CopyCited 112 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...the state’s four-year statute of limitations.
37
Case: 16-11818 Date Filed: 10/19/2017 Page: 38 of 42
Under Florida law, plaintiffs have four years to bring a products
liability action. Fla. Stat. §§
95.11(3)(e),
95.031....
...Accrual for these
actions is governed by the discovery rule, according to which the
statute of limitations period does not begin to run until “the date that
the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or should
have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” Id. §
95.031(2)(b)....
CopyCited 99 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 1288688
...ccrued and whether the limitation period was tolled. A statute of limitations "runs from the time the cause of action accrues" which, in turn, is generally determined by the date "when the last *1185 element constituting the cause of action occurs." § 95.031, Fla....
CopyCited 96 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 13078
...cause of action) is limited to those actions, such as products liability or fraud, where the statute of limitations expressly provides that the period within which the action must be brought runs from the time of discovery or constructive discovery, § 95.031(2), Fla. Stat. (1983), and that all other actions, including conversion, run from the time the cause of action accrues, that is, "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs," § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 85 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 354441
...Whether the Carrs knew or should have known of the "incident" and whether the incident or its effects were fraudulently concealed, their cause of action was permanently barred in December of 1982 by the seven-year statute of repose, if that statute is validly imposed here. Unlike the products liability statute of repose, (section 95.031(2), under which, where fraud is involved, the period runs from "the date of the commission of the alleged fraud") the incident of malpractice begins the period of repose in a medical malpractice case despite fraudulent concealment....
CopyCited 71 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 428
...Lauderdale, for Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae. ALDERMAN, Justice. We review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Pullum v. Cincinnati,
458 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 1984), wherein the district court certified the following question as being of great public importance: Does section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes, deny equal protection of the laws to persons such as appellant [petitioner] who are injured by products delivered to the original purchaser between eight and twelve years prior to the injury? Id....
...He filed suit against the manufacturer in November 1980, more than twelve years from this delivery date but within the applicable four-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted summary judgment against Pullum on the basis that his action was barred by section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....
...1980), it held that the reduction by this statute of repose of the time within which he was required to file suit after his accident from four years to one and one-half years did not deny him equal protection of the laws. It explained that the fact that Mrs. Purk's injury occurred prior to the enactment of section
95.031 and was covered by a one-year savings clause, while Pullum's injury occurred after the effective date of the act, did not furnish Pullum with any equal protection argument materially different from that of Mrs. Purk's. Pullum conceded that application of section
95.031(2) did not deny him his right to *659 access to the courts guaranteed by article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. Pullum asks this Court to quash the decision of the First District and to hold that section
95.031(2), as "amended" by this Court's decision in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,
392 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1980), violates his right to equal protection of the laws. In view of this decision, holding that where section
95.031(2) barred a right of action before it ever existed, it was unconstitutional as applied because it denied access to the courts, Pullum argues that the statute now irrationally applies to a very limited class of persons, i.e., those pers...
...Purk's argument, he states, was strictly directed to the legislature's choice of twelve years as an ultimate cutoff point to prevent perpetual liability. We have reconsidered our decision in Battilla wherein we expressly held: The circuit court held that this product liability action was barred by the statute of limitations, section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1975). We reverse on the authority of Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons,
369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979), and hold that, as applied to this case, section
95.031 denies access to courts under article I, section 21, Florida Constitution. See also Purk v. Federal Press Co.,
387 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1980); Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Co.,
357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978).
392 So.2d at 874. We recede from this decision and hold that section
95.031(2) is not unconstitutionally violative of article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution....
...liability places an undue burden on manufacturers, and it decided that twelve years from the date of sale is a reasonable time for exposure to liability for manufacturing of a product. Justice McDonald, in maintaining the constitutional validity of section 95.031(2) in his dissenting opinion in Battilla, correctly reasoned as follows: Until the decision of Matthews v....
...Because the normal useful life of buildings is obviously greater than most manufactured products there is a distinction in the categories of liability exposure between those sought to be limited by section
95.11(3)(c), struck down in Overland, and those listed in section
95.031(2)....
...The premise of Pullum's argument is that the "amendment" of this statute by Battilla has rendered it violative of his right to equal protection of the laws. He concedes that as enacted, this statute was capable of withstanding an equal protection challenge. Since we have receded from Battilla, it logically follows that section 95.031(2) does not deny equal protection....
...BOYD, C.J., and McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur. ADKINS and OVERTON, JJ., dissent. NOTES [*] Pullum also refers to Diamond v. E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc.,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1981), as being in accord with Battilla. In Diamond, we held that the operation of section
95.031(2) operated to bar a cause of action before it accrued and thereby denied the aggrieved plaintiff access to the courts....
CopyCited 67 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1978 Fla. LEXIS 4729
...Chapter 74-382, Laws of Florida. The changes became effective January 1, 1975. As revised, the pertinent provisions are as follows. Section
95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), provides that the limitations period for negligence actions is four years. Section
95.031 deals with the computation of time. It states that "[e]xcept as provided ... in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues." Subsection (1) of Section
95.031 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." Subsection (2) provides that in actions for products liability, the period runs "from the time the facts giv...
CopyCited 64 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The judgment passed upon the validity of a state law. The notice of appeal was filed January 12, 1979. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. (1972). The circuit court held that this product liability action was barred by the statute of limitations, section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1975). We reverse on the authority of Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons,
369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979), and hold that, as applied to this case, section
95.031 denies access to courts under article I, section 21, Florida Constitution....
...It is so ordered. SUNDBERG, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD and ENGLAND, JJ., concur. McDONALD, J., dissents with an opinion, with which OVERTON and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. McDONALD, Justice, dissenting. I disagree that there is anything unconstitutional about section 95.031(2)....
...duct. It could also be argued that such liability would place an onerous burden on industry and that, therefore, liability should be restricted to a time commensurate with the normal useful life of manufactured products. The legislature, in enacting section 95.031(2), has determined that perpetual liability places an undue burden on manufacturers....
...Because the normal useful life of buildings is obviously greater than most manufactured products there is a distinction in the categories of liability exposure between those sought to be limited by section
95.11(3)(c), struck down in Overland, and those listed in section
95.031(2). I would sustain the trial judge's actions in upholding section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes, which statute restricts actions against a manufacturer to twelve years from the date of the sale of the product....
CopyCited 58 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...The third element of a legal malpractice claim, that the attorney's negligence be the proximate cause of loss to the client, is also referred to as the concept of "redressable harm." Lenahan v. Russell L. Forkey, P.A.,
702 So.2d 610, 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Pursuant to Fla. Stat. Ann.
95.031(1), a cause of action accrues "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." 7 Alvarez argues that the third element of his malpractice cause of action, that of redressable harm, did not occur until after the filing of his bankruptcy petition....
...A cause of action can accrue for ownership purposes before the statute of limitations for that cause of action has begun to run. Along these lines, we note that a study of relevant Florida caselaw may create some confusion about use and meaning of the word "accrual." As explained above, under Fla. Stat. Ann. 95.031(1), "[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." Some Florida cases, however, suggest that the concept of accrual in the legal malpractice context includes the discovery aspect of the statute of limitations inquiry....
...As noted, however, a cause of action can accrue for ownership purposes in a bankruptcy proceeding before the statute of limitations begins to run. Thus, our inquiry is concerned with when Alvarez's legal malpractice "accrued" in the sense of Fla. Stat. Ann. 95.031(1), i.e....
CopyCited 55 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 21180319
..."emotional distress"), citing to Pulmosan Safety Equip. Corp. v. Barnes,
752 So.2d 556 (Fla.2000). This was clearly error. First, Amodeo's knowledge barred all of his claims equally, including his fraud claim and his derivative conspiracy claim. See §
95.031(2)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 47 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 1230326, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 4401
...Dismissal Based on Statute of Limitations The limitations periods applicable here are set forth in section
95.11, Florida Statutes, and discussed below. In Florida, the statute of limitations runs from the time the plaintiffs cause of action accrues. §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (2011). “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” §
95.031(1), Fla....
...The limitations period for “a legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument” is five years. §
95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011). Thus, the Condominium Association may not assert any claims for declaratory relief that accrued before July 2004. Pursuant to section
95.031(1), Florida Statutes, the Condominium Association’s claims for declaratory relief accrued when the last element constituting the cause of action occurred....
CopyCited 46 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...DUBINA, Circuit Judge: 1 Plaintiffs/Appellants Robert C. Mosher and Margaret M. Mosher (collectively "Mosher") appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment on their products liability claim based on the Florida products liability statute of repose, Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 95.031(2) (West 1982) (repealed as amended by Laws 1986), in favor of the Defendants/Appellees, Speedstar Division of AMCA International, Inc....
...t decision long since overruled in delaying the institution of his action. 11 District Court's Memorandum of Decision at 8. Mosher then perfected this appeal. 12 B. Historical Background: The Florida Statute of Repose 13 Florida's statute of repose, section 95.031(2), was enacted in 1975 and repealed by way of amendment in 1986....
CopyCited 45 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 9039, 1999 WL 300894
...the cause of action has occurred within five years preceding the
date the suit was filed, or the statute is tolled from some reason.
The limitations period begins to run when "the last element constituting the cause of action occurs."
§ 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 44 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 6072, 2000 WL 664052
...hen the legislature has not. Id. at 1122; see also Beck v. Lazard Freres & Co., LLC,
175 F.3d 913, 914 (11th Cir. 1999). Under section
95.11(2)(b), the limitations period begins to run when "the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 44 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...e developing cancerous or precancerous conditions. The complaint charged that in developing, promoting, and marketing the drug, Squibb knew or should have known that it was not safe. The defendant Squibb moved for summary judgment on the ground that section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1977), was applicable and barred the action. Section
95.031(2) provides: *672 Actions for products liability and fraud under subsection
95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were di...
...e completed product to its original purchaser or the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the defect in the product or the fraud was or should have been discovered. In response to the motion, the plaintiffs argued that section 95.031(2), if held to apply, would have abolished their right of action thereby depriving them of due process of law and denying them access to courts in violation of article I, section 21, Florida Constitution....
...The circuit court ruled for defendant and entered summary judgment. Article I, section 21, Florida Constitution, provides: "The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." The operation of section 95.031(2) in this case has the same effect as it had in Overland Construction Co....
...on the ground that it violated article I, section 21, Florida Constitution. We find that binding precedent exists because petitioners' right of action was barred before it ever existed, as in Overland. We therefore hold that as applied in this case, section 95.031(2) violates the Florida Constitution's guaranty of access to courts....
CopyCited 43 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 53238
...As a result of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the rule against splitting *1213 causes of action is no bar to Tyson's breach of contract and fraud in the inducement claims. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS The statute of limitations for a fraud in the inducement claim is four years. See §
95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat. Section
95.031(2)(a) addresses the accrual of a claim for fraud in the inducement and provides that it occurs when "the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." In th...
CopyCited 42 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 52 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 701, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 12867
...2d 1061, 1065 (Fla. 2001) (“[I]n the
circumstances presented here, a negligence/malpractice cause of action accrues when
the client incurs damages at the conclusion of the related or underlying judicial
proceedings. . . .”); see also Fla. Stat. § 95.031(1) (“A cause of action accrues when
6
the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.”)....
CopyCited 40 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 31477296
...ion which results in the plaintiff's delay in filing suit. In so doing, the Fifth District followed the Second District's decision in Halkey-Roberts Corp. v. Mackal,
641 So.2d 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). In Halkey-Roberts, the Second District considered section
95.031, and held that the delayed discovery rule could not operate to delay the accrual of a cause of action for the intentional tort of breach of fiduciary duty because this cause of action is not specified in the statute....
...strict's decision and reinstate the trial court's order granting limited summary judgment. It is so ordered. ANSTEAD, C.J., SHAW and WELLS, JJ., and HARDING, Senior Justice, concur. LEWIS, J., concurs in result only. PARIENTE, J., recused. NOTES [1] Section 95.031, Florida Statutes (Supp. 2000), provides: 95.031 Computation of time.Except as provided in subsection (2) and in s....
CopyCited 39 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...ims. We first address whether the statute of limitations bars FP & L’s state law tort and contract claims. 1. Statute of Limitations Under Florida law, the statutes of limitations begin to run at the time the cause of action accrues. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.031 (West 1982)....
CopyCited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 519, 1987 Fla. LEXIS 2397
...3d DCA 1987), pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution. In affirming a summary judgment for the respondent, the Third District Court of Appeal certified to this Court two questions as being of great public interest: I. Should the legislative amendment of Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), abolishing the statute of repose in product liability actions, be construed to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action which accrued before the effective date of the amendment? II....
...en sold and delivered to the original purchaser by the defendant on October 28, 1963. The plaintiff filed a product liability *736 action against the defendant on May 17, 1983. The trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant predicated on section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983). Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), was a statute of repose which precluded actions based on products liability if they were brought more than twelve years after the product was sold....
...ne had to be commenced by October 28, 1975. The plaintiff was not injured by the machine until May 10, 1982, almost seven years beyond the twelve-year period of the statute of repose. As noted in the first certified question, the legislature amended section 95.031(2) in 1986 so as to repeal the statute of repose in products liability actions....
...statute. Finding no legislative manifestation that the new statute could be applied retroactively, the Court declined to allow resurrection of the cause of action. Using language similar to that construed in Foley, the 1986 legislation pertaining to section 95.031(2) only provided that it became effective on July 1, 1986....
...5th DCA 1987). See Walker & LaBerge, Inc. v. Halligan,
344 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1977) (immunity from suit not retroactively withdrawn by subsequent legislation). In order to understand the second certified question, it is necessary to review the history of section
95.031(2). Prior to the plaintiff's accident, this Court had held in a product liability action that as applied section
95.031 was unconstitutional because it denied access to the courts under article I, section 21, Florida Constitution. Battilla,
392 So.2d at 874. While the plaintiff's suit was pending, this Court receded from Battilla and held that section
95.031 was constitutional even with respect to causes of action which did not accrue until after the twelve-year statute of repose had expired....
CopyCited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2000 WL 1726779
...this chapter [four years], with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action [a] were [actually] discovered [by the claimant] or [b] should have been discovered [by the claimant] with the exercise of due diligence,' § 95.031(2), Fla....
CopyCited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1984 Fla. LEXIS 3026
...section
95.11(3)(c). Consequently, the action was absolutely barred by the cap provision and the inapplicability of the savings clause's one-year extension period. See also Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1981) (interpreting section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1977))....
...Consequently, the action was not absolutely barred because not only did the plaintiff have until the effective date of the statutory revision to file suit but, in addition, the plaintiff had the one-year extension granted by the savings clause. See also Purk v. Federal Press Co.,
387 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1980) (interpreting section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975))....
...[3] It is interesting to note that the circuit court's orders granting summary judgment for Universal did not make reference to the particular statute of repose under consideration, but Universal in its motions to that court argued that the applicable statute of repose barring Perez's and Rodriguez's claims was § 95.031(2), Fla....
...ed product to its original purchaser or the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the defect in the product or the fraud was or should have been discovered. Perez's and Rodriguez's brief to the circuit court mentioned §§
95.031(2) and
95.11(3)(c). It is unclear from the record before this Court whether the parties presented their arguments to the district court based on §
95.11(3)(c), §
95.031(2), or both....
...d as fixtures between 1952 and 1958." Perez,
413 So.2d at 76. This Court questions the applicability of §
95.11(3)(c) to the facts of this particular case, but as to the issue in this case the result would be the same under either §
95.11(3)(c) or §
95.031(2)....
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 2751, 1990 WL 11650
...In June 1984, the remaining action against Firestone was removed to federal court on diversity grounds. On October 31, 1985, Firestone moved for summary judgment on the basis of Florida’s 12-year statute of repose for product liability actions. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.031(2) (West 1982), repealed in relevant part, *1506 1986 Fla.Laws, ch....
...under [Fla.Stat.Ann. § ]
95.11(3) [ 2 ] must be begun ... within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser ... regardless of the date the defect in the product ... was or should have been discovered.” Fla.Stat.Ann. §
95.031(2) (West 1982)....
CopyCited 26 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7642
...]", §
95.11(3)( o ), and must be brought within four years. See Falk v. Allen,
152 Fla. 413,
12 So.2d 109 (1943), and Newberger v. United States Marshals Service,
751 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir. 1985). The commencement of this limitations period is set by section
95.031; "... the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues." "A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §
95.031(1), Fla....
...See, Orpheus Investments v. Ryegon Investments, Inc.,
447 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983). Accordingly, motion for summary judgment as to Count II, as applied to all Plaintiffs, is hereby granted. COUNT III Count III is based on common law fraud and therefore is governed by §
95.031(2), Fla.Stat....
...Claims for civil theft must be brought "within five years after the cause of action accrues." §
812.035(10), Fla.Stat. (1985). Because the term "accrual" is not defined in Chap. 812, its meaning must be taken from Chap. 95, which governs "except as provided ... elsewhere in these statutes." §
95.031, Fla.Stat. (1985). Accordingly, a cause of action for civil theft accrues "... when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §
95.031(1), Fla....
...Plaintiffs contend that claims for civil theft are governed by a "discovery" standard, relying on Senfeld v. Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co.,
450 So.2d 1157 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984). The holding in Senfeld seems to disregard the clear statutory scheme and language, particularly as there is no express discovery language in §
95.031(1)....
CopyCited 25 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 7987, 1994 WL 419054
...Counts I and II are actions for breach of fiduciary duty which is an intentional tort. See Allerton v. State Dep't of Ins.,
635 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). As such, the four-year statute of limitations applies. §
95.11(3)( o ), Fla. Stat. (1991). The discovery rule found in section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1991), [1] does not apply to either of these counts....
...(4th Ed.) § 992. Douglas v. Ogle,
80 Fla. 42,
85 So. 243, 244 (Fla. 1920). As a recognized species of fraud, constructive fraud is controlled by section
95.11(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1991), a four-year limitations period, and the discovery rule of section
95.031(2) applies....
...We also note that the granting of summary judgment as to counts I and II in their entirety was error because several of the complained-of acts are alleged to have occurred within four years preceding the filing of the complaint. Reversed and remanded. CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1991), provides: (2) Actions for products liability and fraud under s....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13691, 2003 WL 21525295
...The delayed discovery
doctrine applies to the accrual of a cause of action; it does not toll the applicable
statute of limitations once the cause of action has accrued and the statute of
limitations has begun to run. See id. The delayed discovery rule was codified by the
Florida legislature in 1999. See FLA. STAT. ch. 95.031 (2002).
Appellants concede § 95.031 does not specifically extend the delayed
discovery doctrine to wrongful death actions....
...y
a product, . . . if the harm was caused by exposure to or use of the
product more than 12 years after delivery of the product to its first
purchaser or lessee . . . .
4
FLA. STAT. ch. 95.031(2)(b)....
...malpractice, and intentional torts based on abuse, each of which permits postponing
accrual where there is delayed discovery. Davis v. Monahan,
832 So. 2d 708, 710
(Fla. 2002).
It is plain from the statutory text that the delayed discovery rule of
§
95.031(2)(b) applies only to products liability actions under §
95.11(3), not
wrongful death actions which are governed by §
95.11(4)(d). Plaintiffs argue,
however, that it makes little sense for §
95.031(2)(b) to extend the statute of repose
to wrongful death actions without similarly extending the delayed discovery rule to
wrongful death actions....
...As a pure matter of statutory interpretation, this argument
fails because the statute simply does not extend the delayed discovery rule to
wrongful death actions. The Florida legislature clearly could have extended the
delayed discovery rule by adding a reference to wrongful death actions in the first
part of § 95.031(2)(b), just as it did in the later statute of repose provision....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32659, 2007 WL 1303035
...[45] Doc. 30, ¶ 6. [46] Beck v. Lazard Freres & Co., LLC,
175 F.3d 913, 914 (11th Cir.1999). [47] Doc. 2, ¶ 5. [48] The statute of limitations under Florida law for a breach of contract action is five years. Fla. Stat. §
95.11(2)(b). [49] Fla. Stat. §
95.031(1)....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 314126
...lorida Statutes (1997), which sets a five-year period for suits involving an action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument, as here. The statute of limitations begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues. §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (1997); Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co.,
357 So.2d 401 (Fla.1978). A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27707
...This is a products liability action arising out of grievous injuries sustained by a passenger in a vehicle manufactured by the Defendants. Volkswagen has averred that it is exonerated from all liability based upon the tolling of the Florida products liability statute of repose, Florida Statute Section 95.031(2)....
...litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court." This basic precept commands us to follow the most recent pronouncement of the Florida Supreme Court regarding the statute of repose. The statute of repose under examination here, Florida Statute Section 95.031(2), sets forth the time limits for commencing products liability actions and provides in pertinent part: Actions for products liability ......
...Sirmons,
369 So.2d 572 (Fla.1979), where it held that a similar twelve-year statute of repose regarding architects and builders was similarly violative of a plaintiff's constitutional right of access to the courts. [4] Most recently the Florida Supreme Court had occasion to revisit the product liability statute of repose, Section
95.031(2), reversed its prior ruling in Battilla, and held that the statute was not unconstitutional....
...e delivered to its original purchaser in November, 1966. The plaintiff filed suit in 1980, more than twelve years from the delivery date. In upholding the summary judgment in favor of the defendant-manufacturer the Court reconsidered the validity of Section
95.031(2) and affirmed the legislature's determination that "twelve years from the date of sale is a reasonable time for exposure to liability for manufacturing of a product." Pullum,
476 So.2d at 659....
...Still the statute of repose under scrutiny here does not constitute a case of first impression. This statute was enacted in 1975, a full four years prior to the incident causing Plaintiff's injuries and seven years prior to the filing of this lawsuit. Thus it is at least arguable that Section 95.031(2) represents "a new principle of law." As to the overruling of "clear past precedent," the caselaw regarding the statute of repose cannot be considered altogether definitive....
...on will further or retard its operation."
404 U.S. at 106-107,
92 S.Ct. at 355. The enactment of the Florida statute of repose attests to the unmistakeable legislative intent to curtail the perpetual liability of manufacturers. The effective date of Section
95.031(2) was 1975....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1989 WL 23391
...not unconstitutionally denied access to courts guaranteed by article I, section 21, Florida Constitution. The court, in so holding distinguished this case from the product liability statute, stating: Unlike the products liability statute of repose, (section 95.031(2), under which, where fraud is involved, the period runs from "the date of the commission of the alleged fraud") the incident of malpractice begins the period of repose in a medical malpractice case despite fraudulent concealment....
...In Pullum, we recognized that statutes of repose are a valid legislative means to restrict or limit causes of action in order to achieve certain public interests. Pullum concerned the statute of repose for actions for products liability and fraud as set forth in section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....
...elve years from the date of sale is a reasonable time for exposure to liability for manufacturing of a product.
476 So.2d at 659. In Pullum, we receded from Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,
392 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1980), which had held that section
95.031, as applied in a products liability action, unconstitutionally denied access to courts. We concluded that section
95.031 was constitutional even as applied to causes of action which had not accrued until after the twelve-year statute of repose had expired....
CopyCited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 591, 1987 Fla. LEXIS 2544, 1987 WL 2364
...GRIMES, Justice. We review Clausell v. Hobart Corp.,
506 So.2d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), to answer three certified questions of great public importance. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The certified questions are as follows: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION
95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS, SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY AS TO A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ACCRUED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT? II....
...It removed the bar of the statute to plaintiffs' assertion of a cause of action. But plaintiffs had, at most, a mere expectation that they had a cause of action they could pursue, and a subsequent decision, holding the statute to be constitutional, could not and does not deprive them of any vested rights. Id. at 47. Section 95.031 provided a defense to a cause of action rather than creating a cause of action. In Battilla the court simply held section 95.031(2) unconstitutional as applied to the facts of that case....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1626, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5852, 1990 WL 63031
...Counts I and IIIFraud and Constructive Trust Plaintiff admits that fraud and its derivative claims are governed by the four-year statute of limitation found in Florida Statutes §
95.11(3)(j) (1989). Plaintiff also correctly notes that Florida Statutes §
95.031(2) (1989) starts the four-year clock "running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s.
95.11(3)." Fla.Stat. §
95.031(2) (1989)....
CopyCited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 414, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 815, 1989 WL 101537
...The United States Court of Appeals in and for the First Circuit has certified two questions which it finds determinative of this cause and for which there is no controlling Florida precedent. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const. The two questions are as follows: 1. Is Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2), the 12-year statute of repose, constitutional under the "access to courts" or any other provision of the Florida Constitution, when applied to a fraud that was not discovered or discoverable until more than 12 years after the date of its commission? 2....
CopyCited 20 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...III. 11 Appellants in two of the cases before us argue that Florida's statute of repose violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 10 Appellants contend that the operation of the twelve-year statute of repose, Fla.Stat. Sec. 95.031(2) (1982), together with the four-year statute of limitations, Fla.Stat....
...13 For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of summary judgment in each of these four consolidated cases is 14 AFFIRMED. * Honorable Seybourn H. Lynne, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by designation 1 The statute of repose, Fla.Stat. Sec. 95.031(2) (1982), provided as follows: Actions for products liability ......
...must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter ... but in any event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser ... regardless of the date the defect in the product ... was or should have been discovered. In 1986, the Florida legislature amended section 95.031(2) so as to repeal the statute of repose in products liability actions. See Fla.Stat. Sec. 95.031(2) (Supp.1987)....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 591, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 1868, 2009 WL 3644163
...ed the sanctions claim and filed the stipulation dismissing the case with prejudice. II. SILVESTRONE AND THE CONFLICT IN THE CASES Florida law provides that "[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs," § 95.031(1), Fla....
...Before that point is reached, the "malpractice claim is hypothetical and damages are speculative." Id. But once a judgment adverse to the client has reached the point of finality, "the last element constituting the [malpractice] cause of action occurs," § 95.031(1), Fla....
...; and (7) failed to adequately advise TSE's management staff regarding weaknesses in the action before and after filing suit. [10] Florida law provides that "[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 21221313
...precautions. In Abbott Lab., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital,
765 So.2d 737, 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), the court held that "[u]nder section
95.11(2)(b), the limitations period begins to run when `the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.' §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 2782549
...5th DCA 2001). The Davis court recognized: [In reaching its decision in Yusuf ], the Fifth District followed the Second District's decision in Halkey-Roberts Corp. v. Mackal,
641 So.2d 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). In Halkey-Roberts, the Second District considered section
95.031, and held that the delayed discovery rule could not operate to delay the accrual of a cause of action for the intentional tort of breach of fiduciary duty because this cause of action is not specified in the statute....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Appellants do not deny that the applicable statute of limitations for legal malpractice is two years. They correctly point out, however, that in Florida it is the accrual of a cause of action which commences the running of the statute of limitations. Section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1977); see Edwards v....
CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Kashi of Grimmett, Scherer & James, Fort Lauderdale, for Florida Machinery Corp. BOYD, Justice. This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County in which that court passed upon the constitutionality of section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...uld have been barred by the new statute on its effective date was allowed until January 1, 1976 to be commenced. [3] Since the *357 appellants did not bring their action until April 13, 1976, the complaint was not timely. The appellants contend that section 95.031(2) denies access to courts in violation of article I, section 21, Florida Constitution....
...Board of Public Instruction,
48 So.2d 912 (1951). The title of chapter 74-382 is sufficient. The judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered. SUNDBERG, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, ENGLAND, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 3 of chapter 74-382 created section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1975), the section at issue in the instant case, which after an amendment not directly pertinent, chapter 75-234, Laws of Florida, provided as follows:
95.031 Computation of time....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1992 WL 301363
...Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
592 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), and Walker v. Miller Electric Manufacturing Co.,
591 So.2d 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), in which the Third and Fourth Districts took opposing views of the applicability of the statute of repose set forth in section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975), [1] and repealed by the legislature in *1362 1986....
...pose vested when the time period under the statute had expired for the product in issue prior to the statute's repeal in 1986. The Walker court certified the following question as being of great public importance: DID THE REPEALED STATUTE OF REPOSE, SECTION
95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES ([1975]), GIVE A MANUFACTURER OR A DELIVERER OF THE COMPLETED PRODUCT A VESTED RIGHT NOT TO BE SUED FOR AN ACCIDENT THAT OCCURRED AFTER THE DATE OF REPEAL? Walker,
591 So.2d at 246. The Acosta court subsequently acknowledged conflict with Walker and certified the following question as being of great public importance: DOES THE NOW REPEALED STATUTE OF REPOSE, SECTION
95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1975), BAR A PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION WHERE THE LAW IN EFFECT AT THE TIME THE DECEDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED WOULD HAVE PERMITTED HIM TO MAINTAIN A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION IF HE WERE ALIVE[?] Acosta,
592 So.2d at 1105....
...Rubber Company (Firestone) and Kelsey-Hayes Company (Kelsey), the manufacturers of the components of the rim assembly. Firestone and Kelsey moved for a summary judgment, asserting that Acosta's claim was time-barred under the 1975 statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...We find there is no authority or intent by the legislature to do so. We agree with Walker and approve its reasoning. This holding is consistent with the view and policy that this Court has already established in this difficult and sensitive area. In Melendez, this Court held that the 1986 amendment to section
95.031(2) that repealed the product liability statute of repose could not be "construed to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action that accrued before the effective date of the amendment."
515 So.2d at 735....
...Certainly it did, for it would be absurd to conclude, as the majority does, that the legislature intended for a repealed statute to apply prospectively to bar causes of action that did not and could not arise until after the repeal. This common-sense conclusion finds support in the history of the statute. Section 95.031(2) was in full force from the effective date in 1975, see Bauld v....
...Daniell,
1991 WL 302693 at [*]3; see Acosta,
592 So.2d at 1104. The court in Daniell correctly interpreted Florida law by concluding that the repeal of the statute of repose applies to all actions arising after the effective date of the 1986 amendment to section
95.031(2)....
...the plaintiffs' rights to access the courts in violation of article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. Accordingly, the Court should approve the decision in Acosta and disapprove the decision in Walker. SHAW and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975), read as follows: Actions for products liability and fraud under subsection
95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to...
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 70859
...Therefore, although the Zakaks knew that their liability was probably fixed on February 12, 1985, such liability did not become a confirmed fact until the entry of final judgment. A period of limitations does not begin to run until there is in existence a fully matured cause of action which may be prosecuted. § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 256, 1987 Fla. LEXIS 1923
...Phlieger's death, his widow, in her capacity as his personal representative (respondent herein), filed a wrongful death action against Nissan, pursuant to section
768.19, Florida Statutes (1983). Nissan filed a motion for summary judgment relying on section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), the twelve-year products liability statute of repose. Nissan argued that since the truck had been originally purchased on February 13, 1970, its exposure to liability ended on February 13, 1982, pursuant to section
95.031(2). Nissan maintained that because on June 3, 1983, the date this action was filed, a products liability action by Mr. Phlieger would have been barred by section
95.031(2), a wrongful death action on behalf of his survivors was likewise barred. The trial court agreed with Nissan, entering summary judgment in its favor. On appeal the district court reversed, holding section
95.031(2) inapplicable in wrongful death actions. In reaching this conclusion the court looked first to the various limitations set forth in sections
95.11 and
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....
...or sale of personal property that is not permanently incorporated in an improvement to real property, including fixtures. ..... (j) A legal or equitable action founded on fraud. ..... (4) WITHIN TWO YEARS. ..... (d) An action for wrongful death. Section 95.031(2) dealing with computation of time under chapter 95 provides: Actions for products liability and fraud under s....
...the defect in the product or the fraud was or should have been discovered. The district court reasoned that since this action was a wrongful death action pursuant to section
768.19 [1] rather than a products liability action, "by its very language, section
95.031(2) does not apply and, rather, the two year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions found in section
95.11(4)(d) applies."
487 So.2d at 1097. Nissan concedes that it is section
95.11(4)(d) rather than section
95.11(3) which is the applicable statute of limitations in this action but argues that the twelve-year statute of repose set forth in section
95.031(2) applies to bar what Nissan characterizes as the underlying products liability cause of action....
...Florida's Wrongful Death Act simply gives the designated beneficiaries a right of action based on the decedent's underlying products liability cause of action. Thus, according to Nissan, because the underlying products liability action is barred by section 95.031(2), Mrs....
...Phlieger, acting as his personal representative, had a statutory right to bring an action based on injuries suffered by Mr. Phlieger's survivors as a result of his death. See Ake v. Birnbaum,
156 Fla. 735,
25 So.2d 213. The question then becomes does section
95.031(2) apply to bar this otherwise viable wrongful death action. We agree with the district court that "by its very language section
95.031(2) does not apply [to wrongful death actions]."
487 So.2d at 1097. Section
95.031(2) specifically refers to "the actions for products liability ... under s.
95.11(3)." Section 965.031(2) makes no reference to wrongful death actions under section
95.11(4)(d); nor does either section
95.11(3) or section
95.031(2) refer to actions for damages because of death....
...1955) (wrongful death action was not barred by statute of limitations pertaining to actions against city for any negligence or wrongful injury or damage to person or property where statute did not expressly refer to death actions.). Therefore, we conclude that the legislature did not intend that section 95.031(2) operate as a bar to wrongful death actions brought more than twelve years after the original purchase of the product allegedly causing death....
...A statute of repose cuts off a right of action within a specified time after the delivery of a product or the completion of an improvement, regardless of the time of the accrual of the cause of action. Bauld *716 v. J.A. Jones Construction Co.,
357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978). Section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), was a statute of repose which precluded actions for products liability if brought more than twelve years after the product was sold....
...ed upon death under common law. While wrongful death actions are authorized to be filed within two years of the death of the decedent, this does not have the effect of tacking additional time on the statute of repose. The absence of any reference in section
95.031(2) to the provisions of section
95.11(4)(d) is of no moment because the statute of repose is only directed to limiting fraud and product liability actions, both of which are delineated under section
95.11(3). Section
95.031(2) does not purport to shorten the two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions....
...as entirely based on products liability, the statute of repose dictated that it should be dismissed. Ironically, in Pait v. Ford Motor Co.,
500 So.2d 743 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), another panel of the Fifth District Court of Appeal has recently held that section
95.031(2) precluded the filing of a wrongful death action. In that case the death occurred more than twelve years after the offending product had been purchased. Nevertheless, if section
95.031(2) has no effect upon wrongful death actions, the suit should have been upheld because it was obviously filed within two years of the death. Having reached the conclusion that section
95.031(2) is applicable to wrongful death actions, I must necessarily address two additional arguments posed by respondent. First, respondent points to the fact that in 1986 the legislature amended section
95.031(2) so as to repeal the statute of repose in product liability actions....
...d been untimely filed under the old statute. Finding no legislative manifestation that the new statute could be applied retroactively, the court declined to do so. Using language similar to that construed in Foley, the 1986 legislation pertaining to section 95.031(2) referred only to the fact that it became effective on July 1, 1986....
...532 (M.D.Fla. 1985) (repeal of a statute does not divest one of the defense which arose under the former statute), aff'd,
803 F.2d 1183 (11th Cir.1986). In order to address respondent's remaining argument, consideration must be given to the history of section
95.031....
...Prior to the death of respondent's husband, this Court, reviewing the validity of this statute in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,
392 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1980), stated: The circuit court held that this product liability action was barred by the statute of limitations, section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1975). We reverse on the authority of Overland Construction Co. v. Simmons,
369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979), and hold that, as applied to this case, section
95.031 denies access to courts under article I, section 21, Florida Constitution....
...Federal Press Co.,
387 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1980); Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Co.,
357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978).
392 So.2d at 874. Several years later in Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.,
476 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1985), the Court receded from Battilla and held that section
95.031(2) was constitutional even with respect to causes of action which did not accrue until after the twelve-year statute of repose had expired....
...hat would have been liable in damages if death had not ensued shall be liable for damages as specified in this act notwithstanding the death of the person injured, although death was caused under circumstances constituting a felony. [2] We note that § 95.031(2) has been amended to effectively repeal the twelve-year statute of repose as it applies to products liability actions....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11479, 2016 WL 3448447
...1994).
That means that the clock on the statute of limitations for a fraud claim does not
start running until “the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or
should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. Stat.
§ 95.031(2)(a).
Allstate argues that the statute of limitations began running on September
18, 2008, when its investigator first visited Dr....
CopyCited 17 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 19011, 1996 WL 403103
...FDIC's claims, see id.
at 1101; therefore, Stahl and Cheplak's reliance on non-Florida
law is misplaced. In Florida, "[a] cause of action accrues when
the last element constituting the cause of action occurs."
Fla.Stat. § 95.031(1) (1995)....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 16970
...However, it should be stated that the plaintiffs in Nardone claimed medical negligence in the post-operative treatment of their son. The appeal was taken from a summary final judgment for the defendants entered on the basis of an affirmative defense of this same section of the statute of limitations. Although Section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1977), containing the language "......
...Plaintiff, having failed to follow the rule even to move for a continuance of the hearing on the motion, may not claim error in the appellate court because the trial judge proceeded as provided by the rules. Cf. Page v. Staley,
226 So.2d 129, 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). Affirmed. NOTES [1] "
95.031 Computation of time....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 333
...3d DCA 1984), the legislature, in 1975, revised Chapter 95, including Section
95.10, and not only made no effort to distinguish between these terms, but instead reinforced their equation by defining accrue as occurring "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs", §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1992 WL 206426
...cause of action purposes. This timely appeal followed. The statute of limitations applicable to a negligence action is four years. §
95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989). The statute of limitations begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues. §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (1989). See Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co.,
357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978). A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. §
95.031(1)....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2013 WL 1501928, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 7479
...t and unjust enrichment
claims. Under Florida law, the four-year limitations period began when Merle
Wood’s “cause[s] of action accrue[d]”—that is, “when the last element constituting
the cause[s] of action occur[red].” See Fla. Stat. § 95.031(1)....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1954 Fla. LEXIS 1179
by any other method." (Emphasis supplied.) Section 95.31(1) Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A.; and a succeeding
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
... Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ... . (4) WITHIN TWO YEARS. ... . (g) An action for libel or slander. *115 Section
95.11, Fla. Stat. (1987). The period begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues:
95.031 Computation of time. Except as provided .. . elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues. Section
95.031, Fla....
...that is its intent. Based on the foregoing, I would hold that for other than media defendants the statute of limitations for defamation begins to run on discovery, not publication, of the defamatory statement. NOTES [1]
95.11, Fla. Stat. (1987). [2]
95.031, Fla. Stat. (1987). [3]
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 761
...Pitts did not raise or argue a statute of limitations defense based on section
95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1985). Since the loans, as extended by the mortgage, had no specific maturity date and the Pastores' demands to pay were not in writing, this statute provides no aid to Mr. Pitts. §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...rights." (emphasis supplied) Chapter 74-382, Laws of Florida, did not change this rule though it did provide an overall limitation on its application as to certain specific types of cases. Rather than abrogate the rule, the amendment reinforces it. §
95.031, Florida Statutes (1975) now provides: "Except as provided in subsection
95.051(2) and elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues....
...ereon of 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to the original purchaser or the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the defect in the product or the fraud was or should have been discovered. See § 95.031(2)....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1921
...In other words, an easement is a nonpossessory interest in land. [9] Since an easement is an incoporeal interest in land, [10] under no circumstances would the fee owner be affected by section
95.12. Further, had the fraud remedy been sufficiently pleaded in this case, we think that section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983) [11] makes clear that such a cause of action does not accrue until the facts constituting fraud are discovered or should have been discovered....
...1st DCA 1977); 35 Fla.Jur.2d, Limitations and Laches § 39 (1982). This is analogous to the tolling of the statute of limitations for insanity. [13] Facts constituting concealment established by an affidavit filed in opposition to the summary judgment. [14] Although section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983) provides a complete bar to a fraud action filed twelve years after the misrepresentations were made without regard to their accrual, the application of this portion applied to fraud discovered after twelve years, constitutes an unconstitutional bar of access to the courts....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...PEARSON, JJ., and EZELL, BOYCE F., Jr. (Ret.) Associate Judge. HUBBART, Judge. The central issue presented by this appeal is at what point in time does a cause of action accrue for purposes of the statute of limitations in a products liability tort action [§§
95.11(3)(e),
95.031(2), Fla....
...We hold, in accord with the established law, that such a cause of action accrues when "the facts giving rise to the cause of action [a] were [actually] discovered [by the claimant] or [b] should have been discovered [by the claimant] with the exercise of due diligence...", § 95.031(2), Fla....
...ed motions for summary judgment on various grounds. The trial court, after a full hearing, entered a final summary judgment for all defendants on the ground that the action was time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations [§§
95.11(3)(e),
95.031(2), Fla....
...this chapter [four years], with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action [a] were [actually] discovered [by the claimant] or [b] should have been discovered [by the claimant] with the exercise of due diligence," § 95.031(2), Fla....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...736,
36 So.2d 419 (1948) (court deferred to legislative declaration of policy in upholding statute which abolished the cause of action for alienation of affection). With respect to the product liability claim against Arvinil, the pertinent statute is section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1979), which reads in part: (2) Actions for products liability and fraud under s....
...American Liberty originally argued that this statute was unconstitutional upon the authority of Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,
392 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1980), which was followed in Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1981). In these cases, the supreme court held section
95.031(2) to be unconstitutional for the same reasons that section
95.11(3)(c) was declared invalid in Overland Construction Co. However, shortly after the filing of the initial brief in this appeal, the supreme court in Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.,
476 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1985), receded from Battilla and upheld the constitutionality of section
95.031(2)....
...facts by the supreme court in Pullum through the vehicle of a footnote which stated: Pullum also refers to Diamond v. E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc.,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1981), as being in accord with Battilla. In Diamond, we held that the operation of section
95.031(2) operated to bar a cause of action before it accrued and thereby denied the aggrieved plaintiff access to the courts....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Civil form 1.965 authorizes pleading in an inverted style: Each cause of action, claim and item of damages did not accrue within the time prescribed by law for them before this action was brought. [3] See Sections
95.04 and
95.051, Florida Statutes (1977); Section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.).
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 1855687
...The Cause of Action Was Not Barred by the Statute of Limitations The statute of limitations for both malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy is four years. See §
95.11(3)(o), (p), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). "A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 403637
...ty cause of action, violated the plaintiff's due process rights. In 1980, the Florida Supreme Court held in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,
392 So.2d 874 (Fla.1980), that the twelve-year statute of repose in products liability actions, section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975), was unconstitutional as applied because it denied access to the courts....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20062, 1993 WL 666702
...THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant Enstrom Helicopter Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on October 1, 1993. (D.E. # 107). In its Motion, Enstrom argues that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by Florida's twelve-year statute of repose for products liability claims. Fla.Stat. § 95.031(2) (repealed effective July 9, 1986)....
...Again, these SDBs and ADs were authored prior to the crash of N9056 but after the repair was allegedly performed on the helicopter. III. Motion for Summary Judgment Defendant Enstrom has moved for summary judgment based on Florida's twelve-year statute of repose for products liability claims. Fla.Stat. § 95.031(2) (repealed effective July 9, 1986)....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 698905
...Therefore, we agree with the trial court that this action must be controlled by the four-year provision applicable to "[a]ny action not specifically provided for in these statutes." §
95.11(3)(p). A more difficult question is when does this four-year period begin to run. The general rule, as set forth *173 in section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1991), is that "the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues" and that "a cause of action accrues when the last element constituting t...
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Dunwody & Cole for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc., as amici curiae. Before HUBBART, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ. BASKIN, Judge. Ruling that appellants' product liability action was barred by the statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), the trial court entered Final Judgment in favor of appellees. The trial court determined that the action to recover damages for injuries sustained by the Shaws when their refrigerator caught fire accrued more than twelve years after the date of delivery to the original purchaser; section 95.031(2) required that actions be commenced within twelve years of delivery to the original purchaser....
...Ford Motor Co.,
500 So.2d 743 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft,
631 F. Supp. 1144 (S.D. Fla. 1986), the Shaws' action was properly the subject of the statutory bar. After the Shaws appealed the Final Judgment, the legislature amended section
95.031(2) and abrogated the statute of repose in product liability actions....
...Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision. We are aware, however, that this case presents questions of great public importance; we therefore certify, as did the fifth district in Pait, the following questions to the Supreme Court of Florida: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS, SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY AS TO A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ACCRUED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 268910
...re "not specifically provided for" in the statute. §
95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (2002). The parties also acknowledge that "the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues," §
95.031, and that "[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs," §
95.031(1)....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 992
...In that case, as we gather from the dissent and from discussions in subsequent cases, a negligence action based upon products liability was commenced more than twelve years after the date of delivery of the product to the original purchaser. The court struck down section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1975), as it applied to this case, on the authority of Overland, as an impermissible denial of access to the courts....
...1985), again involves a defective product and application of the statute of repose. The product was delivered to the original purchaser in November of 1966. Injury occurred in April of 1977. The period of repose was twelve years, as established by section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...They filed suit against their employers in 1975 but did not add the designers, manufacturers and installers (the suppliers) of the allegedly defective machines until March 26, 1976. The trial court had granted summary judgment in favor of the suppliers based upon the four-year statute of repose, section
95.11(3)(c) or section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...The district court also said that "the twelve-year ban portion of the statute ... cannot constitutionally be applied to bar appellants' action for recovery." Perez v. Universal Engineering Co.,
413 So.2d 75, 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The supreme court, referring in its opinion to section
95.11(3)(c) (while pointing out that section
95.031(2) was the more appropriate statute and had probably been relied on by the trial court), noted that the twelve-year repose period had expired....
...on. In either event, plaintiffs/appellants would lose if the statute validly applied. Whether the statute of repose impermissibly extinguishes their causes of action under these circumstances would depend on (1) which statute, section
95.11(3)(c) or section
95.031(2) applies and, if the former, (2) whether the legislative language in chapter 80-322, Laws of Florida, is sufficient to overcome the Kluger objection as articulated in Overland. If section
95.031(2) applies, which appears more likely, that statute would almost certainly be held violative of the right of access to the courts, as applied, because of the absence of language of justification in Laws of Florida, Chapter 74-382, which originated this section....
...ncident or its effects were fraudulently concealed, *575 their cause of action was permanently barred in December of 1982 by the seven-year statute of repose, if that statute is validly imposed here. Unlike the products liability statute of repose, (section 95.031(2), under which, where fraud is involved, the period runs from "the date of the commission of the alleged fraud") the incident of malpractice begins the period of repose in a medical malpractice case despite fraudulent concealment....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 5633, 2007 WL 1135697
...4th DCA 1995) (observing "Hogan's claim was not based on a written agreement, and was thus barred by the four year statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts"). "A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (2006); Barbara G. Banks, P.A,
938 So.2d at 575 (quoting section
95.031(1) and observing "the limitations period begins to run when `the last element constituting the cause of action occurs'")....
...learn upon making such inquiry, then he must suffer the consequence of his neglect. Because Acosta did not bring this action until October 23, 2000, these claims are all barred by the statute of limitations. The delayed discovery rule encompassed in section 95.031(2)(a) of the Florida statutes provides Acosta with no relief from the time limitation bar....
...There are several packing houses, but there are only two that can handle large volumes. The other packing house doesn't even have a lime machine, and their cooler space is very limited, so I also was scared to fly away and have no place to go. [5] Section 95.031(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes, provides: (2)(a) An action founded upon fraud under s....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...at there was no genuine issue of fact and that the appellees were entitled to a final judgment as a matter of law. They are as follows: 2. Summary Final Judgment is hereby entered in favor of all Defendants because the Plaintiffs' claim is barred by 95.031(2) Florida Statute....
...nst these Defendants. 4. The Court makes no determination as to whether the claim of the Plaintiffs may be barred for any other reason. The first question for consideration is whether it appears as a matter of law that plaintiffs' claim is barred by Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1977)....
...Squibb and Sons,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1981), the Supreme Court of Florida had before it the case of a young woman who had been exposed to an allegedly harmful drug during the years 1955 and 1956, but who did not learn of the ill effects of the drug until 1976. The court held that Section
95.031(2) could not be applied to bar the Diamonds' action because their right of action did not come into existence until after the statute's twelve-year limitation period had run....
...The plaintiff stated in discovery that he did not learn of the existence of his asbestos-related disease until he was diagnosed by a physician in August, 1976. The appellees offered no evidence that he knew or should have known of the disease and its cause at an earlier date. On this record, the twelve-year bar portion of Section 95.031(2), if applied, would foreclose the plaintiff's cause of action before he received any indication that it existed....
...Under the rule set forth in Diamond v. E.R. Squibb and Sons, supra , and Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons, supra , to so apply the statute would be unconstitutional. It is clear, therefore, that at this stage of the proceedings a material issue of fact exists as to whether Section 95.031(2) may constitutionally bar the plaintiffs' action....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2023
...*802 Sharon Lee Stedman, of Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Cabaniss & Burke, Orlando, for amicus curiae, Florida Defense Lawyers Ass'n. WENTWORTH, Judge. Appellants seek review of a summary final judgment entered in a products liability action for a 1982 injury, asserting that the court erred by applying section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes. We affirm the order appealed. Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1982), [1] provided that: Actions for products liability ......
...within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser... . Appellants' action involves an injury which occurred more than twelve years after the allegedly defective product was delivered to the original purchaser, and the action was thus not begun within the period prescribed by section
95.031(2). Both the injury and the commencement of the action occurred subsequent to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,
392 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1981), that in those circumstances "section
95.031(2) denies access to courts under article I, section 21, Florida Constitution." However, after appellants' action was filed the supreme court receded from Battilla and upheld the constitutionality of section
95.031(2) in Pullum v. Cincinnati Inc.,
476 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1985). As in the present case, in Pullum summary judgment was granted to bar a products liability action by application of section
95.031(2)....
...statute is deemed to relate back to the enactment of the statute. Appellants have shown no cause to depart from this general rule in the present case. [3] We therefore determine that Pullum should be given effect and appellants' action is barred by section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1982)....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Obviously, our decision as to the validity of the statute vis-a-vis Pearl Bauld would not operate to bar our declaring the same statute invalid vis-a-vis Jerry Sirmons. In Diamond v. E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc.,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1981), the court in interpreting Section
95.031(2), relied on Overland Construction Co....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 30 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 1688
...We hold that a cause of action for deficiency [2] does not accrue, and thus the statute of limitations does not begin to run, until the final judgment of foreclosure and subsequent foreclosure sale. The time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues. § 95.031, Fla. Stat. "A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." § 95.031(1), Fla....
...as filed, the court did not need to reach the question of what date the statute of limitations would begin to run. We also note that Barnes appears to contradict the "last element" requirement for a cause of action to accrue, as explained above. See § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 30612
...otion for post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Using this date, the actions against both Schreiber and Jorandby were timely. Generally, a statute of limitations begins to run from the time a cause of action accrues. See § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (1997). A "cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25965
...Florida law provides a four year statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Fla. Stat. §
95.11 (3)(o). In Florida, a cause of action accrues “when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” Fla. Stat. §
95.031 (1)....
...or intentional torts based on abuse. Davis v. Monahan,
832 So.2d 708, 709-10 (Fla.2002) (refusing to extend doctrine of delayed discovery to claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment); see Fla. Stat. §§
95.031 ;
95.11....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...anch had mentioned that there was some money owed to Edwards on the house and that he would try to work something out. Section
95.11(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979) provides that an action to foreclose a mortgage shall be commenced within five years. Section
95.031(1) provides that generally a cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs and that the last element constituting a cause of action "on a negotiable or nonnegotiable note payable on demand ......
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
produce the final disability", Larson, op. cit., § 95.31, citing Anderson v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 1931
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 188, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 623, 2015 WL 1472319
...2d 146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), on a question of law. We
have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.1
The question before the Court, in this Engle2-progeny case, is whether
plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment claim is barred pursuant to section 95.031(2),
Florida Statutes (1993), the statute of repose for fraud claims, because the jury
found no evidence of the smoker’s reliance within the statute of repose period, i.e.,
from May 5, 1982, through May 5, 1994....
...nce and damages. Id. (quoting Engle,
945 So. 2d at 1277). The district court noted that fraud claims, pursuant to the
statute of repose, “must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission
of the alleged fraud.” Id. at 260 (citing §
95.031(2), Fla....
...t requires proof of reliance, [plaintiff’s]
-8-
ANALYSIS
The issue presented is whether an Engle-progeny plaintiff’s fraudulent
concealment claim is barred by section 95.031(2), the fraud statute of repose,
because there is no evidence of the smoker’s reliance within the twelve-year repose
period....
...be reasonably discovered.” Kush,
616
So. 2d at 418.
The Florida Legislature has determined that the time within which an action
generally must be begun under any statute of limitations is from the time the cause
of action “accrues.” §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (2014). An action “accrues when the last
element constituting the cause of action occurs.” §
95.031(1), Fla. Stat. The
Legislature carved out the following exceptions to the accrual-date trigger: claims
of fraud (§
95.031(2)(a), Fla. Stat.)10 and products liability actions (§
95.031(2)(b),
Fla. Stat.); tolling exceptions provided in section
95.051(1)(a)-(i), Florida Statutes
(2013); and “elsewhere in these statutes.” §
95.031, Fla....
...The statute of limitations for claims of fraud is four years, §
95.11(3)(j),
Fla. Stat. (2014), “run[ning] from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of
action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due
diligence,” §
95.031(2)(a), Fla....
...empts statutes of limitations applicable to state law tort actions in certain
circumstances, also preempts state statutes of repose. Id. at 2180.
- 17 -
The Statute of Repose for Fraud Claims
Effective in 1975, section 95.031, which included the statute of repose
governing fraud claims, has essentially remained unchanged....
...The twelve-year statute of repose for fraud claims
provides as follows:
[I]n any event an action for fraud under s.
95.11(3) must be begun
within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud,
regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.
§
95.031(2), Fla....
...In Engle, the statute of repose period is from May 5, 1982, through
May 5, 1994, because this encompasses the twelve-year period preceding the filing
of the Engle complaint. There is no tolling provision for the fraud statute of
repose.14
13. Presently, the fraud statute of repose is in section 95.031(2)(a).
14. In contrast, the Legislature expressly created a tolling provision for the
statute of repose governing products liability claims. See § 95.031(2)(d), Fla....
...is tolled for any period during which the manufacturer
through its officers, directors, partners, or managing agents had actual knowledge
that the product was defective in the manner alleged by the claimant and took
affirmative steps to conceal the defect.”); see also § 95.031(2)(c), Fla....
...stayed pending disposition of the case at bar.
Reliance During the Statute of Repose Period is Irrelevant
Pursuant to the statute of repose, fraud claims “must be begun within 12
years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud.” § 95.031(2), Fla....
...t on the part of the
defendant,” Kush,
616 So. 2d at 418, we hold that the defendant’s last act or
omission triggers Florida’s fraud statute of repose. In other words, we find that
“the date of the commission of the alleged fraud” under section
95.031(2), refers to
the defendant’s wrongful conduct....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...She contends it was not until that time that she could have known of any cause of action she may have against the Department. This, of course, would be after the effective date of Section
768.28. This cause of action, sounding as it does in fraud, [1] accrues when the fraud or deceit was or should have been discovered. Section
95.031(1), Florida Statutes (1975); Tullo v....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 16862, 2007 WL 3118664
...With regard to the statute of limitations issue, both parties acknowledge that section
95.11(5)(f) is applicable to this case. The issue, then, is when Canete's cause of action accrued for purposes of commencing the running of the one-year limitation. As DOC correctly notes, section
95.031, Florida Statutes, provides in general terms that a cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Newman,
183 So.2d 25 (Fla. 2d DCA (1966); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.050. Section
95.11(3), Florida Statutes (1981), provides that actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced within four years (from the time the cause of action accrues, §
95.031, Fla....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 333143
...Johnson, Roth, Romano, Erikson & Kupfer, P.A. v. Flanagan, *535
629 So.2d 113 (Fla.1994) (rejecting judge-made discovery rule in defamation actions and holding that limitations issue is controlled "by the plain language of applicable statutes"). In section
95.031 the legislature has clearly said that "the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues." [e.s.] The legislature has provided only a few exceptions from this broad rule. For example, subsection (2) of section
95.031 expressly begins the limitations period in product liability and fraud cases from the time of discovery rather than the accrual of the cause of action....
...[3] §
95.11(3)(f) and (p), Fla. Stat. (1997) ("Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows ... (3) within four years ... (f) an action founded on a statutory liability ... (p) any action not specifically provided for in these statutes."). [4] §
95.031, Fla....
...95.051 and elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues."). Section
95.051 provides when a limitations period may be tolled, but none of the allowable tolling provisions apply to this action. See fn. 9, below. [5] §
95.031(2), Fla....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 2960, 2010 WL 793688
...the non-final orders denying their motions for summary judgment. They argue that the trial court erred in determining that Respondents' claims are not barred by the statutes of repose in the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA) [1] and section 95.031(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2004)....
...The carburetor was last overhauled in October 1992 as part of a manufacturer recommended engine overhaul. The engine overhaul was completed in December 1992. Petitioners filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by the 18-year statute of repose in GARA [2] and the 12-year statute of repose in section 95.031(2)(b)....
...titioners were restarted in 1992 by the engine and carburetor overhaul because Petitioners were the de-facto manufacturers of the replacement parts, [4] and that the periods were tolled based upon the fraud and concealment provisions in GARA [5] and section 95.031(2)(d)....
...Respondents counter that the purpose of GARA was to create a limited statute of repose subject to several factually-driven exceptions, and not to provide aircraft manufacturers immunity from suit. Respondents contend that the statutes of repose in GARA and section 95.031(2)(b) are essentially affirmative defenses and that the alleged erroneous denial of those defenses can be adequately remedied on appeal....
...Ctr.,
687 So.2d 258, 261 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), for the proposition that a statute of repose was a straightforward affirmative defense; the court inserted the word "repose" for the word "limitations" found in the Vause opinion). The fact that section 2(b) of GARA (and section
95.031(2)(d)) contain exceptions to the application of the repose periods provides further support for the proposition that the statutes are not "true" statutes of repose or jurisdictional non-claim statutes....
...Crews,
494 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (construing the 60-day period in section 174.171 as a statute of non-claim that is an absolute bar to any suit filed after that period). In sum, we hold that the 18-year statute of repose in GARA and the 12-year statute of repose in section
95.031(2)(b) are analogous to statutes of limitations that operate as affirmative defenses....
...of the aircraft or the manufacturer of any new component, system, subassembly, or other part of the aircraft, in its capacity as a manufacturer if the accident occurred" more than 18 years after the aircraft's delivery to its initial purchaser. [3] Section 95.031(2)(b) provides in pertinent part: Under no circumstances may a claimant commence an action for products liability, including a wrongful death action or any other claim arising from personal injury or property damage caused by a product, to recover harm allegedly caused by the product......
...provision," which provides that if a replacement component or system caused the accident, the 18-year repose period runs from the date the replacement component or system was installed. Similarly, we have previously held that replacement parts toll section 95.031(2)(b) for injuries resulting from defects in the replacement parts....
...relevant to the performance or the maintenance or operation of such aircraft, or the component, system, subassembly, or other part, that is causally related to the harm which the claimant allegedly suffered. [6] The 12-year repose period provided in section 95.031(2)(b) is tolled for any period during which the manufacturer through its officers, directors, partners, or managing agents had actual knowledge that the product was defective in the manner alleged by the claimant and took affirmative steps to conceal the defect. Any claim of concealment under this section shall be made with specificity and must be based upon substantial factual and legal support. § 95.031(2)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1993 WL 2973
...Matthews,
222 So.2d at 286; Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. Borbiro,
201 So.2d 571, 572 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied,
207 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1967). In regard to Count III, alleging fraud, the parties also agree that fraud is governed by the four-year limitations provision of section
95.11(3)(j). Under Section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1985), the four-year period for fraud actions begins "from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." Appellees claim...
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 468482
...ent and permanent injunction were barred by the statute of limitations, because the claims did not accrue until 1996 when Leonor took the position that she owned 100% of the Chiriqui shares, two years before they filed suit on December 30, 1998. See § 95.031, Fla....
...(1997) (The statute of limitations "runs from the time the cause of action accrues."). In support of their argument, they assert that the last element constituting each claim did not occur until 1996 and that the delayed discovery doctrine prevented the causes of action from accruing until 1996. See § 95.031(1), Fla....
...e under Davis. It is unlikely that the supreme court narrowed the delayed discovery doctrine in Davis on November 7, 2002, only to have it subsumed by equitable estoppel on November 27, 2002 in S.A.P. NOTES [1] §
95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (1997). [2] §
95.031(2), Fla....
...[s]ince estoppel is an avoidance which was not pleaded ... the issue of the [appellant's] estoppel to assert the applicable statute of limitations was not an issue properly before the trial court based on the pleadings at the time." Id. at 848. [10] Section
95.031(2)(a)-(b); section
95.11(4), (7), Florida Statutes (2000)....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8139, 1993 WL 50906
...pursuant to Section
95.11 of the Florida Statutes. The four year time period begins running "from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence...." Fla.Stat. §
95.031(2) (1991)....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16563, 2002 WL 2002408
...1084, 1099 (S.D.Fla.1992) (applying Florida's statute of limitations); Sands v. Blando,
575 So.2d 1306, 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (same). Such an action accrues at the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. See Fla. Stat. §
95.031(2)(a); Colonial Penn Ins....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2013 WL 4854492, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132020
...3:06-cv-959-J-HTS,
2007 WL 1837842 , at * 13 (M.D.Fla.2007) (four year statute of limitations applicable to statutory claims applied to statutory bad faith claim under Fl. Stat. §
624.155). A statute of limitations begins to run “from the time the cause of action accrues.” See Fl. Stat. §
95.031. “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” See FI. Stat. §
95.031(1)....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 133280
...5th DCA 1981). Nevertheless, assuming that Puchner could not, as a matter of fact, have discovered the wrongful acts until November 22, 1982, parts of his claim for fraud and his claim for securities law violations are barred by the statutes of repose. Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that a claim for fraud "must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered." Because Puchner fi...
...[2] The limitations periods for Puchner's claims are: securities law violations, two years from discovery, but not more than five years from violation §
95.11(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (1987); fraud, four years from discovery, but not more than twelve years from violation §§
95.031,
95.11(3)(j), Fla....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 1057655
...As to those complaints, the supreme court has held that the four-year statute of limitations in section
95.11(3)(f) applies. See Joshua,
768 So.2d 432. However, the supreme court did not expressly state when the four-year period commenced or whether it was tolled by the administrative process. Section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1993), provides that a statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues unless otherwise provided by statute. No one argues that a special statutory exception exists in this case. "A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §
95.031(1)....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99459, 2008 WL 4507506
..."It is axiomatic that under Florida law, a cause of action accrues, for statute of limitations purposes `when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.'" New Lenox Indus., Inc. v. Fenton,
510 F.Supp.2d 893, 906 (M.D.Fla.2007) (citing Fla. Stat. §
95.031(1))....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...The right to pursue a cause of action is generally considered to have become vested when the cause of action has accrued. R.A.M. of So. Fla. Inc. v. WCI Communities Inc.,
869 So.2d 1210, 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). A cause of action accrues when "the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | District Court, N.D. Florida | 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30624
...In neither case is there any genuine dispute respecting any material facts. In each of the cases the action was begun more than twelve (12) years after the date of the delivery of the Volkswagen automobile involved in that suit to the original purchaser. Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes, reads as follows: Actions for products liability and fraud under s....
...ourts in violation of Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution. After these two suits were instituted the Supreme Court of Florida, in Pullum v. Cincinnati, et al.,
476 So.2d 657 (Fla.1985), receded from the Battilla decision, and held that Section
95.031(2) is not unconstitutionally violative of Article I, Section 2 of the Florida Constitution. Defendants contend Pullum must be given retroactive application, and that, under it, these actions are barred by §
95.031(2), Florida Statutes....
...In Wuest, plaintiff cites Diamond v. E.R. Squibb,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla.1981). In that case injury had occurred but the cause of action could not be pursued because the injurious consequences did not manifest themselves until years later. The court held that §
95.031(2), as applied in that case, violated the Florida Constitution's guaranty of access to the courts....
...ifferent from that existing in Pullum or Battilla and it is from the factual context existing in this case. Plaintiff cites also Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons,
369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979). Battilla had relied on it in reaching the conclusion §
95.031 denied access to the courts....
...In receding from Battilla, Pullum pointed out that, because the normal useful life of buildings is obviously greater than most manufactured products, there is a distinction in the categories of liability exposure between those sought to be limited by §
95.11(3)(c) struck down in Overland, and those listed in §
95.031(2)....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 277, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 6308
...Cabaniss and Sharon Lee Stedman, of Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Cabaniss & Burke, Orlando and John M. Thomas, Dearborn, Mich., for appellee. ORFINGER, Judge. The plaintiff appeals from a final judgment dismissing this wrongful death action on the basis of section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1985), the statute of repose, which provides that product liability actions must be commenced within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product *744 to its original purchaser....
...It does not appear that any property or contract rights were acquired by the plaintiff here such as would make an exception to this rule applicable. Cf. Florida Forest and Park Service v. Strickland,
154 Fla. 472,
18 So.2d 251 (1944). Neither do we perceive a legislative intent that the 1986 amendment to section
95.031(2), abolishing the 12 year statute of repose in products liability cases, operate retroactively. However, because the questions involved here are recurring and appear to be of great public importance, we certify the following to the Supreme Court of Florida. I WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION
95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), ABOLISHING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS, SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY TO A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ACCRUED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT? II IF NOT, WHETHER THE DECISION OF PULLUM V....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17796, 1991 WL 259869
...mitations. Fla.Stat. §
95.11(3)(j). The four-year statute of limitations period commences to run from the date Plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the facts giving rise to the cause of action with the exercise of due diligence. Fla.Stat. §
95.031(2)....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...The court stated that where an act is to be performed within a specified period of time, the first day of the period is excluded from the computation and the last day of the period is included. Mobil argues that the holding of McMillen v. Hamilton, supra , was superseded in 1974 by the passage of Section 95.031, Florida Statutes, which stated in part: [2] "95.031 Computation of time....
...considered as the first day in computing the period of limitations. Under this interpretation, the last day for filing the complaint against Mobil would have been Friday, October 31, 1975. We cannot agree with this contention. The obvious purpose of Section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1974) was to make more precise the dates upon which various causes of action accrued. Since specific statutory circumstances under which limitations periods are tolled were being established in Section
95.051 as part of the same legislation, it was logical to include in Section
95.031 a statement that except as set forth in Section
95.051, the time within which an action shall be begun runs from the time the cause of action accrues. Section
95.031 did not provide for a new method of computation....
...(1949) then in effect, an action was not deemed commenced until the process was delivered to the proper officer for service. [2] This statute was amended in 1975 but those changes are not pertinent to the disposition of this case. [3] Under Mobil's interpretation of § 95.031, unless the act which precipitates the cause of action occurs immediately after midnight, the various limitation periods prescribed by law would always be reduced by a fraction of a day.
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1996 WL 590971
...hat OCF's conduct "rose to the level of intentional, willful, or wanton." This appeal followed the judgment. We first address OCF's argument that this action is barred by the twelve year *554 products liability statute of repose formerly found at subsection 95.031(2), Florida Statutes. See, e.g., § 95.031(2), Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 19135, 2006 WL 3300342
...The statute of limitations for a contract founded on a written instrument is five years. See §
95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). "A cause of action accrues [for statute of limitations purposes] when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §
95.031(1), Fla....
...latory authority grounded Medical Jet's aircraft. The basis of that belief is that Medical Jet suffered no actual damages until the plane was grounded on May 14, 1999, and that such damage was the last element giving rise to the cause of action. See § 95.031(1), Fla....
...The dissent's approach to the "accrual" concept in breach of contract cases seeks to introduce the delayed discovery doctrine into Florida contract law. The supreme court rejected an expansion of the delayed discovery doctrine in Davis v. Monahan,
832 So.2d 708 (Fla.2002). The general rule is consistent with the wording of section
95.031(1) that ties "accrual" to the occurrence of the last element giving rise to a cause of action....
...However, not one of these cases has tackled how this fiction of presumed damages exists simultaneously when the breach is not evident. More importantly, they fail to address the statutory requirement that "[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 7394, 2002 WL 1062239
...ions. The City asserts, however, that Collections was aware of this since 1992. [2] Under section
95.11(2)(b), a "legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation or liability founded on a written instrument" shall be commenced within five years. Section
95.031, Florida Statutes (2001), in turn, provides that the time within which an action shall be commenced under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues. A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1992 WL 106945
...able future deterrent effect that such awards might create. If this court had the power, I would be inclined to limit the element of punitive damages to claims in which the wrongful acts occurred within twenty years of the filing of the lawsuit. Cf. § 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1991); Puchner v....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 1520844, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 6882
...Hess responds that the statute of repose sets forth the relevant time period for the statute’s application, focusing on the defendant’s conduct in committing the alleged fraud. Therefore, Mrs. Hess contends that reliance is irrelevant. Florida’s statute of repose under section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1993) provides, “[Ajctions for ... fraud ... under s.
95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.” §
95.031(2), Fla....
...4th DCA 1987) (also discussing how a statute of repose will “prevent the accrual of a cause of action where the final element necessary for its creation occurs beyond the time period established by the statute”), approved,
541 So.2d 92 (Fla.1989). “On its face, section
95.031(2) clearly bars [a] fraud claim to the extent that it is based on fraudulent conduct committed more than twelve years before the institution of this action.” Shepard v....
...not resolve the issue. See Engle,
945 So.2d at 1277 . As discussed above, the triggering event set forth in the applicable statute of repose, “the date of the commission of the alleged fraud”, necessarily includes reliance by the plaintiff. See §
95.031(2)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 25 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 12, 2000 Fla. LEXIS 3, 2000 WL 4960
...ness. Barnes claimed that he was exposed to the silica dust from 1972 to 1974. The manufacturers denied the material allegations of Barnes' complaint and argued that Barnes' action was barred by the now-repealed products liability statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975).[ [2] ] The trial court granted the manufacturers' motion for summary judgment....
...Although in a later opinion the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute of repose, the majority reiterated the underlying rationale for the latent injury exception as one of constitutional magnitude: In Diamond, we held that the operation of section 95.031(2) operated to bar a cause of action before it accrued and thereby denied the aggrieved plaintiff access to the courts....
...actions for statute of repose purposes"). As the Third District explained in Corcoran, a case with facts similar to those *559 here: "[B]ecause a public necessity was never enunciated, demonstrated, or contemplated for application of the now defunct section
95.031(2) to a case such as this one, resulting in a long delay in manifestation of symptoms that will support a medical diagnosis of injury, such application is constitutionally impermissive."
679 So.2d at 294-95....
...ts portion of the case and was voluntarily dismissed as a party to the proceedings in this Court. Because Clark Sand Company, Inc., did not petition for review, the only remaining petitioner in this case is Pulmosan Safety Equipment Corporation. [2] Section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1975), providing for a twelve-year statute of repose for products liability actions, became effective January 1, 1975, and was later repealed on July 1, 1986. See § 95.031, Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 223072, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 588
...s for “[a] legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instru-menté]” We agree this section applies to Harris’s complaint. Thus, the issue for this court is when the cause of action *368 accrued. See § 95.031(1), Fla....
...Funding, Inc. v. Chiles,
680 So.2d 400, 404 (Fla.1996) (quoting Santa Rosa County, v. Admin. Comm’n, Div. of Admin. Hearings,
661 So.2d 1190, 1192-93 (Fla.1995)). “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.”
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 366
...claim brought by Mr. Small seeking damages for loss of affection, society, services, consortium, and companionship. The timeliness of the lawsuit was governed by various sections of chapter 95 which prescribe limitations of actions. The preamble to section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1979), states: Computation of time....
...listed under subsection 3, Mrs. Small's remaining counts were governed by subsection 3(p) which allowed four years for "[a]ny action not specifically provided for in these statutes." §
95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. (1979). At the core of our analysis is section
95.031(2), a statute of repose, which provided: Actions for products liability and fraud under s....
...any date prescribed elsewhere in s.
95.11(3), but in any event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser ... regardless of the date the defect in the product ... was or should have been discovered. §
95.031(2), Fla....
...the twelve-year statute of repose. See Ch. 86-272, Laws of Fla. Chapter 86-272 is entitled: An act relating to limitations of actions; amending s.
95.11, F.S.; reducing the time within which actions for libel and slander must be commenced; amending s.
95.031, F.S.; deleting a limitation upon the initiation of actions for products liability; providing an effective date. The pertinent sections of the amendment provide: Section 2. Subsection (2) of section
95.031, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
95.031 Computation of time....
...1985), has expressly receded from Battilla and has held that the statute of repose is not unconstitutional as a denial of access to the courts. We are not persuaded by this argument. In Pullum, the supreme court receded from Battilla, and held that section 95.031(2) does not violate article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution....
...1st DCA 1986), in which our sister *947 court recently considered facts and time sequences remarkably similar to the case sub judice. Cassidy was a products liability case involving an appeal from a summary final judgment in favor of the defendant. The trial court's decision was based on section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1982), the twelve-year statute of repose....
...m suggest that it should be limited to prospective application. Cassidy,
495 So.2d at 802. Accordingly, the court affirmed the summary final judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that Pullum was applicable and plaintiffs' action was barred by section
95.031(2)....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1987 WL 2368
...Brackenridge was injured by a laundry extractor more than twelve years after its delivery to the original purchaser. In affirming the dismissal of his product liability action, the court certified the following questions: I. SHOULD THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS, BE CONSTRUED TO OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY AS TO A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ACCRUED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT? II....
...Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co.,
515 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1987). Because it was not specifically discussed in the Melendez opinion, we will address the contention that in spite of this Court's opinion in Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.,
476 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1985), upholding the constitutionality of section
95.031(2), Brackenridge is entitled to relief because he relied upon our earlier decision of Battilla v....
...He was not deprived of a property or contract right acquired in reliance upon this Court's decision in Battilla. His accident was fortuitous and did not occur as a result of conduct prompted by Battilla. Moreover, he did not act in reliance on the Battilla declaration of the unconstitutionality of section 95.031(2) and thereby miss the limitation deadline for filing suit with which he could have otherwise complied....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 864179
...3d DCA 1966), and this suit was not filed until April 13, 1998, it is time barred. However, we have held that in a general negligence case, the elements of a cause of action are existence of a duty, breach of that duty, causation, and damage. See Miller v. Foster,
686 So.2d 783, 783 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Section
95.031(1), Florida Statutes, provides that "a cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." Thus, in the instant case, appellants' cause of action did not accrue until such time as they suffered damage as a result of appellee's alleged negligence....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1996 WL 148174
...Section
95.11(3)( o ) provides in relevant part that a cause of action for an assault or any other intentional tort except as provided in subsection (7) of section
95.11 must be commenced within four years from the time the cause of action accrues. Section
95.031(1) provides that a cause of action accrues "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." Thus, as the Cluetts contend, because the last act of sexual abuse occurred in 1971, Boyce would have had to file her complaint in 1975 when she was nineteen years of age....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 5476, 2012 WL 1192076
...Reynolds have cross-appealed the circuit court’s ruling granting preclusive effect to certain findings by the Supreme Court of Florida in Engle and the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury regarding the twelve-year statute of repose applicable to fraud claims, section 95.031(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1994)....
...eal. This court has already acknowledged the preclusive effect of the Phase I findings in Engle. 9 Three other District Courts have done so as well. 10 The appellees also argue that Florida’s twelve year statute of repose relating to fraud claims, section 95.031(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1994), barred Ms....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 2683275
...se as provided by their contract. Banks, P.A., concludes that the cause of action, therefore, did not accrue until the appeal process for the products liability case was completed and the attorney's fees were paid to Lardin, P.A., in 2004. We agree. Section 95.031, Florida Statutes, provides that "the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues." Subsection (1) provides that "[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." In Mosher v....
...GECC did not file suit until more than five years later when Abbott breached the indemnification provision of the same contract. The district court held: Under section
95.11(2)(b), the limitations period begins to run when "the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 601324
...MOD Properties, Ltd.,
528 So.2d 432 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied,
534 So.2d 400 (Fla.1988). Thus sections
95.12 and
95.14 are inapplicable because they govern actions to recover real property. See Kempfer (section
95.12 does not apply to action for rescission of grant of easement). Section
95.031(1) provides that a cause of action accrues when the last element giving rise to it occurs....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 627458
...within which the plaintiff can initiate a claim. The statute of limitations begins to run on a claim from the date the cause of action accrues. Kush v. Lloyd,
616 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1992); Penthouse North Ass'n, v. Lombardi,
461 So.2d 1350 (Fla. 1984). Section
95.031(1), Florida Statutes (1987) defines "accrual" as the time when "the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." Keller v....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 868251
...are preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (the Labeling Act). Second, Appellees argue that the Laschkes' conspiracy to commit fraud claims are barred by the fraud statute of repose. See § 95.031(2), Fla....
...er the facts of this case. Appellees argue that the fraud statute of repose bars the Laschkes' claim for conspiracy to commit fraud to the extent that it arose prior to 1984, twelve years before the Laschkes' commencement of this action in 1996. See § 95.031(2), Fla....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 88031, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 100
...This evidence was admitted through Hiott’s expert historian and on cross-examination of a Reynolds witness; however, the evidence was discussed only briefly during an extensive trial. The graphic wai-nings at issue were not admitted at trial. On the issue of the statute of repose, section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes, Reynolds argued below that Hiott could only recover on her fraudulent concealment and fraud-based conspiracy claims to the extent they rested on conduct that occurred after May 5, 1982, twelve years before the Engle suit was filed. Reynolds argued that an action for fraud under section
95.11(3), Florida Statutes, must be brought “within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.” §
95.031(2)(a), Fla....
...inly there is no reasonable possibility that the result would have been different, had the evidence not been admitted. Reynolds’ second argument asserts that the trial court erred in denying its requested jury instruction on the statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes....
...ris USA, Inc. v. Hess,
95 So.3d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), rev. denied,
117 So.3d 412 (Fla.2013), on the issue of whether the trial court reversibly erred in denying Reynolds’ requested jury instruction and verdict question on the statute of repose, section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 316
...ie's counterclaim. On appeal, we held that Ionata's action for rescission was barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations, section
95.11(3)( l ), Florida Statutes, since it had not been extended by fraudulent concealment by Allie under section
95.031(2), as established by the jury finding that there was no (actual) fraud by Allie....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 186, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 622, 2015 WL 1472282
...defendants agreed with each other, with other companies, or both to
conceal or omit information concerning the health effects or the
addictive nature of smoking cigarettes or both.
The defendants requested that the trial judge instruct the jury on section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the twelve-year statute of repose governing
fraud claims....
...the trial court grant her motion for a directed verdict on the statute of limitations
issue. Id. at 939, 948.4
PM USA and R.J. Reynolds cross-appealed, asserting that Ms. Frazier’s
fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to conceal claims were barred by section
95.031(2), the fraud statute of repose, and that Ms....
...Id. at 948.5 PM USA and R.J. Reynolds
then sought review of the district court’s decision in Frazier relating to their cross-
appeal claims.6
ANALYSIS
Pursuant to the statute of repose contained in section 95.031(2), fraud claims
“must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged
fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.” §
95.031(2), Fla....
...effect in individual actions,
provided that they were filed against the defendants within one year of our
mandate. Id. In Hess v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. SC12-2153 (Fla. Apr. 2,
2015), we recently held that the statute of repose provided in section 95.031(2), did
not bar a fraudulent concealment claim even though there was no evidence of the
smoker’s reliance within the repose period (May 5, 1982, through May 5, 1994).
Hess, No....
...Lloyd],
616 So. 2d [415,] 418 [(Fla. 1992)], we
hold that the defendant’s last act or omission triggers Florida’s fraud
statute of repose. In other words, we find that “the date of the
commission of the alleged fraud” under section
95.031(2), refers to
the defendant’s wrongful conduct....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 2124, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 10326
...a & Sons, Inc., more than 20 years prior to the injury. Hampton filed suit against Duda in 1982 within the four-year statute of limitations. See §
95.11(3), Fla. Stat. (1981). Duda raised as an affirmative defense the twelve-year statute of repose, section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides: Actions for products liability and fraud under s....
...sion a retrospective operation.
18 So.2d at 253. In the instant case, Hampton acquired no property or contract rights under the court's construction in Batilla. Nor did Hampton act in reliance on the Batilla declaration of the unconstitutionality of section
95.031(2), and thereby miss a limitation deadline for filing suit with which he otherwise could have complied....
...We note that the specially concurring opinion of Justice Grimes in Nissan explains why the Strickland exception does not apply where an accident occurs after expiration of the twelve years, and there is no detrimental reliance by a claimant on the erroneous court decision. The majority opinion in Nissan, which held that section 95.031(2) does not apply to wrongful death actions, is irrelevant to the instant case, which does not concern wrongful death....
...urer. [2] Because the decedent *1107 could not have maintained an action for products liability, there was no basis for a wrongful death suit because this prerequisite had not been met. Any statements by the supreme court in Phlieger suggesting that section 95.031(2) does not apply to wrongful death actions must be read in the context of the facts in that case and the above-discussed principle which underlies wrongful death actions, viz: that a right of action to sue for his injuries must first have existed in the decedent at the time of his death....
...nt's death, to conclude that the plaintiff in Pait, and any other plaintiff in a wrongful death action predicated on an injury occurring more than 12 years after the sale of the product which results in death, is barred from maintaining an action by section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes....
...ow recovery for damages caused to the decedent's surviving beneficiaries. [3] After recognizing the crucial fact that "Mr. Phlieger had a right to maintain an action against Nissan at the time of his death," the court stated the issue to be: "[D]oes section
95.031(2) apply to bar this otherwise viable cause of action."
508 So.2d at 715....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 4366038
...d have been timely filedthat is, Technical had until January 2005 to file its complaint. Hanchett/Trenam's chronology is based on the following chain of reasoning: (i) a cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the action occurs, § 95.031(1), Fla....
...2d DCA 2006); (iii) here, the last element of the cause of action was damages, which occurred sometime after January 14, 2000, when Technical's customers apparently began complaining about the defective product originally made by UCB. Notwithstanding the statutory "last-element" principle of section 95.031(1), however, Florida case law consistently holds that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues and the limitations period commences at the time of the breach....
...Hanchett/Trenam cite to the dissent in Medical Jet, S.A. v. Signature Flight SupportPalm Beach, Inc.,
941 So.2d 576, 579 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (May, J., dissenting), which calls for a more careful analysis of the breach-damages distinction in light of section
95.031(1), Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...e diligence his injury some 4 years prior to the commencement of the action. The Florida Statute of Limitations governing this cause of action for negligence and products liability is Section
95.11(3)(a), (e), Florida Statutes (1979). This read with Section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1979) provides that the four year time period commences "running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence......
...* * * * * * (e) An action for injury to a person founded on the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of personal property that is not permanently incorporated in an improvement to real property, including fixtures. Section
95.11(3) must be read in conjunction with Section
95.031(2), which provides in pertinent part: (2) Actions for products liability ......
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 8083, 2011 WL 2031331
...Under the statute of limitations, actions for negligence or breach of fiduciary duty must be commenced within four years of when the cause of action accrued. §
95.11(3)(a), (p), Fla. Stat. (2009). "A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 4820, 2016 WL 1238265
...a fraudulent transfer claim, it could have said so. 6 In prescribing periods within which suit must be brought, the legislature has often linked the commencement of that period to the discovery of the facts underlying the cause of action. See, e.g., § 95.031(2)(a), (b), Fla....
...Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc.,
553 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (holding that the appellant’s claim was barred because it was commenced after the time periods prescribed by section
95.11(4)(e)). Other combined limitations/repose statutes are structured similarly. See, e.g., §§
95.031(2)(a), .11(3)(j) (actions founded on fraud), .11(4)(b) (medical malpractice)....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 743, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 7060
...al property that is not permanently incorporated in an improvement to real property, including fixtures. * * * * * * (j) A legal or equitable action founded on fraud. * * * * * * (4) WITHIN TWO YEARS. * * * * * * (d) An action for wrongful death. Section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1983) provides for the computation of time as follows: (2) Actions for products liability and fraud under s....
...Phlieger brought a products liability action against Nissan for her own injuries from the defective truck, then her cause of action would have been a products liability action governed by the four year statute of limitations under section
95.11(3). In that case, the provisions of section
95.031(2) would also apply to bar a suit twelve years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser regardless of the date the defect was discovered. Here, however, the action, although admittedly based on negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty, was a wrongful death action pursuant to section
768.19. Thus by its very language, section
95.031(2) does not apply and, rather, the two year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions found in section
95.11(4)(d) applies....
...itations for actions against municipalities. In the present case, Mrs. Phlieger likewise is not suing for the injuries sustained by her husband but is seeking damages for the death resulting from that injury. There is no express language in sections
95.031(2) and
95.11(3) which would include a wrongful death action based on products liability claims....
...tort for damages because of death. Based on this language, the court concluded that the legislature had clearly intended the section to apply to wrongful death actions in cases where the basis for the action is medical malpractice. In contrast, here section 95.031(2) does not define a products liability action as including claims for damages because of death....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2013 WL 1137482, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37687
...Graham,
767 So.2d 1179, 1185 (Fla.2000). Generally, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations therefore begins to run, on the date the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. Hearndon,
767 So.2d at 1184 -85 (citing Fla. Stat. §
95.031 )....
...An exception is made for claims of fraud (and other causes of action not relevant to this case), for which the accrual is delayed until the plaintiff either knows or should know that the last element of the cause of action occurred. Davis v. Monahan,
832 So.2d 708, 709-10 (Fla.2002) (citing Fla. Stat. §
95.031 )....
...The Florida delayed discovery doctrine applies to a fraud claim, and therefore the statute of limitations does not run until the plaintiff either knows or should know that the last element of the cause of action occurred. Davis,
832 So.2d at 709 -10 (citing Fla. Stat. §
95.031 )....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 1004642
...hich asserted a claim of fraud against Mr. Barber. The trial court dismissed this count, ruling that the fraud claim was barred by Florida's statute of repose, statute of limitations, and economic loss rule. Florida's statute of repose, set forth in section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1997), requires that an action for fraud must be instituted within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud....
...against Mr. Barber and Prudential. We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED. COBB and PETERSON, JJ., concur. SAWAYA, J., concurs, without participation in oral argument. NOTES [1] 95.031....
...ate prescribed elsewhere in s.
95.11(3), but in any event an action for fraud under s.
95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered. §
95.031, Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 445795
...Our only focus is whether the factual allegations set forth in Ms. Ambrose's complaint establish that her claims of fraud and negligence are barred by Florida's statute of repose or statute of limitations. FRAUD CLAIMS We first address the trial court's conclusion that Florida's statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1997), bars Ms....
...relating to fraud, section
95.11(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1997). This four-year period begins to run "from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence". See §
95.031(2), Fla....
...Ambrose's complaint because the facts alleged in the complaint do not establish, as a matter of law, that the applicable statute of repose and statute of limitations period expired prior to the filing of the complaint. REVERSED and REMANDED. COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §§
95.031(2);
95.11, Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 75035
...The falsity of these representations could not have been discovered until some years after receipt of the policy. A cause of action for fraud does not accrue until the basis for the action is discovered or should be discovered through due diligence. § 95.031(2), Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 194890
...I Appellees argue that the delayed discovery doctrine does not apply to the causes of action here at issue. They cite Halkey-Roberts Corp. v. Mackal,
641 So.2d 445, 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), to support their contention that the doctrine is limited by section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (2000), to causes of action for products liability and fraud....
...The statute of limitations for such intentional torts was found at section
95.11(3)( o ). [1] Such causes of action were different from fraud or products *438 liability, indicating that, contrary to appellees' argument, the doctrine applies to delay the accrual of causes of action other than those mentioned in section
95.031(2)....
...Hearndon receded from past decisions that applied the delayed discovery doctrine to toll the running of the statute of limitations; the case reaffirmed that the doctrine still applied to delay the accrual of causes of action. Under Hearndon, the proper reading of section 95.031(2) is that it limits the application of the delayed discovery doctrine in cases of fraud and products liability "under s....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...y to pursue his claim within the context of Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. In Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Co.,
357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978), the court found that the twelve-year limitation provisions of sections
95.11(3)(c) and
95.031(2) were not unconstitutional where the injury occurred prior to the enactment of the twelve-year repose provisions....
...In the interim, the revision to Chapter 95 was enacted. It contained a new statute of repose which limited to twelve years the time for instituting actions in products liability and construction defect cases, measured from the "date of delivery of completed product to its original purchaser," section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975), or from the date of possession by the owner or termination or completion of the contract, section
95.11(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), without regard to the date of discovery of the injury or right of action....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 169753
...rtance. Lindabury v. Lindabury An action for damages from child abuse is governed by the four-year statute of limitations applicable to civil actions for injury or damages caused by an intentional tort. See §
95.11(3)( o ), Fla. Stat. (1987). Under section
95.031, "the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues." The cause of action will have accrued "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §
95.031(1), Fla....
...ing through 1965, the memories of which she allegedly had repressed but had "rediscovered" when she sought psychological counseling just prior to filing the complaint. Reading subsection
95.11(3)( o ), Florida Statutes (1987), in conjunction with subsection
95.031(1), the Lindabury court found that "[i]t is beyond contradiction that the alleged incestuous acts, if taken as true, damaged the appellant at the time they occurred," Lindabury,
552 So.2d at 1117, and that the last contemporaneous inju...
...nterpretation of the statutes of limitations for purposing of determining when the applicable statute should begin to run. Sullivan appears to have receded, sub silentio, from the line of cases which held that the last element occurs for purposes of section 95.031 and the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the invasion of his legal rights....
...Thus, under Sullivan, unless the legislature has expressly adopted a provision tolling the running of the statute of limitations, delaying accrual of a cause of action, or otherwise recognizing an exception to the statute, the last element for purposes of section 95.031(1) is determined by looking at the common law elements for the respective causes of action....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 14513, 2015 WL 5712568
...Miraglia, M.D., P.A.,
125 So.3d 855, 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Fox v. Madsen,
12 So.3d 1261,1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). However, the triggering event for the running of the statute of limitations in this case is when the “last element constituting” the breach of contract occurred. §
95.031(1), Fla....
...The court appears to have concluded that the cause of action did not accrue until Gee became aware that something was “amiss.” For specified causes of action, the Legislature has established exceptions that would toll the statute of limitations. See §§
95.031(2)(a) & (b),
95.11(4)(a) & (b),
95.11(7), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...*1137 Wayne Hogan of Brown, Terrell & Hogan, Jacksonville, for appellant. Ellis E. Neder, Jr., Jacksonville, for appellees. NIMMONS, Judge. Richard Pullum, plaintiff below, appeals a summary judgment entered against him on the basis that his claim was barred by Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes, [1] a statute of repose....
...tion of the twelve-year statute; provided, however, that such person might not have as many as four years to bring the action where his injury occurred prior to January 1, 1975, the effective date of Chapter 74-382, Laws of Florida (the law creating Section 95.031), and where he would be required to file suit by January 1, 1976, by virtue of the one-year savings clause provided for by Chapter 74-382, section 36; and (3) that those persons injured during the time frame of eight to twelve years af...
...f repose would have four full years from the date of injury within which to file suit. The Purk court, nevertheless, held that the statute did not deny equal protection of the laws. The fact that Mrs. Purk's injury occurred prior to the enactment of Section 95.031 and thus was covered by the one-year savings clause of Chapter 74-382, Section 36, [5] whereas Pullum's injury occurred after the effective date of the act, does not furnish Pullum with any equal protection argument materially different from that of Mrs....
...The summary judgment is Affirmed. MILLS and SMITH, JJ., concur. On Motion for Rehearing PER CURIAM. Although we deny the appellant's motion for rehearing, we certify the following, pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v), as a question of great public importance: Does Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes, deny equal protection of the laws to persons such as appellant who are injured by products delivered to the original purchaser between eight and twelve years prior to the injury? MILLS, SMITH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 95.031(2) provides: (2) Actions for products liability and fraud under s....
...d have been discovered. (e.s.) [2] Although the statute of repose involved in Overland, Section
95.11(3)(c), deals with liability for improvements to real property, the Overland holding applies equally to product liability statutes of repose such as Section
95.031(2)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 150454
...eat rails." The Gill affidavit then stated that the logbook entry should read "replaced both right front seat rails" or "replaced right seat rails on both front seats." On November 23, 1992, Cessna filed a motion for summary judgment predicated upon section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes, which required that actions for product liability must be brought within twelve years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser....
...*281 The question for our resolution is whether there is record support for the trial court's determination that appellants' claim against Cessna was extinguished in its entirety by the statute of repose formerly applicable to products liability actions. The preamended statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes, states: (2) Actions for products liability and fraud under s....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 498388
...tion accrued at the time of the City's resolution on February 17, 1988. There is no dispute that a cause of action accrues when the last element necessary to constitute the cause of action occurs. Birnholz v. Blake,
399 So.2d 375 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 16994, 2011 WL 5061345
...or subparagraph 2., are conclusively presumed to have an expected useful life of 10 years or less. 1. Aircraft used in commercial or contract carrying of passengers or freight, vessels of more than 100 gross tons . . . are not subject to the statute of repose provided within this subsection. § 95.031(2)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2411, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 10720
...s arguendo assumed that Supro indeed "manufactured" the ribbon blender by adapting it for its own use in 1970, it must also be deemed to have "delivered" the completed product at that time, thus invoking the bar of the twelve-year statute of repose. § 95.031(2), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 11452, 1992 WL 332645
...Reed,
603 So.2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Fraudulent concealment can toll the running of a statute of limitations when the fraud perpetrated upon the injured party places him in ignorance of his right to sue. Nardone v. Reynolds,
333 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1976). In cases of fraud, section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1989), commences the running of the four year statute of limitations from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The issue concerns the authority of the legislature to affect existing causes of action by (1) reducing a statute of limitations period and (2) changing the point at which a cause of action on a demand note accrues. The latter issue relates to the enactment of section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1975)....
...be barred when this act becomes effective and that would not have been barred under prior law may be commenced before January 1, 1976, and if it is not commenced by that date, the action shall be barred. Six months later, effective in June of 1975, section 95.031(1) was amended and changed the point at which a cause accrues on a written instrument payable on demand....
...se of a time instrument on the day after maturity; (b)1. In the case of a demand instrument other than a note payable on demand, upon its date or, if no date is stated, on the date of issue. 2. In the case of a note payable on demand, as provided in s. 95.031(1)....
...The primary issues are (1) whether sections
95.11(2)(b) and 95.022 may constitutionally be applied to the facts of this case, and, if applicable, (2) does the change in the law relating to the time a cause of action accrues upon a demand note as prescribed in section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1975), allow the cause of action to be brought in this cause....
...The one-year grace period from January 1, 1975, to January 1, 1976, granted by the savings clause would govern this claim, and, as a result, the cause of action would have to be filed within this grace period or be barred. During this grace period, specifically on June 27, 1975, the legislature amended section 95.031 to change the time when a cause of action accrued on demand promissory notes from date of issuance or delivery to when the first written demand is made on the note....
...the cause of action was filed, because no written demand had previously been made. The note was due "on demand after two years from date," which terminology renders the maturity date nonspecific, and, therefore, the note is within the provisions of section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1975)....
...Such an assertion is neither reasonable nor logical. If the legislature may modify existing remedies by shortening or lengthening the statute of limitations without impairing the obligation of contract, it may also modify the time when a cause of action accrues. The contention by appellant that section 95.031 is a limiting procedural mandate requiring a written demand and nothing more, is without merit....
...on a written instrument payable on demand with no specific maturity date when the "first written demand for payment occurs." See Wetmore v. Brennan,
378 So.2d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Consequently, in view of *357 the grace period and the adoption of section
95.031 during that period, the new five-year statute of limitations did not commence in this cause until the cause of action was filed, since that was admittedly the first written demand for payment....
...f their cause of action since it occurred during the savings clause grace period. We recognize that section 673.122, as it existed in 1975, provided that the cause of action on a demand instrument accrues on the date of issue. We find, however, that section 95.031 was the last legislative expression on the subject and is controlling in the instant case. Subsequently, in 1977, section 673.122 was amended to expressly adopt section 95.031; consequently, no present conflict between the two statutes exists....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20619, 2011 WL 794817
...ere discovered or should have been discovered.'" In re Burton Wiand Receivership Cases Pending in the Tampa Division of the Middle District of Florida, Case No. 8:05-cv-1856-T-27-MSS,
2008 WL 818504 at *8 (M.D.Fla. Mar. 26, 2008) (quoting Fla. Stat. §
95.031(2)(a))....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1738, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 9294
...The issue before the court is whether as a matter of law the statute of limitations began to run at an earlier time. The causes of action at issue here fall within the general rule that the statute of limitations runs from when the cause of action accrued. § 95.031, Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2242, 2003 WL 297508
...4th DCA 2002). In fraud cases, however, the statute of limitations begins running either at the time that plaintiff learned of the fraud or when the plaintiff reasonably should have learned about the facts supporting the fraud claim. See Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2); Moneyhun v....
...Unlike well managed account damages, the commissions Desimone earned are readily determinable and Lyman's guess, estimation, or approximation is insufficient to create an issue of material fact. [9] The delayed discovery rule contained in Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2) does not apply to any cause of action other than Plaintiffs' fraud cause of action....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...ous lesions. Squibb moved for summary judgment on the ground that this action was commenced well in excess of 12 years after the last date of delivery of the drug (i.e. April 1956) and, therefore, was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1977). [2] After a hearing, summary judgment was entered for Squibb and the Diamonds appeal. Section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1977) clearly requires that product liability actions as in the instant case be brought within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to the original purchaser regardless of when the defect in the product should have been discovered. The present action being filed well after this 12-year period, the trial court correctly entered summary judgment for Squibb. See *1223 Bauld v. J.A. Jones Const. Co.,
357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978). Affirmed. NOTES [1] by proper testing. [2] "§
95.031 LIMITATIONS * * * * * * "(2) Actions for products liability and fraud under subsection (3) of §
95.11 must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of a...
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1992 WL 266
...vileged. The trial court agreed with the defendants that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, and entered a written order dismissing the complaint. The statute of limitations applicable to an action for libel or slander is two years. Section 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). The cause of action for defamation arises "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." Section 95.031(1), Fla....
...In addition, the amendment under consideration dealt with a reduction of the limitations period from four to two years, impacting on section
95.11(4)(g), and having no effect on the statutory section dealing with the question of when the limitation period commences to run; that is, section
95.031(1)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...NOTES [1] This "filing" did not comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(a) and thus was ineffective to amend U.S. Bank's complaint. [2] A cause of action must be complete before a party files a lawsuit. See Trawick, Fla. Prac. and Proc., § 14:8 (2010 ed.); see also § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 613, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 11978
...s affirmed on the authority of Shaw v. General Motors Corp.,
503 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). As in Shaw, we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida the following questions as being of great public importance: I. Should the legislative amendment of Section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), abolishing the statute of repose in product liability actions, be construed to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action which accrued before the effective date of the amendment? II....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 546
...Lefebvre and Marc Cooper, Miami, for appellee. *365 Before BARKDULL, NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed on authority of Shaw v. General Motors Corp.,
503 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). We certify the same questions: (1) Whether the legislative amendment of section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), abolishing the statute of repose in product liability actions, should be construed to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action which accrued before the effective date of the amendment....
...1980), applies so as to bar a cause of action that accrued after the Battilla decision but before the Pullum decision. FERGUSON, Judge, specially concurring. Affirmance is required by Shaw; otherwise I would dissent. The reason for giving the revised section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...1626,
90 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986), effectively shut the courthouse door on a cause of action in certain product liability cases even before the cause of action accrued, leaving a person injured by another private person without a remedy. The 1986 revision to section
95.031(2) was a prompt legislative overruling of Pullum....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 478
...Affirmed on the authority of Shaw v. General Motors Corp.,
503 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). As in Shaw, we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida the following questions as being of great public importance: I. Should the legislative amendment of Section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), abolishing the statute of repose in product liability actions, be construed to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action which accrued before the effective date of the amendment? II....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 479
...Affirmed on the authority of Shaw v. General Motors Corp.,
503 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). As in Shaw, we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida the following questions as being of great public importance: *364 I. Should the legislative amendment of Section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), abolishing the statute of repose in product liability actions, be construed to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action which accrued before the effective date of the amendment? II....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1987 WL 2268
...Whether the Carrs knew or should have known of the "incident" and whether the incident or its effects were fraudulently concealed, their cause of action was permanently barred in December of 1982 by the seven-year statute of repose, if that statute is validly imposed here. Unlike the products liability statute of repose, (section 95.031(2), under which, where fraud is involved, the period runs from "the date of the commission of the alleged fraud") the incident of malpractice begins the period of repose in a medical malpractice case despite fraudulent concealment....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 6479415, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 19638
...repose defense, 1.e., plaintiffs claims were barred as plaintiff could not demonstrate detrimental reliance upon any statements made by defendant on or after May 5, 1982, twelve years prior to the filing of suit by plaintiffs in the Engle case. See § 95.031(2)(a), Fla....
...plaintiffs claim that date of reliance was irrelevant as “the *1052 triggering event set forth in the applicable statute of repose, ‘the date of the commission of the alleged fraud,’ necessarily includes reliance by the plaintiff’) (quoting section 95.031(2)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 790701
...Meros of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, Tallahassee, for Appellee. BROWNING, J. James M. Cassoutt, Cindy L. Cassoutt, his wife ("the Cassoutts") and Judy Kealey (collectively, "Appellants"), appeal a final summary judgment holding their claims barred by section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1986) (repealed effective July 9, 1986), the Florida statute of repose ("the statute")....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 11748, 1991 WL 248417
...The statute of limitations applicable to this products liability case is four years. §
95.11(3)(e). The statute commences to run "from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence... ." §
95.031(2), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 5869998, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 20048
...The statute of limitations for fraud is four years. §
95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (2009). The four years, however, runs “from the time that the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” §
95.031(2)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...The Second District reasoned that such a rule would be barred by our decision in Davis v. Monahan . 4 See
217 So.3d at 1078 . Absent an applicable statutory exception, the Second District concluded, a claim "accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs."
217 So.3d at 1077 (quoting §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 268376
...e., against appellant or plaintiff in error. Id. Based on this definition, we cannot conclude that Simkins' claim was frivolous when filed. Although it is clear that the statute of limitations begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues, § 95.031, Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1224
...Affirmed on the authority of Shaw v. General Motors Corp.,
503 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). We certify the following questions to the Florida Supreme Court as questions of great public importance. As in Shaw: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION
95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS, SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY AS TO A *1161 CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ACCRUED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23387
...Jons-Mansville Corp., 78 App.Div.2d 577, 432 N.Y.S.2d 422 (N.Y. 4th Dept. 1980), affmd., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 446 N.Y. S.2d 244, 430 N.E.2d 1297 (N.Y.Ct.App. 1981). In Florida, however, the limitations period begins to run when the injured party first discovers, or should have discovered, his injury. Fla.Stat. 95.031(2)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 9028, 2001 WL 725681
...But the record contained evidence that Garden Street consented to the presence of the remaining tires and did not withdraw its consent until August 1995, when it sent its demand for their removal. Under the reasoning of Merrill Stevens, only then did the limitations period begin. See also § 95.031, Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 346018
...Barnes,
661 So.2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). A cause of action "accrues" when the last element necessary to constitute the cause of action occurs. See, e.g., County Collection Servs., Inc. v. Allen,
650 So.2d 650, 650 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); see also §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 7578, 1996 WL 396083
...McMurray, Miami, for Pittsburgh Corning Corporation, as amicus curiae. Before BARKDULL, NESBITT and COPE, JJ. NESBITT, Judge. Robert Galotti, decedent of James Corcoran et al., was exposed to asbestos-containing products between 1966 and 1972. The legislature enacted Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes in 1975, imposing a twelve-year limitation on product liability actions....
...He sued the manufacturer in 1980, past the repose period. In 1985, the supreme court affirmed the summary judgment that had been ordered in the manufacturer's favor. In doing so, the court receded from Battilla, and concluded that the legislature, in enacting section 95.031(2), had reasonably decided that perpetual liability placed an undue burden on manufacturers....
...Nonetheless, by footnote, the Pullum court maintained the exception earlier established in Diamond, stating: Pullum also refers to Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1981), as being in accord with Battilla. In Diamond, we held that the operation of section
95.031(2) operated to bar a cause of action before it accrued and thereby denied the aggrieved plaintiff access to the courts....
...an announced public necessity and no less stringent measure would obviate the problems the legislature sought to address, and thus the statute does not violate the access-to-courts provision.") Nor does our decision affect the general application of section 95.031(2), a question settled in Pullum. Rather, Diamond, Pullum, and Conley, confirm our analysis that because a public necessity was never enunciated, demonstrated, or contemplated for application of the now defunct section 95.031(2) to a case such as this one, resulting in a long delay in *295 manifestation of symptoms that will support a medical diagnosis of injury, such application is constitutionally impermissive....
...e has expired for the product in issue, prior to the statute's repeal in 1986. Thus, Owens-Corning asserts it had a right not to be sued since the statute had expired for the asbestos at issue, at the latest in 1984. [2] Florida's statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 10878, 2008 WL 2744386
...1 The City also raises the procedural issue that the statute of limitations bar was not a proper ground for dismissal. Section 95.081, Florida Statutes, instructs that a statute of limitations period runs from the time the cause of action accrues. §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (2005); Margolis v. Andromides,
732 So.2d 507, 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1993 WL 13463
...t providers of health care. Therefore, the final order must be reversed with regard to Civitan, a blood bank. We note that in Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1981), a products liability action, the Florida Supreme Court held section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1977), unconstitutional as applied to bar a suit for injuries to a child resulting from a prenatal drug administered to the child's mother....
...Diamond as follows: Pullum also refers to Diamond v. E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc.,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1981), as being in accord with Battilla [v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,
392 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1980)]. In Diamond, we held that the operation of section
95.031(2) operated to bar a cause of action before it accrued and thereby denied the aggrieved plaintiff access to the courts....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 15 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 33, 1990 Fla. LEXIS 149, 1990 WL 59407
...1985), appeal dismissed,
475 U.S. 1114,
106 S.Ct. 1626,
90 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986). [2] The trial court granted respondents' motions for summary judgment, finding the claims time barred because they were filed after the expiration of the twelve-year statute of repose prescribed in section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...The premise of the majority opinion is erroneous. In Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,
392 So.2d 874, 874 (Fla. 1980), this Court held: The circuit court held that this product liability action was barred by the statute of limitations, section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1975). We reverse on the authority of Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons,
369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979), and hold that, as applied to this case, section
95.031 denies access to courts under article I, section 21, Florida Constitution. See also Purk v. Federal Press Co.,
387 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1980); Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Co.,
357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978). Contrary to the belief of many, we did not hold section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1975), unconstitutional, but held that, as applied to that case, section
95.031 denied access to the courts under article I, section 21, Florida Constitution....
...months after the sale of the equipment which allegedly caused his injury. [1] This differs from the facts in Purk v. Federal Press Co.,
387 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1980), and Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Co.,
357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978), in which we held section
95.031 constitutional....
...that occurred more than twelve years after delivery. Neither Battilla nor Pullum disturbed the line of cases which had recognized a shortened limitation of action. [2] Where the injury occurred within twelve years from the delivery of the equipment section 95.031 shortened the time to bring, but did not prohibit, a cause of action....
...tiffs' cases. This Court's overruling of Battilla in Pullum is of no consequence to them. After his injury, Frazier had over two years in which to file his action; Hearn had seventeen months in which to file his. Their causes of action are barred by section 95.031....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 118210
...THE ADVERSARY PROCEEDING IS NOT BARRED BY A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS In the adversary proceeding, the children maintained that Robert breached his written agreement to provide for them in his will. The statute of limitations on such a claim runs from the date the cause of action accrues. See § 95.031, Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 554, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 11953
...Affirmed on the authority of Shaw v. General Motors Corp.,
503 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). As in Shaw, we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida the following questions as being of great public importance: I. Should the legislative amendment of Section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), abolishing the statute of repose in product liability actions, be construed to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action which accrued *366 before the effective date of the amendment? II....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 80
...Myron Johnson was seriously injured in an accident involving a baseball pitching machine manufactured by Advance [2] and filed suit against several defendants including Advance and Athlone, the alleged distributor. Athlone and Advance both filed motions for summary judgment based on the then existing statute of repose, Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1979), which required actions for products liability to be brought within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser....
...after the date of the product's delivery to the original purchaser. After the hearing on those motions for summary judgment in October 1980, the trial court denied the motions, the trial court basing its determination upon the unconstitutionality of Section 95.031(2) as applied to plaintiff Johnson inasmuch as the subject accident did not occur until after the running of the twelve-year period and the statute's savings clause afforded no time to Johnson to file suit....
...Federal Press Company,
387 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1980) had been decided. Those decisions, the significance of which will be explicated more fully below, were supportive of the trial court's ruling denying Athlone's and Advance's motions for summary judgment based upon the unconstitutionality of Section
95.031(2) as applied....
...Within a few days thereafter, the Florida Supreme Court issued its opinion in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
392 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1980). Consistent with its earlier holding in Overland Construction, and expressly relying thereon, the Supreme Court in Battilla held Section
95.031(2) unconstitutional in its application in barring Battilla's product liability action....
...Five years later, while the contribution action was still pending in the lower court, [3] the Supreme Court receded from its earlier holding in Battilla. In Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.,
476 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1985), the Court, notwithstanding its earlier holding to the contrary, held that Section
95.031(2)'s purported bar of suits filed more than twelve years after delivery of the product was permissible and constitutional even where the accident did not occur until after the expiration of the twelve-year period and the statute's saving clause afforded no time for the plaintiff to file suit....
...ion 21, Florida Constitution. In 1980, a few months prior to Athlone's settlement of Johnson's tort claim, the Supreme Court decided Purk v. Federal Press Co.,
387 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1980). There, the Supreme Court in a product liability case held that Section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975), was not violative of Purk's right of access to Court because her injury occurred less than twelve years after delivery of the product and Section
95.031(2) was not enacted until after the accident, thus giving Purk two years and nine months (counting the one year provided in Chapter 74-382's saving clause) after the accident within which to bring suit....
...e required to institute suit under the standard four year limitation period, did not violate her constitutional right of access to court. Therefore, her right of action was barred since she did not file suit until after the time period prescribed by Section 95.031(2). The reason why Purk is significant in our analysis is because of the Supreme Court's heavy reliance in its consideration of Section 95.031(2) upon Overland Construction, supra, and Bauld v....
...After Purk, it was apparent that the rationale of Overland precluding the bar of Section
95.11(3)(c) from operating against a claim for injuries, which occurred over twelve years after completion of improvements and after the enactment of that section, was equally applicable to Section
95.031(2)'s operation upon the kind of situation which we have in the instant case, i.e....
...a claim for injuries occurring over twelve years after delivery of the product to the original purchaser and enactment of that section. This conclusion was bolstered by the Supreme Court's brief opinion in Battilla which, although dealing with the constitutionality of Section
95.031(2), expressly relied upon Overland and Bauld both of which, as above noted, dealt with a similar statute of repose, Section
95.11(3)(c)....
...Of course, as we earlier noted, the trial court in the tort claim proceeding understandably in view of the then prevailing Supreme Court opinions had denied in October, 1980, Athlone's and Advance's motions for summary judgment by which the movants sought to have the court apply the bar of Section 95.031(2)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 589, 1987 Fla. LEXIS 2548, 1987 WL 2370
...by Ford Motor Company. In affirming the dismissal of her wrongful *1279 death action against Ford predicated upon a theory of product liability, the district court of appeal certified the following questions: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), ABOLISHING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS, SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY TO A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ACCRUED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT? II....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 21391, 2012 WL 6171608
...1st DCA 1977) (citation omitted). Florida’s statute of repose requires that any action “founded upon fraud” be filed within twelve years “after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.” § 95.031(2)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 4081105, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 12726
...That concern is not applicable to the issue of Engle class membership. In products liability cases, the four-year statute of limitations period begins to run “from the date that the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” § 95.031(2)(b), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Therefore, if we assume that the statute was running on January 1, 1975, the last date for filing suit on the note would have been December 31, 1975. Carpenter v. Florida Central Credit Union,
369 So.2d 935 (Fla. 1979). However, this does not take into account the fact that Section
95.031(1), Florida Statutes (1979), which became effective June 27, 1975, specifies that for purposes of the statute of limitations the cause of action on a demand note accrues upon the first written demand for payment....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 9761, 1996 WL 531158
...Section
95.11, Florida Statutes (1995) specifies the applicable period in which a cause of action founded on fraud must be commenced. It provides: (3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS. . . . . (j) A legal or equitable action founded on fraud. When the four years begins to run, however, is controlled by section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1995) which provides: Actions for ......
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 3964705, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 15313
...Davis,
480 So.2d 625, 627 (Fla.1985)). Florida’s statute of repose requires that any action “founded upon fraud” be filed within twelve years “after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.” §
95.031(2)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 17682, 2014 WL 5462468
...Knipp,
982 So.2d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co.,
819 So.2d 732, 734-35 (Fla.2002); Todd v. Johnson,
965 So.2d 255, 257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The statute of limitations begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues. §
95.031, Fla. Stat.; see Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co.,
357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978). A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. §
95.031(1); see Bauld....
...he outset.
403 So.2d at 1100 (citing Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc.,
499 F.2d 996,1002 (5th Cir.1974)). Section
95.11(3)(j) provides that a legal or equitable action founded on fraud must be brought within four years; however, pursuant to section
95.031(2)(a), the period for filing a cause of action founded on fraud does not commence to run until the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or should have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 15915, 2008 WL 4568075
...ected the argument that the limitations period was tolled until the latent defect was discovered. The general rule is that in a suit for breach of contract, the action accrues when the last element giving rise to the cause of action takes place. See § 95.031(1) Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2016 Fla. LEXIS 2422
...assume that Kipnis and Kibler are correct and hold that their claim accrued when
their underlying dispute with the IRS became final.
Generally, “the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute
of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues.” § 95.031, Fla. Stat.
(2013). “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of
-5-
action occurs.” § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 5933030, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 20440
...Similarly, a plaintiff claiming conspiracy to *1151 commit fraudulent concealment in an En-gle progeny case need only prove that he or she detrimentally relied upon deceptive statements made by a member of the conspiracy. Under Florida’s statute of repose — section 95.031, Florida Statutes (2007) — a party’s cause of action “founded upon fraud” must be filed within twelve years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. | 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3925
...two year statute of limitations. However, the Court must consider when the Debtor's claims, and thus the Trustee's claims, accrued under Florida law. A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. Fla. Stat. § 95.031(1)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 2101238, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 7632
...Under the statute of limitations, a negligence action must be commenced within four years of when the cause of action accrued. §
95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2012 WL 830527, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31577
...This suit was filed on September 8, 2010 making September 8, 2006 the critical date for statute of limitations purposes. Under Florida law, the general rule is that “the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues.” Fla. Stat. § 95.031 ....
...laintiff either knows or reasonably should know of the tortious act giving rise to the cause of action.” Raie v. Cheminova, Inc.,
336 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir.2003) (citing Hearndon v. Graham,
767 So.2d 1179, 1184 (Fla.2000)); see also Fla. Stat. §
95.031 (2)....
...e to claims of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. Rather, this Court must apply the general rule that “the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues.” Fla. Stat. § 95.031 ....
...Since the delayed discovery exception does not apply, this Court must determine under the general rule when MWA’s causes of action for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment accrued. Under the general rule, “[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (1)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2004 WL 1418437
...Co.,
790 So.2d 1061, 1065 (Fla.2001) (“[I]n the circumstances presented here, a negligence/malpractice cause of action accrues when the client incurs damages at the conclusion of the related or underlying judicial proceedings .... ”); see also Fla. Stat. §
95.031 (1) (“A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.”)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21584, 1993 WL 237608
...Fla.Stat. §
95.11(3)(j) (1991). The time within which a fraud action must be commenced begins to run "from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence...." Id. at §
95.031(2)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Thus, an e/c's request for a hearing before a deputy commissioner to contest a denial of reimbursement from the Fund is an action founded on a statutory liability. And section
95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that an action founded on a statutory liability shall be commenced within four years. Section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1985), provides generally that the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 3189914, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 10516
...coverage was alleged to have been erroneously denied. See §
95.11(2)(b),
Fla. Stat. (2010) (providing for a five-year limitations period for “[a] legal
or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a
written instrument”); §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 23004
...s purportedly undertook distribution of corporate assets. "A statute of limitations `runs from the time the cause of action accrues' which, in turn, is generally determined by the date `when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.' § 95.031, Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 43516
...me court in Phlieger cautions against narrowly interpreting Perkins as follows: The district court reasoned that since this action was a wrongful death action pursuant to section
768.19 rather than a products liability action, "by its very language, section
95.031(2) does not apply and, rather, the two year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions found in section
95.11(4)(d) applies." 487 So.2d at 1097. Nissan concedes that it is section
95.11(4)(d) rather than section
95.11(3) which is the applicable statute of limitations in this action but argues that the twelve-year statute of repose set forth in section
95.031(2) applies to bar what Nissan characterizes as the underlying products liability cause of action....
...Florida's Wrongful Death Act simply gives the designated beneficiaries a right of action based on the decedent's underlying products liability cause of action. Thus, according to Nissan, because the underlying products liability action is barred by section 95.031(2), Mrs....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...The Delayed Discovery Doctrine
While fraud claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations (see section
95.11(3), Fla. Stat. (2009)), when that four-year limitations period begins to run
depends upon the application of the delayed discovery doctrine. The Florida
Legislature enacted section
95.031(2)(a), which codified the delayed discovery
doctrine, and provides:
An action founded upon fraud under s....
...See §
95.11(3)(o)
(establishing four-year statute of limitations for intentional torts not otherwise
covered by this section); §
95.11(3)(j) (establishing four-year statute of limitations
for fraud). Rather, the relevant question is when that four-year period began to run,
and whether Tejera is authorized by section
95.031(2)(a) to rely on the delayed
discovery doctrine because this claim, regardless of its conspiratorial character, is an
“action founded upon fraud.” There can be no doubt that Tejera’s claim for
conspiracy to perpetrate fr...
...onspiracy, we
must conclude that count 21, as pleaded by Tejera, is an action founded upon fraud.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Tejera’s claim of conspiracy to perpetrate fraud in the inducement
alleged an action “founded upon fraud,” section 95.031(2)(a)’s delayed discovery
doctrine may properly be invoked in determining when the statute of limitations
began to run on this claim....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 541
...n principle or policy between this situation and the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, section 673.122, Florida Statutes (1983), which was enacted in 1977 as an amendment to prior law, that a cause of action on a note accrues as provided in section 95.031(1), which provides that the cause of action accrues upon written demand....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 540
...Parrish of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, P.A., Tampa, for appellee. CAMPBELL, Judge. We are presented once again with the question of whether the legislature's 1986 amendment repealing the twelve-year statute of repose that is contained in section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1985), should be applied retroactively to revive appellants' products liability claim filed on December 3, 1985....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...Wallace, Daytona Beach, for appellants. Kathleen M. O'Connor of Thornton, David & Murray, P.A., Miami, for appellee. COBB, Judge. The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment, based upon the twelve-year statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), which provided: Actions for products liability and fraud under s....
...hin the exception to the general rule. He was not deprived of a property or contract right acquired in reliance upon this Court's decision in Battilla.... Moreover, he did not act in reliance on the Battilla declaration of the unconstitutionality of section 95.031(2) and thereby miss the limitation deadline for filing suit with which he could have otherwise complied....
...at 669 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the judgment entered below is REVERSED. SHARP, C.J., concurs. COWART, J., dissents with opinion. COWART, Judge, dissenting. In 1981, the Florida Supreme Court held that the twelve year products liability statute of repose (section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983)) was unconstitutional....
...He was not deprived of a property or contract right acquired in reliance upon this Court's decision in Batilla. His accident was fortuitous and did not occur as a result of conduct prompted by Batilla. Moreover, he did not act in reliance on the Batilla declaration of the unconstitutionality of section 95.031(2) and thereby miss the limitation deadline for filing suit with which he could have otherwise complied....
...the existing statutory construction to their detriment" which statement is incapable of being rebutted. This will effectively emasculate the decision in Melendez as well as the general rule that Melendez applied to this particular problem involving section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....
...3d DCA), approved
517 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1987); Shaw v. General Motors Corporation,
503 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). [3] See Hampton v. A. Duda & Sons, Inc.,
511 So.2d 1104 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) ("Nor did Hampton act in reliance on the Battilla declaration of the unconstitutionality of section
95.031(3), and thereby miss a limitation deadline for filing suit with which he otherwise could have complied.").
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 12641, 1995 WL 722913
...r if the record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue might exist, summary judgment is improper. Snyder. See also Moore v. Morris,
475 So.2d 666 (Fla. 1985). The statute of limitations begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues. §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (1993). See Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co.,
357 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1978). A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. §
95.031(1)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 1781452
...The trial court concluded that the cause of action accrued, at the very latest, on July 16, 1991, and that Robbat's legal malpractice suit, filed on April 3, 1996, was time-barred. Statute of limitations Generally, a statute of limitations begins to run from the time a cause of action accrues. See § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (1997). A "cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 590, 1987 Fla. LEXIS 2541, 1987 WL 2366
...Wallis was injured in the crash of a Grumman aircraft more than twelve years after delivery of that aircraft to its original purchaser. In affirming the dismissal of his product liability action, the court certified the following questions: I. SHOULD THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS, BE CONSTRUED TO OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY AS TO A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ACCRUED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT? II....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...Garland,
269 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972), cert. denied,
275 So.2d 14 (1973); W. Prosser, Law of Torts, 276, 290 (4th ed. 1971). By cross appeal appellees have assigned as error the trial court's initial denial of their motion for summary judgment based on section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1985), proscribing the bringing of products liability actions more than twelve years after delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...r than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows: ..... (2) WITHIN FIVE YEARS. ..... (b) A legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation or liability founded on a written instrument; Section 3 of Chapter 74-382 codified as Section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1975) prescribed when a cause of action under a demand note accrued; to wit: Except as provided in subsection
95.051(2) and elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues....
...3) was already in effect. That section provided: (1) A cause of action against a maker or an accepter accrues: ..... (b) In the case of a demand instrument upon its date or, if no date is stated, on the date of issue. (emphasis added). *81 Patently, Section
95.031(1), supra, and Section 673.122(1)(b) were in conflict. In that posture, the Commercial Code, which specifically set forth when a cause of action accrued on a demand note governed over the general provisions of Section
95.031(1). See Hughey v. Stevmier, Inc.,
190 So.2d 410 (Fla.2d DCA 1966). The 1975 Legislature adopted Section 1 of Chapter 75-234, Laws of Florida, which amended Section
95.031(1), Florida Statutes, Supplement 1974, by adding a second sentence thereto which provides: For the purposes of this chapter, the last element constituting a cause of action on an obligation or liability founded on a written instrument...
...for payment, notwithstanding that the endorser, guarantor, or other person secondarily liable has executed a separate writing evidencing such liability. (emphasis added). The above amendment became effective June 27, 1975. [2] The 1975 amendment to Section 95.031(1), Florida Statutes, Supplement 1974, is dispositive of the statute of limitations question posed by this appeal....
...If a claim has not been barred when an amending statute lengthens the time within which it must be asserted, then the claimant gets the benefit of the extended period. Walter Denson & Son v. Nelson, Fla. 1956,
88 So.2d 120; Corbett v. General Engineering and Machinery Co.,
160 Fla. 879,
37 So.2d 161. Under Section
95.031(1), Florida Statutes (1975), as amended and augmented by the 1975 Legislature, [3] the time for computing the accrual of a cause of action on certain demand notes was defined to be "the first written demand for payment." The appellee i...
...The complaint, which was commenced on June 19, 1978, was well within that time. For the foregoing reason, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. NOTES [1] §
95.11(1), Fla. Stat. (1973). [2] Under Ch. 77-54, Laws of Fla., there were further amendments to § 673.22(1)(b) as well as §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 308, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 960, 2000 WL 1209984
...In Silvestrone, for example, the Supreme Court of Florida looked to §
95.11(a)(4)(a) for guidance. Generally, in Florida a statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action "accrues," defined as "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." Fla.Stat. §
95.031....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. | 42 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1017, 52 Fed. R. Serv. 1028, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 953
...1117, 1128 (M.D.Ala.1997). A federal court will only borrow as much state law as is necessary to fill in the gaps in the federal law and, because there is an established *876 federal rule for accrual, there is no need to borrow Florida's accrual rules. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.031 ("A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.")....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. | 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1894
...title after the loan was paid off, is a direct violation of Fla.Stat. §
319.24(2), (3) and (5). Servico claims that the statute of limitation bars Plaintiff from seeking the declaratory and injunctive relief it seeks. The Court disagrees. Fla.Stat. §
95.031 provides in relevant part that: "(1) A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
...A cause of action founded upon fraud accrues when the facts giving rise to the cause of action "were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence..." but must commence within 12 years of the date of commission of the fraud. Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Florida | 8 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 289, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 2105, 1994 WL 738829
...1. The statute of limitations is tolled while payments are being made on an installment note. Fla.Stat. §
95.051(f). Upon accrual of a cause of action, e.g. defaulting on a promissory note, the statute of limitations period begins to run. Fla.Stat. §
95.031....
...Debtor/Husband defaulted on the second promissory note in May, 1983, the stated maturity date of the note, by failing to pay it. The limitations period began to run on the second note when the cause of action accrued in May, 1983, also more than five years prior to commencement of this case. Fla.Stat. § 95.031....
...Therefore, any claim based on this promissory note is likewise barred by the statute of limitations. *365 The third promissory note, which "[d]oes not state any time of payment," is "payable on demand" pursuant to F.S. §
673.1081. The statute of limitations begins to run from the date the cause of action accrues. F.S. §
95.031. A cause of action on a "note payable on demand" accrues at the time of the first written demand for payment. F.S. §
95.031(1)....
...§
673.1081 (absent due date, promise is "payable on demand"). In Florida, the statute of limitations on oral contracts is four years. Fla. Stat. §
95.11(3)(k). The limitations period begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues. Fla.Stat. §
95.031....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 1875486
...The general rule for the application of a statute of limitations is that the time for filing an action begins to run when the cause of action accrues, and a cause of action is said to accrue when "the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." § 95.031....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 716163
...nded on a written instrument" shall be brought within four years. Thus, all agree that an action on the oral loan in this case is subject to a four-year statute of limitation. However, at issue is when the four-year limitations period begins to run. Section 95.031, Florida Statutes (2001), provides that "the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues." Section 95.031(1), provides that "[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." Therefore, the dispositive issue is when the cause of action accrues, where, as here, the oral loan does not contain explicit terms for repayment....
...n principle or policy between this situation and the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, section 673.122, Florida Statutes (1983), which was enacted in 1977 as an amendment to prior law, that a cause of action on a note accrues as provided in section 95.031(1), which provides that the cause of action accrues upon written demand....
...payment is made, rather than at the time the loan is made. I also conclude that the majority's policy reasons are flawed. Thus, I would approve the Fourth District Court of Appeal's opinion in Anderson v. Mosher,
758 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Section
95.031, Florida Statutes (2001), provides that "the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues." Furthermore, "[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §
95.031(1), Fla....
...oral loan did not contain repayment terms. At common law, a cause of action on a payable-on-demand note accrued on the date of issuance or delivery. See Ruhl v. Perry,
390 So.2d 353, 356 (Fla.1980); Syerson v. Kimball,
40 So.2d 781, 782 (Fla. 1949). Section
95.031(1), however, changed the common law regarding when a cause of action arising from nonpayment of a negotiable or nonnegotiable note accrues: For the purposes of this chapter, the last element constituting a cause of action on an obligat...
...ny endorser ... *816 is the first written demand for payment.... Both parties agree that because the loan in this case was oral, it did not constitute a "negotiable or nonnegotiable note." Thus, the modification of the common law by the enactment of section 95.031(1) does not control the statute of limitations for the oral loan in this case. If the Legislature had intended for section 95.031(1) to apply to oral loans, it would have specifically included oral loans....
...exclusion of another. See Young v. Progressive Southeastern Ins. Co.,
753 So.2d 80, 85 (Fla.2000). Accordingly, the inclusion of written payable-on-demand loans and written loans that do not include specific maturity dates in the second sentence of section
95.031(1) necessarily implies the exclusion of oral payable-on-demand loans and oral loans that do not contain specific maturity dates. Indeed, the legislative history for the 1977 changes to section
95.031(1) acknowledges that providing that the cause of action on a payable-on-demand note runs from the date of written demand, rather than from issuance " does not follow the generally accepted rule that an action may be brought on a demand note immediately upon issue, without demand....
...Anderson,
758 So.2d at 1178. Therefore, although the majority contends that there is "no valid basis" to distinguish between written payable-on-demand loan agreements and oral payable-on-demand agreements, see majority op. at 814, in fact, both the UCC and section
95.031(1) apply only to written instruments....
...If the cause *819 of action accrues at the time the oral loan is made, a creditor's recourse is either to demand payment within four years from the date the loan was made or require that the oral loan be reduced to writing. In the latter scenario, section 95.031(1) will expressly control and the statute of limitations will not begin to run until demand is made....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1021
...Koehring Co.,
503 So.2d 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). But cf. Dominguez v. Bucyrus-Erie Co.,
503 So.2d 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). As in Shaw, we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida the following question as being of great public importance: I. Should the legislative amendment of section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), abolishing the statute of repose in products liability actions, be construed to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action which accrued before the effective date of the amendment? II....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 9 Fla. L. Weekly 2078, 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 15252
...Halbach, of Marks, Gray, Conroy & Gibbs, Jacksonville, for appellee. THOMPSON, Judge. MacRae appeals a summary final judgment in favor of the defendant Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) which found that the 12-year statute of limitations set out in § 95.031(2), Fla. Stat. barred his products liability claim. MacRae contends that § 95.031(2) is unconstitutional as applied to him, that § 95.031(2) unconstitutionally denies *1094 him equal protection of law, and that there remain genuine issues of material fact which should have precluded summary judgment....
...On April 20, 1977, the passengers of this aircraft filed suit against numerous defendants, including appellant-MacRae and appellee-Cessna. MacRae filed a cross-claim against Cessna and other defendants on September 7, 1977. Cessna asserted the affirmative defense, among others, that the statute of limitations set forth in § 95.031(2) had run....
...The trial court entered summary final judgment in favor of Cessna because MacRae's cross-claim was filed more than 12 years after May 27, 1965, the date the aircraft in question was delivered as a completed product to the original purchaser and the date the §
95.031(2) statute of limitations began to run. MacRae appeals this summary judgment. Sections
95.11(3) and
95.031(2) provide that products liability actions must be commenced within four years of the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, but that in any event such actions must be commenced within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser, without regard to the date the defect in the product was or should have been discovered. Section
95.031(2) creates an absolute bar to the filing of a products liability case more than 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to the original purchaser. At first glance it would appear that neither of appellant's contentions as to the unconstitutionality of §
95.031(2) has any merit in view of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Purk v. Federal Press Company,
387 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1980), which held that §
95.031(2) does not deny equal protection of laws and does not deny right of access to the courts. Purk specifically held §
95.031 constitutional against an equal protection challenge because it rationally treated differently persons in different circumstances....
...ould be commenced. Although shortened, the court found that the one-year extension of time for bringing the suit was ample and reasonable and that it did not altogether forestall the bringing of an action. MacRae contends that the time limitation in § 95.031(2) is unconstitutional as applied to him because the time for filing his action could have expired only two or three days after his cause of action arose....
...a completed product to its original purchaser. In the recent case of Universal Engineering Corp. v. Perez,
451 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1984), the court, in interpreting §
95.11(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (which for purposes of this opinion is identical in effect to §
95.031(2), Fla....
...." Foley v. Morris,
339 So.2d 215, 216 (Fla. 1976). The enactment of the savings clause, § 95.022, manifests a legislative intent to retrospectively shorten the period and there was a reasonable time within which MacRae could have filed suit in this case. Section
95.031(2) is therefore constitutional as applied to MacRae....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12916, 1989 WL 129190
...Whether Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Florida statute of repose; and 2. Whether Plaintiffs state a cause of action against Defendants for marketing defective DES where Plaintiffs admittedly cannot establish that a particular defendant was responsible for their injuries. I Florida's statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Fla.Stat....
...s.
95.11(3), but in any event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser ... regardless of the date of the defect in the product ... was or should have been discovered. Florida's statute of repose, section
95.031(2), precludes a cause of action based upon products liability if brought more than twelve years after the product was sold, regardless of when the cause of action actually accrues....
...rom the date of sale is a reasonable time for exposure to liability for manufacturing of a product." Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.,
476 So.2d 657, 659 (Fla.), reh'g denied, (1985), appeal dismissed,
475 U.S. 1114,
106 S.Ct. 1626,
90 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986). Section
95.031(2) became effective in 1975 and has since been held to apply to products placed in the market before its effective date. Pullum,
476 So.2d 657 (statute applied to a press brake which reached its first purchaser in November 1966). Hence, section
95.031(2) applies to the instant action despite the fact that the product in question, DES, was placed in the "stream of commerce" prior to the statute's effective date of enactment. The Florida Legislature amended section
95.031(2) in 1986, so as to repeal the statute of repose in products liability actions. 1986 Fla. Laws 272. The amendment became effective as of July 1, 1986. However, the Supreme Court of Florida has held that the amendment is not retroactive in effect. Melendez v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co.,
515 So.2d 735 (Fla.1987). Hence, section
95.031(2) remains in effect with regard to this action....
...ued, would deny plaintiff access to the courts in violation of article I, section 21, of the Florida Constitution. Receding from this line of precedent, however, the Supreme Court of Florida in Pullum,
476 So.2d 657, overruled Battilla and held that section
95.031(2) should be uniformly applied even though, as thus applied, it might bar a cause of action before the cause of action accrues. With regard to Battilla, the Court stated that "... we recede from this decision and hold that section
95.031(2) is not unconstitutionally violative of article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution." Id....
...The Pullum Court, however, inserted a brief caveat in a footnote to the opinion, which restricted the Court's holding: Pullum also refers to Diamond v. E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc ., ... as being in accord with Battilla. In Diamond, we held that the operation of section 95.031(2) operated to bar a cause of action before it accrued and thereby denied the aggrieved plaintiff access to the courts....
...Melendez merely resolved the issue of whether Pullum applied retroactively. Thus, absent a specific statement to the contrary, Melendez did not alter Pullum in any manner, and the opinion rendered in Diamond remains the law in Florida for cases involving DES claims. In accord with Diamond, section 95.031(2) violates the Florida Constitution's guarantee of access to the courts under the facts of this case because Plaintiffs' right of action under the statute would have been barred before it ever existed....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2016 WL 6459829, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151306
...mation to the authorities. Accordingly, all of Plaintiffs’ claims fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). B. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Barred by Florida’s Statute of Limitations Under § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...n April 30, 1983 crashed, killing Kirchner's decedent. On April 26, 1985, less than two years later, Kirchner sued General Dynamics for wrongful death based on a products liability theory. The 12 year statute of repose on products liability actions, § 95.031(2), Fla....
...Motion for rehearing is denied. However, because this case presents a question of great public importance and because of the conflict in the decisions of the district courts of appeal we certify the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida: DOES THE STATUTE OF REPOSE, § 95.031(2) FLA....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1854
...Accordingly, despite the fact that by 2006, the debt underlying the 1986 Note was barred by Florida’s statute of limitations, the debt was revived in 2008 and again in 2010. This revived debt is now represented by the Restated Note. The Restated Note is payable on demand. Florida Statute Section 95.031 provides that “the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues.” 14 Section 95.031(1) in turn provides that a “cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” 15 Where a note is payable on demand, the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run on the date that demand for payment is first made and there has been a failure to pay....
...See In re Bavelis,
490 B.R. 258, 308 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2013); In re White,
168 B.R. 825, 829 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994). . Fla. Stat. §
95.11 (2)(b) (2016). . See Fla. Stat. §
95.04 ; Nolden v. Nolden,
650 So.2d 84, 85 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). . Fla. Stat. §
95.031 ....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1380, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 8524
...more than thirty years before the product allegedly injured the plaintiff in September 1982. The plaintiff did not appeal the judgment, apparently accepting the trial court's conclusion that the revitalization of the twelve-year repose provision of Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), in Pullum v....
...avoided by a revival of an earlier action through the vehicle of a Rule 1.540(b)(5) motion. *1199 Lastly, we certify the following questions to the Supreme Court of Florida as being of great public importance: I. Should the legislative amendment of Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), abolishing the statute of repose in product liability actions, be construed to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action which accrued before the effective date of the amendment? II....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1993 WL 210574
...The court reaffirmed this position in Melendez v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing *1021 Co.,
515 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1987), interpreting a statute repealing the statute of repose in products liability actions. The court stated in Melendez that the 1986 legislation pertaining to section
95.031(2) did not apply retroactively because the mere statement that the statute became effective on July 1, 1986 was not sufficient clear and express manifestation of intent for retroactive effect....
...The grandfather thus claims that once the limitations period expired, a defendant acquired a vested right not to be sued. The grandfather relies on Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Acosta,
612 So.2d 1361 (Fla. 1992), another product liability/statute of repose case where the court dealt with the same 1986 amendment to section
95.031(2) as it did in Melendez....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 98003
...ngful death action against Firestone and Kelsey Hayes, the manufacturers of the component parts of the rim assembly. Firestone and Kelsey Hayes moved for summary judgment alleging that Acosta's claim was time-barred under the 1975 Statute of Repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes. [1] In response, Acosta alleged that her cause of action was viable under the current version of section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes, which repealed the twelve-year statute of repose in products liability actions....
...he initial purchaser and seven and one-half years after the twelve-year repose period had expired. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment finding that the twelve-year repose period had expired while section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975), was still in force and effect and constitutional and that, therefore, the plaintiff's cause of action was extinguished before it ever accrued....
...Then, in 1985, the Florida Supreme Court, in Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.,
476 So.2d 657, 659 (Fla. 1985), receded from Battilla and held that the statute of repose is "not unconstitutionally violative of the Florida Constitution." The following year, the Florida legislature amended section
95.031(2) to repeal the twelve-year statute of repose in products liability actions....
...1987), held that the legislative amendment abolishing the statute of repose in products liability actions did not apply retrospectively to an action that arose before the effective date of the amendment. Based upon the plain language of the 1986 amendment and case law interpreting the repealed and current versions of section
95.031(2), we conclude that the repealed statute of repose is inapplicable here and that a products liability action may be maintained under sections
95.031(2) and
95.11, Florida Statutes (1987). [3] We agree with Judge Ryskamp's interpretation in Daniell that the Florida Supreme Court in Melendez, by holding that the repeal of section
95.031(2) does not operate retroactively, "merely provided a definite date, the effective date of the amendment, to break cleanly with past policy regarding repose in products liability actions....
...Co., 16 F.L.W. 1386,
1991 WL 82508 (Fla. 4th DCA May 22, 1991). Furthermore, because this case presents a question of great public importance, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court: DOES THE NOW REPEALED STATUTE OF REPOSE, SECTION
95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1975), BAR A PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION WHERE THE LAW IN EFFECT AT THE TIME THE DECEDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED WOULD HAVE PERMITTED HIM TO MAINTAIN A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION IF HE WERE ALIVE....
...se of due diligence, ... but in any event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser ... regardless of the date the defect in the product ... was or should have been discovered. (Emphasis added) [2] Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that "actions for products liability under s....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100503, 2015 WL 4623733
...The twelve-year statute of reposes for fraud claims in Florida provides that “an action for fraud under §
95.11(3) must be begun within -12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the *1348 fraud was or should have been discovered.” Fla. Stat. §
95.031 (2)(a)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
cause of action accrues[.]" Id. at 115 ; accord §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (2012). "A cause of action for defamation
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 128330
...pellant have specific damages upon which to bring suit. Florida law is clear that it is the accrual of a cause of action which commences the running of the statute of limitations. Penthouse North Assoc., Inc. v. Lombardi,
461 So.2d 1350 (Fla. 1984); §
95.031, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 126
...f machinery was originally delivered under a lease agreement. The trial judge was of the opinion that an actual sale, not merely a lease, must occur to activate the statute and we agree. The head note to Chapter 78-418, Laws of Florida, which became section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1985) stated: "An act relating to products liability actions; providing that the liability of a manufacturer or seller of a product be based on the knowledge and technology in existence at the time the product was originally sold....
...ithin 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the defect in the product or the fraud was or should have been discovered. (emphasis supplied) Similarly, the Melendez case contains the following language: Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), was a statute of repose which precluded actions based on products liability if they were bought more than twelve years after the product was sold....
...rther provides that "the lessee agrees that the equipment is to be returned ... to the lessor's storage yard at Aurora, Illinois ... upon expiration of the rental period." This cause is affirmed. AFFIRMED. ANSTEAD and GUNTHER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1985), amended by section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 546, 2010 WL 255984
...e time for filing a claim for the costs of incarceration did not begin to run until Appellant filed his action for damages against DOC. This was error. The statute of limitations begins to run when the last element of the cause of action occurs. See § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 471, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2300, 2007 WL 2043880
...mestead property. The Debtor also contends that DIRECTV's claim to establish an equitable lien or constructive trust upon the Debtor's Home and ESOP are time barred pursuant to the applicable statutes of limitation set forth in Sections
95.11(3) and
95.031(1) of the Florida Statutes....
...§§
222.30(5) (Fraudulent asset conversions), and
95.11(Limitations other than for the recovery of real property).(2006). Pursuant to these Sections, DIRECTV'S action to recover on the alleged equitable liens must have been brought within four *536 years of the accrual of the claim. See Fla. Stat. §
95.031 (2006)("[T]he time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues." and "A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.")....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 293019
...*478 It is well settled that "[a] cause of action for general negligence must be commenced within four years." Nale v. Montgomery,
768 So.2d 1166, 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); §
95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). "A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 4553011
...uded by the language of the Mutual Release Agreement. "[A] cause of action is said to accrue when `the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.'" Maggio v. Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec.,
910 So.2d 876, 878 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (quoting §
95.031, Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...nt in favor of the plaintiff. This appeal ensued. The appellants contend that the Ionatas had to bring suit within four years from the time when the last element constituting the cause of action occurred, which was the execution of the contract. See §
95.031, Florida Statutes. Therefore, both claims would have been barred by November, 1980, the date the action was filed. On the other hand, the appellees contend that section
95.11(3)(j), as modified by section
95.031(2), applies so that the four-year period did not begin to run until the "constructive fraud" (breach of a fiduciary duty) was discovered by the Ionatas, which occurred when they were told by their new accountant that the lands were overpriced. Given the jury finding that there was no fraud, the appellees argue that breach of a fiduciary duty is a cause of action separate from fraud or rescission (thereby attempting to escape the consequences of section
95.11[3][j] and [ l ] and section
95.031), and that it is also a "constructive fraud" (thereby attempting to gain the benefit of section
95.031[2])....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 156382
...She alleged that in July of 1988 a defective machine manufactured by Miller Electric and delivered by Air Products accidentally caused the decedent's death. The machine was manufactured and delivered in 1971. Appellees moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of repose, section 95.031(2) of the Florida Statutes, barred the action....
...ate prescribed elsewhere in s.
95.11(3), but in any event an action for fraud under s.
95.11(3) must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered. §
95.031(2), Fla....
...Although Acosta is not binding on this court, the reasoning therein is thorough and persuasive. The opinion focused on the fact that the statute of repose expired when the statute of repose was still in force and effect and constitutional. [2] In Acosta and here the statute of repose ran, then section 95.031(2) was repealed and amended through the enactment of a statute of limitation, then the cause of action accrued....
...at the repeal of the statute of repose sub judice could not affect appellees' vested right to not be sued. Finally, as Acosta noted, the wording of section
11.2425 of the Florida Statutes, enacted during the same session when the legislature amended section
95.031(2), is an expression of legislative intent and highly persuasive support for the Nelson line of reasoning: The repeal of any statute by the adoption and enactment of Florida Statute 1987 ......
...shall not affect any right accrued before such repeal. Melendez, relied on by appellant, is factually distinguishable. The Florida Supreme Court in Melendez responded negatively to the following certified question: Should the legislative amendment of section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), abolishing the Statute of Repose in products liability actions be construed to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action which accrues before the effective date of the amendment? Here the cause of action (the accident) accrued after the effective date of the amendment....
...o appellant as a result of the machine manufactured or delivered by appellees. Appellees established that the statute of repose had run. However, we certify the following question to be of great public importance: DID THE REPEALED STATUTE OF REPOSE, SECTION 95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), GIVE A MANUFACTURER OR A DELIVERER OF THE COMPLETED PRODUCT A VESTED RIGHT NOT TO BE SUED FOR AN ACCIDENT THAT OCCURRED AFTER THE DATE OF REPEAL? AFFIRMED....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 73, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15622
...The defendant raises nine affirmative defenses, which the plaintiff has moved to strike. The Court will consider the defenses seriatum. The first affirmative defense presents a threshold question in the case. The defendant asserts that the claims are barred by Florida's twelve-year statute of limitations, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes, which provides: Actions for product liability ......
...The Supreme Court of Florida has applied the Overland Construction doctrine to invalidate the very statute under consideration in this case. In Batilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
392 So.2d 874 (Fla.1981), the Court held that, as applied to a "product liability action ...[,] section
95.031 denies access to courts under article I, section 21, Florida Constitution." Id. In Diamond v. Squibb and Sons, Inc.,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1981), the Court held that section
95.031(2) was invalid to bar a "negligence and product liability" action by a young woman whose mother had taken the company's diethystilbestrol product during pregnancy....
...To apply the twelve-year limitation would abolish the right by removing the ability to sue before the injury occurred. See Diamond, Batilla, and Overland Construction. Therefore, applying the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida, this Court holds that the twelve-year statute of limitations, section 95.031, Florida Statutes (Supp....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...Florida’s fraud statute of repose provides in part:
[I]n any event an action for fraud under s.
95.11(3) must be
begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the
alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should
have been discovered.
§
95.031(2)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida
...,
22 F.Supp.3d 1240 , 1247 n. 2 (S.D. Fla. 2014), aff'd (Feb. 17, 2015) (quoting *1304 Fortson v. Colangelo ,
434 F.Supp.2d 1369 , 1378 n. 11 (S.D. Fla. 2006) ).The limitations period begins running from the time the cause of action accrues. Fla. Stat. §
95.031 ....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 1148644
...Before WELLS, CORTIAS, and ROTHENBERG, JJ. WELLS, Judge. John and Elizabeth Kish appeal from a final summary judgment, wherein the trial court ruled in favor of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company "on the basis of the statute of repose for fraud claims as described in ß 95.031, Fla....
...Kish's injuries because during the 1930's and 1940's, Metropolitan Life allegedly agreed, at the request of a number of its co-conspirator group policy holders, not to "fully share with the public" the results of industrial hygiene surveys and studies it had performed. The court below ruled that section 95.031(2)(a), the fraud statute of repose, [1] barred the Kishes' fraud claims....
...an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown. The statute of repose as applied to this case satisfies this test. First, although the Legislature, through section 95.031(2)(a), has foreclosed the Kishes' stale fraud claim, it has provided them with a reasonable alternative remedy via the Diamond exception, now codified in sections 95.031(2)(c) and (d) of the Florida Statutes....
...In sum, the test set out in Kluger has been met in this case. Thus we reject the claim that application of the statute of repose resulted in an unconstitutional denial of access to the courts as to these litigants. Accordingly, we affirm. NOTES [1] Section 95.031(2)(a) provides: An action founded upon fraud under s....
...ife, we nonetheless review the trial court's ruling on this point. [3] Diamond's continued applicability to products liability actions was recently reconfirmed in Pulmosan Safety Equipment Corp. v. Barnes,
752 So.2d 556, 559 (Fla.2000). [4] Sections
95.031(2)(c) and (d) provide: (c) The repose period prescribed in paragraph (b)[addressing product liability claims] does not apply if the claimant was exposed to or used the product within the repose period, but an injury caused by such exposure or use did not manifest itself until after expiration of the repose period....
...[5] Those few courts addressing Florida's fraud statute of repose have deemed it constitutional: The complaint generally alleges in Count III that Defendant [tobacco company] intentionally concealed known information about the dangerous and addictive qualities of their product.... ... On its face, section 95.031(2) clearly bars Plaintiffs' fraud claim to the extent that it is based on fraudulent conduct committed more than twelve years before the institution of this action. * * * * ... Plaintiffs argue that the statute of repose contained in section 95.031(2) is invalid as an unconstitutional denial of access to courts .......
...on. See Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla.1981); Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons,
369 So.2d 572 (Fla.1979); Vilardebo v. Keene Corp.,
431 So.2d 620 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The cases cited by Plaintiffs do not require a finding that section
95.031(2) is unconstitutional as applied to this case.......
...s expired); see also Damiano v. McDaniel,
689 So.2d 1059, 1061 n. 4 (Fla. 1997) (rejecting reliance on Diamond because that decision was made years before recent decisions involving statutes of repose). In further support of the constitutionality of section
95.031(2) is Armbrister v. Roland Intern. Corp.,
667 F.Supp. 802, 811 (M.D.Fla.1987), holding that section
95.031(2), as applied to fraud actions, does not deny access to courts. One Florida case, Kempfer v. St. Johns River Water Management District,
475 So.2d 920, 924 n. 14 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), states in a footnote that section
95.031(2) constitutes an unconstitutional denial of access to courts....
...Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,
392 So.2d 874 (Fla.1980). Diamond and Overton are distinguishable as stated in this Order, and Battilla has been overruled by Pullum. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established that the generous twelve-year statute of repose for fraud actions in section
95.031(2) is unconstitutional. See Puchner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc.,
553 So.2d 216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (applying section
95.031(2) to extinguish claims based on fraud that occurred outside the twelve-year statute of repose)....
...r of litigation"; and (3) "[p]romote security and stability in human affairs by stimulating activity and punishing negligence." See Thomas E. Bevis, Florida Revision Council, Project on Statutes of Limitations: Some Policy Considerations (1972). [7] Section 95.031(2)(a), when first enacted provided for a twelve year statute of repose for both products liability and fraud claims....
...inated the twelve year statute of repose applicable to fraud claims as well. See Fla. S. Comm. On Com., CS/SB 821 (May 26, 1986). In 1990, the Legislature reenacted the fraud statute of repose without change. Finally in 1999, the Legislature amended section 95.031 to reenact a statute of repose for products liability, but again chose not to change statute of repose for fraud....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 4498, 2011 WL 1198272
...m, “Florida case law consistently holds that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues and the limitations period commences at the time of the breach.” Technical Packaging, Inc. v. Hanchett,
992 So.2d 309, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); see also §
95.031(1) (“A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.”)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 39 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1332, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16481, 1997 WL 656198
...The applicable statute of limitations in Florida for regulatory taking is four years. See Baker v. Gulf & Western Indus.,
850 F.2d 1480, 1481 (11th Cir.1988); Fla.Stat. Ann. §
95.11(3) (1995). Plaintiff filed this action six years and several months after the events leading to this claim. Additionally, §
95.031, Florida Statutes, states that the statute of limitations period begins to run "from the time the cause of action accrues." A Fifth Amendment regulatory taking claim accrues when state authorities make a final determination on the status of the subject of the property affected by the ordinance....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1977 Fla. App. LEXIS 16944
...She contends it was not until that time that she could have known of any cause of action she may have against the Department. This, of course, would be after the effective date of Section
768.28. This cause of action, sounding as it does in fraud, 1 accrues when the fraud or deceit was or should have been discovered. Section
95.031(1), Florida Statutes (1975); Tullo v....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 12730
...Barnes claimed that he was exposed to the silica dust from 1972 to 1974. The manufacturers denied the material allegations of Barnes’ complaint and argued that Barnes’ action was barred by the now-repealed products liability statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....
...ngal infection known as actinomycosis. Barnes testified that he did not know that his lung problems were related to silicosis or exposure to silica dust until 1992, and that the diagnosis of silicosis was not confirmed by tissue analysis until 1995. Section 95.031, Florida Statutes (1975), the statute of repose for products liability cases, eliminated any cause of action based on fraud or products liability filed more than twelve years after the fraud was committed or after the product was sold to its original purchaser....
...Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla.1981). In Diamond , a pregnant woman ingested the drug diethylstilbes-trol (DES) from 1955 to 1956. The daughter born of the pregnancy developed cancer in 1976 allegedly as a result of the mother’s ingestion of the drug. Section
95.031, Florida Statutes, was in effect at the time the action in Diamond was brought....
...The appellant sued the manufacturer in 1980, more than twelve years after the date of delivery. The supreme court, in affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer, expressly receded from Battilla and held that section
95.031(2) did not violate the right of access to the courts guaranteed under article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. The court explained that the legislature enacted section
95.031(2) because it found that “perpetual liability places an undue burden on manufacturers,” and because “twelve years from the date of sale is a reasonable time for exposure to liability for manufacturing of a product.” Pullum,
476 So.2d at 659 . However, the Pullum court distinguished Diamond , stating: Pullum also refers to Diamond v. E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc.,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla.1981), as being in accord with Battilla . In Diamond , we held that the operation of section
95.031(2) operated to bar a cause of action before it accrued and thereby denied the aggrieved plaintiff access to the courts....
...Were it applicable, there certainly would have been a denial of access to the courts. Pullum,
476 So.2d at 659 n*. The Third District Court of Appeal, in Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Corcoran,
679 So.2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), review denied,
690 So.2d 1300 (Fla.1997), held that applying section
95.031(2) to facts similar to those alleged in the instant case “would result in an unconstitutional denial of access to the court.” Corcoran,
679 So.2d at 294 ....
...On appeal, the Corcoran court, in affirming, held that Diamond was still viable, and added: Diamond, Pullum, and Conley confirm our analysis that because a public necessity was never enunciated, demonstrated, or contemplated for application of the now defunct section 95.031(2) to a case such as this one, resulting in a long delay in manifestation of symptoms that will support a medical diagnosis of injury, such application is constitutionally impermissive....
...announced public necessity and no less stringent measure would obviate the problems the legislature sought to address, and thus the statute does not violate the access-to-courts provision.”) Nor does our decision affect the general application of section 95.031(2), a question settled in Pullum ....
...SQUIBB & SONS, INC.,
397 So.2d 671 (Fla.1981), STILL VIABLE IN VIEW OF THE COURT’S RECENT DECISIONS HOLDING THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF REPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL? REVERSED and remanded for consistent proceedings. JOANOS, J. and SHIVERS, DOUGLASS B., Senior Judge, concur. . Section
95.031, effective January 1, 1975, and repealed July 1, 1986, provided: Computation of time....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 85 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 83, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154767, 2014 WL 5522478
...[or] [a]ny action not specifically provided for in these statutes” must be commenced within four years from the time the cause of action accrues. *1350 “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (1)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 5349381, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 18963
...Inasmuch as Appellants reside in Miami-Dade or Broward County, and no property is at issue, our resolution of the issue in this case requires us to determine where the action accrued. *535 A cause of action accrues when the last element necessary to complete it occurs. § 95.031(1), Fla....
...statute of limitations. The limitations period for claims arising out of the Fraudulent Transfer Act expires “within 4 years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.” §
726.110(2), Fla. Stat. (2010) (emphasis added); see also §
95.031, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, N.D. Florida | 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130131, 2009 WL 7115136
...eriod running from the date that the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, rather than running from any other date prescribed elsewhere in s.
95.11(3). Fla. Stat. §
95.031(2)(b)(2008)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2017 WL 4546114
runs from the time the cause of action accrues.” §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (2013). “A cause of action accrues
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2007 WL 4179807
...District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. November 28, 2007. Heyward A. Bradman, for appellant. Garbett, Stiphany, Allen & Roza and David S. Garbett and Angela Sherrill, Miami, for appellees. Before GERSTEN, C.J., and GREEN, and ROTHENBERG, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 95.031, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2015 WL 7272738
constituting the cause of action occurs.” Fla. Stat. §
95.031. However, circumstances can *1170arise that necessitate
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...cause of action has
occurred within five years preceding the date the suit was filed, or the statute is tolled from some
reason.
The limitations period begins to run when “the last element constituting the cause of action
occurs.” § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...2010 to the filing the second
complaint. Thus, having limited its recovery only to those defaults
occurring within five years of the second lawsuit, BNY’s action was not
barred by the statute of limitations. See §
95.11(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2015); §
95.031, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida
...product more than 12 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a component in the manufacture of another product." Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (2)(b)....
...ought more than 20 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product in the component in the manufacture of another product." Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (2)(b)(3)....
...as defective in the manner alleged by the claimant and took affirmative steps to conceal the defect. Any claim of concealment under this section shall be made with specificity and must be based upon substantial factual and legal support." Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (2)(d)....
...Because Plaintiffs fail to cite to a single person at Piper who had actual knowledge of any problem with the stabilator or to any affirmative steps taken by anyone at Piper to conceal the alleged defect, their claims are barred under Florida Statute § 95.031(2)(d)....
...red evidence that any of Piper's officers, directors, partners, or managing agents had actual knowledge that the product was defective and took affirmative steps to conceal it, as required for the statute of repose to be tolled under Florida Statute § 95.031(2)(d)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2017 WL 1076928, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 3777
...“A statute of limitations ‘runs from the time the cause of action accrues’ which, in turn, is generally determined by the date ‘when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.’ ” Heamdon v. Graham,
767 So.2d 1179, 1184-85 (Fla. 2000) (quoting §
95.031, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77917, 2013 WL 2363233
...aintiffs from challenging the validity of the contracts. In Florida, fraud-based claims have a four-year statute of limitations running from the date that the fraud was, or with due diligence should have been, discovered. Fla. Stat. §
95.11 (3)(j); §
95.031(2)(a)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1996 WL 350166
...tionality? 2) If the "reliance exception" is still viable, could Mosher have justifiably relied on the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
392 So.2d 874 (Fla.1980)? Id. at 917. Florida's former statute of repose, section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1985), was enacted in 1974 and barred products liability claims that were brought more than twelve years after the date of delivery of the completed product to the original purchaser, regardless of the date the defect in the product was or should have been discovered....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 2361748, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 10122
...1st DCA 1977) (citation omitted). Florida’s statute of repose requires that any action “founded upon fraud” be filed within twelve years “after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the fraud was or should have been discovered.” § 95.031(2)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1989 WL 67462
...nce have been truthfully and fully represented. 27 Fla. Jur.2d 294 Fraud and Deceit § 10 (1981). Undue influence is treated as fraud in general. Peacock v. DuBois,
90 Fla. 162,
105 So. 321 (1925); Heasley v. Evans,
104 So.2d 854 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958). Section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that an action based upon fraud must be begun within the time periods prescribed in section
95.11(3), with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discove...
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...f limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." §
95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). The statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues. §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (2014). This occurs "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 10904, 2008 WL 2774434
...However, the trial court ruled that the Stimpsons’ claims were barred by Florida’s products liability statute of repose, which provides that any claim arising out of a product defect cannot be brought more than twelve years after the date of the first sale to a consumer. § 95.031(2)(b), Fla....
...Mrs. Stimpson was not injured within the twelve-year statutory period. Based on our reading of the controlling statute, this ruling was incorrect. At issue in this case is a tolling provision within Florida’s products liability statute of repose. Section 95.031(2)(d) provides: The repose period described within paragraph (b) is tolled for any period during which the manufacturer through its officers, directors, partners, or managing agents had actual knowledge that the product was defective i...
...The statute provides that the “[twelve year] repose period ... is tolled [, or stopped,] for any period during which the manufacturer ... had actual knowledge that the product was defective ... and took affirmative steps to conceal the defect.” § 95.031(2)(d), Fla....
...The Stimpsons should have been given the opportunity to prove concealment by Ford and to demonstrate that their claims were not barred by the statute of repose. The trial court improperly granted summary judgment on the ruling that Mrs. Stimpson had to be injured within twelve years of the initial consumer sale. Section 95.031(2)(d) provides that the statutory clock is tolled for any time during which Ford actively concealed a defect....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1746, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 9405
...The plaintiff in this personal injury products liability suit appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant. The injury was allegedly caused by a defective gun manufactured by defendant. The basis for the summary judgment was that the suit was barred by the statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1985), because the gun was delivered to its original purchaser more than twelve years before this suit was filed....
...Shaw, Small and Pait held that the 1986 repeal of the statutory repose period was not retroactive. [1] Shaw, Small, Pait, Cassidy and West and Conyers were to the effect that, as stated in Shaw, "the overruling [by Pullum ] of a decision [in Battilla ] holding a statute [section
95.031(2) in pertinent part] unconstitutional validates the statute as of its effective date."
503 So.2d at 363....
...the twelve-year period, the applicability of which was retroactively reinstated by Pullum, had expired before this suit was filed. Shaw and Pait certified the following questions to the Florida Supreme Court: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS, SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY AS TO A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ACCRUED *345 BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT....
...a remedy... . Pullum ... effectively shut the courthouse door on a cause of action in certain product liability cases even before the cause of action accrued, leaving a person injured by another private person without a remedy. The 1986 revision to section 95.031(2) was a prompt legislative overruling of Pullum....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74778, 2011 WL 2693669
...The statute stated in relevant part: Actions for products liability ... must be begun ... within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser ... regardless of the date the defect in the product ... was or should have been discovered. Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (2) (1975)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
...th Cir. 2000)). Under Florida law, a cause of action accrues or begins to run for purposes of the statute of limitations upon the occurrence of the last element of the cause of action. Davis v. Monahan,
832 So.2d 708, 709 (Fla. 2002); see Fla. Stat. §
95.031 ....
...However, products liability claims are subject to an exception, “in which the accrual of the cause[ ] of action is delayed until the plaintiff either knows or should know that the last element of the cause of action occurred.” Davis,
832 So.2d at 709 ; see Fla. Stat. §
95.031 (2)(b)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2013 WL 125729, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5408
...As the Court indicated to the parties at oral argument, however, only the first of these issues is dispositive. Principally, in their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by a statute of repose applicable to products liability actions in Florida. Section 95.031 of the Florida Statutes precludes products liability claims under certain circumstances: An action for products liability under s....
...if the harm was caused by exposure to or use of the product more than 12 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a component in the manufacture of another product, whichever is later. Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (2)(b) (emphasis added)....
...is tolled for any period during which the manufacturer through its officers, directors, partners, or managing agents had actual knowledge that the product was defective in the manner alleged by the claimant and took affirmative steps to conceal the defect.” Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (2)(d)....
...abrupt maneuvers. (DE 72, at 3.) Given that the statute of repose required knowledge and concealment “in the manner alleged by the claimant,” and that “[a]ny claim of concealment under this section shall be made with specificity” Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (2)(d), Toyota asserted that there was insufficient evidence for Plaintiffs to maintain claims related to defects in roof strength based on evidence directed to handling and stability....
...The repose statute requires “actual knowledge that the product was defective in the manner alleged by the claimant” and that fact must be known to “the manufacturer through its officers, directors, partners, or managing agents.” Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (2)(d)....
...own that Toyota should have understood more, there was no evi *1313 dence adduced that Toyota had actual knowledge of a roof defect. B. Concealment A second requirement of the statute of repose is that the manufacturer conceal the defect. Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (2)(d)....
...applicable to products liability actions. Nevertheless Section
95.03l(2)(d) specifies that there must be "actual knowledge.” Fla. Stat §
95.03l(2)(d). Given the legislature's clear pronouncement, there is no doubt that concealment for purposes of Section
95.031(2)(d) requires knowledge....
...Iowa Code § 614 . l(2A)(a)). . Additionally, as with all of Plaintiffs’ evidence, it is not apparent that whatever defect the tests showed was known by an officer, director, partner or managing agent, as is required by the statute. See Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (2)(d)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 2616
...This is more than amply illustrated by the extensive litigation ensuing from the court's decision in Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.,
476 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1985), to recede from the majority decision in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
392 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1980) (holding unconstitutional the statute of repose in section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes), based on an apparent change of mind expressed in the court's newly found agreement with the dissent in Battilla, and the court's subsequent decision to give retrospective effect to its decision in Pullum but pros...
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...ed.” Hess v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc.,
175 So. 3d 687, 695 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Merkle
v. Robinson,
737 So. 2d 540, 542, n.6 (Fla. 1991)). Accordingly,
“[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting
the cause of action occurs.” §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 19106, 2010 WL 5093137
...te of limitation began to run. But the wrongful taking of the business records is but one element of the cause of action. The cause of action does not accrue and become actionable until the final element is satisfied which, in this case, is damages. § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...false and wrongful taxes, fines, penalties and closures; and accompanied by threats
to close down Appellants’ business if they did not comply with the extortionate
demands.
“A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of
action occurs.” § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
...at 882-83 (citing Dinuro Inv., LLC v. Camacho,
141 So.3d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)). . Id. at 884. . Id. at 885. . Id. . Id. at 882-83 (quoting Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell,
742 So.2d 381, 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). . §
95.11(3)0), Fla. stat. . §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 12068, 2016 WL 4205352
...(internal citation omitted). To be timely, an action for negligence must be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues. §
95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012). “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs,” §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6327, 2015 WL 1741138
...We set forth the relevant Florida law before outlining the parties’
contentions on appeal. We then state the certified question.
A. Florida Accrual Rules
Absent statutory tolling or another exception, the Florida statute of
limitations begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues. Fla. Stat.
§ 95.031. “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause
of action occurs.” Id. § 95.031(1)....
...intentional torts based on abuse).
In relevant part, “[a]n action founded upon fraud” accrues when “the facts
giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered
with the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(a)....
...See id. §
772.17.
In accordance with the general accrual rule, Plaintiffs’ claims for conspiracy,
breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and
negligent supervision accrued when they suffered damages. See id. §
95.031(1)
(“A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action
occurs.”); Olson v....
...currence of damages.”).
In accordance with the statutory exception for delayed discovery, Plaintiffs’
claims for fraud and aiding and abetting fraud accrued when they knew or should
have known that they suffered damages. See Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(a); Davis, 832
So....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 5584
the last element of .the cause of action occurs. §
95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). A statute of repose operates
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...pplicable statute, section
95.11(3)(a),
Florida Statutes (2007), specifies a four-year limitation period for “[a]n action
founded on negligence.” The cause of action accrues “when the last element
constituting the cause of action occurs.” §
95.031(1), Fla....
...accrued later under the delayed discovery
doctrine, are unavailing. The first amended complaint and attachments do not
include, nor does this record suggest that any further amendment could include, any
allegation supporting a tolling claim under section 95.031, Florida Statutes (2007).
This Court has also construed the delayed discovery doctrine cautiously and
narrowly, following Florida Supreme Court precedent, in cases of intentional torts
arising from childhood sexual abuse and ...
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...subject real property. Mikhaylov
argues that despite being aware of Bizlin’s alleged malpractice as early as
November 2017, the claim in the underlying malpractice action won’t finally
accrue until resolution of the bankruptcy petition.
4
Per section 95.031, Florida Statutes, “the time within which an action shall
be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of
action accrues.” Subsection (1) states, “[a] cause of action accrues when...
CopyPublished | Florida 6th District Court of Appeal
runs from the time the cause of action accrues.” §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (2007). “A cause of action accrues
CopyPublished | Florida 6th District Court of Appeal
767 So. 2d 1179, 1184–85 (Fla. 2000) (quoting §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (1987)). Here, a review of the Amended
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...3d 855, 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013);
Fox v. Madsen,
12 So. 3d 1261, 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). However, the
triggering event for the running of the statute of limitations in this case is
when the “last element constituting” the breach of contract occurred. §
95.031(1), Fla....
...The court appears
to have concluded that the cause of action did not accrue until Gee became
aware that something was “amiss.” For specified causes of action, the
Legislature has established exceptions that would toll the statute of
limitations. See §§
95.031(2)(a) & (b),
95.11(4)(a) & (b),
95.11(7), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...If it began at the foreclosure sale or later, Llano’s suit beats the deadline.
The legal starting point for a limitations period is the point “when the last
element of the cause of action occurs.” Davis v. Monahan,
832 So. 2d 708, 709 (Fla.
2002); see also §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107726, 2010 WL 3835663
...Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
778 So.2d 932, 936 (Fla.2000). The limitations period starts to run "from the date that the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." Fla. Stat. §
95.031(2)(b)....
...ued when child became paralyzed and suffered brain damage within months of last administration of drug, where parents knew about the use of the drug in child's treatment), the amended complaint is not subject to dismissal at this time. 2. FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2)(B) Florida's current statute of repose for products liability actions, enacted in 1999, provides in relevant part as follows: Under no circumstances may a claimant commence an action arising from personal *1304 injury ......
...by the product more than 12 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser ... who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a component in the manufacture of another product. Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(b) (emphasis added)....
...The defendants' argument is that the statute of repose bars the claims of Mr. and Mrs. Kravitz because the lawsuit was filed more than 12 years after the sale of the vaccine to Dr. Singer, the "first purchaser" of the product. This argument fails for a number of reasons. First, §
95.031(2)(b) is not a traditionally-worded statute of repose, which would absolutely bar a suit brought after a specified time measured from the date of a certain act (e.g., the sale of a product). See Bogorff,
583 So.2d at 1003; Black's Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed. 2009). The current statute of repose does not say, as the defendants would like it to say, and as did the previous version of the statute (Fla.Stat. §
95.031(2), repealed in 1986), that no products liability action will be brought more than 12 years after the sale of the product to the first purchaser....
...in a statute are not to be construed as superfluous if a reasonable construction exists that gives effect to all words.'" Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tepper,
2 So.3d 209, 215 (Fla.2009) (citations omitted). As I see it, the defendants' reading of §
95.031(2)(b) would make irrelevant or superfluous the phrase "if the harm was caused." The defendants may believe that the legislature intended to create an absolute bar for products liability actions filed more than 12 years after the sale of the...
...t, and not on the supposed unexpressed motives of lawmakers. See, e.g., Freeman v. First Union National Bank,
865 So.2d 1272, 1276 (Fla.2004); A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 29-37 (1997). [3] Third no Florida cases have definitively construed §
95.031(2)(b) since its enactment in 1999, or explained the relationship between the "if harm was caused" language and the 12-year period of repose....
...5th DCA 2008), that supports the defendants' reading of the statute, that language is dicta, as the Fifth District eventually ruled that the trial *1305 court should not have granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs because they had evidence which, if believed, could establish tolling of the repose period under § 95.031(2)(d)....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...time the last element constituting
6
the cause of action occurred. See §
95.11(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (providing that
actions “alleging a willful violation of s.
448.110” must be brought within 5
years); §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 15117, 2013 WL 5334590
...repose defense, 1.e., plaintiffs claims were barred as plaintiff could not demonstrate detrimental reliance upon any statements made by defendant on or after May 5, 1982, twelve years prior to the filing of suit by plaintiffs in the Engle case. See § 95.031(2)(a), Fla....
...ecting plaintiffs claim that date of reliance was irrelevant as “the triggering event set forth in the applicable statute of repose, ‘the date of the commission of the alleged fraud,’ necessarily includes reliance by the plaintiff’) (quoting section 95.031(2)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17763, 2002 WL 31127286
...ted to its unique facts." See id. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion. See Monahan v. Davis,
781 So.2d 436 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.), rev. granted,
799 So.2d 217 (2001). In Monahan, the court reasoned that the legislature in section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes, limited the application of the delayed discovery doctrine in cases of fraud and products liability "under s....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Thus, to ensure that a
manufacturer’s potential liability is not of indefinite duration, the Florida
Legislature enacted a statute of repose for products liability claims that
generally requires such claims be brought no later than twelve years after
6
In pertinent part, section 95.031(1) of the Florida Statutes provides: “A
cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of
action occurs.”
7
the alleged defective product is first purchased, irrespective of when the
plaintiff’s injury occurs. § 95.031(2)(a), Fla....
...from any date prescribed elsewhere . . . , but in any event an
action for fraud . . . must be begun within 12 years after the date
of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the
fraud was or should have been discovered.
§ 95.031(2)(a), Fla....
...Obviously, not just any materially false statement made by the defendant
during the repose period satisfies Hess’s requirement. The repose statute
requires the action be brought within twelve years of “the commission of the
alleged fraud.” Hess, 175 So. 3d at 698 (quoting § 95.031(2), Fla....
...incipe filed his lawsuit. If, in our de
novo review of the record, we conclude that PM engaged in “wrongful
conduct” during the repose period, we must affirm. Hess, 175 So. 3d at 698.
Otherwise, the statute of repose bars Principe’s claims. § 95.031(2)(a), Fla.
Stat....
...ndant, without regard to
the plaintiff’s reliance on that act. Hess, 175 So. 3d at 698. Because the plain
text of the repose statute expressly requires a defendant’s “commission of
the alleged fraud” to occur within the repose period, see § 95.031(2)(a), Fla.
14
Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...2d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008);
Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co.,
819 So. 2d 732, 734-35 (Fla. 2002);
Todd v. Johnson,
965 So. 2d 255, 257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
The statute of limitations begins to run from the time the cause of action
accrues. §
95.031, Fla. Stat.; see Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co.,
357 So. 2d 401
(Fla. 1978). A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause
of action occurs. §
95.031(1); see Bauld....
...
403 So. 2d at 1100 (citing Hudak
v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc.,
499 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1974)).
Section
95.11(3)(j) provides that a legal or equitable action founded on fraud
must be brought within four years; however, pursuant to section
95.031(2)(a), the
period for filing a cause of action founded on fraud does not commence to run until
the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or should have
been discovered by the exercise of due diligence....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 14952, 2011 WL 4374453
...because the crash occurred thirty-three years after Cessna delivered the aircraft, the suit was barred by the eighteen-year statute of repose in GARA. Alternatively, Cessna asserted that the suit was barred by Florida’s 12-year statute of repose, § 95.031 (2)(b), Florida Statutes (2003)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
runs from the time the cause of action accrues. §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (2023). The filing of a complaint
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21677, 1994 WL 515521
...Using a four year statute of limitations, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs claims regarding Defendant’s denial of permit applications prior to August 23,1987, are barred, since Plaintiffs complaint was filed on August 23, 1991. However, Florida Statutes § 95.031 states that the statute of limitations period begins to run “from the time the cause of action accrues.” Fla.Stat. § 95.031 (1993)....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...Liggett Grp., Inc.,
945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).
2 Florida’s statute of repose provides that a fraud claim must be filed “within 12
years after the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date
the fraud was or should have been discovered.” §
95.031(2)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 13762
...Ryan and Jessica Dominguez appeal the entry of final judgments in their
product liability claim against appellees Hayward Industries, Inc., Certified Gunite
Company d/b/a Custom Pools and John M. Pieklo. We affirm because the statute
of repose, section 95.031, Florida Statutes (2003), bars the product liability claim.
Ryan Dominguez sustained a severe head injury on November 17, 2012
when the filter of his swimming pool exploded....
...negligence against Pieklo; and a count for loss of consortium. The delivery and
installation of the pool and filter were completed on December 20, 1999.
The defendants argued below that the twelve-year statute of repose barred
the Dominguezes’ cause of action, pursuant to section 95.031(2)(b), Florida
Statutes (2003). The defendants also argued that no exception to the statute of
repose applied because the pool filter was a component part that did not constitute
an improvement to real property, pursuant to section 95.031(2)(b)1....
...whole, and in such a manner that no part of the statute is rendered meaningless.
State v. Debaun,
129 So. 3d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).
Product liability actions in Florida are subject to a four-year statute of
limitations, pursuant to section
95.11, Florida Statutes (2013). Section
95.031(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2013), further provides a twelve-year statute of
repose to products liability claims based upon injuries or death caused by a
product with an expected useful life of ten years or less, except for certain
aircraft, vessels, and certain type of railroad equipment, and improvements to
real property, including elevators and escalators.1 Improvements to real property
1 The statute of repose, section
95.031(2)(b), specifically provides:
An action for products liability under s....
...selling or leasing the product or of using the product
as a component in the manufacture of another product,
whichever is later.
3. With regard to those products listed in subparagraph
4
95.031(2)(b)1.
Section 95.031(2)(b) is triggered once the product is delivered or the work
completed....
...The statute forms no basis for recovery based upon an
injury caused when a product was purchased twelve or more years before the
injury. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Acosta,
612 So. 2d 1361, 1362 (Fla. 1992).
The term “improvements to real property” in section
95.031(2)(b)1 is
undefined....
...of limitations for tort action, holding that the suit was barred).
7
The pool filter, a component part of the swimming pool, thus does not
constitute an improvement to real property within the context of section 95.031.
The plain and obvious meaning of the language contained in section 95.031
supports this conclusion.
The products liability statute of repose, section 95.031, barred the
Dominguezes’ cause of action....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 11682, 2000 WL 1283863
...We do not need to decide this issue, as even if this is considered an ordinary common law negligence action, the statute of limitations still has run. A cause of action for general negligence must be commenced within four years. See §
95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). Pursuant to section
95.031(1), “[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” In the instant case, the elements of the cause of action were the existence of a duty, breach of that duty, causation, and damage to the appellants....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
element constituting the cause of action occurs.” §
95.031(1), Fla. Stat. However, causes of action “founded
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 13160, 2002 WL 31015547
...time within 5 years after the conduct in violation of a provision of this act terminates or the cause of action accrues. §
772.17, Fla. Stat. (1999). A cause of action is said to accrue when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...that, even if Barrera had fraudulently induced Donald to work for the
corporations based on false promises of an ownership interest in them, any
such claims accrued upon Donald being made aware that she held no
ownership interest in any of the three corporations.3 See § 95.031(2)(a), Fla.
1
The corporations, co-appellees of Barrera in this appeal, are Synergy
Dialysis, Inc., N’Sync Consulting Corp., and Synergy Dialysis of Pembroke
Pines, LLC.
2
We have not been provided a transcript of this hearing.
3...
....”).
Because the summary judgment evidence establishes that Donald was
aware she held no ownership interest in the corporations earlier than four
years from the December 31, 2020 filing of Donald’s lawsuit, her claims are
barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. See §§
95.031(2)(a),
95.11(3)(j), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida | 116 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6578, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143357, 2015 WL 6329854
...Because the law does not support the existence of a fiduciary duty on the part of the Hospital, its motion to dismiss on this ground is due to be granted. B. Whether the Statute of Limitations Has Elapsed In Florida, the statute of limitations runs “from the time the cause of action accrues.” § 95.031, Fla. Stat. (2015). “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” Id. § 95.031(a)....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...In Appellants’ view, the action to establish paternity is timely, given that the
alleged fraud occurred less than twelve years ago. 6 This argument fails.
The delayed discovery doctrine applies solely to causes of action that
are specified in section
95.031, Florida Statutes, which includes claims of
5
As Appellees correctly noted, fraud must be pled with specificity, and
Appellants failed to assert any cause of action for fraud as part of this suit in
any of their complaints. See Strack v. Fred Rawn Constr., Inc.,
908 So. 2d
563, 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
6
Appellants cite to section
95.031(2)(a) for the proposition that “in any event
an action for fraud under s....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...3d 14, 21-22 (Fla. 4th DCA
2022)). Legal issues surrounding the statute of limitations are also
reviewed de novo. Clark v. Estate of Elrod,
61 So. 3d 416, 418 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2011) (quoting Hamilton v. Tanner,
962 So. 2d 997, 1000 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2007)).
Section
95.031, Florida Statutes (2019), provides that “the time within
which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from
the time the cause of action accrues.” Subsection (1) explains that “[a]
cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of
action occurs.” §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...While we
disagree that the statute of limitations completely barred recovery, we
conclude that it does bar breach of contract damages which had occurred
before April 28, 2016. The issue was properly preserved.
The statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action
accrues. § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 2357, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 12352
1876): I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.-031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
limitations. They further argued that, under section
95.031(1), S.B.’s and R.R.’s claims accrued at the
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 11152, 1997 WL 599653
...1984, 1995 ,
138 L.Ed.2d 373 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Arif v. AT&T,
959 F.Supp. 1054, 1060 (E.D.Ark.1997). We believe that such law is applicable in this instance, and apply the Florida state statute of limitations to the LHWCA. Pursuant to section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1997), “the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues.” A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. §
95.031(1)....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...discussed the trusts with him, but he was not interested in viewing the
information. His failure to know the law or consult with an attorney is not
a lack of actual knowledge of the facts (no accountings given to him) upon
which the claim is based. See § 95.031, Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida
...Under these circumstances, the Fla. SOL does not reduce the amount owed, it simply requires that lenders “bring suit for all amounts due” within five years of the date on which the cause of action accrues. 5 See Id.; see also Bollettieri,
228 So.3d at 74 ; Fla. Stat. §
95.031 (1); Id....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
subject to the delayed discovery provisions of section
95.031(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2015). Flanzer’s
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161770, 2014 WL 6467305
...The statute of repose defense that supports this Court’s finding of fraudulent joinder for Dr. Small and MIC therefore would not be dispositive of, or even applicable to, the causes of action against Medtronic. Compare Fla. Stat. §
95.11 (4) with Fla. Stat. §
95.031 (2)(a) & (b); see Smallwood,
385 F.3d at 575 (holding that the “common defenses” rule applies only “[w]hen the only proffered justification for improper joinder ......
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2683, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 6418, 1989 WL 137733
...Grace to a contractor who affixed it to structural aspects of a building Times Publishing constructed in 1969. After learning of the presence of the asbestos, Times Publishing commenced the instant action in 1985. W.R. Grace was successful in procuring a summary judgment from the trial court based upon section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), the products liability statute of repose....
...There is no dispute that Times Publishing commenced its action some 16 years after the asbestos-containing material was sprayed upon the building’s superstructure. Thus, the 12 year statute of repose forecloses the product liability claim. Times Publishing, however, recognizing the effect of section 95.031(2) urges that we adopt and follow the exception expressed in Diamond v....
...The child’s mother had been administered the drug during her pregnancy. Subsequently, it was found that the drug caused cancer in female children that could not be detected until the child reached puberty, a time when the claim would be in repose. Squibb obtained a summary judgment based upon section 95.031(2)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 18764, 2014 WL 5900018
...nistrative and
judicial proceeding. We agree that, pursuant to the tolling provision in subsection
70.001(11), this was the date that the cause of action accrued, i.e., it was "when the last
element constituting the cause of action occurred." See §
95.031(1); Sarasota Welfare
Home, Inc....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 11027, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 2620
...The gun was delivered to its original purchaser in 1963. In 1984 appellant filed suit. Because appellant’s cause of action accrued more than twelve years after the date of the gun’s delivery to its original purchaser, summary judgment was granted based on the twelve year statute of repose, § 95.031(2) Fla. Stat. (1983). Section 95.031(2), Fla.Stat....
...Then in 1985 the court receded from Battilla and held that the statute of repose was not unconstitutional. Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 *
400 So.2d 657 (Fla.1985), appeal dismissed
475 U.S. 1114 ,
106 S.Ct. 1626 ,
90 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986). Shortly thereafter the Florida legislature amended §
95.031(2) to abrogate the statute of repose in product liability actions....
...86-272, § 2, Laws of Fla. The Pullum decision validated the statute of repose as of its effective date. Cassidy v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Company,
495 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), review denied
506 So.2d 1040 (Fla.1987). The legislature’s amendment of §
95.031(2), absent any express intent to the contrary, operates prospectively only....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1164, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 8069
PER CURIAM. Plaintiffs appeal from a summary final judgment which determined that their product liability action against Fulton Manufacturing Corp. (Fulton) was barred by section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....
...1 Suit was filed by plaintiffs in May, 1984, alleging that plaintiff Francis H. Keyes was injured oh February 15, 1984, by a defective winch manufactured by Fulton. It was established that Keyes had purchased the winch on August 3, 1971. Fulton moved for summary judgment on grounds the action was barred by section 95.031(2), as it was not commenced within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser (Keyes)....
...We affirm. Shaw v. General Motors Corp.,
503 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), and authorities cited. As in Shaw , we certify the following questions to the Florida Supreme Court as questions of great public importance: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION
95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS,[ 2 ]SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY AS TO A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ACCRUED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1161, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 12099
...Affirmed on the authority of Shaw v. General Motors Corp.,
503 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). As in Shaw , we certify the following questions to the Florida Supreme Court as questions of great public importance: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION
95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS, SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY AS TO A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ACCRUED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...Miraglia, M.D., P.A.,
125 So. 3d 855,
859 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
So we must determine when the statute of limitations began to run.
Generally, the limitations period begins to run “from the time the cause of
3
action accrues,” §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (2013), which is “when the last
element constituting the cause of action occurs,” §
95.031(1), Fla....
...laim. But a cause of
action for unjust enrichment accrues “when the last element constituting
the cause of action occurs,” which would have been when Cleveland Clinic
accepted or retained the benefit conferred—i.e., misspent the donations.
See § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...action, after which time obtaining relief is barred.’” Hess,
175 So. 3d at
695 (quoting Merkle,
737 So. 2d at 542 n.6). For statute of limitations
purposes, “[a]n action ‘accrues when the last element constituting the
cause of action occurs.’” Id. (quoting §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...action, after which time obtaining relief is barred.’” Hess,
175 So. 3d at
695 (quoting Merkle,
737 So. 2d at 542 n.6). For statute of limitations
purposes, “[a]n action ‘accrues when the last element constituting the
cause of action occurs.’” Id. (quoting §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 5313, 1996 WL 273508
...Unfortunately, the Johnsons failed to file their complaint until November 24,1992. A cause of action for misrepresentation is governed by a four year statute of limitations. §
95.11(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1995). The cause of action accrues “when the last element constituting the cause of action oc^ curs.” §
95.031(1), Fla.Stat. (1995). The period runs “from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” §
95.031(2), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...AFFIRMED. See Larson & Larson, P.A. v. TSE Indus., Inc.,
22 So. 3d
36, 42 (Fla. 2009) (“[O]nce a judgment adverse to the client has reached the
point of finality, ‘the last element constituting the [malpractice] cause of action
occurs,’ §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 11934
...intiffs/Appellants Robert C. Mosher and Margaret M. Mosher (collectively “Mosher”) appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment on their products liability claim based on the Florida products liability statute of repose, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.031(2) (West 1982) (repealed as amended by Laws 1986), in favor of the Defendants/Appellees, Speedstar Division of AMCA International, Inc....
...Court decision long since overruled in delaying the institution of his action. District Court’s Memorandum of Decision at 8. Mosher then perfected this appeal. B. Historical Background: The Florida Statute of Repose Florida’s statute of repose, section 95.031(2), was enacted in 1975 and repealed by way of amendment in 1986....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1237, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 8193
...The summary final judgment appealed from is affirmed on the authority of Pait v. Ford Motor Company,
500 So.2d 743 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). Because of the great public importance of the questions involved in the interpretation of the statute of repose as it pertains to product liability (section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1985)), we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida the same questions certified in Pait , viz: I WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION
95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), ABOLISHING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS, SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY TO A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ACCRUED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT? II IF NOT, WHETHER THE DECISION OF PULLUM V....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...the Estate of Saleh Halum (collectively “appellants”), appeals the trial
court’s final summary judgment order in favor of ZF Passive Safety
Systems US, Inc. (“Manufacturer”). Because appellants’ lawsuit is barred
by Florida’s statute of repose, section 95.031(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2016),
we affirm.
Appellants purchased their vehicle, a Lincoln Navigator, in June 2004.
The vehicle was assembled and sold to the first user in June 2001, and
used a seat belt buckle that was designed, manufactured, and constructed
by Manufacturer....
...defective—that the pushbutton had warped causing the belt to detach—
and this defect caused Victim’s injuries by not preventing his ejection from
the vehicle. Manufacturer moved for summary judgment, arguing
appellants’ claims were barred by the statute of repose found in section
95.031(2)(b), because the accident occurred more than ten years after
initial delivery of the vehicle to its first purchaser....
...production of the seat belt pushbutton.
The trial court disagreed and entered final summary judgment in favor
of Manufacturer. The court held appellants did not present sufficient
evidence to identify an employee who constituted a managing agent under
section 95.031(2)(d), finding the employees in question were only “mid-
level managers.” The court also found appellants did not meet their
burden of proving “actual knowledge” of the alleged concealment of the
claimed defect as required by section 95.031(2)(d)....
...3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021)). A fact is “material” if “it may affect the
outcome of the case under the applicable substantive law.” Star Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Gables Ins. Recovery, Inc.,
346 So. 3d 1244, 1246 (Fla. 3d DCA
2022).
The statute of repose, section
95.031(2)(b), provides that a plaintiff may
not “commence an action for products liability ....
...Any
claim of concealment under this section shall be made with
specificity and must be based upon substantial factual and
legal support. Maintaining the confidentiality of trade secrets
does not constitute concealment under this section.
§ 95.031(2)(d), Fla....
...reached a duty),
a statute of repose abolishes or eliminates an underlying substantive right
of action.
Appellants do not dispute that they did not bring their products liability
claim within twelve years of the original purchase of the vehicle. §
95.031(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016). Instead, appellants argue the repose period
was tolled under section 95.031(2)(d), allowing their claim to proceed
based upon testimony and evidence obtained from low-level and mid-level
managers and supervisors employed by Manufacturer. Appellants do not
contend that any officer or director of Manufacturer engaged in the
conduct required by section 95.031(2)(d), and because Manufacturer is a
corporation, Manufacturer has no “partners” as the term is used in
business organizations....
...with the seat belt buckles and that “the issue was a varied issue and the
parts could fail depending upon the day and the weather.” Appellants also
claim that certain statements made by these employees, whom they argue
are “managing agents” under section 95.031(2)(d), create material issues
of fact relating to the issue of willful corporate concealment.
Section 95.031 does not define the term “managing agent.” However,
Florida courts have expounded on who is—and who is not—a “managing
agent” for the purposes of imposing corporate liability for punitive damages
based on their acts....
...at 1303. The court found the plaintiff’s evidence did not
5
show the defect “was known by an officer, director, partner or managing
agent, as is required by the statute.” Id. at 1311 n.11 (citing §
95.031(2)(d)). Moreover, the plaintiff’s witnesses did not have the sufficient
“level of responsibility” to constitute a managing agent under section
95.031 because they “only had responsibility for discrete operations within
the company, did not participate in the formation of company policy, and
did not have an ownership stake.” Romero, 916 F....
...Furniture Warehouse,
919 F.2d at 1524, cert. denied,
502 U.S.
815 (1991)).
As the trial court correctly observed, when considered in its
juxtaposition to the terms “officer,” “director,” and “partner” in the
applicable statute, a “managing agent” under section
95.031(2)(d) must be
an individual of such seniority and stature within the corporation or
business to have ultimate decision-making authority for the company....
...4th DCA 1989) (awarding no corporate punitive damages on
a defamation claim because hotel manager was not a “managing agent”),
review denied,
551 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1989). Therefore, these employees
could not be managing agents for purposes of imputing corporate
concealment to Manufacturer to avoid the application of section
95.031.
See id.
Lastly, the trial court correctly found that appellants did not
demonstrate a triable issue of fact on the element of “actual knowledge
that the product was defective in the manner alleged by the claimant.” §
95.031(2)(d), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 731, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 1442, 1989 WL 24043
NESBITT, Judge. The issue in these consolidated cases is whether the trial courts erred in granting appellees’ motions for summary judgment, based upon the twelve-year statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 2131, 1997 WL 106972
...In this case, summary judgment was inappropriate. It is well-settled that the statute of limitations begins to run when the last element of a cause of action accrues. Bourne v. State Bank of Orlando & Trust Co.,
106 Fla. 46 ,
142 So. 810 (1932); §
95.031(1), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 750, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 12055
DAUKSCH, Judge. This is an appeal from a summary judgment in a products liability case. The question is whether the statute of limitations (repose) bars recovery. § 95.031(2), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1432, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 12106
PER CURIAM. Affirmed on authority of Shaw v. General Motors Corp.,
503 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). We certify the same questions: (1) Whether the legislative amendment of section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), abolishing the statute of repose in product liability actions, should be construed to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action which accrued before the effective date of the amendment....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 8398, 2011 WL 2200705
...ract or tort; provided that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. For purposes of determining when the limitations period begins to run, section 95.031(1), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that “[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” A legal malpractice action has three elements: 1) the attorney’s employment; 2) the attorney...
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1409, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 8542
affirm. In Pullum, the Florida Supreme Court held §
95.031(2) constitutional, specifically considering both
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Argued: Oct 3, 2023
...t she had a cause
of action against Coloplast before September 18, 2010.
Under Florida’s statute of limitations, a plaintiff has four
years to initiate a products liability suit. Fla. Stat. §§
95.11(3)(e),
95.031(2)(b) (2014). The four-year period begins to run “from the
date that the facts giving rise to the cause of action were
discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due
diligence[.]” Id. §
95.031(2)(b)....
...e exercise of due diligence”
about her cause of action before September 18, 2010, because she
experienced the same kind of pain in 2009/2010 as she experienced
in 2014 and knew she had a mesh erosion. See Fla. Stat.
§ 95.031(2)(b) (2014)....
...n some way from
conditions naturally to be expected from’ her implantation”
surgery before September 18, 2010. See Babush,
589 So. 2d at 1381
(stating that, under the “should have known” standard in Fla. Stat.
§
95.031(2)(b), a plaintiff must have “an injury distinct in some way
from conditions naturally to be expected from the plaintiff’s
condition”); see also Eghnayem,
873 F.3d at 1323 (laying out this
framework under Flori...
...devices and her symptoms between the initial surgery on
December 15, 2009, and the statute of limitations cut-off date on
September 18, 2010. See Babush,
589 So. 2d at 1381 (stating that,
under the “should have known” standard in Fla. Stat.
§
95.031(2)(b), the connection between the injury and the product
“must be to some extent causal”); see also Eghnayem,
873 F.3d at
1323 (same)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 2783190, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 9384
...Azima regarding finding a roofer for the repairs is not significant to a determination of the statute of limitations issue. The record is clear that by 2005 the limited scope of the repairs actually covered by the insurance policy was known to all parties and the cause of action had accrued. See § 95.031(1) (“A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs”)....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 2866414, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 9233
...te of Stephanie’s birth—the “incident,” according to the defendants. The plain language of that section states that the three years begins from the date “such claim accrues,” and “accrual” can be a mixed factual and legal conclusion. Section 95.031(1), Florida Statutes (2010), states that a “cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” That definition is clearly different than the more restrictive formulation advanced by the defendan...
CopyPublished | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18790
repose for products liability actions, FLA.STAT. § 95.-031(2), as an affirmative defense. Ford then moved
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1488, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 8828
importance: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION
95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 13609
element constituting a cause of action occurs. §
95.031(1). At the time of dismissal, nothing in the pleadings
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...f limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence." §
95.11(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). The statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues. §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (2014). This occurs "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9309, 1997 WL 366048
...Florida, the action cannot be maintained in Florida, regardless of whether the action would still be viable in the jurisdiction in which it arose). Time limitations begin to run when the last element constituting a cause of action occurs. Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (1)....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 5936, 1991 WL 98011
...As we did in Acosta , we certify conflict with the fourth district, Walker v. Miller Electric Mfg. Co., 16 F.L.W. 1386,
1991 WL 82508 (Fla. 4th DCA May 22, 1991). We certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question as one of great public importance: DOES THE NOW REPEALED STATUTE OF REPOSE, SECTION
95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1975), BAR A PLAINTIFF’S CAUSE OF ACTION WHERE THE LAW IN EFFECT AT THE TIME THE PLAINTIFF’S CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED WOULD HAVE PERMITTED HIM TO MAINTAIN A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION? Reversed; conflict certifi...
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...We disagree.
“Except as provided in subsection (2) [fraud and products liability] and in s.
95.051 [tolling] and elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which an action
shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of
action accrues.” §
95.031, Fla. Stat. (2011). “A cause of action accrues when the
last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 3295021, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 10551
...1st DCA 2014), we certify conflict with the Fourth District’s decision in Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Hess,
95 So.3d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), rev. denied,
117 So.3d 412 (Fla.2013), on the issue of whether the trial court reversibly erred by denying Reynolds’ requested jury instruction on the statute of repose, section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 2010 WL 2720734
...d unjustified interference with this relationship; and 4) damage as a result. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Cotton,
463 So.2d 1126, 1127 (Fla.1985). "A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs." FLA. STAT. §
95.031(1) (2009)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 9072, 1999 WL 454416
...uld not have been apparent until the nursing home brought this suit against him on an individual basis. The period of limitations for fraud runs from the time the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. § 95.031(2), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida
...Fraud Claim Under Florida law, a fraud claim must be commenced within four years from when the cause of action accrued. Fla. Stat. §
95.11 (3)(j). Fraud actions accrue when the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered with due diligence, the facts giving rise to the fraud (" Delayed Discovery Doctrine "). Id. §
95.031(2)(a); see also Davis v....
...on fraud. See Marlborough Holdings Grp. v. Azimut-Benetti, Spa, Platinum Yacht Collection No. Two, Inc. , 505 F. App'x 899 , 906 (11th Cir. 2013). 2 Rather, the limitations period begins to run when the last element of the claim occurred. Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (1)....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...1st DCA 2014), we certify conflict with the Fourth District’s
decision in Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Hess,
95 So. 3d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012),
rev. denied,
117 So. 3d 412 (Fla. 2013), on the issue of whether the trial court
reversibly erred by denying Reynolds’ requested jury instruction on the statute of
repose, section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes.
AFFIRMED; CONFLICT CERTIFIED.
VAN NORTWICK, MARSTILLER, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.
2
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1646, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 15154
...Appellee Monarch discovered that the date of delivery of the product was more than twelve years prior to the date suit was filed during the deposition of Rinker’s vice-president on June 8, 1983. Accordingly, Monarch and the other defendants amended their answers to include the products liability statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1981), as an affirmative defense....
...estions presented here. In Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.,
458 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) and MacRae v. Cessna Aircraft Company,
457 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), that court reviewed all of the recent cases and arguments relative to application of section
95.031(2) and related statutes and synthesized the arguments and holdings presently constituting the law of this state in this area....
...ate of the accident. Appellants contend that they learned of the defect nearly a year after the accident during discovery procedures in this suit. How *1340 ever, we suggest that assertion is based upon a misconception of the meaning of the statute. Section 95.031(2) provides that the limitation period of four years begins to run “from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” That subsection then...
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1841, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 9554
...General Motors Corp.,
503 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); and Pait v. Ford Motor Co.,
500 So.2d 743 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). Further we certify under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.125(a) the following questions to the Supreme Court of Florida: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION
95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS, SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO OPERATE RETROSPECTIVELY AS TO A CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ACCRUED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 751, 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 9419, 2000 WL 1034525
...Farmers Bank,
708 F.2d 104 , 107 (3d Cir.1983); Pagano v. United Jersey Bank, 276 N.J.Super. 489 , 648 A.2d 269, 272 (1994), affirmed, 143 N.J. 220 , 670 A.2d 509 (1996). Because in analogous circumstances the Florida statute of limitations interprets “demand” to mean a written demand, see §
95.031(1), Fla....
...p. 1992). If, however, section
673.1181 controls, we still reach the same result. Section
673.1181 states that “Chapter 95 governs when an action to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising under this chapter [673] must be commenced.” Under section
95.031, Florida Statutes (1991), “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” 3 “The clear majority view is statutes of limitations do not begin to run with respect to the liability of a ban...
...See Baskerville-Donovan Engineers, Inc. v. Pensacola Executive House Condominium Ass’n, Inc.,
581 So.2d 1301, 1303 (Fla.1991); Melendez v. Dreis and Krump Mfg. Co.,
515 So.2d 735, 736 (Fla. 1987); Homemakers, Inc. v. Gonzales,
400 So.2d 965, 967 (Fla.1981). . Subsection
95.031(1) goes on in the next sentence to address the issue of "demand” in the context of a demand note, but we assume for present purposes that the demand note provision does not apply to a certificate of deposit.
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...years. See §
95.11(4)(g), Fla. Stat. (2012); Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Roth, Romano,
Erikson & Kupfer, P.A. v. Flanagan,
629 So. 2d 113, 114 (Fla. 1993). “The
period begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues[.]” Id. at
115; accord §
95.031, Fla....
...beyond the conclusion of the statute of limitations for defamation. 4 See §
4The application of the two-year statute of limitations, as opposed to the four-
year statute of limitations as argued by Weeks, is based upon our prior
5
95.11(4)(g); §
95.031; Wagner, 629 So....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 2965882, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 10168
...r breach of a
property insurance contract must be filed within five years of the cause of action
accruing. See §
95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2010). “A cause of action accrues
when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” §
95.031(1), Fla.
Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 1705, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 4007, 1989 WL 78308
...f the payroll by appellee) was apparent on the face of the records. We conclude on these facts that appellant’s claims should have been discovered, in the exercise of due diligence, in 1981. See Cherney v. Moody,
413 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); §
95.031, Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1747, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 9418
...The plaintiff in this personal injury products liability suit appeals from a summary judgment in favor of defendant. The injury was allegedly caused by a defective gun manufactured by defendant. The basis for the summary judgment was that the suit was barred by the statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1985), because the gun was delivered to its original purchaser more than twelve years before the suit was filed....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 10789, 2015 WL 4269245
...nc. v. Hess,
95
So. 3d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), in providing an improper instruction on
the statute of repose. Pursuant to the statute of repose, fraud claims
“must be begun within 12 years after the date of the commission of the
alleged fraud.” §
95.031(2)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 1539, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 2883, 1988 WL 68084
WIGGINTON, Judge. The Lowells bring this appeal from the final summary judgment entered in favor of defendant/appellee The Singer Company based upon the 12-year statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), which provided: Actions for products liability and fraud under s....
...and ] exception to the general rule. He was not deprived of a property or contract right acquired in reliance upon this Court’s decision in Battilla.... Moreover, he did not act in reliance on the Battilla declaration of the unconstitutionality of section 95.031(2) and thereby miss the limitation deadline for filing suit with which he could have otherwise complied....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 51692, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 167
...f limitations for Arrowood’s legal malpractice claim expired before December 22, 2010, the date it filed suit against its former attorneys. Generally, “[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. | 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 6
...years, which period has expired. See §
95.11(3)(j), Florida Statutes (1986). However, the four year limitation period begins to run only from the time when the facts underlying the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered. See §
95.031(2), Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 1988 WL 1511
follows: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.-031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 761, 2003 WL 187439
...The Monahan decision now makes it clear that the delayed discovery doctrine does not apply to a cause of action for civil conspiracy. 3
832 So.2d at 708, 711 . Therefore, in this case the statute of limitations began to run when Young’s cause of action accrued. §
95.031(1), Fla....
...nd breach of fiduciary duty). .On appeal, all parties address Young's causes of action as if they sounded in fraud. However, the complaint alleges civil conspiracy and does not mention fraud. Thus, the statutory delayed discovery doctrine for fraud, § 95.031(2), Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 62, 1988 Fla. LEXIS 114, 1988 WL 6028
importance: I.Should the legislative amendment of Section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), abolishing the
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 1091
...This "filing” did not comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(a) and thus was ineffective to amend U.S. Bank’s complaint. . A cause of action must be complete before a party files a lawsuit. See Trawick, Fla. Prac. and Proc., § 14:8 (2010 ed.); see also § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 627
...We therefore conclude that appellants’ due process challenge must fail. III. Appellants in two of the cases before us argue that Florida’s statute of repose violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 10 Appellants contend that the operation of the twelve-year statute of repose, Fla.Stat. § 95.031(2) (1982), together with the four-year statute of limitations, Fla.Stat....
...statute of repose violates the fourteenth amendment’s equal protection clause. IV. For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment in each of these four consolidated cases is AFFIRMED. . The statute of repose, Fla.Stat. § 95.031(2) (1982), provided as follows: Actions for products liability ......
...must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter ... but in any event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser ... regardless of the date the defect in the product ... was or should have been discovered. In 1986, the Florida legislature amended section 95.031(2) so as to repeal the statute of repose in products liability actions. See Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (2) (Supp.1987)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 129847, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 532
...Fuss filed this lawsuit on May 12, 2003, alleging that he had been defrauded. An action for fraud must be filed within four years. §
95.11(3)(j), Fla. Stat. (1995). This period, however, is rarely measured from the accrual of the cause of action because an action for fraud can be tolled for as long as twelve years. §
95.031(2), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...and V.A. Crudele Dredging Corp. At summary judgment, the trial court
correctly concluded that the statute of limitations barred the relief sought by
Mendoza. “A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the
cause of action occurs.” § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida | 43 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1295, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1586, 1999 WL 80337
...l knowledge of Defendant’s recall of Benlate 50 DF, as shown by Plaintiffs written claim to Defendant and Plaintiffs attribution of plant damage to the application of Benlate 50 DF, no later than June 14, 1991 (Dkts. 42, 43). Under Florida Statute § 95.031(2) the statute of limitations begins to run “from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” Under Florida law, the applicable statutes of li...
...oral contract must be commenced within four (4) years “from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” See Fla.Stat. §§
95.11(3)(b), (e), (k), (p);
95.031(2)....
...*685 Plaintiffs claims of strict liability, negligence, and fraud against Defendant must be commenced within four (4) years “from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.” See Fla.Stat. § 95.031(2); Byington, 580 F.Supp....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
constituting the cause of action occurs” (quoting section
95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2005))). “Florida law is
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Chapter 95, Florida Statutes, which requires an action arising out
of statutory liability to be brought within four years of the date the
cause of action accrues. §
95.11(3)(f), Fla. Stat. A cause of action
accrues when the last element of the action has been met. §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 2212, 2011 WL 589688
...1st DCA 1987) (holding E/C on notice at end of statutory "interval[s] that reimbursement request for that interval have either been accepted or rejected"). Because the E/C's contest of a denied reimbursement request is based on a statutory liability, section 95.031, Florida Statutes, provides that such an action must be instituted within four years....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1983 Fla. App. LEXIS 18710
completed product to its original purchaser,” section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975), or from the date
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 441403
...Kravitz admitted that he expected to receive substantially more than $25,000. The trial court granted the Passon estate's motion for summary judgment on all causes of action, finding that all were barred by the statute of limitations or statute of repose set forth in section 95.031(2)(a), Florida Statutes....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 151, 1988 Fla. LEXIS 284, 1988 WL 12546
...The petitioners also raise an issue in this case that was not specifically discussed in the Melendez opinion. They contend that, notwithstanding this Court’s opinion in Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.,
476 So.2d 657 (Fla.1985), upholding the constitutionality of §
95.031(2), they are entitled to relief because of reliance upon our earlier decision of Battilla v....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1988 WL 5705
...rcraft in question and was liable for negligence and breach of implied warranty as well as strict liability for the alleged deficiencies of the aircraft. General Dynamics filed its motion for summary judgment, based on the Florida statute of repose, § 95.031(2) Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Mellon,
228 So. 3d
72, 74-75 (Fla. 2017) (Lawson, J., concurring); see also Nationstar Mortg.,
LLC v. McDaniel,
288 So. 3d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (reciting the
four elements of a cause of action for foreclosure, including the
acceleration of the loan); §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 517, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 6681
relied on Overland, in holding unconstitutional section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes, a statute of repose on
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 1846
...discussed the trusts with him, but he was not interested in viewing the
information. His failure to know the law or consult with an attorney is not
a lack of actual knowledge of the facts (no accountings given to him) upon
which the claim is based. See § 95.031, Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 431, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 531
...n the exception to the general rule. He was not deprived of a property or contract right acquired in reliance upon this Court’s decision in Battilla.... Moreover, he did not act in reliance on the Battilla declaration of the unconstitutionality of section 95.031(2) and thereby miss the limitation deadline for filing suit with which he could have otherwise complied....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 100, 1988 Fla. LEXIS 180
follows: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.-031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...delivery of goods, wares, and merchandise, and on store accounts.
§
95.11(3)(k), Fla. Stat. (2013); Beltran, M.D. v. Vincent P. Miraglia, M.D., P.A.,
125 So. 3d 855, 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
12 Florida’s delayed discovery doctrine is codified in section
95.031(2)(a), and
reads, in relevant part, as follows:
An action founded upon fraud under s....
...nning
from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were
discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due
diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in s.
95.11(3) . . . .
§
95.031(2)(a), Fla....
...See
dissenting opinion at 35-37. Neither Yost’s nor Steinberg’s actions prevented
Flatirons from a timely asserting of its rights.
14 Without citation to any authority, Flatirons suggests that Davis has been
abrogated by the Legislature’s 2003 amendment to section 95.031(2)(a)....
...at 709 (footnote omitted).
Section
95.11(3), Florida Statutes (2013), is the applicable statute governing
the limitations period for Flatirons’ unjust enrichment claim, which the parties
agree is four years. Florida’s delayed discovery doctrine, as codified in section
95.031(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), provides, in relevant part, as follows:
An action founded upon fraud under s....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 18369, 2008 WL 5100339
...However, a limitations period ordinarily does not begin to run until the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, and a cause of action does not become complete and present until the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief. 35 Fla. Jur. 2d Limitations and Laches § 56; see also § 95.031, Fla....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 600, 1987 Fla. LEXIS 2740, 1987 WL 4308
follows: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.-031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 599, 1987 Fla. LEXIS 2742, 1987 WL 21460
follows: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.-031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 600, 1987 Fla. LEXIS 2737, 1987 WL 2369
follows: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.-031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 617, 1987 Fla. LEXIS 2741, 1987 WL 21464
follows: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.-031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 601, 1987 Fla. LEXIS 2738, 1987 WL 21476
follows: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.-031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 599, 1987 Fla. LEXIS 2543, 1987 WL 21468
*981I. SHOULD THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 95.-031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 599, 1987 Fla. LEXIS 2739, 1987 WL 21472
...ER CURIAM. We review Lane v. Koehring Co.,
503 So.2d 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), to answer two certified questions of great public importance. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The certified questions are as follows: I. Should the legislative amendment of Section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1983), abolishing the statute of repose in product liability actions, be construed to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action which accrued before the effective date of the amendment? II....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
until written demand for payment is made. See §
95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). See also In re Eddy, 572
CopyPublished | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2012 WL 6644997, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180097
...Because AFFCO’s request for declaratory relief seeks a declaration of its rights under the Undertaking, there is a five-year statute of limitations for this claim. 6 The statute of limitations for contract actions begins to run when “the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (1)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 18504, 2015 WL 8519425
...es for prevailing party
attorney's fees on the same basis.
-4-
statute, "the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations
runs from the time the cause of action accrues." § 95.031.
Interestingly, neither the trial court nor the parties addressed the legal
issue of when the causes of action accrued so that the applicable statutes of limitations
began to run for each of Blinn's four claims....
CopyPublished | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17069
...Baker,
489 F.2d 1031, 1032 (5th Cir.1974). The Moldovans filed their motion for voluntary dismissal in the wake of a motion for summary judgment by Remington Arms Company. The basis of the Remington motion is that the Moldovans’ action is barred by Fla.Stat. §
95.031(2), a statute of repose that requires products liability actions to be brought within 12 years of the product’s delivery. The parties agree that the statute was in effect when this action was filed and that if it is applied, it will defeat the plaintiffs’ claim. The Moldovans note, however, that the Florida legislature has amended Fla. Stat. §
95.031 (2), and as of July 1, 1986, there has been no applicable statute of repose....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...e of limitations for "[a] legal or
equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a
written instrument" is four years. And the limitations period beings to
run "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs."
§ 95.031(1).
The elements of a cause of action for declaratory relief are
well established....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1879, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 17477
...This is an appeal from a final summary judgment holding that appellants’ action was time barred. We affirm on the authority of Feil v. Challenge-Cook Brothers, Inc.,
473 So.2d 1338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) wherein another panel of this court rejected the same constitutional attack on section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1981) now asserted by appellants....
...We also find no error in the trial court’s refusal to grant rehearing or leave to amend after summary judgment was entered. However, recognizing the importance of the constitutional issue, we join the Pullum court in certifying the following issue as one of great public importance: DOES SECTION 95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1981) UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DENY EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW TO APPELLANTS AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED WHO ARE INJURED BY PRODUCTS IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE EIGHTH AND THE TWELFTH YEAR AFTER ORIGINAL DELIVERY OF TH...
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...The third element of a legal malpractice
claim, that the attorney’s negligence be the proximate cause of loss to the client, is
also referred to as the concept of “redressable harm.” Lenahan v. Russell L. Forkey,
P.A.,
702 So.2d 610, 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Pursuant to Fla. Stat. Ann. §
95.031(1), a cause of action accrues “when the last element constituting the cause of
6
See, e.g., Segal v....
...statute of limitations for that cause of action has begun to run.
Along these lines, we note that a study of relevant Florida caselaw may create some
confusion about use and meaning of the word “accrual.” As explained above, under Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 95.031(1), “[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of
action occurs.” Some Florida cases, however, suggest that the concept of accrual in the legal
malpractice context includes the discovery aspect of the statute of limitations inquiry....
...As
noted, however, a cause of action can accrue for ownership purposes in a bankruptcy proceeding
before the statute of limitations begins to run. Thus, our inquiry is concerned with when
Alvarez’s legal malpractice “accrued” in the sense of Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.031(1), i.e....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...that the appropriate inquiry for determining whether the debtor's cause of action is property of the estate is
whether the claim is sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past, not the date that the claim accrues
under state law).
4th DCA 1997). Pursuant to Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.031(1), a cause of action accrues "when the last element
constituting the cause of action occurs."7 Alvarez argues that the third element of his malpractice cause of
action, that of redressable harm, did not occur until after the filing of hi...
...limitations for that cause of action has begun to run.
Along these lines, we note that a study of relevant Florida caselaw may create some
confusion about use and meaning of the word "accrual." As explained above, under Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 95.031(1), "[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of
action occurs." Some Florida cases, however, suggest that the concept of accrual in the legal
malpractice context includes the discovery aspect of the statute of limitations inquiry....
...As
noted, however, a cause of action can accrue for ownership purposes in a bankruptcy proceeding
before the statute of limitations begins to run. Thus, our inquiry is concerned with when
Alvarez's legal malpractice "accrued" in the sense of Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.031(1), i.e....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...* DUBINA, Circuit Judge: 1 In this diversity action, Robert C. Mosher and Margaret M. Mosher (collectively "Mosher") appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on their products liability claim based on the Florida products liability statute of repose, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.031(2) (West 1982) (repealed as amended by Laws 1986), in favor of Speedstar Division of AMCA International, Inc....
...26 2) If the "reliance exception" is still viable, could Mosher have justifiably relied on the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
392 So.2d 874 (Fla.1980)? 27 Id. at 917 . 28 Florida's former statute of repose, section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1985), was enacted in 1974 and barred products liability claims that were brought more than twelve years after the date of delivery of the completed product to the original purchaser, regardless of the date the defect in the product was or should have been discovered....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22398
...iversity action, Robert C. Mosher and Margaret M. Mosher (collectively “Mosher”) appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on their products liability claim based on the Florida products liability statute of repose, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 95.031(2) (West 1982) (repealed as amended by Laws 1986), in favor of Speedstar Division of AMCA International, Inc....
...? 2) If the “reliance exception” is still viable, could Mosher have justifiably relied on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
392 So.2d 874 (Fla.1980)? Id. at 917 . Florida’s former statute of repose, section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1985), was enacted in 1974 and barred products liability claims that were brought more than twelve years after the date of delivery of the completed product to the original purchaser, regardless of the date the defect in the product was or should have been discovered....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 7633, 1994 WL 397544
...est of $143,193.68. The trial court correctly ruled that the statute of limitations did not bar Bryan’s contract action for his portion of the 1987 syndication fees. The statute of limitations begins to run from the time a cause of action accrues. § 95.031, Fla.Stat. (1993). A cause of action accrues upon the occurrence of the last element constituting the cause of action. § 95.031(1), Fla.Stat....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...rcraft in question and was liable for negligence and breach of implied warranty as well as strict liability for the alleged deficiencies of the aircraft. General Dynamics filed its motion for summary judgment, based on the Florida statute of repose, § 95.031(2) Fla.Stat....
...The district court dismissed the complaint of all of the plaintiffs against General Dynamics, Inc., the manufacturer of the plane. The order of dismissal stated: The Court finds that this cause of action against defendant, GENERAL DYNAMICS, is barred by the Florida Statute of Repose, Fla.Stat. § 95.031(2)....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...therefore qualifies as an ‘improvement’” (citation omitted)). Cf.
Dominguez v. Hayward Indus., Inc.,
201 So. 3d 100 (Fla. 3d DCA
2015) (concluding that a pool filter, which is a component part of
the swimming pool, does not constitute an improvement to real
property under section
95.031(2)(b), Florida Statutes, which sets
forth a statute of repose for products liability claims and exempts
“improvements to real property, including elevators and
escalators”).
In Collins v....
CopyPublished | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 501, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2472
...A cause of action founded upon fraud accrues when the facts giving rise to the cause of action “were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence ...” but must commence within 12 years of the date of commission of the fraud. Fla. Stat. § 95.031 (2)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 3237813, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 13342
...We have no need to decide what statute of limitations might be applicable to this action. . The time within which to commence an action alleging fraud begins to run at the point where the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the facts giving rise to the claim. § 95.031(2)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 2861, 2009 WL 928467
...by the statute of limitations. This decision involves analyzing the applicable statute of limitations, and exceptions to the statute's exclusionary effect. A cause of action accrues when all the elements necessary to the cause of action are present. §
95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). The statute of limitations for negligence provides that the action must be commenced within four years from the date of accrual. §§
95.11(3),
95.031, Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...ns begins to run—i.e., the date upon which the plaintiff may bring an action on the claim asserted. See Hearndon v. Graham,
767 So.2d 1179, 1184-85 (Fla. 2000) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Lee,
678 So.2d 818, 821 (Fla. 1996)); see also §
95.031....
...tinct inquiries, we analyze each possibility separately. A. We turn first to the question of accrual. Under Florida law, unless another statute applies, “[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” § 95.031(1)....
...at 712 (explaining that Hearndon, which created the exception, “is limited to the specific facts in that case”). Davis thus makes clear that unless another statute provides differently, courts applying a statute of limitations must follow the default rule codified in section 95.031(1) that “[a] cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” See also Nat’l Auto Serv....
...As a result, the grandparents’ knowledge of the alleged invasion of the twins’ rights is not pertinent to when the twins’ negligence causes of action accrued. Although cases like S.A.P. and Drake have held otherwise, those cases predate the supreme court’s decision in Davis. Under the plain language of section 95.031(1), as *1079 applied in Davis, the cause of action accrues when its last element occurs....
...emed to have accrued until there is a person capable of bringing that cause of action on the minor’s behalf. See, e.g., Drake,
462 So.2d at 1144 . This reasoning, which flows from decisions predating Davis, cannot survive that decision. If we take section
95.031(l)’s directive that a cause of action accrues when its last element occurs for what it says, as Davis contemplates, then the existence of a person who can bring the claim on the minor’s behalf is not relevant to the question of accrual....
...on the claims of unrepresented minors in specified circumstances. §
95.051(l)(h). After Davis, the relevant question with respect to a minor’s access to a legal remedy-should be whether that tolling statute applies in any given ease, not whether section
95.031(l)’s last element rule silently incorporates a requirement that there be an adult capable of bringing a minor’s claim before that claim can accrue....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1108, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 12097
Florida: I. WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF SECTION
95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), ABOLISHING THE
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...d have applied
the 2005 version of the ordinance instead of the 2014 version. We
disagree.
The trial court properly found the 2014 version controlled. “A cause of
action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action
occurs.” § 95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 4579, 2000 WL 390329
...Under section
95.11(5)(a), a claim of specific performance of a contract must be brought within one year. §
95.11(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). In both of these statutes, the limitations period begins to run when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs. §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 968, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 2106
...*1228 We turn next to the summary judgment entered in favor of Lederle Laboratories, the manufacturer of methotrexate. During the period Adam was receiving in-trathecal methotrexate injections, products liability actions were governed by a four year statute of limitations. §
95.11(4), Fla. Stat. (1971). In 1975, section
95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975), established a statute of repose for products liability actions. According to section
95.031(2), the period of limitation in a products liability action commences to run “from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, ......
...roduct ... was or should have been discovered.” 10 The twelve-year bar has been applied to cases in which the incident giving rise to the cause of action occurred before 1975, the year the repose statute became effective, provided the operation of section 95.031(2) does not bar a cause of action before it accrues, thereby denying an injured party access to the courts....
...In examining the record, we find no information indicating precisely when the University of Miami and Dr. Koch received delivery of the methotrexate used to treat Adam. Thus, we cannot determine whether the Bogorffs’ cause of action should be barred under the twelve-year limitation provided in section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 1491639, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 5557
...Sapphire-Fort Lauderdale, LLP,
693 F.Supp.2d 1325,1345 (S.D.Fla.2010), citing Franconia and Barbara G. Banks, supra. In this case Dutra elected the third option. She gave Kaplan the full five years to make the payment due under the contract. When he failed to do so, Dutra’s claim for breach of contract accrued. See, §
95.031(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 1425, 1988 WL 31739
...Maimin Co., Inc., and remand for further proceedings. We do this because there is existent a genuine issue of material fact which pre-eludes summary disposition. That issue is the date of the delivery of the fabric cutting machine in question, which date triggers the running and applicability of section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1985)....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 1482779
...onsistent with the terms of the contract. Although the School Board is correct in asserting the general proposition that a statute of limitations begins to run only “ ‘when a cause of action accrues[,]’” Hearn don,
767 So.2d at 1184 (quoting section
95.031, Florida Statutes), we disagree with its contention that its cause of action against Langley did not accrue until 2010. A cause of action accrues “ ‘when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.’ ” Id. at 1185-86 (quoting §
95.031, Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 3394, 1994 WL 123666
...The summary judgment entered below is affirmed on the holding that plaintiffs-appellants’ “restitution” claim that the defendant asbestos manufacturer should be required to pay the costs of removing asbestos from the plaintiffs’ building 1 is barred by the then-applicable products liability statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975) (repealed Ch....
