The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XXXVII
INSURANCE

Chapter 627
INSURANCE RATES AND CONTRACTS

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F.S. 627.732

627.732 Definitions.—As used in ss. 627.730-627.7405, the term:

(1) “Broker” means any person not possessing a license under chapter 395, chapter 400, chapter 429, chapter 458, chapter 459, chapter 460, chapter 461, or chapter 641 who charges or receives compensation for any use of medical equipment and is not the 100-percent owner or the 100-percent lessee of such equipment. For purposes of this section, such owner or lessee may be an individual, a corporation, a partnership, or any other entity and any of its 100-percent-owned affiliates and subsidiaries. For purposes of this subsection, the term “lessee” means a long-term lessee under a capital or operating lease, but does not include a part-time lessee. The term “broker” does not include a hospital or physician management company whose medical equipment is ancillary to the practices managed, a debt collection agency, or an entity that has contracted with the insurer to obtain a discounted rate for such services; nor does the term include a management company that has contracted to provide general management services for a licensed physician or health care facility and whose compensation is not materially affected by the usage or frequency of usage of medical equipment or an entity that is 100-percent owned by one or more hospitals or physicians. The term “broker” does not include a person or entity that certifies, upon request of an insurer, that:

(a) It is a clinic licensed under ss. 400.990-400.995;

(b) It is a 100-percent owner of medical equipment; and

(c) The owner’s only part-time lease of medical equipment for personal injury protection patients is on a temporary basis not to exceed 30 days in a 12-month period, and such lease is solely for the purposes of necessary repair or maintenance of the 100-percent-owned medical equipment or pending the arrival and installation of the newly purchased or a replacement for the 100-percent-owned medical equipment, or for patients for whom, because of physical size or claustrophobia, it is determined by the medical director or clinical director to be medically necessary that the test be performed in medical equipment that is open-style. The leased medical equipment cannot be used by patients who are not patients of the registered clinic for medical treatment of services. Any person or entity making a false certification under this subsection commits insurance fraud as defined in s. 817.234. However, the 30-day period provided in this paragraph may be extended for an additional 60 days as applicable to magnetic resonance imaging equipment if the owner certifies that the extension otherwise complies with this paragraph.

(2) “Medically necessary” refers to a medical service or supply that a prudent physician would provide for the purpose of preventing, diagnosing, or treating an illness, injury, disease, or symptom in a manner that is:

(a) In accordance with generally accepted standards of medical practice;

(b) Clinically appropriate in terms of type, frequency, extent, site, and duration; and

(3) “Motor vehicle” means any self-propelled vehicle with four or more wheels which is of a type both designed and required to be licensed for use on the highways of this state and any trailer or semitrailer designed for use with such vehicle and includes:

(a) A “private passenger motor vehicle,” which is any motor vehicle which is a sedan, station wagon, or jeep-type vehicle and, if not used primarily for occupational, professional, or business purposes, a motor vehicle of the pickup, panel, van, camper, or motor home type.

(b) A “commercial motor vehicle,” which is any motor vehicle which is not a private passenger motor vehicle.

The term “motor vehicle” does not include a mobile home or any motor vehicle which is used in mass transit, other than public school transportation, and designed to transport more than five passengers exclusive of the operator of the motor vehicle and which is owned by a municipality, a transit authority, or a political subdivision of the state.

(4) “Named insured” means a person, usually the owner of a vehicle, identified in a policy by name as the insured under the policy.

(5) “Owner” means a person who holds the legal title to a motor vehicle; or, in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of a security agreement or lease with an option to purchase with the debtor or lessee having the right to possession, then the debtor or lessee shall be deemed the owner for the purposes of ss. 627.730-627.7405.

(6) “Relative residing in the same household” means a relative of any degree by blood or by marriage who usually makes her or his home in the same family unit, whether or not temporarily living elsewhere.

(7) “Certify” means to swear or attest to being true or represented in writing.

(8) “Immediate personal supervision,” as it relates to the performance of medical services by nonphysicians not in a hospital, means that an individual licensed to perform the medical service or provide the medical supplies must be present within the confines of the physical structure where the medical services are performed or where the medical supplies are provided such that the licensed individual can respond immediately to any emergencies if needed.

(9) “Incident,” with respect to services considered as incident to a physician’s professional service, for a physician licensed under chapter 458, chapter 459, chapter 460, or chapter 461, if not furnished in a hospital, means such services must be an integral, even if incidental, part of a covered physician’s service.

(10) “Knowingly” means that a person, with respect to information, has actual knowledge of the information; acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or acts in reckless disregard of the information, and proof of specific intent to defraud is not required.

(11) “Lawful” or “lawfully” means in substantial compliance with all relevant applicable criminal, civil, and administrative requirements of state and federal law related to the provision of medical services or treatment.

(12) “Hospital” means a facility that, at the time services or treatment were rendered, was licensed under chapter 395.

(13) “Properly completed” means providing truthful, substantially complete, and substantially accurate responses as to all material elements to each applicable request for information or statement by a means that may lawfully be provided and that complies with this section, or as agreed by the parties.

(14) “Upcoding” means an action that submits a billing code that would result in payment greater in amount than would be paid using a billing code that accurately describes the services performed. The term does not include an otherwise lawful bill by a magnetic resonance imaging facility, which globally combines both technical and professional components, if the amount of the global bill is not more than the components if billed separately; however, payment of such a bill constitutes payment in full for all components of such service.

(15) “Unbundling” means an action that submits a billing code that is properly billed under one billing code, but that has been separated into two or more billing codes, and would result in payment greater in amount than would be paid using one billing code.

(16) “Emergency medical condition” means a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity, which may include severe pain, such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in any of the following:

(a) Serious jeopardy to patient health.

(b) Serious impairment to bodily functions.

(17) “Entity wholly owned” means a proprietorship, group practice, partnership, or corporation that provides health care services rendered by licensed health care practitioners and in which licensed health care practitioners are the business owners of all aspects of the business entity, including, but not limited to, being reflected as the business owners on the title or lease of the physical facility, filing taxes as the business owners, being account holders on the entity’s bank account, being listed as the principals on all incorporation documents required by this state, and having ultimate authority over all personnel and compensation decisions relating to the entity. However, this definition does not apply to an entity that is wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by a hospital licensed under chapter 395.

History.—s. 3, ch. 71-252; s. 3, ch. 76-168; s. 1, ch. 77-457; s. 2, ch. 78-374; ss. 2, 3, ch. 81-318; ss. 551, 563, ch. 82-243; s. 68, ch. 82-386; s. 1, ch. 85-320; s. 5, ch. 86-182; s. 6, ch. 95-202; s. 1, ch. 97-84; s. 361, ch. 97-102; s. 5, ch. 2001-271; s. 18, ch. 2003-2; ss. 7, 19, ch. 2003-411; s. 30, ch. 2005-3; s. 98, ch. 2006-197; s. 10, ch. 2007-324; s. 9, ch. 2012-197.

F.S. 627.732 on Google Scholar

F.S. 627.732 on Casetext

Amendments to 627.732

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 627.732

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 627.732.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

AA SUNCOAST CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC, P. A. P. A. d b a v. PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,, 321 F.R.D. 677 (M.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 627.732(16), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . .

PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, v. EDUARDO J. GARRIDO D. C. P. A., 211 So. 3d 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . objective, the Legislature expressly: (i) defined what medical conditions constitute an “EMC” (section 627.732 . . . (c) Serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.” § 627.732(16), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. FIRST CARE SOLUTION, INC., 232 F. Supp. 3d 1257 (S.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 627.732(11). . . .

MEDICAL CENTER OF PALM BEACHES d b a a a o v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,, 202 So. 3d 88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . . § 627.732(16), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

ROBBINS, v. GARRISON PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a v. a, 809 F.3d 583 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 627.732(16). . . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY AND STATE FARM FIRE CASUALTY COMPANY, v. B A DIAGNOSTIC, INC. n k a M. D. M. D., 145 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (S.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . . § 627.732(11), Florida’s No-Fault Law also provides that “[n]o statement of medical services may include . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. MEDICAL SERVICE CENTER OF FLORIDA, INC., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . . § 627.732(17) (defining “entity wholly owned” as having licensed health care practitioners who are . . . Stat. § 627.732(11). . . .

STATE FARM FIRE CASUALTY COMPANY, v. SILVER STAR HEALTH AND REHAB,, 739 F.3d 579 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 627.732(11) (emphasis added). . . .

CHIROPRACTIC ONE, INC. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE,, 92 So. 3d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . The word “knowingly” is subsequently defined in section 627.732(10): “Knowingly” means that a person, . . .

ANDERSON, v. STATE, 87 So. 3d 774 (Fla. 2012)

. . . , or disqualification issued under the provisions of this chapter, chapter 318, chapter 324, or ss. 627.732 . . .

SOMMERVILLE, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 65 So. 3d 558 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See § 627.732(4), Fla. . . .

F. NODAL, M. D. v. INFINITY AUTO INSURANCE CO. f k a Co. v. Co. f k a Co., 50 So. 3d 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . . § 627.732(14), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . . . § 627.732(15). . . .

DWFII CORPORATION, d b a v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 271 F.R.D. 676 (S.D. Fla. 2010)

. . . . § 627.732(15). . . .

USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, v. PEMBROKE PINES MRI, INC., 31 So. 3d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . .” § 627.732(13) (emphasis added). In United Automobile Insurance Co. v. . . .

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL GROUP, INC. a a o M., 26 So. 3d 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . “Properly completed,” in turn, is defined in section 627.732(13), Florida Statutes (2004): “Properly . . .

D. GUTIERREZ, v. M. YOCHIM,, 23 So. 3d 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 627.732(3), Fla. Stat. (2006). Dairyland also knew that Mr. . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. FISCHER,, 16 So. 3d 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . respects identical to the definition of “relative residing in the same household” found in section 627.732 . . . Section 627.732(6) provides as follows: " 'Relative residing in the same household’ means a relative . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES NO., 966 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2007)

. . . The definition of “medically necessary” is based on section 627.732(2), Florida Statutes (2003). . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE COMPANY, v. DR. J. MARK RENFROE, D. C. d b a, 915 So. 2d 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . essential requirements of law by refusing to apply the definition of “medically necessary” found in section 627.732 . . . See § 627.732(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . new or renewed on or after October 1, 2001; (4) Section 5 of the act amended paragraph (2) of section 627.732 . . . In passing section 627.732(2), Florida Statutes, section 5 of the act, the Legislature chose to exercise . . . and (c) Not primarily for the convenience of the patient, physician, or other health care provider. § 627.732 . . .

FISCHER, v. ALESSANDRINI,, 907 So. 2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . the trial court concluded that because Fischer’s truck was a “motor vehicle” as defined in section 627.732 . . .

REGIONAL MRI OF ORLANDO, INC. v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 884 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . .” § 627.732(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . .

UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, v. G. PHILLIPS,, 740 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . However, the term motor vehicle’ shall not include any motor vehicle as defined in s. 627.732(1) when . . .

FIELDS, v. STATE, 731 So. 2d 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . revocation, or disqualification issued under the provisions of this chapter, chapter 318, chapter 324, or ss 627.732 . . .

PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, v. K. WATSON,, 696 So. 2d 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . At the time Gateway was decided, section 627.732(1), Florida Statutes (1973), defined “motor vehicle” . . .

WATSON, v. PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,, 696 So. 2d 394 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . shuttle bus in this case is not “used in mass transit” as described by the policy as well as section 627.732 . . . municipality, a transit or public school transportation authority, or a political subdivision of the state. § 627.732 . . .

NIGLIO, v. OMAHA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a, 679 So. 2d 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . The front end loader was not a “motor vehicle” under section 627.732(1), Florida Statutes (1983). . . .

MARTIN Co- v. ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 670 So. 2d 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . . § 627.732(1), Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

A. LANINFA, v. PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE,, 656 So. 2d 965 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . “Motor vehicle” is defined in section 627.732(1), Florida Statutes (1993), as a “self-propelled vehicle . . .

PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, v. CHERKAS,, 651 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . Co., 493 So.2d 87 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); §§ 59.041; 627.732(4), Fla.Stat. (1993). . . .

GRANT, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,, 638 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1994)

. . . In comparison, section 627.732, Florida Statutes (1991), pertaining to PIP coverage, defines motor vehicle . . . Grant also points out that the definition of motor vehicle in section 627.732, Florida Statutes (1991 . . .

GRANT, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,, 620 So. 2d 778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . In comparison, section 627.732, Florida Statutes (1991), pertaining to PIP coverage, defines motor vehicles . . . which is of a type both designed and required to be licensed for use on the highways of this state_” § 627.732 . . . In addition, he points to section 627.732, Florida Statutes (1991), asserting that his motorcycle is . . .

STERLING, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY,, 600 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . See, e.g., §§ 316.003(26); 320.01(3); 324.021(9); 627.732(3), Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .

ESKER, v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 593 So. 2d 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . and that coverage was thereby excluded under the terms of the policy and the provisions of section 627.732 . . . public school bus is excluded from the definition of motor vehicles by the explicit terms of subsection 627.732 . . . conclusion is inevitable when we consider the definition of “motor vehicle” as defined in subsection 627.732 . . . does not include “any motor vehicle which is used in mass transit or public school transportation.” §§ 627.732 . . . (1) and 627.732(l)(b). . . .

AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE COMPANY, v. BAROLETTI, E. d b a, 566 So. 2d 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . . § 627.732(1), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .

PEARSON, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, 560 So. 2d 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . Although clearly a legal title holder and thus an owner of the Oldsmobile according to section 627.732 . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. JOHNSON,, 536 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . Appellee replied to the affirmative defense and asserted that section 627.732(4), Florida Statutes (1985 . . .

DOYLE, v. FAFORD,, 517 So. 2d 778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . See § 627.732(1), Fla.Stat. (1983). . . .

CRANE RENTAL OF ORLANDO, INC. v. S. HAUSMAN,, 518 So. 2d 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . .”); § 627.732(1), Fla.Stat. (1985) (under Florida no-fault law, motor vehicle means “any self-propelled . . .

J. MAGLIO, v. NECA- IBEW WELFARE TRUST FUND,, 506 So. 2d 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . It is clear that section 627.732(1) specifically excludes: any motor vehicle which is used in mass transit . . . the state from the definition of a “motor vehicle" as that term is “used in §§ 627.730-627.7405.” § 627.732 . . . Furthermore, there can be no question but that the definitions of section 627.732 apply to section 627.7372 . . .

STATE FARM FIRE CASUALTY COMPANY v. W. BECRAFT, R. BECRAFT, a W. v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, 501 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . Unlike the statutory provisions for UM coverage, section 627.732(1), pertaining to PIP coverage, defines . . .

C. WELTY, v. CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY,, 498 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . Since the front-end loader is itself not a motor vehicle under Florida Statute 627.732(1) F.S. 1983, . . .

ALAVA, a By ALAVA v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 497 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . Section 627.732(4), Florida Statutes (1983), of the Automobile Reparations Reform Act, defines the term . . .

C. STURGIS, v. FORTUNE INSURANCE COMPANY, a, 475 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . .” § 627.732(3), Fla.Stat. (1983). . . .

LANE v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 472 So. 2d 823 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . We also found in Prinzo that the definitions provided under the No-Fault Act (section 627.732(1)), the . . .

DUNLAP, IV, v. UNITED STATES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION,, 470 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . See particularly, Sections 627.732(1), and 627.-736(4)(d)l., Florida Statutes (1983). . . .

SANTIAGOHERRERA, v. R. STOUT a, 470 So. 2d 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . Section 627.732(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1983) provides: The term “motor vehicle” does not include .. . . . insurer for damages in excess of its policy limits, no claim for punitive damages shall be allowed. . § 627.732 . . .

M. BANACK, Jr. M. Jr. M. III, a v. FLORIDA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION INC., 467 So. 2d 842 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . Section 627.732 defines a motor vehicle as “a sedan, station wagon, or jeep type vehicle not used as . . .

L. PRINZO, a By E. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 465 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . .” § 627.732(1), Fla.Stat. (1983). A moped does not satisfy that criterion. . . . motor vehicle under this section, we find that the definitions provided under the No-Fault Act (section 627.732 . . .

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a v. HILSENRAD, 462 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . insured under the terms of the policy, nor under the definition of “relative”, as provided in Section 627.732 . . . “Section 627.732(4) Fla.Stat. (1981) Definitions” ****** “(4) 'Relative residing in the same household . . .

R. VELEZ, v. CRITERION INSURANCE COMPANY,, 461 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1984)

. . . Initially, we note that section 627.732, Florida Statutes (1981), specifically excludes mopeds from the . . . For purposes of the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act, however, we find that section 627.732( . . . Section 627.732(1), Florida Statutes (1981), reads as follows: “Motor vehicle" means any self-propelled . . .

JEAN v. AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 7 Fla. Supp. 2d 106 (Volusia Cty. Ct. 1984)

. . . Section 627.732(1) defines motor vehicles as: “Any self propelled vehicle with four or more wheels which . . . the Court finds that as a matter of law that a golf cart is not a motor vehicle as defined in Section 627.732 . . . are ones that are designed and licensed for use on the highways of this State and defined in Section 627.732 . . .

R. VELEZ, v. CRITERION INSURANCE COMPANY, a, 445 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . phrase “while not an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle,” the exception that was contained in section 627.732 . . . That phrase was specifically included in the definition of “motor vehicle” in section 627.732(1). . . . section 627.-736(4)(d)l as it existed at the time of the accident here, the phrase extracted from section 627.732 . . . As noted, even section 627.732 has now been amended by chapter 82-243, Laws of Florida (1982), so that . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. LINK, Jr., 416 So. 2d 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . Section 627.732(1), defines “motor vehicle” as: [A]ny self-propelled vehicle which is of a type both . . . Section 627.732(1), however, specifically refers to mopeds as defined in section 316.008(2). . . .

PACHIVAS, v. GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,, 411 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . . §§ 627.409 and 627.732(4), Fla.Stat. (1979); Life Insurance Company of Virginia v. . . .

DEESE, Jr. v. STATE, 378 So. 2d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

. . . .-02(1) and 627.732(1). . . .

LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, v. CASTAGNA,, 368 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1979)

. . . Section 627.732(1), Florida Statutes (1975), provides: “Motor vehicle” means a sedan, station wagon, . . .

L. HEREDIA, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 358 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1978)

. . . . § 627.732(1), Fla.Stat. (1975). . Heredia v. Allstate Ins. . . .

CAVALIER INSURANCE CORPORATION, v. MYLES,, 347 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)

. . . Said statute provides: “F.S. 627.732(1) ‘Motor vehicle’ means a sedan, station wagon, or jeep-type vehicle . . . Bronco, although registered in a state other than Florida, was a “motor vehicle” as defined in F.S. 627.732 . . .

L. HEREDIA, L. C. a L. C. a v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 346 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)

. . . its owner (not the insured) is or is not a “motor vehicle” as defined by subsection (1) of section 627.732 . . .

MAIN INSURANCE COMPANY, a v. E. WIGGINS,, 349 So. 2d 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)

. . . The lease did not contain an option to purchase and therefore, under § 627.732(2), Florida Statutes ( . . .

GUARDADO v. GREYHOUND RENT- A- CAR, INC., 340 So. 2d 510 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . based its position on the contention that a rental car is not a “motor vehicle” as defined in Section 627.732 . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. BUTLER,, 340 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . of the utility vehicle she occupied, because owners of vehicles of that class are not required by § 627.732 . . . pains to give the term “motor vehicle” a restricted definition for purposes of the no-fault act, § 627.732 . . . Section 627.732(1) defines a “motor vehicle” as “a sedan, station wagon, or jeep-type vehicle not used . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a v. M. NICHOLSON,, 337 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . . § 627.732(1). . . .

STANDARD MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, a v. E. ALLYN,, 333 So. 2d 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . similar to the definition of “motor vehicle” in the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act, F.S. 627.732 . . .

TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, v. A. SMITH, a By, 328 So. 2d 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . the provisions of the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform (No-Fault Insurance) Act, specifically §§ 627.732 . . .

K. BRANDAL, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a, 327 So. 2d 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . The applicable provisions of the law relating to the term “motor vehicle” are found in Section 627.732 . . .

GREYHOUND RENT- A- CAR, INC. a v. CARBON, 327 So. 2d 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)

. . . is one of first impression in Florida: Whether a rental vehicle is a “motor vehicle” as defined in § 627.732 . . .

SABORIT, a Sr. v. DELIFORD, 312 So. 2d 795 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . charge complained of by the appellants was inappropriate on the evidence, under §§ 627.727, 627.731 and 627.732 . . .

CAMACHO, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 310 So. 2d 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . .” § 627.732, Fla.Stat. . . . vehicle involved in the accident with plaintiff Camacho’s truck was not a motor vehicle as defined in § 627.732 . . . vehicles would be covered by the Act, to-wit: those included in the definition of motor vehicles, § 627.732 . . .

COMMERCIAL UNION INSURANCE COMPANY, a v. WILLIAMS, a, 309 So. 2d 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . “The position of the defendant Commercial Union Insurance Company is that under Florida Statutes §§ 627.732 . . .

CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, a v. FILLMORE, a, 306 So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)

. . . The issue turns on the definition of “motor vehicle” in § 627.732(1), Fla.Stat. . . .

DEEL MOTORS, INC. v. CARRINGTON,, 305 So. 2d 811 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)

. . . . § 627.732(1).- Defendant Horowitz went to defendant new car dealer and was shopping for a new car. . . . Is this vehicle a “motor vehicle” in contemplation of Fla.Stat. § 627.732(1)? . . . Fla.Stat. § 627.732(1) provides: “(1) “Motor vehicle” means a sedan, station wagon, or jeep type vehicle . . . Stat. § 627.732(1). It is unnecessary for us to deal with this issue, see DeThorne v. . . . registerable, under the Florida automobile reparations reform act is a “motor vehicle” under Fla.Stat. § 627.732 . . .

FARLEY, a v. GATEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY,, 302 So. 2d 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)

. . . of the majority assuming Farley, as a stepson, is indeed a “relative” of Ryan as contemplated by § 627.732 . . . “Relative” is defined in § 627.732(4), F.S. 1971, as a “. . . relative of any degree by blood or by marriage . . .

NEGRON, v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY,, 282 So. 2d 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)

. . . . § 627.732(1), F.S.A., defines motor vehicle for the purpose of the act as follows: “(1) ‘Motor vehicle . . .

H. KLUGER, v. WHITE, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973)

. . . . § 627.738, F.S.A., provides : "(1) The owner of a motor vehicle as defined in § 627.732 is not required . . .

DeTHORNE, v. BECK, 280 So. 2d 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)

. . . passengers, but is used primarily in the business of the insured a ‘motor vehicle’ as defined by Section 627.732 . . . Section 627.732(1), F.S.A., and giving the language of that statute its intended meaning, we conclude . . . passengers but is used primarily in the business of the insured, is a motor vehicle, as defined by Section 627.732 . . .