Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Ross's note and mortgage, and therefore affirm this point without further discussion. We write further to address Alachua County's contention that foreclosure of Cheshire's mortgage, securing a $15,000 note, was barred by the statute of limitations, section 95.281(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides that a mortgage lien terminates five years from the date of maturity of the note secured by the mortgage....

...Pitts, his third wife, and his adult son who resided in the home. The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the Pastores at the conclusion of a bench trial. Three issues raised by Mr. Pitts warrant discussion. [2] First, Mr. Pitts contends that the statute of limitations, under section 95.281(1), Florida Statutes (1985), barred the Pastores' action. [3] Section 95.281(1) provides that a mortgage lien shall terminate: (a) If the final maturity of an obligation secured by a mortgage is ascertainable from the record of it, 5 years after the date of maturity....

...The final judgment contains the following finding: "That the defense of the running of the Statute of Limitations is not available to the Defendants in this case because Florida Statutes § 95.11(2)(c) setting forth a five (5) year period must be read in pari materia with Florida Statutes § 95.281(3) which provides: `If the record of the mortgage shows that it secures an obligation payable in installments and the maturity date of the final installment of the obligation is ascertainable from the record of the mortgage, the time shall...

...We must assume from the above quoted findings of the trial court (which are undisputed by the record before us) that the maturity date of the final installment is ascertainable from the recorded mortgage. § 95.11, Florida Statutes (1975), provides that an action to foreclose a mortgage shall be commenced within five years. § 95.281, Florida Statutes (1975), provides *782 that if the final maturity of an obligation secured by a mortgage is ascertainable from the record of it, the lien of the mortgage encumbering real property shall terminate five years after the date of maturity....

...oreclose accrued which occurred on August 1, 1975, at the earliest. The trial court correctly concluded, citing Locke v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 509 So.2d 1375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), that the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Section 95.281, Florida Statutes (1991), is the limitation statute applicable to mortgages. Smith v. Branch, 391 So.2d 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). The lien of a mortgage shall terminate twenty years after the date of the mortgage if the final maturity of an obligation secured by a mortgage is not ascertainable from the record of it. Section 95.281(1)(b)....

...the last element constituting a cause of action "on a negotiable or nonnegotiable note payable on demand ... is the first written demand for payment." Ruhl v. Perry, 390 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1980); Jones v. Rainey, 386 So.2d 1319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). [2] Section 95.281 is the limitation statute applicable to mortgages. Section 95.281(1)(b) provides that if maturity is not ascertainable from the record, the mortgage terminates twenty years after the date of the mortgage....

...Approval of a compromise of claim is inappropriate when the compromised claim is invalid as a matter of law. In re Planned Protective Services, 130 B.R. 94, 98 (Bankr.C.D.Ca.1991) citing In re Walsh Construction, Inc., 669 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1982). Berger's claim has been determined invalid pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 95.281....

...or liability founded on a written instrument.” The Association responds that its claim challenging the validity of the amendment to Restrictive Covenants is a reformation claim, not a breach of contract claim, and therefore the claim is subject to section 95.281(2), Florida Statutes, which provides that “[a]fter 20 years from recording of a deed ..., no person shall assert any claim to the property against the claimants under the deed ......

...Taylor of Warlick, Fassett & Anthony P.A., Orlando, for Appellee Evelyn Denson. ANTOON, Judge. WRH Mortgage, Inc. (WRH), appeals a summary final judgment in favor of Michael and Jean Butler in this mortgage foreclosure action. The trial court ruled that section95.281, Florida Statutes (1995), extinguished WRH's right to foreclose on the Butler's mortgage five years after the debt secured by the mortgage became due. We reverse because 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1995) preempts section 95.281 and grants WRH, an assignee of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), six years within which to institute suit in a foreclosure matter....

...on] February 25, 1990". The Butlers failed to timely pay the balance. On April 6, 1995, more than five years after the debt became due, WRH sued the Butler's for foreclosure. In defending against WRH's motion for summary judgment, the Butlers raised section 95.281 as a statute of limitations defense....

...d. Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 (Fla.1992); Universal Engineering Corp., v. Perez, 451 So.2d 463 (Fla.1984). See also University of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So.2d 1000 (Fla.1991). No Florida court has discussed or analyzed the specific issue of whether section 95.281 operates as a statute of repose. [3] However, in resolving the issue presented here, it is not necessary for us to categorize section 95.281 as a statute of repose or a statute of limitation because, regardless of the designation given the statute, the provisions of the statute are preempted by 12 U.S.C....

...e created. The same distinction applies here because 12 U.S.C. § 1821 does not create a cause of action and the rights WRH possessed under the mortgage were not state created. REVERSED and REMANDED. PETERSON, C.J., and HARRIS, J., concur. NOTES [1] 95.281 Limitations; instruments encumbering real property.— (1) The lien of a mortgage or other instrument encumbering real property, herein called mortgage,..., shall terminate after the expiration of the following periods of time: (a) If the final...

...ration as conservator or receiver shall be ... in the case of any contract claim, the longer of ... six-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or ... the period applicable under State law. [3] Unfortunately, our courts have referred to section 95.281 as being both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose. See Verde Capital Corp., v. Gutierrez, 548 So.2d 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), dismissed, 558 So.2d 20 (Fla.1990) (under section 95.281, the lien of a mortgage terminates five years after the date of maturity where the final maturity of the obligation is ascertainable from the record); USX Corp., v. Schilbe, 535 So.2d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)(the timeliness of an action to foreclose a mortgage is controlled by section 95.11 and the duration of the lien created by such mortgage is governed by section 95.281, a statute of repose). Cf. Monte v. Tipton, 612 So.2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (section 95.281 is the limitation statute applicable to mortgages); Alachua County v. Cheshire, 603 So.2d 1334 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (section 95.281 is the statute of limitations for foreclosure suits); Smith v. Branch, 391 So.2d 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)(section 95.281 is the limitation statute applicable to mortgages)....

...after April 14, 1988 was barred. KRC, which purchased the note and mortgage on August 10, 1988, argued that the language of the mortgage prevailed and the statute of limitations did not commence until the maturity date of the note and mortgage. See § 95.281, Fla....

...Houck argues that the trial court erred in determining that its foreclosure action was barred by a five-year statute of limitations pursuant to section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2002). Houck asserts that the applicable statute of limitations is twenty years as set forth in section 95.281(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2002). We conclude that section 95.281 is a statute of repose that prescribes the enforceable life of a mortgage lien, but does not operate to preclude an action to foreclose the mortgage....

...Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. New River contended that it was entitled to summary judgment based on the five-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(c), and Houck contended that the applicable statute of limitations was twenty years, based on section 95.281(1)(b)....

...The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of New River and dismissed Houck's complaint. Section 95.11(2)(c), entitled "Limitations other than for the recovery of real property," provides that actions to foreclose a mortgage must be commenced within five years. Section 95.281(1)(b), entitled "Limitations; instruments encumbering real property," provides that a mortgage lien terminates after the expiration of twenty years from the mortgage date if the maturation of the note secured by the mortgage *603 is not ascertainable from the record. If the maturation of the note is ascertainable from the record, the mortgage lien terminates five years from the date of maturity. § 95.281(1)(a). Many courts have referred to both sections as "statutes of limitation." However, the statutes conflict under this interpretation because section 95.281(1)(b) would extend the amount of time to bring a foreclosure action from the five years articulated without exception in section 95.11(2)(c) to twenty years if the maturation of the note secured by the mortgage is not ascertainable from the record. The trial court determined that the sections do not conflict because section 95.281 is a statute of repose that prescribes the enforceable life of a mortgage lien but does not direct the limitation period for filing a foreclosure action....

...e are circumstances that would make it difficult to discover. Id. The limitations period provided in section 95.11(2)(c) does not affect the life of the lien or extinguish the debt; it merely precludes an action to collect the debt after five years. Section 95.281(1)(b), conversely, establishes an ultimate date when the lien of the mortgage terminates and is no longer enforceable. Section 95.051, Florida Statutes (2002), sets forth the times when the limitations period under section 95.11 is tolled, but expressly excludes section 95.281. Thus it is clear that section 95.11(2)(c) operates as a statute of limitation while section 95.281(1)(b) operates as a statute of repose. While the duration of a lien is determined by section 95.281(1)(b), section 95.281(1)(b) does not constitute a bar to the filing of an action to foreclose the mortgage unless it causes the lien to terminate before the statute of limitations under section 95.11(2)(c) has expired. Our determination of this issue is supported by the legislative history of sections 95.11 and 95.281....

...ssignment from the state of the tax sales certificate, and, provided, further that the mere redeeming of the tax certificate shall be insufficient for such subrogation purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) In 1974, section 95.28 was amended and replaced by section 95.281....

...Schilbe, 535 So.2d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). There, the court held that "[t]he timeliness of an action to foreclose a mortgage is controlled by section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1987), and the duration of the lien created by such mortgage is governed by section 95.281, Florida Statutes (1987), a statute of repose." Schilbe, 535 So.2d at 719....

...recover on a promissory note and to foreclose a mortgage. The court answered the question in the negative and determined that the mortgage foreclosure action was time-barred by section 95.11(2)(c) and that the life of the lien had also expired under section 95.281....

...Layton filed a foreclosure action more than five years from the date of maturity but less than twenty years from the date of the mortgage. The trial court entered summary judgment against Layton based on its conclusion that the suit was barred by "the five-year statute of limitations" in section 95.281(1)(a). The issue on appeal was whether the date of maturity of the note was ascertainable from the record of it, and whether subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b) of section 95.281 therefore applied....

...This court held that the date of maturity was not ascertainable from the record and that "the applicable statute of limitations is twenty years" under subsection (1)(b). This court reversed the summary judgment on the foreclosure action. Id. *605 This court's reference in Layton to section 95.281 as a "statute of limitations" is unfortunate because, as we have already explained, section 95.281 is not a true statute of limitations, but a statute of repose. Regardless, this court did not address the issue of whether the statute of limitations in section 95.11(2)(c) barred the foreclosure action. The only issue decided by the Layton court was that section 95.281(1)(a) did not bar a foreclosure action on the mortgage....

...This decision is not based on a determination that the statute of limitations for filing a mortgage foreclosure action under section 95.11(2)(c) had not expired, but on a determination that the mortgage lien had not terminated because it was governed by the twenty-year period in section 95.281(1)(b)....

...Houck also relies on Monte v. Tipton, 612 So.2d 714, 716 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Pitts v. Pastore, 561 So.2d 297, 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); and Smith v. Branch, 391 So.2d 797, 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), in which this court determined that the twenty-year "statute of limitations" under section 95.281 precluded dismissal of the foreclosure actions. Again, to the extent that it has caused confusion in the interpretation of the relation between sections 95.11(2)(c) and 95.281, the reference to section 95.281 as a "statute of limitations" is unfortunate....

...However, in those cases, the causes of action had not yet begun to accrue; therefore, the five-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(2)(c) had not expired. In fact, in Smith, this court set forth an analysis consistent with that articulated by the trial court in this case. There, the court read sections 95.281 and 95.11 together to conclude that neither provision barred the foreclosure action because "[t]he twenty-year lien of the mortgage has not yet terminated, and appellants' cause of action did not accrue until the filing of the complaint herein." Smith, 391 So.2d at 798....

...New River failed to make any payments and defaulted in 1991. The mortgage was assigned to Houck in January 2003; shortly thereafter, Houck filed its foreclosure action. Pursuant to section 95.11(2)(c), the statute of limitations to file the foreclosure action expired on October 30, 1996; however, under section 95.281(1)(b), the mortgage lien was enforceable until November 1, 2004....

...closure action was barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(2)(c). At the time Houck filed suit, the five-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(2)(c) had expired, but the twenty-year statute of repose under section 95.281(1)(b) had not....

...2275 West defended on the ground that foreclosure was barred by the statute of limitations. Six months after the action was filed, American Bankers moved for summary judgment on its foreclosure claim. 2275 West also moved for summary judgment claiming that foreclosure was barred by section 95.281 of the Florida Statutes. On February 13, 2003, American Bankers' motion for summary judgment was granted. The following day, American Bankers moved for leave to reply to 2275 West's affirmative defenses regarding the bar of section 95.281 which had been asserted six an one half months earlier. In that reply, American Bankers sought to avoid 2275 West's claim that section 95.281 barred foreclosure of the American Bankers mortgage first because 2275 West was equitably estopped from raising this statutory defense by virtue of its "conduct in its dealings with [American Bankers]"; second, by virtue of correspondence between between the parties in 1993 which, according to American Bankers, constituted a modification agreement that would preclude the bar of section 95.281; and third, because American Bankers' interest in the property secured by the mortgage "should be protected by an equitable lien." On March 9, 2004, after hearing additional argument regarding American Bankers' avoidances, a final judgment of foreclosure was entered in American Bankers' favor. We reverse the judgment because by the time this action was commenced in March 2002, there was no valid lien to enforce. Section 95.281(1)(a), of the Florida Statutes provides that the lien created by a mortgage terminates five years after the maturity date of the obligation it secures where the date of maturity may be ascertained from the record: (1) The lien of a mortgage or other instrument encumbering real property, herein called mortgage ... shall terminate after the expiration of the following periods of time: (a) If the final maturity of an obligation secured by a mortgage is ascertainable from the record of it, 5 years after the date of maturity. § 95.281(1)(a), Fla....

...e are circumstances that would make it difficult to discover. Id. The limitations period provided in section 95.11(2)(c) does not affect the life of the lien or extinguish the debt; it merely precludes an action to collect the debt after five years. Section 95.281(1)(b), conversely, establishes an ultimate date when the lien of the mortgage terminates and is no longer enforceable. The maturity date of the note secured by American Bankers' mortgage, which may be ascertained from the record, is September 15, 1993. Under section 95.281(1)(a), American Bankers had until September 15, 1998 to enforce its lien....

...First Federal of Miami, Inc., 429 So.2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), and observing "[i]n order to be binding, a contract must also be definite and certain as to the parties' obligations to one another"). The correspondence also does not comply with the recordation requirements mandated by section 95.281(2), of the Florida Statutes, which extends the life of a mortgage lien "[i]f an extension agreement executed by the mortgagee or the mortgagee's successors in interest and the mortgagor or the mortgagor's successors in interest is reco...

...The complaint states a cause of action for mortgage foreclosure. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT I. Statute of Limitations In Florida, the Statute of Limitations on mortgage foreclosures with an ascertainable date of maturity is five (5) years. § 95.111 and § 95.281, Fla.Stat. (1982 & Supp.1996). Florida Statute § 95.281 addresses limitations on instruments encumbering real property and provides in pertinent part: (1) The lien of a mortgage or other instrument encumbering real property, herein called mortgage ......

..., the time shall be extended as follows: (a) If the final maturity of the obligation, as extended, secured by the mortgage is ascertainable from the record of the extension agreement, 5 years after the date of maturity of the obligation as extended. § 95.281, Fla.Stat....

...The modification agreement, which was entered into by Ollie Adkinson and Ellis National Bank of Tampa, specifically stated that "the entire balance of interest and principal shall be due and payable on the 9th day of August 1989." Application of Florida Statute § 95.281(2)(a) to the modification agreement clearly determines that the monthly payments were to end August 9, 1989, and the statute of limitations would bar a cause of action for foreclosure after August 9, 1994, five (5) years from the date of maturity....

...(The unsupported allegation of partial payment is not material to our deliberations.) *334 Geelhoed lived in the house until her death on October 5, 1985. The period permitted for enforcement of the note and mortgage by the statute of limitations was five years. § 95.281 Fla....

...In response, six of those unit owners filed motions to dismiss, asserting that Pathfinder’s foreclosure action was barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2013), and by the five-year statute of *7 repose set forth in section 95.281(1)....

...Therefore, we hold only that dismissal of the complaint based on *8 the statute of limitations was erroneous. On remand, the unit owners may pursue this as an affirmative defense if they so choose. The second basis articulated by the trial court for dismissing Pathfinder’s complaint was the statute of repose found in section 95.281(1)....

...e it difficult to discover. Id. Thus, while both a statute of repose and a statute of limitations may bar a party from proceeding with an action, they do so for two different reasons and based on two different legal theories. As a statute of repose, section 95.281(1) operates to terminate a mortgage lien and render it completely unenforceable if the statutory conditions are satisfied....

...dentify the maturity date of the loan agreement. Hence, because the maturity date of all of the obligations secured by the recorded mortgage was not ascertainable from face of the record of the recorded mortgage, the twenty-year statute of repose of section 95.281(l)(b) applies....

...Since Pathfinder’s foreclosure complaint was filed before the expiration of that twenty-year period, its action is not barred by the statute of repose, and the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint on this basis. We recognize that this application of section 95.281(1) appears to conflict with the purpose of recording documents in the public records....

...The law should encourage specificity in recorded documents — not ambiguity. Nevertheless, it is this court’s role to apply the law as written rather than to question the wisdom of the legislature in enacting those laws. Therefore, we are constrained by the language of section 95.281(1) to conclude that the statute of repose does not bar Pathfinder’s foreclosure action....

...rtgage loan on the property from First Federal Savings. In October, 1976, Bertha Corwin assigned her vendor's lien to the appellees herein who filed a complaint to foreclose the lien on November 11, 1976. Appellants asserted at summary judgment that § 95.281 Fla....

...It alleged that the five-year statute of limitations had run on their enforcement; therefore, as the mortgages were no longer enforceable, they became a cloud on Evergrene’s title. Citibank filed a motion to dismiss the quiet title action arguing inter alia that section 95.281(1), Florida Statutes (2012), provides in part that: (1) The lien of a mortgage or other instrument encumbering real property, herein called mortgage, ......

...The City maintains that the five-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until the City filed the instant foreclosure action, and that it had twenty years to foreclose on the liens under the statute of repose pertaining to mortgage liens with no ascertainable maturity date. See § 95.281(l)(b), Fla....

...On June 30, 1978, an action to foreclose a mortgage on real property was filed by appellees. Appellants filed an answer and affirmative defenses raising the issue of statute of limitations. The only issue at trial was the determination of the applicability of the statute of limitations contained in section 95.281(1)(a) and (1)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...There was an oral understanding between counsel that the trial would be conducted similar to an argument for summary judgment in that there would be no presentation of testimony because there were no questions of fact. At trial appellees took the position that the applicable subsection of Florida Statute 95.281 was subsection (1)(b); that the final maturity of the note was not ascertainable from the record of it, and that the statute of limitations was therefore twenty years. Appellants took the position that Florida Statute 95.281(1)(a) was applicable in that the final maturity of the note was ascertainable from the record and that the five-year statute of limitations should apply....

...ublication costs. Based upon this stipulation and settlement of the case, counsel for appellees cancelled the foreclosure sale. The agreement was never carried through and this appeal followed. Appellants argue that the trial court erred in applying section 95.281(1)(b)....

...§ 95.11(2)(b)), the one-year period applicable to specific performance of a contract ( id. § 95.11(5)(a)), or the four-year period applicable to equitable or other actions ( id. 95.11(3)(k) & (3)(p)). Simonetti, in contrast, suggests the five-year period applicable to the foreclosure of certain mortgage liens ( id. § 95.281(1)(a)), or the five year period applicable to actions on a written instrument ( id....

...That is incorrect. Even if the statute of limitations has run on an action to enforce a promissory note and foreclose on a mortgage, the lien against the property remains valid until five years after the maturity date of the debt secured by the mortgage. See § 95.281, Fla....

...New River, Ltd., Pasco, 900 So.2d 601, 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“The limitations period provided in section 95.11(2)(c) does not affect the life of the lien or extinguish the debt; it merely precludes an action to collect the debt after five years. Section 95.281(l)(b), conversely, establishes an ultimate date when the lien of the mortgage terminates and is no longer enforceable.”)....

...s an intervening bankruptcy proceeding had an over-riding effect. The timeliness of an action to foreclose a mortgage is controlled by section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1987), and the duration of the lien created by such mortgage is governed by section 95.281, Florida Statutes (1987), a statute of repose....

...osure of the mortgage they held or the foreclosure of their resulting lien, the result is the same. That is to say, foreclosure of the mortgage is time barred by section 95.11(2)(c) and the enforceable life of the mortgage lien ended by operation of section 95.281 prior to the commencement of their action. We note that none of the tolling grounds contained in section 95.051 is involved in the present matter because of the express exception from that statute of section 95.281....

...The next case cited was Zlinkoff v. Von Aldenbruck, 765 So.2d 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In Zlinkoff, this court found a foreclosure action was barred as untimely. Id. at 843. The recorded mortgage stated a final maturity date of February 1992. Id. at 842. Under section 95.281, Florida Statues, which concerns limitations on foreclosure actions, the right to pursue an action for foreclosure terminated in February 1997, five years after the maturity date on the recorded mortgage. Id. There was evidence that there was an oral agreement and an unrecorded written agreement to extend the final maturity date. Id. However, this court found that section 95.281 requires an extension of the final maturity date to be recorded in order to extend the time to file a foreclosure action....

...As *606 the extensions were not recorded, there was no valid extension for the purposes of pursuing a foreclosure action against Zlinkoff who acquired the property in October 1998. Id. at 842-43. In the instant case, because there is no issue raised involving the application of section 95.281 or whether a party has a right to pursue a foreclosure action, Zlinkoff does not apply....

...Essentially, Plaintiff claims that the Note and Mortgage are invalid and unenforceable based on the expiration of the five-year statute of limitations for mortgage foreclosure under Florida Statute § 95.11(2)(c), and the five-year statute of repose under Florida Statute § 95.281(l)(a); and that the allegedly invalid mortgage hen represents a cloud on her title to the property....

...In this case, BANA did affirmatively accelerate payment, however, the court’s dismissal of that foreclosure action repositioned the parties to their initial contractual obligations. Consequently, the BANA’s lien continues to exist until barred by the statute of repose contained in Florida Statutes § 95.281(l)(a)....

...Assuming arguendo, that the statute of limitations here has also tolled, BANA could still enforce the lien in the event that the mortgagee sells the property before the statute of repose passes. See Houck, 900 So.2d at 605 . Similarly in this case, § 95.281 is the applicable statute for the lien, and its statute of repose expires five years after the final maturity date contained in the recorded mortgage—October 1, 2036....

...a cloud on Plaintiffs title. The central issue to this claim is whether the mortgage lien constitutes a valid cloud on Plaintiffs title. The case law is clear that it does. As Plaintiffs basis for terminating the lien, she relies on Florida Statute § 95.281(l)(a), which reads: The lien of a mortgage or other instrument encumbering real property, herein called a mortgage, except those specified in subsection (5), shall terminate after the expiration of the following periods of time: (a) If the...

...13-Civ-23252, 2013 WL 6157932 , at *3 (S.D.Fla. Nov. 8, 2013) (J. Graham) (quoting Layton v. Bay Lake Ltd. Partnership, 818 So.2d 552, 553 (Fla.2d Dist.Ct.App.2002)). In the instant case, Plaintiffs recorded mortgage has a stated maturity date of October 1, 2036. Therefore, Florida Statute § 95.281(l)(a) is not triggered until five years later on October 1, 2041....

...y. The mortgage document, however, contained no maturity date. When Layton filed her foreclosure action February 4, 1999, nearly ten years after the note was executed, the trial court determined that the five-year statute of limitations contained in section 95.281, Florida Statutes (1989), applied to bar Layton’s action. We disagree. Section 95.281 specifies that a lien of a mortgage terminates five years after the date of maturity of the obligation if the date of maturity is “ascertainable from the record of it.” However, that same statute provides that a lien of mortgage ex...

...rtainable from the record of it.” The order granting summary judgment specifically found that “the maturity date is ascertainable,” and, since more than five years had elapsed since that date, the foreclosure of the mortgage was time-barred by section 95.281....

...Pastore, 561 So.2d 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Since the note itself was not recorded, and the recorded mortgage did not provide the maturity date, the maturity date was not ascertainable of record, and the applicable statute of limitations is twenty years. See § 95.281(l)(b), Fla....

...REVERSED and REMANDED for further action consistent with this opinion. COBB and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur. . Grogan-Cole, Williams and Chikanies, defendants below, are the remaining partners of Interstate, now a dissolved Florida limited partnership. . § 95.281(1)(a) Fla.Stat. (1989). . § 95.281(l)(b), Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. Appellant Norman Zlinkoff appeals the final judgment of foreclosure entered against him, arguing that under section 95.281, Florida Statutes (1999), the foreclosure action was untimely....

...oreclosure action against Zlinkoff. Von Al-denbruck and Zlinkoff agreed that the full amount under the note and mortgage (over $68,000) plus interest was due. Zlinkoffs position, however, was that the time for suing on the mortgage had expired under section 95.281....

...notice of the mortgage and thus had a duty to further inquire into the status of the mortgage and any extension of its maturity date. Based on this conclusion, *842 the trial court determined Von Alden-bruck’s foreclosure action was not barred by section 95.281 and that Von Aldenbruck was entitled to final judgment against Zlin-koff....

...us costs, and over $18,000 in attorney’s fees. The final judgment also included nearly $10,000 in property taxes from 1995, 1996, and 1997 that Von Alden-bruck had paid on the property. On appeal, Zlinkoff argues that because the plain language of section 95.281 bars Von Aldenbruek’s foreclosure action as untimely, the trial court erred in finding that Von Aldenbruck was entitled to judgment. Section 95.281 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) The hen of a mortgage or other instrument encumbering real property, herein called mortgage ......

...ears after the date of maturity as extended. [[Image here]] (4) The time shall be extended only as provided in this law and shall not be extended by any other agreement, non-residence, disability, part payment, operation of law, or any other method. § 95.281, Fla. Stat. (1999). Here, the recorded mortgage reflected a final maturity date of February 1992. At that time, under section 95.281(1), the ability to foreclose on the mortgage terminated in February 1997, five years after the recorded date. A written agreement executed by Von Alden-bruck and the DeSantises and recorded would have extended that time by five to twenty years, depending upon whether the final maturity date, as extended, was ascertainable from the record. See § 95.281(2). While Von Aldenbruck and the DeSantises executed one written agreement extending the maturity date of the mortgage, and while other extension agreements were orally made, an extension agreement was not recorded. Section 95.281(4) specifically states that anything other than a recorded agreement executed between the mortgagor and mortgagee (or their successors-in-interest) will not extend the time for pursuing a foreclosure action. See also § 95.281(2). Because the final maturity date of the mortgage was not made according to the provisions of section 95.281(2), the time to foreclose the mortgage terminated in February 1997. See § 95.281(1), (4). Thus, when Zlinkoff pur *843 chased the property in a clerk’s foreclosure sale in October 1998, he did not take subject to the mortgage because under the terms of section 95.281, the time for Von Aldenbruck to foreclose on the mortgage had expired....

...Von Aldenbruck argues that the recorded supplemental judgment of divorce created a duty for Zlinkoff to investigate further into the status of the mortgage. He also argues that the Legislature intended to allow parties to privately extend the time for foreclosing on a mortgage without complying with the precise terms of section 95.281(4)....

...ithout involving rules of construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended.” Zuckerman v. Alter, 615 So.2d 661, 663 (Fla.1993); see Zuckerman v. Hofrichter & Quiat, P.A., 646 So.2d 187, 188 (Fla.1994). Nothing in the language of section 95.281 suggests or creates a duty to investigate, and the statute does not provide for an extension of time simply because a party might be on notice. Rather, the language of section 95.281clearly cuts off the time to pursue a foreclosure action unless that time is properly extended in the manner prescribed, that is, by a recorded extension agreement executed by the mortgagee (or the mortgagee’s successors in interest) and the mortgagor (or the mortgagor’s successors in interest). The language of section 95.281is clear....

...The Fifth District held that because the mortgagor’s successor-in-interest took title to the property subject to the mortgage, thus recognizing the mortgage as valid and existing after the time for enforcing the mortgage had already expired under section 95.281(1), the mortgagor’s successor-in-interest could not later claim that the mortgage was invalid and unenforceable under section 95.281....

...At no time did he recognize the validity or existence of the mortgage. His certificate of title fails to mention the mortgage at all. In fact, he maintained that he bought the property believing the time for foreclosing on the mortgage had expired under section 95.281(4) because a valid extension under subsection (2) had not been filed. Thus, despite Von Alden-bruck’s urging, Irwin does not persuade us to allow him to pursue his foreclosure action without complying with the clear extension provisions of section 95.281....

...minating. If Von Aldenbruck and the DeSantises had agreed to extend the mortgage, they should have done so in writing, properly executed it, and recorded it. Doing so would have extended the time period for Von Aldenbruck to recover on the mortgage. Section 95.281does not prevent a mortgagee from extending the time period; it merely dictates the procedure....

...Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the final judgment allowing Von Alden-bruck to recover on the mortgage. With regard to the property taxes awarded, the record is insufficient for us to determine whether they were awarded in error. Thus, we remand to the trial court to reconsider the award of property taxes. See § 95.281(l)(c)....

...analysis outlined above, we likewise reverse that portion of the, trial court’s order which declared that the mortgage was null and void, canceled same, and quieted title to the property in favor of the Association. The Legislature, by .its express language, provided that the. mortgage lien under section 95.281(l)(a) would terminate five years after a maturity date that can be determined from the face of a recorded document. The face of the recorded mortgage in the instant case reveals a maturity date of March 1, 2036. Therefore, and pursuant to section 95.281(l)(a), the mortgage lien remains valid until March 1, 2041, five years from the date of maturity as reflected in the recorded mortgage securing the obligation....

...nd notary were not present when Appellee signed the deed. Appellants denied that the deed was procured by fraud and asserted as an affirmative defense that Ap-pellee’s challenge to the deed was time-barred pursuant to the limitations provisions of section 95.281, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...Trust Co. v. Avila-Gonzalez, 164 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (noting that there was no authority for the trial court to award the borrower “a lottery-like windfall” by cancelling the mortgage based on the bank’s conduct in the foreclosure case). Section 95.281(1)(a), Florida Statutes, clearly and unambiguously provides that a mortgage lien encumbering real property is not terminated until five years after the maturity date of the obligation secured by the mortgage if, as in this case, the maturity date is ascertainable from the public records....

...New River, Ltd. Pasco, 900 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“The limitations period provided in section 95.11(2)(c) does not affect the life of the lien or extinguish the debt; it merely precludes an action to collect the debt after five years. Section 95.281(1)(b), conversely, establishes an ultimate date when the lien of the mortgage terminates and is no longer enforceable.”). Finally, contrary to Wayne’s “tipsy coachman” argument on appeal, the dismissal order cannot b...

...iation is entitled to final summary judgment because when the federal district court quieted title in the name of the Homeowners Association, Razak held no valid lien interest in the subject property and the title passed free and clear of all liens. Section 95.281(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that the lien of a mortgage encumbering real property terminates five years after the date of the maturity of the note if the maturity date can be ascertained from the record of the note and mortgage....

...The note that Bhadelia *619 executed in favor of Razak on January 7, 1993, stated that the note was a balloon note that matured five years from the date of execution. Accordingly, by operation of law, the lien of the mortgage given by Bhadelia to Razak to secure the note expired on January 7, 2003. Section 95.281 is considered to be a statue of repose rather than a statute of limitations....

...the cause of action does not exist. Id. Based on the operation of this statute of repose, the lien securing the promissory note terminated on January 7, 2003, and the Homeowners Association obtained title free of this encumbrance. Razak argues that section 95.281 is not controlling here because the future advances clause of the mortgage provides him the protection provided by section 697.04(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), which states: Any mortgage or other instrument given for the purpose of c...

...Razak maintains that based on this language, the future advance clause represents a lien on the property for twenty years even though no future advances have been made. Razak thus suggests that the provisions of section 697.04 prevail over those of section 95.281 when a future advance clause is contained in the mortgage and that accordingly, the lien securing the initial promissory note in the instant case was valid for twenty years regardless of whether future advances were actually made....

...Further, the statute creates the lien only for advances that are actually made. The record before us evidences no future advances made by Razak to Bhadelia that would effectuate the provisions of this statute. Accordingly, we conclude that pursuant to section 95.281, the lien created by the mortgage to secure the promissory note terminated five years after the note matured....

...objection except to the extent that, inter alia, such claim is unenforceable against the debtor or the property of the debt- or. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (b)(1). . Before the Bankruptcy Court, Anthony also argued that Florida's statute of repose, Fla. Stat. § 95.281 , precluded a foreclosure action by U.S....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. § 95.11(2)(c), Fla.Stat. (1979); § 95.281(3), Fla.Stat....

...*642 For purposes of § 547, the transfer of the Debtor’s expectancy to Michael was perfected and therefore was made when the assignment was executed. The Trustee also argues that the assignment to Michael Rosin should be treated as a mortgage and that, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 95.281 , the lien of a mortgage terminates five years after the date of maturity of the obligation secured by a mortgage. Fla.Stat. § 95.281 provides: 95.281 Limitations; instruments encumbering real property....

...by a mortgage is ascertainable from the record of it, 5 years after the date of maturity. As discussed above, the Debtor’s assignment to Michael does not convey or encumber real property. Accordingly, the limitations period prescribed in Fla.Stat. § 95.281 does not apply....

...Thus, Stern is seeking to extinguish any rights BOA has pursuant to the Mortgage and, éffectively, quiet title to the Property in favor of himself. Even under Beauvais , such relief is unavailable. As explained in Beauvais , the duration of a mortgage lien is governed by Fla. Stat. § 95.281 (1)(a), which provides that a mortgage lien with a readily ascertainable maturity date terminates five years after maturity....

...We find that section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes, is the applicable statute of limitation to apply and reject the associations’ contention that the subject lease is itself a mortgage or other encumbrance against the real property which would require section 95.281, Florida Statutes, to be the applicable statute of limitation....

...Lender’s position. We find the trial court correctly determined that the subject mortgage “shall have no force and effect” because the lien of the subject mortgage terminated five years after its stated maturity date of October 1, 2008. See § 95.281(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013). Prior to the termination of the lien, the Lender took no action to foreclose the mortgage, and at no time did the parties execute and record an agreement extending the maturity date of the mortgage. See § 95.281(2), Fla....

...3d DCA 2005) (rejecting mortgagee’s “claim that its lien is still valid because correspondence between the parties . . . extended the maturity date of the mortgage” where the correspondence was not only “indefinite in all particulars,” but “also does not comply with the recordation requirements mandated by section 95.281(2), of the Florida Statutes, which extends the life of the mortgage lien ‘[i]f 2 an extension agreement executed by the mortgage . . . and the mortgagor . . . is recorded’” (brackets in original) (quoting § 95.281(2))); Zlinkoff v. Von Aldenbruck, 765 So. 2d 840, 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that section 95.281 requires that an extension of the maturity date set forth in the mortgage must be recorded in order to extend the time to file a foreclosure action, and that the parties did not enter into a valid extension although there was eviden...

...The Court, however, will reconsider these questions should the debtor file an adversary proceeding. For the reasons set forth above, it is ORDERED that: 1. The Objection is overruled without prejudice. 2. The Motion is denied without prejudice. ORDERED. . Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (2)(c). . Fla. Stat. § 95.281 (1)(a)....

obligation either orally or in writing. Under section 95.281, Florida Statutes (Supp.1974), the lien of

...In response, six of those unit owners filed motions to dismiss, asserting that Pathfinder's foreclosure action was barred by the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2013), and by the five-year statute of repose set forth in section 95.281(1)....

...limitations was erroneous. On remand, the unit owners may pursue this as an affirmative defense if they so choose. The second basis articulated by the trial court for dismissing Pathfinder's complaint was the statute of repose found in section 95.281(1)....

...discover. Id. Thus, while both a statute of repose and a statute of limitations may bar a party from proceeding with an action, they do so for two different reasons and based on two different legal theories. As a statute of repose, section 95.281(1) operates to terminate a mortgage lien and render it completely unenforceable if the statutory conditions are satisfied....

...note, it did not identify the maturity date of the loan agreement. Hence, because the maturity date of all of the obligations secured by the recorded mortgage was not ascertainable from face of the record of the recorded mortgage, the twenty-year statute of repose of section 95.281(1)(b) applies....

...Since Pathfinder's foreclosure complaint was filed before the expiration of that twenty-year period, its action is not barred by the statute of repose, and the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint on this basis. We recognize that this application of section 95.281(1) appears to conflict with the purpose of recording documents in the public records....

...The law should encourage specificity in recorded - 11 - documents—not ambiguity. Nevertheless, it is this court's role to apply the law as written rather than to question the wisdom of the legislature in enacting those laws. Therefore, we are constrained by the language of section 95.281(1) to conclude that the statute of repose does not bar Pathfinder's foreclosure action. For both of these reasons, we reverse the dismissal of Pathfinder's foreclosure complaint and remand for further proceedings....

...95.11(2)(c), The Court is also denying this alternative request for relief. Even if the Florida Supreme Court reverses Bartram and adopts Beauvais , Residential’s mortgage lien will not be extinguished. That is so because termination of a mortgage lien is governed by Fla. Stat. 95.281(l)(b), Florida’s statute of repose....

PER CURIAM. We affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in the instant foreclosure action. As the trial court properly found, pursuant to section 95.281(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), the mortgage terminated prior to the plaintiff filing the foreclosure action. 1 . Section 95.281(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), provides as follows: (1) The lien of a mortgage or other instrument encumbering real property, herein called mortgage, except those specified in subsection (5), shall terminate after the expiration of th...

JOHNSTON, L.V., III, Associate Judge, concur. . § 95.281(l)(a), Fla.Stat. . See, e.g., First American

...The issues are subject to separate statutory consideration and analysis. “[A] ‘statute of limitations’ is a shield that may be used as an affirmative defense; a ‘statute of repose’ is a sword that may terminate a lien.” Matos, 2014 WL 3734578, at *3. Section 95.11(2)(c) is a statute of limitations; section 95.281 is a statute of repose, 23 and determines the duration of a mortgage lien....

...final element necessary for its creation occurs beyond the time period established by the statute.” American Bankers, 905 So. 2d at 191 (quoting WRH Mortgage, Inc. v. Butler, 684 So. 2d 325, 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)). Both parties agree that the applicable subsection is 95.281(1)(a)....

...However, the parties disagree on the construction of that provision and its application to the instant case. The Association contends that Deutsche Bank’s acceleration of the note accomplishes an acceleration of the maturity date of the note itself. The language of section 95.281(1)(a) provides that the duration of the lien is “5 years after the date of maturity.” Under the facts of this case, the Association argues, the date of maturity became the date of acceleration when the Initial Action was filed on January 23, 2007, and therefore the mortgage lien terminated January 23, 2012, five years after that date of acceleration, and is extinguished.6 Deutsche Bank contends, and we agree, that the definitive time limitation established by section 95.281(1)(a) is based upon the fact that the final maturity “is ascertainable from the record” of an obligation secured by a mortgage. The 6 For this proposition, the Association cites to Casino Espano de Habana, Inc. v. Bussel, 566 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). However, we find Casino inapposite, as it did not involve the construction or application of section 95.281 or a determination of the duration of a mortgage lien. 25 Legislature, by its express language, provided that the mortgage lien under section 95.281(1)(a) would terminate five years after a maturity date that can be determined from the face of a recorded document.7 The Association’s proposed date of maturity (i.e., January 23, 2007, the date of acceleration) cannot be determined from the face of the recorded mortgage. Rather, the face of the recorded mortgage in the instant case reveals a maturity date of March 1, 2036. Therefore, and pursuant to section 95.281(1)(a), the mortgage lien remains valid until March 1, 2041, five years from the date of maturity as reflected in the recorded mortgage securing the obligation....

...on an order granting the Rodriguez Family Investment Partnership, LLLP (“RFIP”), f/k/a Rodriguez Family Investment Co. Ltd., cross-motion for summary judgment. Quintana argues that the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot apply under the factual circumstances here to toll section 95.281(1), Florida Statutes (2018)....

...equitable lien or, in the alternative, to impose an equitable vendor’s lien on the subject property. RFIP later amended its complaint to add a claim for mortgage foreclosure. Quintana answered and raised several affirmative defenses, including that pursuant to section 95.281, RFIP’s time to file its complaint had expired. Quintana later moved for summary judgment contending that: (1) the language of the modified mortgage did not preclude her from raising a statute of limitations or statute of r...

...and (3) RFIP was not entitled to a mortgage foreclosure, an equitable lien, or an equitable vendor’s lien because RFIP failed to seek a remedy within 3 the five-year time period allowed by sections 95.11 and 95.281, Florida Statutes (2018). RFIP cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing: (1) the general waiver in the modified mortgage precluded Quintana from raising the affirmative defenses of the statute of limitations and statute of repose; (2) that under section 95.281(1)(a), Quintana’s post-maturity payments tolled the statute of limitations; and (3) RFIP was entitled to an equitable lien under the theory of unjust enrichment because a judgment in favor of Quintana would result in a windfall....

...RFIP filed a memorandum of law in support of its cross-motion stating that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied to toll both the statute of limitation and the statute of repose. RFIP also argued for the first time that the maturity date was not clear on the face of the modified mortgage, and therefore pursuant to section 95.281(1)(b), the relevant limitation period was twenty years after the date of the mortgage. Quintana responded: (1) reasserting her position that equitable estoppel could not toll section 95.281 because it is a statute of repose; and (2) arguing pursuant to section 95.281(1) the 4 relevant limitation period was five years after the date of maturity because the maturity date was ascertainable from the mortgage, and the modified mortgage stated it was not a novation of the mortgage....

...The trial court held additional hearings on the motions. On November 7, 2022, the trial court granted RFIP’s cross-motion for summary judgment as a matter of law finding that pursuant to the doctrine of equitable estoppel, Quintana’s post-maturity payments tolled the limitation period of section 95.281(1)....

...The standard of review for a pure question of law is also de novo. Travelers Com. Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 154 So. 3d 1106, 1108 n.2 (Fla. 2014) (citing Rando v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 39 So.3d 244, 247 (Fla. 2010)). ANALYSIS It is undisputed that section 95.281 is a statute of repose....

...Thus, the statute of repose does not work to provide a time limitation for filing a suit after the accrual of the cause of action, but prevents the cause of action from arising after its time limitation.” Id. at 191–92 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (citations omitted). The plain language of section 95.281 reflects its status as a statute of repose. Section 95.281(1) provides that “[t]he lien of a mortgage or other instrument encumbering real property . . . shall terminate after the expiration” of five years after the date of final maturity or twenty years after the date of the mortgage if the date of final maturity is not ascertainable. § 95.281(1), Fla....

...The mortgage’s maturity date was still in effect and not altered by the modified mortgage because the modified 6  Pursuant to the statute, this time may be extended by the execution of an extension agreement. See § 95.281(2), Fla. Stat. Further, section 95.281(4) provides that “[t]he time shall be extended only as provided in this law and shall not be extended by any other agreement, nonresidence, disability, part payment, operation of law, or any other method.” § 95.281(4), Fla. Stat. Thus, “the language of section 95.281 clearly cuts off the time to pursue a foreclosure action unless that time is properly extended in the manner prescribed, that is, by a recorded extension agreement executed by the mortgagee (or the mortgagee’s successors in intere...

...4th DCA 2000). It is clear from the record that RFIP and Quintana never executed an extension agreement, and the statute makes clear that time to file a claim “shall not be extended by any other agreement, nonresidence, disability, part payment, operation of law, or any other method.”2 § 95.281(4), Fla....

...of the mortgage.” 2 We also note that section 95.051, which provides that a statute of limitations is tolled by the payment of any part of the principal or interest of any obligation or liability founded on a written instrument, explicitly excludes section 95.281. See § 95.051(1), Fla. Stat. (2018) (“The running of the time under any statute of limitations except ss. 95.281, 95.35, and 95.36 is tolled ....

...State, Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 178 So. 3d 931, 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)). RFIP relies on Irwin v. Grogan-Cole, 590 So. 2d 1102, 1104 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), to support its position that a mortgagor’s payments beyond the maturity date serves to toll section 95.281(1)....

...In Irwin, however, the purchaser took ownership of the property “subject to the mortgage more than five years after its original due date.” Id. at 1104. The court determined that the purchaser was therefore barred from claiming a defense based on the limitation period of section 95.281(1) because it acknowledged the existence 8 of the mortgage “even after the [limitation period of section 95.281(1)] had facially run.” Id....

...age was in August 2016. The final maturity date of the mortgage and notes was April 10, 2012. Thus, despite continuing her payments, Quintana took no action acknowledging the validity of the mortgage at any time after the five-year limitation of section 95.281(1) had facially run. Irwin is therefore inapplicable.3 Further, RFIP had nearly a year between Quintana’s final payment and the expiration of the five-year time limit imposed by section 95.281(1) to file its claim....

...which to file its complaint. See Am. Bankers, 905 So. 2d at 193 (finding that correspondence between parties discussing extending maturity date could not extend life of mortgage lien because it did not comply with recordation requirements mandated by section 95.281(2))....

...the date of the appointment of the Corporation as conservator or receiver; or (ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues. 15 Florida’s statute of limitations for mortgage foreclosures is five years. See Fla.Stat. Ann. §§ 95.11(2)(c) and 95.281(l)(a) (West 1982)....

...in this case. Accord Davidson, 44 F.3d at 249 & n. 2 (mortgage foreclosures are “contract claim[s]” within meaning of § 1821(d)(14)(A)(i)). B. The applicable Florida law governing the accrual date for real estate mortgages is Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.281(3) (West 1982), which provides: If the record of the mortgage shows that it secures an obligation payable in installments and the maturity date of the final installment of the obligation is ascertainable from the record of the mortgage, the...

...ber 13, 1986, the stated maturity date of the Wahlquist instruments, and hence the FDIC’s August 14,1992, mortgage foreclosure counterclaim was timely. However, there are a number of Florida decisions that have recognized a common-law exception to § 95.281....

...constituted a mortgage modification agreement”); id. at 192 (“The limitations period provided in section 95.11(2)(c) does not affect the life of the lien or extinguish the debt; it merely precludes an action to collect the debt after five years. Section 95.281(1)(b), conversely, establishes an ultimate date when the lien of the mortgage terminates and is no longer enforceable.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Zlinkoff v. Von Aldenbruck, 765 So. 2d 840, 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“section 95.281 clearly cuts off the time to pursue a foreclosure action unless that time is properly extended in the manner prescribed, that is, by a recorded extension agreement”); see also Kay’s Custom Drapes, Inc....

the Hardeys’ count for declaratory relief. Section 95.281(2) provides: “After 20 years from the recording

...For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees with HSBC and this action must be dismissed with prejudice. In Beauvais , the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida held that the hen of mortgage does not become null and void until after the expiration of the 5-year statute of limitation because Fla. Stat. § 95.281 (l)(a) 1 operates as a statute of repose and terminates the mortgage lien 5 years after the maturity date that can be determined from the face of a recorded document....

...— So.3d at-, 2014 WL 7156961 at *10-12. LNB rightfully concedes that Beauvais bars its claim to quiet title and prohibits a declaration that the mortgage is null and void. See also Houck Corp. v. New River, Ltd., 900 So.2d 601, 603 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (finding that Section 95.281 “prescribes the enforceable life of a lien” and that its purpose is “to set a definitive time limitation on a valid cause of action”); Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. 2275 W. Corp., 905 So.2d 189 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (same). Here, the recorded mortgage shows that the maturity date is October 1, 2036, D.E. 1-2 at 6, and therefore, based on Section 95.281(l)(a) the mortgage will not become null and void until after October 1, 2041. As a result of Beauvais and Section 95.281(l)(a), LNB’s Complaint must be dismissed....

...by the mortgagee based on all payment defaults occurring subsequent to dismissal of the first foreclosure suit? 140 So.3d at 1014 . As LNB concedes in its Response to the Motion to Dismiss, its action is barred as a matter of law because pursuant to Section 95.281(l)(a) the mortgage lien will not become null and void until after October 1, 2041. The applica *1362 tion of Section 95.281(l)(a) is not on appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida and therefore, any decision rendered by that court will not be dispositive of the case at bar....

....E. 7, is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that for administrative purposes this case is hereby CLOSED and all pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. . Fla. Stat. § 95.281 (l)(a) states: "The lien of a mortgage or other instrument encumbering real property, herein called mortgage, except those specified in subsection (5), shall terminate after the expiration of the following periods of time: (a) If the final...

...years after the maturity date of the obligation. Id. (reversing “that portion of the trial court’s order which declared that the mortgage was null and void, canceled same, and quieted title to the property in favor of the Association”); see § 95.281(1)(a), Fla....