Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...'s Motor Vehicle No-fault Law. Stated succinctly, the central question is, does the exclusivity provision of the Compensation Act, section 440.11, Florida Statutes (1983), prohibit the reimbursement of personal injury protection benefits pursuant to section 627.7405, Florida Statutes (1983), from an employer who has paid out full workmen's compensation benefits....

...verage provided by appellee. Prior to a trial on the merits, appellee admitted that Thomas was entitled to the benefits in the sum of $10,000 and this amount was paid to Thomas. Demand was then made by appellee upon appellant for reimbursement under section 627.7405....

...party tortfeasor and to the employee, the legal representative thereof, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death. Section 627.7405, on the other hand, provides that "any insurer providing personal injury protection benefits on a private passenger motor vehicle shall have ......

...m the employee's job-related injury. The provision does not preclude, nor does it purport to preclude, liability arising out of contract or some separate and distinct obligation incurred by the employer to the employee or others. With the passage of section 627.7405, the legislature required owners of commercial motor vehicles to reimburse no-fault carriers for the personal injury protection benefits paid as a result of accidents involving commercial motor vehicles....

...Appellants contend finally that the legislative scheme does not preclude the medical provider from suing the insured. Appellants rely on Dealers Ins. Co., Inc. v. Jon Hall Chevrolet Co., Inc., 547 So.2d 325 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). In that case, this court declared section 627.7405, Florida Statutes (1985) to be constitutional....

...Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tropicana Products, Inc., 456 So.2d 549 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons set forth below, we approve the Second District Court of Appeal's decision that section 627.7405, Florida Statutes (2001), does not violate Amerisure's rights under the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions....

...hicle, paid personal injury protection (PIP) benefits *1289 to Edman in compliance with the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law. See §§ 627.730-.7405, Fla. Stat. (2001). State Farm then requested reimbursement from Amerisure under the provisions of section 627.7405, requiring insurers of commercial vehicles to reimburse insurers of private vehicles for PIP payments....

...Amerisure refused to pay, and contended that it was not obligated to reimburse State Farm because neither Edman nor Wright Construction Corporation was at fault in the accident. State Farm then sued Amerisure, claiming a right to reimbursement under section 627.7405....

...The trial court granted final summary judgment in favor of State Farm's claim that it was entitled to reimbursement under the statute. On appeal, the Second District affirmed the final summary judgment, citing agreement with the Fifth District's holding in Dealers that the plain language of section 627.7405 "provide[s] for reimbursement without regard to fault and... b[ears] a reasonable relationship to the legitimate state interest of regulating insurance." Amerisure, 865 So.2d at 593. ANALYSIS Section 627.7405 provides: Insurers' right of reimbursement. — Notwithstanding any other provisions of ss. 627.730-627.7405, any insurer providing personal injury protection benefits on a private passenger motor vehicle shall have, to the extent of any personal injury protection benefits paid to any person as a benefit arising out of such private passenger motor...

...om such person having been an occupant of the commercial motor vehicle or having been struck by the commercial motor vehicle while not an occupant of any self-propelled vehicle. In its opinion, the district court rejected Amerisure's contention that section 627.7405 creates an arbitrary classification of private and commercial vehicles in violation of the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The Second District noted that Amerisure "concede[d] that section 627.7405 serves a legitimate governmental purpose," Amerisure, 865 So.2d at 592 ("The legislative history indicates that the amendments were designed in part to reduce overall automobile insurance rates."), and that Amerisure acknowledged a plausible reason for the classification; that is, that section 627.7405 reallocates some of the risk from the insurers of private vehicles to the insurers of commercial vehicles, with the result of reducing insurance premium rates for the owners of private vehicles....

...that would rationally support the classification." Id. The Second District also certified conflict with the summary holding of the Third District in Florida Farm Bureau, approving a trial court ruling finding no rational basis for the provisions of section 627.7405 that require a commercial insurer to reimburse a private insurer even when the commercial vehicle owner is not at fault....

...without a rational basis for such classification'"). In Dealers, the Fifth District also expressed disagreement with the Third District's holding in Florida Farm Bureau. *1290 Dealers, 547 So.2d at 327. The Fifth District upheld the constitutionality of section 627.7405, in part because it concluded that the statute's different treatment of commercial and private vehicles was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose: Because of its quasi-public nature and statewide effects, insurance is an appropriate subject for legislative control.......

...More recently, in Tucker Transportation Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 883 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), the First District Court of Appeal rejected similar constitutional claims. The First District approved a trial court's conclusion that "section 627.7405 did not require a finding of fault and did not violate the Appellant's equal protection rights, citing Dealers....

...otection analysis requires only that a statute bear some reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose.") (quoting In re Estate of Greenberg, 390 So.2d 40, 42 (Fla.1980)). [2] *1291 Amerisure also candidly concedes that the plain language of section 627.7405 does not require a finding of fault on the part of the owner of the commercial vehicle, and that the statute effectively makes the insurer of the commercial motor vehicle the primary insurer, even in the absence of the commercial vehicle owner's fault. Further, as previously noted by the Second District, Amerisure has conceded that section 627.7405 serves a legitimate governmental purpose. Amerisure, 865 So.2d at 592. Therefore, the only remaining question is whether the Second District was correct in holding that the legislative classification scheme in section 627.7405 is rationally related to that legitimate purpose. On this question we agree with the Second District's analysis and conclusion, and we hold, therefore, that the classification in section 627.7405 does not violate the federal and state equal protection clauses because it is rationally related to a legitimate state objective of regulating insurance rates. We do agree with Amerisure, however, that it, like State Farm, has a right to challenge the reasonableness and necessity of the expenses sought to be reimbursed by State Farm. While all parties concede that section 627.7405 provides for a right of reimbursement, we find nothing in the statute's language that would foreclose Amerisure from challenging the reasonableness and necessity of the expenses claimed....

...PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. LEWIS, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] The following facts are taken from the Second District's opinion, Amerisure, 865 So.2d at 591-93. [2] Where, as here, no suspect class or fundamental right is implicated, section 627.7405 "must be upheld if it bears a rational and reasonable relationship to a legitimate state objective and is not arbitrary or capriciously imposed." Dep't of Corr....

...Bos, Orlando, for appellant. Keith C. Warnock of Cameron, Marriott, Walsh & Hodges, P.A., Daytona Beach, for appellee. SCHEB, J.M., Associate Judge. The trial court dismissed Dealers Insurance Company's action seeking reimbursement from Jon Hall Chevrolet Company under Section 627.7405, Florida Statutes (1985), for personal insurance protection (PIP) benefits Dealers paid to one of Jon Hall's employees....

...On September 19, 1986, one of Jon Hall's employees was involved in an accident while driving a pickup truck held by Jon Hall for retail sale. Dealers paid the employee PIP benefits under the employee's private passenger automobile policy. Dealers later filed suit under section 627.7405 against Jon Hall to recover PIP benefits it paid....

...The trial court dismissed the action with prejudice, citing Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Tropicana Products, Inc., 456 So.2d 549 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 464 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1985), as authority for holding the statute unconstitutional. [1] We reverse. Section 627.7405, Florida Statutes (1985), provides: 627.7405. Insurers' right to reimbursement Notwithstanding any other provisions of ss. 627.730-627.7405, any insurer providing personal injury protection benefits on a private passenger motor vehicle shall have, to the extent of any personal injury protection benefits paid to any person as a benefit arising out of such private passenger motor...

...burden properly rests with the commercial vehicle owners. We recognize that our decision conflicts with Farm Bureau v. Tropicana, on which the trial court relied in dismissing Dealers' reimbursement action. In Tropicana, the third district held that section 627.7405 must be read to require a finding of fault on the part of the commercial vehicle owner or else that section would violate the equal protection clauses....

...efits, holding that workers' compensation replaces only the employer's traditional tort liabilities. The court concluded that an employer's statutory obligation to reimburse no-fault carriers is a liability totally distinct from tort, and therefore, section 627.7405 does not violate the exclusivity principle embodied in the workers' compensation statute....

...Although it is not precisely on point, we think American Freight suggests that the second district concluded that the legislature could properly determine that a commercial vehicle owner's obligation to reimbursement of PIP benefits is an acceptable cost of doing business in the state. Accordingly, we find section 627.7405 to be constitutional....

...e, without regard to fault, where the PIP insurer has paid benefits to its insured under a private passenger motor vehicle insurance policy for injuries incurred when the insured was struck by a commercial vehicle. At the heart of the controversy is Section 627.7405, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides: 627.7405 Subrogation....

...al motor vehicle, if the benefits paid result from such person having been an occupant of the commercial motor vehicle or having been struck by the commercial motor vehicle while not an occupant of any self-propelled vehicle. Appellant contends that Section 627.7405 is not a subrogation statute which requires a showing that the commercial vehicle owner and its insurer were at fault, but grants a "pure right of reimbursement without regard to ......

...Hammac of Ramey, Ramey & Kampf, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee. KELLY, Judge. Amerisure Insurance Company appeals a final summary judgment in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in an action in which State Farm sought reimbursement under section 627.7405, Florida Statutes (2001), for personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits it paid to its insured....

...A southbound automobile crossed the median and struck Mrs. Edman's automobile. Mrs. Edman received PIP payments from her personal insurer, State Farm, for the injuries she and her children sustained in the accident. State Farm then sought reimbursement from Amerisure pursuant to section 627.7405. Amerisure refused, arguing that in the absence of fault on the part of Mrs. Edman or Wright Construction Corporation, it was not obligated to reimburse State Farm for the PIP payments it made to Mrs. Edman. Section 627.7405 provides: Notwithstanding any other provisions of ss. 627.730-627.7405, any insurer providing personal injury protection benefits on a private passenger motor vehicle shall have, to the extent of any personal injury protection benefits paid to any person as a benefit arising out of such private passenger motor...

...is test. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n v. Thomas, 434 So.2d 306 (Fla.1983). If the classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective, this court must uphold the statute. Id. at 308. Amerisure rightly concedes that section 627.7405 serves a legitimate governmental purpose....

...ective. However, the rational relationship test does not focus on *593 whether the method chosen by the legislature is the wisest or most effective means of accomplishing its objective. Id. at 309. We also note that although the constitutionality of section 627.7405 has never been addressed by this court, two other district courts have addressed the issue and reached opposite conclusions....

PER CURIAM. Appellee State Farm Mutual Insurance Company filed an action in county court seeking reimbursement for personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits from the Ap-pellee Tucker Transportation Company, Incorporated, under section 627.7405, Florida Statutes....

...mmercial vehicles. Tucker then moved for a directed verdict on the basis that (i) State Farm failed to state a cause of action because it failed to attach a copy of the insurance policy to the complaint, (ii) Tucker was immune from the operations of section 627.7405 under section 440.11 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, (iii) State Farm failed to allege a statutory right to reimbursement, and (iv) without a required finding of fault, section 627.7405 was unconstitutional. The trial court entered its final judgment in favor of State Farm, concluding as a matter of law that section 440.11 did not immunize the Appellant from the operation of section 627.7405, accepting and applying the reasoning and holding in American Freight System, Inc. v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 453 So.2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The Court then concluded that section 627.7405 did not require a finding of fault and did not violate the Appellant’s equal protection rights, citing Dealers Insurance Co....

...Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 456 So.2d 549 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)), review granted, SC04-387 (Sept. 10, 2004). . The questions are: "A. Is an employer immune under section 440.11, Florida Statutes from suit brought by an insurer under section 627.7405 for reimbursement of personal injury protection benefits paid to an employee of the employer? B. Is section 627.7405 unconstitutional to the extent it allows an insurer reimbursement from an employer for personal injury protection benefits paid to an employee of the employer without regard to fault of the employer?” The answer to both questions i...

...Victoria Méndez, City Attorney, and Eric J. Eves, Assistant City Attorney, for appellant. Law Offices of Gary Kornfield, P.A., and Gary Kornfield (Hollywood), for appellee. Before SCALES, HENDON, and MILLER, JJ. PER CURIAM.  Affirmed. See § 627.7405(1), Fla....

...November 21, 2024 LAMBERT, J.  The question that we confront in this appeal is whether a private motor vehicle insurer, in this case the appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), may sue a school board under section 627.7405(1), Florida Statutes (2019), for reimbursement of personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits that it paid to cover injuries that its insured sustained in a school bus accident....

...The insured submitted a PIP claim under her policy to State Farm for payment of the reasonable and necessary medical expenses that she incurred resulting from the accident, and State Farm paid the sum of $7,062.26 to resolve the PIP claim. It thereafter filed suit against School Board under section 627.7405 seeking reimbursement of this sum, plus costs. School Board moved to dismiss the suit with prejudice....

...3d DCA 2024), such as a county school board. See Buck v. McLean, 115 So. 2d 764, 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959) (“County boards of public instruction are agencies of the State . . . .” (citing Bragg v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Duval Cnty., 36 So. 2d 222, 222 (Fla. 1948))). Section 627.7405(1), upon which State Farm filed suit for the subject PIP reimbursement, provides, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding ss. 627.730-627.7405, an insurer providing personal injury protection benefits on a private passenger motor vehicle shall have, to the extent of any personal injury protection benefits paid to any person as a benefit arising out of such private p...

...r vehicle insurance, a right of reimbursement against the owner or the insurer of the owner of a commercial motor vehicle, if the benefits paid result from such person having been an occupant of the commercial motor vehicle .... § 627.7405(1), Fla....

...The reason such statutes are strictly construed is to provide “a protection of the public against profligate encroachments on the public treasury.” Spangler v. Fla. State Tpk. Auth., 106 So. 2d 421, 424 (Fla. 1958). Preliminarily, we observe that the statutes in question, sections 627.7405(1) and 627.732(3)(b), did not expressly waive sovereign immunity....

...unequivocal.” Spangler, 106 So. 2d at 424. Additionally, and pertinent here, “[w]aiver will not be reached as a product of inference or implication.” Id. It was the necessity of having to make the inference that sovereign immunity was waived by section 627.7405(1), based on the definition of commercial vehicle in section 627.732(3)(b), that led the Fourth District to disagree with the Second District’s opinion in Lee County School Board....

...Citing to caselaw from the First District Court of Appeal that held that sovereign immunity had not been waived when the applicable statutes in those cases 3 did not also name or include the State or its entities within the definition of the proper party to be sued, the Fourth District viewed sections 627.7405(1) and 627.732(3)(b) as having the same infirmity. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 390 So. 3d at 33. The court reasoned that because chapter 627 did not name the State or a public school board as a proper party to be sued under section 627.7405(1), the inference would not be based on the text of the 3See Hightower, 306 So. 3d at 1193; State, Dep’t of Elder Aff. v. Caldwell, 199 So. 3d 1107 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). 6 statute Id. And while acknowledging that an inference that section 627.7405(1) did waive sovereign immunity and thus authorized PIP reimbursement suits against school boards could be considered reasonable, the Fourth District held that such an inference could not be the basis of a sovereign immunity waiver. Id....

...Both the School Board and Safety National appeal, with the School Board arguing that State Farm's claims against it are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and Safety National arguing that it is not an insurer for purposes of the reimbursement statute, section 627.7405(1), Florida Statutes (2015), and that its policy exclusions exempt it from the dictates of the statute....

...action for reimbursement. State Farm moved for summary judgment, arguing that because it was undisputed that the School Board owned the bus and that Safety National insured the bus, it was entitled to reimbursement as a matter of law pursuant to section 627.7405(1)....

...ants from coverage. Following a hearing, the trial court concluded that sovereign immunity was not a bar to State Farm's entitlement to reimbursement from the School Board and that Safety National was the School Board's insurer as contemplated by section 627.7405(1)....

...the benefit of sovereign immunity and because the Florida Legislature has not enacted a -3- general law that clearly and unequivocally waives sovereign immunity in this instance. We disagree. Section 627.7405(1) provides as follows: Notwithstanding ss. 627.730-627.7405, an insurer providing personal injury protection benefits on a private passenger motor vehicle shall have, to the extent of any personal injury protection benefits paid to any person as a benefit ari...

...and which is owned by a municipality, a transit authority, or a political subdivision of the state." As such, the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law specifically includes public school buses in the definition of "commercial motor vehicle" and thereby subjects owners of public school buses to the reimbursement provision of section 627.7405(1). The School Board is correct that "[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity ....

...And legislative waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed. Id. at 472 ("[W]aiver will not be found as a product of inference or implication."). Here, the School Board maintains that there is no clear and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity in section 627.7405(1) or any of the related no-fault provisions of chapter 627, and it points to section 768.28, Florida Statutes (2015), as an example of such a waiver....

...intends to do so and that because it did not use the specific language "the state . . . waives sovereign immunity" in chapter 627, the legislature did not intend to waive sovereign immunity with regard to the state's liability for reimbursement of PIP payments pursuant to section 627.7405(1). But although chapter 627 does not include the phrase "the state ....

...any motor -5- vehicle which is used in mass transit or public school transportation." § 627.732(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). Thus, under that earlier version of the statute, owners of public school buses would not have been subject to the reimbursement provision of section 627.7405(1). However, in 1997, the legislature amended the definition of "commercial motor vehicle" in section 627.732 to its current definition, which specifically includes motor vehicles used for public school transportation....

...mass transit" and "owned by a municipality, a transit authority, or a political subdivision of the state," see § 627.732(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015), the legislature has clearly and unequivocally waived sovereign immunity for actions brought under section 627.7405(1) for reimbursement of PIP benefits paid to individuals injured on vehicles used for public school transportation, which necessarily include public school buses....

...y cause of action for reimbursement, the legislature has clearly and unequivocally waived sovereign immunity as to that cause of action. Furthermore, if it was not the intent of the legislature to waive the School Board's sovereign immunity as to section 627.7405(1), the expressed exclusion of other government- -6- owned vehicles from the definition of "commercial motor vehicle" would be unnecessary....

...tatute." (quoting Gaulden v. State, 195 So. 3d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 2016))). Accordingly, we conclude that the legislature expressly waived sovereign immunity for owners of vehicles used for public school transportation in actions brought pursuant to section 627.7405(1)....

...(alteration in original) (quoting Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999))). II. NO-FAULT INSURANCE EXEMPTION The School Board also argues on appeal that it should be exempt from reimbursement under section 627.7405(1) because the legislature expressly exempted motor vehicles used as school buses from the statutory requirement to maintain no-fault insurance coverage....

...The express exemption of school buses from the requirement to maintain no-fault insurance does not conflict with the express inclusion of school buses in the definition of a "commercial motor vehicle," the owner of which is subject to the reimbursement provision of section 627.7405(1). The plain language of section 627.7405(1) expressly provides that the right of reimbursement against the owner of a commercial motor vehicle exists -7- "[n]otwithstanding ss. 627.730-627.7405," and we need look no further than the plain language of the statute....

...ute's plain language to determine the [l]egislature's intent and . . . avoid rules of statutory construction." (quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep't of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005))). As such, section 627.733(1)(a) cannot act as a limitation on section 627.7405(1). III. POLICY EXCLUSIONS Safety National also relies on the fact that the School Board is not required to maintain no-fault insurance on its school buses to argue that it cannot be deemed an "insurer" under section 627.7405(1)....

...It argues that because school buses are exempt from the requirements of section 627.733(1)(a), under the exclusions of its policy, it does not provide no-fault PIP insurance for the School Board's school buses and therefore cannot be considered to be "the insurer of the owner of a commercial motor vehicle" referenced in section 627.7405(1). Safety National maintains that the term as used in the statute can only mean an insurer that provides no-fault PIP benefits for the commercial motor vehicle involved in the accident. We reject this argument. Section 627.7405(1) clearly and unambiguously provides a right of reimbursement against "the insurer of the owner of a commercial vehicle," without any qualification of that term....

...or bodily injury damages -9- incurred as the result of an accident involving a covered vehicle. That makes Safety National the School Board's insurer and subject to the reimbursement provision of section 627.7405(1). Safety National also attempts to avoid reimbursement liability by pointing out that the injured parties are not "insureds" under Safety National's policy with the School Board and that in fact they are specifically excluded under the terms of that policy. While that may be true, it is of no consequence. Safety National is not liable to reimburse State Farm pursuant to the specific terms of its policy with the School Board. Rather, it is liable for reimbursement pursuant to the plain language of section 627.7405(1), and nothing in its policy with the School Board trumps the statutory requirement. IV....

...CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court's order granting final summary judgment in favor of State Farm. State Farm paid PIP benefits to two of its own insureds who were injured while passengers on a school bus owned by the School Board, and pursuant to section 627.7405(1), it has a statutory right to reimbursement from the School Board as the owner of that commercial motor vehicle and from Safety National as the School Board's insurer.1 Affirmed. CASANUEVA and SILBERMAN, JJ., Con...

...reimbursement of PIP benefits paid to persons injured in separate school bus accidents. The issue presented here is one of statutory interpretation—whether the Florida Legislature waived the sovereign immunity of school boards for PIP reimbursement claims brought under section 627.7405(1), Florida Statutes (2019)....

...the Broward School Board seeking reimbursement of PIP benefits paid to its insureds who were involved in separate school bus accidents. In each complaint, State Farm cited Lee County for the proposition that it could sue the Broward School Board for reimbursement under section 627.7405(1). The Broward School Board moved to dismiss each complaint, arguing (1) it was entitled to sovereign immunity, and (2) the Florida Legislature did not intend that school boards be held liable for PIP reimbursement, citing legislative history materials in support....

...that the Broward School Board was not entitled to sovereign immunity under Lee County. 1 B. School Board of Palm Beach County State Farm filed a third county court complaint against the Palm Beach School Board seeking PIP reimbursement under section 627.7405(1)....

...Separation of powers principles also underpin the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Am. Home Assur. Co., 908 So. 2d at 471 (citing Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1022 (Fla. 1979)). B. Chapter 627, Florida Statutes Under section 627.7405(1), an insurer providing PIP benefits on a “private passenger” motor vehicle has a right of reimbursement against the owner or the insurer of a “commercial” motor vehicle. The statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) Notwithstanding ss. 627.730-627.7405, an insurer providing personal injury protection benefits on a private passenger motor vehicle shall have, to the extent of any personal injury protection benefits paid to any person as a benefit arising out of such private passenger motor vehicle insurance, a right of reimbursement against the owner or the insurer of the owner of a commercial motor vehicle . ... 4 § 627.7405(1), Fla....

...§ 627.732(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphasis added). C. Lee County In the Second District’s Lee County decision, the court held—as a matter of first impression—that a private motor vehicle insurer may sue a school board for reimbursement under section 627.7405(1) when the private insurer pays PIP benefits to cover injuries sustained in a school bus accident. Lee County, 276 So. 3d at 358. The court reasoned that, because section 627.732(3)(b) includes vehicles used for “public school transportation” in the definition of a commercial motor vehicle, and section 627.7405(1) creates a right of reimbursement against the owner of a commercial motor vehicle, “the legislature has clearly and unequivocally waived sovereign immunity” for PIP reimbursement actions brought against school boards to recover benefits paid in connection with school bus accidents....

...5 authority, or a political subdivision of the state.’” Id. at 355-56 (quoting § 627.732(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015)). In the court’s view, unless the legislature intended to waive a school board’s sovereign immunity for section 627.7405(1) PIP reimbursement claims, the express exclusion of other government vehicles from the definition of a commercial motor vehicle would have been unnecessary....

...2d DCA 2018)). In sum, the court held that, by expressly including public school buses “in the definition of vehicles subject to a statutory cause of action for reimbursement,” the legislature expressly waived the sovereign immunity of school boards “in actions brought pursuant to section 627.7405(1).” Id. D....

...tes, the plain language of chapter 627 does not clearly and unequivocally waive the sovereign immunity of school boards for PIP reimbursement claims. Although section 627.732(3)(b) clearly includes school buses in the category of vehicles covered by section 627.7405(1), chapter 627 does not identify a school board or any government entity as a proper party to be sued for reimbursement. Therefore, a finding that chapter 627 waives sovereign immunity would require us to infer that section 627.7405(1) authorizes PIP reimbursement suits against school boards, which cannot form the basis of a waiver....

...3d at 1200 (holding the Florida Uniformed Servicemembers Protection Act, chapter 250, Florida Statutes, does not waive sovereign immunity, in part, because it does not “define[] the State as a defendant subject to a private cause of action for damages.”). Here, section 627.7405(1) creates a right of reimbursement against the “owner” or the “insurer” of a commercial motor vehicle, and section 627.732(3)(b) includes public school buses in the definition of a “commercial motor vehicle.” However, un...

...authorize suits against the Department, “such an inference is not sufficient to constitute a clear and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id. (citing Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Schwefringhaus, 188 So. 3d 840, 846 (Fla. 2016)). Here, section 627.7405(1) creates a cause of action for PIP reimbursement against the “owner” or the “insurer” of a commercial motor vehicle....

...However, Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-3.0171 (2021) specifically recognizes that school boards can contract with private entities to provide transportation to public school students. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-3.0171 (1), (5), and (8). Therefore, we believe section 627.7405(1) allows for the potential reimbursement of PIP benefits from those private owners of school buses serving public schools who are not otherwise entitled to sovereign immunity and their insurers....

...While public school buses are included in the category of vehicles 4 We express no view as to whether a private owner of a school bus who contracts with a school board to provide transportation for public school students might be entitled to sovereign immunity from a section 627.7405(1) PIP reimbursement claim in an appropriate case. 9 subject to PIP reimbursement, chapter 627 does not expressly define any state entity as a proper party to be sued for reimbursement. Therefore, a waiver can be found only by inferring that section 627.7405(1) authorizes reimbursement suits against state entities, including school boards....

...Such an inference, even if reasonable, cannot form the basis of a sovereign immunity waiver. See Hightower, 306 So. 3d at 1196 (citing Spangler, 106 So. 2d at 424). Strictly construing chapter 627, as we must, we are “constrained to hold” that school boards retain their sovereign immunity from section 627.7405(1) PIP reimbursement claims absent a “clear and unequivocal” legislative expression to the contrary....

...reimbursement of PIP benefits paid to persons injured in separate school bus accidents. The issue presented here is one of statutory interpretation—whether the Florida Legislature waived the sovereign immunity of school boards for PIP reimbursement claims brought under section 627.7405(1), Florida Statutes (2019)....

...the Broward School Board seeking reimbursement of PIP benefits paid to its insureds who were involved in separate school bus accidents. In each complaint, State Farm cited Lee County for the proposition that it could sue the Broward School Board for reimbursement under section 627.7405(1). The Broward School Board moved to dismiss each complaint, arguing (1) it was entitled to sovereign immunity, and (2) the Florida Legislature did not intend that school boards be held liable for PIP reimbursement, citing legislative history materials in support....

...that the Broward School Board was not entitled to sovereign immunity under Lee County. 1 B. School Board of Palm Beach County State Farm filed a third county court complaint against the Palm Beach School Board seeking PIP reimbursement under section 627.7405(1)....

...Separation of powers principles also underpin the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Am. Home Assur. Co., 908 So. 2d at 471 (citing Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1022 (Fla. 1979)). B. Chapter 627, Florida Statutes Under section 627.7405(1), an insurer providing PIP benefits on a “private passenger” motor vehicle has a right of reimbursement against the owner or the insurer of a “commercial” motor vehicle. The statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) Notwithstanding ss. 627.730-627.7405, an insurer providing personal injury protection benefits on a private passenger motor vehicle shall have, to the extent of any personal injury protection benefits paid to any person as a benefit arising out of such private passenger motor vehicle insurance, a right of reimbursement against the owner or the insurer of the owner of a commercial motor vehicle . ... 4 § 627.7405(1), Fla....

...§ 627.732(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphasis added). C. Lee County In the Second District’s Lee County decision, the court held—as a matter of first impression—that a private motor vehicle insurer may sue a school board for reimbursement under section 627.7405(1) when the private insurer pays PIP benefits to cover injuries sustained in a school bus accident. Lee County, 276 So. 3d at 358. The court reasoned that, because section 627.732(3)(b) includes vehicles used for “public school transportation” in the definition of a commercial motor vehicle, and section 627.7405(1) creates a right of reimbursement against the owner of a commercial motor vehicle, “the legislature has clearly and unequivocally waived sovereign immunity” for PIP reimbursement actions brought against school boards to recover benefits paid in connection with school bus accidents....

...5 authority, or a political subdivision of the state.’” Id. at 355-56 (quoting § 627.732(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015)). In the court’s view, unless the legislature intended to waive a school board’s sovereign immunity for section 627.7405(1) PIP reimbursement claims, the express exclusion of other government vehicles from the definition of a commercial motor vehicle would have been unnecessary....

...2d DCA 2018)). In sum, the court held that, by expressly including public school buses “in the definition of vehicles subject to a statutory cause of action for reimbursement,” the legislature expressly waived the sovereign immunity of school boards “in actions brought pursuant to section 627.7405(1).” Id. D....

...tes, the plain language of chapter 627 does not clearly and unequivocally waive the sovereign immunity of school boards for PIP reimbursement claims. Although section 627.732(3)(b) clearly includes school buses in the category of vehicles covered by section 627.7405(1), chapter 627 does not identify a school board or any government entity as a proper party to be sued for reimbursement. Therefore, a finding that chapter 627 waives sovereign immunity would require us to infer that section 627.7405(1) authorizes PIP reimbursement suits against school boards, which cannot form the basis of a waiver....

...3d at 1200 (holding the Florida Uniformed Servicemembers Protection Act, chapter 250, Florida Statutes, does not waive sovereign immunity, in part, because it does not “define[] the State as a defendant subject to a private cause of action for damages.”). Here, section 627.7405(1) creates a right of reimbursement against the “owner” or the “insurer” of a commercial motor vehicle, and section 627.732(3)(b) includes public school buses in the definition of a “commercial motor vehicle.” However, un...

...authorize suits against the Department, “such an inference is not sufficient to constitute a clear and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id. (citing Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Schwefringhaus, 188 So. 3d 840, 846 (Fla. 2016)). Here, section 627.7405(1) creates a cause of action for PIP reimbursement against the “owner” or the “insurer” of a commercial motor vehicle....

...However, Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-3.0171 (2021) specifically recognizes that school boards can contract with private entities to provide transportation to public school students. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-3.0171 (1), (5), and (8). Therefore, we believe section 627.7405(1) allows for the potential reimbursement of PIP benefits from those private owners of school buses serving public schools who are not otherwise entitled to sovereign immunity and their insurers....

...While public school buses are included in the category of vehicles 4 We express no view as to whether a private owner of a school bus who contracts with a school board to provide transportation for public school students might be entitled to sovereign immunity from a section 627.7405(1) PIP reimbursement claim in an appropriate case. 9 subject to PIP reimbursement, chapter 627 does not expressly define any state entity as a proper party to be sued for reimbursement. Therefore, a waiver can be found only by inferring that section 627.7405(1) authorizes reimbursement suits against state entities, including school boards....

...Such an inference, even if reasonable, cannot form the basis of a sovereign immunity waiver. See Hightower, 306 So. 3d at 1196 (citing Spangler, 106 So. 2d at 424). Strictly construing chapter 627, as we must, we are “constrained to hold” that school boards retain their sovereign immunity from section 627.7405(1) PIP reimbursement claims absent a “clear and unequivocal” legislative expression to the contrary....