Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 320.02
S320.02 5c - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - FALSE AFFIDAVIT MOTOR VEH PROOF OF INSURANCE - M: F
S320.02 19 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - MOTOR VEH DEALER FAIL KEEP REGIS DOCUMENTS - M: S
S320.02 13d - NONMOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - DISABLE REMOVE TAMPER UNLOCK IMMOBILIZE DEVICE - M: S
S320.02 14d - TRAFFIC OFFENSE - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 6493 - M: S
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20600, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 165
...Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Before RONEY, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, HILL, FAY, VANCE, KRAVITCH, JOHNSON, HATCHETT, ANDERSON, EDMONDSON and COX, Circuit Judges. HATCHETT, Circuit Judge: 1 We took this case in banc to determine whether Florida Statute 320.02(9) violates the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution....
...ce with these federal standards. A vehicle which is registered pursuant to this subsection shall not be titled as a new motor vehicle. 14 Act approved June 11, 1984, ch. 84-155, Sec. 3, 1984 Fla. Laws 457 , 458 (codified as amended at Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) (1985)). This provision prevents a gray market vehicle owner from acquiring title and vehicle registration in Florida until the owner has obtained the required documentation from the federal government. 15 Subsequent to the passage of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9), Sims unsuccessfully sought to title and register her automobile at the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DMV)....
...ssive number of forms for review. 6 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 16 Following refusal to title and register the vehicle, Sims and the FICA filed suit in United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida alleging that the state's enforcement of section 320.02(9) violated the Supremacy and Commerce clauses of the United States Constitution: (1) the Clean Air Act and the Safety Act preempt the state's authority to require compliance with federal emission and safety standards, and (2) enforcement of section 320.02(9) impermissibly burdens foreign and interstate commerce. The district court concluded that the Clean Air Act and Safety Act preempt the state's authority to enforce section 320.02(9) and that enforcement of the statute would violate the commerce clause. The district court declared section 320.02(9) unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement....
...The state brings this appeal from the district court's ruling. DISCUSSION 17 We first discuss those issues the parties presented to the district court, upon which the district court ruled, and the state of Florida initially appealed: the constitutionality of Florida Statute 320.02(9) under the Supremacy and Commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. 7 I. Supremacy Clause 18 Sims and the FICA successfully challenged the constitutionality of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) in the district court....
...The express language in section 7543(a) indicates Congress's intent to exclusively regulate the control of new motor vehicle emissions prior to their initial sale. See Michigan Canners,
467 U.S. 461 ,
104 S.Ct. 2518 ,
81 L.Ed.2d 399 . 27 The state contends that Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9) simply ensures that new motor vehicles coming onto Florida's highways comply with the Clean Air Act; it does not establish new or conflicting emission standards....
...The court in Kane, however, noted that the standards derived under the Pennsylvania system required independent testing and the payment of fees to cover the cost of such testing. Kane,
466 F.Supp. at 1245-46 . Unlike the Pennsylvania regulations examined in Kane, section
320.02(9) does not impose requirements on a gray market vehicle importer beyond those imposed by the applicable federal standards....
...ch as FMVSS 218 would be preempted by operation of the Act and of the agency's action in adopting the federal standard in question. 36 47 Fed. Reg. at 885. 37 Recently, the Fifth Circuit examined a Texas statute similar in language to Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) and stated: 9 38 H.B....
...1805, does not impair this objective since it creates no independent state standard or certification of the automobiles. 39 Direct Automobile Imports Association, Inc. v. Townsley,
804 F.2d 1408, 1414 (5th Cir.1986). The same rationale applies to Fla. Stat. Sec.
320.02(9). Section
320.02(9) does not impose additional requirements or burdens on the manufacturer or importer, nor does it require the payment of additional fees. Further, section
320.02(9) does not prescribe the sale of federally certified equipment or impair Congress's objective of establishing uniform federal safety standards to permit the free marketability of vehicles in all states....
...44 We agree with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Townsley that "the legislative history shows an intent to preempt state presale enforcement of federal standards where the sale of federally certified equipment is impaired by an independent state compliance system." Townsley,
804 F.2d at 1415 . Fla. Stat. Sec.
320.02(9) does not impair the enforcement of federal safety standards or frustrate Congress's intent of establishing uniform standards for vehicle manufacturers; consequently, we hold that the Safety Act, as amended, does not preempt Fla. Stat. Sec.
320.02(9) (1985)....
...Commerce Clause 45 Although we hold that the Safety Act does not preempt the Florida Statute, we earlier held that the federal government solely and exclusively may enforce the Clean Air Act before a vehicle's first sale. Consequently, the Clean Air Act preempts Florida Statute 320.02(9), rendering this Florida statute unconstitutional....
...Jurisdictional Issues 46 We now turn to the jurisdictional issues of standing, mootness, and sovereign immunity. 14 A. Standing 47 The state of Florida contends that Sims and the FICA lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) because they failed to show (1) a judicially cognizable injury traceable to the statute's enforcement, and (2) a likelihood of redress if we declare the statute unconstitutional....
...at 2206 ; see Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91 ,
99 S.Ct. 1601 ,
60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). In satisfying the initial article III standing requirement--an allegation of "a distinct and palpable injury," Sims and the FICA allege that the state's enforcement of section
320.02(9) unlawfully prevents titling and registering gray market vehicles in Florida....
...y market vehicles constitutes a distinct and palpable personal injury to Sims and the FICA. 49 Sims and the FICA make additional assertions sufficient to establish the second standing requirement--the requested relief's likelihood of redress. Absent section 320.02(9), Florida would title and register Sim's and other owners gray market vehicles....
...t would clearly abuse its discretion if it denied the motion to formally add as a defendant the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles for the State of Florida. CONCLUSION 63 In summary, we affirm the district court's ruling that Fla. Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) violates the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7522 because Congress has exclusively reserved to the federal government the enforcement of federal emission standards. We reverse the district court's ruling that Fla. Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) violates the Safety Act....
...Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part. 17 64 AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. 65 TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, dissenting in which HILL, KRAVITCH and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, join: 66 In its apparent haste to decide the constitutionality of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) (1987), the en banc court glosses over the jurisdictional requirements of well established precedent, and in so doing sets the stage for untold mischief in future cases....
...he Department), is required to title and register 2 her gray market automobile because she has satisfied the requirements Florida imposes on those who wish to title non-gray market automobiles, but that the State refuses to do so. See Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(1)-(7). Anticipating the State's defense, Sims goes on to allege that the State has refused to title her vehicle because she has not complied with Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) by providing the Department with proof, in the form of a bond release letter issued by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA), that she has satisfied the requirements of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C....
...Sec. 1397 (1982). Finally, in response to this anticipated defense, Sims presents the federal question that, she contends, gives the district court, and consequently this court, subject matter jurisdiction to entertain her suit: whether Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) is unconstitutional....
...The second group of claimants consists of FICA members, namely import brokers and mechanics, who charge fees to those who import gray market automobiles after their automobiles are conditionally admitted into the United States. These members contend that enforcement of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) is chilling importation of gray market automobiles and thus is causing them to lose business....
...rt, on receipt of our mandate, to dismiss the case. 6 II. 76 I turn now to the issue of the mootness of Sims' claim. At the heart of this controversy is Sims' impatience with NHTSA's delay in issuing a bond release letter, required by Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) to title a gray market automobile....
...ntered final judgment for Sims--NHTSA issued Sims her eagerly awaited bond release letter. Since Sims had already acquired the necessary documentation from the Environmental Protection Agency, she now had all the documents required by Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9), and nothing prevented her from obtaining a title for her automobile....
...own a "reasonable likelihood" or "demonstrated probability" that it will recur. III. 81 Because Sims' claim is moot, we have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal only if the remaining appellee, FICA, has standing on its own to attack Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9)....
...464, 472 ,
102 S.Ct. 752, 758 ,
70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); see also Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 752 ,
104 S.Ct. 3315, 3325 ,
82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). 86 FICA attempts to meet its burden of establishing its members' standing by alleging that Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9) injures its members who import gray market automobiles for commercial or personal use by denying them the right to obtain Florida title, and in effect, the right to drive their gray market automobiles....
...nding, as Warth commands. 17 88 FICA lacks standing to sue in behalf of the first group--the importers--because the complaint does not identify anyone who has been or will be denied title as a result of the Department's enforcement of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9)....
...Indeed, all that the complaint alleges is that "importers of automobiles for their personal use as well as ... for resale ... support improving opportunities for commerce with foreign nations in the importation, use and sale in the United States of foreign-manufactured automobiles" 18 and, presumably, want Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) declared unconstitutional....
...93 Nor has FICA demonstrated that it has standing to sue on behalf of its second group of members--import brokers and mechanics. FICA has not identified any one in this group whose business has been adversely affected by the enforcement of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9)....
...95 If, as a matter of policy, we were to follow the majority's approach and disregard this limitation on the standing of those alleging indirect injury, then we would also have to recognize the claims of anyone else who might allege that the enforcement of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) hurt his business....
...at 955 ,
104 S.Ct. at 2846 (citing United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 22 ,
80 S.Ct. 519, 523 ,
4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960)). 20 This rule requires us to hold that the import brokers and mechanics do not have third party standing to challenge Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9)....
...752, 767 ,
70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208, 227 ,
94 S.Ct. 2925, 2935 ,
41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974)). 98 To summarize, I conclude that none of FICA's members have standing to challenge Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9)....
...ubstitute the director of the Department as the party defendant, and begin their case anew--as I have noted. See supra note 24. But this would have denied the majority the power, under article III, of deciding the constitutionality of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9)....
...13 The commerce clause of the United States Constitution reads in part as follows: "The Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states...." U.S.Const. art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3. To determine whether Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) is violative of the commerce clause, we would be called upon to (1) determine exactly what interest the Florida statute purports to protect, (2) determine whether the statute burdens commerce, and if so, to what extent, and (3) balance the...
...egistration for her gray market automobile 3 In addition to an order compelling the Department to title her gray market automobile, Sims also asks the court, in a common prayer for relief with FICA, to enjoin the future enforcement of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9)....
...eds such relief. Because prospective relief is not necessary to make Sims' whole, and since equity does not grant that which is not needed, we should not read the complaint as including a prayer by Sims that the State be enjoined from enforcing Sec. 320.02(9) 4 For simplicity, I refer to FICA's members collectively as importers, import brokers, and mechanics....
...n) to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the director of the Department to title her automobile. The director, in his answer to Sims' petition, would have alleged that Sims was not entitled to relief because she had not complied with Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9)....
...Second, assuming that it would be, there is no reason to believe that any such controversy will arise because we know that Sims possesses the documents required for annual re-registration under Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.055, which are the same as those required for initial registration under Fla.Stat.
320.02(9) 13 The standing and mootness inquiries are closely related....
...ctor's liability to the plaintiffs--and, then, that process be served upon the new defendant. The majority tacitly rejects this alternative because such a disposition would, obviously, prevent it from deciding the constitutionality of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9)....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 9027, 2001 WL 726002
...The Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law places an obligation upon car owners to obtain this coverage if they are required to register their car in Florida. See §
627.733, Fla. Stat. (1993). A person must register a car in Florida if it is used on the roads of Florida. See §
320.02, Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 15302
...the insurance coverage question presented by the petition. On remand, the court below should consider, but is not limited to, the following authorities in declaring the rights of the parties: Section
627.736(4)(d)4 a, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976); Section
320.02, Florida Statutes (1975); Williams v....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...and all other vehicles operated over the public streets and highways of this state and used as a means of transporting persons or property over the public streets and highways and propelled by other than muscular power ..." (Emphasis added) The question of when a motor vehicle is required to be registered is set forth in § 320.02, Florida Statutes (1975), which provides: "Every owner ......
...d in this state, shall for each such vehicle so owned, cause to be filed by mail or otherwise, ... a certified application for registration of same ..." (Emphasis added) In discussing the relationship between §
320.01 and the emphasized language of §
320.02, the Florida Supreme Court stated in the case of Green v. Pederson,
99 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1957), that: "[T]he italicized portion of this section [§
320.02] adds nothing to the definition of a `motor vehicle' .....
...ore be subject to the registration requirement set forth in the Florida Statutes. First, the instrumentality must be operated over the public streets and highways of this state or maintained for that purpose. Section
320.01, Florida Statutes (1972), Section
320.02, Florida Statutes (1975); Green v....
...The automobile while being stored may remain garaged and be totally inoperable for a time period of many months, although the operator is possessed with the intent to place that automobile back on the roadway at some indefinite future date in a restored condition. Surely the legislature in drafting §
320.01, §
320.02 and §
627.733, Florida Statutes, did not intend that the law require that individual to maintain current registration and suffer the burden of paying insurance premiums for an automobile for which there exists no possibility of being involved in an automobile accident on the public roadways....
...the public streets and highways of this state. Again, the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in Green v. Pederson, supra, is instructive: "The primary purpose of the particular provisions of our Motor Vehicle License Law here involved [§
320.01, §
320.02] is to regulate the operation of motor vehicles *353 on the highways and streets of this state....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...ll within the definition of "motor vehicle" established by law, [6] and is therefore neither required to be registered and licensed [7] nor be insured under the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act. The Sherman court found that Sections
320.01,
320.02 and
627.733, Florida Statutes (1975) were required to be considered together, and that, so considered, no legislative intent could be discerned which would require the owner of an inoperable automobile to maintain current registration and pay...
...3rd DCA 1976), cert. denied
345 So.2d 429 (Fla. 1977) (decided prior to Sherman ), reached a conclusion opposite to that in Sherman, but the Williams' opinion does not disclose what the *900 court considered to be the effect, if any, of Sections
320.01 and
320.02, Florida Statutes (1975) [10] ....
...les "which are neither operated over the public streets or highways of Florida nor maintained for that purpose" ( Tapscott opinion, page 477, citing Kotich v. Criterion Ins. Co.,
38 Fla. Supp. 199 (C.C. Escambia Co. 1973), and Sections
320.01(1)(a),
320.02(1), and 320.35, Florida Statutes (1975))....
...tomobiles, ... and all other vehicles operated over the public streets and highways of the state and used as a means of transporting persons or property over the public streets and highways and propelled by power other than muscular power, . .". [7] Section 320.02(1), Florida Statutes (1975) sets forth the requirements for registration of motor vehicles as follows: "Every owner ......
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 7889, 2009 WL 997647
...state. Fla. Stat.
§§
207.004(1)(a),
207.0281. Commercial motor vehicles are subject to higher
liability insurance coverage requirements than ordinary automobiles and must
prove compliance with those higher limits when registering. Fla. Stat. §§
320.02(5)(a);
627.7415(4). Critical to this case, each motor carrier must maintain
a liability insurance policy in full force and effect and the policy “may not be
canceled on less than 30 days’ written notice by the insurer to the [FDHSMV].”
Fla. Stat. §
320.02(5)(e).
As the district court found, Florida Statutes section
320.02(5)(e) applies
when an existing policy is cancelled, but not when a policy expires because of
non-renewal by the insured....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 9 Fla. L. Weekly 491, 1984 Fla. LEXIS 3746
...(2) or devises used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. [4] See, e.g., §
316.2065(14)-(15), Fla. Stat. (1981). [5] See, e.g., § 233.063(1), Fla. Stat. (1981); § 316.2075, Fla. Stat. (1981); §
320.0803, Fla. Stat. (1981). [6] See, e.g., §
320.02(6), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 629
...was required under sections
627.730 through 637.7405, Florida Statutes. Section
627.733(1), Florida Statutes (1985) requires security (PIP) for every owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered and licensed in this state. *1297 Section
320.02(1), Florida Statutes (1985) requires every owner or person in charge of a motor vehicle which is operated or driven on the roads of this state to register the vehicle in this state....
...State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company,
330 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) and Williams v. Leatherby Insurance Company,
338 So.2d 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied,
345 So.2d 429 (Fla. 1977). Those cases were decided when, before an amendment (Chapter 83-318, § 4, Laws of Florida), section
320.02(1), Florida Statutes (1983) required registration not only of motor vehicles "operated or driven upon the highways of this state" but also of motor vehicles "maintained in this state." Perhaps the courts in Tapscott and Williams found...
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20281, 26 ERC (BNA) 1969, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15790
...Before TJOFLAT and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and EATON * , District Judge. HATCHETT, Circuit Judge. 1 The State of Florida, and the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, appeal from the district court's declaration that Florida Statute Sec. 320.02(9) is unconstitutional because it is preempted under the supremacy clause and violates the commerce clause of the United States Constitution....
...ance with these federal standards. A vehicle which is registered pursuant to this subsection shall not be titled as a new motor vehicle. 14 Act approved June 11, 1984, ch. 84-155, Sec. 3, 1984 Fla.Laws 457, 458 (codified as amended at Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) (1985))....
...This provision prevents the owner of a gray market vehicle from acquiring title and vehicle registration in Florida until the owner has obtained the required documentation from the federal government. 15 Subsequent to the passage of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9), Sims unsuccessfully sought to title and register her automobile at the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DMV)....
...Sims had not received a bond release letter from the DOT because of the excessive number of forms the DOT had to review. 5 16 Following refusal to title and register the automobile, Sims and the FICA filed suit in United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida alleging that the state's enforcement of section 320.02(9) violated the supremacy and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution: (1) the Clean Air Act and the Safety Act preempt the state's authority to require compliance with federal emission and safety standards, and (2) enforcement of section 320.02(9) places an impermissible burden on foreign and interstate commerce. The district court concluded that the Clean Air Act and Safety Act preempt the state's authority to enforce section 320.02(9) and that enforcement of the statute would violate the commerce clause. The district court declared section 320.02(9) unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. The state brings this appeal from the district court's ruling. 17 On September 29, 1986, we heard oral arguments addressing whether Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) violates the supremacy and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution....
...ereign immunity under the eleventh amendment, and (3) mootness. The parties complied with our request. 6 DISCUSSION A. Standing 18 The state of Florida alleges that Sims and the FICA lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) because they have failed to show (1) a judicially cognizable injury traceable to the enforcement of the statute, and (2) the likelihood of redress if the Florida statute is declared preempted or in violation of the commerce clause....
...ss by the requested relief. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464 ,
102 S.Ct. 752 ,
70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). 19 Sims and the FICA allege that the state's enforcement of Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9) violates the supremacy and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution because it prevents the owner of a "gray market" vehicle from acquiring title and registration in Florida prior to release of the entry bond and final admission of the vehicle into the United States....
...In satisfying the initial requirement under the Article III doctrine relating to standing--an allegation of "a distinct and palpable injury," Warth,
422 U.S. at 501 ,
95 S.Ct. at 2206 . Sims and the FICA's complaints allege that the state's enforcement of section
320.02(9) unlawfully prevents the titling and registering of gray market vehicles in Florida....
...injury to Sims and the FICA. 21 Also, Sims's and the FICA's complaints contain assertions sufficient to establish the second requirement necessary to show standing--the likelihood of redress by the requested relief. Absent the state's enforcement of section 320.02(9), Sims and other owners of gray market vehicles would immediately have their vehicles titled and registered in Florida....
...granted, they have no reason to seek titling and the registration of these vehicles. Such a contention amounts to mere speculation as to the owner's need for, or the reason for which the owner seeks titling and registration. Moreover, Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(1) does not prohibit the registration of vehicles that are not operated on Florida roads....
...We cannot conclude that titling and registration of a gray market vehicle are necessary only for the operation or sale of the automobile. 9 In this case, we also find that Sims and the FICA have sufficiently alleged a distinct, palpable, and personal injury in the state's enforcement of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(1)....
...We hold that this lawsuit presents a "case or controversy" as required by article III of the United States Constitution and does not constitute a "hypothetical case." Sims and FICA have standing to bring this lawsuit. B. Preemption 22 Sims and the FICA successfully challenged the constitutionality of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) in the district court....
...The express language in section 7543(a) indicates Congress's intent to exclusively regulate the control of emissions from new motor vehicles prior to the initial sale. See Michigan Canners,
467 U.S. 461 ,
104 S.Ct. 2518 . 31 The state contends that Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9) simply ensures that new automobiles coming onto Florida's highways comply with the Clean Air Act; it does not establish new or conflicting emission standards....
...The court in Kane, however, noted that the standards derived under the Pennsylvania system required independent testing and the payment of fees to cover the cost of such testing. Kane,
466 F.Supp. at 1245-46 . Unlike the Pennsylvania regulations examined in Kane, Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9) does not impose additional requirements on the importer of a gray market vehicle than those imposed by the applicable federal standards....
...opting the federal standard in question. 40 47 Fed.Reg. at 885. 41 Recently, the Fifth Circuit in Direct Automobile Importers Association, Inc. v. Townsley,
804 F.2d 1408 (5th Cir.1986), examined a Texas statute similar in language to Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9) and stated: 11 42 H.B....
...June 14, 1966) (remarks of Senator Magnuson). The Texas statute H.B. 1805, does not impair this objective since it creates no independent state standard or certification of the automobiles. 43 Townsley,
804 F.2d at 1414 . The same rationale holds true in this case regarding Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9). As noted above, Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9) neither imposes additional requirements or burdens on the manufacturer or importer, nor involves the payment of additional fees. Additionally, section
320.02(9) does not have the effect of prescribing the sale of federally certified equipment, or impairing the objective of Congress in establishing uniform federal safety standards to permit the free marketability of vehicles in all states....
...48 We agree with the court's conclusion in Townsley that "the legislative history shows an intent to preempt state presale enforcement of federal standards where the sale of federally certified equipment is impaired by an independent state compliance system." Townsley,
804 F.2d at 1415 . Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9) does not create an impairment to the enforcement of federal safety standards or frustrate the intent of Congress in establishing uniformity of standards for manufacturers of vehicles; consequently, we hold that 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1392 (d) (1982) does not preempt Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9) (1985). C. Commerce Clause 49 The district court concluded that since Fla.Stat.
320.02(9) prevents owners of gray market vehicles from titling and registering their vehicles prior to presenting proof of compliance with federal emission and safety standards, the marketability of gray market vehicles is limited and prevents their free introduction into the stream of commerce....
...50 The commerce clause of the United States Constitution reads in part as follows: "The Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states...." U.S. Const. art I, Sec. 8, cl. 3. In determining whether Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) is violative of the commerce clause, we must (1) determine exactly what interest the statute purports to protect, (2) determine whether the statute burdens commerce, and if so, to what extent, and (3) balance the weight and nature of the in...
...ommerce.' [Citation omitted.] Those who would challenge such bona fide safety regulations must overcome a 'strong presumption of validity.' [Citation omitted.] 53 Kassel,
450 U.S. at 669-70 ,
101 S.Ct. at 1315-16 . 54 The objective of Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9) is to ensure that gray market vehicles comply with federal emission and safety standards before receiving titles and registration in Florida. Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9) advances a legitimate and local concern for the health and safety of the state's citizens in that it attempts to prevent the sale and operation of vehicles in Florida that are not considered safe for persons and the environment under federal standards. 55 We must now determine the extent to which Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9) burdens commerce. Section
320.02(9) imposes restrictions on the importation of gray market vehicles into the United States....
...r the entire United States as established by the Constitution. It is precisely this type of state action that the Commerce Clause was designed to prevent; thus the statute is constitutionally infirm. 57 Accordingly, in weighing the local concerns of section 320.02(9) against the burden on commerce, we find that Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) does violate the commerce clause. Although Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) requires no greater compliance than compliance with applicable federal standards, Florida's titling and registration statute imposes a burden on foreign and interstate commerce....
...em on the roads of Florida. D. Immunity 58 Sims and the FICA filed suit in the district court against the State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, and the Attorney General seeking to enjoin the enforcement of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9)....
...endant is prescribed by the eleventh amendment." Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 100 ,
104 S.Ct. 900, 908 ,
79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). 59 The state of Florida, in responding to the constitutional challenge to Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(9), failed to plead the defense of sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment and did not initially raise the issue on appeal....
...Moreover, the state concedes that Sims and the FICA's claim is not moot: "The issue ... is one that is capable of repetition yet evading review." We agree with this conclusion and accordingly hold that the present action is not moot. CONCLUSION 62 In summary, we affirm the district court's finding that Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) violates the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7522 because Congress has reserved to the federal government the sole and exclusive prerogative of enforcing federal emission standards. We also affirm the district court's ruling that Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) violates the commerce clause, U.S....
...artment of Transportation and the United States Environmental Protection Agency to be in compliance with these federal standards. A vehicle which is registered pursuant to this subsection shall not be titled as a new motor vehicle. 66 Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) (Supp.1987) (enacted prior to amendment as Act approved June 11, 1984, ch....
...Sims, the owner and importer of a gray market automobile, sought unsuccessfully to title and register her automobile in Florida. Officials from the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles refused to title and register Sims' automobile because she did not produce proof of compliance with section 320.02(9). Appellees subsequently brought suit in federal district court against the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 1 claiming that the State's enforcement of section 320.02(9) violated the supremacy and commerce clauses 2 of the United States Constitution because (1) the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C....
...7401-7642 (1982), and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1381-1431 (1982) (the Safety Act), preempt the State's authority to require compliance with federal emission and safety standards; and (2) enforcement of section 320.02(9) places an impermissible burden on foreign and interstate commerce. Appellees asked the court to declare section 320.02(9) unconstitutional and to enjoin its enforcement. 68 After a bench trial, the district court concluded that the Clean Air Act and the Safety Act preempt the State's authority to enforce Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9), and that such enforcement would violate the commerce clause....
...The court therefore granted appellees' application for a permanent injunction, and enjoined the State from enforcing its statute. The State now appeals from the district court's rulings. 69 The majority holds that both Sims and FICA have standing to challenge Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9), ante at 1563-64, and that neither party's cause of action is moot....
...I also believe that Sims' cause of action is moot and no longer reviewable. Because of appellees' mootness and standing problems, I should decline to address the merits of their claims. Nonetheless, I am compelled to respond to the majority's conclusion that section 320.02(9) violates the commerce clause....
...In this case, the statutory schemes of both the Clean Air Act and the Safety Act, as well as the special importation regulations applicable to gray market automobiles, must be examined to determine the nature of the injury, if any, appellees have suffered as a result of the enactment of Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9)....
...319.21,
319.34 (Supp.1987). 13 With regard to vehicle registration, Florida law provides that "every owner or person in charge of a motor vehicle which is operated or driven on the roads of this state shall register the vehicle in this state." Fla.Stat. Sec.
320.02(1) (Supp.1987)....
...98 Appellees were not "injured" with respect to the Safety Act's provisions, either. The majority, in its conclusion that the Florida statute is not preempted by the Safety Act, finds that the Florida statute does nothing more than enforce the requirements of the Safety Act. Ante at 1567 ("Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) ......
...105 On September, 18, 1985--three months before the lower court issued its opinion in this case--the NHTSA issued its bond release letter, authorizing Customs to proceed with final admission of Sims' vehicle. Sims now has the documents necessary to comply with Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) and obtain title and registration for her vehicle....
...109 In light of my conclusions that both appellees lack standing to challenge the Florida statute, and that appellee Sims' cause of action is moot, I should refrain from discussing the merits. Nonetheless, I am compelled to respond to the majority's conclusion that Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) violates the commerce clause of the United States Constitution because the majority, overlooking commerce clause precedent, restricts the states' power to regulate interstate commerce when Congress has authorized them to do so....
...If Congress has conferred such power on the states, any state statute promulgated pursuant to this authorization "is rendered invulnerable to Commerce Clause challenge." Western & Southern Life Ins. Co.,
451 U.S. at 652-53 ,
101 S.Ct. at 2075. 111 I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Florida Stat. Sec.
320.02(9) violates the commerce clause because I find that Congress has generally authorized the states to engage in the sort of regulation provided by the Florida statute....
...1392 (d) (1982) (preempting any state standard "which is not identical to the federal standard"); S.Rep. No. 505, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code & Admin. News 3169, 3174 (states are not barred from enforcing federal Safety Act standards). Accordingly, I believe that Fla.Stat. Sec. 320.02(9) is invulnerable to commerce clause challenge, insofar as section 320.02(9) enforces the Safety Act. 112 Section 320.02(9), however, also seeks to enforce the provisions of the Clean Air Act. The proper approach, therefore, is to examine the incremental burden caused by section 320.02(9)'s enforcement of the Clean Air Act....
...oth, for each offense. 14 The gist of appellees' argument may be that they are "injured" because, prior to the enactment of the Florida statute, the gray market prohibitions were only enforced by federal authorities, but now that Florida has enacted section 320.02(9), appellees are subject to both state and federal enforcement of the federal law....
...This would be a difficult argument to swallow indeed 15 Sims argues that her case is not moot because the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DMV) might still refuse to issue Sims her registration and title documents, even though she has received all the federal documents required by section 320.02(9). This contention, however, is insufficient to save her cause of action from a dismissal on mootness grounds. If the officials at DMV still refuse to issue the documents, they are in violation of section 320.02(9), and Sims' recourse is to bring a suit for mandamus to compel the issuance of the documents, not to maintain this action challenging the constitutionality of the statute
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 9 Fla. L. Weekly 1757, 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 14595
...Reserve Insurance Company,
350 So.2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The Automobile Reparations Reform Act requires insurance in this context for "[e]very owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered and licensed in this state... ." §
627.733(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). Section
320.02(1), Florida Statutes (1981), in turn requires registration for motor vehicles "which shall be operated or driven upon the highways of the state, or which shall be maintained in this state......
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 13617, 2015 WL 5306180
...Upon asking for Appellant’s license and registration, as well as his home address, Appellant supplied three different addresses. We find this sufficient grounds for Officer Futrell-to detain Appellant in order to investigate whether he had committed a criminal offense by failing to maintain an up-to-date registration. See § 320.02(4), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 17177, 2010 WL 4484629
...comment. However, we must reverse Riggins’ convictions for operating an unregistered vehicle and unlawful use of a temporary tag because the only evidence supporting these convictions was inadmissible hearsay. I. Operating an Unregistered Vehicle Section 320.02(1), Florida Statutes (2008), requires that every owner or “person in charge of a motor vehicle that is operated or driven on the roads of this state” register the vehicle....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 3357518, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 10754
...t was designed for use on Florida’s highways 5 and was required by federal and state law to have numerous items of safety equipment to help insure its safe operation on public roads. Furthermore, it was required to be registered in accordance with section 320.02, Florida Statutes (2007). Section 320.02(1) provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, every owner or person in charge of a motor vehicle which is operated or driven on the roads of this state shall register the vehicle in this state.” (emphasis added)....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 2003).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
...r property, and propelled by power other than muscular power, but the term does not include traction engines, road rollers, such vehicles as run only upon a track, bicycles, or mopeds." 3 Such a definition would appear to include motorized scooters. Section 320.02 , Florida Statutes, requires, except as otherwise provided in Chapter 320 , Florida Statutes, that every owner or person in charge of a motor vehicle operated or driven on the roads of this state register the vehicle in this state....
...The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, however, has stated that section
320.08 , Florida Statutes, which provides for license taxes for the registration of motor vehicles, does not contain a classification for motorized scooters or go-peds. Thus, the department has stated that since section
320.02 requires that every motor vehicle operating on the roads of this state be registered and since such vehicles cannot be registered, they may not be operated on the roads of this state....
...re the posted speed is 25 miles per hour or less, on marked bicycle paths, and on sidewalks. The statute provides that a driver's license is not required to operate such a device and such devices need not be registered and insured in accordance with section 320.02 , Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Florida 6th District Court of Appeal
...We begin with
registration. The general requirement is that “every owner or person in charge of a
motor vehicle that is operated or driven on the roads of this state shall register the
6
vehicle in this state.” § 320.02(1), Fla....
... schemes: the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, sections
627.730–627.7405,
Florida Statutes, requiring PIP insurance, and the Financial Responsibility Law of
1955, chapter 324, Florida Statutes, requiring liability insurance. Registration cannot
be obtained without proof of both. §
320.02(5)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 16001
...The Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act mandates that every motor vehicle which is required to be registered in Florida must be covered by an insurance policy' which provides PIP benefits. See Section
627.731, .733, and .736, Florida Statutes (1975). The Motor Vehicle Licenses Law, Section
320.02(1), Florida Statutes (1975), requires every owner of a motor vehicle operated or maintained in this state to apply for registration of that vehicle in Florida....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 4427, 2006 WL 782840
...The insurer then filed this action seeking a declaration that its policy had been can-celled, effective November 15, 2002. The trial court found that there was coverage because the insurer had failed to provide notice of cancellation as required by section 320.02(5)(e), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides: The department shall suspend the registration, issued under this chapter or s....
...The insurer argues that because it was cancelling the policy for nonpayment of premiums, it was required to only give the named insured notice under this statute. The problem with the insurer’s position is that section
627.7281 is of general application to all motor vehicles, while section
320.02(5)(e) applies more specifically to commercial vehicles, which are subject to special registration requirements with the state....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 19533
...e of any kind on the vehicle and Exotica knew or should have known this, but nevertheless obtained registration of the automobile in Peck’s name and on his behalf by representing to a state tag agency that Peck had the insurance required by law. 1 Section
320.02(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), provided that every applicant for registration of a motor vehicle must submit proof that personal injury protection (PIP) benefits have been purchased as required under section
627.733....
...f a motor vehicle. Section
319.23(6) provided that no certificate of title may be issued until the applicant has shown that a current registration has been obtained as required by section 320.-02. These statutes are currently in effect. We note that section
320.02(5)(a) now provides that proof of insurance may be by affidavit and that “by executing and notarizing aforesaid affidavit, no licensed motor vehicle dealer shall be liable in damages for any inadequacy, insufficiency, or falsification of any statement contained therein.” That provision was not part of section
320.02 at the time of the sale by Exotica to Peck.
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 10622, 2006 WL 1752252
...thereof suppressed. During the suppression hearing, Officer Wilson testified that the “no record found” response indicated to her that the car was not currently registered in the State of Florida and therefore was being operated in violation of section 320.02(1), Florida Statutes (1997)....
...Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied Ellis’s motion to suppress, and finding no merit in the other issues he has raised, we affirm his judgment and sentence. Affirmed. VILLANTI, J., Concurs. NORTHCUTT, J., Concurs specially with opinion. . Violation of section
320.02(1), which requires owners or persons in charge of a motor vehicle operated or driven on the roads of this state to register the vehicle in the state, is a second-degree misdemeanor pursuant to section
320.57(1), Florida Statutes (1997)....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 8527, 2000 WL 904907
...middle of his console. Although there was some confusion in the record, Willis was charged with violation of section 316. 605(1), Florida Statutes (1997), failure to display a tag, section
320.0605 for not having the registration on his person, and section
320.02, which requires an owner of a motor vehicle to have the vehicle registered in the state. Sections
316.605(1) and
320.0605(1) are noncriminal traffic offenses; section
320.02 is *1007 a misdemeanor....
...320.57(1).” The order concluded that because the arrest was for a criminal offense, the search was proper. Its conclusion is incorrect as to section
320.0605, because that section is not a misdemeanor offense. However, the arresting officer testified, Willis was arrested for failure to register the car, a violation of section
320.02, which is a misdemeanor offense. Because violation of section
320.02 is a criminal offense, its violation justified the search and legitimized the subsequent discovery of contraband in Willis’s vehicle. 4 AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ„ concur. . §
893.13(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). . §§
320.02(1) and
320.57, Fla....
...gree, "unless otherwise provided herein " (emphasis added). Section
320.0605 provides that a "violation of this section is a noncriminal traffic infraction, punishable as a nonmoving violation as provided in chapter 318.” In contrast, violation of §
320.02 does not contain a provision opting it out of the misdemeanor classification of section
320.57....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 39 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 478, 2014 WL 2979378, 2014 Fla. LEXIS 2149, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 10282
...intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the
border, the Court found that the apparent Mexican heritage of the occupants did
not provide reasonable suspicion for a stop. Id. at 881, 886. The Court stated,
5. See § 320.02(6), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 319, 1994 WL 22579
...Such an application for title does not require a current motor vehicle registration in order to obtain a certificate of title. Section
319.23(7), Fla.Stat. (1991). This may be significant because the application for registration requires proof of insurance. Section
320.02, Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
HATCHETT, Circuit Judge: We took this ease in banc to determine whether Florida Statute 320.02(9) violates the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution....
...n compliance with these federal standards. A vehicle which is registered pursuant to this subsection shall not be titled as a new motor vehicle. Act approved June 11, 1984, ch. 84-155, § 3, 1984 Fla. Laws 457 , 458 (codified as amended at Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9) (1985)). This provision prevents a gray market vehicle owner from acquiring title and vehicle registration in Florida until the owner has obtained the required documentation from the federal government. Subsequent to the passage of Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9), Sims unsuccessfully sought to title and register her automobile at the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DMV)....
...number of forms for review. 6 PROCEDURAL HISTORY Following refusal to title and register the vehicle, Sims and the FICA filed suit in United States District Court for the North *1454 ern District of Florida alleging that the state’s enforcement of section 320.02(9) violated the Supremacy and Commerce clauses of the United States Constitution: (1) the Clean Air Act and the Safety Act preempt the state’s authority to require compliance with federal emission and safety standards, and (2) enforcement of section 320.02(9) impermissibly burdens foreign and interstate commerce. The district court concluded that the Clean Air Act and Safety Act preempt the state’s authority to enforce section 320.02(9) and that enforcement of the statute would violate the commerce clause. The district court declared section 320.02(9) unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement....
...The state brings this appeal from the district court’s ruling. DISCUSSION We first discuss those issues the parties presented to the district court, upon which the district court ruled, and the state of Florida initially appealed: the constitutionality of Florida Statute 320.02(9) under the Supremacy and Commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. 7 I. Supremacy Clause Sims and the FICA successfully challenged the constitutionality of Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9) in the district court....
...The express language in section 7543(a) indicates Congress’s intent to exclusively regulate the control of new motor vehicle emissions prior to their initial sale. See Michigan Canners,
467 U.S. 461 ,
104 S.Ct. 2518 ,
81 L.Ed.2d 399 . The state contends that Fla.Stat. §
320.02(9) simply ensures that new motor vehicles coming onto Florida’s highways comply with the Clean Air Act; it does not establish new or conflicting emission standards....
...The court in Kane , however, noted that the standards derived under the Pennsylvania system required independent testing and the payment of fees to cover the cost of such testing. Kane,
466 F.Supp. at 1245-46 . Unlike the Pennsylvania regulations examined in Kane , section
320.02(9) does not impose requirements on a gray market vehicle importer beyond those imposed by the applicable federal standards....
...ndard such as FMVSS 218 would be preempted by operation of the Act and of the agency’s action in adopting the federal standard in question. 47 Fed. Reg. at 885. Recently, the Fifth Circuit examined a Texas statute similar in language to Fla. Stat. § 320.02 (9) and stated: 9 H.B....
...1805, does not impair this objective since it creates no independent state standard or certification of the automobiles. Direct Automobile Imports Association, Inc. v. Townsley,
804 F.2d 1408, 1414 (5th Cir.1986). The same rationale applies to Fla. Stat. §
320.02 (9). Section
320.02(9) does not impose additional requirements or burdens on the manufacturer or importer, nor does it require the payment of additional fees. Further, section
320.02(9) does not prescribe the sale of federally certified equipment or impair Congress’s objective of establishing uniform federal safety standards to permit the free marketability of vehicles in all states....
...We agree with the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion in Townsley that “the legislative history shows an intent to preempt state presale enforcement of federal standards where the sale of federally certified equipment is impaired by an independent state compliance system.” Townsley,
804 F.2d at 1415 . Fla. Stat. §
320.02 (9) does not impair the *1458 enforcement of federal safety standards or frustrate Congress’s intent of establishing uniform standards for vehicle manufacturers; consequently, we hold that the Safety Act, as amended, does not preempt Fla. Stat. §
320.02 (9) (1985)....
...Commerce Clause Although we hold that the Safety Act does not preempt the Florida Statute, we earlier held that the federal government solely and exclusively may enforce the Clean Air Act before a vehicle’s first sale. Consequently, the Clean Air Act preempts Florida Statute 320.02(9), rendering this Florida statute unconstitutional....
...13 III. Jurisdictional Issues We now turn to the jurisdictional issues of standing, mootness, and sovereign immunity. 14 A. Standing The state of Florida contends that Sims and the FICA lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9) because they failed to show (1) a judicially cognizable injury traceable to the statute’s enforcement, and (2) a likelihood of redress if we declare the statute unconstitutional....
...Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91 ,
99 S.Ct. 1601 ,
60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). In satisfying the initial article III standing requirement—an allegation of “a distinct and palpable injury,” Sims and the FICA allege that the state’s enforcement of section
320.02(9) unlawfully prevents titling and registering gray market vehicles in Florida....
...y market vehicles constitutes a distinct and palpable personal injury to Sims and the FICA. Sims and the FICA make additional assertions sufficient to establish the second standing requirement—the requested relief’s likelihood of redress. Absent section 320.02(9), Florida would title and register Sim’s and other owners gray market vehicles....
...t court would clearly abuse its discretion if it denied the motion to formally add as a defendant the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles for the State of Florida. CONCLUSION In summary, we affirm the district court’s ruling that Fla. Stat. § 320.02 (9) violates the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7522 because Congress has exclusively reserved to the federal government the enforcement of federal emission standards. We reverse the district court’s ruling that Fla. Stat. § 320.02 (9) violates the Safety Act....
...The commerce clause of the United States Constitution reads in part as follows: “The Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states_” U.S.Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. To determine whether Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9) is viola-tive of the commerce clause, we would be called upon to (1) determine exactly what interest the Florida statute purports to protect, (2) determine whether the statute burdens commerce, and if so, to what extent, and (3) balance...
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 4481439
...Progressive sent out the notice of cancellation it utilized the statutory procedure for cancellation of insurance on ordinary passenger vehicles. See §
627.728, Fla. Stat. (2003). Progressive neglected to use the more specific cancellation provision for commercial vehicles. See id. §
320.02(5)(e)....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Argued: Jan 19, 2023
...The magistrate judge—whose report the district court
adopted—identified two bases which established probable cause
for the arrest. The first was that Mr. Jones was driving an unregis-
tered vehicle in violation of Fla. Stat. § 320.02, a second-degree mis-
demeanor punishable by up to 60 days of imprisonment....
...3d 348, 350, 352–53 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (reversing
the trial court’s suppression of a firearm because the officers seized
it incident to a lawful arrest for driving an unregistered vehicle);
Fla. Stat. §
320.57(1) (making a violation of §
320.02 a second-de-
gree misdemeanor and referencing statutes setting the available
punishments)....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 26 ERC 1969
HATCHETT, Circuit Judge. The State of Florida, and the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, appeal from the district court’s declaration that Florida Statute § 320.02(9) is unconstitutional because it is preempted under the supremacy clause and violates the commerce clause of the United States Constitution....
...in compliance with these federal standards. A vehicle which is registered pursuant to this subsection shall not be titled as a new motor vehicle. Act approved June 11, 1984, ch. 84-155, § 3, 1984 Fla.Laws 457, 458 (codified as amended at Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9) (1985)). This provision prevents the owner of a gray market vehicle from acquiring title and vehicle registration in Florida until the owner has obtained the required documentation from the federal government. Subsequent to the passage of Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9), Sims unsuccessfully sought to title and register her automobile at the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DMV)....
...Sims had not received a bond release letter from the DOT because of the excessive number of forms the DOT had to review. 5 Following refusal to title and register the automobile, Sims and the FICA filed suit in United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida alleging that the state’s enforcement of section 320.02(9) violated the supremacy and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution: (1) the Clean Air Act and the Safety Act preempt the state’s authority to require compliance with federal emission and safety standards, and (2) enforcement of section 320.02(9) places an impermissible burden on foreign and interstate commerce. The district court concluded that the Clean Air Act and Safety Act preempt the state’s authority to enforce section 320.02(9) and that enforcement of the statute would violate the commerce clause. The district court declared section 320.02(9) unconstitutional and en *1563 joined its enforcement. The state brings this appeal from the district court’s ruling. On September 29, 1986, we heard oral arguments addressing whether Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9) violates the supremacy and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution....
...’s sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment, and (3) mootness. The parties complied with our request. 6 DISCUSSION A. Standing The state of Florida alleges that Sims and the FICA lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9) because they have failed to show (1) a judicially cognizable injury traceable to the enforcement of the statute, and (2) the likelihood of redress if the Florida statute is declared preempted or in violation of the commerce clause....
...redress by the requested relief. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464 ,
102 S.Ct. 752 ,
70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). Sims and the FICA allege that the state’s enforcement of Fla.Stat. §
320.02(9) violates the supremacy and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution because it prevents the owner of a “gray market” vehicle from acquiring title and registration in Florida prior to release of the entry bond and final admission of the vehicle into the United States....
...In satisfying the initial requirement under the Article III doctrine relating to standing—an allegation of “a distinct and palpable injury,” Warth,
422 U.S. at 501 ,
95 S.Ct. at 2206 . Sims and the FICA’s complaints allege that the state’s enforcement of section
320.02(9) unlawfully prevents the titling and registering of gray market vehicles in Florida....
...ry to Sims and the FICA. Also, Sims’s and the FICA’s complaints contain assertions sufficient to establish the second requirement necessary to show standing—the likelihood of redress by the requested relief. Absent the state’s enforcement of section 320.02(9), Sims and other owners of gray market vehicles would immediately have their vehicles titled and registered in Florida....
...is granted, they have no reason to seek titling and the registration of these vehicles. Such a contention amounts to mere speculation as to the owner’s need for, or the reason for which the owner seeks titling and registration. Moreover, Fla.Stat. § 320.02(1) does not prohibit the registration of vehicles that are not operated on Florida roads....
...We cannot conclude that titling and registration of a gray market vehicle are necessary only for the operation or sale of the automobile. 9 In this case, we also find that Sims and the FICA have sufficiently alleged a distinct, palpable, and personal injury in the state’s enforcement of Fla.Stat. § 320.02(1)....
...We hold that this lawsuit presents a “case or controversy” as required by article III of the United States Constitution and does not constitute a “hypothetical case.” Sims and FICA have standing to bring this lawsuit. B. Preemption Sims and the FICA successfully challenged the constitutionality of Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9) in the district court....
...The express language in section 7543(a) indicates Congress's intent to exclusively regulate the control of emissions from new motor vehicles prior to the initial sale. See Michigan Canners,
467 U.S. 461 ,
104 S.Ct. 2518 . The state contends that Fla.Stat. §
320.02(9) simply ensures that new automobiles coming onto Florida’s highways comply with the Clean Air Act; it does not establish new or conflicting emission standards....
...The court in Kane , however, noted that the standards derived under the Pennsylvania system required independent testing and the payment of fees to cover the cost of such testing. Kane,
466 F.Supp. at 1245-46 . Unlike the Pennsylvania regulations examined in Kane , Fla.Stat. §
320.02(9) does not impose additional requirements on the importer of a gray market vehicle than those imposed by the applicable federal standards....
...ction in adopting the federal standard in question. 47 Fed.Reg. at 885. Recently, the Fifth Circuit in Direct Automobile Importers Association, Inc. v. Townsley,
804 F.2d 1408 (5th Cir.1986), examined a Texas statute similar in language to Fla.Stat. §
320.02(9) and stated: 11 H.B....
...June 14, 1966) (remarks of Senator Magnuson). The Texas statute H.B. 1805, does not impair this objective since it creates no independent state standard or certification of the automobiles. Townsley,
804 F.2d at 1414 . The same rationale holds true in this case regarding Fla.Stat. §
320.02(9). As noted above, Fla. Stat. §
320.02 (9) neither imposes additional requirements or burdens on the manufacturer or importer, nor involves the payment of additional fees. Additionally, section
320.02(9) does not have the effect of prescribing the sale of federally certified equipment, or impairing the objective of Congress in establishing uniform federal safety standards to permit the free marketability of vehicles in all states....
...We agree with the court’s conclusion in Townsley that “the legislative history shows an intent to preempt state presale enforcement of federal standards where the sale of federally certified equipment is impaired by an independent state compliance system.” Townsley,
804 F.2d at 1415 . Fla.Stat. §
320.02(9) does not create an impairment to the enforcement of federal safety standards or frustrate the intent of Congress in establishing uniformity of standards for manufacturers of vehicles; consequently, we hold that 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (d) (1982) does not preempt Fla.Stat. §
320.02(9) (1985). C. Commerce Clause The district court concluded that since Fla.Stat.
320.02(9) prevents owners of gray market vehicles from titling and registering their vehicles prior to presenting proof of compliance with federal emission and safety standards, the marketability of gray market vehicles is limited and prevents their free introduction into the stream of commerce....
...The commerce clause of the United States Constitution reads in part as follows: “The Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states_” U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3. In determining whether Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9) is violative of the commerce clause, we must (1) determine exactly what interest the statute purports to protect, (2) determine whether the statute burdens commerce, and if so, to what extent, and (3) balance the weight and nature of the...
...ate commerce.’ [Citation omitted.] Those who would challenge such bona fide safety regulations must overcome a ‘strong presumption of validity.’ [Citation omitted.] Kassel,
450 U.S. at 669-70 ,
101 S.Ct. at 1315-16 . The objective of Fla.Stat. §
320.02(9) is to ensure that gray market vehicles comply with federal emission and safety standards before receiving titles and registration in Florida. Fla.Stat. §
320.02(9) advances a legitimate and local concern for the health and safety of the state’s citizens in that it attempts to prevent the sale and operation of vehicles in Florida that are not considered safe for persons and the environment under federal standards. We must now determine the extent to which Fla.Stat. §
320.02(9) burdens commerce. Section
320.02(9) imposes restrictions on the importation of gray market vehicles into the United States....
...for the entire United States as established by the Constitution. It is precisely this type of state action that the Commerce Clause was designed to prevent; thus the statute is constitutionally infirm. Accordingly, in weighing the local concerns of section 320.02(9) against the burden on commerce, we find that Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9) does violate the commerce clause. Although Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9) requires no greater compliance than compliance with applicable federal standards, Florida’s titling and registration statute imposes a burden on foreign and interstate commerce....
...o use them on the roads of Florida. D. Immunity Sims and the FICA filed suit in the district court against the State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, and the Attorney General seeking to enjoin the enforcement of Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9)....
...he defendant is prescribed by the eleventh amendment.” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 100 ,
104 S.Ct. 900, 908 ,
79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). The state of Florida, in responding to the constitutional challenge to Fla.Stat. §
320.02(9), failed to plead the defense of sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment and did not initially raise the issue on appeal....
...Moreover, the state concedes that Sims and the FICA’s claim is not moot: “The issue ... is one that is capable of repetition yet evading review.” We agree with this conclusion and accordingly hold that the present action is not moot. CONCLUSION In summary, we affirm the district court’s finding that Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9) vi-dates the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7522 because Congress has reserved to the federal government the sole and exclusive prerogative of enforcing federal emission standards. We also affirm the district court’s ruling that Fla.Stat. § 320.02(9) violates the commerce clause, U.S....
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1974).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
made to the relevant portions quoted below]. Section
320.02 provides in pertinent part: "Every owner, or
