 (Fla.1991), the legislature, by enacting subsection
324.021(9)(b), redefined “owner” of a motor vehicle “so as to exclude a long-term lessor upon satisfaction of the statutory preconditions.” The instant lease clearly did not contain this second precondition....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 2374, 1995 WL 96807
...Ady contended that AHFC was responsible to the estate because of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. AHFG, in addition to denying the material allegations of the complaint, affirmatively alleged that it was not liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine because of section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1991)....
...After the action was at issue,' AHFC filed a motion for summary judgment. It contended that it was exempt from liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine because a policy of insurance which met the requirements for coverage set forth in section 324.021(9)(b) was in effect at the time of the accident and that Mr....
...4th DCA 1994), contends that AHFC is not exempt from the dangerous instrumentality doctrine because the lessee did not obtain the insurance policy in question. The appellee, on the other hand, contends that Mr. Pelley was an insured under an insurance policy that complied with section 324.021(9)(b) and that the trial court correctly entered a summary judgment in its favor. We agree with appellee. Section 324.021(9)(b) provides: (b) Owner/lessor....
...cable so long as the insurance required under such lease agreement remains in effect. It is undisputed in this ease that the lease was for sixty months and required the lessee to obtain insurance coverage with limits not less than those set forth in section 324.021(9)(b)....
...This policy provided the insurance required by the statute to any lessee who did not purchase his own insurance pursuant to the requirements of the lease. The limits of the policy were tendered to the appellant. In Gedert , our sister court held that section 324.021(9)(b) clearly requires the lessee to have valid insurance on a leased automobile at the time of an accident; otherwise, liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine reverts to the lessor....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 765008, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 3320
...de from the jury’s verdict due to Mrs. Regalado’s comparative negligence and are the subject of Mr. Ortiz’s first issue. Mr. Regalado’s individual award is the subject of Mr. Ortiz’s second issue. Mr. Ortiz contends in his first issue that section 324.021(9)(b)(3), Florida Statutes (2006), should be applied to limit what he, as a vicariously liable *60 defendant, must pay. In his second issue, he contends that he should not be obligated to pay Mr. Regalado damages exceeding Andy’s percentage of fault. We discuss these two issues in turn. II. Limitation On Mr. Ortiz’s Vicarious Liability Under Section 324.021(9)(b)(3), Florida Statutes (2006) Mr....
...Ortiz does not question that Andy Ortiz was negligent in driving their jointly-owned vehicle when Andy struck the Regalado vehicle. However, he maintains that as the co-owner of that vehicle, he is entitled to the limitation on damages for negligent operation of the vehicle that section 324.021(9)(b)(3) provides....
...The owner who is a natural person and loans a motor vehicle to any permissive user shall be liable for the operation of the vehicle or the acts of the operator in connection therewith only up to $100,000 per person and up to $300,000 per incident for bodily injury and up to $50,000 for property damage. § 324.021(9)(b)(3)....
...We are further unpersuaded by Mr. Ortiz’s argument relating to the requirement to liberally construe remedial statutes, *61 which he claims this subsection to be. He conceives this latter argument by analogizing to the fact that the next subsection, § 324.021(9)(c)(1), gives similar relief to companies whose business is renting or leasing motor vehicles but not to owners whose vehicles are used by another in the owner’s ordinary course of business....
...This term, “loans,” is not defined in the statute nor do we find a clear intent of the legislature to give it a different meaning and apply it as between co-owners; we thus give it its dictionary meaning. We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Mr. Ortiz the statutory cap of section 324.021(9)(b)(3) to limit what he is required to pay Mrs....
...Regalado or either of her surviving children based on his vicarious liability for Andy Ortiz’s negligent operation of their jointly-owned vehicle. 5 Because vicarious liability is of major concern to the citizens of Florida, we certify the following question as one of great public importance: DOES SECTION 324.021(9)(b)(3) APPLY TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES ONE CO-OWNER OF A VEHICLE MUST PAY WHEN THE OTHER CO-OWNER OPERATES THEIR JOINTLY OWNED VEHICLE NEGLIGENTLY AND INCURS DAMAGES PAYABLE TO A THIRD PARTY? III....
...Regalado her damages, there might be a chance that she could no longer contribute; she might soon be judgment proof either because her damage award was spent or because she might have absconded from the jurisdiction. IV. Conclusion We affirm that part of the trial court’s ruling that section 324.021(9)(b)(3) was not applicable to Mr....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...The plaintiff in a personal injury action appeals a summary judgment
in which the trial court determined that the owner of the vehicle involved
in the accident was limited to $100,000 in liability. He argues the court
erred in determining the coverage available under section 324.021(9)(b)(3),
Florida Statutes, and limiting the vehicle owner’s liability....
...of
any kind by any individual or entity in connection with the subject matter
of the incident described in the complaint. He also asserted that he was
entitled to all benefits, restrictions, safeguards, protections, and
limitations contained within section 324.021, Florida Statutes.
The vehicle owner moved for summary judgment on count one, which
the trial court granted....
...insurance availability requirement or it is treated as payment
toward the owner’s additional liability above the $350,000
actually paid by other policies, the total amount of $250,000
paid by the owner’s policy meets his maximum liability under
Section 324.021(9)(b)(3), Fla....
...INDEMNITY COMPANY. Accordingly, Final Judgment shall be
entered in favor of [the vehicle owner] only.
It entered the final judgment in favor of the vehicle owner. The plaintiffs
now appeal.
The plaintiffs argue the trial court incorrectly interpreted section
324.021(9)(b)(3) to allow the vehicle owner’s Allstate policy to apply to both
him and the driver, thereby limiting the vehicle owner’s liability....
...motor vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage
to another.’” Rippy v. Shepard,
80 So. 3d 305, 306 (Fla. 2012) (quoting
Aurbach v. Gallina,
753 So. 2d 60, 62 (Fla. 2000)). However, an owner’s
vicarious liability is limited by section
324.021(9)(b)(3). Richbell v.
Toussaint,
221 So. 3d 764, 768 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).
Section
324.021(9)(b)3, Florida Statutes, provides:
The owner who is a natural person and loans a motor vehicle
to any permissive user shall be liable for the operation of the
vehicle or the acts of the operator in connection there...
...well over the $500,000
threshold required by the statute to limit the vehicle owner’s liability.
The trial court correctly granted the vehicle owner’s motion for
summary judgment. The vehicle owner’s liability was limited to $100,000
under section 324.021 based upon the available coverage in excess of
$500,000....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 5982, 1991 WL 110845
...Appellee Ford Motor Credit Company entered into a long-term auto lease with Nancy Gerken. On February 8, 1987, Gerken was driving the car when an accident injuring appellant Jeff Trevisol occurred. Tre-visol sued Ford as the owner of the automobile. The trial court entered summary judgment for Ford, finding that section 324.021(9)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986), absolves long-term lessors of liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
...General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
572 So.2d 1363 (Fla.1990). See also McCloud v. Wright,
579 So.2d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). This is the same result we reached in Powis v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,
575 So.2d 735 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), a separate case arising out of the same accident. We note that section
324.021(9)(b) does not relieve Ford of liability here....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2017 WL 2664701, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 8972
...They argue the *766 trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings and in giving a special jury instruction. Two of the defendants cross-appeal an order denying their motion to.limit the judgment against the owner of one of the vehicles, , . pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b)(3), Florida Statutes (2014)....
...The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial and entered final judgment for the truck driver, his companies, and the trailer’s owner. Post-verdict, the owner of the vehicle that rear-ended the plaintiffs’ daughter moved to limit the judgment to $100,000, based on section 324.021(9)(b)(3), Florida Statutes, which limits the liability of .the motor vehicle owner who “loans” a vehicle to a permissive user....
...We have de novo, review. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Florida Parks, LLC,
986 So.2d 1260, 1264 (Fla. 2008). The owner and driver argue the car was loaned to the driver as a permissive user, entitling the owner to the financial limitation set forth in section
324.021(9)(b)(3)....
...is vehicle by a permissive user. See Hertz Corp. v. Jackson,
617 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1993). The vicarious liability of a permissive user under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is then limited by Florida’s financial responsibility statute, section
324.021(9)(b)(3)....
...That section provides in part: “The owner who is a natural person and loans a motor vehicle to any permissive user shall be' liable for the operation of the vehicle or the acts of the operator in connection therewith only up to $100,000 per person ....”§ 324.021(9)(b)(3)....
...at 60 (quoting Loan, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)). It also looked to the definition of “loans,” “loaned,” or “on loan” in section 265.565(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2012), for guidance. Id. at 64 n.4. The Second District held that section 324.021(9)(b)(3) did not limit the father’s financial responsibility because he had not “loaned” the vehicle to his son in the ordinary sense of the word since he co-owned the vehicle with his son....
...Rather, it involves a permissive grant of temporary use of the vehicle without transfer of title. Neither Ortiz nor Youngblood , dictate the result here. The temporary control of the car by the passenger in this case falls within the parameters of a loan. This is especially true given the legislative intent of this statute. Section 324.021(9)(b) was enacted to limit strict vicarious liability against innocent owners and lessors of motor vehicles who entrust their vehicles to another who is at fault....
...opinion issued after trial. . If the permissive user is uninsured or has any insurance with limits less than $500,000 combined for property damage and bodily injury liability, the owner is liable for up to an additional $500,000 in economic damages. § 324.021(9)(b)(3)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 4459, 1990 WL 83618
...General Accident Insurance Company of America (“General Accident”) appeals from the trial court’s declaratory judgment which ruled that Southern Insurance Company (“Southern”) had the primary insurance coverage for a truck-tractor, 1 but limited Southern’s primary coverage to $10,-000, pursuant to section 324.021(7)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986)....
...Southern is the insurer for Central Florida, and it had issued a $500,000 policy. The trial court determined that Southern was the primary carrier because its insured was the owner of the truck-tractor. However, it-held that Southern’s primary coverage is limited to the minimum coverage required by section 324.021(7)....
...There is, however, a confusing barrage of possibly applicable statutes. If we err here, it is on the side of requiring more, rather than less, insurance coverage, in order to carry out Florida’s public policy of protecting the motoring public on our public streets and highways. §
627.731, Fla.Stat. (1989). Section
324.021(7), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986) provides the minimum liability coverage that in general must be obtained for a motor vehicle: (a) In the amount of $10,000 because of bodily injury to, or death of, one person in any one accident; (b)...
...627.7415 and
627.742, respectively. Both parties agree the truck-tractor in question is a “commercial vehicle.” 4 Pursuant to section
627.7415, commercial vehicles over 26,000 pounds are required to have more insurance than those covered only by section
324.021(7)....
...n was no longer effective. Since dealers do not need to obtain titles while vehicles are held in their inventory for sale, there was no current declaration of gross weight for this vehicle at the time of the accident. Thus, the general provisions of section 324.021(7) apply....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 7284, 1999 WL 346022
...We affirm the trial court’s well reasoned order granting summary final judgment on the ground that Gelco was not liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine because its lessee, North County Towing, maintained the requisite minimum insurance coverage required by section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1997)....
...ity insurance coverage on the 1992 Chevrolet truck and provided verification to *1157 GELCO with annual Certificates of Insurance. (Footnote omitted). Under these facts, Gelco avoids liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 18342
...Section
627.7263 has been modified by section 29 of Chapter 77-468, Laws of Florida, to reflect the case law cited herein. It will remain in effect until July 1, 1982, the date of its repeal, unless further mod *182 ified by the Legislature. Ch. 76-168, Laws of Fla. . §
324.021(7), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...(2022), limiting liability to
a vessel operator unless the owner is present, §
327.32, Fla. Stat. (2022),
limiting the liability of a lessor of an automobile subject to registration for
operation on public roads, depending on the duration of the lease, §§
324.021(9)(b)1., 2., Fla. Stat. (2022), and, finally, limiting the liability of
owners who are natural persons and lend their car to any permissive user, §
324.021(9)(b)3., Fla....
...ility for Medical Malpractice, 64
Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1309 (Nov. 1964) (“[T]he contradictory term ‘willful and
wanton’ negligence, vaguely denotes quasi-intentional conduct that is
qualitatively different from [mere] negligence.”); see also § 324.021(9)(b)3.,
Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...§ 30106 (2005).
limited the dealership’s liability.
In its answer, the dealership admitted it owned the vehicle but denied
all other allegations. It asserted the following as defenses: comparative
negligence; the plaintiff’s failure to mitigate damages; the damages were
limited by section 324.021, Florida Statutes, because the dealership
leased the vehicle to its employee; and the protection of the Graves
Amendment, 49 U.S.C....
...attached.
The dealership filed an amended motion for summary judgment
arguing entitlement to a judgment as a matter of law based on the Graves
Amendment. The dealership alternatively argued it was entitled to a
partial summary judgment, pursuant to § 324.021, Fla....
...dealership rental cars. The car involved in the accident was pre-owned
and did not have a courtesy vehicle sticker.
The plaintiff also argued the dealership was not entitled to partial
summary judgment capping liability at $600,000, pursuant to
§ 324.021(9)(b)3., Fla....
...The dealership admitted the first rental agreement had not been
executed by the employee but argued the rental agreements were irrelevant
because the Graves Amendment did not require a written rental
agreement. The dealership also admitted it cited the wrong subsection of
§ 324.021, Fla....
...The plaintiff insisted the issue of whether the vehicle was a
rental remained a factual question for the jury. It suggested the dealership
was motivated to have the car appear to be a rental because, without the
Graves Amendment, it was subject to liability under § 324.021, Fla....
...matter of affirmative defense is to be asserted thereto, then the affirmative
defense is deemed denied, and a reply of simple denial would be surplusage.”
Moore Meats, Inc. v. Strawn In & For Seminole Cty,
313 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla.
1975).
4
Section
324.021, Fla....
...Stat., lays out the following three categories of
relationships to vehicles that can limit liability:
1) lessors who rent vehicles for one year or longer;
2) lessors who rent vehicles for less than one year; and
3) an owner who is a natural person and loans a vehicle to
any permissive user.
§ 324.021(9)(b)1-3, Fla....
...liability for a specific category of owner/lessors that
under Florida’s reforms remained, to an extent, exposed—
those “engaged in the trade or business of renting or
leasing motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1). Under
section 324.021(9)(b)2, an owner/lessor who is engaged in the
5
trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles and who
leases a motor vehicle for less than a year is “deemed the
owne...
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 10440, 2002 WL 1724026
...Pursuant to section
627.7263, Florida Statutes (1999), the vehicle rental contract specified in bold type on its face that the driver’s policy provides primary coverage for the limits of liability and personal injury protection coverage required by section
324.021(7) and section
627.736, Florida Statutes....
...motor vehicle for rent or lease is primary unless otherwise stated in at least 10-point type on the face of the rental or lease agreement. Such insurance is primary for the limits'of liability and personal injury protection coverage as required by ss.
324.021(7) and
627.736....
...at least 10-point type: “The valid and collectible liability insurance and personal injury protection insurance of any authorized rental or leasing driver is primary for the limits of liability and personal injury protection coverage required by ss.
324.021(7) and
627.736, Florida Statutes.”
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 9984, 2015 WL 4002557
...le costs, the trial court ultimately entered a final judgment against Santos and Pereles for $12,832,837.17, with language providing that Brink’s recovery against Santos was “[sjubject to the limitations of [Santos’] responsibility pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2008).” On appeal, Santos and Pereles challenge certain evidentiary rulings by the trial court. Additionally, Santos contends that, pursuant to section 324.021, the judgment against him should not have exceeded $600,000, plus applicable costs and interest. We find merit to this last argument, but otherwise affirm. Section 324.021(9)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2008), provides: The owner who is a natural person and loans a motor vehicle to any permissive user shall be liable for the operation of the vehicle or the acts of the operator in connection therewith only u...
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 10879, 2003 WL 21673036
FULMER, Judge. Sandra Lynn appeals the final judgment entered against her in an action arising out of an automobile accident. Lynn specifically challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to reduce the judgment which she filed pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b)(3), Florida Statutes (1999), a provision that, under certain circumstances, limits the liability of a motor vehicle owner who loans the vehicle to a permissive user....
...The verdict form does not differentiate between Dykstra and Lynn as to liability for compensatory damages. The jury also assessed punitive damages of $5000 against Dykstra. Lynn filed a motion seeking to reduce the judgment against her pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b)(3), which provides: The owner who is a natural person and loans a motor vehicle to any permissive user shall be liable for the operation of the vehicle or the acts of the operator in connection therewith only up to $100,000 per...
...Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to affect the liability of the owner for his or her own negligence. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Lynn’s motion. The order recites the trial court’s conclusion “that [section] 324.021(9)(b)(3), Florida Statutes, applies only to motor vehicle lessor/lessee relationships, which was not present in the subject case.” We disagree....
...he trial court made a comment to indicate that it agreed with counsel for Lynn that the stipulation did not operate as a waiver of Lynn’s right to the statutory cap. However, because the trial court accepted the argument presented by Feldmeth that section 324.021 only applies to situations involving leased or rented vehicles, the trial court’s order did not reach the issue of the effect of the parties’ stipulation on Lynn’s right to assert the statutory cap....
CopyPublished | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6729
...One of these ways (and the only one we need consider here) is by furnishing satisfactory evidence that he holds a motor vehicle liability policy, which is defined as a policy furnished as proof of financial responsibility under §
324.031 F.S.A. that fulfills certain statutory requirements, §
324.021 F.S.A....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 586, 1998 WL 27298
...d collectible liability and personal injury protection insurance of the renter, or any other person operating this motor vehicle with the renter’s consent, shall be primary, in accordance with the limits of liability as required by Florida Statute 324.021(7)....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 5011, 2009 WL 175445
...SAWAYA, ORFINGER and LAWSON, JJ., concur. ON MOTION TO CERTIFY PER CURIAM. We grant Appellants’ motion to cei’tify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question as one of great public importance: DOES THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, 49 U.S.C. § 30106 , PREEMPT SECTION 324.021(9)(B)(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (2007)? This is the same question certified by this court in Karling v....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 3618, 2009 WL 275183
...Karling, moved for certification of a question of great public importance. We grant the motion and certify the following question in accordance with rule 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, as one of great public importance: DOES THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, PREEMPT SECTION 324.021(9)(B)(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (2007)? This is the same question recently certified by the Second District in West v....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 315871, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 1385
...DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. Trust,
1 So.3d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), review granted, No. SC09-390 (Fla. Nov. 9, 2011), and certify the following question as a matter of great public importance: DOES THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, PREEMPT SECTION
324.021(9)(b)1., FLORIDA STATUTES? AFFIRMED; QUESTION CERTIFIED....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 1365, 1999 WL 68787
...r is not a rental vehicle. The legislature could have chosen to enact a similar rule for rental cars by which the price of the rental contract included primary coverage of $100,000 per claimant and $300,000 per accident for all authorized users. Cf. § 324.021(9)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 17106
...The provisions in these policies mesh perfectly to require payment from the respective companies in precisely the proportions on which they agreed in settling their respective liabilities for the first $300,000 of damages caused by the accident.” Reversed and remanded with directions. . See Section 324.021(7), Florida Statutes (1975), specifying a $15,000.00 minimum liability limit at the time of the accident here at issue.
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 25393
...Upon discussing this notification with his insurance agent, the insured decided not to include U.M. coverage equal to the amount of his bodily injury limit and in 1974 signed *1110 a rejection of coverage form and elected minimum policy limits for U.M. coverage of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident. In 1975, Section 324.021(7), Florida Statutes (1975), mandated that U.M....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...ways in the last fifty years. See
252 So. 2d at 233-37; compare § 627.0851(1), Fla.
Stat. (1967) (“No automobile liability insurance . . . shall be delivered or issued . . .
unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than limits
described in §
324.021(7) ....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 11132, 2001 WL 883631
PER CURIAM. The trial court properly found that World Investments is not entitled to limit its liability pursuant to section 324.021(9)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (1999). As defined by section 324.021(9)(c)(l), Florida Statutes (1999), World Investments Corp....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1974 Fla. App. LEXIS 8783
...As a result of the accident Smith, Fred D. Clay and Irma J. Clay were killed. Scott and Clay sustained serious injuries. The Fernandez vehicle was insured by State Farm Insurance Company. The State Farm policy contained the minimum limits of public liability coverage as required by Section 324.021(7), Florida’s Financial Responsibility Law, to-wit, $10,000 per person and a maximum of $20,000 for each accident....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 8164, 1991 WL 156602
...r the weight of the cranes. We find, therefore, that there is no precedent nor evidence contrary to the judgment of the trial court that this road grader is not a dangerous instrumentality. Leasing Service also contends that this action is barred by § 324.021(9)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1986), which exempts long term lessors of “motor vehicles” from financial responsibility under certain circumstances. Section 324.021(9)(b) is unavailing to the lessor of a road grader, for the section was intended to apply to lessors of automobiles....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11164, 1990 WL 122419
...Alamo was, at all times material, insured by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty). 4. As a result of the motor vehicle accident, Liberty defended Mr. French and Alamo, and Liberty settled and paid the injured plaintiff’s claim for $98,000. 5. Liberty concedes that, pursuant to Florida Statute Section 324.021(7), it insured Alamo and Mr....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 19753
...The trial court erred in finding the exclusionary language invalid. The policy clearly and unambiguously excludes from coverage the damage to Eddie Jackson’s tractor. See New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Carter,
359 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Furthermore, Section
324.021(1), Florida Statutes (1977) expressly excludes “farm tractors” from the definition of “motor vehicles.” Accordingly, it is difficult to imagine how the legislative intent of Chapter 324 or the public policy of Florida could be violated by a similar exclusion in the insurance policy....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 217, 2013 WL 1338047, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 566
...§ 30106 (2006), which provides that the owner of a motor vehicle who leases the vehicle shall not be vicariously hable for harm that results from the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the lease. Specifically, we consider whether the Graves Amendment preempts liability *1166 under section 324.021(9)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2002), which defines when a long-term lessor remains the owner of a leased motor vehicle and thereby subject to vicarious liability for damages caused by the vehicle under Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
...We have for review the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Rosado v. DaimlerChrysler Financial Services Trust,
1 So.3d 1200, 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), in which the Second District certified a question to this Court as one of great public importance: “DOES THE GRAVES AMENDMENT, 49 U.S.C. § 30106 , PREEMPT SECTION
324.021(9)(b)(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (2002).” We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we answer the certified question in the affirmative. The Graves Amendment preempts section
324.021(9)(b)(1)....
...Rosado, who sustained injuries in the collision, filed suit in Florida against Carl LaMondue, who executed the lease, the law firm, Parham, and DaimlerChrysler. Rosado alleged that because Daimler-Chrysler had failed to comply with the insurance requirements of section 324.021(9)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2002), DaimlerChrysler was vicariously liable for Parham’s negligent operation of the car under Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine. DaimlerChrysler moved for summary judgment, contending that its liability, if any, should be based on Virginia tort law and that if Florida law applied, section 324.021(9)(b)(1) was preempted by the Graves Amendment. The trial court concluded that Florida law applied but that the Graves Amendment did preempt section 324.021(9)(b)(1)....
...e Clause. Second, he argued that the Graves Amendment was inapplicable to his case because the accident occurred and the lawsuit commenced before the enactment of the Graves Amendment. Third, Rosado asserted that the Graves Amendment did not preempt section
324.021(9)(b)(1) because the federal legislation includes a savings clause that exempts state financial responsibility laws from its preemptive reach. Rosado,
1 So.3d at 1204 . The Second District affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the Graves Amendment preempted section
324.021(9)(b)(1)....
...After rejecting Rosado’s first argument as without merit and his second argument as procedurally barred, the Second District discussed Rosado’s third argument in detail. The Second District concluded that the Graves Amendment precludes states from imposing vicarious liability on automobile lessors and that section 324.021(9)(b)(1) *1167 was not an exempted financial responsibility law under the Graves Amendment. The Second District reasoned that 324.021(9)(b)(l) does not “impos[e] financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle” or “impose liability on business entities engaged in the trade o...
...easing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law.” Rosado,
1 So.3d at 1205 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (b)) (alteration in original). Before this Court, Rosado contends that section
324.021(9)(b)(l) is a financial responsibility law and therefore not preempted by the Graves Amendment....
...2) imposing liability on business entities engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under State law. The statute at issue in this case, section 324.021(9), which defines words and phrases used in chapter 324, Florida Statutes, provides in part: (9) OWNER; OWNER/LESSOR.— *1168 (a) Owner....
...per person and up to $300,000 per incident for bodily injury and up to $50,000 for property damage.... Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to affect the liability of the owner for his or her own negligence. This Court has concluded that section
324.021(9)(b)(2), the portion of section
324.021(9) concerning short-term lessors, conflicts with and is thus preempted by the Graves Amendment. See Vargas,
60 So.3d at 1041 . In Vargas , this Court concluded that section
324.021(9)(b)(2), enacted in 1999, “clearly preserved” the existing Florida law imposing vicarious liability on short-term lessors, whereas the Graves Amendment “clearly sought to eliminate *1169 vicarious liability” for lessors.
60 So.3d at 1042 . This Court then rejected the argument that section
324.021(9)(b)(2) was a financial responsibility law within the savings clause of the Graves Amendment: Section
324.021(9)(b)2 does not require insurance or its equivalent as a condition of licensing or registration....
...r liability insurance requirements under state law, and the liability contemplated — i.e., vicarious liability for damages caused by the negligence of lessees— does not flow from any failure to meet such requirements. Rather, as explained above, section
324.021(9)(b)2 preserves Florida common law vicarious liability by deeming short-term (less than one year) lessors to be “owners” for vicarious liability purposes, while limiting their exposure to damages for such claims. Therefore, it conflicts with and is thus preempted by the Graves Amendment. Vargas,
60 So.3d at 1042-43 . Rosado contends that this Court should not follow Vargas regarding the long-term lessor portion of section
324.021(9)(b). Rosado relies on section
324.021(9)(a), which since 1955 has provided that “in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement,” “such conditional vendee ... shall be deemed the owner for the purpose of this chapter.” Rosado asserts that under this definition of “owner” in section
324.021(9)(a), a long-term lessor who enters into a lease agreement that includes a right to purchase the vehicle — such as the lease between DaimlerChrysler and the LaMondue Law Firm — is not an owner and therefore not subject to vicarious liability under Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Based on this conclusion that section
324.021(9)(a) shields long-term lessors from an owner’s vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, Rosado asserts that the vicarious liability contemplated by section
324.021(9)(b)(l) must instead be a punishment for long-term lessors who fail to comply with the insurance standards set out in the statute. Rosado’s argument is without merit. This Court has previously rejected the premise that the definition of “owner” in section
324.021(9)(a) renders a long-term lessor such as DaimlerChrysler not an owner for purposes of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
...owner, subject to vicarious liability stemming from the operation of that vehicle by the lessee. In Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
572 So.2d 1363 (Fla.1990), the lessor, General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), contended that under section
324.021(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), it could not be held vicariously liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for the actions of its lessee because the long-term rental argument included an option to purchase the vehicle. This Court rejected the argument that the lessee’s status as an “owner” under section
324.021(9)(a) absolved the long-term lessor of vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
....” Id. at 1365-66 . In other words, where an owner chooses to lease — rather than sell— a vehicle, the lessor-owner remains subject to vicarious liability under Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Furthermore, while concluding that section 324.021(9)(b) was inapplicable to the case due to GMAC’s failure to maintain insurance coverage, the Court expressly stated in Kraemer that section 324.021(9)0) — not section 324.021(9)(a)— provided a limited avenue by which a long-term lessor in Florida could avoid vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine....
...s of the leased automobiles. In addition, Kraemer recognized that the [Legislature acted to eliminate long-term lessors’ liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, upon the satisfaction of specified preconditions ... as codified at subsection 324.021(9)(b).”). Under Kraemer and Abdala , long-term lessors are owners subject to vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine — unless they avail themselves of the opt-out options prescribed by section 324.021(9)(b)(l)....
...t a long-term lessor is — absent an affirmative action to rid itself of ownership status under section 342.021(9)(b)(l) — the owner of a vehicle and subject to vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Accordingly, unless section
324.021(9)(b)(1) is a financial responsibility law within the savings clause of the Graves Amendment, the federal and state laws conflict. The reasoning from Vargas demonstrates that section
324.021(9)(b)(l) is not such a financial responsibility law. Contrary to the dissent’s claim, a long-term lessor who chooses not to obtain the insurance outlined by section
324.021(9)(b)(l) will not incur any new or additional liability as a result of that decision. Like section
324.021(9)(b)(2), the plain language of section
324.021(9)(b)(l) “does not require insurance or its equivalent as a condition of licensing or registration” and “does not require an owner/lessor to meet any financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under state law.” Vargas,
60 So.3d at 1042 . Rather than requiring a lessor to purchase insurance, the statute creates an option. Under section
324.021(9)(b)(l), a long-term lessor can choose to remain the “owner” of the motor vehicle — and subject to vicarious liability under Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine — or the long-term lessor can opt out of owner status by obtaining a certain amount of insurance coverage or ensuring that the lessee maintains a certain amount of coverage. The Legislature could have chosen to make the insurance limits contemplated in section
324.021(9)(b)(l) mandatory, but instead that Legislature chose to require owners and operators to have proof of only the lesser amount of insurance mandated by section
324.021(7), Florida Statutes (2002), titled “Proof of Financial Responsibility.” As a result, a long- *1171 term lessor who chooses not to obtain the insurance outlined by section
324.021(9)(b)(l) will not incur a new financial obligation....
...Such a long-term lessor will continue to face the existing vicarious liability and financial responsibility imposed by Florida’s common law and other statutes. A long-term lessor who does not obtain insurance will be in the same financial position as he or she would have been if section
324.021(9)(b)(l) had never been enacted. Rosado also argues that section
324.021(9)(b)(l) should be interpreted as a financial responsibility law because — unlike section
324.021(9)(b)(2) — the statute uses the terms “requires” and “requirements” in regard to insurance coverage. The plain language of section
324.021(9)(b)(1) refutes this argument. “Requires” and “requirements” are used in section
324.021(9)(b)(l) to explain what type of optional coverage will trigger the statutory exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The statute does not use the terms to indicate that the acquisition or maintenance of insurance is mandatory under Florida law. Section
324.021(9)(b)(l) creates a “mere financial inducement!]” to purchase insurance, not a legal requirement to do so. Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc.,
540 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir.2008). Finally, Rosado argues in the alternative that if this Court determines that the Graves Amendment preempted section
324.021(9)(b)(l), DaimlerChrysler should be required to indemnify Rosado for $1,000,000 due to DaimlerChrysler’s failure to maintain insurance....
...esented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved.” (quoting Tillman v. State,
471 So.2d 32, 35 (Fla.1985))). III. CONCLUSION Section
324.021(9)(b)(1) is not a law that imposes “financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle” or “liability on business entities engaged in th...
...Rather than imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards, the statute creates a process by which long-term lessors can avoid the default financial responsibility imposed upon them by Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine. As a result, the Graves Amendment preempts section 324.021(9)(b)(l), Florida Statutes (2002)....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Argued: Nov 18, 2022
...ehi-
cle. State Farm argued further that the meaning of the Policy’s term
“uninsured motor vehicle” should be interpreted consistently with
the definition of “motor vehicle” that appeared in Florida Statutes
§ 324.021, also known as the Financial Responsibility Law (“FRL”).
Under the FRL’s definition of “motor vehicle,” State Farm argued,
USCA11 Case: 21-12062 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 04/03/2023 Page: 7 of 23...
...Put simply, a driver of a motor vehicle must maintain
liability insurance. The FRL defines the term “motor vehicle” as
“[e]very self-propelled vehicle that is designed and required to be
licensed for use upon a highway.” Id. § 324.021(1)....
...operating a motor vehicle on Florida’s roadways. Id. §
324.031.
The FRL defines a “[m]otor vehicle” as “[e]very self-propelled ve-
hicle that is designed and required to be licensed for use upon a
highway.” Id. §
324.021(1)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 14828
...Kenilworth claimed, during the discovery period, the policy limits ($20,000/$10,000/$5,000) were repeatedly made a matter of record and acknowledged by Pizarro. Kenilworth does admit that it received a letter from Pizarro’s counsel, wherein the attorney expressed the opinion that Section 324.021(7), Florida Statutes (1973) was applicable, thus making the policy limits $15,000/$30,000....
...The order under review is therefore affirmed, without prejudice to the parties proceeding in the trial court in the manner set forth in Williams v. Banning, supra. Affirmed. . It was a $10,000.00 policy, but there was some dispute that the actual amount should have been $15,000.00 because of the provisions of § 324.021(7), Florida Statutes (1973), which was in effect between the dates of 1973 and October 1, 1976, the accident in question having occurred on January 5, 1975 which falls within the effective date of this statute.
