Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...provided statutory authority for the trial court to impose a higher sentence than allowed by the "statutory maximum." See Mays v. State, 717 So.2d 515, 516 (Fla.1998). Similarly, for those defendants who committed their crimes after October 1, 1998, section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that "if the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s....

...for direct appeal. [14] We note that the Legislature recently amended the sentencing statute applicable to felonies committed after October 1, 1998. See ch. 97-194, Laws of Florida (creating the Florida Criminal Punishment Code, codified at sections 921.002-921.0026, Florida Statutes (1997)); see also § 921.0027, Fla. Stat. (1999). Under this statute, the trial judge must calculate the "lowest permissible sentence." See § 921.00265, Fla. Stat. (1999). Written reasons for imposing a departure sentence are still required when a judge imposes a downward departure. See §§ 921.002(1)(f), .0025, .0026, Fla. Stat. (1999); see Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(25)(26). However, the statute allows the judge to impose a sentence "up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense," section 921.002(1)(g), without requiring the filing of any reasons for doing so. See §§ 921.002(1)(f)(h), 921.0026; Fla....

...The expressed legislative purpose under the Code is articulated thusly: "The primary purpose of sentencing [pursuant to the Code] is to punish the offender. Rehabilitation is a desired goal of the criminal justice system but is subordinate to the goal of punishment." § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). "The penalty imposed [for an offense] is commensurate with the severity of the offense and the circumstances surrounding [it]." § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). In addition, "[t]he severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender's prior record." § 921.002(1)(d), Fla....

...State, 342 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1976); O'Donnell v. State, 326 So.2d 4 (Fla.1975). Moreover, under the Code, a trial court is free to sentence below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Code provided the court gives written reasons for doing so. § 921.002(1)(f), Fla....

...on of criminal penalties, and to make the best use of state prisons so that violent criminal offenders are appropriately incarcerated, has determined that it is in the best interest of the state to develop, implement, and revise a sentencing policy. § 921.002(1), Fla....

...[5] *764 7. Due Process Notice and Apprendi v. New Jersey In instances where the lowest permissible sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for an offense, the Code requires the trial court to sentence a defendant at the lowest permissible sentence. See § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...State, 661 So.2d 1274, 1276 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), overruled on other grounds by White v. State, 714 So.2d 440 (Fla.1998). Accordingly, the Code provides proper notice of a permissible sentence and does not run afoul of due process for lack of notice. Hall also contends that section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), violates the holding of Apprendi v....

...i, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Because the sentence for each of Hall's offenses did not exceed the statutory maximum, we conclude that Apprendi is inapplicable. Hall also asserts that the Code violates due process principles in Apprendi because section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998) creates "wandering" or "floating" statutory maximums....

...ANSTEAD, C.J., and HARDING, WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] According to the information, Hall committed his offenses on November 21, 1998, which subjected him to the Criminal Punishment Code for offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998. See § 921.002, Fla....

...punishment provision of Florida's Constitution, article I, section 17, states that "[e]xcessive fines, cruel or unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of witnesses are forbidden." [4] Section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), gives the trial court authority to sentence consecutively or concurrently under the Code. [5] Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.120(d) states as follows: "The reply brief shall contain argument in response and rebuttal to argument presented in the answer brief." [6] Section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), states in relevant part: "If the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s....

the definitions in Florida Statutes § 921.01 and § 921.02, F.S.A.[3] support the distinction made here between

...The State's objection made clear that the State sought imposition of a nondeparture sentence because there was no legal reason justifying a downward departure. We therefore turn to an evaluation of the merits of the State's claim that there was no legal basis for the downward departure sentence. Section 921.0026(1), Florida Statutes (2003), provides that a sentence less severe than the lowest permissible sentence shown on the Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet "is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably *945 justify the downward departure." See also § 921.00265(1). Section 921.0026(2), which sets forth a nonexclusive list of such mitigating circumstances, provides in pertinent part: "Mitigating circumstances under which a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is reasonably justified include... (j) The offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse." Under section 921.002(3), "[t]he level of proof necessary to establish facts supporting the mitigation of a sentence is a preponderance of the evidence" and any downward departure sentence "must be explained in writing by the trial court judge." See also § 921.00265(2). Here, although the trial court failed to explain in writing the reason for the downward departure, the transcript of the sentencing hearing makes clear that the trial court relied on the mitigating circumstance set forth in section 921.0026(2)(j) as the basis for imposing a downward departure. The transcript makes equally clear that the trial court's reliance on that mitigating circumstance was unwarranted. Three elements must be shown to establish the existence of the mitigating circumstance listed in section 921.0026(2)(j): (a) the offense must have been "committed in an unsophisticated manner," (b) the offense must have been "an isolated incident," and (c) the defendant must have "shown remorse" for the offense....

...The fact that a defendant who has previously committed numerous offenses has not in the past committed the same crime as the offense for which he is being sentenced does not mean that the current offense is "an isolated incident." See id. Although the trial court made reference to two of the elements in section 921.0026(2)(j) in the court's attempt to articulate an appropriate basis for the downward departure, the entirety of the trial court's comments shows that the underlying basis for the decision to impose a departure sentence was the trial cour...

...In the Criminal Punishment Code, the legislature has made the policy determination that certain offenders, because of *946 their prior criminal record, should receive sentences which exceed the statutory maximum ordinarily applicable to the offense for which they are being sentenced. See § 921.0024(2) ("If the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s....

...The trial court "sentenced him to the maximum sentence authorized by law on each charge: life imprisonment for the armed burglary and 15 years for the attempted armed robbery." Id. at 2020. Importantly, "[b]ecause Florida... abolished its parole system, see Fla. Stat. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003), a life sentence gives a defendant no possibility of release unless he is granted executive clemency." Id....

...If the Supreme Court has more in mind, it will have to say what that is. We conclude that Henry's aggregate term-of-years sentence is not invalid under the Eighth Amendment and affirm the decision below. AFFIRMED. ORFINGER, C.J., and PALMER, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 921.002(1)(e), Florida Statutes, provides: The sentence imposed by the sentencing judge reflects the length of actual time to be served, shortened only by the application of incentive and meritorious gain-time as provided by law, and may not...

...[1] On appeal, the district court affirmed the trial court's denial of the petitioner's rule 3.850 motion and agreed that the sentence was legally based on this Court's statement in Maddox v. State, 760 So.2d 89, 101 n. 9 (Fla.2000), that "for those defendants who committed their crimes after October 1, 1998, section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that `if the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed.'" The district court then recognized potential statutory conflict between two provisions of the Criminal Punishment Code: (1) section 921.002(1)(g), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), which does not authorize a court to impose a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum; and (2) section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), which directs that "[i]f the lowest permissible sentence under the [Criminal Punishment Code] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence ..., the sentence required by the code must be imposed." Due to th...

...If the lowest permissible sentence under the Code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, the sentence required by the Code must be imposed. (Emphasis added.) This rule harmonizes the two provisions. The first provision (section 921.002(1)(g)) applies to general sentencing, while the second provision (section 921.0024(2)) applies to those circumstances in which "the lowest permissible sentence under the Code exceeds the statutory maximum." By this rule, application of section 921.0024(2) is an exception to the general provision of section 921.002(1)(g) that sentences cannot exceed the statutory maximum. We do, however, hold that when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2002), is exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence under the code, the lowest permissible sentence under the code becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose. Because section 921.002(1)(g) and section 921.0024(2) were amended at the same time and deal with the same general subject, they should be read as in pari materia....

...e sentencing guidelines may have, for some cases, provided statutory authority for the trial court to impose a higher sentence than allowed by the "statutory maximum." Similarly, for those defendants who committed their crimes after October 1, 1998, section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that "if the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s....

...Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and find that the petitioner's sentence is legal. We therefore approve the decision below affirming the denial of the petitioner's rule 3.850 motion. We reject the petitioner's second issue, a constitutional attack based on our construction of section 921.0024(2), and hold that section 921.0024(2) is not vague....

...which governs sentencing. In support of this contention, the State relies upon Montgomery v. State, 897 So.2d 1282, 1286 (Fla.2005), in which this Court held, in the context of sentencing guidelines, that the statutory definition of "conviction" in section 921.0021, Florida Statutes (2002), includes those felonies to which a defendant pled no contest, regardless of whether adjudication was withheld. A review of the legislative history of the definition of "conviction" leads us to conclude that the Legislature did not intend for the definition in section 921.0021, Florida Statutes (2003), to apply to the "prior violent felony conviction" aggravator. See generally § 921.002(1), Fla....

...plain language of section 921.0011, the 1993 definition of "conviction" applied to section 921.141(5)(b), and a plea, regardless of whether adjudication was withheld, constituted a conviction. In 1997, section 921.0011 was repealed and renumbered as section 921.0021. See ch. 97-194, §§ 1, 4, at 3674-75, Laws of Fla. While renumbered, section 921.0021 still indicated in 1997 that it applied to the whole of chapter 921....

...ss of whether adjudication is withheld. Ch. 98-204, § 3, at 1937-38, Laws of Fla. (emphasis supplied). In Montgomery v. State, 897 So.2d 1282, 1285-86 (Fla.2005), we subsequently held that, under the statutory definition of "conviction" provided in section 921.0021, a no contest plea with adjudication withheld constituted a conviction for purposes of the sentencing guidelines, *878 which do not apply to capital felonies. The specific decision of the Legislature in 1998 to limit section 921.0021 to noncapital felonies demonstrates that it did not intend for the broader definition of the word "conviction" to apply to the "prior violent felony" aggravating circumstance in capital cases....

...Dakan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent. LEWIS, J. We have for review a decision of a district court of appeal on the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance: WHEN SENTENCING PURSUANT TO THE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT CODE (§§ 921.002-921.0027, Fla.Stat.(1999)) FOR A VIOLATION OF A PROBATIONARY TERM ORIGINALLY IMPOSED TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO A PRISON TERM IMPOSED FOR A DIFFERENT OFFENSE, DO Tripp v....

...It was then within the judge's discretion to sentence the defendant within that narrow range. In contrast, under the now-applicable CPC, "[t]he permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence [as determined by the number of total sentencing points] up to and including the statutory maximum." § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...These restrictions were eliminated by the CPC. Under the CPC, "[t]he trial court judge may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense, including an offense that is before the court due to a violation of probation or community control." § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added). The Legislature expressed that the primary purpose of sentencing is to be punishment. See § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

..."The permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum ... for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing. The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or consecutively." § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...In his motion, Carpenter claimed that the alleged episode from which the charges against him arose did not occur on October 5, 1998, but on September 28, 1998. The alleged difference in the date on which the offenses occurred is significant because the Criminal Punishment Code became effective on October 1, 1998. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (1997). Under the Criminal Punishment Code the sentencing judge has unfettered discretion to impose the statutory maximum for offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998. See § 921.002(1)(g)....

...purposes of the sentencing guidelines. For sentencing purposes, chapter 921, Florida Statutes, provides that prior convictions are scored on the sentencing guidelines worksheet in computing a defendant's sentence. See § 921.0014, Fla. Stat. (2002). Section 921.0021 defines a conviction as "a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld." See § 921.0021(2), Fla....

...State, 395 So.2d 1145 (Fla.1980), reiterated the position that guilty pleas with adjudication withheld are considered convictions for purposes of capital sentencing. Despite this language in Garron, the Legislature, eleven years after Garron, enacted section 921.0021, [1] defining convictions and specifically including convictions whether or not adjudication is withheld. A finding that a no contest plea is a prior conviction, regardless of adjudication being withheld, is consistent with the legislative intent of section 921.0021(2)....

...State, 802 So.2d 281, 286 (Fla.2001) (citation omitted) (quoting Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992)). Here, the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. A conviction is a "determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld." § 921.0021(2), Fla....

...Also, "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender. Rehabilitation is a desired goal of the criminal justice system but is subordinate to the goal of punishment.... The severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender's prior record." § 921.002(1)(b), (d), Fla....

...ithheld, are prior convictions for purposes of sentencing under section 921.0014. For sentencing purposes, a conviction is defined as "a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld." § 921.0021(2), Fla. Stat. (2002). Prior record is defined as "a conviction for a crime committed by the offender, as an adult or a juvenile, prior to the time of the primary offense." § 921.0021(5), Fla....

...I believe a plain reading of the sentencing statute compels that the question be answered in the negative. I therefore respectfully dissent. In the sentencing statute, the term "conviction" is defined as "a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld." § 921.0021(2), Fla....

...(2004) (defining "conviction" as "a determination of guilt which is the result of a trial or the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld"). In chapter 921, on the other hand, the Legislature did not employ such a broad definition, and any interpretation of section 921.0021(2) should account for this fact....

appeal. Committee Note: To the same effect as Section 921.02, except the portion reading "in writing, signed

...The state argues that appellant's five-year sentence is not subject to appellate review because it falls within the statutory limits of the Code. The Code provides that "the trial court may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense ...." § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2000). "The permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum...." Section 921.0024(2), Fla....

...The state contends that because the trial court imposed a legal sentence under the statutes, this issue is not cognizable on direct appeal. As authority, the state cites sections 924.06(1)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes (2000) (a defendant may appeal an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed under section 921.0024 which exceeds the statutory minimum), and Rule 9.140(b)(1)(D), Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure (a defendant may appeal an unlawful or illegal sentence)....

...Section 921.001(1)(h) grants only the state the right to appeal a departure sentence, which is defined as a sentence below the lowest permissible sentence. Observing that a statute cannot be construed so as to restrict a defendant's right to appeal contained in the Florida Constitution, we interpreted section 921.002(1)(h) as not prohibiting all appeals by defendants from sentences under the Code....

the court's judgment. Appellant refers us to Section 921.02, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which reads as follows:

...The State objected to the downward departure sentences at the time they were imposed. At a minimum, the trial court must impose the lowest permissible sentence calculated according to the Criminal Punishment Code unless the court finds that the evidence supports a valid reason for a downward departure. See e.g., § 921.002(1)(f) & (3), Fla....

...use of discretion. Discretion is abused only where no reasonable person would agree with the trial court's decision." Id. An appellate court will uphold a departure sentence if any reason given by the trial judge is a valid reason for departure. See § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). Section 921.0026, Florida Statutes (1999), sets out a list of mitigating grounds for sentencing departures. Specifically, section 921.0026 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) A downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence, as calculated according to the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024, is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure....

...rison sentence. * * * (i) The defendant cooperated with the state to resolve the current offense or any other offense. (j) The offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse. § 921.0026, Fla. Stat. (1999). The list of statutory departure reasons is not exclusive, so departures based on reasons not delineated in section 921.0026, which are supported by the record, may be permissible....

...See State v. Randall, 746 So.2d 550, 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); State v. Turro, 724 So.2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). We are mindful, however, that under the Criminal Punishment Code, "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender." § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999). REMORSE Turning now to the grounds utilized by the trial court for departure, we first discuss Appellees' remorse as a basis for departure. While it is true that at sentencing each Appellee expressed remorse for his conduct, section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (1999), requires, in addition to remorse, that the crime be committed in an unsophisticated manner, and constitute an isolated incident....

...No evidence was presented regarding these requirements. To the contrary, the record clearly indicates that the crimes were committed in a sophisticated manner and were not isolated incidents. Simply saying "I'm sorry" at sentencing is not enough to satisfy the requirements of section 921.0026(2)(j)....

...Laroe was a fugitive until this morning." The record contains no competent substantial evidence that Appellees persuaded Laroe to surrender or otherwise cooperated with the State to resolve the instant offenses or any other offenses. *127 NEED FOR RESTITUTION Section 921.0026(2)(e) allows the court to impose a downward departure sentence if the need for restitution to the victim outweighs the need for a prison sentence....

...JONES'S MEDICAL CONDITION Finally, the trial court considered Jones's medical condition as a basis for downward departure. Jones introduced medical records showing that he had surgery for an aneurysm in 1990. As a result, he suffers from seizures and takes medication on a regular basis. While section 921.0026(1)(d) allows the court to depart downward if a defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental or physical disability, there was no evidence presented showing that Jones required specialized treatment for his condition, or that...

...departure were not established); State v. Arvinger, 751 So.2d 74 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). SENTENCES VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING. THOMPSON, C.J. and COBB, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 895.03(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). [2] § 796.05, Fla. Stat. (1999). [3] § 921.002, et seq., Fla....

...The court does find that he qualifies as a habitual felony offender and I am going to enter the order finding that he qualifies as a habitual felony offender. I am going to find that he does not—it is not necessary to protect the public in this case to sentence him as a HFO. I'm instead going to downward depart under 921.0026....

...ent Code, explaining: At a minimum, the trial court must impose the lowest permissible sentence calculated according to the Criminal Punishment Code unless the court finds that the evidence supports a valid reason for a downward departure. See e.g., § 921.002(1)(f) & (3), Fla....

...n abuse of discretion. Discretion is abused only where no reasonable person would agree with the trial court's decision." Id. An appellate court will uphold a departure sentence if any reason given by the trial judge is a valid reason for departure. Section 921.0026(1) and (2)(j), Florida Statutes (2006), which governs mitigating circumstances justifying a downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence, provides in relevant part: (1) A downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence, as calculated according to the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024, is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure....

...asonably justified include, but are not limited to: . . . (j) The offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse. However, the list of statutory departure reasons provided in section 921.0026(2) is not exclusive. State v. Randall, 746 So.2d 550, 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Therefore, the trial court may impose a downward departure for reasons not delineated in section 921.0026, so long as the reason given is supported by competent, substantial evidence and not otherwise prohibited....

...Here, the trial court gave three reasons for downward departure: Mr. Stephenson's remorse, his family support obligations, and the fact that he had "kept his nose clean" since being released from prison in 2004. The first reason, remorse, is specifically authorized under section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes. However, section 921.0026(2)(j) requires, in addition to remorse, that the crime be committed in an unsophisticated manner and constitute an isolated incident....

...Further, the record contains no competent, substantial evidence that would support a finding that the charged offense was committed in an unsophisticated and isolated manner. See Tyrrell, 807 So.2d at 126 ("Simply saying `I'm sorry' at sentencing is not enough to satisfy the requirements of section 921.0026(2)(j)."). Therefore, a downward departure under section 921.0026(2)(j) was unjustified....

...Mann, 866 So.2d 179, 181 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). We hold that the basis for downward departure was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. *1057 DISCUSSION The provision of criminal penalties is a matter of predominantly substantive law determined by the legislature. § 921.002(1), Fla. Stat. (2003); State v. Ayers, 901 So.2d 942, 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Ordinarily, the lowest permissible guideline sentence is "assumed to be the lowest appropriate sentence for the offender being sentenced." § 921.00265(1); Mann, 866 So.2d at 181. A downward departure is prohibited unless circumstances reasonably justify the departure, which must be articulated in writing. § 921.0026(1); 921.002(1)(f); Mann, 866 So.2d at 181, 183; Ayers, 901 So.2d at 944-45; Staffney v....

...Mann, 866 So.2d at 181; Staffney, 826 So.2d at 511. UNSOPHISTICATION AS A REASON FOR DEPARTURE A valid basis for departure exists where "[t]he offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse." § 921.0026(2)(j); Mann, 866 So.2d at 182; Thompson, 844 So.2d at 815; Ayers, 901 So.2d at 945; Staffney, 826 So.2d at 511....

...Munro, 903 So.2d 381, 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Staffney, 826 So.2d at 511-12. However, " intoxication at the time of the offense is not a mitigating factor . . . and does not, under any circumstances, justify a downward departure from the permissible sentencing range." § 921.0026(3) (emphasis added); Thompson, 844 So.2d at 815. The trial court did not explain the departure in writing, but the transcript shows that the court relied on the "unsophisticated manner" language in section 921.0026(2)(j)....

...uch as he was inebriated . . . [a]nd that's why I detail it as being somewhat clumsy in the approach and what transpired." This contravened the plain language of the statute, which forbids the use of intoxication to justify a downward departure. See § 921.0026(3); Thompson, 844 So.2d at 815....

...f you served fifteen months. The state then objected to the downward departure sentence "for the record," but stated no grounds. Assuming the earlier objection can carry over to the court's reasons for departure, the state is not entitled to relief. Section 921.0026(2) provides a list of mitigating circumstances which will justify a downward departure....

...This list includes the instance in which a defendant cooperates with the state to resolve the offense, the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner, and the criminal acts constitute isolated incidents for which the defendant has shown remorse. § 921.0026(2)(i) and (j), Fla. Stat.(1999). However, this list of statutory departure reasons is not exclusive. § 921.0026(1). See also State v. Turro, 724 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). In addition, even if some of the court's stated reasons are insufficient, only one valid reason is necessary to sustain a departure. § 921.002(3)....

...to have committed a delinquent act that would be a felony if committed by an adult." The difference between subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) is not arbitrary; rather, it recognizes the fundamental difference between criminal proceedings and juvenile proceedings. The primary purpose of criminal sentencing is to punish. § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...ue to a violation of probation or community control. (h) A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the Criminal Punishment Code only if the sentence is below the lowest permissible sentence or as enumerated in s. 924.06(1). [e.s.] § 921.002 Fla. Stat. (2003). Section 924.06(1) provides: A defendant may appeal from ... a sentence, on the ground that it is illegal; or ... [a] sentence imposed under s. 921.0024 of the Criminal Punishment Code which exceeds the statutory maximum penalty provided in s....

...r lack of jurisdiction. FACTS The order from the Second District in Gandy's case reads in its entirety: "Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus is treated as a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and is denied. See § 921.002(g), Fla....

...ial court erred in imposing a discretionary cost of $150. We find reversible error only as to the third issue. *574 Mr. Patterson committed his offenses on February 19, 1999, and is thus subject to the provisions of the Criminal Punishment Code. See § 921.002, Fla....

...Instead, the sentences imposed were each for a specified term of years, albeit for an *973 extraordinary length because of the consecutive requirement. Further, pursuant to Florida law, after serving eighty-five percent of the sentence, Mr. Walle may qualify for a lessening of his sentence. See § 921.002(l)(e), Fla....

Notes 1968 Adoption. To the same effect as section 921.02, Florida Statutes, except the portion reading

...impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. " Under the Criminal Punishment Code, a trial court may impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum without any additional factual findings. See § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...2d DCA 2003) (victim injury points must be submitted to jury if addition of points causes sentence to go beyond statutory maximum). Below, the appellant also asserted that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, by scoring victim injury points for "death" when the jury acquitted him of all murder charges. We agree. Section 921.0021(7)(a), Fla....

....00 to be paid at a rate of $425.82 per month. The trial court based this downward departure sentence on a finding that the need for restitution outweighed the need for incarceration. II "The primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender." § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...A defendant's minimum sentence is based on the crime he committed and the points he earned. Accordingly, departures below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Criminal Punishment Code must be articulated in writing and supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See § 921.002(1)(f) & (3), Fla....

...ll not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. See id. A victim's need for restitution is a valid reason for a downward departure sentence only if competent, substantial evidence shows the victim's need outweighs the need for incarceration. See § 921.0026(2)(e), Fla....

...ally provided valid reasons for departure. Jackson, 22 So.3d at 818 . The district court concluded further that the ground provided orally for the downward departure — that Jackson was amenable to drug rehabilitation — was not valid. Id. (citing § 921.0026(3), Fla....

...termined to be invalid. This issue presents a legal question and thus is subject to de novo review. See Sanders v. State, 35 So.3d 864, 868 (Fla.2010). The CPC governs sentencing in all non-capital felonies committed on or after October 1, 1998. See § 921.002, Fla....

...Jackson committed the aforementioned offenses on April 11, 2008, thus subjecting him to sentencing under the CPC. Generally, a trial court must impose, at a minimum, the lowest permissible sentence calculated according to the CPC unless there is a valid reason to impose a downward departure sentence. See § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). For noncapital offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998, “[t]he lowest permissible sentence provided by calculations from the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024(2) is assumed to be the lowest appropriate sentence for the offender being sentenced.” § 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). A departure sentence is one that “decreases an offender’s sentence below the lowest permissible sentence” provided by calculations from the total sentence points. § 921.00265(2), Fla. Stat. (2008); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(27)(A). A trial court must not impose a downward departure sentence unless mitigating circumstances or factors are present which reasonably justify such a departure. §§ 921.0026(1), 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (2008); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(27). Section 921.0026(2) sets forth a nonexclusive list of mitigating factors under which a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is reasonably justified. § 921.0026(2), Fla....

...State, 565 So.2d 1329, 1331 (Fla.1990), receded from on other grounds by Smith v. State, 598 So.2d 1063 (Fla.1992). However, the CPC and applicable rules now require a sentencing court to file written reasons supporting the imposition of a downward departure sentence within seven days after the date of sentencing. § 921.00265(2); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(27)(A). A court may file a written transcription of reasons stated orally at sentencing for a downward departure within seven days after the date of sentencing. § 921.00265(2); see also Fla....

...t. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(27)(A). The CPC is silent on how a trial court must resentence a defendant when the original departure sentence is reversed on appeal. However, the Legislature has expressed certain principles embodied by the CPC. See § 921.002(1)....

...udge and made only when circumstances or factors reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence. The level of proof necessary to establish facts that support a departure from the *93 lowest permissible sentence is a preponderance of the evidence. § 921.002(1)®, Fla....

...ntencing range would have remained that of a non-state prison sanction. Thus, we conclude that the error regarding the exclusion of the prior misdemeanors does not require resentencing. Affirmed. BLUE, A.C.J., and SALCINES, J., Concur. NOTES [1] See § 921.002, Fla....

...After having heard the testimony and arguments of the attorneys, the trial judge concluded that Appellee had "a serious problem with alcohol [that caused Appellee] to act in an unsophisticated manner." Based thereon, the court chose to impose a downward departure probationary sentence, pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes, (2002). For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the imposition of the departure sentence was error. Section 921.0026, Florida Statutes, contains a non-exclusive list of mitigating circumstances a court may use as the basis for a departure sentence. One such circumstance is where the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse. § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla....

...lated incident, committed in an unsophisticated manner, and for which the defendant had shown remorse. Id. Any departure based on these grounds must be supported by written reasons or orally pronounced findings of fact on each of the three elements. § 921.00265(2), Fla....

...tted in an unsophisticated way. The trial judge made no findings related to the other two elements, nor was there record evidence to support any conclusion that the offenses were isolated or that Appellee had shown remorse. Departure predicated upon section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes, therefore, was not proper. Although the statutory list of mitigating circumstances upon which downward departure may be based is not intended to be exhaustive, the legislature has clearly prohibited departure on the basis of substance abuse or addiction. Section 921.0026(3), Florida Statutes, states as follows: The defendant's substance abuse or addiction, including intoxication at the time of the offense, is not a mitigating factor......

...On remand, therefore, the court should determine whether Appellee entered an open plea to the court without agreement for a particular sentence. If so, the court should simply sentence Appellee *816 in accordance with the Criminal Punishment Code. § 921.002, Fla....

...Under the new Criminal Punishment Code, if a sentence of imprisonment is authorized, the maximum sentence is never less than the statutory maximum and the scoresheet determines the lowest permissible sentence in the absence of a reason for a downward departure sentence. See § 921.002, Fla....

...We have for review the decision in State v. VanBebber, 805 So.2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), which certified conflict with the decision in State v. Warner, 721 So.2d 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), approved on other grounds, 762 So.2d 507 (Fla.2000), on the issue of whether the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), is available to support a downward departure from a sentence for a driving under the influence (DUI) conviction. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we hold the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward departure from a sentence for a felony DUI conviction....

...Defense counsel argued for a downward departure from the guidelines sentence of *1048 175.9 to 240 months based on the statutory mitigator of "offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse." § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The trial court agreed that the evidence fulfilled the requirements of section 921.0026(2)(j) and imposed a downward departure....

...ticated manner. The State objected to the downward departure, thus preserving this issue, which it then appealed. VanBebber, 805 So.2d at 919 (footnotes omitted). The Second District affirmed the decision of the trial court and held the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward departure from a sentence for a DUI conviction, but certified conflict with Warner on this issue. See VanBebber, 805 So.2d at 921. DISCUSSION Section 921.0026 is part of the Florida Criminal Punishment Code [2] and provides, in relevant part: 921.0026 Mitigating circumstances.—This section applies to any felony offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after October 1, 1998. (1) A downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence, as calculated according to the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024, is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure....

...(3) The defendant's substance abuse or addiction, including intoxication at the time of the offense, is not a mitigating factor under subsection (2) and does not, under any circumstances, justify a downward departure from the permissible sentencing range. § 921.0026, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). In concluding that the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward departure from a sentence for a DUI conviction, the Second District reasoned: (1) section 921.0026 states unequivocally, *1049 "This section applies to any felony offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after October 1, 1998," and (2) cognizant of the public policy against drunk driving, the Legislature still did not exempt DUI crimes from application of section 921.0026(2)(j). VanBebber, 805 So.2d at 920. [3] We agree with the Second District's reasoning. Section 921.0026 plainly states, "This section applies to any felony offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after October 1, 1998." [4] Because the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) applies to any felony offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after October 1, 1998, [5] it is available to support a downward departure from a felony DUI conviction. The fact that the Legislature specifically exempted only capital felonies is further support for the conclusion that section 921.0026(2)(j) applies to felony DUI convictions....

...Beck, 763 So.2d 506, 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ("We also note that drunk driving cannot be committed in an unsophisticated manner."). Although we fully recognize the State's strong public policy against DUI, we find that the issue in this case, whether the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward departure from a DUI conviction, is resolved by the clear and unambiguous statutory language of section 921.0026. Because the statute states that the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) applies to any felony offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after October 1, 1998, we hold that the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward departure from a felony DUI conviction. The State also argues, however, that to hold section 921.0026(2)(j) applicable to felony DUI convictions would create conflict with section 921.0026(3), which provides: (3) The defendant's substance abuse or addiction, including intoxication at the time of the offense, is not a mitigating factor under subsection (2) and does not, under any circumstances, justify a downward departure from the permissible sentencing range. We find that no conflict is created by holding section 921.0026(2)(j) applicable to felony DUI convictions....

...Under subsection (3), intoxication at the time of the offense cannot be used as a mitigating factor to support a downward departure from a sentence under the sentencing guidelines. There is no prohibition, however, against using the mitigators listed in section 921.0026(2) in cases where the offense is intoxication....

...As the Second District noted, "we shall not judicially legislate and interpret the law to negate the clear language used by the legislature." VanBebber, 805 So.2d at 920. Finally, the State argues that the Second District improperly relied on State v. Sachs, 526 So.2d 48 (Fla.1988), to buttress its conclusion that section 921.0026(2)(j) is available in this case....

...iously found the same reasons for departure valid in a case involving a DUI offense, even before the reasons were codified as a mitigator in the Florida Statutes. Therefore we find that the Second District did not err by relying on Sachs. CONCLUSION Section 921.0026 is clear and unambiguous and provides that the mitigators found therein are applicable to all felony offenses except capital felonies. The offense of DUI is a noncaptial felony offense. Therefore, we hold that the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward departure from a sentence for a felony DUI conviction....

...PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS, J., concurs. PARIENTE, J., concurring. I write to express my agreement with the majority and elaborate on my reasons for concurring. Section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (2002), allows the trial court to impose a downward departure sentence if the trial court finds that the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse....

...been required to impose a Criminal Punishment Code prison sentence of no less than 175.9 months (14.65 years) up to 240 months (20 years) in prison. The evidence presented in the trial court establishes the basis for a downward departure pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j): this was an isolated instance and the defendant exhibited "extreme and sincere remorse while recognizing his fault." These facts are more fully detailed in Judge Altenbernd's concurrence: Mr....

...He pleaded guilty to these offenses with no promise as to the sentence he would receive. He is a religious man, who has repeatedly stated that he wishes that he could have been the person who died in this accident. State v. VanBebber, 805 So.2d 918, 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (Altenbernd, A.C.J., concurring). Section 921.0026(2)(j) appears to have been written exactly for a defendant such as VanBebber....

...although he or she has demonstrated remorse for an offense that was an "isolated" incident, nonetheless committed the crime in a sophisticated manner either in its planning or execution. As the Second District succinctly stated in this case: First, section 921.0026, which lays out certain mitigating circumstances, states unequivocally: "This section applies to any felony offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after October 1, 1998." There is no exception provided for DUI offenses, as was done for a capital felony....

...erious and real problem of DUI. [8] I likewise urge the Legislature to examine whether a prison term under the guidelines must necessarily be imposed for this type of offense in the absence of one of the twelve grounds for a downward departure under section 921.0026....

...These substantial sanctions fashioned by the trial court are tailored to fit the crime and offender, and also serve in some way to attempt to repair the damage caused by his terrible act. [9] For all these reasons, I agree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court in this case was permitted to use section 921.0026(2)(j) to support a downward departure sentence for a felony DUI conviction. ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs. QUINCE, J., dissenting. I disagree with the majority that because section 921.0026, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), provides that the mitigators in that section are applicable to all felonies except capital felonies, that the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is applicable to the felony of driving under the influence (DUI). I would affirm the view espoused by the Fourth District in State v. Beck, 763 So.2d 506 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), and State v. Warner, 721 So.2d 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), that the mitigating factor in section 921.0026(2)(j) is not applicable to DUI convictions. In Beck, the Fourth District reversed a trial court's downward departure from the sentencing guidelines. One of the reasons given for the departure was the section 921.0026(2)(j) mitigating factor....

...If the crime is one that is not capable of being committed in a sophisticated manner, then logically, it cannot be committed in an unsophisticated manner. As the Fourth District held, DUI is a crime which cannot be committed in a sophisticated or unsophisticated manner. This reading of section 921.0026(2)(j) does not run afoul of the general provision that the mitigators in this section are applicable to all noncapital felonies....

...In determining whether a mitigating factor is applicable, the sentencing court must look at the facts and circumstances of the offense as well as the type of crime that was committed. When the facts and circumstances and the type of crime are considered in this case, I reach the conclusion that section 921.0026(2)(j) is not applicable to the crime of DUI....

...WELLS, J., concurs. NOTES [1] The State contends this is a slight misstatement. The mitigator at issue in this case has three parts-the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse. See § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The State agreed that the offense was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse, but disputed whether the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner. [2] §§ 921.002-921.0027, Fla....

...und the manner of committing the offense, the fact that it was an isolated incident, and the fact that the defendant had shown remorse were valid reasons for a downward departure in a DUI case. See VanBebber, 805 So.2d at 920-21. [4] As noted above, section 921.0026(2)(j) is part of the Florida Criminal Punishment Code. See §§ 921.002-921.0027, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The introduction to the Code also provides: "The Criminal Punishment Code shall apply to all felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998." § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998). [5] The offense in this case was committed on May 23, 1999. [6] Section 921.0016(4) was repealed effective October 1, 1998, with the implementation of the Florida Criminal Punishment Code. See §§ 921.002-921.0026, Florida Statutes (1997). Section 921.0026 was enacted effective October 1, 1998. The mitigators listed in sections 921.0016(4) and 921.0026(2) are identical....

...whose statistical life expectancy is arguably longer, then a fifty-six-year sentence is not a de facto life sentence. Moreover, as we raised in Henry, it is unclear whether gain time would be a factor in this analysis. Id. If it is, and, pursuant to section 921.002(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2002), Peterson serves only eighty-five percent of his sentence, then his sentence is not a de facto life sentence, but then the sixty-year sentence in Guzman, that Justice Pariente clearly inferred would be a...

...in a minimum permissible sentence of 13.1 months in prison. In order to depart downward from 13.1 months, the trial judge would have had to have provided written reasons in writing. § 921.0017(3). The state can appeal downward departure sentences. § 921.002(1)(h)....

...PETERSON and PLEUS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 893.13(1)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (1999), a first degree felony. He had been charged with trafficking in cocaine, but was convicted of the lesser included offense. [2] § 893.247(1), Fla. Stat. (1999), a first degree misdemeanor. [3] §§ 921.002(1)(g), (h); 924.06, Fla....

...ida State Prison. § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2010). Under Florida’s Criminal Punishment Code, the trial court is permitted to sentence the defendant to any permissible sentence not to exceed the maximum sentence allowed for the degree of crime. § 921.002(g), Fla....

...In this case, we are faced with a situation where Appellant, if he serves the entirety of his sentence, will be ninety-seven when he is released. Even if Appellant received the maximum amount of gain time, the earliest he would be released is at age eighty-five. See § 921.002(l)(e), Fla....

...The plea agreement provided a fifteen-year prison sentence for Mora, and the trial court imposed a shorter term of ten years in prison. And, last, a trial court has great discretion in determining the length of a sentence, so long as it is within the statutory limits. § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...See generally, e.g., Dwight v. State, 677 So.2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). "[A] trial court has great discretion in determining the length of a sentence, so long as it is within the statutory limits." Mora v. State, 964 So.2d 881, 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...Thus, the issue squarely facing us is whether the willing participation of a seventeen-year-old young woman in a statutorily prohibited sexual relationship, although not a defense to the crime, can be considered by the judge in determining the appropriate sentence. We agree that section 921.0026, Florida Statutes, gives the trial judge the discretion to mitigate under appropriate circumstances, that the circumstances found by the trial court to exist herein are supported by the record and are appropriate, and affirm recognizing our contrary holding in State v....

...te based on the willing participation of a minor victim, did the court err in this case by doing so? Even if the court finds that a mitigating factor exists, it is still within the judge's discretion whether the guideline sentence should be reduced. Section 921.002(3), Florida Statutes, provides: "A court may impose a departure below the permissible sentencing range based upon circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the mitigating of the sentence in accordance with s. 921.0026." Thus, when we are asked to review a downward departure, there are two questions that we must consider....

...2 Included in this statu *97 tory scheme are a number of non-exclusive mitigating grounds for departure that may establish a basis for a more lenient sentence. 3 The issue we must resolve is whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision to impose a departure sentence pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (2011), which allows a sentence below the minimum guideline range when the crime was “committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse.” We must...

...ds. If the statutory ground is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record, affirmance is appropriate. Banks . As to the non-statutory grounds, “[t]he trial court can impose a downward departure sentence for reasons not delineated in section 921.0026(2), so long as the reason given is supported by competent, substantial evidence and is not otherwise prohibited.” State v....

...Henderson, 108 So.3d 1137, 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (citing State v. Stephenson, 973 So.2d 1259, 1263 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)). The facts that support a departure from the lowest permissible guideline sentence must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. §§ 921.002(1)(0, (3), Fla....

...a mitigated sentence based on their own predilections. See Williams v. State, 492 So.2d 1308 (Fla.1986); State v. Whiteside, 56 So.3d 799 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); State v. Ayers, 901 So.2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). We will begin with the statutory ground. Section 921.0026(2)(j) allows for a departure sentence when: 1) the crime was committed in an unsophisticated manner; 2) it was an isolated incident; and 3) the defendant expressed remorse for his wrongful acts....

...Deleon, 867 So.2d 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Regarding the second statutory element, Thompkins has a significant criminal history, including a prior conviction for burglary of a dwelling, that clearly indicates that his crimes are not isolated incidents within the meaning of section 921.0026(2)(j)....

...eparture is consistent with legislative sentencing policies.” State v. Knox, 990 So.2d 665, 669 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (citations omitted); see also Chestnut. The stated policy of the Criminal Punishment Code is to punish miscreants for their crimes. § 921.002(l)(b), Fla....

...McKnight, 85 So.Bd 995, 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010); Chestnut, 718 So.2d at 313 (“Further, the first purpose of sentencing is to punish, not rehabilitate.”). Whether there is any redeeming value to the criminal in sending him to prison is largely of secondary concern. See § 921.002(l)(b), Fla....

...(2011); State v. Hall, 47 So.3d 361 , 364 n. 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“Rehabilitation is a secondary goal, and it is a stated policy that a defendant’s sentence should increase with the length and nature of the defendant’s prior record.” (citing § 921.002(l)(b), (d))); Chestnut, 718 So.2d at 314 (“It is obvious that prison will always be detrimental to one’s future even if it is essential to his appropriate punishment....

...(citations omitted)). We have analyzed each of the reasons given by the trial court to justify the sentence it imposed because if just one is a valid ground for departure that is supported by competent evidence, then the sentence should be affirmed. § 921.002(3), Fla....

...Having done so, we conclude that the statutory ground is not supported by competent sub *101 stantial evidence and that none of the non-statutory grounds are valid. The sentence is reversed and the case is remanded for resentencing. REVERSED and REMANDED. ORFINGER, C.J. and COHEN, J., concur. . §§ 921.002-.0027, Fla. Stat. (2011). . §§ 921.0024(2)-(3), 921.0026(1), 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). The Criminal Punishment Code does not apply to defendants charged with capital felonies. § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2011); see also § 775.082(8)(d), Fla. Stat. (2011). . § 921.0026(2), Fla....

...9.140(b)(1)(E), (F); § 924.06(1)(d), (e), Fla. Stat. (2000). As this sentence was not illegal, in that it was not beyond the statutory maximum for the crime, there is no appellate issue raised. For each defendant, the Criminal Punishment Code establishes a "lowest permissible sentence." § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2000). The code provides that a "court may impose a departure below the lowest permissible sentence based upon circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence." § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added). One of those mitigating factors is physical disability which is amenable to treatment. See § 921.0026(2)(d), Fla....

...The Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.992(a) Criminal Punishment Code Scoresheet contains this notation: "Departure based on mental health for depression & vascular dementia." The sentence computation shown on the scoresheet reflects a lowest permissible prison sentence of fifty-one months. II. Analysis Section 921.0026(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), provides that, under the Criminal Punishment Code, "[a] downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence ... is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure." See also § 921.002(1)(f). Section 921.0026(2) provides in pertinent part: Mitigating circumstances under which a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is reasonably justified include, but are not limited to: . . . . (d) The defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical disability, and the defendant is amenable to treatment. Section 921.002(3) provides in pertinent part: "The level of proof necessary to establish facts supporting the mitigation of a sentence is a preponderance of the evidence.... Any sentence imposed below the lowest permissible sentence must be explained in writing by the trial court judge." The sentencing scoresheet shows that the circuit court determined that a departure sentence was warranted under section 921.0026(2)(d)....

...and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Sentence reversed; case remanded. ALTENBERND, C.J., and WHATLEY, J., concur. NOTES [1] We note that although the circuit court did not expressly rely on section 921.0026(2)(c), which provides that a defendant's "substantially impaired" capacity "to appreciate the criminal nature of the conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law" is a mitigating circumstance, that subsection might b...

...give the trial judge the opportunity to re-sentence the defendant and provide the written reasons for the departure sentence or to allow the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial or be resentenced under the guidelines. § 921.002(3), Fla....

...The existence of prior convictions has long been taken into consideration by sentencing judges. Both the sentencing guidelines as well as the Criminal Punishment Code scale sentences based upon prior criminal conduct. See § 921.001, et seq., Fla. Stat. (sentencing guidelines); § 921.002, et seq., Fla....

...legally insufficient to meet the statutory requirements for such departure. In particular, the State argues that Green failed to establish that the Department of Corrections could not provide the specialized treatments for his physical disabilities. Section 921.002(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2004), provides: The Criminal Punishment Code embodies the principles that: ....

...rt judge and made only when circumstances or factors reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence. The level of proof necessary to establish facts that support a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is a preponderance of the evidence. Section 921.0026, entitled "Mitigating circumstances," provides in pertinent part: (1) A downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence, as calculated according to the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024, is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure....

...justified include, but are not limited to: . . . (d) The defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical disability, and the defendant is amenable to treatment. . . . § 921.0026, Fla....

...ve in treating his problems. At the close of the evidence, the trial court concluded that "there was testimony that he is only able to receive in his incarceration Tylenol and not other drugs better to treat him." "To receive a sentence pursuant to [section 921.0026(2)(d)], a defendant must prove that the Department of Corrections (DOC) cannot provide the specialized treatment required." State v....

(1997) (abolishing parole for capital felonies); § 921.002(l)(a)(5), Fla. Stat. (1997) (stating chapter 947

...ls under this exception; therefore, his life sentence for the burglary is not illegal. Affirmed. MORRIS and BLACK, JJ., Concur. . A life sentence imposed under the Criminal Punishment Code in Florida does not carry with it the possibility of parole. § 921.002(l)(e), Fla....

open court in the presence of the appellants. Section 921.02, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.; Brown v. State,

factor is not one of the enumerated factors in section 921.002(1), Florida Statutes (2014), and' the Florida

(1997) (abolishing parole for capital felonies); § 921.002(l)(a)(5), Fla. Stat. (1997) (stating chapter 947

...got a license. A downward departure sentence less severe than the lowest permissible sentence shown on the criminal punishment code scoresheet "is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure." § 921.0026(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). At a minimum, the trial court must impose the lowest permissible sentence calculated according to the Criminal Punishment Code unless the court finds that the evidence supports a valid reason for a downward departure. See e.g., § 921.002(1)(f) & (3), Fla. Stat. (1999); State v. Henderson, 766 So.2d 389, 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Section 921.0026(2) sets forth the circumstances under which a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is reasonably justified. The statutory list of mitigating factors is not exclusive and the trial court may impose a downward departure sentence for reasons not delineated in section 921.0026....

...ld have sentenced Appellant to the same term if the error was corrected. See State v. Anderson, 905 So.2d 111 (Fla.2005). Under the Criminal Punishment Code, trial courts are authorized to sentence convicted defendants to the maximum statutory term. § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2003). The minimum calculation limits a trial court's authority to depart below the lowest permissible sentence. § 921.00265, Fla....

...delines scoresheet. Because there was no reason, valid or otherwise, proffered for the downward departure, the sentence is reversed and the cause is remanded for resentencing within the guidelines or to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea. See § 921.002(1)(f), Fla....

...State, 766 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (reversing guidelines sentence where trial court suffered from misimpression that it could not consider lower sentence of more culpable defendant). [2] If a legal reason is received by a court, we are compelled by section 921.002(3) of the Criminal Punishment Code in effect at the time of the crime, § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. (2002), to affirm the court's decision to depart even though all but one of the proffered reasons are not valid grounds to authorize a trial court to award a downward departure. Section 921.002(3) states: A court may impose a departure below the lowest permissible sentence based upon circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence in accordance with s. 921.0026....

...stance or factor justifies the mitigation regardless of the presence of other circumstances or factors found not to justify mitigation. Any sentence imposed below the lowest permissible sentence must be explained in writing by the trial court judge. § 921.002(3), Fla....

...Parisi, 660 So.2d 372 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (trial court may not base downward departure on State's revoked offer); State v. Caride, 473 So.2d 1362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (non-violent nature of crime not sufficient because already contemplated by the guidelines). See also § 921.0026(2)(a)-( l ), Fla....

...citing Albritton v. State, 476 So.2d 158, 160 (Fla. 1985). Because, unlike Sanders and Albritton, the crimes in this case occurred after the effective date of the 1987 amendment, we are required to follow this more current legislative directive. See § 921.002, Fla....

...from the sentencing range indicated by the Criminal Punishment Code (CPC) scoresheet. Because we lack the authority to review the sentence imposed below, we affirm. The trial court here imposed a sentence within the CPC scoresheet sentencing range. Section 921.002(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2005), provides that "[a] sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the Criminal Punishment Code only if the sentence is below the lowest permissible sentence or as enumerated in s. 924.06(1)." Under sections 924.06(1)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes (2005), a defendant is authorized to appeal an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed under section 921.0024 which exceeds the statutory maximum penalty....

...a downward departure from the minimum permissible sentence. See State v. Adkison, 56 So.3d 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“A sentence consisting of a suspended prison term followed by probationary period is treated as a downward departure sentence.”). Section 921.0026(1), Florida Statutes, prohibits a downward departure “unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure.” In addition, “[a]ny sentence imposed below the lowest permissible sentence must be explained in writing by the trial court judge.” § 921.002(3), Fla....

...2d DCA 2011). The trial court’s first step is to “determine whether it can depart, i.e., whether there is a valid legal ground and adequate factual support for that ground in the case pending before it.” Banks v. State, 732 So.2d 1065, 1067 (Fla.1999). Section 921.0026(2) lists valid mitigating factors which may support a downward departure, but a trial court is authorized to depart for non-statutory reasons as well....

...Further, the trial court must determine if a non-statutory mitigator “is consistent with legislative sentencing policies.” State v. Knox, 990 So.2d 665, 669 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). In this case, the issue is whether the trial court based its departure sentence on a valid legal ground not listed in section 921.0026(2)....

...d no case applying this federal policy to Florida sentences. “The provision of criminal penalties and of limitations on such penalties is a matter of predominantly substantive law and, as such, is a matter properly addressed by the Legislature.” § 921.002(1), Fla. Stat. The Florida Legislature has codified Florida’s policies for sentencing, including departure sentences, in Florida’s Criminal Punishment Code, sections 921.002-921.0027, Florida Statutes....

...We therefore reverse the life sentence on the violation of probation and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing on the violation only. Reversed and Remanded. DAMOORGIAN and CONNER, JJ., concur. . Because Florida abolished parole, a life sentence is without the possibility of parole. See § 921.002, Fla....

...d impose the lowest guidelines sentence for offenses in question. The plea colloquy includes a statement that the offenses in question occurred on October 17, 1998. Effective October 1, 1998, the Legislature *927 passed the Criminal Punishment Code, section 921.002. Section 921.002(1)(g) states that "[t]he trial court judge may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense, including an offense that is before the court due to a violation of probation or community control." That prov...

...excess of the statutory maximum. Despite that provision in the Criminal Punishment Code, in Maddox v. State, 760 So.2d 89, 101, n. 9 (Fla.2000), the Florida Supreme Court pointed out that "for those who committed their crimes after October 1, 1998, section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that `if the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed.'" Section 921.0024 is the Criminal Punishment Code worksheet and explains how score sheets should be completed. The provision in section 921.024 would seem to be at odds with section 921.002 and the ordinary rules of statutory construction, which require penal statutes to be strictly construed in favor of the accused....

...ing scoresheet reflected a minimum sentence of 27.375 months in the Department of Corrections. Appellee sought a downward departure, arguing the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner, was an isolated incident, and he showed remorse. See § 921.0026(j), Fla....

...5 months' prison sentence contingent upon successful completion of probation. The State then filed this appeal. Appellee shouldered the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts reasonably justifying a downward departure. See § 921.002(3) Fla....

...criminal penalties, and to make the best use of state prisons so that violent criminal offenders are appropriately incarcerated, has determined that it is in the best interest of the state to develop, implement, and revise a sentencing policy. *409 § 921.002(1), Fla....

...of punishment. The penalty imposed is commensurate with the severity of the primary offense and the circumstances surrounding the primary offense. The severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender’s prior record. . § 921.002(l)(b), (c), and (d), Fla....

...d convictions. § 921.231(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2010). In other words, by definition, the arrests and convictions considered by a trial judge in.sentencing occur “prior to the time of the primary offense,” and not subsequent to the primary offense. § 921.0021(5), Fla. Stat. (2010). Additionally, the terms “primary offense” and “prior record,” which are included in the CPC’s sentencing principles, do not include a subsequent arrest and its . related charges. See §§ 921.0021(4)(5), Fla....

...nce and failure to show remorse in determining what sentence to impose. A trial court generally has discretion to impose any sentence within the minimum and maximum allowed by law. Nusspickel v. State, 966 So.2d 441, 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); see also § 921.002(1)(f), (g), Fla....

...committed the crimes. We therefore vacate the sentences below and remand for resentencing in accordance with the dictates of Graham. Affirmed in part, vacated, and remanded. NOTES [1] "Because Florida has abolished its parole system, see Fla. Stat. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003), a life sentence gives a defendant no possibility of release unless he is granted executive clemency." Graham, 130 S.Ct....

...Hall's request for downward departure sentences. The Criminal Punishment Code requires that a sentencing scoresheet, including "the permissible range for the sentence that the court may impose," be prepared for every defendant sentenced for a felony offense. § 921.0024(3), (7), Fla. Stat. (2008). "The lowest permissible sentence is the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure." § 921.0024(2). And "[i]f the lowest permissible sentence under the [C]ode exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the [C]ode must be imposed." § 921.0024(2). A court may impose a departure below the lowest permissible sentence based upon circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence in accordance with s. 921.0026....

...ce. When multiple reasons exist to support the mitigation, the mitigation shall be upheld when at least one circumstance or factor justifies the mitigation regardless of the presence of other circumstances or factors found not to justify mitigation. § 921.002(3)....

...ed not address the trial court's discretionary determination *364 of whether it should impose a departure sentence. State v. Knox, 990 So.2d 665, 668 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). Here, neither of the stated grounds for departure is expressly set forth under section 921.0026(2) as a basis for imposing a departure sentence. But the list of mitigating factors under section 921.0026(2) is not exclusive....

...5th DCA 2010) (noting that a trial court may not grant a departure "based on factors already taken into account by the sentencing guidelines"). As noted above, "[i]f the lowest permissible sentence under the [C]ode exceeds the statutory maximum sentence ... the sentence required by the [C]ode must be imposed." § 921.0024(2). Thus imposing a sentence below the minimum permissible sentence because the minimum permissible sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence conflicts with the mandate of section 921.0024(2)....

...Although it is true that 66.1 months' imprisonment exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for a single grand theft, it does not exceed Ms. Hall's maximum sentence under her scoresheet, which is ten years' imprisonment. See §§ 775.082(3)(d), 812.014(2)(c)(1), 921.0024(2), Fla....

...ence of ten years' imprisonment. [5] As suggested by the State, the concepts of acceptance and early acceptance of responsibility set forth under the federal sentencing guidelines are arguably incorporated into the mitigating factors set forth at subsection 921.0026(2)(i) (cooperation) and subsection 921.0026(2)(j) (remorse) of the Code....

...), (j). Moreover, Florida's primary goal under its sentencing scheme is punishment. Rehabilitation is a secondary goal, and it is a stated policy that a defendant's sentence should increase with the length and nature of the defendant's prior record. § 921.002(1)(b), (d)....

...In November 2000, appellant entered no-contest pleas to charges of grand theft and felony failure to appear in case number 99-2202, and to identical charges in case number 99-4516. In January 2001, the trial court sentenced appellant pursuant to the Criminal Punishment Code (§§ 921.002-921.0027, Fla.Stat.(1999)) to concurrent 24-month prison terms on the two counts in case number 99-2202, to be followed by concurrent 5-year probationary terms on the two counts in case number 99-4516....

...We begin our analysis with recognition of the fact that, "[i]n Florida, the plenary power to prescribe the punishment for criminal offenses lies with the legislature, not the courts." Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20, 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citations omitted). See also § 921.002(1), Fla....

...perly addressed by the Legislature"); Hall v. State, 823 So.2d 757, 763 (Fla.2002). Accordingly, to answer the question posed by this appeal we must determine what the legislature intended the result to be pursuant to the Criminal Punishment Code (§§ 921.002-921.0027, Fla.Stat.(1999))....

...cing guidelines. The Code states that "[t]he trial court judge may impose a sentence up to and *618 including the statutory maximum for any offense, including an offense that is before the court due to a violation of probation or community control." § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or consecutively. However, any sentence to state prison must exceed 1 year. If the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed. § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...imposed in case number 99-2202. IV. We affirm appellant's sentences. However, we also certify to the supreme court the following question, which we believe to be of great public importance: WHEN SENTENCING PURSUANT TO THE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT CODE (§§ 921.002-921.0027, Fla....

...2d DCA 2000), were inapplicable because they dealt with "Sentencing Guidelines" cases and not cases governed by the "Criminal Punishment Code." The court observed that Bracero's offenses were committed in 2002 and were governed by the Criminal Punishment Code. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2002) (stating effective date of October 1, 1998, for the Criminal Punishment Code). The court stated that section 921.002(1)(g) allows "the Court to impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense before the Court due to a violation of probation" and denied Bracero's motion....

...of probation. “The primary purpose of sentencing [pursuant to- the Criminal Punishment Code (“CPC”) ] is to punish the offender. Rehabilitation is a desired goal of the criminal justice system but is subordinate to the goal of . punishment.” § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...State, 64 So.3d 90 (Fla.2011), the Florida Supreme Court explained sentencing requirements under the CPC as follows: Generally, a trial court must impose, at a minimum, the lowest permissible sentence calculated according to the CPC unless there is a valid reason to impose a downward departure sentence. See § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). For noncapital offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998, “the lowest permissible sentence provided by calculations from the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024(2) is assumed to be the lowest appropriate sentence for the offender being sentenced.” § 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). A departure sentence is one that “decreases an offender’s sentence below the lowest permissible sentence” provided by calculations from the total sentence points. § 921.00265(2), Fla. Stat. (2008); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(27)(A). A trial court must not impose a downward departure sentence unless mitigating circumstances or factors are present which reasonably justify such a departure. §§ 921.0026(1), 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (2008); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(27). Section 921.0026(2) sets forth a nonexclusive list of mitigating factors under which a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is reasonably justified. § 921.0026(2), Fla....

...Because we find that the court erred under the first step, we need not address the second step. At sentencing, the trial court set forth two reasons for a downward departure sentence. First, the trial court found that Lindsay “cooperated with the State to resolve the current offense or any other offense.” See § 921.0026(2)©, Fla....

...Therefore, the trial court was not justified in using Lindsay’s cooperation with law enforcement as a mitigating circumstance. Second, the trial court found that the crime “was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse.” See § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla....

..., 1986. [2] The Criminal Punishment Code, which is inapplicable to Daniels, does not recognize the idea of an "upward departure sentence." Rather, the statutory maximum for a given offense limits the length of a prison sentence for that offense. See § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...stantial evidence, we reverse. Though the lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal Punishment Code was 15.15 months in the Department of Corrections, the trial court imposed a downward departure sentence of 51 weeks in the county jail. ’ See § 921.002(1)’(bj, Fla....

...w and whether competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s reason for imposing a downward departure sentence.” State v. Leverett, 44 So.3d 634, 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing State v. Mann, 866 So.2d 179, 181 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)). Section 921.0026(2), Florida Statutes (2015), sets forth a list of mitigating circumstances that permit the imposition of a downward departure. Only one reason given by the trial judge at the time of the offense, that Appellee was too young to appreciate the consequences of the offense, is found on that list. § 921.0026(2)(k), Fla, Stat....

...Butterworth, Attorney General, and Karen M. Holland, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. KAHN, J. The question in this case is whether a defendant may, pursuant to a negotiated plea, be sentenced pursuant to both the Criminal Punishment Code (CPC), sections 921.002 through 921.0027, Florida Statutes (2000), and also the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act (PRRPA), section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...The Defendant cites two very recent decisions from the Second and Fifth District Courts of Appeal in support of his instant motion. This Court finds that the Defendant's argument is without merit. The CPC provides a method for calculating the "lowest permissible sentence." § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...97-194, § 1, at 3674, Laws of Fla. The CPC was intended to apply to "any felony" committed on or after October 1, 1998. Ch. 97-194, § 2, at 3674, Laws of Fla. Consistent with this scheme, the CPC, as enacted, refers to the "former sentencing guidelines." § 921.002(2), Fla....

...thority to so depart: At a minimum, the trial court must impose the lowest permissible sentence calculated according to the Criminal Punishment Code unless the court finds that the evidence supports a valid reason for a downward departure. See e.g., § 921.002(1)(f) & (3), Fla....

...use of discretion. Discretion is abused only where no reasonable person would agree with the trial court's decision." Id. An appellate court will uphold a departure sentence if any reason given by the trial judge is a valid reason for departure. See § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). Section 921.0026, Florida Statutes (1999), sets out a list of mitigating grounds for sentencing departures. Specifically, section 921.0026 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) A downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence, as calculated according to the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024, is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure....

...de, but are not limited to: * * * (i) The defendant cooperated with the state to resolve the current offense or any other offense. *1202 * * * The list of statutory departure reasons is not exclusive, so departures based on reasons not delineated in section 921.0026, which are supported by the record, may be permissible....

...See State v. Randall, 746 So.2d 550, 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); State v. Turro, 724 So.2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). We are mindful, however, that under the Criminal Punishment Code, "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender." § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.” Id. at D522 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)). The sentencing judge has broad discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory range set forth by the legislature, see § 921.002(g), Fla. Stat....

...At that time, the defense requested 4 that the court depart below the minimum guidelines sentence of 31.94 years by imposing a lengthy term of imprisonment followed by a lengthy term of probation. The defense argued that the statutory basis for the downward departure was section 921.0026(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2009), which provides that a downward departure may be granted if “[t]he defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical di...

...o support the ruling; whereas the second prong involves a judgment call within the sound discretion of the trial court, which will be sustained on appellate review absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Salgado, 948 So.2d 12, 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). Section 921.002(l)(f), Florida Statutes (2009) provides: Departures below the lowest permissible sentence established by the code must be articulated in writing by the trial court judge and made only when circumstances or factors reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence. The level of proof necessary to establish the facts that support a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is a preponderance of the evidence. Section 921.0026(2)(d) further provides that mitigating circumstances include those in which “[t]he defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical disability, and t...

...he contents of their reports, including the source and accuracy of the information they relied upon in forming their opinions as they pertain to Davis’ need for "specialized treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse[J” § 921.0026(2)(d), Fla....

...or restitution," noting that Ford "currently has a job." Ford accepted the court's offer and was adjudicated guilty. The State appeals. The Florida Criminal Punishment Code states that "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender." Section 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...e legally imposed. A victim's need for restitution is a valid reason for a downward departure sentence only if competent, substantial evidence shows that "[t]he need for payment of restitution to the victim outweighs the need for a prison sentence." Section 921.0026(2)(e), Fla....

...Furthermore, "there is no reason that restitution could not be made a condition of any post-incarceration probation." State v. White, 755 So.2d 830, 832 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); see § 775.089, Fla. Stat. (2009); § 948.03(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2009). Ford argues that although the record does not support the departure under section 921.0026(2)(e), it does support a departure under section 921.0026(2)( l ), Florida Statutes (2009), which allows youthful offender sanctions if the defendant is between eighteen and twenty years old, is pleading guilty to a felony, and has never before been sentenced as a youthful offender. However, the trial court made no oral or written findings that it considered youthful offender sanctions as a basis for a downward departure, as is required by statute. See § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. (2009) ("Any sentence imposed below the lowest permissible sentence must be explained in writing ...."); accord § 921.00265(2), Fla....

...Thereafter, the state filed a motion to correct illegal sentence pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.800, arguing that the lower court had improperly imposed a downward departure sentence in this case. The trial court denied the motion and this appeal followed. Section 921.002(1), Florida Statutes (1998) allows the sentencing court to depart downward from the lowest permissible sentence if there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure. Section 921.0026(2) provides a list of non-exclusive mitigating circumstances which will justify a downward departure, none of which have any applicability to this case. [2] See section *1132 921.0026(1); see also State v....

...State, 746 So.2d 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). I would sustain the downward departure reason, but allow it only where, as here, the defendant inflicted no harm on the person or property of others. NOTES [1] Sixteenth Judicial Circuit case no. 98-954-CF. [2] According to Section 921.0026(2), mitigating circumstances under which a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is reasonably justified include, but are not limited to: (a) The departure results from a legitimate, uncoerced plea bargain....

...KAHN, C.J., PADOVANO and THOMAS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The information charged that Appellant committed the crime between March 1 and December 31, 1998. The Criminal Punishment Code only applies to crimes that were committed on or after October 1, 1998. § 921.002, Fla....

...ity control and three years of probation. Among other things, the court departed downward on the basis that the victim’s need for restitution outweighed the need for incarceration. “The primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender.” § 921.002(l)(b), Fla....

...A defendant’s minimum sentence is based on the crime that he committed and the points that he earned. Therefore, any departure below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Criminal Punishment Code must be articulated in writing and supported by a preponderance óf the evidence. See id, § 921.002(l)(f) & (3). A victim’s need for restitution is a valid reason for a downward departure sentence when competent, substantial evidence shows the victim’s need for restitution outweighs the' need for incarceration. See § 921.0026(2)(e), Fla....

...The trial court’s other two grounds for downward departure were similarly legally insufficient or factually unsupported. Contrary to the trial court’s finding, Wheeler did not cooperate with the State to resolve the current offense or any other offense. § 921.0026(2)(i), Fla....

...5th DCA 2008) (“A downward departure sentence is not justified merely because the defendant cooperated after his offense was discovered because that cooperation did not solve a crime.”). Further, the trial court found that Wheeler needed treatment as a basis for a downward departure. However, section 921.0026(2)(m) & (3), Florida Statutes (2014), provides that, unless a defendant scores sixty points or less, substance abuse or addiction does not, under any circumstances, justify a downward departure sentence....

...ould be imposed, not the maximum as Thomas seems to contend. Because Thomas's offenses were committed after the effective date of the Criminal Punishment Code, October 1, 1998, Thomas could have been given the statutory maximum for his offenses. See § 921.002(g), Fla....

...consideration of remorse and responsibility. A trial court may apply “[a] downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence” if the offense was an isolated incident done in an unsophisticated way and was one “for which the defendant has shown remorse.” § 921.0026(1), (2)(j), Fla....

...defendant’s remorse—or willingness to take responsibility—fits with the Legislature’s command that each sentence be not only commensurate with the severity of the offense but also fashioned in light of “the circumstances surrounding” it. § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat....

...rehabilitation.” Simmons v. State, 419 So. 2d 316, 320 (Fla. 1982) (quoting Grayson, 438 U.S. at 47-48). Indeed, with a legislative pronouncement that rehabilitation “is a desired goal of the criminal justice system” (albeit subordinate to punishment), § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...After the Criminal Punishment Code’s enactment, our sentencing statutes no longer “contemplate upward departure sentences, because generally the statutory maximum sentence is the highest possible sentence for any crime.” Bryant v. State, 148 So. 3d 1251, 1258 (Fla. 2014); see also § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...its in return for the plea.” Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978). These substantial benefits can include sentences lower than what would be possible after trial, or even sentences lower than would be required after trial. Id.; cf. also § 921.0026(2)(a) (authorizing downward departure if it “results from a legitimate, uncoerced plea bargain”)....

...357, 364 (1978) (marks and alterations omitted). To the extent Davis had to choose between maintaining his innocence at sentencing or seeking a more favorable sentence, he was in no different situation than defendants facing plea offers every single day. In fact, had Davis requested a downward departure based on section 921.0026(2)(a)—which requires a showing that there was “a legitimate, uncoerced plea bargain”— the trial court obviously would have rejected the request because Davis did not plead guilty....

...And under specific legislative authorization in the Criminal Punishment Code, a trial court can impose the maximum statutory penalty on a remorseless convicted criminal defendant or any other convicted criminal defendant for a non- capital felony. See § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...In addition to authorizing trial courts to impose the maximum penalty on a convicted felon for any reason, which necessarily includes the lack of remorse, the Legislature has authorized trial courts to treat a remorseful convicted criminal defendant more leniently. See § 921.0026(1),(2)(j), Fla....

...We must determine whether constitutional rights have been violated. On the other hand, sentencing courts can consider and rely upon factors such as defendants’ prior criminal convictions, character, likelihood of rehabilitation or recidivism, the deterrent effect of punishment, and danger to others upon release. § 921.002(1)(d) (“The severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender’s prior record.”); see § 921.231(1)(m) (mandating that presentence investigation report include, among other things, explanation of the offend...

...ewed Appellant’s prior felonies, and the “responsibility” comment was made in light of Appellant’s obvious knowledge of his status as a convicted felon. 30 This was a proper sentencing consideration. See §§ 921.002(1)(d), 921.231(1)(m), Fla....

...se (“[y]ou still fail to take any responsibility for your actions”) (emphasis added) were separate factors that contributed to the ultimate sentence imposed. Davis had an extensive criminal history, which is a statutory factor in sentencing, see § 921.002(1)(d), Fla....

...ature has specifically permitted consideration of remorse. For example, the Florida Legislature has determined that a trial judge may decide that remorse has been sufficiently shown and that leniency is warranted in limited circumstances. See, e.g., § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla. Stat....

...some situations doesn’t mean the opposite is condoned, i.e., that a lack of remorse or failure to accept guilt is a permissible sentencing factor. Quite the opposite. The primary focus of Florida’s Criminal Punishment Code is on punishment. See § 921.002, Fla....

...Rehabilitation is a desired goal of the criminal justice system but is subordinate to the goal of punishment.”). It does not include a lack of remorse as a basis for increased punishment; and its inclusion is a job best left to the Legislature. Id. § 921.002(1) (“The provision of criminal penalties and of limitations upon the application of such penalties is a matter of predominantly substantive law and, as such, is a matter properly addressed by the Legislature.”) (emphasis added)....

...he meaning of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a)). The Criminal Punishment Code defines the “lowest permissible sentence” as the “the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure.” § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added). The Code allows for imposition of sentences that are less than the “lowest permissible sentence.” See id.; see also § 921.002(1)(f), Fla....

...“The question then becomes whether the sentencing 2 The state alternatively argues that it would have had the ability to appeal the 48-month sentence, because it fell below the lowest permissible sentence without valid, written reasons for downward departure. See § 921.002(1)(h), Fla....

...m . . . for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing. The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or consecutively.” Moore v. State, 882 So. 2d 977, 985 (Fla. 2004) (quoting § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...de is articulated thusly: “The primary purpose of sentencing [pursuant to the Code] is to punish the offender. Rehabilitation is a desired goal of the criminal justice system but is subordinate to the goal of punishment.” § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998). “The penalty imposed [for an offense] is commensurate with the severity of the offense and the circumstances surrounding [it].” § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998). In addition, “[t]he severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender’s prior record.” § 921.002(1)(d), Fla....

...onment. Over the State’s objections, the trial court imposed a downward departure sentence, orally stating specific reasons to support it. Id. The trial court, however, did not file written reasons as required by statute and rule. Id.; see also § 921.00265(2), Fla....

...July 1, 2009, which is a third degree felony but not a forcible felony as defined in [section] 776.08, and excluding any third-degree felony violation under chapter 810, and if the total sentence points pursuant to [section] 921.0024 are 22 points or fewer, the court must sentence the offender to a nonstate prison sanction....

...e failure to provide a valid reason. Pope, 561 So. 2d at 556. Further, we recognize that the applicable statutes for imposing either an upward or downward departure sentence require the trial court to enter written findings. See §§ 775.082(10), 921.0025-.0026(2), Fla....

...We accept the state’s concession that the case must be remanded for resentencing since the defendant’s sixty (60) year terms *118 exceed both the statutory maximum for the second and third felonies for which he was convicted and the lowest Criminal Punishment Code sentence. § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). The defendant’s first degree misdemeanor conviction was not subject to the Code. § 921.002, Fla....

...5th DCA 2002), we explained: At a minimum, the trial court must impose the lowest permissible sentence calculated according to the Criminal Punishment Code unless the court finds that the evidence supports a valid reason for a downward departure. See e.g., § 921.002(1)(f) & (3), Fla....

...An appellate court will uphold a departure sentence if any reason given by the trial judge is a valid reason for departure. See also State v. Stephenson, 973 So.2d 1259, 1262-63 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). None of the grounds utilized by the trial court to mitigate the sentence are established by statute. See generally § 921.0026, Fla....

...ided statutory authority for the trial court to impose a higher sentence than allowed by the “statutory maximum.” See Mays v. State, 717 So.2d 515, 516 (Fla.1998). Similarly, for those defendants who committed their crimes after October 1, 1998, section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that "if the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s....

...r direct appeal. . We note that the Legislature recently amended the sentencing statute applicable to felonies committed after October 1, 1998. See ch. 97-194, Laws of Florida (creating the *107 Florida Criminal Punishment Code, codified at sections 921.002-921.0026, Florida Statutes (1997)); see also § 921.0027, Fla. Stat. (1999). Under this statute, the trial judge must calculate the "lowest permissible sentence.” See § 921.00265, Fla. Stat. (1999). Written reasons for imposing a departure sentence are still required when a judge imposes a downward departure. See §§ 921.002(1)©, .0025, .0026, Fla. Stat. (1999); see Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(25)-(26). However, the statute allows the judge to impose a sentence "up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense,” section 921.002(l)(g), without requiring the filing of any reasons for doing so. See §§ 921.002(1)©-(h), 921.0026; Fla....

...In doing so, we emphasize that our holding in this case is narrow. A trial court continues to have “great discretion in determining the length of a sentence, so long as it is within the statutory limits.” See Mora v. State, 964 So.2d 881, 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing § 921.002(l)(g), Fla....

...g hearing, within the guidelines range. Reversed and remanded. KAHN and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This provision does not apply to offenses that were committed after October 1, 1998, the effective date of the Criminal Punishment Code. See § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...tences. As for the trial court's statutory reasons for departure, the trial court erred in concluding that departure sentences were warranted based on the fact that the defendant's crimes were isolated incidents for which he showed remorse. Section 921.0026(2)(j) of the Florida Statutes (2017) authorizes the imposition of a departure 2 sentence when the "offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident fo...

...e, this reason for departure is invalid. Next, the trial court erred in imposing the downward departure sentences based on the fact that the need for the payment of restitution to the victim outweighed the need for a prison sentence. See § 921.0026(2)(e), Fla....

...In this case, the defendant failed to present any evidence regarding the loss sustained by the victim; therefore, this ground for departure is not supported by the evidence. The trial court's finding that departure was warranted based on the defendant's undiagnosed mental illness is also invalid. Section 921.0026(2)(d) of the Florida Statutes (2017) authorizes the imposition of a departure sentence when a defendant "requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical disa...

...sentences because personal injury was already taken into account during sentencing by virtue of the computations performed in preparing the defendant's Criminal Punishment Code worksheet. See State v. Chapman, 805 So. 2d 906, 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing to section 921.0024, Florida Statutes, which provides that victim injury is a consideration when calculating scoresheets). The trial court further erred in departing downward based on the fact that the defendant's crimes were non-violent felonies involving property....

...policies.” State v. Knox, 990 So. 2d 665, 669 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (citations omitted); see also Chestnut. The stated policy of the Criminal Punishment Code is to punish miscreants for their crimes. § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...2d at 313 (“Further, the first purpose of sentencing is to punish, not rehabilitate.”). Whether there is any redeeming value to the criminal in sending him to prison is largely of secondary concern. See § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...3d 361, 364 n. 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“Rehabilitation is a secondary goal, and it is a stated policy that a defendant's sentence should increase with the length and nature of the defendant's prior record.” (citing § 921.002(1)(b), (d))); Chestnut, 718 So.2d at 314 (“It is obvious that prison will always be detrimental to one's future even if it is essential to his appropriate punishment....

...ns: 1) “The victim was an initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker *1232 of the incident” 1 and 2) “The offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse.” § 921.0026(2)©, (j), Fla....

...“When multiple reasons exist to support the mitigation, the mitigation shall be upheld when at least one circumstance or factor justifies the mitigation regardless of the presence of other circumstances or factors found not to justify mitigation.” § 921.002(3), Fla....

...Unable to lawfully apply a youthful offender designation, the presiding judge stated that he was imposing a downward departure for Mr. Lackey's sentence because of the "need for restitution." The circuit court provided no written findings as required under section 921.002(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2015)....

...ce."). "A trial court must impose a guidelines sentence unless the court finds that the evidence supports a valid reason for a departure sentence." State v. Barnes, 753 So. 2d 605, 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). One potential valid reason, section 921.0026(2)(e), Florida Statutes, provides that a downward departure beneath the lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal Punishment Code may be issued if "[t]he need for payment of restitution to the victim outweighs the need for a...

..., or that restitution would be effective, we do not find competent, substantial evidence in this -5- record to justify a departure beneath the Criminal Punishment Code's minimum prison sentence under section 921.0026(2)(e)....

...with the possibility of parole.” The trial court accordingly modified Appellant’s sentence to include the possibility of parole. 1 This appeal followed. Analysis Parole was eliminated in 1985 for noncapital felonies in the State of Florida. See § 921.002(l)(e), Fla....

...ard departure sentence without written justification. The trial court’s summary denial implies that it was operating under the mistaken impression that it was free to impose up to the statutory maximum pursuant to the Criminal Punishment Code. See § 921.002(l)(g), Fla....

ORFINGER, J. Damien 0. Macintosh appeals, his five-year sentence.for. grand theft and assault. Although the sentence was authorized by the Criminal Punishment. Code, section 921.002, Florida Statutes (2014), Macintosh correctly argues that the trial' court violated his due process rights by basing his sentence, at least in part, on uncharged or dismissed offenses....

...lied if it requires the court to impose a mandatory, nondiscretionary sentence of *22 life without possibility of parole for every juvenile convicted in this context. See §§ 782.04(l)(a)(2), 782.04(l)(b), 775.082(1), 775.082(2), Fla. Stat. (2006); § 921.002(l)(e), Fla....

...At this 2001 resentencing hearing, Logan elected to be sentenced "under the guidelines." The question before us is which sentencing provision applies to this election: section 921.001(4)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2001), also known as the 1983 guidelines, or section 921.002, Florida Statutes (2001), also known as the Criminal Punishment Code ("CPC")....

...However, Logan argues that, like the appellant in Smith, his election was to be sentenced according to section 921.001(4)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2001), the 1983 guidelines. Logan is correct. [2] Consistent with our holding in Smith and a fair reading of both sections 921.001(4)(b)(1) and 921.002, we hold that Logan elected and is entitled to be sentenced under section 921.001(4)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2001), the 1983 guidelines....

...pursuant to such provisions. Pursuant to this express language of section 921.001(4)(b)(1) and consistent with Smith, this affirmative election entitled Logan to be sentenced under the 1983 guidelines. [4] Moreover, the express language of the CPC, section 921.002, confirms this. The CPC expressly states that "[t]he Criminal Punishment Code shall apply to all felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998. " § 921.002, Fla....

...ure at all. The new Criminal Punishment Code allows the trial judge to "impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense, including an offense that is before the court due to a violation of probation or community control." § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (1999). But the state's argument ignores controlling language with which the statute begins: "The Criminal Punishment Code shall apply to all felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998." § 921.002, Fla....

...For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the new sentences imposed on Mr. Horne in all respects. Affirmed. WHATLEY and LaROSE, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] The Criminal Punishment Code applies "to all felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998." § 921.002, Fla....

...Abrams, 706 So.2d 903 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. Johnson, 696 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). Under the current Criminal Punishment Code, [1] which applies to this case, the sentencing judge must supply reasons for departing downward in all cases. See § 921.00265(1) and (2), Fla....

...defense and the state. The scales of justice have now tipped in favor of the state. NOTES [1] We note that even if reversal on this ground were not appropriate, the reason given for the downward departure is not supported by the present record. [1] § 921.002, et seq., Fla. Stat. [2] § 921.0026(2)(a), Fla....

...to only B64 days in the county jail, followed by reinstatement of probation. 4 The State appeals pursuant to section 924.07(l)(i), Florida Statutes (2010), and we reverse. That error was committed below is conclusively established, without more, by section 921.002, Florida Statutes (2009), which provides: The Criminal Punishment Code shall apply to all felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1,1998....

...(2009) (“The Criminal Punishment Code applies to all felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998. Any revision to the Criminal Punishment Code applies to sentencing for all felonies, except capital felonies, committed on or after the effective date of the revision.”); § 921.0024(l)(b)2., Fla....

...ort — 364 days, 60 days, or 60 minutes — solely within the presumably unreviewable discretion of the trial court. 7 Martinez initially escaped a 21.15 month sentence because the State agreed to a downward departure as part of a plea bargain. See § 921.0026(2)(a), Fla....

...State, 14 So.3d 1166 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); State v. Kasten, 775 So.2d 992 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). . Because the violation of probation is factored into the guideline computation, the bottom of the guidelines now provides for two and one-half years in prison. See § 921.0024(l)(b)2.a„ Fla....

...and violation for any other reason adds 6 points. For a violent felony offender of special concern, the bill increases the additional points to 24 for a new felony conviction and 12 for other violations. [[Image here]] The Criminal Punishment Code, ss. 921.002 through 921.0027, F.S., is applicable to all felony offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998....

...If *1016 the total points exceed 44, the court must subtract 28 points and multiply by 75 percent. The resulting number is the minimum number of months in state prison that the offender must serve. However, the court may find that one or more of the mitigating circumstances at s. 921.0026, F.S., warrants a downward departure, except for capital felonies....

...of the evidence. The bill sets forth a number of factors that may be considered by the court in determining dangerousness, and requires the court to enter a written order in support of its findings. The bill also amends the Criminal Punishment Code (s.921.0024, F.S.) to increase the number of Community Sanction Violation Points that are added to the violent felony offender of special concern’s Total Sentence Points as a result of the violation....

...nd convictions, and not mere arrests subsequent to the charged crime. Id. ("[A]rrests and convictions considered by a trial judge in sentencing occur 'prior to the time of the primary offense,' and not subsequent to the primary offense." (quoting § 921.0021(5), Fla....

..."The provision of criminal penalties and of limitations upon the - 13 - application of such penalties is a matter of predominantly substantive law and, as such, is a matter properly addressed by the Legislature." § 921.002(1); see also Woods v. State, 740 So....

...community control must be imposed according to the sentencing law applicable at the time of the commission of the original offense."), the trial court had to use the sentencing scoresheet associated with the 1998 CPC when sentencing him for his violation of community control. The 1998 version of section 921.0024(1)(b) directs that the assessment of "[c]ommunity sanction violation points [be] assessed when a community sanction violation is before the court for sentencing." See also § 921.0021(6)(b) (enumerating community control as a "community sanction")....

...e the sentencing court, twelve (12) community sanction violation points are assessed for such violation, and for each successive community sanction violation involving a new felony conviction. § 921.0024(1)(b)....

...2010) ("As a result of these community sanction violation points, the scoresheet prepared for a sentencing upon revocation of probation necessarily will differ from the scoresheet prepared for the original sentencing. Recalculation is not only permitted but required by section 921.0024."). Because the scoresheet's inclusion of Mr....

...A downward departure sentence—i.e., a sentence less severe than the lowest permissible sentence shown on the Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet—"is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure." § 921.0026(1), Fla. Stat. (2001); see also § 921.00265(1)....

...The trial court stated on the record that the mitigating circumstances justifying the downward departure were that the need for payment of restitution outweighed the need for a prison sentence and that Scott cooperated with the State to resolve another offense. See § 921.0026(2)(e), ( l )....

...orrectly contends—and Scott concedes—that the downward departure sentence of probation with restitution must be reversed. Reversal is required because no evidence of any kind was adduced at the sentencing hearing to support the downward departure. Section 921.002(1)(f) provides that "[t]he level of proof necessary to establish facts that support a departure from the lowest permissible sentence [under the Criminal Punishment Code] is a preponderance of the evidence." Of course, where no evidenc...

...competent substantial evidence supports its ruling.” Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 1999). A downward departure sentence is prohibited unless there are mitigating circumstances or factors present which reasonably justify a departure. § 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). “Departures below the lowest permissible sentence established by the code must be articulated in writing by the trial court judge and made only when circumstances or factors reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence.” § 921.002(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2013); see also § 921.002(3), Fla....

...hird-degree felony, is illegal. We conclude that Champagne's twenty-year sentence is legal, and we certify a question of great public importance. Champagne was sentenced under the Criminal Punishment Code, chapter 921, Florida Statutes (2005) (CPC). Section 921.0024(2) states that when "the lowest permissible sentence under the [CPC] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s....

...ence on the robbery count. 2 The court then sentenced Champagne to twenty years (240 months) in prison on the false imprisonment count. 3 In his postconviction motion, Champagne argued that his twenty-year sentence is illegal based on his reading of section 921.0024(2) and Butler v....

...ntences for any additional offenses must not exceed the individual statutory maximums for those offenses. Essentially, Champagne contends that the LPS is a collective minimum sentence. The postconviction court denied Champagne's motion, finding that section 921.0024 does not require the LPS to be imposed "only if it exceeds the statutory maximum for the primarily scored offense....

...the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Eustache v. State , 248 So.3d 1097 , 1100 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Holly v. Auld , 450 So.2d 217 , 219 (Fla. 1984) ). III. Applicable law A. Statutory language The CPC provides that "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender." § 921.002(1)(b)....

...It also provides that "[t]he penalty imposed is commensurate with the severity of the primary offense and the circumstances surrounding the primary offense" and that "[t]he severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender's prior record." § 921.002(1)(c), (d)....

..."Primary offense" is defined as the "the offense at conviction pending before the court for sentencing for which the total sentence points recommend a sanction that is as severe as, or more severe than, the sanction recommended for any other offense committed by the offender and pending before the court at sentencing." § 921.0021(4). "Prior record" is defined as "a conviction for a crime committed ... prior to the time of the primary offense." § 921.0021(5). Additional offenses, those "for which an offender is convicted and which [are] pending before the court for sentencing at the time of the primary offense," § 921.0021(1), are scored and included in the total sentence points calculation, which is then used solely to determine the offender's LPS, see § 921.0024(1)(a), (2)....

...Additional offenses are also referenced as part of the CPC's sentencing range: "The permissible range for sentencing shall be the [LPS] up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing." § 921.0024(2). The LPS "is assumed to be the lowest appropriate sentence for the offender being sentenced," § 921.00265(1), and it "is the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure," § 921.0024(2)....

...imum sentence " does not reference primary or *633 additional offenses, statutory maximum s , or multiple sentences: "If the [LPS] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the [CPC] must be imposed." § 921.0024(2); cf....

...y additional offenses as provided in s. 775.082, F.S., unless the [LPS] exceeds the statutory maximum." (emphasis added) ). The CPC also provides that the trial court "may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense," § 921.002(1)(g), and expressly allows for concurrent or consecutive sentencing, § 921.0024(2)....

...ffense at sentencing for which it exceeds that offense's statutory maximum, or a collective minimum sentence. If the LPS is an individual minimum sentence, our analysis is complete and the LPS was legally imposed. But as is apparent, the language of section 921.0024(2) is not consistent; both singular and plural terms are used, and the terms statutory maximum and statutory maximum sentence are used without explanation or definition. Although the supreme court has interpreted section 921.0024(2), it has not addressed the issue presented to us. And as will be seen, courts have not consistently applied the language. B. Precedent 1. Butler v. State , 838 So.2d 554 (Fla. 2003) In Butler , the supreme court determined that sections 921.002(1)(g) and 921.0024(2), respectively providing that a court may sentence an offender up to the statutory maximum for any offense and that a court must impose the LPS where it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, are not in conflict and can be harmonized. 838 So.2d at 556 . In so concluding, the supreme court held that "when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2002), is exceeded by the [LPS], the [LPS] becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose." Id....

...But Moore does not address how to apply the directive to impose the LPS when it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence. Nor does it address whether the LPS is an individual minimum sentence or whether the "statutory maximum" referenced in the range is different than the "statutory maximum sentence" in the directive of section 921.0024(2). IV. Analysis Although courts have applied the language of section 921.0024(2) and the holdings of Butler and Moore , they have often done so inconsistently, with conflicting application and results, and without analysis....

...have imposed in the instant case is [the LPS of] 64.5 months" without distinguishing between the two convictions). 7 The inconsistencies may be strictly the result of courts addressing only the discreet issues presented and the terms or portions of section 921.0024(2) about which they were asked. Nonetheless, the results of these cases and their applications of section 921.0024(2) are often conflicting and, at a minimum, imprecise....

...idual offense; and that where it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, the LPS becomes the maximum sentence which may be imposed. What has not been analyzed, except in two concurrences and one dissent, is how to interpret and apply the language of section 921.0024(2) where there are multiple convictions at sentencing....

...State , 199 So.3d 960 , 964 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (Warner, J., concurring specially); Dennard v. State , 157 So.3d 1055 , 1056-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (Conner, J., concurring specially); Id. at 1057-61 (Warner, J., dissenting). And although it has been stated that section 921.0024(2) "is unclear on how a sentence should be imposed in cases where there are multiple offenses for sentencing and the sentencing points result in a[n] [LPS] above the statutory maximum," we disagree. See Dennard , 157 So.3d at 1056-57 (Conner, J., concurring specially) (discussing two potential interpretations of section 921.0024(2) as requiring imposition of the LPS "for each offense" for which it exceeds that offense's statutory maximum or as requiring imposition of the LPS where it exceeds the primary offense's statutory maximum); see also Colon , 199 So.3d at 964 (Warner, J., concurring specially) (discussing application of section 921.0024(2)'s *636 directive when the statutory maximum of the primary offense exceeds the LPS but the additional offense statutory maximum is less than the LPS); Dennard , 157 So.3d at 1059-61 (Warner, J., dissenting) (interpreting Butler and the language of section 921.0024(2) as requiring the court to sentence the offender to at least the LPS on the primary offense where the primary offense's statutory maximum exceeds the LPS but prohibiting the court from sentencing the offender to the LPS on an addit...

...ceeds the statutory maximum for the additional offense and determining that in light of Moore , the LPS "is the collective total minimum sentence for all offenses" and " not the sentence which must be applied to each offense at sentencing" such that section 921.0024(2)'s directive "appl[ies] to the collective total statutory maximum of the individual sentences "). Based on the language of section 921.0024(2) and bounded by the language of Butler and Moore , we conclude that the LPS is an individual minimum sentence which applies to each felony at sentencing for which the LPS exceeds that felony's statutory maximum sentence, regardless of whether the felony is the primary or an additional offense....

...As noted previously, because Butler appears to have involved misdemeanor additional offenses, to which the CPC does not apply and for which consecutive sentencing would be impossible, 9 Butler 's holding in this context is questionable. Likewise, while Moore did not address the directive of section 921.0024(2) requiring imposition of the LPS when it exceeds the statutory maximum where multiple convictions are before the court for sentencing, the court's holding that once the *637 minimum sentence is established the offenses are no longer interrelated is important to our conclusion....

...ximums, as well as the absence of limiting or clarifying language, i.e., restricting mandatory imposition of the LPS to circumstances where the LPS exceeds the statutory maximum for the primary and any additional offenses on the scoresheet). But cf. § 921.002(1)(h) ("A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the [CPC] only if the sentence is below the [LPS] or as enumerated in s....

...775.082 for an offense at conviction, or the consecutive statutory maximums for offenses at conviction, unless otherwise provided by law." (emphasis added) ). Although this court has not previously analyzed the statutory language or how it is to be applied, it has cited Butler and section 921.0024(2) and remanded for resentencing where the sentences were illegal, exceeding both the LPS and the statutory maximums....

...son for departure, to sentence the defendant to the [LPS] for each crime" and that "[o]nly the State's agreement to cap [the offender's] sentence ... enabled the trial court to depart from imposing the [LPS] for both counts" (emphasis added) (citing § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...1st DCA 2016) (concluding, in part, that the LPS was required to be imposed on each of two third-degree felony convictions, neither of which would have been the primary offense where a second-degree felony conviction was also pending before the court for sentencing, stating "[p]er section 921.0024(2) and Butler , [the LPS] becomes the required sentence" for both third-degree felony convictions not subject to habitual felony offender enhancement)....

...11 But see *638 Colon , 199 So.3d at 964 (Warner, J., concurring specially) ("[I]n this case, as the statutory maximum for [the primary offense] was life, well in excess of the LPS, sentencing appellant to the LPS for the primary offense satisfies the statutory directive of section 921.0024(2). The sentences for the remaining third degree felonies should not exceed the statutory maximum for each crime."); Dennard , 157 So.3d at 1060-61 (Warner, J., dissenting) (determining that the directive of section 921.0024(2) can be harmonized with the language from section 921.002(1)(g) that the trial court "may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense" and courts may impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, directing "consecutive sentencing to achieve an LPS without exceeding the statutory maximum for any one offense"); but cf....

...to counts one to three, for a total of 48.5 years. In case 2D14-4920, the trial court sentenced him to 15 years for each of the seven counts .... [T]he sentences imposed on Mr. Walsh are legal ." (emphasis added) ). It is evident that the effect of section 921.0024(2)'s directive differs significantly if the LPS is an individual minimum sentence rather than a collective minimum sentence....

...Conclusion We affirm the postconviction court's order and conclude that Champagne's sentence on the false imprisonment conviction is legal. Recognizing the importance of the issue, we certify the following question: IS THE LOWEST PERMISSIBLE SENTENCE AS DEFINED BY AND APPLIED IN SECTION 921.0024(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (2017), AN INDIVIDUAL MINIMUM SENTENCE AND NOT A COLLECTIVE MINIMUM SENTENCE WHERE THERE ARE MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS SUBJECT TO SENTENCING ON A SINGLE SCORESHEET? Affirmed; question certified....

...KELLY and LUCAS, JJ., Concur. A single scoresheet is prepared "for each defendant to determine the permissible range for the sentence that the court may impose," and the scoresheet "must cover all of the defendant's offenses pending before the court for sentencing." § 921.0024(3); see also Fla....

...ree-time violent felony offender and a VCC. The propriety of listing the robbery as the primary offense, given those enhancements, has not been raised. See § 775.084(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (2005) ("A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.002."); see also Fla....

...l offender sentence for an offense, the trial court removes that offense from sentencing under the guidelines and cannot include that offense either as a primary or additional offense on the guidelines scoresheet."). However, we note that "[s]ection 921.0021 does not differentiate original sentencing proceedings ......

...2010). Neither the State, the sentencing court, nor the postconviction court addressed the difference between the LPS of 240.15 months and the sentence of 240 months. A departure sentence is one "that decreases an offender's sentence below the [LPS]." § 921.00265(2). The CPC expressly states that it applies "to all felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998," § 921.002, but it also allows for misdemeanors to be scored as additional offenses and prior record, § 921.0024(1)(a); see Fudge v....

...Hall's maximum sentence under her scoresheet, which is ten years' imprisonment."). We recognize that our conclusion may result in the State successfully appealing additional-offense sentences which are individually less than the LPS and for which a basis for departure has not been established. See § 921.002(1)(h) ("A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the [CPC] only if the sentence is below the [LPS] ...."), § 924.07(1)(i), Fla....

...[a] sentence imposed below the [LPS] established by the [CPC] under chapter 921."). See § 775.08(2); Kittles v. State , 31 So.3d 283 , 284-85 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ; see also Bautista v. State , 128 So.3d 117 , 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ("The defendant's first degree misdemeanor conviction was not subject to the [CPC]." (citing § 921.002, Fla....

...The Court further stated that “[a] state need not guarantee the offender eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life, it must provide him or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term. Id. Since Florida has abolished its parole system, see § 921.002(l)(e) Fla....

...Code, at a minimum, a trial court must impose the lowest permissible sentence calculated on the guideline scoresheet, unless the court recites a valid basis for a downward departure. See State v. Tyrrell, 807 So.2d 122 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); see also § 921.002(l)(f), (3), Fla. Stat. The legal grounds for a departure sentence are set forth in section 921.0026, Florida Statutes....

...Parrish was sixteen years old at the time of the offenses. A jury found Parrish guilty on all counts. At sentencing, Parrish presented evidence to support a downward departure sentence on the ground that he requires specialized treatment for a disorder. See § 921.0026(2)(d), Fla. Stat....

...Mitchell Polinsky, DETERRENCE AND THE OPTIMALITY OF REWARDING PRISONERS FOR GOOD BEHAVIOR, 44 Int’l Rev. of Law and Econ. 1 (2015). Ultimately, it is the citizens of Florida who benefit if a juvenile offender is rehabilitated and becomes a productive member of society. See § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...claim that his forty-year prison sentence was an illegal upward- departure sentence. There can be no illegal “departure” sentences for any felony committed after October 1, 1998, where those sentences are imposed within the statutory-maximum term under section 921.002(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Lane v. State, 981 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (quoting § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...for his conviction was life in prison. Id.; § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). He was also subject to thirty years in prison for each of the four convictions of sexual battery with threats reasonably believed for a total potential sentence of 120 years imprisonment. §§ 921.002(1)(g), 794.011(4)(a) Fla....

...This argument is meritless as Appellant’s cited cases only require separate jury findings to exceed the statutory maximum. In Florida, a trial court is authorized to impose the statutory maximum term without any “departure” or separate jury finding for every felony offense. § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...e jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Under the Criminal Punishment Code, a trial court may impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum without any additional factual findings. See § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...imprisonment not exceeding 15 years). His 10 year sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum. Moreover, in Florida, a trial court may impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum without any additional factual findings. See § 921.002(l)(g), Fla....

...Appellant has had six judicial opportunities to contest his convictions and sentences. Appellant’s latest argument raised in this Court was completely meritless because as a principal under section 777.011, Florida Statutes, and under the Criminal Punishment Code’s provision in section 921.002(1)(g), Florida Statutes, he was subject to a punishment of life in prison for the burglary he committed during which he (as a principal) and Revels sexually battered the victim four times....

...2d DCA 1988); Tyner v. State, 491 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). 2 This court affirmed this sentence on appeal. Tyner v. State, 545 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). -2- after October 1, 1998. See § 921.002, Fla....

...As the State points out, McCray’s sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment for the second-degree felony of possession of cocaine with intent to sell is a legal guidelines sentence because the trial court “may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense” before the court for sentencing. § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998); see §§ 775.082(3)(c), 893.13(1)(a)(1), 921.0024(2), Fla....

defendant is a valid sentencing consideration. See § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (stating that “the circumstances

...The penalty imposed is commensurate with the severity of the primary offense and the circumstances surrounding the primary offense. The severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender’s prior record. § 921.002(1)(b), (c), and (d), Fla....

...and convictions. § 921.231(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2010). In other words, by definition, the arrests and convictions considered by a trial judge in sentencing occur “prior to the time of the primary offense,” and not subsequent to the primary offense. § 921.0021(5), Fla. Stat. (2010). Additionally, the terms “primary offense” and “prior record,” which are included in the CPC’s sentencing principles, do not include a subsequent arrest and its related charges. See §§ 921.0021(4)(5), Fla. Stats....

...r’s “prior record.” 191 So. 2d at 409 (citation omitted). The Criminal Punishment Code defines “prior record” as “a conviction for a crime committed by the offender, as an adult or a juvenile, prior to the time of the primary offense.” § 921.0021(5), Fla. Stat. (2016). 5  We apply the “last antecedent doctrine” to conclude that section 921.0021(5)’s antecedent phrase, “committed by the offender, as an adult or juvenile, prior to the time of the primary offense,” modifies only the immediately preceding term – “crime” – and not the earlier preceding term “conviction.” See Kasischke v....

...ve here, applied the last antecedent doctrine: Pursuant to statute, “prior record” is defined as “a conviction for a crime committed by the offender, as an adult or a juvenile, prior to the time of the primary offense.” § 921.0021(5), Fla....

...were illegal because they exceeded the applicable statutory maximum sentences for those offenses. The postconviction court denied the motion reasoning that Miller's sentences were legal because they were the lowest permissible sentences under the criminal punishment code. See § 921.002, Fla....

...assault or act involving a child was twenty years. It then applied the rule that when the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the applicable statutory maximum sentence, the lowest permissible sentence under the code must be imposed. See § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...The difficulty with the postconviction court's reasoning is that Miller was never subject to sentencing under the criminal punishment code. By its terms, the code applies only to "felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998." § 921.002....

...Appellant, if he serves the entirety of his sentence, will be ninety-seven when he is released. Even if Appellant received the maximum amount of gain time, the earliest he would be released is at age eighty-five. See § 921.002(1)(e), Fla....

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 921.002(g), Fla....

...and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the armed burglary and a fifteen- year sentence for the attempted armed robbery. Id. at 57. Because Florida had abolished the parole system, a life sentence provided no possibility of release absent the grant of executive clemency. See § 921.002(1)(c), Fla....

...ty to obtain release before the end of that term. Graham, 560 U.S. at 64 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 . Currently, the State of Florida does not provide any opportunity for parole, and any life sentence imposed is a sentence for a prisoner’s natural life. See § 921.002(1)(e), Fla....

...198 So. 3d at 60 (quoting Moorer v. State, 926 So. 2d 475, 477 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)). Although it is permissible for the trial court to consider the circumstances surrounding the primary offense and the defendant's prior record, see § 921.002(1)(c), (d), Fla....

...Based on the victim's assent, the trial court adjudicated Montgomery guilty, placed him on five years of probation, and ordered payment of $50,000 in restitution to the victim. The primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender. § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...not prohibit the trial court from fulfilling its obligation to impose criminal sanctions. See Kirby v. State, 863 So. 2d 238, 242 (Fla. 2003). A victim’s need for restitution is a valid reason for departure from the sentencing guidelines under section 921.0026(2)(e), if the evidence shows that the victim's actual need outweighs the need for imprisonment....

...churches, schools in such a way as to provide more serious damage and harm to the community than would be the normal case. At the same time, the Court has to be mindful of the provisions of chapter 921.0026 and the factors that have been presented here....

...Analysis Under the CPC, the lowest permissible sentence calculated in the offender’s scoresheet is “the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure.” § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2011); see also § 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (2011) (“A departure sentence is prohibited unless there are mitigating circumstances or factors present as provided in s. 921.0026 which would rejected that argument based upon McCloud and ruled that “the scoresheet is correct, as filed, based on the information to which Mr....

...5 reasonably justify a departure.”). The trial court “may impose a departure below the lowest permissible sentence based upon circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence in accordance with s. 921.0026.” § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. (2011). The mitigating factors and circumstances that may be considered by the trial court in determining whether to impose a downward departure sentence “include, but are not limited to” those listed in section 921.0026(2). § 921.0026(1), Fla. Stat. (2011); see also State v. Henderson, 108 So. 3d 1137, 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“The trial court can impose a downward departure sentence for reasons not delineated in section 921.0026(2), so long as the reason given is supported by competent, substantial evidence and is not otherwise prohibited.”); McCorvey v. State, 872 So....

...handled differently in Hamilton County than in other areas of the state is not a legally valid reason for a downward departure. The CPC is a general law that applies uniformly across the state irrespective of the nature and size of the community in which the crime was committed. See § 921.002, Fla....

...lea is not a legally valid reason for departure. See Geoghagan, 27 So. 3d at 113. A defendant’s plea only provides justification for downward departure when there has been a “legitimate, uncoerced plea bargain” with the State. Id.; see also § 921.0026(2)(a), Fla....

...m. Reversed and remanded for resentenc-ing within the guidelines. NORTHCUTT, A.C.J., and SALCINES, J., Concur. . We note that Jenigeris offenses were committed prior to October 1, 1998, the effective date of the Florida Criminal Punishment Code. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (1997). For crimes committed after October 1, 1998, the trial court may impose a sentence up to the statutory maximum for any offense, including an offense that is before the court due to a violation of probation. See § 921.002(l)(g), Fla....

Notes 1968 Adoption. To the same effect as section 921.02, Florida Statutes, except the portion reading

PER CURIAM., AFFIRMED. See § 921.002(3), Fla.Stat....

...2011). When sentencing a defendant within the statutory range, the judge “may consider a variety of factors, including the defendant’s criminal history, employment status, family obligations, and over-all reputation in the community.” Imbert v. State, 154 So. 3d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (citing § 921.002(g), Fla....

...We note that the CPC does not list sending a message to the community or deterring persons other than the individual defendant being sentenced as sentencing factors properly considered by trial courts. Under the CPC, the “primary purpose” of sentencing is “to punish the offender.” § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

argues that the Criminal Punishment Code, section 921.002(1)(h), violates the state constitutional provision

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 921.002(1)(5), Fla....

...ere the guidelines are exceeded, is problematic. We do not reach that question here because section 921.001 was repealed effective October 1, 1998, and it remains in effect only as to crimes committed before that date. Ch. 97-194, § 1, Laws of Fla. Section 921.002, et seq., The Florida Criminal Punishment Code, applies to felonies committed on or after October 1, 1998. Ch. 97-194, § 2, Laws of Fla. Jackson committed the crimes involved in this case on April 11, 1999. Thus the new Code is controlling. Section 921.002(l)(g) of the Code provides that the court may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense....

Code does not apply to capital felonies. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. Easterling was convicted only of first

...The penalty imposed is commensurate with the severity of the primary offense and the circumstances surrounding the primary offense. The severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender’s prior record. Id. at 409 (quoting §§ 921.002(1)(b), (c), and (d), Fla....

...concluded that “the arrests and convictions” considered by a trial judge in 7 sentencing must, “by definition,” occur “prior to the time of the primary offense” and not after the primary offense. Id. (quoting § 921.0021(5), Fla. Stat....

...Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court emphasized, “the terms ‘primary offense’ and ‘prior record,’ which are included in the [Criminal Punishment Code’s] sentencing principles, do not include a subsequent arrest and its related charges.” Id. (citing §§ 921.0021(4), (5), Fla....

...The court noted that the Criminal Punishment Code defines “prior record” as “a conviction for a crime committed by the offender, as an adult or a juvenile, prior to the time of the primary offense,” and applied the “last antecedent doctrine” to conclude that section 921.0021(5)’s antecedent phrase, “committed by the offender, as an adult or juvenile, prior to the time of the primary offense,” modified only the immediately preceding term—“crime”—and not the earlier preceding term “conviction.” Id. (citing § 921.0021(5), Fla....

...Instead, the trial court relied on Barnes, concluding that the fact that Ducas was not a juvenile and section 921.1401 was not a consideration did not require a different outcome because rehabilitation was still a relevant consideration when sentencing an adult. See § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...from that order—we affirm. I A After a jury convicted Gazoombi of felony battery for his involvement in a barroom altercation—but before sentencing—he moved for a downward departure under section 921.0026, Florida Statutes, seeking a sentence more lenient than the lowest one ordinarily allowed. See § 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (providing for a “lowest permissible sentence” and prohibiting a sentence below (i.e., a “departure sentence”) “unless there are mitigating circumstances or factors present as provided in s. 921.0026 which reasonably justify a departure”). Gazoombi presented three statutorily enumerated bases for a sentence below the calculated lowest permissible sentence: 4 1) the “capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminal nature...

...ctim was the initiator of the altercation”; and 3) the “defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical disability, and the defendant is amenable to treatment.” § 921.0026(2)(c)−(d), (f), Fla. Stat....

...atutory entitlement to the trial court’s consideration of whether it could depart downward, based both on what the law allows as mitigating circumstances and on whether there was evidence to support an extant mitigating factor for departure. See §§ 921.002(3), 921.0024(2)–(3), 921.0026(1)–(2), 921.00265(1)–(2), Fla....

...rrect determination of the legally permissible sentencing range. Ordinarily, the sentencing range will be the “lowest permissible sentence” (or the floor), at one end of the range; to the statutory maximum (or the ceiling), at the other end. See § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (“The trial court judge may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense . . . .”); § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (“The lowest permissible sentence is the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure.”); § 921.0024(3), Fla. Stat. (“A single digitized scoresheet shall be prepared for each defendant to determine the permissible range for the sentence that the court may impose.”); § 921.0026(1), Fla. Stat. (“A downward departure 9 from the lowest permissible sentence, as calculated according to the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024, is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure.”); § 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (“A departure sentence is prohibited unless there are mitigating circumstances or factors present as provided in s. 921.0026 which reasonably justify a departure.”); cf. § 921.002(1)(f), Fla....

...These two actions have distinctly different legal consequences. The Criminal Punishment Code creates a lowest permissible sentence, and specifies that a “downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence” without proper statutory support is “prohibited” and “subject to appellate review.” § 921.0026(1), Fla. Stat. An improper departure, one not justified by a statutorily defined departure ground, is an error subject to correction. In contrast, a sentence within the permissible range is not an error subject to correction. No statutory counterpart to section 921.0026(1) permits a defendant to challenge a decision to sentence within the permissible range rather than to depart....

...After sentencing, Millien gave notice of appeal. During this appeal’s pendency, Millien filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct sentencing errors, raising the application of the adult-on-minor multiplier provision contained in section 921.0024(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2015) (“the adult-on-minor multiplier”). The motion is deemed denied because the trial court failed to rule within sixty days....

...defendant qualifies for a multiplier, “application of th[e] sentencing multiplier is not discretionary.” State v. Stafford, 711 So. 2d 612, 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). However, we note that the drug trafficking multiplier, also 2 listed in both section 921.0024(b) and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.704(19), has a clause providing that it may be applied “at the discretion” of the court. § 921.0024(b), Fla....

...re intended.’” D.M.H. v. Pietilla, 33 So. 3d 800, 801 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (quoting Maddox v. State, 923 So. 2d 442, 446 (Fla. 2006)). Therefore, the fact that the legislature included discretionary terms in the drug trafficking multiplier within section 921.0024(1)(b), but specifically left the discretionary term out of the adult- on-minor multiplier, supports the conclusion that consideration of the adult-on-minor multiplier is mandatory, not discretionary. Although the trial court erre...

...We focus our analysis first on the sentence imposed for count 1 (lewd or lascivious battery on a child), which was the primary offense on Millien’s scoresheet, and then shift our analysis to count 2 (lewd or lascivious battery on a child), identified as the additional offense on the scoresheet. Section 921.0024(1)(b) provides the Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet’s “Worksheet Key” to be used to compute the subtotal and total sentence points for sentencing. § 921.0024(1)(b), Fla....

...making it clear that Millien’s offenses qualify for the adult-on-minor multiplier. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.704(d)(24)(A)(ii)e. Having determined that Millien’s offenses met the threshold qualifications for the adult-on-minor multiplier, the next question is the effect of section 921.0024(1)(b)’s limiting language of the multiplier....

...The limiting language states: If applying the multiplier results in the lowest permissible sentence exceeding the statutory maximum sentence for the primary offense under chapter 775, the court may not apply the multiplier and must sentence the defendant to the statutory maximum sentence. § 921.0024(1)(b), Fla....

...te’s language is ambiguous.” Lopez, 233 So. 3d at 453. We conclude that the adult-on-minor multiplier is not ambiguous. That conclusion, and our determination as to the adult-on-minor multiplier’s plain meaning, is guided by another portion of section 921.0024, as well as our supreme court’s interpretation of that portion in its recent decision, State v. Gabriel, 314 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. 2021). Section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (2015), states, in part: (2) The lowest permissible sentence is the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure....

...The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or consecutively. . . . If the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed. § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2015) (emphasis added). In Gabriel, our supreme court interpreted section 921.0024(2)....

...6 minimum sentence. 314 So. 3d at 1252. In conducting its analysis, the court noted that when the legislature referenced “the statutory maximum” and the “statutory maximum sentence” in the two italicized portions above within section 921.0024(2), respectively, “both refer to section 775.082.” Id. at 1248. As to the adult-on-minor multiplier, the first use of the phrase “the statutory maximum sentence” is specifically linked to chapter 775. § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...tutory maximum sentence” as used in the limiting language’s concluding words is literally the maximum sentence which Millien faced under the Florida Criminal Punishment Code, without application of the adult-on-minor multiplier. We also find section 921.0024(2)’s language relevant to the interpretation of the adult-on-minor multiplier for a second reason....

...achieve a consistent whole.” Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992). “Where possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.” Id. As noted above, section 921.0024(2) states: “If the lowest permissible sentence under the 7 code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed.” § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). Millien’s interpretation of the adult-on-minor multiplier would nullify section 921.0024(2)’s language requiring that the LPS must be imposed where it exceeds the statutory maximum under section 775.082....

...sentence points to calculate the LPS, and instead, the trial court was required to sentence Millien on count 1 to the maximum sentence under Florida Criminal Punishment Code for the scoresheet’s primary offense without applying the adult-on-minor multiplier. See § 921.0024(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015); § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...Thus, the trial court did not err in imposing the sentence for count 1. Count 2, The Additional Offense 3 We note that in Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2003), the supreme court addressed a concern about a potential statutory conflict between section 921.002(1)(g), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998) (providing that a trial court may sentence an offender up to the statutory maximum for any offense) and section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998) (providing that a trial court must impose the lowest permissible sentence where it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence). Id. at 555. The supreme court concluded that sections 921.002(1)(g) and 921.0024(2) were not in conflict and could be harmonized. Id. at 555-56. The court explained that section 921.002(1)(g) is a general sentencing provision, while section 921.0024(2) is an exception to the general sentencing provisions. Id. at 556. Thus, the supreme court held that “when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2002), is exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence under the code, the lowest permissible sentence under the code becomes the maxi...

...imposed for the primary offense (count 1). That is because the LPS for the primary offense in this case exceeds the maximum sentence for the offense under section 775.082. Again, the statutes’ plain language and the Gabriel opinion guide the analysis. Section 921.0021, Florida Statutes (2015), of the Florida Criminal Punishment Code provides the definition of “primary offense” and “additional offense” as used on the scoresheet to calculate the LPS: (1) “Additional offense” means...

...severe than, the sanction recommended for any other offense committed by the offender and pending before the court at sentencing. Only one count of one offense before the court for sentencing shall be classified as the primary offense. § 921.0021(1), (4), Fla....

...(2015) (emphasis added). Because (1) the primary offense’s total sentence points, by definition, must be “as severe as, or more severe than, the sanction recommended for any other offense committed by the offender and pending before the court at sentencing,” § 921.0021(4), Fla. Stat. (2015); (2) the Criminal Punishment Code’s required sentence must be imposed if the LPS under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...least 44.45 years in prison (the lowest permissible sentence without the multiplier), including a sentence of 15 years in prison on the primary offense. Id. at 819. Based on Gabriel, we assume that Hayes’s interpretation of the adult- on-minor multiplier included in section 921.0024(1)(b) is no longer viable. However, the First District has not receded from Hayes, so we certify conflict with Hayes v....

...the majority, I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the adult-on-minor multiplier that “the statutory maximum sentence” means something different than “the statutory maximum sentence for the primary offense under chapter 775” in section 921.0024(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2015)....

...nding to construe “statutory maximum sentence” as something other than what is set forth in a phrase immediately preceding it in the same sentence. It is similar to abbreviating the “Criminal Punishment Code” to the “Code.” For instance, section 921.002(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2015), provides: “Departures below the lowest permissible sentence established by the code must be articulated in writing by the trial court judge and made only when circumstances or factors reasonably justi...

...he “statutory maximum sentence” should not be construed as anything other than the “statutory maximum sentence under chapter 775.” The “statutory maximum sentence” has an established meaning throughout the sentencing statutes, and in section 921.0024, it is clearly something different than the “lowest permissible sentence.” That section provides: (2) The lowest permissible sentence is the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure....

...However, any sentence to state prison must exceed one year. If the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum 11  sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed. Section 921.0024(2), Fla....

...nor multiplier was not applied, and thus its application did not result in the LPS exceeding the statutory maximum. The LPS was exceeded without application of the multiplier. Since Millien’s LPS already exceeded the statutory maximum, pursuant to section 921.0024(2), the trial court was required to sentence him to the LPS. In this regard, I disagree with Hayes v....

...This interpretation harmonizes the LPS with the adult-on-minor multiplier. Where the LPS exceeds the statutory maximum based upon the sentencing points subtotal, the adult-on-minor multiplier is not applied, and the defendant is sentenced in accordance with section 921.0024(2) to the LPS....

...he meaning of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a)). The Criminal Punishment Code defines the “lowest permissible sentence” as the “the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure.” § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added). The Code allows for imposition of sentences that are less than the “lowest permissible sentence.” See id.; see also § 921.002(1)(f), Fla....

...he state’s objection. The record 2 The state alternatively argues that it would have had the ability to appeal the 48-month sentence, because it fell below the lowest permissible sentence without valid, written reasons for downward departure. See § 921.002(1)(h), Fla....

...The court revoked appellant’s probation and sentenced her to the lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal Punishment Code. The lowest permissible sentence of 94.5 months exceeded the five-year statutory maximum for the underlying offense and therefore became the sentence required by the code. See § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...anding any finding that she violated probation. The State is correct that, “[i]f the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed.” § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). However, “[a] court may impose a departure below the lowest permissible sentence based upon circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence in accordance with s. 921.0026.” § 921.002(3), Fla....

Perkins v. Mayo, Fla.1957, 92 So.2d 641. . F.S. § 921.02, F.S.A. . Sneed v. Mayo, Fla.1953, 66 So.2d

...775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statutes.10 See Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 395. then a fifty-six-year sentence is not a de facto life sentence. Moreover, as we raised in Henry, it is unclear whether gain time would be a factor in this analysis. Id. If it is, and, pursuant to section 921.002(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2002), Peterson serves only eighty- five percent of his sentence, then his sentence is not a de facto life sentence, but then the sixty-year sentence in Guzman, that Justice Pariente clearly inferred would be...

...775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statutes.10 See Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 395. then a fifty-six-year sentence is not a de facto life sentence. Moreover, as we raised in Henry, it is unclear whether gain time would be a factor in this analysis. Id. If it is, and, pursuant to section 921.002(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2002), Peterson serves only eighty- five percent of his sentence, then his sentence is not a de facto life sentence, but then the sixty-year sentence in Guzman, that Justice Pariente clearly inferred would be...

...d lewd or lascivious conduct are both second-degree felonies, the former is a “Level 7” offense whereas the latter is a “Level 6” offense. In practical terms, this scoresheet error lowered Boyd’s “Total offense score” by 20 points. See § 921.0024(1)(a), Fla....

...Because of the error in identifying the primary offense, the scoresheet failed to reflect the severity of Boyd’s sexual molestation of a fourteen-year- old girl. Second, the scoresheet does not include 40 Victim Injury points for Sexual Contact. See § 921.0024(1)(a), Fla....

...* Accordingly, Boyd’s “Total Sentence Points” should have been 192.40 points—not the 36.20 points listed on the scoresheet. With a correct number listed for the “Total Sentence Points,” Boyd’s LPS should have been 123.30 months or 10.275 years in prison, ([196.40 – 28] x 0.75 = 123.30). See § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. By only scoring 36.20 points, however, Boyd’s score supported the nonstate prison sanction he received. See § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. Because the LPS should have been 10.275 years in state prison, Boyd’s nonstate prison sanction was an improper downward departure—improper because the trial court did not articulate any valid reasons for the sentence imposed. See § 921.002(1)(f), Fla....

...calculated scoresheet when deciding upon a sentence . . . .”). 4 “must be articulated in writing by the trial court judge and made only when circumstances or factors reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence.”); § 921.0026(1), Fla....

...scoresheet points to make the negotiated sentence appear consistent with the LPS. If the State had provided the trial court with an accurate scoresheet, then the court could have identified the plea bargain as the basis for a downward departure. See § 921.0026(2)(a), Fla. Stat....

...even though Boyd previously completed the sentence on that misdemeanor count. See Sanders v. State, 35 So. 3d 864 (Fla. 2010). This increased the point total by 0.20 points. The parties agreed on 24 points under the “Community Sanction” section of the scoresheet. See § 921.0024(1)(b), Fla....

...release date when the underlying conviction is not in dispute and the release date is not being used to prove eligibility for an enhanced sentence. Indeed, it was entirely proper for the State to advise the court about Appellant’s undisputed criminal history. See § 921.002(1)(d), Fla....

...g on the original offense.”); see also § 948.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (stating that if probation is revoked, a court shall “impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation”) (emphasis added); § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

implement, and revise a sentencing policy.” § 921.002(1), Fla. .Stat. (1998). The Code “embodies” these

violation of probation or community control.” § 921.002(l)(g), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added). The

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 921.002(g), Fla....

offense when imposing an in-range sentence. See § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat; Garcia v. State, 346 So. 3d

...tory maximum. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.704(d)(25). And "[b]y its terms, the code applies only to 'felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998.' " See Miller v. State, 177 So. 3d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (quoting § 921.002, Fla....

...we have no difficulty preferring in each of their steads the prevenient principles of punishment enunciated by our controlling muse, the Florida legislature, which has instructed that “[t]he primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender,” § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010), and that under our system, “the punishment must fit the crime.” § 921.002(1)(c), Fla....

...months to thirty years in state prison. The Code also instructs that “the lowest permissible sentence calculated pursuant to the Criminal Punishment Code Scoresheet is assumed to be the lowest appropriate sentence for the offender being sentenced.” § 921.00265, Fla. Stat. (2010). “A departure sentence is prohibited unless there are mitigating factors as provided in s. 921.0026 which reasonably justify a departure.” Id....

...Characterizing Bailey as a once prominent lawyer and “leader in the civic affairs,” the trial judge offered Bailey the opportunity of a lifetime – no prison time provided that he repay just some, even a few dollars in good faith, of the money he stole. The court based its decision on subsection 921.0026(2)(e), which permits a downward departure sentence where “[t]he need for restitution to the victim outweighs the need for a prison sentence.” On appeal, Bailey concedes that the evidence does not support this exception because...

...d the departure is not otherwise supported by the record. Instead, Bailey makes the Tipsy Coachman – better known in this court by its updated equivalent, the “Drunken Cabbie” – argument, that the sentence imposed may be affirmed under subsection 921.0026(2)(d) because Bailey “requires specialized treatment for ....

...me and the criminal. In short, there should be no “breaks” given to Bailey simply because the crime he committed might generically be referred to as “white collar.” This is not a valid consideration under the Criminal Punishment Code, see section 921.0022, Florida Statutes (2010), or in applying the Code via the Criminal Punishment Code Scoresheet, see Fla....

...C scoresheet. The record reflects that this was not a negotiated sentence. The offense in XX-XXXXXX was possession of cocaine, a third degree felony punishable by a maximum of five years in prison unless the CPC score exceeded the statutory maximum. § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...The trial court denied Bradley's motion. Bradley is correct that the burglary offense, which was committed April 22, 1998, should not have been listed as the primary offense on his CPC scoresheet. The CPC applies only to offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998. § 921.002, Fla. Stat. Separate scoresheets should have been prepared for the offenses committed before and after the effective date of the CPC. Section 921.002(2), Florida Statutes, provides: When a defendant is before the court for sentencing for more than one felony and the felonies were committed under more than one version or revision of the former sentencing guidelines or the code, each...

...herefore agree with appellant that his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident resulting only in property damage must be reversed. Appellant has also raised issues involving the constitutionality of the Criminal Punishment Code, specifically section 921.002(1)(h), which provides: A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the Criminal Punishment Code only if the sentence is below the lowest permissible sentence or as enumerated in s....

...State, 767 So.2d 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), we held that the above provision did not violate due process. We adhere to Hall and therefore reject the due process argument, but address other constitutional issues which were not addressed in Hall. Appellant also argues that section 921.002(1)(h) is a denial of equal protection because it allows only a sentence which is below the lowest permissible sentence to be appealed "on the basis that it departs from the Criminal Punishment Code." This violates equal protection, ac...

...Similarly, Article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution provides that "all natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law." Equal protection does not require that the defendant and the state be treated equally in criminal cases. In addition, appellant contends that section 921.002(1)(h) is unconstitutional because it violates the right to appeal contained in Article V, section 4(b) in the Florida Constitution....

...court held that this statute did not prohibit the taking of an appeal, because that would be an unconstitutional restriction of the subject matter jurisdiction of the appellate courts. As the court did with section 924.051 in Jefferson, we construe section 921.002(1)(h) as not prohibiting appeals from sentences....

...apital cases ..."). Thus, the legislature had the authority to change the nature of the sentencing structure, and, in doing so, to reduce the statutorily created rights which accrued to defendants under earlier versions of the sentencing guidelines. Section 921.002(1)(h) does not prohibit all appeals by a defendant, but rather grants the state the right to appeal a departure sentence, defining a departure sentence as one that is less than the calculated lowest permissible sentence. Under earlier versions of the sentencing guidelines, the propriety of an upward departure could be raised. Section 921.002(1)(h) is directed at that appellate issue, and no more....

...Appellant argues that her rights to due process, equal protection and the prohibition against imprisonment for debt were violated by her sentence. She did not seek to withdraw her plea. The state argues that appellant's sentence cannot be appealed under section 921.002(1)(h), Florida Statutes, which provides: A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the Criminal Punishment Code only if the sentence is below the lowest permissible sentence or as enumerated in s....

sentenced under the Criminal Punishment Code, section 921.002, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), that became

defendant is a valid sentencing consideration. See § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (stating that “the circumstances

...ne count of possession of a controlled substance. However, his argument on appeal  Geske pleaded no contest to the charges and was adjudicated guilty. Prior to sentencing, he filed a motion for a downward departure. In the motion, he relied on section 921.0026(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2021), to argue that he required specialized treatment for a mental disorder that was unrelated to substance abuse or addiction.2 He also relied on section 921.0026(2)(j) to argue that the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and that it was an isolated incident for which he had shown remorse....

...substantial evidence to support the reason for a downward departure." State v. Lackey, 248 So. 3d 1222, 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). "The level of proof necessary to establish facts that support a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is a preponderance of the evidence." § 921.002(1)(f), Fla....

...proving a ground for a downward departure by a reasonable doubt or by clear and convincing evidence. Geske argues that that reference proves that the trial court held him to a higher burden of proof than the preponderance of the evidence standard set forth in section 921.002(1)(f). We agree that it appears that the trial court applied an incorrect burden of proof....

...Geske also argues that the trial court committed a due process violation by considering Geske's truthfulness as reflected by the trial court's comment that Geske was "not completely forthright" when he was evaluated by his expert witness. We find no merit to these arguments. Section 921.0026(2)(j) specifically permits a trial court to grant a downward departure where the crime was an isolated incident and unsophisticated and where the defendant has shown remorse....

...3d DCA 2012) (noting that courts can consider whether a defendant has shown remorse or accepted responsibility where the defendant seeks a reduction, mitigation, or downward departure of his sentence); Johnson v. State, 948 So. 2d 1014, 1017 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (noting that section 921.0026(2)(j) permits consideration of lack of remorse). This is not a case where the trial court equated Geske's exercise of his constitutional rights with a lack of remorse....

...Nor is there any evidence that the trial court denied the motion for downward departure because Geske entered a no contest plea instead of a guilty plea. Rather, it is evident that in determining whether Geske was entitled to a downward departure under section 921.0026(2)(j), the trial court properly considered whether Geske had shown remorse or accepted responsibility, a necessary requirement for that statutory ground. Turning to the issue of whether the trial court erroneously considered Geske's truthfulness, we conclude that the record does not support that argument....

...credibility of the witness. The trial court did not fundamentally err in 9 considering whether Geske had shown remorse or accepted responsibility for purposes of determining whether he was entitled to a downward departure pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j)....

...urt considered the additional images or search terms, and even if it did, there was no fundamental error because the evidence and arguments were presented for the purpose of establishing why Geske was not entitled to a downward departure pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j). In fashioning a sentence, a trial court may not consider incidents of misconduct that occur after the charged offense or unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct; nor may a trial court rely on speculation that the defendant may commit crimes in the future....

...Second, the State did not continue to focus on the additional images; instead, the State proceeded to ask the witness whether there was an indication that Geske encouraged the trial court to consider the additional uncharged images. However, neither of those cases involved a motion for downward departure pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j) based on the argument that the crimes were isolated and unsophisticated and that the defendant showed remorse....

...The testimony elicited by the State and the State's arguments were presented to establish that the crimes were not isolated or unsophisticated and that Geske had failed to take responsibility for the crimes. That testimony and argument was directly relevant to whether Geske was entitled to a downward departure pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j)....

...downward departure where a defendant fails to show remorse. Rather, they reflect that the trial court considered the evidence presented to reach the conclusion that Geske himself had not shown remorse, a necessary factor for a downward departure pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j). CONCLUSION We hold that Geske failed to establish that fundamental error occurred in the trial court's denial of his motion for downward departure and the imposition of his sentences....

...defendant’s failure to pay restitution and court costs in determining whether to revoke her probation based on the admitted violations was appropriate pursuant to the statutorily delineated principles of the Criminal Punishment Code (CPC). See generally § 921.002(1)(b), (c), Fla. Stat....

...It argues that the trial court failed to articulate any basis for the departures and that no evidence was presented at the sentencing hearing to support a departure. The State further argues that the trial court failed to articulate in writing the basis for the downward departures pursuant to section 921.002(3), Florida Statutes (“Any sentence imposed below the lowest permissible sentence must be explained in writing by the trial court judge.”). “Whether there is a valid legal ground for a downward departure is a question of law, to be reviewed de novo.” Wynkoop v....

...Murray held that “[d]epartures below the lowest permissible sentence established by the code must be articulated in writing by the trial court judge and made only when circumstances or factors reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence.” Id. at 1289-90 (citing § 921.002(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2013); § 921.002(3), Fla....

...merely requested a sentence at the bottom of the guidelines. Thus, no evidence was presented at the sentencing hearing to support a departure. Further, the trial court failed to articulate in writing the basis for the downward departures pursuant to section 921.002(3), Florida Statutes (2016) (“Any sentence imposed below the lowest permissible sentence must be explained in writing by the trial court judge.”)....

...The trial court denied relief stating “the written sentences do not indicate that they were imposed pursuant to the provisions of the prison releasee reoffender statute and the fifteen year sentence was not a departure sentence pursuant to the applicable provision of the criminal punishment code, section 921.002(g), Fla....

...would have imposed the same sentence absent the erroneous inclusion of the disputed points. However, the defendant was sentenced pursuant to the habitual felony offender statute, see generally § 775.084(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011), and not the Criminal Punishment Code, see generally § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2011); see also § 775.084(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (2011) (“A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.002 [The Criminal Punishment Code].”), making his sentencing guidelines scoresheet legally irrelevant and any miscalculations on it harmless as a matter of law....

BENTON, J. Delma McNally Blair appeals the sentence imposed after revocation of his probation, under the criminal punishment code, sections 921.0Ó2 to 921.0027, Florida Statutes (2013)....

...“Sentences imposed after revocation of probation or community control must be imposed according to the sentencing law applicable at the time of the commission of the original offense.” Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(30). The criminal punishment code applies only to felony offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998. See § 921.002, Fla....

...Blair argues (and the state agrees) the trial court erred in sentencing him pursuant to the criminal punishment code in effect in 2014, when he should instead have been sentenced using the 1994 scoresheet in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.990, 1 , 2 which was in effect *1252 at the time of the original offenses.. See § 921.002, Fla....

...remorse—or willingness to take responsibility—fits with the Legislature’s command that each sentence be not only commensurate with the severity of the offense but also fashioned in light of ‘the circumstances surrounding’ it.” Id. at 963 (quoting § 921.002(1)(c), Fla....

...legality of considering remorse or acceptance of responsibility to reduce (or not reduce) a sentence.” Id. 1 The court took issue with this position, explaining, 1. Indeed, consideration of remorse to reduce a sentence is specifically authorized in section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (2017), which permits a downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence in cases where “[t]he offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant h...

...unanimously find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt”), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1051 (2021). In a noncapital case, the statutory maximum sentence is a legal sentence by virtue of the conviction alone. See § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...Chapter 921, Florida Statutes, authorizes a trial court to impose a sentence lower than the minimum sentence if “[t]he offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse.” § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla....

...y could not be sentenced as a PRR. See Parker v. State, 799 So.2d 282, (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The fifteen-year term of imprisonment was nonetheless legal and not a departure sentence pursuant to the applicable provision of the criminal punishment code, section 921.002(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...His scoresheet indicated a lowest permissible sentence of twenty-one months' prison. But the trial court sentenced him to twenty-one months' prison, suspended, and twenty-four months' probation. At sentencing, the trial court indicated that it was departing downward pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (2013), which allows for a sentence below the lowest permissible sentence where "[t]he offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse." In departing downward, the court only stated, "I don't believe the operation in and of itself was sophisticated enough to come into the category in my mind, okay, that doesn't obviate some section (j) of Florida Statute 921.0026 . . . . So I'm going to depart under that statute." The State now challenges this sentence, and we reverse. We initially note that the trial court failed to put its reasons for departing downward into writing. See § 921.002(1)(f) (requiring that "[d]epartures below the lowest permissible sentence established by the code ....

...erent occasions, suggesting a certain level of sophistication in the area of drug sales.1 Finally, Hudson maintains on appeal that even if departure was not proper under subsection (j), the record supports a downward departure under section 921.0026(2)(m), which provides as follows: 1 On appeal, Hudson also argues that the State did not preserve its objection to the downward departure sentence....

...Nothing in the record supports the claim that the trial court relied on any improper arguments, testimony, or other impermissible sentencing factors. The trial court is permitted to consider the circumstances surrounding the crimes for which appellant was being sentenced. § 921.002(1)(c), Fla....

...tial drug treatment program. As the Appellee acknowledges, the need for substance abuse treatment is not a permissible basis for departure here because Appellee’s CPC score renders her ineligible for a reduction of sentence for drug treatment. See § 921.0026(2)(m), Fla....

...he trial court agreed. Without discounting the seriousness of Appellee’s experience of domestic abuse, the record on appeal does not establish by a preponderance of evidence a diagnosis of the clinical condition of battered woman’s syndrome. See § 921.002(3), Fla....

...Chamblee (Appellant) appeals his convictions of one count of racketeering (RICO) and numerous counts of grand theft. He also challenges the constitutionality of his concurrent sentences to 25 years’ incarceration under the Florida Criminal Punishment Code (the Code) for the first-degree felonies. § 921.002, Fla....

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 921.002(l)(g), (h), Fla.Stat....

imposed by the Criminal Punishment Code. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2003). The time a defendant is required

....”). Further, the State appealed appellant’s 7.875-month sentence because it fell below the lowest permissible sentence without valid, written reasons for downward departure and an objection on those grounds was made to the trial court. See § 921.002(1)(h), Fla....

...according to the amended scoresheet, besides its fear of technically violating double jeopardy. Under Florida law, a trial judge may depart from a defendant’s lowest permissible sentence if justified based on a non- exhaustive list of factors. See § 921.0026(2), Fla. Stat. (2018). However, “[d]epartures below the lowest permissible sentence established by the code must be articulated in writing by the trial court judge . . . .” § 921.002(1)(f), Fla....

...4th DCA 2015) (reversing a downward departure sentence because the defendant did not move for downward departure and the trial court did not state it was departing, orally articulate reasons for doing so, nor enter a written order memorializing the reasons for departure); § 921.002(1)(f), Fla....

...ect; however, sexual battery does not include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose.” , The fact that penetration occurred was established by the factual basis recited during the plea colloquy and is a fact that Green does not dispute. . See § 921.002(l)(a), Fla....

...ee of these counts and imposed a twenty-five-year minimum mandatory sentence on only count four. The beginning date of the offenses in counts two, three, and four was September 1, 1998 — prior to October 1, 1998, the effective date of the CPC. See § 921.002, Fla....

...Because felonies with continuing dates of enterprise must be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines in effect on the beginning date of the criminal activity, § 921.001(4)(b)(3); Bigbee v. State, 848 So.2d 1286 , 1287 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), 1995 guidelines scoresheets should have been used for these offenses, see *1014 § 921.002(2); see also Bradley, 998 So.2d at 1214 ....

...n. WARNER, J., dissents with opinion. CONNER, concurring specially. I concur with the majority opinion that Dennard is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing because there is no manifest injustice. I write to agree with Judge Warner that section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (1999), is unclear on how a sentence should be imposed in cases where there are multiple offenses for sentencing and the sentencing points result in a lowest permissible sentence (LPS) above the statutory maximum for the primary offense....

...tences consecutively). However, there is language in the statute which indicates to me that in the context of sentencing for two counts of the same offense, the legislature did not intend for the sentencing court to have only two narrow options. Section 921.0024(2) provides: The total sentence points shall be calculated only as a means of determining the lowest permissible sentence....

...I read the second and last sentences in pari materia. Although not explicit, I contend the legislature intended the last sentence to refer only to the primary offense, since under the Criminal Punishment Code scoring system, there can be only one primary offense. § 921.0021(4), Fla....

...It also allows more options than the limited two options of 16.15 years or 32.3 years in prison discussed above. Judge Warner’s interpretation of the statute has merit. Obviously, the legislature needs to clarify its intent as to the application of the last sentence in section 921.0024(2). WARNER, J., dissenting. 3  I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion....

...episode, and providing “the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively”); § 921.16(1), Fla. Stat. (1999) (court may direct that two or more of the sentences for offenses charged in the same information be served consecutively); § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...Id. These all appear to be misdemeanors, and the sentences for those charges do not appear in the opinion. Butler challenged his sentence for possession of cocaine of 75.6 months, his LPS, as exceeding the statutory maximum. Id. The supreme court held that section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (2002), required sentencing above the statutory maximum, where the LPS exceeded the maximum....

...r did it discuss what constituted the statutory maximum for the offenses at sentencing. It addressed only the sentence for the third degree felony, the primary offense. Therefore, we must take in that context the court’s pronouncement that “when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2002), is exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence under the code, the lowest permissible sentence under the code becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose.” Id....

...LPS above the statutory maximum for the primary offense but less than the statutory maximum of all offenses available for sentencing, run consecutively. I think, however, that the statute provides a way to 6 harmonize all of its terms. Section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (1999), requires that a sentencing scoresheet be prepared to arrive at a “lowest permissible sentence,” below which the trial court may not sentence absent the limited reasons for a downward departure....

...Under the CPC, “[t]he trial court judge may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense, including an offense that is before the court due to a violation of probation or community control.” § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added). The Legislature expressed that the primary purpose of sentencing is to be punishment. See § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...“The permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum . . . for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing. The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or consecutively.” § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...1 One count of kidnapping and the count charging intimidation of a witness—both of which involved Hauter’s wife— were dropped by the State as part of Hauter’s plea. 3 on or after October 1, 1998. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2018). The Florida Legislature enacted the Code “to make the best use of state prisons so that violent criminal offenders are appropriately incarcerated.” § 921.002(1), Fla....

...(i) Use of incarcerative sanctions is prioritized toward offenders convicted of serious offenses and certain offenders who have long prior records, in order to maximize the finite capacities of state and local correctional facilities. § 921.002(1)(a)–(d), (i), Fla....

...utions upon which our ordered liberty is constructed. B. Within this context, and to serve these ends, the Code establishes sentencing guidelines that provide a minimum sentence a trial court must impose. See § 921.002, et seq., Fla. Stat....

...2 While the sentencing guidelines set forth the minimum required sentence, a trial court remains free to “impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense, including an offense that is before the court due to a violation of probation or community control.” § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. A trial court is permitted to impose a sentence below that contemplated by the Code “only when circumstances or factors reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence,” § 921.002(1)(f), Fla. Stat., and in a manner consistent with section 921.0026, Florida Statutes....

...Thus, the Code establishes a presumption that a sentence within the guidelines is to be imposed by the trial court— and this presumption is a strong one since a downward departure sentence “is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure.” § 921.0026(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). A defendant seeking a sentence that departs below the guidelines must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an asserted mitigating circumstance or factor. See § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. Section 921.0026 lists fourteen mitigating factors. See § 921.0026(2)(a)–(n), Fla....

...l court in felony cases considers numerous factors such as the charged offense(s) and severity thereof, a defendant’s criminal record of prior offenses, injury to a victim, and other classifications or considerations that may be applicable. See §§ 921.0022– 921.0024, Fla. Stat. 5 exhaustive, as the statute expressly states that the “[m]itigating factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, those listed in [section 921.0026(2)].” See § 921.0026(1)–(2), Fla....

...In making this determination, the trial court is guided by the Code, the sentencing guidelines, and the expressed purposes for criminal sanctions undergirding Florida law. When the trial court imposes a sentence below the minimum sentence contemplated by the Code, section 921.002 requires—twice—that the judge enter a written order articulating the departure sentence and the reasons therefor. See §§ 921.002(1)(f) and 921.002(3), Fla....

...of a written sentencing order. Thus, we do not consider such in this appeal and will review the reasons orated by the trial judge on the record at time of the sentence. To be clear, however, Florida trial courts must enter a written order, as plainly required by section 921.002, Florida Statutes, when imposing a departure sentence. 6 court’s analysis (whether the law allows the trial court to impose a departure sentence), the trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed...

...trial release set for him; and (vi) Hauter had previously served 39 months of a life sentence and “lived with that for a number of years.” The first three reasons articulated by the trial court are statutory mitigating factors identified in section 921.0026; the remaining three are non-statutory mitigating circumstances not expressly identified by the Code. None of the three statutory reasons is supported in the record. Further, the three non- statutory reasons are insufficient to permit a departure sentence. Pertinent to the first three factors considered by the trial court, section 921.0026 provides in part: (2) Mitigating circumstances under which a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is reasonably justified include, but are not limited to: (a) The departure results from a legit...

...ing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident. .... (j) The offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse. § 921.0026(2), Fla....

...ted from a legitimate uncoerced plea bargain. Such finding is erroneous as a matter of law. Of primary importance, the statute provides for mitigating a sentence when “[t]he departure results from a legitimate, uncoerced plea bargain.” See § 921.0026(2)(a), Fla....

...ator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident. This mitigating circumstance is identified as the lone reason marked on the sentencing guidelines justifying the departure sentence. The trial court wrongly applied the plain text of section 921.0026(2)(f) to this case. This mitigating circumstance applies when “[t]he victim was an initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident.” See § 921.0026(2)(f), Fla....

...mitigating circumstance justifying a downward departure. 9  3. The final statutory mitigating circumstance cited by the trial court as a basis to depart was Hauter’s remorse. See § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla. Stat. However, remorse alone cannot in itself support a downward departure sentence. Section 921.0026(2)(j) allows a mitigating circumstance when “[t]he offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse.” Thus, this statute expressly requires three things: the commission of the crime in an unsophisticated manner, the charged incident was isolated, and the demonstration of remorse. See § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla....

...thirty-nine months in prison. None of these non-statutory mitigating circumstances found by the trial court, viewed individually or cumulatively, is sufficient to permit a downward departure sentence. As mentioned, the list of mitigating circumstances set forth in section 921.0026(2) is not exclusive, and a trial court is permitted to consider non-statutory mitigating circumstances if such circumstances are established by a preponderance of the evidence and are not otherwise prohibited....

...3d at 98. First, as to Hauter’s “emotional stability,” this ground is invalid because the trial court could not rely on this “non-statutory factor when that factor is encompassed within a listed statutory factor.” See State v. Sawyer, 350 So. 3d 427, 429 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022). Section 921.0026 permits mitigation when “[t]he defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical disability, and the defendant is amenable to treatment.” § 921.0026(2)(d), Fla....

...greatest, though it doesn’t fit specifically into a mental health type of a problem that would be a downward departure itself.” To permit this non-statutory consideration to justify a downward departure sentence would circumvent the requirements of section 921.0026(2)(d) for mitigating a sentence because of a mental disorder....

...This non- statutory circumstance also fails to permit a departure sentence because it—like the other two non-statutory circumstances—is inconsistent with the sentencing policy declared by the Florida Legislature in enacting the Code—to ensure “that violent criminal offenders are appropriately incarcerated.” See § 921.002(1), Fla. Stat. It is also contrary to the expressed “primary purpose” of sentencing expressly stated in the Code—“to punish the offender” in a manner “commensurate with the severity of [his crime].” See § 921.002(1)(b)–(c), Fla. Stat. Such punishment “increases with the 12 length and nature of [Hauter’s] prior record.” See § 921.002(1)(d), Fla. Stat. III. As a result, since there are no valid grounds under section 921.0026 to permit a departure from the minimum sentence contemplated by the Code, the trial court erred in imposing a sentence less than the minimum required by the Florida sentencing guidelines. Accordingly, this case is REVERSED and R...

...4th DCA 2002)). These limits were set by the legislature in the Criminal Punishment Code, which provides that a “trial court judge may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense . . . that is before the court . . . .” § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...“The permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum . . . for . . . any . . . offenses before the court for sentencing. The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or consecutively.” § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...We know that subject to constitutional limitations, “a trial court has broad discretion to sentence a person convicted of a crime to a term of incarceration within the range authorized by law.” State v. Manago, 375 So. 3d 190, 192 (Fla. 2023); see also § 921.002(1), (1)(g), Fla....

...at 1082 (explaining that “so long as the sentence imposed is within the maximum limit set by the legislature, an appellate court is without power to review the sentence”). Punishment, not surprisingly, is the primary objective behind the Legislature’s Criminal Punishment Code (“CPC”). See § 921.002(1)(b), (g), Fla....

...decision in Gabriel v. State, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2913 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 6, 2019), in which the Fifth District certified the following question of great public importance: IS THE LOWEST PERMISSIBLE SENTENCE AS DEFINED BY AND APPLIED IN SECTION 921.0024(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, AN INDIVIDUAL MINIMUM SENTENCE AND NOT A COLLECTIVE MINIMUM SENTENCE WHERE THERE ARE MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS SUBJECT TO SENTENCING ON A SINGLE SCORESHEET? Id....

...Id. -3-  “On appeal, Gabriel argue[d] that his sentences for aggravated assault with a firearm and resisting an officer with violence are unlawful because they exceed the statutory maximum for those offenses.” Id. The Fifth District applied the language in section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (2012), which provides that “[t]he permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in s....

...o each offense at sentencing.” Id. (quoting Dennard v. State, 157 So. 3d 1055, 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (Warner, J., dissenting)). The Fifth District explained, “[W]hen applying the provision of section -4- 921.0024(2), which requires the trial court to impose the LPS if it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, the LPS must exceed the collective statutory maximum, not each individual statutory maximum, before such exception is triggered.” Id....

...statutory maximum sentences. Consequently, Gabriel’s sentences for aggravated assault with a firearm and resisting an officer with violence are illegal because they exceed the statutory maximum sentence in contravention of section 921.0024(2). Id. Ultimately, the Fifth District reversed the trial court and certified that its decision conflicts with the Second District’s decision in Champagne....

...imposed on his primary offense but argued that the 240-month sentence imposed on his conviction for false imprisonment was illegal because it exceeded the 5-year statutory maximum sentence for that offense. Id. at 630. The Second District examined the statutory language in section 921.0024(2) and existing precedent and “conclude[d] that the LPS is an individual minimum sentence which must be imposed when the LPS exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for each offense and therefore [the defendant]’s sentence is legal.” Id....

...Accordingly, the Second District affirmed the trial court and certified the same question of great public importance as the Fifth District’s decision in Gabriel. -6-  II. ANALYSIS The State argues that, based on the plain language of section 921.0024(2), the LPS is an individual minimum sentence, and the trial court properly sentenced Gabriel to 107.25 months (the LPS) on both of his third-degree felony convictions because the LPS exceeded the 5-year individual statutory maximum sentence for each of his third-degree felony convictions. Gabriel counters that the LPS is a collective minimum sentence, and section 921.0024(2) is ambiguous with respect to the maximum permissible punishment for additional offenses when the LPS exceeds their respective statutory maximum sentences.2 We agree with the State and answer the certified question in the affirmative, quash the Fifth District’s decision in Gabriel, and approve the Second District’s decision in Champagne to the extent it is consistent with this opinion. Based on our analysis of the text of the statute, we conclude that under section 921.0024(2), the LPS is an individual 2....

...e’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction.” City of Parker v. State, 992 So. 2d 171, 176 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005)). A. Section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes Section 921.0024(2) provides: (2) The lowest permissible sentence is the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure....

...der to life imprisonment. An offender sentenced to life imprisonment under this section is not eligible for any form of discretionary early release, except executive clemency or conditional medical release under s. 947.149. § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...provides, “[i]f the lowest permissible sentence under the code points, any legal status points, community sanction points, prior serious felony points, prior capital felony points, and points for possession of a firearm or semiautomatic weapon.” 4. Section 921.0021(4), Florida Statutes (2012), defines “primary offense” as “the offense at conviction pending before the court for sentencing for which the total sentence points recommend a sanction that is as severe as, or more severe than, the sanction recommended for any other offense committed by the offender and pending before the court at sentencing” and explains that “[o]nly one count of one offense before the court for sentencing shall be classified as the primary offense.” Section 921.0021(1) defines “additional offense” as “any offense other than the primary offense for which an offender is convicted and which is pending before the court for sentencing at the time of the primary offense.” - 10 - exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed.” The last two sentences of the statute address a sentence for life imprisonment. We reject Gabriel’s argument that section 921.0024(2) is ambiguous with respect to the maximum permissible sentence for additional offenses when the LPS exceeds their respective statutory maximum sentences. First, section 921.0024(2) specifies that the LPS is the minimum sentence that a trial court may impose, absent a basis for departure, and it must be imposed where it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence. While the fifth sentence of section 921.0024(2) outlining the permissible range for sentencing expressly includes the language “for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing,” language which could contemplate a “collective” approach, the LPS exception does not....

...2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1995) (“When the legislature has used a term, as it has here, in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.”). Further, the second sentence of section 921.0024(2) includes the language “up to the statutory maximums for the offenses committed,” which the Legislature also could have included in the eighth sentence addressing the LPS exception but did not....

...This Court may not “rewrite the statute or ignore the words chosen by the Legislature so as to expand its terms.” Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 2004). Contrary to the Fifth District’s decision in Gabriel, nothing in the plain language of section 921.0024(2) limits the LPS to be imposed only if it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for the primary offense or the collective statutory maximum sentences for all of the offenses before the court for sentencing. Additionally, t...

...designated felony may be punished . . . [f]or a felony of the second degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years . . . [and] [f]or a felony of the third degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years.” Nothing in the plain language of section 921.0024(2) or section 775.082 refers to a collective statutory maximum. Pursuant to section 921.0024(2), the LPS exception increases the maximum for sentencing purposes, and the Legislature has determined in a very certain way that a sentence must be increased above the statutory maximum sentence when exceeded by the LPS....

...n read together, the plain language provides that a trial court may impose a sentence for each individual offense before the court and may sentence an offender up to the statutory maximum for any offense before the court for sentencing. See also § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...Therefore, to determine whether to increase the maximum sentence based on the application of the LPS exception, the trial court must look to each individual offense before the court for sentencing. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and conclude that, under section 921.0024(2), the LPS is an - 15 - individual minimum sentence where there are multiple convictions subject to sentencing on a single scoresheet. B....

...maximum of five years for the third-degree felony of cocaine possession.” The district court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s postconviction motion and agreed that the sentence was legal but questioned a potential statutory conflict between section 921.002(1)(g), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998) (providing that a court may sentence an offender up to the statutory maximum for any offense) and section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998) (providing that a court must impose the LPS where it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence). Id. We concluded that the defendant’s sentence was legal and that sections 921.002(1)(g) and 921.0024(2) were not in conflict and could be harmonized. Id. at 555-56. Specifically, we explained that section 921.002(1)(g) applied to general sentencing, while section 921.0024(2) is an - 16 - exception to the general sentencing provisions. Id. at 556. In doing so, we held that “when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2002), is exceeded by the [LPS] under the code, the [LPS] becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose.” Id. Then, in Moore v....

...on the first offense must be awarded on the sentence imposed after revocation of probation on the second offense.”). - 17 - Moore, 882 So. 2d at 985. Nothing in this Court’s decisions in Butler or Moore contradicts the plain language of section 921.0024(2)....

...Gabriel argues that this Court’s statement in Moore that together the individual offenses only establish the minimum sentence that may be imposed supports his argument that the LPS is a collective minimum sentence. However, this statement is consistent with the fourth sentence in section 921.0024(2), which provides that “[t]he total sentence points shall be calculated only as a means of determining the lowest permissible sentence.” As previously explained, pursuant to rule 3.704(d)(18), the LPS calculation takes the en...

...cause each offense has its own statutory maximum sentence such that the range could differ for each offense. C. The Conflict Cases In the Fifth District’s decision in Gabriel, based on its own interpretation of section 921.0024(2) and this Court’s decision in Moore, the Fifth District reached a conclusion contrary to the plain language of the statute....

...years The Fifth District concluded that “the sentencing range for Gabriel was 107.25 months, the LPS, to twenty-five years, the collective statutory maximum sentence.” Id. The Fifth District explained, “when applying the provision of section 921.0024(2), which requires the trial court to impose the LPS if it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, the LPS must exceed the collective statutory maximum, not each individual statutory maximum, before such exception is triggered.” Id....

...dual statutory maximum sentences. Consequently, Gabriel’s sentences for aggravated assault with a firearm and resisting an officer with violence are illegal because they exceed the statutory maximum sentence in contravention of section 921.0024(2). Id. 6 Contrary to the Fifth District’s decision in Gabriel, the plain language of section 921.0024(2) does not require the LPS to be imposed only if it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for the primarily scored offense or the collective statutory maximum sentences. We conclude that the result reached in the Second Di...

...In light of this opinion, we will refer reconsideration of the referenced section of the CPC Scoresheet contained in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.992 to the Supreme Court Criminal Court Steering Committee. - 21 - 921.0024(2) and our decisions in Butler and Moore....

...In Champagne, the Second District concluded “that the LPS is an individual minimum sentence which must be imposed when the LPS exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for each offense.” 269 So. 3d at 630. Specifically, the Second District explained: Based on the language of section 921.0024(2) and bounded by the language of Butler and Moore, we conclude that the LPS is an individual minimum sentence which applies to each felony at sentencing for which the LPS exceeds that felony’s statutory maximum...

...But where the LPS exceeds the offense’s statutory maximum sentence, there is no range; the LPS must be imposed. Id. at 636-37 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). Accordingly, because the Second District’s decision in Champagne is consistent with the plain language of section 921.0024(2), we quash the Fifth District’s decision in Gabriel and approve the Second District’s decision in Champagne to the extent it is consistent with this opinion. - 22 -  III....

...CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we answer the certified question in the affirmative, quash the Fifth District’s decision in Gabriel, and approve the Second District’s decision in the conflict case of Champagne to the extent it is consistent with this opinion. In doing so, we conclude that under section 921.0024(2), the LPS is an individual minimum sentence where there are multiple convictions subject to sentencing on a single scoresheet. It is so ordered. CANADY, C.J., and LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. LABARG...

Notes 1968 Adoption. To the same effect as section 921.02, Florida Statutes, except the portion reading

...hird-degree felony, is illegal. We conclude that Champagne's twenty-year sentence is legal, and we certify a question of great public importance. Champagne was sentenced under the Criminal Punishment Code, chapter 921, Florida Statutes (2005) (CPC). Section 921.0024(2) states that when "the lowest permissible sentence under the [CPC] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s....

...ence on the robbery count. 2 The court then sentenced Champagne to twenty years (240 months) in prison on the false imprisonment count. 3 In his postconviction motion, Champagne argued that his twenty-year sentence is illegal based on his reading of section 921.0024(2) and Butler v....

...ntences for any additional offenses must not exceed the individual statutory maximums for those offenses. Essentially, Champagne contends that the LPS is a collective minimum sentence. The postconviction court denied Champagne's motion, finding that section 921.0024 does not require the LPS to be imposed "only if it exceeds the statutory maximum for the primarily scored offense....

...the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Eustache v. State , 248 So.3d 1097 , 1100 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Holly v. Auld , 450 So.2d 217 , 219 (Fla. 1984) ). III. Applicable law A. Statutory language The CPC provides that "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender." § 921.002(1)(b)....

...It also provides that "[t]he penalty imposed is commensurate with the severity of the primary offense and the circumstances surrounding the primary offense" and that "[t]he severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender's prior record." § 921.002(1)(c), (d)....

..."Primary offense" is defined as the "the offense at conviction pending before the court for sentencing for which the total sentence points recommend a sanction that is as severe as, or more severe than, the sanction recommended for any other offense committed by the offender and pending before the court at sentencing." § 921.0021(4). "Prior record" is defined as "a conviction for a crime committed ... prior to the time of the primary offense." § 921.0021(5). Additional offenses, those "for which an offender is convicted and which [are] pending before the court for sentencing at the time of the primary offense," § 921.0021(1), are scored and included in the total sentence points calculation, which is then used solely to determine the offender's LPS, see § 921.0024(1)(a), (2)....

...Additional offenses are also referenced as part of the CPC's sentencing range: "The permissible range for sentencing shall be the [LPS] up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing." § 921.0024(2). The LPS "is assumed to be the lowest appropriate sentence for the offender being sentenced," § 921.00265(1), and it "is the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure," § 921.0024(2)....

...imum sentence " does not reference primary or *633 additional offenses, statutory maximum s , or multiple sentences: "If the [LPS] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the [CPC] must be imposed." § 921.0024(2); cf....

...y additional offenses as provided in s. 775.082, F.S., unless the [LPS] exceeds the statutory maximum." (emphasis added) ). The CPC also provides that the trial court "may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense," § 921.002(1)(g), and expressly allows for concurrent or consecutive sentencing, § 921.0024(2)....

...ffense at sentencing for which it exceeds that offense's statutory maximum, or a collective minimum sentence. If the LPS is an individual minimum sentence, our analysis is complete and the LPS was legally imposed. But as is apparent, the language of section 921.0024(2) is not consistent; both singular and plural terms are used, and the terms statutory maximum and statutory maximum sentence are used without explanation or definition. Although the supreme court has interpreted section 921.0024(2), it has not addressed the issue presented to us. And as will be seen, courts have not consistently applied the language. B. Precedent 1. Butler v. State , 838 So.2d 554 (Fla. 2003) In Butler , the supreme court determined that sections 921.002(1)(g) and 921.0024(2), respectively providing that a court may sentence an offender up to the statutory maximum for any offense and that a court must impose the LPS where it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, are not in conflict and can be harmonized. 838 So.2d at 556 . In so concluding, the supreme court held that "when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2002), is exceeded by the [LPS], the [LPS] becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose." Id....

...But Moore does not address how to apply the directive to impose the LPS when it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence. Nor does it address whether the LPS is an individual minimum sentence or whether the "statutory maximum" referenced in the range is different than the "statutory maximum sentence" in the directive of section 921.0024(2). IV. Analysis Although courts have applied the language of section 921.0024(2) and the holdings of Butler and Moore , they have often done so inconsistently, with conflicting application and results, and without analysis....

...have imposed in the instant case is [the LPS of] 64.5 months" without distinguishing between the two convictions). 7 The inconsistencies may be strictly the result of courts addressing only the discreet issues presented and the terms or portions of section 921.0024(2) about which they were asked. Nonetheless, the results of these cases and their applications of section 921.0024(2) are often conflicting and, at a minimum, imprecise....

...idual offense; and that where it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, the LPS becomes the maximum sentence which may be imposed. What has not been analyzed, except in two concurrences and one dissent, is how to interpret and apply the language of section 921.0024(2) where there are multiple convictions at sentencing....

...State , 199 So.3d 960 , 964 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (Warner, J., concurring specially); Dennard v. State , 157 So.3d 1055 , 1056-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (Conner, J., concurring specially); Id. at 1057-61 (Warner, J., dissenting). And although it has been stated that section 921.0024(2) "is unclear on how a sentence should be imposed in cases where there are multiple offenses for sentencing and the sentencing points result in a[n] [LPS] above the statutory maximum," we disagree. See Dennard , 157 So.3d at 1056-57 (Conner, J., concurring specially) (discussing two potential interpretations of section 921.0024(2) as requiring imposition of the LPS "for each offense" for which it exceeds that offense's statutory maximum or as requiring imposition of the LPS where it exceeds the primary offense's statutory maximum); see also Colon , 199 So.3d at 964 (Warner, J., concurring specially) (discussing application of section 921.0024(2)'s *636 directive when the statutory maximum of the primary offense exceeds the LPS but the additional offense statutory maximum is less than the LPS); Dennard , 157 So.3d at 1059-61 (Warner, J., dissenting) (interpreting Butler and the language of section 921.0024(2) as requiring the court to sentence the offender to at least the LPS on the primary offense where the primary offense's statutory maximum exceeds the LPS but prohibiting the court from sentencing the offender to the LPS on an addit...

...ceeds the statutory maximum for the additional offense and determining that in light of Moore , the LPS "is the collective total minimum sentence for all offenses" and " not the sentence which must be applied to each offense at sentencing" such that section 921.0024(2)'s directive "appl[ies] to the collective total statutory maximum of the individual sentences "). Based on the language of section 921.0024(2) and bounded by the language of Butler and Moore , we conclude that the LPS is an individual minimum sentence which applies to each felony at sentencing for which the LPS exceeds that felony's statutory maximum sentence, regardless of whether the felony is the primary or an additional offense....

...As noted previously, because Butler appears to have involved misdemeanor additional offenses, to which the CPC does not apply and for which consecutive sentencing would be impossible, 9 Butler 's holding in this context is questionable. Likewise, while Moore did not address the directive of section 921.0024(2) requiring imposition of the LPS when it exceeds the statutory maximum where multiple convictions are before the court for sentencing, the court's holding that once the *637 minimum sentence is established the offenses are no longer interrelated is important to our conclusion....

...ximums, as well as the absence of limiting or clarifying language, i.e., restricting mandatory imposition of the LPS to circumstances where the LPS exceeds the statutory maximum for the primary and any additional offenses on the scoresheet). But cf. § 921.002(1)(h) ("A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the [CPC] only if the sentence is below the [LPS] or as enumerated in s....

...775.082 for an offense at conviction, or the consecutive statutory maximums for offenses at conviction, unless otherwise provided by law." (emphasis added) ). Although this court has not previously analyzed the statutory language or how it is to be applied, it has cited Butler and section 921.0024(2) and remanded for resentencing where the sentences were illegal, exceeding both the LPS and the statutory maximums....

...son for departure, to sentence the defendant to the [LPS] for each crime" and that "[o]nly the State's agreement to cap [the offender's] sentence ... enabled the trial court to depart from imposing the [LPS] for both counts" (emphasis added) (citing § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...1st DCA 2016) (concluding, in part, that the LPS was required to be imposed on each of two third-degree felony convictions, neither of which would have been the primary offense where a second-degree felony conviction was also pending before the court for sentencing, stating "[p]er section 921.0024(2) and Butler , [the LPS] becomes the required sentence" for both third-degree felony convictions not subject to habitual felony offender enhancement)....

...11 But see *638 Colon , 199 So.3d at 964 (Warner, J., concurring specially) ("[I]n this case, as the statutory maximum for [the primary offense] was life, well in excess of the LPS, sentencing appellant to the LPS for the primary offense satisfies the statutory directive of section 921.0024(2). The sentences for the remaining third degree felonies should not exceed the statutory maximum for each crime."); Dennard , 157 So.3d at 1060-61 (Warner, J., dissenting) (determining that the directive of section 921.0024(2) can be harmonized with the language from section 921.002(1)(g) that the trial court "may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense" and courts may impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, directing "consecutive sentencing to achieve an LPS without exceeding the statutory maximum for any one offense"); but cf....

...to counts one to three, for a total of 48.5 years. In case 2D14-4920, the trial court sentenced him to 15 years for each of the seven counts .... [T]he sentences imposed on Mr. Walsh are legal ." (emphasis added) ). It is evident that the effect of section 921.0024(2)'s directive differs significantly if the LPS is an individual minimum sentence rather than a collective minimum sentence....

...Conclusion We affirm the postconviction court's order and conclude that Champagne's sentence on the false imprisonment conviction is legal. Recognizing the importance of the issue, we certify the following question: IS THE LOWEST PERMISSIBLE SENTENCE AS DEFINED BY AND APPLIED IN SECTION 921.0024(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (2017), AN INDIVIDUAL MINIMUM SENTENCE AND NOT A COLLECTIVE MINIMUM SENTENCE WHERE THERE ARE MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS SUBJECT TO SENTENCING ON A SINGLE SCORESHEET? Affirmed; question certified....

...KELLY and LUCAS, JJ., Concur. A single scoresheet is prepared "for each defendant to determine the permissible range for the sentence that the court may impose," and the scoresheet "must cover all of the defendant's offenses pending before the court for sentencing." § 921.0024(3); see also Fla....

...ree-time violent felony offender and a VCC. The propriety of listing the robbery as the primary offense, given those enhancements, has not been raised. See § 775.084(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (2005) ("A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.002."); see also Fla....

...l offender sentence for an offense, the trial court removes that offense from sentencing under the guidelines and cannot include that offense either as a primary or additional offense on the guidelines scoresheet."). However, we note that "[s]ection 921.0021 does not differentiate original sentencing proceedings ......

...2010). Neither the State, the sentencing court, nor the postconviction court addressed the difference between the LPS of 240.15 months and the sentence of 240 months. A departure sentence is one "that decreases an offender's sentence below the [LPS]." § 921.00265(2). The CPC expressly states that it applies "to all felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998," § 921.002, but it also allows for misdemeanors to be scored as additional offenses and prior record, § 921.0024(1)(a); see Fudge v....

...Hall's maximum sentence under her scoresheet, which is ten years' imprisonment."). We recognize that our conclusion may result in the State successfully appealing additional-offense sentences which are individually less than the LPS and for which a basis for departure has not been established. See § 921.002(1)(h) ("A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the [CPC] only if the sentence is below the [LPS] ...."), § 924.07(1)(i), Fla....

...[a] sentence imposed below the [LPS] established by the [CPC] under chapter 921."). See § 775.08(2); Kittles v. State , 31 So.3d 283 , 284-85 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ; see also Bautista v. State , 128 So.3d 117 , 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ("The defendant's first degree misdemeanor conviction was not subject to the [CPC]." (citing § 921.002, Fla....

...imprisonment, a third-degree felony, is illegal. We conclude that Champagne's twenty- year sentence is legal, and we certify a question of great public importance. Champagne was sentenced under the Criminal Punishment Code, chapter 921, Florida Statutes (2005) (CPC). Section 921.0024(2) states that when "the lowest permissible sentence under the [CPC] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s....

...1A single scoresheet is prepared "for each defendant to determine the permissible range for the sentence that the court may impose," and the scoresheet "must cover all of the defendant's offenses pending before the court for sentencing." § 921.0024(3); see also Fla....

...bery count.2 The court then sentenced Champagne to twenty years (240 months) in prison on the false imprisonment count.3 In his postconviction motion, Champagne argued that his twenty-year sentence is illegal based on his reading of section 921.0024(2) and Butler v....

...ree-time violent felony offender and a VCC. The propriety of listing the robbery as the primary offense, given those enhancements, has not been raised. See § 775.084(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (2005) ("A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.002."); see also Fla....

...when the trial court imposes a habitual offender sentence for an offense, the trial court removes that offense from sentencing under the guidelines and cannot include that offense either as a primary or additional offense on the guidelines scoresheet."). However, we note that "[s]ection 921.0021 does not differentiate original sentencing proceedings ....

...sentences for any additional offenses must not exceed the individual statutory maximums for those offenses. Essentially, Champagne contends that the LPS is a collective minimum sentence. The postconviction court denied Champagne's motion, finding that section 921.0024 does not require the LPS to be imposed "only if it exceeds the statutory maximum for the primarily scored offense....

...3d 1097, 1100 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)). III. Applicable law A. Statutory language The CPC provides that "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender." § 921.002(1)(b)....

...It also provides that "[t]he penalty imposed is commensurate with the severity of the primary offense and the circumstances surrounding the primary offense" and that "[t]he severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender's prior record." § 921.002(1)(c), (d)....

..."Primary offense" is defined as the "the offense at conviction pending before the court for sentencing for which the total sentence points recommend a sanction that is as severe as, or more severe than, the sanction recommended for any other offense committed by the offender and pending before the court at sentencing." § 921.0021(4). "Prior record" is defined as "a conviction for a crime committed . . . prior to the time of the primary offense." § 921.0021(5). Additional offenses, those "for which an offender is convicted and which [are] pending before the court for sentencing at the time of the primary offense," § 921.0021(1), are scored and included in the total sentence points -5- calculation, which is then used solely to determine the offender's LPS, see § 921.0024(1)(a), (2)....

...Additional offenses are also referenced as part of the CPC's sentencing range: "The permissible range for sentencing shall be the [LPS] up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing." § 921.0024(2). The LPS "is assumed to be the lowest appropriate sentence for the offender being sentenced," § 921.00265(1), and it "is the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure," § 921.0024(2).4 However, unlike the CPC's sentencing range which references "the statutory maximum ....

...y maximum sentence" does not reference primary or additional offenses, statutory maximums, or multiple sentences: "If the [LPS] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the [CPC] must be imposed." § 921.0024(2); cf. id....

...775.082, F.S., unless the [LPS] exceeds the statutory maximum." (emphasis added)). The CPC also provides that the trial court "may impose a sentence 4Adeparture sentence is one "that decreases an offender's sentence below the [LPS]." § 921.00265(2). -6- up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense," § 921.002(1)(g), and expressly allows for concurrent or consecutive sentencing, § 921.0024(2). The LPS is a minimum sentence; the question is whether it is an individual minimum sentence, required to be imposed on each offense at sentencing for which it exceeds that offense's statutory maximum, or a collective minimum sentence. If the LPS is an individual minimum sentence, our analysis is complete and the LPS was legally imposed. But as is apparent, the language of section 921.0024(2) is not consistent; both singular and plural terms are used, and the terms statutory maximum and statutory maximum sentence are used without explanation or definition. Although the supreme court has interpreted section 921.0024(2), it has not addressed the issue presented to us. And as will be seen, courts have not consistently applied the language. B. Precedent 1. Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2003) In Butler, the supreme court determined that sections 921.002(1)(g) and 921.0024(2), respectively providing that a court may sentence an offender up to the statutory maximum for any offense and that a court must impose the LPS where it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, are not in conflict and can be harmonized. 838 So. 2d at 556. In so concluding, the supreme court held that "when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2002), is exceeded by the [LPS], the [LPS] becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose." Id....

...In holding that Tripp does not apply to CPC sentences, the court addressed conceptual and procedural differences 5The CPC expressly states that it applies "to all felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998," § 921.002, but it also allows for misdemeanors to be scored as additional offenses and prior record, § 921.0024(1)(a); see Fudge v....

...But Moore does not address how to apply the directive to impose the LPS when it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence. Nor does it address whether the LPS is an individual minimum sentence or whether the "statutory maximum" referenced in the range is different than the "statutory maximum sentence" in the directive of section 921.0024(2). IV. Analysis Although courts have applied the language of section 921.0024(2) and the holdings of Butler and Moore, they have often done so inconsistently, with conflicting application and results, and without analysis....

...ave imposed in the instant case is [the LPS of] 64.5 months" without distinguishing between the two convictions).7 The inconsistencies may be strictly the result of courts addressing only the discreet issues presented and the terms or portions of section 921.0024(2) about which they were asked. Nonetheless, the results of these cases and their applications of section 921.0024(2) are often conflicting and, at a minimum, imprecise. Given the statutory language and Moore and Butler, we know that the LPS is a minimum sentence; that it must be imposed where it exceeds the statutory maximum sen...

...al offense; and that where it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, the LPS becomes the maximum sentence which may be imposed. What has not been analyzed, except in two concurrences and one dissent, is how to interpret and apply the language of section 921.0024(2) where there are multiple convictions at sentencing....

...Hall's maximum sentence under her scoresheet, which is ten years' imprisonment."). - 11 - 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (Conner, J., concurring specially); Id. at 1057-61 (Warner, J., dissenting). And although it has been stated that section 921.0024(2) "is unclear on how a sentence should be imposed in cases where there are multiple offenses for sentencing and the sentencing points result in a[n] [LPS] above the statutory maximum," we disagree. See Dennard, 157 So. 3d at 1056-57 (Conner, J., concurring specially) (discussing two potential interpretations of section 921.0024(2) as requiring imposition of the LPS "for each offense" for which it exceeds that offense's statutory maximum or as requiring imposition of the LPS where it exceeds the primary offense's statutory maximum); see also Colon, 199 So. 3d at 964 (Warner, J., concurring specially) (discussing application of section 921.0024(2)'s directive when the statutory maximum of the primary offense exceeds the LPS but the additional offense statutory maximum is less than the LPS); Dennard, 157 So. 3d at 1059-61 (Warner, J., dissenting) (interpreting Butler and the language of section 921.0024(2) as requiring the court to sentence the offender to at least the LPS on the primary offense where the primary offense's statutory maximum exceeds the LPS but prohibiting the court from sentencing the offender to the LPS on an ad...

...eeds the statutory maximum for the additional offense and determining that in light of Moore, the LPS "is the collective total minimum sentence for all offenses" and "not the sentence which must be applied to each offense at sentencing" such that section 921.0024(2)'s directive "appl[ies] to the collective total statutory maximum of the individual sentences"). Based on the language of section 921.0024(2) and bounded by the language of Butler and Moore, we conclude that the LPS is an individual minimum sentence which applies to each felony at sentencing for which the LPS exceeds that...

...and for which 8We recognize that our conclusion may result in the State successfully appealing additional-offense sentences which are individually less than the LPS and for which a basis for departure has not been established. See § 921.002(1)(h) ("A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the [CPC] only if the sentence is below the [LPS] ....

...[a] sentence imposed below the [LPS] established by the [CPC] under chapter 921."). - 13 - consecutive sentencing would be impossible,9 Butler's holding in this context is questionable. Likewise, while Moore did not address the directive of section 921.0024(2) requiring imposition of the LPS when it exceeds the statutory maximum where multiple convictions are before the court for sentencing, the court's holding that once the minimum sentence is established the offenses are no longer interrelated is important to our conclusion....

...ums, as well as the absence of limiting or clarifying language, i.e., restricting mandatory imposition of the LPS to circumstances where the LPS exceeds the statutory maximum for the primary and any additional offenses on the scoresheet). But cf. § 921.002(1)(h) ("A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the [CPC] only if the sentence is below the [LPS] or as enumerated in s....

...775.082 9See§ 775.08(2); Kittles v. State, 31 So. 3d 283, 284-85 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); see also Bautista v. State, 128 So. 3d 117, 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ("The defendant's first degree misdemeanor conviction was not subject to the [CPC]." (citing § 921.002, Fla....

...secutive statutory maximums for offenses at conviction, unless otherwise provided by law." (emphasis added)). Although this court has not previously analyzed the statutory language or how it is to be applied, it has cited Butler and section 921.0024(2) and remanded for resentencing where the sentences were illegal, exceeding both the LPS and the statutory maximums....

...a valid reason for departure, to sentence the defendant to the [LPS] for each crime" and that "[o]nly the State's agreement to cap [the offender's] sentence . . . enabled the trial court to depart from imposing the [LPS] for both counts" (emphasis added) (citing § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...- 15 - two third-degree felony convictions, neither of which would have been the primary offense where a second-degree felony conviction was also pending before the court for sentencing, stating "[p]er section 921.0024(2) and Butler, [the LPS] becomes the required sentence" for both third-degree felony convictions not subject to habitual felony offender enhancement).11 But see Colon, 199 So. 3d at 964 (Warner, J., concurring specially) ("[I]n this case, as the statutory maximum for [the primary offense] was life, well in excess of the LPS, sentencing appellant to the LPS for the primary offense satisfies the statutory directive of section 921.0024(2). The sentences for the remaining third degree felonies should not exceed the statutory maximum for each crime."); Dennard, 157 So. 3d at 1060-61 (Warner, J., dissenting) (determining that the directive of section 921.0024(2) can be harmonized with the language from section 921.002(1)(g) that the trial court "may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense" and courts may impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, directing "consecutive sentencing to achieve an LPS without exceeding the statutory maximum for any one offense"); but cf....

...concurrent to counts one to three, for a total of 48.5 years. In case 2D14-4920, the trial court sentenced him to 15 years for each of the seven counts . . . . [T]he sentences imposed on Mr. Walsh are legal." (emphasis added)). It is evident that the effect of section 921.0024(2)'s directive differs significantly if the LPS is an individual minimum sentence rather than a collective minimum sentence....

...clude that Champagne's sentence on the false imprisonment conviction is legal. Recognizing the importance of the issue, we certify the following question: IS THE LOWEST PERMISSIBLE SENTENCE AS DEFINED BY AND APPLIED IN SECTION 921.0024(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (2017), AN INDIVIDUAL MINIMUM SENTENCE AND NOT A COLLECTIVE MINIMUM SENTENCE WHERE THERE ARE MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS SUBJECT TO SENTENCING ON A SINGLE SCORESHE...

including the statutory maximum for any offense[,]” § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2011), statutory construction

and well-being of the children committed”); cf. § 921.002(1), Fla. Stat. (1997) (“primary purpose of [adult]