CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2014 WL 2609201
...governments and the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.
In City of Aventura v. Masone,
89 So. 3d 233, 234 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), the
Third District Court of Appeal held that Aventura’s ordinance was a valid exercise
of municipal power under section
316.008(1)(w), Florida Statutes (2008), which
specifically grants “local authorities, with respect to streets and highways under
their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power,” authority
for “[r]egulating,...
...y preempted by state
law. The Fifth District ruled that the imposition of penalties other than those
specifically provided for by state statute “for running a red light in a particular
municipality does not fall within the specific authority of section 316.008(1)(w)[,]”
Florida Statutes (2008), which the court concluded “appears to contemplate only
unique situations for which a statewide law is lacking or is inadequate.” Id....
...For the reasons we
explain, we agree with the Fifth District and conclude that the ordinances are not
valid.
I.
In arguing that the respective ordinances are valid, both Aventura and
Orlando rely on the specific power provided to local authorities by section
316.008(1)(w) for “[r]egulating, restricting, or monitoring traffic by security
devices.” Udowychenko and Masone, who challenged the validity of the
ordinances in order to set aside fines imposed under the ordinances, contend that
section 316.008(1)(w) does not authorize the municipal enforcement regime
adopted by the ordinances, an enforcement regime that they contend is at odds in
multiple ways with the enforcement regime adopted by state law.
As is clear from the arguments presented by the parties, the crux of these
consolidated cases is whether section 316.008(1)(w) provides authority for the
ordinances....
...The Legislature recognizes that there are conditions which require
municipalities to pass certain other traffic ordinances in regulation of
municipal traffic that are not required to regulate the movement of
traffic outside of such municipalities. Section 316.008 enumerates the
area within which municipalities may control certain traffic movement
or parking in their respective jurisdictions....
...uniform throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities
therein, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on a matter
covered by this chapter unless expressly authorized.” (Emphasis added.)
As indicated in section
316.002, section
316.008 contains an enumeration of
specific powers that local authorities may exercise to control traffic movement or
parking in their respective jurisdictions “within the reasonable exercise of the
police power.” Section
316.008(1)(w)—the crucial provision at issue here—
provides that local authorities are not precluded from “[r]egulating, restricting, or
monitoring traffic by security devices or personnel on public streets and highways,...
...316. The ordinances
consequently can be sustained as a valid exercise of municipal authority only if
they are—as the express preemption provision of section
316.007 requires—
expressly authorized by statute. Orlando and Aventura only point to section
316.008(1)(w) as the source of such an express authorization. That provision,
however, is not equal to the task.
The Orlando and Aventura ordinances establish a regime for the punishment
of red light violations that is distinct from the statutory regime for the punishment
of such violations. Section
316.008(1)(w)’s grant of authority for “[r]egulating,
restricting, or monitoring traffic by security devices” does not, however, explicitly
provide authority for local governments to adopt measures for the punishment of
conduct that is already subject to punishment under the framework established by
chapters 316 and 318. As broadly described in section
316.002, the powers
granted to municipalities by section
316.008 are powers by which “municipalities
may control certain traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions.”
“Control[ling] certain traffic movement” through “[r]egulating, restricting, or
monitoring traffic by...
...undertaking enforcement measures—that is, imposing punishment—outside the
framework established by chapters 316 and 318 for conduct that is proscribed by
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chapter 316 and subject to punishment under chapter 318. Certain provisions of
section
316.008 do grant express authority to local authorities to adopt additional
measures with respect to the punishment of violations. See §§
316.008(4),
316.008(5), Fla. Stat. (2008). But section
316.008(1)(w) is silent with respect to
the punishment of violations.
Contrary to the dissent, our decision in Thomas v. State,
614 So. 2d 468
(Fla. 1993), does not support the reliance of Orlando and Aventura on section
316.008(1)(w) to escape the sweep of the express preemption provisions of chapter
316 and chapter 318. Thomas dealt with a local ordinance adopted under the
authority granted to local governments by section
316.008(1)(h) for “[r]egulating
the operation of bicycles.” Id....
...But that statement is in
the context of the Court’s general discussion of municipal authority to “legislate
concurrently in areas that are not expressly preempted by the State.” Id. It has no
application where express preemption is operative. The reasoning of Thomas,
therefore, does not support the conclusion that section
316.008(1) grants local
governments the authority to establish code enforcement regimes for the
punishment of specific conduct that is already proscribed and subject to
punishment under state law.
The prohibition and punishment of red light violations are matters “covered
by” chapter 316, and section
316.008(1)(w) does not “expressly authorize[]” local
ordinances on those matters. §
316.007, Fla. Stat. (2008). The Orlando and
Aventura ordinances therefore are expressly preempted by state law. Nothing in
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section
316.008(1)(w) provides that municipalities are granted the authority to
enact an enforcement regime different from the enforcement regime applicable
under the provision of section
316.075(4) that red light violations are “punishable
pursuant to chapter 318.” And nothing in section
316.008(1)(w) creates an
exception from the express preemption imposed by section
318.121 of any fines
other than the penalties imposed as provided in chapter 318.
IV.
The Orlando and Aventura ordinances are invalid because they are expressly
preempted by state law....
...See id.
Prior to the passage of that Act, however, the Legislature had already
granted municipalities such as Orlando and Aventura the power to enact red light
ordinances pursuant to the powers expressly granted to municipal governments
through section 316.008, Florida Statutes (2008), entitled “Powers of local
1....
...individuals who violated these ordinances.
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authorities.” These powers, which included the authority to “[r]egulat[e], restrict[],
or monitor[] traffic by security devices or personnel on public streets and
highways,” § 316.008(1)(w), Fla....
...[t]he Legislature recognizes that there are conditions which require
municipalities to pass certain other traffic ordinances in regulation of
municipal traffic that are not required to regulate the movement of
traffic outside of such municipalities. Section
316.008 enumerates the
area within which municipalities may control certain traffic movement
or parking in their respective jurisdictions. This section shall be
supplemental to the other laws or ordinances of this chapter and not in
conflict therewith.
§
316.002, Fla. Stat. (2008).
Included within section
316.008 is subsection (1)(w), which grants
municipal governments the power to “[r]egulat[e], restrict[], or monitor[] traffic by
security devices or personnel on public streets and highways, whether by public or
private parties and provid[e] for the construction and maintenance of such streets
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and highways.” §
316.008(1)(w), Fla....
...oes not support the majority’s
interpretation. Rather than attempt to harmonize the ordinances in a way that does
not conflict with the statutory scheme, the majority reads this authorizing section
too narrowly.
When sections
316.002 and
316.008 are examined together, “the plain text
of the Uniform Traffic Control Law expressly confers authority to a municipal
government to regulate traffic within its municipal boundaries as a reasonable
exercise of its police power where such r...
...ura,
89 So. 3d at 236. In my
view, the use of red light cameras by municipalities to enforce red light infractions
within their municipal boundaries is a regulation that falls squarely within the
authority granted to municipal governments through section
316.008(1)(w)....
...raffic
accidents, and regulates and restricts red light infractions at those intersections
through the issuance of its notices of violation.” Id. at 239.
I agree with the reasoning of the Third District, which explained that
“[s]ection 316.008 allows the local authorities to use their home rule powers to
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effectuate certain restrictions and regulations but does not specify the means or the
schemes for implementing such restrictions or regulations.” Id....
...By
creating a system through which to impose penalties on drivers for running red
lights, “the City has simply developed a procedure for carrying out its power to
regulate, restrict or monitor traffic.” Id.
Conversely, the majority concludes that section 316.008(1)(w) does not
expressly authorize the municipal ordinances in this case because “ ‘[r]egulating,
restricting, or monitoring traffic by security devices’ does not . . . explicitly
provide authority for local governments to adopt measures for the punishment of
conduct that is already subject to punishment under the framework established by
chapters 316 and 318.” Majority op. at 9 (quoting § 316.008(1)(w), Fla....
...Uniform Traffic Control Law, to encompass the power to impose punishment for
the violation of municipal regulations within an area already addressed by the state.
In Thomas v. State,
614 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. 1993), this Court reviewed a
municipal ordinance enacted pursuant to section
316.008(1)(h), which granted the
municipality the power to “[r]egulat[e] the operation of bicycles,” an area already
covered by chapter 316. §
316.008(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (1989). Despite the fact that
the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law already regulated the operation of
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bicycles, this Court concluded that, pursuant to the authority granted in section
316.008(1)(h), a municipal government had the power to enact an ordinance that
imposed noncriminal penalties for violations of conduct within an area already
regulated by the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law, as long as the penalties
imposed by the municipal ordinance did “not exceed the penalty imposed by the
state.” Thomas,
614 So. 2d at 470. By concluding in Thomas that municipal
governments had the power to impose penalties pursuant to section
316.008(1)(h),
this Court interpreted the word “regulate” in the Florida Uniform Traffic Control
Law to encompass the power to impose fines for violations of municipal
regulations within an area covered by chapter 316.
Based on...
...In determining that the municipal government could impose non-
criminal penalties for violations of conduct within an area covered by chapter 316,
the Court did not rely on the absence of state regulation, but looked solely to
whether the regulated conduct fell within one of the areas enumerated in section
316.008, within which municipalities are expressly authorized to act. See id.
Here, just as in Thomas, the regulation undertaken by the municipalities falls
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within an area enumerated in section 316.008....
...The plain text of the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law
expressly confers authority to a municipal government to regulate traffic within its
municipal boundaries where such regulation “does not conflict, but supplements
the laws found therein.” City of Aventura,
89 So. 3d at 236; see §
316.002, Fla.
Stat. (“Section
316.008 enumerates the area within which municipalities may
control certain traffic movement or parking in their respective jurisdictions....
...That is because these municipal ordinances exist independently of
the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law and represent supplemental enforcement
mechanisms that have been expressly authorized by the Florida Uniform Traffic
Control Law pursuant to section 316.008(1)(w)....
...consistent with the purposes underlying Florida’s decision to grant municipal
governments extensive powers of self-governance. City of Aventura,
89 So. 3d at
- 24 -
237. Therefore, I cannot agree with the majority that section
316.008(1)(w), which
expressly authorizes municipalities to “[r]egulat[e], restrict[], or monitor[] traffic
by security devices or personnel on public streets and highways, whether by public
or private parties,” in a manner consistent...
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 16790, 2014 WL 5149159
...Eric Arem’s motion to dismiss a red light camera prosecution against him.
The county court certified the following questions of great public
importance pursuant to section
34.017, Florida Statutes (2011), and
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.160(d):
1. Does Florida Statute
316.0083(1)(a) authorize a
municipality to delegate and have a private vendor actually
issue Florida Uniform Traffic Citations, when notices of
violation, (also issued by the vendor), are not complied
with, where...
...d be
issued. We decline to answer the second question posed by the county
court because the City’s improper delegation of authority in this case
renders the citation void at its inception.
Factual and Procedural Background
Section
316.0083, Florida Statutes, known as the Mark Wandall Traffic
Safety Program (the “Act”), authorizes local governments to use red light
cameras to enforce violations of sections
316.074(1) and
316.075(1)(c)1;
both of which prohibit the running of red lights. See Ch. 2013-160, § 5,
-2-
Laws of Fla.; §
316.008(8)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). The Act specifically
authorizes the use of TIEOs to enforce red light violations. §
316.0083(1),
Fla....
...knowledge
of the communication, what information was sent to the
Clerk, and when it was done. . . .
....
The procedure employed by the City of Hollywood in this
case is also actually contrary to Florida Statute 316.0083
(1)(a) which provides in pertinent part:
....
...71-135, Laws of Fla.
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“stated purpose” of chapter 316 is “outlined” in section
316.002). Section
316.002 expressly limits the power of municipalities to legislate over traffic
matters, as follows: “Section
316.008 enumerates the area within which
municipalities may control certain traffic movement or parking in their
respective jurisdictions.” Id. The powers of a municipality to legislate on
traffic matters are thus limited to those enumerated in section
316.008.
Finally, section
316.002 makes it “unlawful for any local authority to pass
or to attempt to enforce any ordinance in conflict with the provisions of
this chapter.” Id.
Consistent with section
316.002, section
316.007, like a...
...Whether the City has the authority to outsource the issuance of these
citations, or to outsource any other statutory duty, must therefore be
derived from the plain wording of the statutes. Here, the applicable
statutes are clear and unambiguous. Section 316.0083(1)(a) provides, in
pertinent part:
A notice of violation and a traffic citation may not be issued
for failure to stop at a red light if the driver is making a right-
hand turn in a careful and prudent manner at an intersection
where right-hand turns are permissible....
...fraction
detector by an authorized employee or agent of the
department, a county, or a municipality before issuance of the
traffic citation by the traffic infraction enforcement officer.
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§
316.0083(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). Section
316.650
(3)(c) also provides:
If a traffic citation is issued under s.
316.0083, the traffic
infraction enforcement officer shall provide by electronic
transmission a replica of the traffic citation data to the court
having jurisdiction over the alleged offense or its traffic
violations bureau...
...(2011) (emphasis added).
In Florida, only law enforcement officers and traffic enforcement officers
have the legal authority to issue citations for traffic infractions, which
means only law enforcement officers and traffic enforcement officers are
entitled to determine who gets prosecuted for a red light violation. See
§
316.0083(3); see also §
316.640, Fla....
...sheriff’s or police department. §
316.640(5)(a).
Section
316.640(5)(a) permits employees of a sheriff’s department or
police department of a municipality, without conveying arrest powers, to
become TIEOs empowered to issue traffic citations under section
316.0083. However, the statute does not authorize a private vendor to issue
citations, either expressly or impliedly. Although the legislature in section
316.0083(1)(a) did permit cities to delegate the review of information
obtained from a traffic infraction detector, it did not permit cities to
delegate their authority to issue any resulting traffic citations anywhere in
these statutes. Had the legislature intended to allow for delegation of this
authority or responsibility, just as it expressly allowed for delegating the
review of traffic infraction detector information by employees or agents
under section
316.0083(1)(a), it could have easily done so....
