Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...This is so because that which the lot owners acquire under such a "dedication" is a right to the use of the park or designated facility, in the nature of an easement, which the subdivider is required permanently to observe. The appellant's second contention, which is that under § 95.36, Fla....

...1974 by 1000 Brickell’s predecessor, which property was to be used for public park purposes. For the reasons that follow, we reverse in part1 the final summary judgment, because it was entered upon an erroneous construction and application of section 95.36, Florida Statutes (1974). FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 1974, Allen Morris, through his company, 1000 Brickell, deeded the subject property (“the Property”) to the City....

...ties to the instrument and “heirs, legal representatives and assigns of individuals, and the successors and assigns of corporations.” 3  The City moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that section 95.36(1), Florida Statutes (1974)3 barred 1000 Brickell’s lawsuit, because the deed was executed more than thirty years before the filing of the complaint and that, pursuant to the language of the statute, 1000 Brickell’s rights had terminated. Section 95.36(1) provides: It is hereby declared to be in the best interest of the public that ancient dedications of lands to municipalities for park purposes for a period of thirty years or more shall not hereafter be distu...

...However, when read in light of the various types of property 3 It is undisputed that the 1974 version of the statute is the applicable version in this case. 4 conveyance methods recognized by the common law,4 it is clear that section 95.36(1) is inapplicable, as the instant conveyance does not involve a “dedication of land,” but rather a fee simple conveyance with an automatic reverter clause. Indeed, a more specific statutory provision—section 689.18, Florida Statutes (1974)—addresses time limitations on claims based upon reverter provisions in fee simple conveyances of real property. That statute—rather than section 95.36(1)—applies to the instant conveyance and dictates the result in this case. Section 95.36(1) and the Common Law of Dedications to Municipalities for a Public Purpose By its plain language, section 95.36(1)’s application is limited to “ancient dedications of lands to municipalities for park purposes.” The dedication of property by a grantor to a municipality for a public purpose existed at common law, and today property ma...

...1923); City of Miami v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 84 So. 726, 729 (Fla. 1920); Lehmann v. Cocoanut Bayou Assoc., Inc., 269 So. 3d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019); Brevard Cty. v. Blasky, 875 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Bishop v. Nussbaum, 175 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); §95.361, Fla....

...issue was a fee simple determinable estate, subject to the restriction that it be used as a public park, and that, if the Property ceased to be used as such, it would automatically revert to the grantor and/or his successor. Thus, the time limitation contained in section 95.36(1) is simply inapplicable, since that statute, by its terms, applies to “dedications of land.” 7  Section 689.18 and the Instant Conveyance Indeed, there is another, more specific, statutory provision which controls the outcome of this case....

...common law, which excepted possibilities of reverter from the rule against perpetuities. John N. Redding, Florida Real Property Sales Transactions: Title Considerations, Ch. 11 (Fla. Bar CLE 10th ed. 2020). 9 another: one law (§ 95.36(1)) gives the grantor thirty years to file suit against a grantee who violates the terms of an ancient dedication of land with restrictions; while another (§ 689.18) gives the grantor only twenty-one years to do so....

...3d 97, 102 (Fla. 2014). Applying that canon here, the more specific statute—section 689.18, which specifically addresses reverter clauses—would control over 10 the more general provision contained in section 95.36, thus leading us to the same result. 6 CONCLUSION We hold that the deed executed by 1000 Brickell in favor of the City of Miami was a fee simple conveyance with an automatic reverter clause, and that section 95.36(1) is inapplicable to that deed....

...Appellants brought suit for a declaratory decree to determine the rights of the parties to the land under the provisions of the above clause. After a hearing on the motion by appellees for summary final decree the court entered its summary final decree in which it stated that F.S.A. § 95.36 was applicable so that the appellants’ rights were terminated and void. F.S.A. § 95.36 provides: “Dedications for park purposes....

...of their ancestors created by their conveyance of a limited title to the city was a possibility of reverter which is not an estate but the mere possibility of having an estate at some future time. They then asserted that the foregoing quoted F.S.A. § 95.36 as applied in this cause on these facts unconstitutionally operates to impair the obligation of that contract....

...eir heirs. 31 C.J.S. Estates § 112. Upon the expiration of seven years the board took a brand-new title by adverse possession not connected in any way with the grantors or their heirs. F.S.A. § 95.16. We therefore determine without applying F.S.A. § 95.36 that the appellants do not have any enforceable right, title or interest in the lands....

...deeded in 1974 by 1000 Brickell’s predecessor, which property was to be used for public park purposes. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the final summary judgment, because it was entered upon an erroneous construction and application of section 95.36, Florida Statutes (1974). FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 1974, Allen Morris, through his company, 1000 Brickell, deeded the subject property (“the Property”) to the City....

...language of the deed, the fee simple estate terminated “automatically and immediately” and “all right, title and interest in and to” the Property reverted to the grantor, 1000 Brickell. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that section 95.36(1), Florida Statutes (1974)2 barred 1000 Brickell’s lawsuit, because the deed was executed more than thirty years before the filing of the complaint and that, pursuant to the language of the statute, 1000 Brickell’s rights had terminated. Section 95.36(1) provides: 2 It is undisputed that the 1974 version of the statute is the applicable version in this case. 3  It is hereby declared to be in the best interest of the public that a...

...t this statute precludes the instant claim to a reversionary interest after thirty years—might appear to have merit. However, when read in light of the various types of property conveyance methods recognized by the common law,3 it is clear that section 95.36(1) is inapplicable, as the instant conveyance does not involve a “dedication of land,” but rather a fee simple conveyance with an automatic 3 The common law is still in effect in Florida today, except where it has been repealed or substituted by statute....

...reverter clause. Indeed, a more specific statutory provision—section 689.18, Florida Statutes (1974)—addresses time limitations on claims based upon reverter provisions in fee simple conveyances of real property. That statute—rather than section 95.36(1)—applies to the instant conveyance and dictates the result in this case. Section 95.36(1) and the Common Law of Dedications to Municipalities for a Public Purpose By its plain language, section 95.36(1)’s application is limited to “ancient dedications of lands to municipalities for park purposes.” The dedication of property by a grantor to a municipality for a public purpose existed at common law, and today property...

...1923); City of Miami v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 84 So. 726, 729 (Fla. 1920); Lehmann v. Cocoanut Bayou Assoc., Inc., 269 So. 3d 599 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019); Brevard Cty. v. Blasky, 875 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Bishop v. Nussbaum, 175 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); §95.361, Fla....

...issue was a fee simple determinable estate, subject to the restriction that it be used as a public park, and that, if the Property ceased to be used as such, it would automatically revert to the grantor and/or his successor. Thus, the time limitation contained in section 95.36(1) is simply inapplicable, since that statute, by its terms, applies to “dedications of land.” Section 689.18 and the Instant Conveyance Indeed, there is another, more specific, statutory provision which controls the outcome of this case....

...rter provision will be rendered unenforceable twenty-one years later. The City’s position would require this court to accept that the Florida Legislature intentionally crafted two statutes which are in conflict with one another: one law (§ 95.36(1)) gives the grantor thirty years to file suit against a grantee who violates the terms of an ancient dedication of land with restrictions; while another (§ 689.18) gives the grantor only twenty-one years to do so....

...over a general statute.” Florida Virtual Sch. v. K12, Inc., 148 So. 3d 97, 102 (Fla. 2014). Applying that canon here, the more specific statute—section 689.18, which specifically addresses reverter clauses—would control over the more general provision contained in section 95.36, thus leading us to the same result. 5 CONCLUSION We hold that the deed executed by 1000 Brickell in favor of the City of Miami was a fee simple conveyance with an automatic reverter clause, and that section 95.36(1) is inapplicable to that deed....