Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...use of the United States Constitution and as constituting an unlawful delegation of legislative authority under article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. The 1983 and 1984 proposed and pro forma assessments also were challenged as barred by section 95.091, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...The court also found the assessment of additional premium taxes void because the premium tax statute was invalid and rendered judgment in favor of the State on the Taxpayers claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Although the court found the proposed assessments of retaliatory tax for the years 1983 and 1984 barred by section 95.091, it rejected the remainder of the challenges raised in connection with section 624.429, and ordered the premium tax refunds offset by the amount of retaliatory tax owed under the pro forma assessments....

...Accordingly, we also affirm the trial court's rejection of this challenge to section 624.429. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS The State does not challenge that portion of the judgment finding the proposed assessment of retaliatory tax for the years 1983 and 1984 barred by section 95.091, Florida Statutes (1989). Under the statute *72 of limitations set forth in section 95.091(3)(a)1.a., the State is precluded from assessing tax under chapter 624 beyond five years after the date the tax is due, any return with respect to the tax is due, or such return is filed, whichever occurs later....

...on within 30 days of the lifting of an automatic stay issued in a bankruptcy action as is provided in 11 U.S.C. § 108(c). (2) No disability or other reason shall toll the running of any statute of limitations except those specified in this section, § 95.091, the Florida Probate Code, or the Florida Guardianship Law....

...ld allow it to shift the credit forward to a year fortuitously dictated by the Department's auditing activity, which could occur in any one of the five or more years allotted to the Department within which to conduct an audit and levy an assessment. Section 95.091, Florida Statutes....

...The appellant is a manufacturer of electronic equipment. The appellee is attempting to collect sales tax on some of this equipment for the period June 1, 1974, through June 30, 1978. The only issue is the interpretation of the relevant statute of limitations. Section 95.091(3) Fla....

...The Department issued its notice of proposed assessment on June 25, 1979, after 147 additional days had expired on the three-year "clock." The total period expiring before issuance on the notice of assessment was, therefore, 1,089 days, or less than the three-year limitation period provided for in Section 95.091(3), Florida Statutes....

...ter it has been domesticated under the applicable statutes. In Patafio and in the instant case, the New York judgments were not domesticated in Florida. Appellant argues that Patafio is wrongly decided in that it did not address the issue of whether section 95.091(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), applies to an action brought under section 72.041, and asserts that section 95.091(1)(b) is applicable. Section 95.091(1)(b), entitled "Limitation on actions to collect taxes," provides: Any tax lien granted by law to the state or any of its political subdivisions for any tax enumerated in s....

...An action to collect any tax enumerated in s. 72.011 may not be commenced after the expiration of the lien securing the payment of the tax. Section 72.011 applies to sales tax which is the type of tax appellant is seeking to recover. However, a clear reading of section 95.091(1)(b) indicates that it applies to tax liens granted by law of this state, not any other state....

...session of the property in question for more than 25 years. Even if the appellant does amend his complaint to attempt to state a cause of action he would not only have to overcome the defenses of res judi-cata and estoppel but also the limitation in § 95.091, Fla.Stat., which provides that if *645 real property is adversely possessed by any person no action shall be brought by a tax deed holder unless the action is begun within four years from the date of the deed....

...Upon receipt of this document, Catalina, instead of pursuing administrative remedies, obtained the consent of DOR to amend its existing circuit court complaint to include the refund issue. Then, once the three-year limitations period prescribed by section 95.091(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), had expired, Catalina moved for and obtained summary judgment in the circuit court, claiming that it had never received proper notice that the Department was rejecting its claim for a refund of $1 million....

...“identifie[d] the [tax] deficiency” for the three-year period at issue. The balance due from Appellant was $3,169,168.74, plus interest. Appellant was informed that if it did not agree with the “proposed assessment,” it could request a review through an 1 Section 95.091(3)(a)1.b., Florida Statutes (2010), the statute of limitations at issue, provides in part that “the Department ....

...Both parties subsequently moved for summary judgment. In the Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting 3 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court determined that the NOPA constituted an assessment for purposes of section 95.091(3)(a)....

...The trial court rejected Appellant’s argument that section 213.21(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which provides for a tolling of the statute of limitations period for the issuance of final tax assessments when informal protest procedures are sought, establishes that the assessment contemplated in section 95.091(3)(a) is a final assessment....

...against the taxing authority and any ambiguity in the provision of a tax statute must 5 be resolved in the taxpayer’s favor. Philip C. Owen, Chartered v. Dep’t of Revenue, 597 So. 2d 380, 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). As we explained, section 95.091(3)(a)1.b., Florida Statutes (2010), provides that the Department may “determine and assess the amount of any tax, penalty, or interest due under any tax enumerated in s....

...Department timely assessed Appellant for purposes of the statute of limitations when it issued the NOPA within the agreed-upon extended statute of limitations period. Appellant contends that the Department’s proposed tax assessment did not constitute the assessment contemplated in section 95.091(3)(a) and that it is the date upon which a proposed assessment becomes final that must be used to ascertain whether an assessment is timely. The Department argues that the proposed assessment was the pertinent assessment for purposes of the statute of limitations. As the parties acknowledge, section 95.091 does not define the word “assess.” In support of its argument, the Department relies upon section 72.011, Florida Statutes (2010), which addresses in part the jurisdiction of circuit courts in specific tax matters....

...by virtue of the Legislature’s use of the language “assessment becomes final.” Nevertheless, we find that neither the language of section 72.011 nor rule 12-6.003 settles the specific matter at hand of whether the assessment contemplated in section 95.091(3)(a) is a final assessment. 7  As did the trial court, the Department also relies upon our decision in Florida Export Tobacco Co., Inc....

...axes exists prior to the informal procedures and a final assessment. While that may be the case, the fact remains that the statute talks of a “final assessment” in terms of the tolling of the statute of limitations, which, in taxing cases, is section 95.091....

...The fact that it chose to qualify “assessment” with the word “final” leads us to conclude that the assessment contemplated in the statute of limitations is a final assessment. If, as the Department contends, a proposed assessment was the assessment contemplated in section 95.091(3)(a), then there would be no need for 10 section 213.21(1)(b) and the tolling of the statute pending the informal dispute or conference procedures because the necessary act for purposes of...

...the words in the statute). We also reject the Department’s argument that the provision only applies in cases where taxpayers invoke informal procedures. We see no reason to conclude that a proposed assessment is the “assessment” for purposes of section 95.091(3)(a) only in cases where a taxpayer does not dispute the proposed assessment. Instead, we construe, as we must, section 95.091(3)(a) and section 213.21(1)(b) in para materia....

...2005) (noting that pursuant to the doctrine of in para materia, statutes relating to the same subject or object should be construed together to harmonize the statutes and to give effect to legislative intent). Doing so leads to the conclusion that the assessment contemplated in section 95.091(3)(a) is a final assessment....

...Florida Statutes, which addresses corporate income tax, provides that “[n]o deficiency shall be assessed with respect to a taxable year for which a return was filed unless a notice of deficiency for such year was issued not later than the date prescribed in s. 95.091(3).” Both parties and the trial court likened a notice of deficiency in the corporate income tax context to a NOPA in the sales and use tax context....

...partment of Revenue Tallahassee QUESTION: Are tax liens created by the recording of a warrant issued by the Department of Revenue pursuant to ss. 199.262 (1) and 212.15 (3), F. S. (1978 Supp.), governed by the limitation provisions of s. 95.11 or by s. 95.091 , F. S.? SUMMARY: Tax liens created by the recording of warrants issued by the Department of Revenue pursuant to ss. 199.262 (1) and 212.15 (3), F. S. (1978 Supp.), are governed by the limitation provisions of s. 95.091 , F....

...Such liens, therefore, expire at the end of 5 years after the date the tax is assessed or becomes delinquent, whichever is later, and no action may be begun to collect any tax after the expiration of the lien securing the payment of the tax. In light of the following reasons, it is evident that the limitation provisions of s. 95.091 , F. S., govern such liens. Section 95.091 , F. S., places a limitation on actions to collect taxes. It provides, in part: 95.091 Limitations on actions to collect taxes....

...Fla., 1966), cert. discharged 199 So.2d 714 . Exceptions or provisos in statutes are to be strictly construed. Coe v. Broward County, 327 So.2d 69 (4 D.C.A. Fla., 1976), aff'd 341 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1976): Farrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1957). Section 95.091 (1), F. S., enumerates two exceptions from the applicability of its provisions — Chs. 198 and 220, F. S. Since ss. 199.262 (1) and 212.15 (3), F. S. (1978 Supp.), are not included within these exceptions, they come under the scope of s. 95.091 ....

...Fla., 1978), and Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1959). Neither s. 199.262 (1) nor s. 212.15 (3), F. S. (1978 Supp.), purports to prescribe any limitation on `the amount of the warrant,' the `lien' imposed by said sections, or its expiration. Both ss. 95.11 and 95.091 , F. S., are statutes of limitation. Since s. 95.091 specifically deals with `any tax lien granted by law,' it controls over s....

...ch liens and does not control here. While a lien created by the recording of a warrant may become a lien in the same manner as a recorded judgment, the warrant itself or `the amount of such warrant' does not constitute a judgment or a judgment lien. Section 95.091 (1), F....

...tax.' In conclusion, therefore, I am of the opinion that tax liens created by the recording of warrants issued by the Department of Revenue pursuant to ss. 199.262 (1) and 212.15 (3), F. S. (1978 Supp.), are governed by the limitation provisions of s. 95.091 , F....