Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Because the injured insured is statutorily prohibited from recovering these costs from the tortfeasor whose wrongful conduct caused the injury or death, he or she is relegated to payment of these necessary costs from his or her insurance carrier unless the statutorily-imposed threshold of permanency is established. § 627.737, Fla....

...Bill Wagner, Tampa for amicus curiae — Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers. Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Barry Scott Richard, Deputy Atty. Gen., for intervenor. DEKLE, Justice. This appeal comes to us directly from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County and involves the constitutional validity of F.S. §§ 627.737 and 627.738, F.S.A., these being the portions of the 1972 Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act (hereinafter referred to as the "no-fault" insurance act) providing for tort immunity in certain specified circumstances....

...Because the Lasky car was a 1958 Ford, its replacement value did not meet the $550.00 "threshold" requirement of our no-fault insurance law as to property damage. Mrs. Lasky's injuries did not include any compound fracture or other injury which would bring her within the provisions of § 627.737(2) allowing her to recover damages for pain and suffering, etc., in the traditional tort action; if she comes within these provisions at all, it must be by virtue of the one thousand dollar medical expense "threshold" provision of F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A....

...specifically finding the statutes in question to be constitutionally valid in the face of appellant's challenge; this direct appeal ensued. CONSTITUTIONALITY Appellants here present a many-faceted attack upon the constitutional validity of both F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A....

...ion invalid on grounds that it unconstitutionally denied the right of access to the courts under Art. I, § 21, Fla. Const. Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973). We now hold, however, that, with one exception, the personal injury aspects of F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., are valid and constitutional....

...t this requirement. This provides a reasonable alternative to the traditional action in tort. In exchange for his previous right to damages for pain and suffering (in the limited class of cases where recovery of these elements of damage is barred by § 627.737), with recovery limited to those situations where he can prove that the other party was at fault, the injured party is assured of recovery of his major and salient economic losses from his own insurer....

...n insurer of medical costs, lost wages, etc., while foregoing the right to recover in tort for these same benefits and (in a limited category of cases) the right to recover for intangible damages to the extent covered by the required insurance (F.S. § 627.737(1), F.S.A.); furthermore, the accident victim is assured of some recovery even where he himself is at fault....

...five hundred and forty dollars as the result of the fault of another would be without recourse against anyone under § 627.738, despite a clear loss to him and even where evidence of fault of the other party was overwhelming. The provisions of F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., present a totally different picture....

...rom tort liability for tangible damages resulting from injury except where the benefits provided in F.S. § 627.736(1), F.S.A., are payable to the injured party by his insurer or would be so payable but for an authorized deduction or exclusion. F.S. § 627.737(1), F.S.A....

...are less than one thousand dollars. [9] In computing the one thousand dollar figure, a person entitled to receive free medical *15 and surgical benefits is credited with the equivalent value of the services so provided him, as a part of the $1,000. § 627.737(2)....

...from the total deprivation of any right of recovery for property loss under $550.00 disapproved in Kluger . The property provisions considered in Kluger did not allow any reasonable alternative to the traditional tort action; the provisions of F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., do provide a reasonable alternative to the traditional action in tort, and therefore do not violate the right of access to the courts guaranteed by Art....

...ssed in the legal literature on the subject. In order to determine whether the act in question is reasonably related to these permissible legislative objectives, we are compelled next to examine what changes the act makes in the prior tort law. F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., grants an exemption from liability in tort for vehicular accidents, to persons meeting the insurance requirements of F.S....

...ars a substantial relationship to the legislative purpose, the classification does not deny equal protection. Daniels v. O'Connor, 243 So.2d 144 (Fla. 1971). Appellants' basic equal protection argument deals with the "threshold" requirements of F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., relating to circumstances in which an exemption is granted from tort liability for damages for pain and suffering, etc....

...It is not therefore the amount of the actual bill rendered to the patient which determines if the $1,000 "threshold" has been met, but rather the reasonable amount referred to in the statute and such medical expense as shall be "necessary." The second noted class of cases provided for in the threshold requirements of F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., is that in which the *19 $1,000 medical expense "threshold" has not been reached, but in which death or permanent injury results....

...t's towers." As surely as "All men are created equal," so are all "equal" in death. PERMANENCY Similarly, equal protection of the laws is not offended by differentiating between non-permanent injuries and permanent injuries, i.e., those specified in § 627.737(2): permanent disfigurement, loss of a body member, permanent injury within reasonable medical probability and permanent loss of a bodily function, which have a reasonable likelihood of creating substantial pain and suffering. The grammatical construction of § 627.737(2) makes it abundantly clear that the $1,000 medical expense threshold is to be considered separately from the other thresholds, since it provides: "only in the event that the benefits which are payable for such injury ......

...se to substantial suffering, the Legislature has not been arbitrary or unreasonable. This is amplified by the fact that an alternate threshold is provided by the $1,000 medical provision for persons who have sustained serious but transient injuries. § 627.737(2)....

...A substantial relationship to permissible legislative objectives having been shown, and the other tests having been met, we find no denial of equal protection of the laws to be present. In sum, we here uphold both the $1,000 medical expenses threshold and the threshold listed in F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., if: "......

...xcess of $1,000, and in which no death or permanent injury results, but in which: "... the injury or disease consists in whole or in part of ... a fracture to a weight-bearing bone, [or] a compound, comminuted, displaced or compressed fracture... ." § 627.737(2) Although this alternative "threshold" test was undoubtedly well intended, it unfortunately constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws by discriminating among members of the class of persons injured in automobile accidents who...

...The same is not true as to the weight-bearing little toe. One who suffers a soft tissue injury may not seek recompense for pain and suffering unless it can be proved that the injury is permanent; yet these have been shown to be among the most serious of bodily injuries. Under the provisions of § 627.737(2) dealing with this category of cases, a person sustaining a fracture as described in the statute (as the broken little toe described above) would be allowed to *21 proceed with suit, but a person who receives a severe wrenching of the ne...

...may suffer great pain and discomfort is allowed no redress in the courts under this provision. Such results cannot reasonably be said to rest on a rational basis, but are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, and for that reason this provision of F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A....

...the statute will be sustained. State ex rel. Lamar v. Dillon, supra ; State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, supra ; City of Miami v. State, 158 Fla. 56, 27 So.2d 829 (1946). Applying these tests to the instant provision we hold that the invalid portion of § 627.737 (2), as separate, independent "thresholds" alone, namely, the fracture of a weight-bearing bone or the compound, comminuted, displaced or compressed fracture, may properly be severed from the remainder of that section, and therefore that t...

...ants (despite their lack of standing to raise these points) and find them to be devoid of merit. The no-fault insurance act has not been shown to violate the equal protection of the laws, except as to the alternative "threshold" requirements of F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., of particularized injuries involving weight bearing bones, etc., as outlined above. RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY Appellants' next contention is that the provisions of F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., deprive them of their right to trial by jury under Fla....

...While the abolition of a cause of action triable by jury might in some instance be unconstitutional on another ground, [18] the present statutory provisions do not violate the right to trial by jury. *23 RESTRAINT ON NON-RESIDENTS' RIGHT TO TRAVEL Appellants argue that the provisions of F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., infringe unconstitutionally on the rights of non-residents to travel to or in the State of Florida....

...However, the unique circumstances involved in this case persuade us that a simple affirmance of the order appealed would be contrary to the interests of justice. As noted earlier, the appellants in this action have now in fact exceeded the one thousand dollar "threshold" requirement of F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., and thus would be entitled, under the act, to pursue their claims for intangible damages for pain and suffering, etc., absent the trial court's order of dismissal prior to such a showing....

...lants under F.S. § 627.736(1)(a), F.S.A., having now exceeded in amount the sum of one thousand dollars, in order to allow an opportunity to pursue a recovery in tort of damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience pursuant to F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., as the facts may appear, and for such other and further proceedings as may be necessary, not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. ADKINS, C.J., and ROBERTS, McCAIN and CARLTON (Retired), JJ., concur. ERVIN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion. BOYD, J., dissents. ERVIN, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part): F.S. Sections 627.737 and 627.738, F.S.A....

...However, when the differences in treatment between those included and those excluded from the class bear a real and substantial relationship to the purposes sought to be obtained by the act, the classification is valid, as against an attack under the equal protection clause. Under Fla. Stat. § 627.737, F.S.A., entitled "Tort Exemption," there is an exemption from tort liability for damages because of bodily injuries, sickness or disease arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in this State....

...How can the Legislature possibly contend that a statute which would breed such results can be said to rest on a rational basis? This legislation unabashedly favors the rich — who can afford to pay and are charged and do pay higher medical fees and thus reach the threshold much faster — over the less affluent. In Fla. Stat. § 627.737, F.S.A., the tort exemption section, certain injuries were set forth which would support an action for damages for pain and suffering....

...on for pain and suffering, unless same is considered to be a permanent injury. Also, one who suffers a soft tissue injury may not recover for pain and suffering unless it can be proved that the injury is permanent. Under the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 627.737, F.S.A., a person sustaining a fracture as described in the statute would be allowed to proceed with suit, but a person who receives a severe wrenching of the neck and spine and the associated soft tissue (such as the typical "whiplash" in...

...[8] Or its approved equivalent. As used hereafter in this opinion, the term "insurance" refers to the security required to be maintained by F.S. § 627.733(3), F.S.A., whether the means by which such security is provided is insurance or some other approved method. [9] F.S. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., referring to benefits payable under F.S....

...1962). [20] The use of the terms "accrued" and "cause of action" in this context is different from the historical definitions, due to the possible subsequent accrual of the further cause of action at such later time as the $1,000 threshold of F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., is reached.

...The defendants, Rollins and Cates, argued that the plain language of section 627.736(3), Florida Statutes (1991), [1] required the court to instruct the jury not to compensate the Pizzarellis for PIP benefits that had been paid or were to be paid in the future. The Pizzarellis argued that section 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1991), [2] applied and entitled Rollins and Cates to a setoff only for those PIP benefits that had been paid up until the time of trial....

....78 in PIP benefits fit the definition of "payable" and therefore set off the $524.78 from the $5000 future medical expense award. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that section 627.736(3) applied rather than section 627.7372....

...As an alteration of the common law, the statutory provisions that allow the introduction into evidence and setoff of collateral insurance benefits must be narrowly construed. Lastly, we disagree with the dissents in this case that our prior case law construing section 627.737(3) mandates a contrary result. In Purdy v. Gulf Breeze Enterprises, Inc., 403 So.2d 1325 (Fla.1981), we upheld the constitutionality of section 627.737(3) because it simply reduced the amount of damages injured plaintiffs can recover by the amount of PIP benefits "they have received." Purdy, 403 So.2d at 1327. In discussing the provisions of section 627.737(3) in effect at that time, we stated that "[t]o prevent the injured persons from receiving double recovery, the legislature has provided that any PIP benefits they have received from their insurers will be set off from the amount they...

...In all cases in which a jury is required to fix damages, the court shall instruct the jury that the plaintiff shall not recover such special damages for personal injury protection benefits paid or payable. § 627.736(3), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis supplied). [2] Specifically, section 627.7372(1), Florida Statutes (1991), provides: (1) In any action for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of the ownership, operation, use, or maintenance of a motor vehicle, the court shall admit into evidence the total amount of a...

...ready burdened judicial system," id., outweighed in the particular case the plaintiff's need to sue for property damage and later, having reached the no-fault threshold of $1,000 in personal injury damages or suffered permanent injury as required by Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1975), to sue for these latter damages....

...revises the civil and criminal law concerning fraudulent insurance claims and soliciting of motor vehicle tort claims by attorneys and others (Section 36); generally requires mandatory joinder of all personal injury claims and actions brought under Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975) (Section 38); generally precludes joinder of liability insurers in suits against insureds (Section 39); changes the definition of "minor children" in the Wrongful Death Act (Section 40); provides for mandatory...

...Two physicians testified that Morey sustained permanent injury from the auto accident. However, it was also demonstrated that the medical history on which the doctors based their opinion of permanency was in part inaccurate. The jury found that Morey did not sustain a permanent injury under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1985), [1] and the court entered judgment in favor of Harper....

...ssenting). Accordingly, the decision below is quashed and the cause is remanded with directions that the trial court's judgment be affirmed. It is so ordered. BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1985), a plaintiff is precluded from recovering damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease arising out of ownership, maintenance, operati...

...listed threshold requirements. Morey and the instant case both involve the subsection (b) requirement that the injury or disease must be a "[p]ermanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement." § 627.737(2)(b), Fla....

...3d DCA 1991); Pulte Home Corp. v. Ply Gem Indus., 804 F. Supp. 1471 (M.D.Fla. 1992). Technically, this is incorrect. Because the law of negligence does not recognize a protected interest in purely economic loss, no cause of action exists under such circumstances. Cf. § 627.737, Fla....

...Rehearing Denied July 26, 1984. *588 Paul Antinori, Jr. of Antinori & Thury, P.A., and Rudy G. LaRussa, Tampa, for appellant. Michael S. Rywant of Prugh & Rywant, Tampa, for appellees. RYDER, Judge. Patricia Fay, plaintiff below in a negligence action brought pursuant to section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1981), [1] appeals the final judgment entered in favor of appellees, Mincey and his insurance company, which confirmed the jury's findings that *589 Mincey had been negligent but Fay had not sustained permanent injuries....

...We reverse because the trial court abused its discretion with respect to these rulings and the exclusions were not harmless error. Fay filed a complaint against appellees Mincey and Sentry Insurance Company (Sentry) to recover damages recoverable under section 627.737(2) for personal injuries she allegedly suffered in an automobile collision which occurred on May 14, 1981....

...It was further stated that Mincey was insured under a liability insurance policy issued by Sentry. Appellees filed an answer denying Mincey's negligence and asserted Fay's comparative negligence as one defense and the "no-fault" tort liability exemption provision of section 627.737 as a second defense....

...Finally, we note the trend is to liberally construe section 90.702. Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846 (6th Cir.1981) (construing similar federal provisions). Accordingly, assuming LCT is an appropriate subject for a jury's consideration in personal injury cases brought under section 627.737, we hold a licensed chiropractor is not precluded from being qualified to testify as to LCT and giving an opinion with respect to a particular thermographic study done by him if the trial court determines the proffered expert possesse...

...Dr. Kriz's also recently obtained evidence that Fay was not suffering compensable, permanent injuries under the no-fault law. In short, the exclusions were not harmless because medical testimony is necessary in establishing a permanent injury under section 627.737(2)....

...Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Stuart, 301 So.2d 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). We therefore REVERSE the jury's verdict, order a new trial, and REMAND the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion. BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 627.737(2) provides: (2) In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...n insurer of medical costs, lost wages, etc., while foregoing the right to recover in tort for these same benefits and (in a limited category of cases) the right to recover for intangible damages to the extent covered by the required insurance (F.S. § 627.737(1), F.S.A.); furthermore, the accident victim is assured of some recovery even where he himself is at fault....

...Legislative History In an apparent response to concerns that unscrupulous doctors and lawyers were inflating or outright falsifying personal injury claims in an effort to meet and exceed the statutory monetary threshold amount, [4] the Legislature enacted section *818 627.7375, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976). See ch. 76-266, § 7, Laws of Fla. [5] Section 627.7375, when enacted, contained essentially that which is now found in subsections (1) through (4) of section 817.234, all of which then included, and still include, fraud as an element of the crime....

...e tort claims or claims for personal injury protection benefits. See ch. 78-258, § 3, Laws of Fla. The Legislature, again having the opportunity to include intent to defraud as an element, did not do so. The following year, the entire section (then-section 627.7375) was renumbered as section 817.234....

...Worthy of notice, however, is that during the same year, the Legislature passed a reviser's bill to remove inconsistencies and redundancies and otherwise clarify statutes and facilitate their correct interpretation. See ch. 79-400, Laws of Fla. While revising then-section 627.7375, the Legislature permitted subsections (8) and (9) to remain untouched....

...71-252, § 8, Laws of Fla. In 1976, the Legislature eliminated this monetary requirement, and in its place adopted a scheme which made recovery in tort dependent on the character of the injury suffered by the accident victim. See ch. 76-266, § 5, Laws of Fla.; see also § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat....

...Dillon suffered severe but nonpermanent injuries and had medical expenses exceeding $1,000. The defendants moved for dismissal or a judgment in their favor, asserting that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the facts alleged did not meet the "tort threshold" under section 627.737. Plaintiffs responded with the contention that section 627.737 is unconstitutional as a denial of access to courts, due process, and equal protection. The trial court issued an order holding for the defendants and finding the statute constitutional. On appeal, the district court found sections 627.736(1), [1] 627.737, [2] and 627.739 [3] of *15 the no-fault statute unconstitutional....

...tional. As did the district court, we shall address each of the constitutional issues separately. DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS Dillon was not allowed to maintain his suit for pain and suffering because he did not meet the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1979), insofar as his injuries were not permanent....

...The district court recognized that in Lasky we held that the denial of the right to recover such damages did not violate this constitutional provision because the legislature had established a reasonable alternative. The court concluded, however, that subsequent changes in sections 637.736, 627.737, and 627.739 rendered the alternative no longer reasonable....

...t this requirement. This provides a reasonable alternative to the traditional action in tort. In exchange for his previous right to damages for pain and suffering (in the limited class of cases where recovery of these elements of damage is barred by § 627.737), with recovery limited to those situations where he he can prove that the other party was at fault, the injured party is assured of recovery of his major and salient economic losses from his own insurer....

...f PIP coverage have been increased from $5,000 to $10,000. Regardless of the actual amount of recovery, an injured person will receive prompt payment for his major and salient economic losses even where he himself is at fault. Thus the provisions of section 627.737 still provide a reasonable alternative to the traditional action in tort and therefore do not violate the right of access to courts guaranteed by article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. *18 DUE PROCESS OF LAW The district court found that sections 627.736(1), 627.737(1), and 627.739(1), Florida Statutes (1979), unconstitutionally denied due process in that they did not bear a reasonable relationship to permissible legislative objectives. The district court explained: The changes to sections 627.736, 627.737 and 627.739 noted above cause the 1979 no-fault act to no longer be reasonably related to several of the permissible legislative objectives noted in Lasky: (1) injured parties are able to initiate suits for expenses not payable by an insurer...

...presume that they do so with knowledge of the consequences. This provision is reasonably related to the legislative objective of minimizing the cost of insurance in this state. EQUAL PROTECTION Finally, Dillon argues that the threshold provisions of section 627.737(2), which require some sort of permanent injury before a suit for pain and suffering can be brought, unconstitutionally deny him equal protection of the laws....

...ain to recover damages to recompense them, while not granting such right of recovery to those substantially less likely to incur any prolonged pain. Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 296 So.2d at 19. In conclusion, we find that sections 627.736(1), 627.737, and 627.739 of the Florida Statutes (1979), do not violate the rights of access to courts, due process, or equal protection....

...ed personal injury protection for medical expenses and loss of earnings. SUNDBERG, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Although I concur substantially with the majority opinion, I feel compelled to dissent from the holding that section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1979), is constitutional insofar as it eliminates all causes of action for intangible damages for nonpermanent injuries....

...Florida Constitution. But complete elimination of the common law right to redress for such injury and damages requires that analysis now. When I apply the principles of Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), I am compelled to the conclusion that section 627.737(2) violates article I, section 21 of our constitution by absolutely denying access to the courts to vindicate a prior existing common law right to recover intangible damages for nonpermanent injuries....

...This right is withdrawn without supplying any viable alternative just as was condemned in Kluger. If the right to intangible damages for nonpermanent injuries can be constitutionally eliminated then so too could the right to damages for permanent injuries. For this reason I dissent from the holding that section 627.737(2) is constitutional insofar as it prohibits recovery of intangible damages for nonpermanent injuries....

...air or deceptive act or practice involving the business of insurance, and any such insurer committing such violation shall be subject to the penalties afforded in such part, as well as those which may be afforded elsewhere in the insurance code. [2] 627.737 Tort exemption; limitation on right to damages; punitive damages....

...(b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. (3) When a defendant, in a proceeding brought pursuant to ss. 627.730-627.741, questions whether the plaintiff has met the requirements of s. 627.737(2), then the defendant may file an appropriate motion with the court, and the court shall, on a one-time basis only, 30 days before the date set for the trial or the pre-trial hearing, whichever is first, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it, ascertain whether the plaintiff will be able to submit some evidence that the plaintiff will meet the requirements of s. 627.737(2)....

...Because the injured insured is statutorily prohibited from recovering these costs from the tortfeasor whose wrongful conduct caused the injury or death, he or she is relegated to payment of these necessary costs from his or her insurance carrier unless the statutorily-imposed threshold of permanency is established. § 627.737, Fla....

...insurer of medical costs, lost wages, etc., while foregoing the right to recover in tort for these same benefits and (in a limited category of cases) the right to recover for intangible damages to the extent covered by the required insurance (F.S. s 627.737(1), F.S.A.); furthermore, the accident victim is assured of some recovery even where he Himself is at fault....

...This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the circuit court in Manatee County awarding the appellants $7,937.20 for damages incurred as a result of an automobile accident. Because the trial judge upheld the constitutionality of sections 627.736(3) [1] and 627.7372, [2] Florida Statutes *1327 (1977), we have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution (1972)....

...During the course of the trial a dispute arose as to the admissibility of evidence relating to Mr. Purdy's receiving PIP benefits from his insurer. Both sides agreed to postpone arguments concerning the constitutionality of the collateral source statute, section 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1977), and the effect it would have on the amount of damages awarded until after the trial was over....

...At the end of the trial the jury awarded Mr. Purdy $11,318.00 as compensation for his injuries and Mrs. Purdy $500.00 as compensation for the loss of her car. At a post trial hearing the trial judge upheld the constitutionality of sections 627.736(3) and 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...ive method of meeting such public necessity can be shown. Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973). This holding does not apply to these statutes since they do not abolish any previous right of access to courts. Basically, sections 627.736(3) and 627.7372 reduce the amount of damages injured plaintiffs can recover from tortfeasors by the amount of benefits they have received from collateral sources....

..."admit into evidence the total amount of all collateral sources which have been paid to the claimant prior to the commencement of the trial. The court shall also admit into evidence any amount paid by the claimant to secure such collateral sources." § 627.7372(1), Fla....

...yearly. We believe the statute refers to the costs incurred by claimants to secure the actual policies from which they received benefits for whatever period of time the policy is in effect. From this analysis we conclude that sections 627.736(3) and 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1977), do not deprive persons injured in automobile accidents of their right of access to the courts....

...These sections merely prevent injured plaintiffs from recovering monies which, equitably speaking, belong to their insurers. Furthermore, there is nothing in the law which prevents injured persons from waiving their rights to receive insurance benefits and suing the tortfeasor for the full amount of their damages. Section 627.7372 sets off only those benefits which actually have been paid....

...— No insurer shall have a lien on any recovery in tort by judgment, settlement, or otherwise for personal injury protection benefits, whether suit has been filed or settlement has been reached without suit. An injured party who is entitled to bring suit under the provision of s. 627.737, or his legal representative, shall have no right to recover any damages for which personal injury protection benefits are paid or payable....

...heir interests may appear, or without obtaining the insurer's consent to a different method of payment. (d) In the event an injured party or his legal representative is entitled to bring suit against a third party tort-feasor under the provisions of § 627.737 and fails to bring such suit against such third pay tort-feasor within one year after the last payment of any benefits under subsection (1), the insurer of such injured party, upon giving thirty days' written notice to such injured party,...

...Prosser, The Law of Torts 236 (4th ed. 1971). Since Greene relied upon his loss of smell and taste to meet the nofault thresholds, it was incumbent upon him to prove that Mrs. Flewelling's negligence was the legal or proximate cause of his loss of these senses. See § 627.737(2), Fla....

...correct, it is not necessary that we address this point. For the same reason, it is unnecessary that we address Greene's further argument that the court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction on a "serious, nonpermanent injury" as described in § 627.737(2)(e)....

...Accordingly, the order of the trial court setting aside the jury's verdict and entering *782 a judgment in favor of Greene for only his property damage is affirmed. GRIMES, C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur. NOTES [1] In order for Greene to maintain his tort suit for personal injuries, § 627.737, Fla....

...tested. In response to special interrogatories, the jury found that plaintiff was not comparatively negligent and that she had sustained a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability as a result of the automobile accident. See § 627.737(2)(b), Fla....

...In any given case, because of the absence of a statutory definition or jury instruction, a permanent injury is essentially what the medical experts and lawyers tell the jury it is. ("We know it when we see it."). Comment 3 to Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 6.1 states: "Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991), does not define `permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability'.......

...tually obligated to pay the defendant's costs and attorney's fees and the statute does not provide for reimbursement or indemnification of the insurer. (4) The jury's finding of "no permanent injury", a threshold finding necessary for recovery under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence in view of the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff's dentist as to damages to the plaintiff's teeth....

...jury, “the trial court took from the jury’s consideration the issue of the permanency of [Wald’s] *1207 neck and back injuries, the only conditions for which [he] sought damages.” Grainger, 982 So.2d at 43 . The First District concluded that section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (2007), precluded the jury from awarding Wald damages based on the permanency of the thigh injury because it did not cause “pain, suffering, mental anguish, or inconvenience” where defense counsel had stated that the thigh injury caused no “ongoing daily chronic pain.” Id. at 43 & n. 1. We find the First District’s reading of the statute does not comport with its plain language. Section 627.737(2)(b) provides that a plaintiff may recover damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience (noneconomic damages) because of a bodily injury arising out of the use of a motor vehicle only in the event that the injury “consists in whole or in part of ......

...e to meet the threshold requirements deprived them of their right to recover all damages, including property damages and damages for loss of consortium. Such an interpretation of Florida's no-fault law is contra to the plain language of the statute. Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975) [3] *216 provides tort exemption for damages due to "bodily injury, sickness, or disease arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use" of a motor vehicle only to the extent that the benefits de...

...n to be answered by you, and it will be your duty to answer each of these questions. If you answer each of these three questions "no," you will not consider the issue of damages, but will find a verdict for the defendants. [Emphasis added.] [3] Sec. 627.737, Florida Statutes, provides: (1) Every owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...Fensom, Barron, Redding, Boggs, Hughes & Fite, Panama City, for appellees. PER CURIAM. Peggy J. Burkett appeals a summary final judgment entered by the trial court dismissing her complaint for personal injuries for failure to meet the threshold requirements of Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, allowing a tort action for damages suffered in a motor vehicle accident for "permanent injury," other than "scarring or disfigurement." We reverse....

...d against cannot prevail. Mejiah v. Rodriguez, 342 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977). Under the foregoing principles, we conclude that a genuine issue existed of whether plaintiff's injury comes within the "permanent injury" requirement of the statute, Section 627.737(2), precluding summary judgment. See Johnson v. Phillips, 345 So.2d 1116 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977). Although Section 627.737 has been held unconstitutional in Dillon v....

...No permissible inference of permanent injury otherwise arises from this record. Compare Sullivan v. Price, 368 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). I therefore think the trial court's summary judgment was entirely correct, and that this claim is barred by section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...tained as a result of [his] [her] injury and death, including any damages that the estate and the survivors are reasonably certain to incur or experience in the future. NOTE ON USE FOR 501.1 If there is an issue of limitation on damages because of F.S. 627.737(2), use instruction 501.4....

...dequately compensate (spouse) for any loss by reason of [his wife's] [her husband's] injury, of [his] [her] services, comfort, society and attentions in the past [and in the future] caused by the incident in question. NOTES ON USE FOR 501.4 1. See F.S. 627.737(2) (1991). Use of the threshold instruction will in most cases require the use of an interrogatory verdict form. 2. If there is proof that a claimant will incur future damages that are not excluded from recovery by F.S. 627.737 (1991), such as where claimant at trial is not at maximum medical improvement and will have a limited period of future lost income or medical expenses, it will be necessary to add the following language after the word "question": "includin...

...The committee has placed this instruction in the damages section because the statute sets a threshold to the recovery of non-economic damages only. If claimant does not establish permanency, claimant may still be entitled to recover economic damages that exceed personal injury protection benefits. See F.S. 627.737(2) (1991); Auto-Owners Insurance Co....

...jury, then the court may wish to modify the instruction. For example, the court may instruct the jury: "If the greater weight of the evidence does not support the claim on the issue of permanency, then your verdict should be for the defendant." 4. F.S. 627.737(2) (1991) does not define "permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability" that is established by expert testimony....

...Instruction 501.8b, not instruction 501.8a, should be given in all actions for personal injury or wrongful death accruing before October 1, 1993, arising out of the ownership, operation, use, or maintenance of a motor vehicle. Instruction 501.8b is derived from F.S. 627.7372 (1987), which was repealed for causes of action accruing on or after October 1, 1993....

...She contends that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow testimony by one of her expert witnesses, Dr. Hartwig, regarding the results of a thermographic examination, introduction of which was sought in support of her claim of permanent injury meeting the threshold requirements of Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...also unused benefits believed to be available. Rollins did not address how the PIP setoff should be calculated or involve any consideration of comparative negligence and therefore does not expressly and directly conflict with the decision below. [3] Section 627.737(1) limits an injured party's entitlement to bring suit in tort by stating in pertinent part: Every owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by [the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law] ......

...the extent that the benefits described in s. 627.736(1) are payable for such injury ... unless a person is entitled to maintain an action for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience for such injury under the provisions of subsection (2). § 627.737(1), Fla....

...This conclusion makes it necessary to reach the merits of the defendants' appeal. On that point, it seems clear that the failure to credit the defendants with 80% of the $10,000.00 in PIP benefits was completely in conflict with the parties' agreement and, more important, with the mandatory terms of section 627.737(1), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...[6] The Wooten and Marquez decisions are disapproved to the extent they are inconsistent with our conclusions, and the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in this case is affirmed. OVERTON, C.J., and BOYD, SUNDBERG and KARL, JJ., concur. HATCHETT, J., concurs in result only. ADKINS, J., dissents. NOTES [1] § 627.737, Fla....

...The amended law is not before us, but the issues considered in this proceeding are applicable to rights and procedures under the amended statute. [2] Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. [3] In fact, a 1976 amendment to the statute indicates the contrary. Ch. 76-266, § 5, Laws of Florida, enacted § 627.737(3), Fla....

...r v. Walker, 335 So.2d 636, 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 341 So.2d 1086 (Fla. 1977), and in the footnotes in the district court's opinion on rehearing in this proceeding. 341 So.2d at 778 n. 1, 2. [5] See § 34.01(1), Fla. Stat. (1975). [6] § 627.737(3), Fla....

...3d DCA 1991), in which the Third District Court of Appeal held that an injured party's recovery for unpaid medical bills for a non-permanent injury should not be reduced by the amount of benefits recoverable under the injured party's personal injury protection policy, rejecting the contention that the exemption contained in section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1983), required the reduction....

...We find conflict with Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Worthy, 447 So.2d 998 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), and Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 296 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1974). [1] We quash the district court's decision, finding that its holding would effectively repeal the exemption contained in section 627.737, which is a fundamental *988 part of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law. The following are the pertinent portions of the No-Fault Law applicable to the issues in this case: 627.737 Tort exemption; limitation on right to damages; punitive damages....

...of: (a) Significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function. (b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. § 627.737(1)-(2), Fla....

...t pain and deeply depressed. While the Mansfields admitted liability, they denied that Rosa Rivero suffered permanent physical injuries and the trial proceeded on the issue of whether Rosa Rivero crossed the permanent injury threshold requirement of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The record establishes that the Riveros' insurance carrier has refused to provide them any benefits; no rule requires them to recover from the carrier. Rivero, 584 So.2d at 1014. We disagree because we find that the district court failed to apply the clear exemption contained in section 627.737(1). The record reflects that both the Mansfields and the Riveros had PIP coverage as required by the statute. Because the jury found that no permanent injury existed, the Mansfields were exempted from tort liability by the express provisions of section 627.737(1) to the extent of the personal injury protection benefits....

...e no-fault law. As noted, the no-fault statutory scheme sets up a means by which an injured party recovers most of his or her out-of-pocket expenses from his or her own insurer, where the injury fails to reach the permanent injury threshold found in section 627.737(2)....

...efits and suing the tortfeasor for the full amount of the damages was dicta and written in the context of discussing the constitutionality of the collateral source rule. It was not written with any consideration of the mutual exemption provisions of section 627.737....

...*990 498 So.2d at 423 (emphasis added). The district courts have applied this exemption, as illustrated by the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Worthy, 447 So.2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), in which that court said that section 627.737(1) exempts "a tortfeasor from tort liability for damages because of bodily injury caused by a motor vehicle only `to the extent that benefits described in section 627.736(1) are payable for such injury, or would be payable but for any...

...Accordingly, because the record reflects that both the Mansfields and the Riveros had PIP coverage as required by the statute, and because the jury found that no permanent injury existed, the Mansfields were exempted from tort liability by the express provisions of section 627.737(1) to the extent that PIP benefits would be payable under the Riveros' PIP policy....

...See Connecticut General Life Insurance v. Dyess, 569 So.2d 1293 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), review denied, 581 So.2d 1307 (Fla. 1991). The majority's further attempt to distinguish Purdy by stating that it related only to a discussion of the collateral source rule, contained in section 627.7372, is equally unpersuasive....

...For the reasons stated above I find Purdy and Matthews controlling and would affirm the analysis and decision below. BARKETT, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. [2] In accordance with sections 627.737(1) and 627.736(1), the Riveros should recover 80% of all their reasonable medical expenses from their own PIP carrier....

...Morey contends on appeal that he presented uncontroverted medical evidence at trial that he sustained a permanent injury as a result of Carl Harper's negligent operation of a motor vehicle and that such evidence entitled him to a directed verdict on the issue of whether he sustained a permanent injury under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Flinchbaugh's finding of permanent impairment was based on an inadequate history and related only to appellant's back and neck, while Dr. Sharf's opinion as to permanency was based on an inadequate history and related only to the right wrist. *1288 Under section 627.737(2), a plaintiff is precluded from recovering damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience because of bodily injury, sickness or disease arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of a motor...

...been met. REVERSED AND REMANDED for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. HOBSON, Acting C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 627.730-741, Fla. Stat. (1979) (more correctly styled the "Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act"). [2] § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. (1979). [3] § 627.737(2)(b), Fla....

...n Alamo Rent-A-Car bumper sticker. When the Stellases rested their case in chief, it was immediately assailed by a motion for partial directed verdict on the issue of noneconomic damages, for failure of plaintiffs to have established, in accord with section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1993), that Mrs....

...Ultimately, the trial court opted for the test emanating from Novak, and, applying that test, concluded that a sufficient nexus existed between the motor vehicle and the Stellases' injuries so as to make the statute applicable. We disagree with the lower court's decision to apply section 627.737 in this case....

...nership, maintenance, operation, or use of such motor vehicle only in the event that the injury or disease consists in whole or in part of: (b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. § 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...DeLaura of Smalbein, Eubank, Johnson, Rosier & Bussey, P.A., Rockledge, for appellees. Larry Klein, West Palm Beach, for amicus curiae The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers. DAUKSCH, Chief Judge. This is an appeal from an order which found sections 627.737 et seq., Florida Statutes (1979), (the 1979 no-fault act) to be constitutional, granted defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and, in the alternative, granted defendants' Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice. Defendants' motions were granted because plaintiffs' pleadings did not meet the tort threshold required by section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1979), in order to sue for plaintiffs' damages....

...n and physical suffering, intangible injuries for which damages have historically (before "no-fault") been recoverable through an action in tort. However, since this complaint clearly showed that the plaintiffs did not meet the threshold required by section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1979), the trial court found plaintiffs to be precluded from maintaining their action for redress of Dillon's injuries....

...heir right of access because the Legislature had established a reasonable alternative. The court first noted that the exemption for tort liability only applied to owners of motor vehicles who maintained security as required by the no-fault act. Sec. 627.737, Fla....

...Chapter 77-468, Laws of Florida, amended these recovery provisions and the present no-fault act allows an injured party to only recover 80% of his medical expenses and either 60% or 80% of his lost income. However, the injured party may recover the remaining percentage of his expenses through litigation because section 627.737(1), Florida Statutes (1979), only grants an exemption from tort liability for damages "to the extent that the benefits described in s....

...The 1979 no-fault act requires PIP coverage of $10,000.00 but the maximum allowable deductible is $8,000.00. Sec. 627.739(1), Fla. Stat. (1979). This change means that the 1979 act allows for decreased PIP coverage. These changes to sections 627.736, 627.737 and 627.739 mean that these provisions no longer provide a reasonable alternative for redress of injuries suffered in automobile accidents....

...We find that the Legislature has not shown any public necessity different from that which was present when the Lasky court considered the 1972 no-fault act. The provisions upheld in Lasky thereby constitute an alternative method for meeting such necessity. DUE PROCESS We also find that sections 627.736(1), 627.737(1), and 627.739(1), Florida Statutes (1979), cause plaintiffs' due process rights to be violated and are thus unconstitutional....

...58 system which was supposedly unduly costly; and (6) correcting the situation in which the pressing necessity of paying medical bills often forced an injured party to accept an unduly small settlement for his claim. The changes to sections 627.736, 627.737 and 627.739 noted above cause the 1979 no-fault act to no longer be reasonably related to several of the permissible legislative objectives noted in Lasky : (1) injured parties are able to initiate suits for expenses not payable by an insurer...

...a) Significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function. (b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. Sec. 627.737(2), Fla....

...We must follow this declaration of our supreme court in Lasky supporting the conclusion that the threshold provisions of the 1979 no-fault act do not deny plaintiffs their right to equal protection. Accordingly, the order of the trial court which found sections 627.737 and 627.739, Florida Statutes (1979), constitutional, granting defendants' summary judgment *359 and in the alternative granting defendants' motion to dismiss is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings....

...State, 384 So.2d 141 (Fla. 1980). The Motion for Stay is denied. DAUKSCH, C.J., FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and COWART, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §§ 627.730 et seq., Fla. Stat. (1971), effective January 1, 1972. [2] Injured parties who do not meet the threshold requirement of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1977). [3] See sec. 627.737(1), Fla....

...each of those statutes and altering the dynamics of trial, without any indication that such a result was one that the legislature intended. The situation presented in this case is analogous to that arising under another portion of the No-Fault Law, section 627.737(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), which uses the phrase "[p]ermanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability" without defining it. The standard jury instructions do not attempt to define the terms. In its note explaining the absence of a jury *275 instruction on permanency, the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases observed: Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991), does not define "permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability" that is established by expert testimony....

...lon v. Reid, 602 So.2d 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), review granted, 614 So.2d 503 (Fla.), case dismissed, 620 So.2d 762 (Fla.1993). Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Civ.) 6.1, Comment 3. The Supreme Court authorized the use of the Committee's proposed instruction on section 627.737(2)....

...Discovery proceedings were instituted, and on October 9, 1973 petitioner and his father were deposed. At petitioner's deposition, counsel for the insurer learned for the first time of the fact that petitioner had incurred medical expenses in excess of the threshold $1,000 provided in Fla. Stat. § 627.737(2), F.S.A., and therefore he possessed a right of action....

...Use the appropriate bracketed numbered provision applicable to the evidence adduced in the case. 2. Use of the threshold instruction will in most cases require the use of an interrogatory verdict form. 3. If there is proof that a claimant will incur future damages that are not excluded from recovery by section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1991), such as where claimant at trial is not at maximum medical improvement and will have a limited period of future lost income or medical expenses, it will be necessary to add the following language after the word "question": "including any such damage as (claimant) is reasonably certain to [incur] [experience] in the future." Comments 1. See section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...The committee has placed the threshold instruction after instructions on negligence because the statute sets a threshold to the recovery of noneconomic damages only. If claimant does not establish permanency, claimant may still be entitled to recover economic damages that exceed personal injury protection benefits. See § 627.737(2), Fla....

...e jury, then the court may wish to modify the instruction. For example, the court may instruct the jury: "If the greater weight of the evidence does not support the claim on the issue of permanency, then your verdict should be for the defendant." 3. Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991), does not define "permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability" that is established by expert testimony....

...We agree with defendants that the evidence in the record does not support a claim for punitive damages and that, therefore, the issue should not have gone to the jury. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. NOTES [1] See § 627.737(2), Fla....

...[1] Accordingly, we reverse the orders for directed verdict and new trial appealed in this case and remand for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion. COBB and DANIEL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Armour & Co. v. Doig, 45 Fla. 162, 34 So. 249 (1903). [2] See Robertson v. Robertson, 106 So.2d 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958). [1] § 627.737(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. (1985); Calhoun v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 354 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1978) (plaintiff may not relitigate if jury verdict of negligence results but jury does not find permanency under § 627.737).

...r her subrogated insurer, is entitled to recover damages for personal injuries to the nominal plaintiff Linda caused by the negligent operation of the Wallace motor vehicle by the defendant Lisa unless the plaintiff first establishes, as required by section 627.737(2)(b), Florida Statutes, that Linda suffered a "permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement." This is a condition precedent or threshold requirement to the plaintiff's right to recover damages for Linda's personal injuries in this case....

...Permanency of injury is considered in the Florida Standard Jury Instructions only in model instruction 6.9a relating to life expectancy and the use of mortality tables. Unfortunately the Standard Jury Instructions do not contain an instruction on the no-fault threshold issue of permanent injury contained in section 627.737(2)(b) and should be amended to do so....

...(1981), against the defendants, Eley and her insurer, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. In his complaint alleging negligence on the part of Eley, the plaintiff sought recovery of medical expenses and general damages based on permanent injury. See § 627.737(2)(b), Fla....

...of the ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of such motor vehicle only in the event that the injury or disease consists in whole or in part of: *1103 ... . Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability. ... [emphasis added] § 627.737(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981). Absent a finding of permanent injury by the jury, it could not award general damages for pain, suffering or any of the other elements of damages set forth in section 627.737(2)....

...ages under the next question. We first deal with the trial court's conclusion that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. This whole issue turns on the jury's finding that the plaintiff had not sustained a permanent injury. See § 627.737(2)(b)....

...In an action by Horowitz and his wife, the plaintiffs presented Anthony J. Dorto, a chiropractor for the purpose of establishing that he had suffered a "permanent injury within reasonable medical probability" to qualify him to maintain his tort action against the defendants under Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...But do the requirements of the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act, Chapter 627, Florida Statutes, dictate a contrary ruling? To maintain a tort action for injuries received from an automobile accident, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish a permanent injury within "reasonable medical probability" under Section 627.737, or to establish medical expense in excess of $1,000....

...the ambit of his permitted practice and his professional expertise. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. BOARDMAN, C.J., and OTT, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 627.737, concerning limitation on bringing tort actions, was amended by Ch. 76-266, effective October 1, 1976, repealing the $1,000 threshold. As amended, Section 627.737(2) now provides: (2) In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...Ipser was unqualified to render an opinion about whether she had a permanent injury because he has no medical training. It is well established that expert medical testimony is required to prove that a plaintiff has suffered a permanent injury under our no-fault insurance law. See § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat....

...The Riveros alleged that as a result of her injuries Rosa was in constant pain that left her unable to work and caused her to become deeply depressed. At trial, the Mansfields admitted liability. The trial proceeded on the issues of damages and whether the Riveros crossed the permanent injury threshold requirement of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...al bills, but finding that Rosa had not sustained a permanent injury. Consequently, the trial court entered a final judgment in accordance with *1014 the jury verdict. The Mansfields then requested the court to reduce the judgment by 80% pursuant to section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...reduced amount. The Riveros filed this appeal. The Riveros argue that the trial court erred in failing to give the requested instruction. We disagree, and in so doing, recede from our decision in Jones v. Smith, 547 So.2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). [1] Section 627.737 permits a plaintiff to recover damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience "only in the event that the injury consists in whole or in part of: ... (2) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability." § 627.737(2), Fla....

...The remaining points on appeal lack merit. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded. NOTES [1] In Jones v. Smith, 547 So.2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), we held that the trial court had committed reversible error in refusing plaintiff's request to instruct the jury that in section 627.737(2) "the words permanent injury include subjective complaints obtained resulting from an initial organic injury." Jones, 547 So.2d at 201....

...setoffs, $741,636.31, plus attorney’s fees and costs” in the bad-faith case. Id. Because Cadle may recover only economic damages (medical expenses and wages) if her injuries do not meet the threshold requirement of permanent injury under Florida Statutes § 627.737(2), the judge reasoned “the vitality of her $75,000 demand and GEICO’s good faith obligation to pay it depends entirely on whether GEICO had reason to believe, prior to June 2009, that ....

...shall include any amount in excess of the policy limits.” 9 185 So. 3d at 1221. In contrast to this expansive coverage, the Florida Supreme Court has explained the requirement of a permanent injury for recovery of noneconomic damages: Section 627.737(2)(b) provides that a plaintiff may recover damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience (noneconomic damages) because of a bodily injury arising out of the...

...mages. Wald v. Grainger, 64 So. 3d 1201, 1207 (Fla. 2011) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).10 Consequently, insureds seeking noneconomic benefits from their uninsured-motorist carrier, first must meet the permanent-injury requirement of § 627.737(2)(a)-(d). 11 “In view of section 627.727(7), it is clear that the statute 10 The interrelated Florida Statutes § 627.727(7) and § 627.737(2) state and define the permanency requirements for noneconomic damages: The legal liability of an uninsured motorist coverage insurer does not include damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless the injury or disease is described in one or more of paragraphs (a)-(d) of s. 627.737(2). Fla....

...(b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. Fla. Stat. § 627.737(2)(a)-(d). 11 The district judge instructed the jury on the permanent-injury requirement of § 627.727(7) for recovery of noneconomic damages: 22  Case: 15-11283 Date Filed: 09/30/2016 Page: 23 of 27 does not require an insurance carrier to provide uninsured motorist coverage for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) have been met.” Dauksis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 623 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla. 1993).12 The Florida Supreme Court has explained the interrelationship of § 627.727(7) and § 627.737(2) regarding the medical proof required for a permanent injury resulting from an automobile accident: [T]he statute[s] require[] that the plaintiff establish the existence of a physical injury and prove that this injury is permanent....

...in a reasonable degree of medical probability; “(c) significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement; and, “(d) death.” Trial Tr. vol. III at 24-25 (Dec. 3, 2014) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 627.737(2)(a)-(d)); see Fla. Standard Jury Instruction 501.3. 12 “It is axiomatic that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole....

...permanent injury—the plaintiff must also present expert medical testimony to establish the existence and permanency of the alleged injury. City of Tampa v. Long, 638 So. 2d 35, 37-38 (Fla. 1994) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 627.737(2)(b)) (emphasis added)....

...of her injury. Noneconomic damages are available under an insurance policy only if the plaintiff incurs a “permanent injury,” which must be established “within a reasonable degree of medical probability” within the cure period. Fla. Stat. § 627.737(2)(b). While witness credibility determinations traditionally are a jury function, the court should review the record as a whole[;] it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe....

...Nevertheless, because of our disposition of this case, those matters are moot. The original 1972 "no-fault" statutes provided in section 627.736(1), Florida Statutes, for PIP benefits of 100 percent of medical expenses and 100 percent of lost earnings up to a limit of coverage of $5,000. Section 627.737, Florida Statutes, gave exemption from tort liability to the extent of the PIP benefits payable under section 627.736(1), Florida Statutes, and provided that if certain thresholds relating to permanency and seriousness were met the in...

...e court in Chapman v. Dillon, 415 So.2d 12, 18 (Fla. 1982), stated: Under the new provisions the injured party still recovers most of his out-of-pocket expenses from his own insurer and is allowed to bring suit for the remainder. (emphasis supplied) Section 627.737(1), Florida Statutes, undertakes to exempt a tortfeasor from tort liability for damages because of bodily injury caused by a motor vehicle only "to the extent that benefits described in s. 627.736(1) are payable for such injury, or would be payable but for any [authorized] exclusion... ." Therefore, under the statutes cited and Lasky and Chapman, without meeting the thresholds in section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, the tortfeasor and his liability carrier, here State Farm, is liable to the injured party for the 20 percent of medical expenses not payable under the PIP coverages provided by section 627.736(1)(a) and the 40 pe...

...f lost gross income and earning capacity not payable under the PIP coverage provided by section 627.736(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and for 100 percent of those damages as exceeds the applicable policy limits. Of course, after meeting the thresholds of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, the injured party may also recover in tort from the tortfeasor and his liability carrier for all pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience resulting from bodily injury caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle....

...For these reasons, whether the insured's question to the adjuster is construed to relate to payment of medical expenses, as the insured's counsel contends, or to the possibility of recovery for pain and suffering resulting from a significant and permanent injury under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, as the PIP insurer suggests, the suggestion of the insurer's adjuster for *1002 the insured to "take it up with State Farm" was fair and appropriate because of State Farm's legal liability and was reasonable in r...

...He was ultimately scheduled for knee surgery on September 28, 1995, for injuries that his orthopaedic surgeon related to the accident. Bills for this surgery were received by State Farm on October 13, 1995. Rather than pay the bill within the thirty-day period provided for in section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1993), because of her concern that the surgery might not be related to the accident, State Farm's adjuster scheduled Jones for a physical examination on November 30, 1995, in Daytona Beach, Florida. Jones responded by filing a four-count complaint against the tortfeasor and State Farm on November 20, 1995. The complaint sought PIP benefits and alleged that State Farm had violated section 627.737 because of the failure to make payment on the claim within the thirty-day period provided for in the statute....

...who live in Florida. To understand why the legislature placed any state residency requirement in subsection (4)(d) of section 627.736 in 1971, one must look at the overall operation of the no-fault law. The law was very controversial in 1971 because section 627.737 created a "no-fault threshold" and took away a person's common law right to sue for any minor injury occurring in a Florida automobile accident....

...See Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1 (Fla.1973). The quid pro quo that allowed the nofault statute to survive this constitutional challenge was found both in the payment of personal injury benefits under section 627.736 and in the immunity provided under section 627.737....

...At trial, Dauksis moved in limine to preclude State Farm from presenting evidence directed toward the lack of permanency of his injuries. Dauksis argued that because the tortfeasor did not have the required security necessary to claim tort exemption under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1987), it was unnecessary for him to meet the permanency threshold of that subsection....

...... . (7) The legal liability of an uninsured motorist coverage insurer does not include damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless the injury or disease is described in one or more of paragraphs (a) through (d) of s. 627.737(2). Section 627.737(2) provides: (2) In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...anent loss of an important bodily function. (b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. The security referred to in section 627.737 is an insurance policy or other equivalent security which provides PIP benefits....

...more serious cases. In view of section 627.727(7), it is clear that the statute does not require an insurance carrier to provide uninsured motorist coverage for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) have been met....

...Thus, the critical question in this case is whether the insurance carriers should be bound by the language of their contracts with the insureds, or whether they should be afforded the exemption from tort liability available under the provisions of sections 627.727(7) and 627.737(2), Florida Statutes. 560 So.2d at 1312. The court held that the claimants could recover under the language of their policy because they would be "legally entitled to recover" from the uninsured tortfeasor without the necessity of meeting the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2)....

...e Fla.Bar 2d ed. 1991), which states: Uninsured motorist policies typically contain language to the effect that the carrier will pay the damages the insured is legally entitled to recover from the operator or owner of an uninsured vehicle. Because F.S. 627.737(2) provides that the tort threshold requirements apply only to an owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle for which security has been provided, it follows that an insured is entitled to recover all damages regardless of whether the tort threshold requirements are met when seeking UM benefits....

...accident involving a vehicle owned by the City of Tampa. Long sought damages for her injuries which consisted mostly of pain in her neck and lower back. The City defended the lawsuit on the ground that Long had failed to satisfy the requirements of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1989), a provision of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law. Under this statute a plaintiff's injuries are recoverable only if the injuries are "permanent ... within a reasonable degree of medical probability." § 627.737(2)(b)....

...In response Long argues that the Mansfield decision was wrong and that, even if it is correct, the instruction in the instant case differs from the instruction disapproved in that case. Our decision in this case requires a construction of the no-fault law contained in section 627.737, which provides, in relevant part, as follows: (2) In any action of tort brought against the owner......

...ury ... arising out of the ownership ... of such motor vehicle only in the event that the injury ... consists in whole or in part of: ..... (b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. § 627.737(2), Fla....

...The first issue we must address is whether a permanent injury can be established when the only evidence of that permanent injury is based on the subjective complaints of the claimant. The second issue concerns the proper jury instruction, given the provisions of section 627.737....

...ault Law, include permanent subjective complaints of pain resulting from an initial organic injury." Id. The district court, in affirming the trial court's action, explained why the trial court properly rejected the requested instruction. It stated: Section 627.737 permits a plaintiff to recover damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience "only in the event that the injury consists in whole or in part of: ... (2) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability." § 627.737(2), Fla....

...Ordinarily in automobile accident cases such as this, before a jury may render an award for pain and suffering, there has to be a threshold finding of permanent injury. See McClellan v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 475 So.2d 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); § 627.737(2), Fla....

...3d DCA 1991), quashed, 620 So.2d 987 (Fla. 1993). Second, section 627.739(1) was not the basis for our decision in Mansfield, but was cited in the footnote in order to distinguish it from the calculations made in accordance with sections 627.736(1) and section 627.737(1)....

...r, or occupant of a vehicle or any person or organization legally responsible for any such person's acts or omissions who is made exempt from tort liability by ss. 627.730-627.7405. [2] In Mansfield v. Rivero, 620 So.2d 987 (Fla. 1993), we held that section 627.737 of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law requires that an injured party's recovery for unpaid medical bills for a non-permanent injury be reduced by the amount of benefits recoverable under the injured party's PIP policy. In a footnote, we calculated the percent that would be recovered from the injured party's own PIP carrier and the percent that the tortfeasor was obligated to pay, in accordance with sections 627.737(1) and 627.736(1), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The School Board sought to dismiss the negligence claim against it for failure to comply with the notice requirements stated in section 768.28(6)(a) of the Florida Statutes. [1] Wolentarski then moved for summary judgment on this issue. Wolentarski also moved to strike the School Board's section 627.737(2) affirmative defense....

...[3] By this juncture, depositions (two to be exact) had already been taken and other discovery exchanged. Following amendment to add the PIP claim, litigation continued primarily on the School Board's affirmative defenses. Wolentarski moved to strike the School *1053 Board's section 627.737 defense....

...resents such claim in writing to the Department of Financial Services, within 3 years after such claim accrues and the Department of Financial Services or the appropriate agency denies the claim in writing.... § 768.28(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). [2] Section 627.737(2) limits damages in tort actions against owners, registrants, operators, and occupants of motor vehicles or against any person or organization legally responsible for such persons' acts or omissions, where "security has been provided as required by ss....

...in the special jury interrogatory, showed no permanency and, therefore, did not establish or maintain a cause of action. In order to answer the questions raised by this appeal, we first must consider jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit. 627.737(1), Fla....

...Accordingly, the final judgment for the plaintiff is reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter an order of dismissal for want of jurisdiction, and assess costs accordingly. Reversed and remanded with directions. NOTES [1] The No Fault threshold requirements are set out in § 627.737(2) Fla....

...In analyzing this dispute, we should start with the proposition that a tortfeasor is responsible for all damages caused by his or her negligence unless relieved by statute. We are urged by the parties that there are two statutes that may apply to this case— section 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1991), and section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1991). The parties' primary dispute is which statute is controlling in this case. DeMarco urges that section 627.7372, the collateral source setoff statute which was in effect at the time of the accident, should control. Kokotis, on the other hand, contends that the case is controlled by section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1991), the tort exemption statute....

...This argument is based upon the fact that the damages found by the jury in the aggregate amount of $2,350.00 were necessarily predicated on an implied finding by the jury, consistent with the trial court's instructions, that the plaintiff had sustained a permanent injury per the threshold requirement of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...*825 Lawrence J. Robinson, Sarasota, for appellant. Roger T. Minor of Fuller & Minor, P.A., Fort Myers, for appellee. RYDER, Acting Chief Judge. Donna Holmes challenges the trial court's final judgment in this personal injury action brought pursuant to section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...ion of the earlier condition. To the court's query about whether a doctor had testified on this the defense answered no. The defense did not request an instruction regarding the permanency threshold for recovery under the no fault insurance statute, section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, and no such instruction was given....

...Stat.) prohibits the recovery of future economic damages in the absence of an affirmative finding of a permanent injury. The Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law limits the right of a person involved in a motor vehicle accident to bring an action for damages sought for bodily injury, sickness or disease. Section 627.737(1), Florida Statutes, provides that no action may be brought to recover damages for bodily injury, sickness or disease to the extent the damages are covered by the insurance (Personal Injury Protection) required by section 627.736(1), Florida Statutes. Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, provides that no action may be brought to recover damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease resulting from a motor vehicle accident, unless a threshold requirement is met....

...Ludwig, the driver of the other car. Mrs. Ladner sought damages for loss of consortium. On appeal, it is undisputed that Mr. Ludwig's negligence was the sole cause of the accident. The parties vigorously tried the issue of the no-fault threshold. See § 627.737, Fla....

...The appellant claimed that she had sustained a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability and was, therefore, in addition to other damages, entitled to recover for the pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience she suffered as a result of the accident. See § 627.737(2), Fla....

...jury should have been allowed to award future medical expenses even though it found that the appellant did not sustain a permanent injury. Throughout these proceedings, the appellant has taken the position that she met the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) because she established that she had sustained a permanent injury as a result of the automobile accident....

...CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur. NOTES [1] The committee comments to the Standard Jury Instructions-Civil Cases, 613 So.2d 1316 (Fla. 1993), are noteworthy. The comments by the Standard Jury Instructions Committee state that "[s]ection 627.737(2) does not define `permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability' that is established by expert testimony." (Cites omitted.) The comments then state that "[t]herefore the instructions do not attempt to define the terms a...

...(Fla. 1993), are again noteworthy. The comments by the committee indicate that "[i]f claimant does not establish permanency, claimant still may be entitled to recover economic damages that exceed personal injury protection benefits." A "see" cite of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991), and Smey follows.

...A tort-feasor is liable to the injured party for the percentage of medical expenses and lost wages not payable under P.I.P. coverage and for any amount of these damages which exceed the statutory limits, without regard to the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes....

...The calculation used by the trial court properly encompassed these objectives. AFFIRMED. HARRIS and ANTOON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] These kinds of damages are encompassed in the required personal injury protection benefits of Florida's no-fault law. § 627.736(1), Fla. Stat. [2] § 627.736(3), Fla. Stat. (1995). [3] § 627.737(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). [4] Economic damages of $21,019.23, minus Assi's comparable negligence of $9,458.65, for a subtotal of $11,560.58, minus 55% tort liability of defendants applied to the $10,000 PIP payment ($5,500.00), equals $6,060.58. [5] § 627.737, Fla....

...verage. The verdict awarded zero for any future medical expenses or lost earning ability, and, more significant to our decision, zero for past bodily injury, pain and suffering. Automobile personal injury cases arising prior to the effective date of section 627.737, Florida Statutes, and non-automobile personal injury cases decided both before and after that date, have held that a jury verdict awarding to an injured person only the exact amount of the medical expenses incurred and nothing for pa...

...Corp., 463 So.2d 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Skelly v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 445 So.2d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Rodriguez v. Allgreen Corp., 242 So.2d 741 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); Pickel v. Rosen, 214 So.2d 730 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). The effect of the No-Fault Law, section 627.737, Florida Statutes, was to foreclose damages for pain and suffering because of injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation or use of a motor vehicle, unless the injured plaintiff first met one of the threshold requirements, e.g., permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability....

...Upon a finding that there is no permanent injury, a plaintiff is precluded from any recovery only to the extent that the benefits described in s. 627.736(1) are payable for such injury, or would be payable but for any exclusion authorized by ss. 627.730-627.7405... . § 627.737(1), Fla....

...and accepting unduly small settlements. [Emphasis supplied.] In Iowa National Mutual Insurance Company v. Worthy, 447 So.2d 998 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), the fifth district discussed the pertinent sections of our no-fault insurance law. The court stated: Section 627.737(1), Florida Statutes, undertakes to exempt a tortfeasor from tort liability for damages because of bodily injury caused by a motor vehicle only "to the extent that benefits described in s. 627.736(1) are payable for such injury, or would be payable but for any [authorized] exclusion... ." Therefore, under the statutes cited and Lasky and Chapman, without meeting the thresholds in section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, the tortfeasor and his liability carrier, here State Farm, is liable to the injured party for the 20 percent of medical expenses not payable under the PIP coverages provided by section 627.736(1)(a) and the 40 pe...

...f lost gross income and earning capacity not payable under the PIP coverage provided by section 627.736(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and for 100 percent of those damages as exceeds the applicable policy limits. Of course, after meeting the thresholds of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, the injured party may also recover in tort from the tortfeasor and his liability carrier for all pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience resulting from bodily injury caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle....

...cClellan is entitled to recover the 20% of his medical expenses and 40% of his lost gross income not payable under the PIP coverages, and we remand for a determination of these amounts subject, of course, to any collateral sources of indemnity under section 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...ies sustained in the December 3, 1976 accident. A motion to dismiss was filed by Sanchez. The trial court granted same without stating the grounds therefor and this appeal ensued. The Legislature amended the no fault insurance law in 1976 to include Section 627.737(2)(e), Florida Statutes, which reads as follows: "(e) A serious, nonpermanent injury which has a material degree of bearing on the injured person's ability to resume his normal activity and lifestyle during all or substantially all of...

...r all, had an accessible client and a free lawyer — to have recited those facts in an affidavit opposing the motion for summary judgment. The time to ascertain whether the defendant in automobile personal injury litigation has immunity by reason of § 627.737(1), F.S....

...al case into trial. I would amend the judgment to render it without prejudice to the filing of a new action should evidence of permanent injuries appear within the limitation period or should appellant Graff otherwise acquire a right of action under § 627.737(2), F.S....

...quirement was declared unconstitutional. See Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1 (Fla.1973). [4] They are not responsible for many minor accidents that do not result in permanent injuries, but they have uncapped liability for all significant accidents. See § 627.737, Fla....

...Fessenden, Jr., Lane, Massey, Trohn, Clarke, Bertrand & Smith, Lakeland, for appellee Auto Owners Ins. Co. HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge. The only point on this appeal and cross appeal which merits discussion is whether or not the appellee, Mary Phillips, crossed the threshold requirement provided for in Florida Statute 627.737(2)....

...Phillips' initial injury was of an organic nature, to wit, a brain concussion. This organic injury resulted in "permanent injury" albeit it manifests itself through subjective complaints of pain, which complaints, according to the medical testimony, are permanent. We interpret the words "permanent injury" in Florida Statute 627.737(2) to include permanent subjective complaints of pain resulting from an initial organic injury. Therefore, we hold that Mrs. Phillips crossed the threshold requirements of Florida Statute 627.737(2) and affirm the judgments appealed....

...operator of an uninsured car because of bodily injury: 1. sustained by an insured person; 2. caused by accident ; and 3. arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured car. The bodily injury must be a serious injury as described in Section 627.737(2) of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law before we will pay for damages consisting of pain, suffering, mental anguish, or inconvenience....

...van how many times he had been convicted of a crime. See State v. Young, 283 So.2d 58, 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973), and Robinson v. State, 254 So.2d 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). AFFIRMED. McCORD, C.J., and MELVIN, J., concur. NOTES [1] Recently we interpreted § 627.737(2)(c), Fla....

...of: (a) Significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function. (b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. § 627.737(2), Fla....

...This is an appeal by the plaintiff Robert Daniel Scarfone from a final judgment entered in an automobile negligence action in favor of the defendants Thomas R. Magaldi, Richard Magaldi and Government Employees Insurance Company based on an adverse jury finding that the plaintiff had not met the no-fault threshold under Section 627.737(2), Fla....

...s. This appeal ensued. Plaintiffs contend the trial court should have dismissed their suit without prejudice once the jury found that plaintiff failed to establish either injuries or medical expenses in excess of $1,000, as required under Fla. Stat. § 627.737....

...e issues. Plaintiffs argue, however, that Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., Fla. 1974, 296 So.2d 9, mandates a different result. In Lasky the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the permanent injury and medical expense thresholds of Fla. Stat. § 627.737....

...olved against him by the jury. [2] The judgment entered herein does not bar the plaintiffs from bringing a later action within the limitations period, should Tucker sustain medical expenses in excess of the $1,000 threshold requirement of Fla. Stat. § 627.737(2) subsequent to the trial of this cause....

...ges such as pain and suffering, disability, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish, inconvenience, aggravation of a disease or physical defect, or loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. These non-economic damages are precluded under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1993), [2] absent a finding of a permanent injury; however, there is nothing in section 627.737(2) that precludes an *1021 award of future economic damages without a permanent injury....

...Because negligence and causation were combined in question 1 on the verdict form, and the verdict was admittedly inconsistent and excessive, I would reverse for a new trial on all issues. NOTES [1] Vogel and Paul, who were also defendants below, settled with Morrisey and are not parties to this appeal. [2] Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1993), provides: (2) In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...r vehicle. Both the GEICO homeowners policy and the American States business policy exclude coverage for bodily injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of motor vehicles owned or operated by an insured. Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1985), provides: ......

...Procedurally, this case is more closely analogous to Calhoun v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 354 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1978), than to Levine. In Calhoun, the plaintiff filed a suit seeking damages for personal injuries sustained in a car accident. At that time, section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975), provided that a condition precedent to maintaining an action for damages was proof of permanent injury or aggregate compensable damages over $1,000....

...Additionally, the statute's requirement of an immediate payment effectively deprives State Farm of the right to question its legal liability for noneconomic damages under its contract in the event the tortfeasors had personal injury protection insurance coverage under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1989), at the time of Mrs....

...In that regard, section 627.727(7), Florida Statutes (1989), provided that: The legal liability of an uninsured motorist coverage insurer does not include damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless the injury or disease is described in one or more of paragraphs (a) through (d) of s. 627.737(2). [8] Section 627.737(2), which describes the "injury" or "disease" requirements that must first be met, provided as follows: In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...(d) Death. [9] Thus, "[i]n view of section 627.727(7), it is clear that the statute does not require an insurance carrier to provide uninsured motorist coverage for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) have been met." Dauksis v....

...icle." 623 So.2d at 457. The specific issue facing the court was whether the insured, based on this policy language, could recover noneconomic damages against the *136 uninsured motorist carrier without first satisfying the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) in a factual setting involving an uninsured motorist who did not have personal injury protection coverage. The court began its analysis by noting that the underlying legislative theory of section 627.737 "is that if every automobile has PIP coverage, injured motorists will be reimbursed by their own carriers for most of their economic damages regardless of fault, and negligence actions against third parties will be limited to the more serious cases." 623 So.2d at 456. The court also observed that section 627.737 furthers this objective by rewarding individuals who have secured personal injury protection coverage as required by Florida's no-fault law "by exempting them from liability for noneconomic damages except in cases involving permanency or death." Id....

...law. If the tortfeasor had personal injury protection coverage then the uninsured motorist carrier, standing in the shoes of the tortfeasor, was entitled to raise as a defense to such damages its insured's failure to meet the threshold conditions of section 627.737(2)....

...Hassen may be claiming as a result of an alleged permanent injury. Hence, by an anomalous twist of legislative fiat, the mandatory payment requirement imposed on State Farm by the 1992 statute effectively relieves Mrs. Hassen of having to satisfy the mandatory threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) before she is entitled to collect noneconomic damages from State Farm....

...We do not determine, however, the legislature's authority to effectuate such a retroactive change in the law. [8] The legislature left this subsection intact when it amended the statute in 1992. Ch. 92-318, § 79, at 3150, Laws of Fla. [9] This subsection continues to retain this language to the present day. § 627.737(2), Fla....

...ons injured in motor vehicle accidents for medical expenses and lost earnings, regardless of fault. In exchange, the owner or operator of a motor vehicle having such coverage is exempted from tort liability (except in certain limited circumstances). § 627.737, Fla....

...ant motor vehicle operator. At the subsequent trial, the jury found that the defendant was 100% negligent and that the plaintiff sustained damages of $4,500.00, yet it also determined that the plaintiff had not satisfied the threshold requirement of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...e plaintiff's mode of transportation, the threshold requirement applies as long as the defendant has personal injury protection benefits as required by statute. The applicable statutory provisions refute this contention. The threshold requirement of Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1981), applies only in a tort action where security has been provided....

...[2] Reading section 627.736(1), Florida Statutes (1981), one discovers that security is not provided to a motorcyclist, who is "an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle." [3] Thus, a motorcyclist need not satisfy the threshold to maintain a suit for the damages enumerated in subsection (2) of section 627.737. Similarly, a motor vehicle operator cannot assert the tort exemption of section 627.737 (1), Florida Statutes (1981), against a plaintiff motorcyclist because the exemption protects against liability only to the extent personal injury protection benefits are payable or would be payable but for express statutorily authorized exclusions....

...e the thresholds of the statute are not met, the injured party is assured a speedy payment of his medical bills and compensation for lost income from his own insurer, even where the injured party was himself clearly at fault... . The provisions of F.S. 627.737, F.S.A., do provide a reasonable alternative to the traditional action in tort, and therefore do not violate the right of access to the courts......

...equal protection of the laws. Of course, in those states where acceptance of the coverage of a no fault plan confers at least a partial immunity to tort liability, all common law actions may remain against an uninsured motorcyclist or motorist. [2] § 627.737(2): In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...Gaines, Beggs, Lane, Daniel, Gaines & Davis, Pensacola, for appellee. BOYER, Chief Judge. The only issue to be here resolved relates to the definition of "permanent disfigurement" as that term is used in the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act, specifically F.S. 627.737....

...photograph. The learned trial judge, apparently holding that the scar does not constitute a "permanent disfigurement" entered a summary final judgment in favor of the defendant, reciting that the plaintiff's claims are barred by the provisions of F.S. 627.737....

...233, 25 S.E.2d 865, the court defined "disfigurement" as a "blemish, a blot, a scar or a mutilation that is external and observable, marring the appearance." We hold that a permanent scar may be a permanent disfigurement within the contemplation of F.S. 627.737....

...International Bankers Insurance Company (Interbankers), on appellants' claim for uninsured motorist coverage under their policies with the respective insurers. The issue presented is whether a Florida insured must meet the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1984), when the claim is based upon the alleged negligence of an uninsured, nonresident motorist, and where the subject policy does not require the insureds to meet such threshold requirements, and specifically s...

...of an accident with a non-resident, uninsured motorist. Specifically, appellants sought a decree that they are entitled to recover damages for their injuries arising out of the accident without the necessity of meeting the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2)(a)-(d), Florida Statutes (1984), under the uninsured motorist coverage of the policies issued to them by Auto-Owners and Interbankers....

...Newton sought personal injury protection benefits. Thereafter, the insurers filed motions to dismiss, raising as grounds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action in that appellants admitted they had not sustained a permanent injury pursuant to section 627.737, Florida Statutes. On October 5, 1987, the trial court entered an order, determining that appellants must meet the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2), to sustain a claim under the uninsured motorist coverage of the policies....

........ (7) The legal liability of an uninsured motorist coverage insurer does not include damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless the injury or disease is described in one or more of paragraphs (a) through (d) of s. 627.737(2). (Emphasis supplied.) The section 627.737(2) limitation on tort damages specifies that — a plaintiff may recover damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease arising out of the ownership, maintenance, o...

...Thus, the critical question in this case is whether the insurance carriers should be bound by the language of their contracts with the insureds, or whether they should be afforded the exemption from tort liability available under the provisions of sections 627.727(7) and 627.737(2), Florida Statutes....

...Cobb, appealed a judgment entered for Joseph A. Stuart as natural guardian and next friend for Mark K. Stuart, against them. The claim arose as a result of an automobile accident that occurred on April 20, 1972. In view of the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 627.737, the Plaintiff sought to prove a permanent injury....

...Duncan, 169 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964). Therefore, we must reach the merits of the controversy. Judge Calhoun's order was premised on certain cases of the Third District Court of Appeal in which that court held that where the personal injury threshold prescribed by Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975) has not been reached, an order dismissing the cause without prejudice should be entered for want of jurisdiction....

...se cases clearly had jurisdiction to determine whether or not the threshold was reached. There is nothing in the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act which suggests that a court has no jurisdiction where a plaintiff fails to meet the threshold. Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975) simply provides that a plaintiff may recover damages only when one of the threshold requirements is met....

...efendant's position. Having granted the directed verdict on the issue of permanency, the trial court allowed the jury to consider plaintiff's claim for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience. See Easkold v. Rhodes, 614 So.2d at 497 n. 1; § 627.737(2)(b), Fla....

...Elliott Zisser, of Zisser, Robison & Spohrer, Jacksonville, for appellants. Stephen E. Day, of Matthews, Osborne, Ehrlich, McNatt, Gobelman & Cobb, Jacksonville, for appellee. *66 PER CURIAM. In this case of first impression we are asked to determine whether the phrase "medically or scientifically demonstrable" in Section 627.737(2)(e), Florida Statutes, requires objective signs of an injury or allows subjective statements of pain as proof of injury. The Second District Court of Appeal in Johnson v. Phillips, 345 So.2d 1116 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), determined that the term "permanent injury" in Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes, includes "permanent subjective complaints of pain from an initial organic injury." That holding is not dispositive of the issue here because of the wording of the statute. Section 627.737(2)(e), Florida Statutes, provides for recovery by the plaintiff for: "A serious, nonpermanent injury which has a material degree of bearing on the injured person's ability to resume his normal activity and lifestyle during all or subs...

...Thus, we interpret the phrase "medically or scientifically demonstrable" to require the plaintiff to show objective signs of injury. In light of this interpretation, we affirm the action of the trial court dismissing the complaint without prejudice for failure to meet the threshold requirements of Section 627.737(2)....

...scretion in the denial thereof by the trial judge. We adhere to our original opinion and the Petition for Rehearing is DENIED. SHARP, J., and BAKER, JOSEPH P., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] On date of the accident, the threshold requirements of § 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1975), included among other things medical bills in excess of $1,000.00 or a permanent injury as a condition to maintaining a tort action.

...Perry of Crary, Buchanan, Bowdish & Bovie, Stuart, for appellee. PER CURIAM. REVERSED. We believe the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial after a jury had determined that the appellee did not sustain a permanent injury within the meaning of Florida's tort claim statute, section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Appellants' contention that they were prejudiced by the foregoing instruction cannot be sustained. The instruction referred to counsel's argument concerning the amount of damages. However, the jury never reached this issue because it determined that the appellants failed to meet the permanent injury threshold of section 627.737(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...nt injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, defense counsel objected, and the trial court required plaintiff's counsel to limit the question to reasonable chiropractic probability. The court instructed the jury, however, pursuant to section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1987), that they were to determine whether plaintiff sustained a "permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability." The question was posed in the same manner on the form of verdict, and the jury answered the question in the negative....

...accident caused the difficulty, and to allow the commencement of proper medical treatment. We reverse the judgment below and remand for a new trial on the issue of damages in light of Banyas. [3] REVERSED. CROSS and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 627.737(2), Fla....

...5th DCA 1986) (en banc), in which the district court certified the following as a question of great public importance: Are non-residents who voluntarily obtain PIP coverage conforming to Florida's no-fault law (§ 627.730-627.7405, Fla. Stat.) exempt from tort liability under section 627.737, Florida Statutes, to the same extent as residents who obtain the same coverage because required by statute to do so? Id....

...McDONALD, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON and SHAW, JJ., concur. EHRLICH, J., dissents with opinion with which ADKINS, J., concurs. EHRLICH, Justice, dissenting. I agree with the reasoning expressed in the dissenting opinion of Judge DAUKSCH. ADKINS, J., concurs. NOTES [*] Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1983), provides in pertinent part: (1) Every owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...The order approved a jury finding of no permanent injury to plaintiff and ordered a new trial upon those elements of damages not barred by that finding. We reverse. The jury verdict form stated that if the jury finds no permanent injury, the verdict must be for defendant. The trial court, apparently referring to section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1983), found that the verdict form was erroneous because, as plaintiff argues on appeal, even though he did not suffer a permanent injury, he may still have sued for damages consisting of benefits not payable by his...

...med to have received as a result of the collision. Meyer had raised the affirmative defense that the Hutchinsons had not sustained the threshold injuries which would entitle them to recover for pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...In no event shall anyone collect more than once. The trial court's construction of an insurance policy to determine coverage as a matter of law is subject to de novo review. E.g., Hartford Ins. Co. v. Bellsouth Communications, Inc., 824 So.2d 234 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Section 627.737, Florida Statutes, is the authority for a "threshold defense" under which Meyer contends her Michigan insurance policy provides. The pertinent parts of section 627.737 include: (1) Every owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...on. (b) permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) death. Before a claimant can recover the non-economic damages, described in section 627.737(2), the claimant must establish a threshold injury as described in section 627.737(2)(a)-(d)....

...1987), the Florida Supreme Court adopted this court's decision in Spence v. Hughes, 485 So.2d 903 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), in which non-residents of Florida who voluntarily obtain PIP coverage conforming to Florida's no-fault law were held to be exempt from tort liability under section 627.737 to the same extent as Florida residents who had obtained the required statutory coverage....

...pt that the same was entered with prejudice. In Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Company, 296 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1974) the court indicated, at page 23, that where the record below fails to show that the plaintiff has exceeded the "threshold" requirements of § 627.737(2) F.S.A., a dismissal should be without prejudice to a plaintiff's right to later file the action should he thereafter achieve the "threshold" amount, subject, of course, to the statute of limitations....

...McCall of Ayers, Cluster, Curry, McCall & Briggs, P.A., Ocala, for appellees. SHAW, Judge. This is an appeal from a directed verdict rendered against the plaintiff/appellant in a personal injury action predicated upon the court's finding that the appellant failed to meet the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1977). We disagree with the trial court's application of the statute and reverse. Under section 627.737(2)(e) a plaintiff may recover damages in tort if he shows: A serious, nonpermanent injury which has a material degree of bearing on the injured person's ability to resume his normal activity and lifestyle during all or substantially a...

...future medical expenses, no loss of consortium was suffered by Alpheus Simpson. Accordingly, the verdict as to Alpheus is affirmed. As to the jury's denial of non-economic damages for Lois Simpson, we conclude that, while the threshold finding of a section 627.737 permanent injury coupled with a denial of any damages for pain and suffering indeed appears to be inconsistent, [1] the lack of clarity in the existing case law on this point, as noted by Judge Altenbernd, makes it inappropriate to fi...

...ida's No-Fault Law. See Scherzer v. Beron, 455 So.2d 441, 442 (Fla. 5th DCA), cause dismissed, 459 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 1984), holding that "a motorcyclist need not satisfy the threshold to maintain a suit for the damages enumerated in subsection (2) of Section 627.737." Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for new trial....

...Hightower of Levin, Warfield, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Rosenbloum & Magie, Pensacola, for appellant. John F. Windham of Beggs & Lane, Pensacola, for appellees. PER CURIAM. Mr. Snowden appeals the lower court's ruling that he did not meet the threshold requirements of Section 627.737(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1977), regarding the effects and severity of his non-permanent injury....

...The doctor had restricted Mr. Snowden's activities regarding lifting in excess of 25 pounds, crawling, and stooping, all of which activities would have been necessary to adequately perform his class work. These restrictions were still in effect five months after the accident. Section 627.737(3), Florida Statutes (1977), requires a plaintiff to "submit some evidence" to show that he has suffered: * * * * * * A serious, nonpermanent injury which has a material degree of bearing on the injured person's ability to resume his normal *903 activity and lifestyle during all or substantially all of the 90-day period after the occurrence of the injury, and the effects of which are medically or scientifically demonstrable at the end of such period. Section 627.737(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Snowden initially had a low back strain and the point at which the straight leg raising test elicited pain was consistent with this diagnosis. If Mr. Snowden has been malingering or faking, it is unlikely that he would know at which point the test would induce pain indicative of the injury he complained of. Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1977), is a statutory limitation on an injured party's common law right of action in tort....

...a new trial. BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur. NOTES [1] Ironically, the jury found Packer 80% negligent. [2] Packer also suggests that the directed verdict against Russ can be sustained because he failed to meet the no-fault threshold under section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...njury requirement. And finally, GEICO argues that the trial court failed to use an itemized verdict form. First, GEICO correctly argues that the trial court erred in determining that the Hurleys did not have to meet the threshold injury requirement. Section 627.737(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991) requires that the plaintiff prove permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability....

...Johnson further alleged that at the time of the collision he was a resident of the State of Missouri. After various pleadings, amendments, motions and affidavits, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Christensen (and Liberty Mutual) on the basis of the tort exemption provisions of sec. 627.737, F.S....

...[1] In reviewing the provisions of the "no-fault" act we are of the view that the tort exemption provisions of the act are applicable to nonresidents receiving injuries while passengers in a motor vehicle operating in this state. The *860 pertinent portion of the exemption provision set forth in 627.737 is as follows: "627.737 Tort exemption; limitation on right to damages (1) Every owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by §§ 627.730-627.741, and every person or organization legall...

...tort action is maintained by a resident or a nonresident. The recent revised opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida, Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Company, 296 So.2d 9, opinion filed April 17, 1974, in sustaining the constitutional validity of sec. 627.737, points out the inapplicability of the decision of Kluger v....

...In this regard, suffice it to refer to the following observation made by the Supreme Court in Lasky, at p. 15: "... The property provisions considered in Kluger did not allow any reasonable alternative to the traditional tort action; the provisions of F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., do provide a reasonable alternative to the traditional action in tort, and therefore do not violate the right of access to the courts guaranteed by Art....

...(with which we deal directly here) there is sufficiently persuasive dicta in Lasky suggesting that the act constitutes a reasonable restraint on nonresidents: "RESTRAINT ON NON-RESIDENTS' RIGHT TO TRAVEL "Appellants argue that the provisions of F.S. § 627.737, F.S.A., infringe unconstitutionally on the rights of non-residents to travel to or in the State of Florida....

...eros. Within ten days following the rendition of the verdict the defendants filed two motions. One was a motion made under Rule 1.190(b) F.R.C.P. to amend their answer to conform with the evidence, to assert the defense that the action was barred by § 627.737 Fla....

...nt with the charge on the law given by the Court to the jury. "In response to a special interrogatory the jury found that the plaintiff-son had not sustained a permanent injury. Upon this basis the defendants invoke the provisions of Florida Statute § 627.737....

...o Ernesto Mederos, as to which there was some conflict in the evidence. However, as to that feature, the special verdict of the jury established the absence thereof. Thus, on the record, lack of jurisdiction for the personal injury action was shown. § 627.737 Fla....

...would show that the jury did not already make the necessary deductions. The focal issue in this case is whether the plaintiff in a personal injury case against his or her uninsured motorist carrier must meet and prove the permanency requirements of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...1986), and other case law concerning uninsured motorist coverage. We find that Newton is inapplicable to the case at bar and we therefore reverse. In Newton the issue before the court was whether a Florida insured must meet the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1984), when the claim is based upon the alleged negligence of an uninsured, nonresident motorist, and where the subject policy does not require the insureds to meet such threshold requirements, and specifically s...

...Thus, it seems that if the tortfeasor had the permanency defense available to him in the case at bar, then State Farm should have been able to assert the defense and force Dauksis to prove that his injuries were permanent, beyond the threshold stated in section 627.737. Dauksis argued that the tortfeasor could not have availed himself of the threshold defense from section 627.737 because he did not have the required security necessary to claim tort exemption....

...On appeal, the Smileys argue that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could award such noneconomic damages even if Mr. Nelson failed to meet the permanency threshold of the Florida Motor Vehicle No Fault Law, sections 627.730-627.7405, Florida Statutes (1993). We agree and reverse. Section 627.737(1) provides that every owner, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle for which security has been provided as required by the no-fault law is exempted from tort liability for damages because of bodily injury arising out of the use of...

...motor vehicle to the extent that personal injury protection (PIP) benefits are payable, unless a person is entitled to maintain an action for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience for such injury under the provisions of subsection (2). Section 627.737(2) states that a plaintiff may recover damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of such motor ve...

...Nelson's request for a nonstandard jury instruction, which allowed the jury to consider damages for any past or future disability, physical impairment, or loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life even if Mr. Nelson did not satisfy the permanency *872 threshold of section 627.737. In allowing the instruction, the trial court found that the legislature, by failing to mention disability, disfigurement, and loss of capacity for enjoyment of life in section 627.737, must have intended to exclude such damages from the statute's threshold requirements. We disagree with the trial court's interpretation of the statute. Section 627.737(1) exempts a defendant from tort liability for damages because of bodily injury arising out of the use of a motor vehicle to the extent that PIP benefits are payable for such injury. It then allows for an action to be maintained for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience only if the injury meets the permanency threshold set forth in subsection (2). § 627.737(1)....

...Although not faced with the issue presented in this appeal, the supreme court in Dauksis did not indicate that the exemption from liability applies only to certain noneconomic damages and excludes others. In support of the trial court's ruling, Mr. Nelson argues that section 627.737 is in derogation of common law because it limits a party's right to recover noneconomic damages that were recognized at common law....

...Where a statute is both in derogation of common law and remedial in nature, however, it is to be construed liberally to ensure access to the remedy provided by the legislature. Golf Channel v. Jenkins, 752 So.2d 561, 566 n. 4 (Fla.2000). Here, the purpose of section 627.737 is to allow for speedy recovery of economic damages from one's own insurer, to lessen court congestion and reduce delays, to reduce insurance premiums, and to reduce the overpayment of minor claims and underpayment of major claims....

...Regardless, whether the statute is construed strictly or liberally to ensure the legislature's remedy, the result is the same: a defendant who complies with the no-fault law is exempt from tort liability for damages unless he meets the permanency threshold of section 627.737(2)....

...ross the no-fault threshold for recovery of compensatory damages for pain and suffering and other noneconomic losses. See 398 So.2d at 455. Compensatory and punitive damages are two different classes of damages. Punitive damages are not mentioned in section 627.737. Section 627.737, however, does contemplate compensatory noneconomic damages....

...Accordingly, we hold that noneconomic damages, including those for disability, physical impairment, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life, are not available under the no-fault law absent a finding of permanent injury. See Loring v. Winters, 802 So.2d 335, (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding that section 627.737 plainly intends to exempt owners, registrants, operators, or occupants from tort liability for all noneconomic damages except those damages "for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience for such injury under the provisions of subsection (2)"); Owen v. Morrisey, 793 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that noneconomic damages, including disability, physical impairment, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life, are precluded under section 627.737(2), absent a finding of permanent injury)....

...Tomeu carried personal injury protection (PIP) coverage but not liability coverage. At trial of plaintiff's uninsured motorist claim against State Farm, plaintiff successfully argued that under the State Farm policy he need not satisfy the verbal threshold of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1989), in order to recover damages for pain and suffering....

...s provided the security required by the no-fault law. If a tortfeasor motorist has failed to provide the security required by the no-fault law, then the injured plaintiff may obtain pain and suffering damages without satisfying the verbal threshold. § 627.737, Fla....

...1990); see also The Florida Bar, Florida Automobile Insurance Law §§ 4.6, 8.12 (2d ed. 1991). If, however, the tortfeasor motorist has provided the required security, then the injured plaintiff must satisfy the verbal threshold in order to obtain pain and suffering damages. § 627.737, Fla. Stat. (1989). Under the no-fault law, carrying personal injury protection (PIP) coverage constitutes the providing of security for purposes of section 627.737. See id. §§ 627.733, 627.736. Since Tomeu had PIP coverage, the plaintiff was required to satisfy the verbal threshold in order to obtain pain and suffering damages from Tomeu. Id. § 627.737....

...uired to satisfy the verbal threshold in order to obtain damages for pain and suffering. The final judgment must be reversed *971 and the cause remanded for a new trial. Reversed and remanded. NOTES [1] The so-called verbal threshold is set forth in section 627.737(2), which states: In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...arges does not abolish' medical providers' access to courts, rather it merely places a reasonable condition on filing a claim for certain insurance benefits); Chapman v. Dillon, 415 So.2d 12, 17 (Fla.1982) (limitations in Florida's no fault statute, § 627.737, provide a reasonable alternative to tort actions and do not limit access to courts); Purdy v. Gulf Breeze Enterprises, Inc., 403 So.2d 1325, 1327-28 (Fla. 1981) (sections 627 .736(3) and 627.7372, which reduce the amount of damages an injured plaintiff can recover from tortfeasors by the amount of benefits received from collateral sources, do not violate the access to courts provision, because there was no abolition of any previous right of access); Bauld v....

...awarded her only the amount of her unpaid medical expenses. The appellants filed this appeal, asserting that the trial court erred by denying their requested instruction. We affirm the final judgment, but we certify a question to the supreme court. Section 627.737(1) provides in pertinent part that every owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle for which security has been provided as required by the no-fault law is exempted from tort liability for damages because of bodily in...

...*249 extent that personal injury protection (PIP) benefits are payable for such injury, unless a person is entitled to maintain an action for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience for such injury under the provisions of subsection (2). Section 627.737(2) provides in pertinent part that in any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by the nofault law, a plaintiff may...

...ty, other than scarring or disfigurement; (c) significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement; or (d) death. The appellants assert that a plain reading of the statute establishes that noneconomic damages are not included in the tort exemption of section 627.737(1). Therefore, they argue that the threshold requirements in section 627.737(2) apply only to those four noneconomic damages specifically listed—pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience—and all other noneconomic damages available at common law and not listed in the statute are recoverable without a threshold injury....

...The second and fourth districts have addressed and rejected this argument. Smiley v. Nelson, 805 So.2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Gill v. McGuire, 806 So.2d 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Welch v. Fega, 800 So.2d 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). In Smiley, the second district reasoned that the tort exemption in section 627.737(1) extends to all damages, economic and noneconomic, and the fourth district adopted the second district's reasoning in Gill and Welch....

...Tompkins, 651 So.2d 89 (Fla.1995); Smey v. Williams, 608 So.2d 886 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), and PIP benefits are not payable for noneconomic damages. See § 627.736, Fla. Stat. Although this interpretation brings into question the language at the end of section 627.737(1), that a tortfeasor is exempt "unless a person is entitled to maintain an action for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience for such injury under the provisions of subsection (2)," we conclude that the legislature merely...

...tain circumstances. We do, however, agree with the second district that it has long been the understanding of the courts in this state and those practicing in the personal injury field that an injured party must satisfy the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) in order to recover any noneconomic damages....

...State Farm Insurance Company, 296 So.2d 9 (Fla.1974); Pearson v. Gregg, 575 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Matiyosus v. Keaten, 717 So.2d 1097 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). As the supreme court observed in Dauksis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 623 So.2d 455 (Fla.1993), section 627.737 rewards automobile owners who carry the required PIP coverage by "exempting them from liability for noneconomic damages except in cases involving permanency or death." Although there has been some adjustment to *250 the nature and degree of the threshold requirements, section 627.737(2) has remained materially unchanged for more than thirty years. In accordance with the long-understood meaning of this provision, we conclude that section 627.737(2) exempts a covered defendant from liability for all noneconomic damages, not just those specifically listed, except in cases involving a threshold injury. The final judgment is accordingly affirmed. But because this is a recurring issue in the courts of this state, we certify the following question to the supreme court as a question of great public importance: DOES SECTION 627.737 EXEMPT A COVERED DEFENDANT FROM LIABILITY FOR ALL NONECONOMIC DAMAGES UNLESS A THRESHOLD INJURY IS ESTABLISHED? AFFIRMED....

...Use the appropriate bracketed numbered provision applicable to the evidence adduced in the case. 2. Use of the threshold instruction will in most cases require the use of an interrogatory verdict form. 3. If there is proof that a claimant will incur future damages that are not excluded from recovery by section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1991), such as where claimant at trial is not at maximum medical improvement and will have a limited period of future lost income or medical expenses, it will be necessary to add the following language after the word "question": "including any such damage as (claimant) is reasonably certain to [incur] [experience] in the future." Comments 1. See section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...The committee has placed the threshold instruction after instructions on negligence because the statute sets a threshold to the recovery of noneconomic damages only. If claimant does not establish permanency, claimant may still be entitled to recover economic damages that exceed personal injury protection benefits. See § 627.737(2), Fla....

...e jury, then the court may wish to modify the instruction. For example, the court may instruct the jury: "If the greater weight of the evidence does not support the claim on the issue of permanency, then your verdict should be for the defendant." 3. Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1991), does not define "permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability" that is established by expert testimony....

...As to Liebling's second issue on appeal, we reverse and remand for the trial court to award Liebling his taxable costs. This was a one-count complaint upon which the jury found FEM solely negligent. Even though the jury found that the threshold requirement for bodily injury was not met for purposes of section 627.737(2), Florida Statute (1991), the fact remains that Liebling is the prevailing party in this case and, as such, is entitled to his taxable costs....

...The basis for the denial of Santiagoherrera's cause of action was her inability to meet the "threshold" requirements of the Florida no-fault insurance law. [1] We reverse. In Scherzer v. Beron, 455 So.2d 441 (Fla. 5th DCA), appeal dismissed, 459 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 1984), we held that the "threshold" requirement of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1981) did not apply to a motorcyclist who filed suit against a defendant motor vehicle operator because a motorcycle is not a "motor vehicle" under the no-fault law. [2] The threshold requirement of Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1981), applies only in a tort action where security has been provided....

...Reading section 627.736(1), Florida Statutes (1981), one discovers that security is not provided to a motorcyclist who is "an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle." Thus, a motorcyclist need not satisfy the threshold to maintain a suit for the damages enumerated in subsection (2) of section 627.737....

...s withdrawn. It is further ORDERED that Appellant's REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES, filed August 27, 1984, is denied. See Section 627.428, Florida Statutes (1983); Gutman v. American Motorists Insurance Co., 410 So.2d 1001 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1982). NOTES [1] Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1983), provides: In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...Winters was awarded $8,612.99 after setoff. [1] Loring raises three issues on appeal, none of which merit reversal. We affirm the final judgment but write to address Loring's challenge to a jury instruction given by the trial court. Loring argued to the trial court that under section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1993), [2] he was entitled to a jury instruction that he could recover damages for disability, disfigurement, and loss of capacity of enjoyment of life....

...Loring argued that these damages were available at common law prior to the enactment of the no-fault legislation and that, under Florida common law, he is still entitled to have the jury instructed on these damages. We disagree and can find no cases in Florida that support Loring's position. Section 627.737 plainly intends to exempt owners, registrants, operators, or occupants from tort liability for all noneconomic damages except those damages "for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience for such injury under the provisions o...

...NOTES [1] After Loring sued Winters for injuries resulting from an auto accident, a jury awarded Loring $2,596.50 plus taxable costs of $1,721.75. Winters, by virtue of proposals for settlement and offers of judgment, was entitled to attorneys' fees of $12,029.80 plus taxable costs of $901.44. [2] Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1993), provides in pertinent part: (1) Every owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...As a result of an accident of the vehicle in which the Plaintiff was riding, the Plaintiff who was pregnant at the time suffered a miscarriage.[ [1] ] Liability was admitted. The pivotal legal question is whether the Plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence under Fla. Stat. 627.737(2) to show that she suffered as alleged: "`(a) Significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function....

...f relies on the fact there was some evidence of `permanent injury' by proof of the loss of a fetus. The Defendant conversely argues there was no evidence of damages sufficient to meet the threshold requirement of Fla. Stat. 672.737 [sic: should read 627.737] by proof of the death of a fetus....

...within ... any degree of medical probability. The Plaintiff admits there was no such testimony but claims that such evidence *1145 would have been `useless' as it is obvious by the loss of a fetus a `permanent injury' was suffered by the Plaintiff. "Section 627.737 is a statutory limitation on an injured party's common law right of action in tort....

...death as a `permanent injury' to her absent a showing of some objective signs of injury resulting from the loss of the fetus.[ [2] ] See: Snowden v. Sprouse, 375 So.2d 901 (1st DCA Fla. 1979). In short, a strict construction of Fla. Stat. 627.37(2) [627.737(2)] requires some evidence, either by expert testimony or by the Plaintiff herself that she suffered some `permanent injury' other than proof of a miscarriage." We agree with the trial court and affirm the judgment under review....

...erty damage were not issues of serious dispute, and the defendant's primary defense was that the plaintiff had not suffered a permanent injury within reasonable medical probability so as to entitle the plaintiff to recover for personal injuries, see § 627.737, Fla....

...be the doctor's own personal opinion based on his own knowledge and experience... ." [5] The latter section recognizes "the functions of accomplishing work may be completely inhibited because of suffering with pain without anatomic change." [6] Cf., § 627.737(2)(b), Florida Statutes, prescribing a standard of proof, for actionable injury in a tort setting, as "permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability." [7] The physician there stated only an "assumption that [claimant]...

...anent scarring or disfigurement"—one of the ways in which a plaintiff may satisfy the permanency threshold necessary to support the award of non-economic damages in a tort suit against the owner or operator of a motor vehicle or his or her insurer. § 627.737(2)(c), Fla....

..., there was no evidence apart from the length that would have permitted a jury to find that the scar rose to the level of "significant and permanent." Cf. Soto v. Scaringelli, 189 N.J. 558, 917 A.2d 734, 743 (2007) (interpreting a statute similar to section 627.737(2) and holding that "significant disfigurement or significant scarring" threshold is satisfied when "on an objective basis, the disfigurement or scarring substantially `impair[s] or injure[s] the beauty, symmetry, or appearance of a p...

...ture medical expenses. State Farm moved to determine setoffs, and the trial court set off $10,000.00 for personal injury protection ("PIP") benefits pursuant to section 627.736(3), Florida Statutes, and $1,331.04 for medpay benefits paid pursuant to section 627.7372(2)(b), Florida Statutes....

...The trial court, however, denied State Farm's motion for set off of $3,668.96 in remaining medpay benefits which were unpaid and available to Klinglesmith for future medical expenses. The court ruled that this amount could not be setoff pursuant to section 627.7372(2)(b). State Farm argues that the trial court incorrectly relied on section 627.7372, the collateral source statute, to deny the setoff for unpaid medpay benefits....

...4th DCA 1991), rev. denied, 599 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1992), the statute requires that collateral source to be applied first, rather than other medical insurance the insured may have, see Christian v. Colonial Penn Insurance Co., 537 So.2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Section 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1991), reads in part: Section 627.7372 Collateral sources of indemnity....

...not subject to a claim at the time of the final judgment should likewise be deducted from the recovery for future medical expenses. *571 To answer this question, we should reexamine Kokotis. We held in Kokotis that the setoff provision contained in section 627.737 (the tort exemption statute) rather than setoff provision contained in section 627.7372 (the collateral source statute) should control in this type of litigation....

...Jiminez struck the Faccones’ vehicle from behind, she was negligent and was the “sole cause” of the accident. The trial court granted the motion. Also pretrial, the Faccones moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether Ms. Jiminez was entitled to the threshold defense under section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1997), requiring the Fac-cones to establish a threshold injury in order to recover noneconomic damages....

...As part of her defense, Ms. Jiminez claimed that she was entitled to argue that the Faccones had not sustained the necessary threshold injuries for them to recover noneconomic damages “for pain, .suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience” under section 627.737(2). Pursuant to section 627.737(2), a part of Florida’s no-fault laws, a plaintiff may not recover noneco-nomic damages from an “owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...tutes (1997), became subject to Florida’s no-fault law requirements because she owned and operated a vehicle in the state and was required to register that vehicle. See §§ 320.02(1), 320.37, 320.38. Thus, Ms. Jiminez met the first requirement of section 627.737(2) — as owner and operator of a vehicle on the roads of this state — but she must also have had the necessary security in order to exercise the permanent injury threshold defense....

...nst Allstate Insurance Company. They raise three points on appeal and we affirm on all points. We choose to address only one. The Sternbergs argue that the trial court erred in requiring them to prove a permanent injury under sections 627.727(7) and 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...PIP coverage. This point is controlled by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Dixon, 732 So.2d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), which held that if the policy providing UM coverage limited coverage for non-economic damages to injuries as described in section 627.737(2), then permanency is an issue which must be decided by the jury....

...JNOV of permanency is reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in accordance with the verdict. In the trial proceedings, the plaintiff sought monetary damages for injury to her neck resulting from an automobile accident with the defendant, under section 627.737(2), ■ Florida Statutes....

...A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity." [4] Uninsured benefits are materially different from PIP benefits because the claimant must show a permanent injury within reasonable degree of medical probability. See § 627.737(2)(a)-(d), Fla....

...ning change in controlling law,” new evidence not previously available to the parties through diligent efforts, or "the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice”). . The PI Requirement is set forth in the Policy and in Florida Statutes, § 627.737(2)....

...cident for which she should have been compensated by an award of future damages. While this is not an automobile case, we would note that in order to recover for scarring in such a case, the plaintiff must prove it is both permanent and significant. § 627.737(2), Fla....

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal and cross-appeal from an amended final judgment. We reverse and remand for new trial. Appellants Kahle, the defendants below in this automobile injury case, asserted a no-fault threshold defense pursuant to section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1991). At the conclusion of the case, the trial court observed that no evidence had been presented on the issue of whether appellants had the required security to qualify for the exemption provided by section 627.737(1), and said it would not give the threshold instructions to the jury....

...ding any damages that (claimant) is the estate and the survivors are reasonably certain to incur or experience in the future. You shall consider the following elements: NOTE ON USE FOR 501.1 If there is an issue of limitation on damages because of F.S. 627.737(2), use in *614 struction 501.34....

...ately compensate (spouse) for any loss by reason of [his wife’s] [her husband’s] injury, of [his][her] services, comfort, society and attentions in the past [and in the future] caused by the incident in question. NOTES ON USE FOR 501.43 1. See F.S. 627.737(2) (1991). Use of the threshold instruction will in most cases require the use of an interrogatory verdict form. 2. If there is proof that a claimant will incur future damages that are not excluded from recovery by F.S. 627.737 (1991), such as where claimant at trial is not at maximum medical improvement and will have a limited period of future lost income or medical expenses, it will be necessary to add the following language after the word “question”: “in...

...The committee has placed this instruction in the damages section because the statute sets a threshold to the recovery of non-economic damages only. If claimant does not establish permanency, claimant may still be entitled to recover economic damages that exceed personal injury protection benefits. See F.S. 627.737(2) (1991); Auto-Owners Insurance Co....

..., then the court may wish to modify the instruction. For example, the court may instruct the jury: “If the greater weight of the evidence does not support the claim on the issue of permanency, then your verdict should be for the defendant.” 4. F.S. 627.737(2) (1991) does not define “permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability” that is established by expert testimony....

...We reverse the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion for new trial finding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial after the jury determined that appellee did not sustain a permanent injury within the meaning of section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...627.733, or by an owner personally liable under s. 627.733 for the payment of such benefits, unless a person is entitled to maintain an action for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience for such injury under the provisions of subsection (2). § 627.737(1), Fla....

...e no-fault law. As noted, the no-fault statutory scheme sets up a means by which an injured party recovers most of his or her out-of-pocket expenses from his or her own insurer, where the injury fails to reach the permanent injury threshold found in section 627.737(2)....

...Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial on causation and damages. *872 Golden also complains about the language of a question on the special verdict form regarding whether Tipton's injuries satisfied the no-fault permanency threshold. See § 627.737, Fla....

...Because Appellant admitted responsibility for causing the accident, the trial was conducted on the issues of causation and damages. Appellee claimed a shoulder injury requiring surgery. Appellant's entitlement to the exemption from liability afforded by section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1999) was not disputed....

...Appellant complains that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that some noneconomic damages—those for disability, physical impairment, disfigurement, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life—may be recovered from a defendant who enjoys exemption from liability pursuant to section 627.737, even when the permanency threshold of that statute is not met....

...specifically mentioned in the statute: pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience. Therefore, asserts Appellant, Appellee's recovery should be reduced by the $25,000 awarded for elements of noneconomic damages not specifically referenced in section 627.737(2)....

...oring v. Winters, 802 So.2d 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), Gill v. McGuire, 806 So.2d 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), and Giles v. Luckie, 816 So.2d 248 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Those decisions hold that an injured plaintiff must satisfy the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) in order to be entitled to recover any noneconomic damages against an exempt defendant. This interpretation of section 627.737 is consistent with the purpose of the statute, which is to permit the speedy recovery of major and salient economic damages, reduce the incidence of overpayment for relatively minor injuries, lessen court congestion and reduce delay, and reduce automobile insurance premiums....

...This interpretation is also consistent with the general practice in bodily injury cases of classifying and grouping all elements of noneconomic damages together. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Civ.) 6.2(a). We agree with this interpretation. Furthermore, we agree with the conclusion of Giles that the language in section 627.737(1), specifically mentioning pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience, was merely intended to emphasize that noneconomic damages would be recoverable only where the threshold had been met....

...To so interpret the statute may also call into question its constitutionality. See id. at 15-16. The statute must not be arbitrary, and must be "reasonably related to ... permissible legislative objectives...." Id. *285 Therefore, we conclude that in the absence of a threshold injury, as defined in section 627.737(2), there can be no recovery for any noneconomic damages....

...was entitled to recover all of her noneconomic damages, and the challenged instruction did not result in harm to Appellant. AFFIRMED. COBB and SHARP, W., JJ., concur. NOTES [1] These elements of noneconomic damages are not specifically referenced in section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1999).

...Under section 627.736(3), Florida Statutes (1997), 1 an injured party has no right to recover any damages for which PIP benefits have been paid or are “payable.” As such, the tort-feasor is exempted from liability for damages to the extent that such PIP benefits have been paid or are “payable” for such injuries. § 627.737(1), Fla....

...(1997) 3 ; Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v. Matthews, 498 So.2d 421 (Fla.1986). At the time of final judgment in this case, the district courts were in conflict as to the definition of “payable” as used in sections 627.736(3) and 627.737(1)....

...e benefits described in s. 627.736(1) are payable for such injury, or would be payable but for any exclusion authorized by ss. 627.730-627.7405, under any insurance policy or other method of security complying with the requirements of s. 627.733.... § 627.737(1), Fla....

...r disease, including death, caused by the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. Section 627.727(7) provides that the legal liability of a UM carrier does not include damages in tort for pain and suffering unless the injury is described in section 627.737(2)(a) through (d)....

...NOTES [1] Significantly, based on a plain reading of the statute, it appears the jury would be precluded from awarding damages based on the permanency of the thigh injury, because that injury did not cause "pain, suffering, mental anguish or inconvenience." See § 627.737(2), Fla....

...dropped into a pothole in a road under the alleged care and control of defendant county. The district court granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, holding that plaintiffs had failed to meet the “threshold” requirement of Fla.Stat., § 627.737(2) (1984) 1 because they had not produced evidence that James had suffered permanent injury. Section 627.737(2) applies to actions in tort brought against “the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided ......

...or against any person or organization legally responsible for his acts or omissions” and permits a plaintiff to recover damages in tort “because of bodily injury ... arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of such motor vehicle____” Fla.Stat. § 627.737(2). Section 627.737(2) does not apply in this case because the action is against the county for negligent maintenance of its roads; the action is not “against the owner, registrant, operator or occupant of a motor vehicle.” Because § 627.737(2) does not apply in this case, plaintiffs are not required to meet the “threshold” requirement of proving permanent injury. See Santiagoherrera v. Stout, 470 So.2d 718 (Fla. 5th D.C.A.1985) (“threshold” requirement of Fla.Stat. § 627.737(2) need not be met because the statute does not apply in a suit in which injuries arose out of an accident involving a city bus). Defendant’s reliance on McKee v. City of Jacksonville, 395 So.2d 222 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.1981) is misplaced. The McKee court applied Fla.Stat. § 627.7372, a statute similar to § 627.737(2), in a suit against a city for alleged failure to maintain, replace, or erect a stop sign. The injuries in McKee arose out of a collision between a motorcycle and an automobile and therefore met the requirement of § 627.7372 that the in *935 jury “arise out of the ownership, operation, use, or maintenance of a motor vehicle.” Section 627.7372 does not require that the defendant own, operate, use, or maintain the motor vehicle. Therefore, § 627.7372 properly applied in McKee . Section 627.737(2) does not apply in this ease, where the injury allegedly arose out of defendant’s negligent maintenance of its roads. 2 REVERSED. 1 . Section 627.737(2) provides: In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by §§ 627.730-627.7405, or against any person or organiz...

...(b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. 2 . Defendant asserts that plaintiffs stipulated to the application of § 627.737(2) in this case....

...ed to immunity under § 440.11, Florida Statutes (1983). Therefore, the verdict in its favor should be sustained. We agree that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the amount of the worker’s compensation benefits received by appellant. § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat....

first satisfying the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) in the case of an uninsured motorist who

damages if the jury finds no permanent injury. See § 627.737(2), Fla. Stat. See also Chapman v. Dillon, 415

...ty damage were not issues of serious dispute, and the defendant’s primary defense was that the plaintiff had not suffered a permanent injury within reasonable medical probability so as to entitle the plaintiff to recover for personal injuries, see § 627.737, Fla.Stat....

damages that are not excluded from recovery by section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1991), such as where claimant

...Tomeu carried personal injury protection (PIP) coverage but not liability coverage. At trial of plaintiff’s uninsured motorist claim against State Farm, plaintiff successfully argued that under the State Farm policy he need not satisfy the verbal threshold of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1989), in order to recover damages for pain and suffering....

...provided the security required by the no-fault law. If a tortfea-sor motorist has failed to provide the security required by the no-fault law, then the injured plaintiff may obtain pain and suffering damages without satisfying the verbal threshold. § 627.737, Fla.Stat....

...1st DCA), review denied, 574 So.2d 139 (Fla.1990); see also The Florida Bar, Florida Automobile Insurance Law §§ 4.6, 8.12 (2d ed. 1991). If, however, the tortfeasor motorist has provided the required security, then the injured plaintiff must satisfy the verbal threshold in order to obtain pain and suffering damages. § 627.737, Fla.Stat. (1989). Under the no-fault law, carrying personal injury protection (PIP) coverage constitutes the providing of security for purposes of section 627.737....

...5 For the reasons stated, under this insurance policy the insured plaintiff was required to satisfy the verbal threshold in order to obtain damages for pain and suffering. The final judgment must be re *971 versed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Reversed and remanded. . The so-called verbal threshold is set forth in section 627.737(2), which states: In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...it. We have reviewed the evidence in detail and find that the testimony adduced by appellant and his medical witnesses was sufficient to create a jury question as to whether his medical expenses exceeded the one thousand dollar threshold required by § 627.737, F.S.1973....

...Grant, plaintiff below, in an automobile negligence case. The issue on appeal is whether the lower court erred in refusing to include on the verdict form an interrogatory to determine whether the plaintiff met the “permanent injury” threshold of Florida’s no-fault law. § 627.737(2), Fla....

...upon having a car in the state for more than ninety of the preceding 365 days, irrespective of registration requirements. 9 A car owner who fails to maintain the required security also loses certain tort liability immunities that would otherwise be available under section 627.737....

...Insurance Company, for damages they allegedly sustained as the result of a collision between an automobile driven by Lois Funny and an automobile driven by Colleen Thompson. The complaint alleged the action was not subject to the tort exemptions of § 627.737, Fla.Stat....

...carring or disfigurement” to the language “a permanent injury based on reasonable medical probability,” which appeared in appellants’ written requested jury instructions. Accordingly, the jury instructions and verdict tracked the language of § 627.737(2)(b), Fla.Stat., which lists as one of the no-fault thresholds “[permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.” The jury found that as a result of the instant accident Lois F...

...a result of the accident, the jury could have easily been misled to appel-lees’ prejudice by the addition of the language “other than scarring or disfigurement.” The trial court concluded that although the language in question is contained in § 627.737(2)(b), it should not have been included in the instructions....

...The jury found that Fega did not suffer any permanent injury; it awarded her $6,448 in economic damages and $20,000 for future non-economic damages. We reverse the award for non-economic damages. We are persuaded by the second district’s interpretation of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1999), in Smiley v....

...after she rejected an additur in a personal injury lawsuit arising from an automobile accident. We affirm. However, because the jury found the plaintiff below, Lolita M. Beilman, did not sustain a permanent injury, the new trial shall be limited to economic damages only. See § 627.737(2), Fla....

inadvertently failed to charge the jury on Section 627.-737(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1977). On this appeal

...cluded the expenses associated with Ms. Small’s trip to the emergency room on the day of the accident. We write in this case primarily to remind defense attorneys that it is not safe in this type of an action involving the no-fault threshold under section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1999), to tell a jury that it can do whatever it wants to do....

...and many different and recurring treatments for pain in both the neck and the back. In view of the testimony that his injuries were permanent, Mr. Arias also sought noneconomic damages to compensate him for past and future pain and suffering. See § 627.737(2), Fla....

...Porter contended that the jury could have properly awarded no past noneconomic damages for pain and suffering related to a neck injury because the evidence of whether any injury to Mr. Arias's neck was permanent was disputed. That is of no legal moment. Section 627.737(2), which requires permanency as a condition to a plaintiff's recovery of noneconomic damages in automobile accident cases, does not say that a plaintiff may only recover noneconomic damages attributable to permanent injuries; it says instead that a plaintiff may not recover noneconomic damages unless his injury "consists in whole or in part" of a permanent injury. See § 627.737(2)(b), Fla....

...a No-Fault Act in effect at the time of the accident (1972), the plaintiff could only maintain his action if he had sustained medical expenses in excess of $1,000 or sustained a “permanent injury within reasonable medical probability.” Fla.Stat. 627.737....

...his injuries are permanent. There is no issue that there is no medical evidence of permanent injury. Thus, assuming plaintiff continues to have pain, but has no medical evidence of permanency, no jury issue exists under the requirements of Fla.Stat. 627.737....

...a result of being struck by Donna Johnson’s automobile while Powers was riding a bicycle on October 15, 1986. Johnson denied negligence, asserted comparative negligence on the part of Powers, denied that the injuries met the threshold set forth in section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1985), 1 and further asserted collateral source reduction....

...parative negligence and further reduced the award by collateral sources paid on behalf of Johnson to Powers. Powers filed a motion for new trial on the issue of damages, contesting the adequacy of the jury verdict. The trial judge denied the motion. Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1985) requires that in order to recover damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience, an injured person must prove that the injury is in whole or in part one of the following: (1) a significant and...

...Thus, we affirm the jury’s finding of permanent injury 2 and its award of medical expenses. We, however, remand this case to the trial court for a new trial on the issue of general damages. See Butte. CAMPBELL, C.J., and FRANK, J., concur. . That subsection provides: 627.737 Tort exemption; limitation on right to damages; punitive damages.— (2) In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...of: (a) Significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function. (b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. § 627.737, Fla.Stat....

...tur in a personal injury lawsuit arising from an automobile accident. We affirm. However, because the jury found the plaintiff below, Lolita M. Beilman, did not sustain a permanent injury, the new trial shall be limited to economic damages only. See § 627.737(2), Fla....

permanent injury, as defined and required by Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1975). Special verdicts

...ls a jury verdict finding her guilty of negligence, and awarding the appellee $22,000 economic and noneconomic damages. We affirm the finding of negligence, but reverse the damage award. As a threshold matter the appellee was required to prove under § 627.737(2)(b), Fla.Stat....

...Section 627.-737(3) unequivocally requires that a dismissal on threshold grounds be entered “without prejudice.” Accord Smith v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 305 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). 1 The judgment under review shall be so amended and is otherwise affirmed. . As Smith indicates, this provision of § 627.737(3) applies notwithstanding that the form of the order is a summary judgment, as here, rather than a dismissal.

...Directed Verdict on Permanency of Injury In an automobile accident case, the plaintiff may only recover for non- economic damages (pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience) if she has received a permanent injury in the accident. § 627.737(2), Fla....

...of an important bodily function. (b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. § 627.737(2)(a)–(d), Fla....

...At the close of all the evidence, Appellee moved for a directed verdict on the issue of her sustaining a permanent injury. Initially, Appellee argued that the scars from her shoulder surgery would constitute a “permanent injury” in accordance with section 627.737(2)(c), but she finally agreed the scars would be an issue for the jury....

...Appellants opposed the directed verdict, noting there was no evidence of the loss of any important bodily function, while pointing to the conflicting evidence discussed above. Appellants further argued below and now, that “permanent anatomical change” is nowhere to be found in section 627.737 as a description or definition of “permanent injury.” Over Appellants’ objections, the trial court directed a verdict that Appellee had sustained a permanent injury to her shoulder. Below and on appeal, Appellants argu...

...Damages for loss of consortium are also recoverable under uninsured motorist coverage, Mobley v. Allstate Insurance Co., 276 So.2d 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). Allstate asserts that Mrs. Collier’s claim is barred by section 627.7403, Florida Statutes, which states: In any action brought pursuant to the provisions of s. 627.737 claiming personal injuries, all claims arising out of the plaintiff’s injuries, including all derivative claims, shall be brought together, unless good cause is shown why such claims should be brought separately....

...on” in this section. Under a very broad construction of the statute perhaps this is so. However, under the narrower construction we must give to the section, mandatory joinder is only required “in any action brought pursuant to the provisions of § 627.737.” Mrs....

the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act. § 627.737, Fla.Stat. We have considered this fact in the

bodily function, the threshold requirements of Section 627.-737(2), Florida Statutes (1981) have not been

...of an important bodily function; (b) permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement; (c) significant and permanent scarring and disfigurement; or (d) death. Fla. Stat. §§ 627.727 (7) & 627.737(2)(a)-(d)....

...Corees, who identified an “internal derangement of the knee” and a medial meniscal tear and recommended arthroscopic surgery [D.E. 71-14 at 4-6]. Wiggins argues that this was sufficient evidence to show that he suffered a permanent injury within the meaning of the insurance policy and Fla. Stat. § 627.737 (2)(b) [D.E....

...pert medical testimony to establish the existence and permanency of the alleged injury.” City of Tampa v. Long, 638 So.2d 35, 37-38 (Fla.1994). But this approach appears to conflate the standard for establishing insurance coverage under Fla. Stat. § 627.737 (2)(b) at trial with the standard for determining whether an insurer acted in good faith in denying a claim....

..., 211 So.3d 210 , 212 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting Anglia Jacs & Co. , 830 So.2d at 172 ). The derivative nature of a loss-of-consortium claim, while being a separate cause of action, supports the conclusion that the instant claims are inextricably intertwined. See § 627.737, Fla....

..., 211 So.3d 210 , 212 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting Anglia Jacs & Co. , 830 So.2d at 172 ). The derivative nature of a loss-of-consortium claim, while being a separate cause of action, supports the conclusion that the instant claims are inextricably intertwined. See § 627.737, Fla....

...ss, or disease arising out of” a car accident “only in the event that the injury or disease consists in whole or in part of [a] permanent injury within a *574 reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.” Id. § 627.737(2)(b) (West 1984). If the threshold requirement of permanent injury is not reached, a court cannot “award general damages for pain, suffering or any of the other elements of damages set forth in section 627.737(2).” Eley v. Moris, 478 So.2d 1100, 1103 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App.1985); accord McClellan v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 475 So.2d 1015, 1016 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985). Although section 627.737(2) does not define permanent injury, “the determination of what constitutes a permanent injury must, as a practical matter, be left to physicians trained in that profession.” Morey v....

...As such, Mrs. Hunter is awarded no damages. 12 C. Summary and Conclusion The accident did not cause permanent injury to Mr. Hunter within a reasonable degree of medical probability. Therefore, he does not satisfy the threshold requirement of Florida Statutes section 627.737(2)....

...denied, 545 So.2d 1369 (Fla.1989) ("Because the claimed injury was subjective (not based on organic evidence), it is obvious the jury could have disbelieved the plaintiff’s claims of continued pain.”); Jones v. Smith, 547 So.2d 201, 202 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (Nesbitt, J., dissenting) (section 627.737(2) does not mention any subjective elements of injury). Contra Johnson v. Phillips, 345 So.2d 1116, 1117 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977), cert. denied, 358 So.2d 131 (Fla.1978) (holding that the threshold requirement of "permanent injury" in section 627.737(2) includes "permanent subjective complaints of pain resulting from an initial organic injury.”) Although the facts in Johnson are similar to the instant action, the medical testimony in Johnson was uncontroverted....

SHIVERS, Judge. Appellant, plaintiff below, appeals an order dismissing his complaint pursuant to section 627.737(3) of the Florida “no-fault” statute....

...The suit was not brought pursuant to the Florida no-fault statute. Defendants filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint and alleging comparative negligence as an affirmative defense. Defendants’ answer did not allege tort immunity pursuant to section 627.737 of the no-fault statute, nor did it allege the existence of no-fault coverage as to defendants’ vehicle. More than one year after filing their answer, defendants filed a “Motion to Question Threshold,” pursuant to section 627.737(3) of the no-fault statute....

...On February 1, 1984, after plaintiff had failed to produce depositions of his doctors, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the complaint. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to meet the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2), where the action was not *373 brought pursuant to the no-fault statute. We agree. Subsection 3 of section 627.737, Florida Statutes, provides a method whereby a defendant, in an action brought pursuant to the no-fault statute, may question whether plaintiff has met the threshold requirements of subsection 2....

not first meet the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2)(a-d), Florida Statutes. The Dixons collided

injury was not otherwise shown as required by § 627.737, Florida Statutes. Just before Bartholf brought

...fault law. As noted, the no-fault statutory scheme sets up a means by which an injured party recovers most of his or her out-of-pocket expenses from his or her own insurer, where the injury fails to reach the permanent injury *242 threshold found in section 627.737(2)....

...d in section 627.736(1), Florida Statutes. Appellee argues that Mansfield does not require a setoff of the parties’ PIP deductible from the jury verdict, principally relying upon the supreme court’s following comment: In accordance with sections 627.737(1) and 627.736(1), the Riveros should recover 80% of all their reasonable medical expenses from their own PIP carrier....

a reasonable degree of medical probability.” § 627.737(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). .The jury awarded

...The Joneses filed an action against Cornelian Smith to recover damages for injuries Robert sustained in an automobile accident. At the charge conference, the Joneses requested the court to instruct the jury on the meaning of the term “permanent injury” contained in section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1983), to reflect that “the words permanent injury include subjective complaints obtained resulting from an initial organic injury.” The requested instruction followed the decision in Johnson v....

...L.K., 532 So.2d at 1098 (citations omitted). Although Smith admitted liability, it was incumbent upon Jones to prove that his injury was permanent within a reasonable degree of medical probability in order to meet the statutory threshold requirement. § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat....

...Under section 627.736(3), Florida Statutes (1997), 1 an injured party has no right to recover any damages for which PIP benefits have been paid or are “payable.” As such, the tort-feasor is exempted from liability for damages to the extent that such PIP benefits have been paid or are “payable” for such injuries. § 627.737(1), Fla....

...(1997) 3 ; Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v. Matthews, 498 So.2d 421 (Fla.1986). At the time of final judgment in this case, the district courts were in conflict as *576 to the definition of “payable” as used in sections 627.736(3) and 627.737(1)....

...benefits described in § 627.736(1) are payable for such injury, or would be payable but for any exclusion authorized by §§ 627.730-627.7405, under any insurance policy or other method of security complying with the requirements of § 627.733.... § 627.737(1), Fla....

...Appellant brought the instant action as a result of injuries she allegedly sustained in an automobile accident with appellee Floyd M. Sauers. The gravamen of appellant’s complaint was that, because of the accident, she had sustained permanent injury within reasonable medical probability. § 627.737, Fla.Stat....

damages under the threshold requirements of section 627.-737, Florida Statutes (1979). However, the Pre-Trial

DOWNEY, Judge. The appellate questions presented in this case are whether appellee, Mary Powers, sustained injuries that exceed the threshold presented in Section 627.737(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1977), and whether the verdict and judgment entered in her favor are excessive....

...uring all or substantially all of the ninety day period following the accident, the effects of which were medically and scientifically demonstrable at the end of such period. REVERSED AND REMANDED, with directions. BERANEK and HERSEY, JJ., concur. . § 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1977).

...ous enough to warrant it. The trial court denied a defense motion for directed verdict which was based on *235 lack of medical testimony, records, or other medical evidence of an injury within the threshold requirements of the 1977 no-fault statute, Section 627.737(2)(a-f)....

...tion. Appellant contends that appellee, as sub-rogee, suffers all the limitations its insured would have had if he had sued appellant directly, and that there was no evidence that the insured had met any of the six no-fault threshold requirements of Section 627.737(2)....

...e introduced evidence that the nature and extent of Hale’s injuries met the threshold requirements. Specifically, appellee says Mrs. Hale’s testimony that her husband suffered a memory loss established a permanent loss of a bodily function under Section 627.737(2)(b), or it showed a serious non-permanent injury under Section 627.737(2)(e). 1 The threshold issue was sufficiently raised in the pleadings. Appellee’s complaint alleged permanent injuries, to which appellant answered she had insufficient knowledge to admit or deny. Section 627.737(2)(b) requires proof of a permanent loss of a bodily function....

...While it is questionable whether loss of memory constitutes loss of a bodily function under the statute, even assuming it does, there is no evidence to show the loss is permanent. Mrs. Hale simply testified that Hale suffers from the memory loss at the present time. Section 627.737(2)(e) requires proof of “a serious nonpermanent injury which has a material degree of bearing on the injured person’s ability to resume his normal activity and lifestyle during all or substantially all of the 90-day period after t...

...an important bodily function. (b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigurement. (c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. (d) Death. § 627.737(2)(a)-(d), Fla....

...It is neither an issue of law nor a mixed issue of law and fact, contrary to the dissent's argument. I find further support for my conclusion that this is a factual issue from decisions that have addressed the issue whether an injured plaintiff suffered an injury that satisfies the permanency threshold under section 627.737(2)....

...e been submitted to the jury for its consideration.") (citation omitted); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Orr, 660 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Ketchen v. Dunn, 619 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). In cases involving the issue of permanency under section 627.737(2), the jury is instructed to determine by "the greater weight of the evidence" whether the plaintiff suffered significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function, significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement, or a permanent injury....

...As a result of the 2007 accident, the Angeluccis sought uninsured motorist benefits from Appellee GEICO. GEICO de *208 nied those benefits because it claimed that David had not suffered any permanent injuries and so did not meet Florida’s automobile no-fault threshold, found at Fla. Stat. § 627.737 ....

...ORDER WHITTEMORE, District Judge. BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint (Dkt.223), in which Defendant contends that Count II fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in that Florida Statute § 627.737(4) precludes the recovery of punitive damages in this common law third party bad faith action. The parties have filed supplemental memoranda addressing the applicability of Florida Statute § 627.737(4). (Dkt.200, 204). Florida Statute § 627.737(4), as amended in 1977, provides in pertinent part: In any action brought against an automobile liability insurer for damages in excess of its policy limits, no claim for punitive damages shall be allowed....

...olely to the "Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law" and has "no application in a contractual action for common law bad faith." (Dkt. 200 at p. 2). Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that this statute applies only to tort actions, pointing to the title of § 627.737: "Tort exemption; limitation on right to damages; punitive damages." (Dkt. 200 at p. 3). Plaintiff's arguments are unpersuasive. The plain language of § 627.737(4) precludes an award of punitive damages in "any action" brought against an automobile liability insurer for damages in excess of its policy limits....

...As Defendant correctly points out, when the language of a statute is unambiguous and conveys a clear and ordinary meaning, there is no reason to resort to other rules of statutory construction. Verizon Florida, *1265 Inc. v. Jacobs, 810 So.2d 906, 908 (Fla.2002). To the extent Plaintiff points to the title of § 627.737 in support of his argument, the Court is not persuaded....

...rida legislature and is not determinative on the issue of legislative intent, although it may be persuasive in some circumstances. State v. Bradford, 787 So.2d 811, 819 (Fla.2001). Here, as Defendant accurately summarizes, the legislative history of § 627.737(4) supports application of that section to all actions against an automobile liability insurer for damages in excess of its policy limits. The parties agree that no appellate decision in Florida has discussed the effect or application of § 627.737(4), other than Nales v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 398 So.2d 455, 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Nales, in dicta, discussed § 627.737(4) only in the context that it was added to § 627.737 in 1977, demonstrating the Florida Legislature's awareness of the doctrine of punitive damages....

...ty bad faith claim against an automobile insurer. The only decision cited to the court is a Florida circuit court decision, Hollis v. Allstate Insurance Co., 10 Fla. Supp.2d 65 (Fla.Cir.Ct. 15th 1985). In that case, the circuit court determined that § 627.737(4) prohibited recovery of punitive damages in a third party bad faith action against an automobile insurer. [1] The plain language of § 627.737(4) renders it applicable to the instant action. [2] Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint (Dkt.223) is GRANTED. Florida Statute § 627.737(4) precludes recovery of punitive damages in this common law third party bad faith claim against Defendant, an automobile liability insurer, for damages in excess of its policy limits....

...t permanency threshold. In that case, punitive damages were not sought against the insurer, State Farm. Finally, in Dunn v. National Security Fire and Casualty Co., 631 So.2d 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), there is no indication that the applicability of § 627.737(4) was raised, argued or considered....

...Stat. § 624.155. see e.g. Thompson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 670 So.2d 1070 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). The instant action is a common law third party bad faith claim. [2] Defendant points to one secondary source which acknowledges the application of § 627.737(4) to any action against an automobile liability insurer where damages in excess of policy limits are sought....

...ased upon a jury verdict finding that Hawkins had not sustained a permanent injury or disfigurement as a result of an automobile/pedestrian accident. He claims that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict on the threshold question under section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1987) and in failing to grant his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in that the verdict rendered was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence....

...There was no testimony presented that there was any other independent cause for a reactivation of the chronic osteomyelitis other than the fractured femur. Appellees concede that an amputation (or disarticulation) is a significant and permanent disfigurement within the meaning of section 627.737(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...matter of the previous litigation. The complaint alleged, among other things, that (1) appellees were not tort exempt because Valdes had now incurred reasonable medical expenses in excess of $1000, and (2) the injuries were permanent in nature. See Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...The trial court granted the motion and entered an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint with prejudice because, at the time of the filing of their complaint, they met the requirements set forth in Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975), and that the action was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata....

...Mederos, 307 So.2d 873 (Fla.3d DCA 1975), we held that a trial court would lose subject matter jurisdiction over a lawsuit, thereby becoming impotent to enter final judgment thereon, whenever it was determined that the no-fault threshold requirements of Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975), had not been met....

...We acknowledge that the party adversely affected by the remittitur has the option of demanding a new trial on the issue of damages alone. § 768.043(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). DOWNEY, STONE and POLEN, JJ., concur. . This was error due to the application of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1989).

...We reach this conclusion based on the following, briefly stated, legal analysis. The sole basis for the new trial order is the trial court’s determination that it erred in failing to instruct the jury on the no-fault threshold of serious, non-permanent injury under Section 627.737(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1977)....

more important, with the mandatory terms of section 627.737(1), Florida Statutes (1997). Mansfield v. Rivero

injury requirement, as related to damages. See, Section 627.737 Florida Statutes (1975). The judgment appealed

...The central point on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdict on the issue of whether the minor plaintiff suffered a permanent injury in the automobile accident sued upon so as to avoid the no-fault threshold. See § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat....

...Harris did not demonstrate permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability during the safe harbor period. Under Florida law, an insured may recover only economic damages, such as medical expenses or lost wages, where the injuries constitute a “serious injury” within the meaning of FI. Stat. § 627.737(2)....

...§ 627.727(7) provides that “the legal liability of an uninsured motorist coverage insurer does not include damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience unless the injury or disease described in one or more paragraphs (a)-(d) of § 627.737(2).” Because first party bad faith actions brought against uninsured motorist carriers did not exist in the common law and are statutory in nature, they must be strictly construed. “Thus, an insured seeking non-economic benefits from her or his uninsured motorist carrier, must first meet the threshold requirements enumerated in section 627.737(2)(a-d).” State Farm Mut....

...Rather, the standard is whether the injury and the permanency thereof can be established within a reasonable degree of medical probability. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Stuart, 301 So.2d 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) involved a car accident wherein the victim attempted to prove the presence of a permanent injury as defined by § 627.737....

...al testimony to establish the existence and permanency of the alleged injury.” See id. See also Fay v. Mincey, 454 So.2d 587, 592, 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) *1232 (noting that “medical testimony is necessary in establishing a permanent injury under section 627.737(2)” and allowing a chiropractor to testify that liquid crystal thermography testing indicated the presence of a permanent lower back sprain)....

...The decision of the fourth district in Dauksis was quashed and the holding in Newton was approved. The supreme court held that whether a plaintiff injured by an uninsured motorist may obtain pain and suffering damages without satisfying the threshold requirements of section 627.737(2) depends on whether the tort-fea-sor motorist has provided the security required by the no-fault law (PIP) and the language of the uninsured motorist policy....

question of “subject matter jurisdiction.” Section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1975), creates specific

...But the basis for our decision was not any categorical rule. Instead it was tied to the particular claim tried and the record in that case. This is clear from the following excerpts from Judge Owen’s opinion: “Automobile personal injury cases arising prior to the effective date of section 627.737 ......

PER CURIAM. The issue in this case is whether a person injured while operating a vehicle owned by a Florida resident must allege threshold injuries (as defined in § 627.737(2), Fla....

...y obtained PIP coverage, she could maintain a negligence action against the defendants without alleging threshold injuries. The trial court ruled that the tort exemption was applicable to the non-resident defendants/appel-lees. This appeal followed. Section 627.737, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: (1) Every owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....

...g out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of such motor vehicle in this state.... This tort exemption is not applicable if the plaintiff alleges and proves a threshold injury, such as significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement. Section 627.737 does not exempt non-residents who voluntarily obtain PIP coverage under Florida’s no-fault law from tort liability for damages normally recompensed under PIP coverage; nor does it exclude such non-residents from the statutory tort exception....

...ion passes upon a question of great public importance and certify the question as follows: Are non-residents who voluntarily obtain PIP coverage conforming to Florida’s no-fault law (§ 627.730-627.7405, Fla.Stat.) exempt from tort liability under section 627.737, Florida Statutes, to the same extent as residents who obtain the same coverage because required by statute to do so? AFFIRMED....

...bstruct the regular flow of traffic.” Clearly, driving a disabled car across the highway would have violated this section. Although our decision makes it unnecessary for us to determine whether appellees met the statutory threshold requirements of section 627.737, Florida Statutes (1977), we find no record evidence that appellees sustained a “serious, nonpermanent injury which has a material degree of bearing on the ......

...Inc. and Jose Rodriguez for alleged injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The jury returned a verdict that Mr. Festa had not sustained a permanent injury as a result of this accident, as required under Florida’s no fault insurance statute. § 627.737(2), Fla.Stat....

...of $1,000 in future medical expenses on the ground that those expenses would be covered by Clark’s PIP policy. Acknowledging this court’s recent decision in Kokotis v. DeMarco, 679 So.2d 296 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), Clark has confessed to error. See § 627.737(1), Fla....

...the amount of Clark’s PIP deductible. Enriquez relies on Hannah v. Newkirk, 675 So.2d 112 (Fla.1996), but, unlike the defendant in Hannah , who was charged with but found not to have caused permanent injuries, Enriquez may not avail herself of subsection 627.737(l)’s exemption. The exemption applies only when the damages caused by a tortfeasor do not exceed the no-fault threshold of subsection 627.737(2). § 627.737(1); see Mansfield v. Rivero, 620 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla. 1993). In a special interrogatory, the jury in this case found that Clark sustained a permanent injury in her accident with Enriquez. She is therefore entitled to bring an action for pain and suffering under 627.737(2), and Enriquez is accordingly not exempted from tort liability by subsection 627.737(1), nor is she entitled to set off the amount of Clark’s PIP deductible....

...se the trial court’s order granting a new trial. We clarify DeLong, Noah, and Albritton to the extent that they should not be read to conflict with Faulkner and McDaniel . Reversed and remanded. CAMPBELL, Acting C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur. . Section 627.737(2), Florida Statutes (1987) provides: In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required by ss....