Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ct, or acts thereon to his disadvantage, then an estoppel against the requirement of the notice may be said to arise."). [19] See Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447, 449 (Fla.1986) ("[J]ustice requires us to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations....

...tates v. Freeman (2d Cir.1966), 357 F.2d 606, 620, "... it cannot be presumed that juries will check their common sense at the courtroom door." Allowing a waiver of immunity where there is liability insurance is a recognized policy in this state. In section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1979), the legislature has allowed for waiver of the three-month statute of limitations for filing claims on a decedent's estate in any proceeding to establish the liability of either the decedent or the personal representative for which there is casualty insurance protection....

...We have for review a question of Florida law certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit as determinative of a cause pending before that court and for which there is no controlling precedent. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has certified the following question to this Court: WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION 733.710 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES CONSIDERED SEPARATELY AND/OR TOGETHER OPERATE AS STATUTES OF NON-CLAIM SO THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION EXISTS, CLAIMS NOT FORMALLY PRESENTED WITHIN THE DESIGNATED TIME PERIOD ARE NOT BINDI...

...In phrasing such question, the Eleventh Circuit stated that it did not intend to limit our consideration of the issue presented or the manner in which we give our answer. See id. at 1208. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const. As explained below, we determine that section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1991), is a statute of limitations that cannot be waived in a probate proceeding by failure to object to a claim on timeliness grounds, while section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1991), is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in a probate proceeding....

...Estate was not obligated to satisfy the judgment obtained by Mr. Prockup in the wrongful death/personal injury action. INIC in turn had no obligation because the Bradley Estate had no liability. INIC relied on the time limits established in sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes (1991), in making this argument....

...May opposed INIC's motion for summary judgment on various grounds, arguing that (1) Mr. Prockup's counter-petition for administration filed in the Bradley Estate probate proceedings satisfied the requirements of section 733.703, Florida Statutes (1991), and provided sufficient notice of the claim in satisfaction of sections 733.702 and 733.710; (2) the co-personal representatives of the Bradley Estate waived the time limitations established by sections 733.702 and 733.710 by failing to raise Mr....

...Probate Code or the Florida Probate Rules; and (3) neither the co-personal representatives' failure to file an objection to Mr. Prockup's claim *1150 nor its partial payment of Mr. Prockup's claim constituted a waiver of the time period set forth in section 733.702(1)....

...The court then certified the question now before this Court for consideration, noting that there is a conflict in the case law of Florida regarding the question. See id. at 1207-08. We now analyze the question posed. II. ANALYSIS The Eleventh Circuit has asked us to determine the nature of sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes. [7] As discussed below, after reviewing the plain language of the statutes, Florida case law, and various actions taken by the Florida Legislature in relation to the Florida Probate Code, we determine that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations that cannot be waived in the probate proceedings by failure to assert the statute in an objection, while section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings. A. SECTION 733.702 Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1991), sets forth in pertinent part: (1) If not barred by s....

...tor shall be limited to a period of 30 days from the date of service of the notice in which to file a petition for extension. . . . . (5) Nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in s. 733.710. In analyzing the nature of section 733.702, we begin with a review of Barnett Bank v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla.1986), because in that case, we were called upon to determine "whether the three-month limitation period in section 733.702 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim or a statute of limitations." Id. at 448. In sum, if nothing has changed since we decided Barnett Bank, then that decision controls our *1151 determination here regarding section 733.702....

...The Fourth District reversed on appeal, holding that the probate court had no authority to order payment on the note because Barnett Bank did not file its statement of claim within three months of first publication of the notice of administration as required by section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), which provided in pertinent part: (1) No claim or demand against the decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent ......

...on the face of a prior pleading, by way of a motion to dismiss. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d). Failure to plead that the statute of limitations has expired constitutes waiver. Barnett Bank, 493 So.2d at 448. Upon reviewing the above-quoted provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1983), we held that section 733.702 "is a statute of limitations." Barnett Bank, 493 So.2d at 448....

...In so holding, we stated: We fully recognize the strong public policy in favor of settling and closing estates in a speedy manner. Estate of Brown, 117 So.2d 478 (Fla.1960). However, as the facts of this case demonstrate, justice requires us to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations. Valid grounds, such as estoppel or fraud, may exist that would and should excuse untimely claims. A creditor would lose the right to assert these potentially valid claims were we to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of nonclaim. Our holding that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations confirms the fact that estates and creditors must adhere to well-established practices when dealing with untimely claims....

...tisfy the promissory note, *1152 given the estate's failure to assert the statute of limitations in an objection in the probate proceedings. [8] In Spohr v. Berryman, 589 So.2d 225 (Fla.1991), we were again called upon to interpret the provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes, with the 1985 version of the statute being applicable in that case. After setting forth the relevant terms of section 733.702, we referred to Barnett Bank and stated, "While known as a statute of nonclaim, [section 733.702] is nevertheless a statute of limitations." Spohr, 589 So.2d at 227; see also Olenek v. Bennett, 537 So.2d 160, 161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (citing Barnett Bank for the proposition that section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985), was a statute of limitations)....

...ement of claim against the estate concerning a marriage settlement agreement executed by the decedent before his death; and (2) the filing of a lawsuit against the personal representative of the estate within the three-month time period set forth in section 733.702 did not constitute compliance with the probate claim requirements of that statute. See Spohr, 589 So.2d at 227-29. In 1988, the Legislature amended section 733.702, Florida Statutes....

...This amendment clearly addressed the policy concerns we expressed in Barnett Bank, in that the amended language allows for an extension of the time limitation on the grounds of fraud or estoppel. Indeed, legislative history shows that the Legislature added the above-quoted language to section 733.702 in response to our decision in Barnett Bank, with the intent to make the statute "an absolute bar" to untimely filed claims, subject to an extension of the time limitation on the grounds of fraud or estoppel. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Jud., HB 645 (1988), Staff Analysis & Economic Impact Statement 6 (April 7, 1988) (on file with comm.). In 1989, the Legislature again amended section 733.702, Florida Statutes. See ch. 89-340, § 5, at 2178-79, Laws of Fla. Among other things, the Legislature added "insufficient notice of the claims period" as a basis for extending the time limitation under section 733.702....

...Indeed, legislative history shows that the Legislature undertook many changes to the Florida Probate Code in response to the Pope decision. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Jud., HB 1408 (1989), Staff Analysis & Economic Impact Statement 2, 6 (final June 15, 1989) (on file with comm.). Based on to the amendments to section 733.702 discussed above, several district courts of appeal in Florida have determined that the statute now bars untimely claims, even in the absence of an objection, unless an extension is granted. See Comerica Bank & Trust, F.S.B. v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So.2d 163, 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) ("It is apparent that section 733.702(3) is unlike an ordinary statute of limitations in that it contains express language barring untimely claims without any necessity for the [personal representative] to object to the tardiness in filing." (footnote omitted)); HCA New Port Richey Hospital v. Estate of Boschelli, 588 So.2d 1012, 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (noting that since this Court decided Barnett Bank, the Legislature amended section 733.702 to make the statute "a bar to untimely filed claims, even in the absence of an objection, unless the court grants an extension"). Similarly, several district courts have relied on amendments to section 733.705, Florida Statutes, made by the Legislature in 1984 and 1986, [9] to support a finding that section 733.702 now operates as a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim, not a statute of limitations....

...4th DCA 1993) (same), receded from on other grounds, Corporate Secs. Group v. Lind, 753 So.2d 151 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Thames v. Jackson, 598 So.2d 121, 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (same). After considering the relevant changes made to chapter 733, Florida Statutes, we hold that section 733.702(3), Florida Statutes (1991), operates to bar untimely claims against an estate even if the time period set forth in section 733.702(1) is not asserted in an objection in the probate proceedings on the basis of timeliness. However, given the fact that the time period set forth in section 733.702(1) may be extended based on fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice, we continue to hold, as we did in Barnett Bank, that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations, as a true jurisdictional statute of nonclaim could not be extended. See, e.g., Barnett Bank, 493 So.2d at 449 (determining that creditors would lose the right to assert valid claims, even if estoppel or fraud existed, "were we to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of nonclaim"); Comerica, 673 So.2d at 166 (stating that "jurisdictional statutes of nonclaim operate to bar untimely claims without any action by the opponent and deprive the court of the power to adjudicate them"). Further, while we determine that section 733.702 operates to bar untimely claims against an estate even if not asserted in an objection in the probate proceedings, we agree with Mr. May that the time period set forth in section 733.702(1) is waived in a separate action outside of the probate proceedings if not raised as an affirmative defense. [10] This is so because *1154 the non-waiver provision contained in section 733.702(3) is, by its own terms, limited to the probate context. See § 733.702(3), Fla....

...the fact that she holds a judgment. The judgment holder must file a claim like any other claimant." Cf. Payne v. Stalley, 672 So.2d 822, 823-24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (barring recovery from an estate for a judgment obtained in federal court, even though section 733.702 was not raised as a defense in the federal court action, where the claim filed in the probate proceedings was untimely). Thus, the ultimate result where an estate waives or does not affirmatively assert the protection of section 733.702 in a separate action and an adverse party obtains a judgment against the estate in that action, but has not filed a timely claim against the estate in the probate proceedings, is that the sole possibility for recovery against the esta...

...es shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as provided in this section. (2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702 within 2 years after the person's death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s....

...Estate of Johnson, 743 So.2d 83, 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (Nesbitt, J., dissenting and concurring) (concluding that section 733.710 constitutes a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim or a statute of repose). After reading section 733.710 in pari materia with section 733.702, see Pezzi v. Brown, 697 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (stating that "sections 733.702 and 733.710, which relate to the same subject matter, should be read in pari materia"); see generally Forsythe v....

...ute in 1989 as part of a "package of amendments" in "obvious response" to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pope. See id.; ch. 89-340, Laws of Fla. The Fourth District then compared the terms of section 733.710 with the relevant terms of section 733.702. See Comerica, 673 So.2d at 165. After conducting this comparison, the Fourth District reasoned as follows: The introductory adverbial phrase in section 733.702(1), "[i]f not barred by s. 733.710," means that the 2-year period of section 733.710 is paramount over the limitations period in section 733.702(1). Reading the two sections together, it appears that section 733.702 fixes the basic time frame for filing of claims in decedent's estates being probated in Florida, but section 733.710 sets an absolute deadline beyond which no claim may be entertained....

...At the same time, the text is formulated to extinguish any liability that the estate, the beneficiaries or the [personal representative] might have had for any claim or cause of action against the decedent. Hence, rather than merely fixing a period of time in which to file claims, as section 733.702 does, in reality it creates an immunity from liability arising from the lapse of the period stated....

...n its own subsection (2), which exempts from the bar of subsection (1) claims that were actually filed within the 2 year period but as to which *1156 the [personal representative] has failed to make payment or file an objection. We also take note of section 733.702(3), which states that: "[a]ny claim not timely filed as provided in this section is barred even though no objection to the claim is filed on the grounds of timeliness or otherwise unless the court extends the time in which the claim may be filed." [e.s.] It is apparent that section 733.702(3) is unlike an ordinary statute of limitations in that it contains express language barring untimely claims without any necessity for the [personal representative] to object to the tardiness in filing. At the same time, this subsection also contains authority for the probate court to extend the nonclaim period of section 733.702(1). The claimant must show fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice to empower the probate court to grant the extension. But the legislature was careful to add in section 733.702(5) that "nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in s. 733.710." There is no extension provision, moreover, in section 733.710. In fact, there is no authority anywhere in the probate code to extend the 2-year period of section 733.710. Reading the limited grant of extension authority in section 733.702(3) to enlarge the section 733.710 period of repose would be contrary to the structure and text of part VII of the probate code....

...Enlarging the repose period would also frustrate the obvious purpose underlying section 733.710 to provide an absolute bar date on the estate's liability for claims in decedent's estates being probated in Florida. Paradoxically, it would tend to make section 733.710 all but indistinguishable from section 733.702....

...an 2 years after the death of the person whose estate is undergoing probate. It does not depend on the [personal representative] timely objecting to a late claim, and the claimant cannot avoid it by showing, as he could for the nonclaim period under section 733.702, fraud or estoppel or insufficiency of notice. The absence of a provision authorizing enlargements of the repose period, together with the provision in section 733.702(5) negating any use of the enlargement provision to extend the repose period, make it clear to us that the lapse of the 2-year period erects an absolute jurisdictional bar to late-filed claims that the probate judge lacks the power to ignore....

...The Comerica court disagreed with the Carter court's reliance on the legislative history of section 733.710, noting that legislative history is irrelevant when the wording of a statute is clear. See Comerica, 673 So.2d at 167-68. Further, the Comerica court essentially concluded that the interrelation of sections *1157 733.702 and 733.710 provided the "magic words of finality" found lacking by the Carter court, relying on the fact that section 733.702(5) expressly disclaims any power to extend the two-year time period set forth in section 733.710. Comerica, 673 So.2d at 168. Judge Nesbitt recently reached a similar conclusion, determining that section 733.710 operates as a statute of nonclaim or statute of repose because "section 733.702(5) expressly prohibits any court from granting an extension of the time to file a claim against the decedent's estate on any grounds including fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice of the claim beyond two years following the death of...

...l representative of the estate failed to ascertain that Sun Bank was a creditor and failed to serve the bank with the notice of administration). After considering the plain language of section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1991), and its interplay with section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1991), we hold that section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that automatically bars untimely claims and is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings....

...of death is the outside time limit to which a decedent's estate in Florida should be exposed by claims on the decedent's assets." 673 So.2d at 167. Accordingly, we now consider the facts of this case in light of our determinations regarding sections 733.702 and 733.710....

...re than three months after first publication of the notice of administration and more than two years after Mr. Bradley's death. Thus, if such document constitutes Mr. Prockup's sole and exclusive claim filed in the probate proceedings, then sections 733.702 and 733.710 would both bar recovery from the Bradley Estate in excess of Mr....

...rcuit. First, our decision in Spohr does not control the facts of this case. In Spohr, we concluded that the filing of an independent lawsuit within three months of first publication of the notice of administration did not constitute compliance with section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Thus, it was not possible to state in a claim against the Bradley Estate that it was in excess of Mr. Bradley's policy limits. Further, it is well settled that the total failure to file a timely claim against an estate does not prevent a creditor from recovering up to the policy limits of a decedent's casualty insurance. See § 733.702(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991); Pezzi, 697 So.2d at 885-86 (determining that sections 733.702 and 733.710 did not bar plaintiffs from stating a cause of action to recover up to policy limits from decedent's casualty insurance even though the plaintiffs did not file a timely claim in the probate proceedings); Kent Ins....

...olicy limits. Third, we find the Second District's decision in Notar persuasive here. In that case, the expectant claimant failed to file a formal statement of claim in the decedent's estate within three years of the decedent's death, as required by section 733.702(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1981) (requiring filing of a claim in an unadministered estate within three years of a decedent's death)....

...Prockup's petition and counter-petition setting forth the claim in detail against the Bradley Estate were both filed within two years after the date of Mr. Bradley's death. The same cannot be said, however, with regard to satisfying the limitation period set forth in section 733.702(1). Specifically, section 733.702(1) requires that a claim be filed "within the later of three months after the time of first publication of the notice of administration or, as to any creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice of administration, 30 days after the date of service of such copy of the notice on the creditor." § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). The Legislature very specifically added the word "after" in 1988, substituting it for the word "from." See ch. 88-340, § 6, at 1805, Laws of Fla. (amending section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes)....

...e generally Dag E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Validity of Claims Against Estate Filed Prior to Publication of Notice to Creditors, 70 A.L.R.3d 784 (1976 & 1999 Supp.), such a result is nonetheless mandated by the clear language used by the Legislature in section 733.702(1). Accord Roberts v. Jassy, 436 So.2d 394, 395 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (decrying inequitable and harsh result required by application of section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1981)). III. CONCLUSION In conclusion, as set forth above, we determine that section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1991), is a statute of limitations that bars untimely claims even if the issue of timeliness is not asserted in an objection in the probate proceedings, but that such limitation may be extended by the probate court....

...of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings. Finally, while we would conclude that Mr. Prockup satisfied the nonclaim period set forth in section 733.710, he did not satisfy the limitation period established in section 733.702(1), and we are not aware of any extension or pending request for extension in any probate court....

...tes (1991), which provides that a personal representative shall serve "reasonably ascertainable" creditors with "a copy of the notice [of administration] within 3 months after first publication of the notice." See also § 733.701, Fla. Stat. (1991); § 733.702(1), Fla....

...ess rights had been violated, citing In re Estate of Danese, 641 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). The federal district court also stated that Mr. Prockup had "actual notice of the administration" of the Bradley Estate. [7] The 1991 version of sections 733.702 and 733.710 are applicable in this case because Mr. Bradley died on September 21, 1991. However, our ruling here applies equally under the current version of those statutes because (1) the Legislature amended section 733.702 only once since 1991, and that amendment did not effect a substantive change, see chapter 97-102, section 1016, at 1360, Laws of Florida (making language in the statute gender-inclusive); and (2) the current version of section 733.710 is identical to the 1991 version....

...[8] In Barnett Bank, a notice of administration was published for the estate, and the bank thereafter filed a statement of claim within three years of the decedent's death. Thus, the factual circumstances there did not implicate subsection (1)(b) of section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1983), which barred claims against an estate unless filed "[w]ithin 3 years after the decedent's death, if notice of administration has not been published." That subsection of section 733.702 dovetailed with the 1983 version of section 733.710, Florida Statutes, which provided, "Three years after the death of a person, his estate shall not be liable in any cause of action if no letters have been issued in Florida within the 3-year period." Thus, although we held in Barnett Bank that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations, such holding should be correctly confined to the three-month time limitation established in subsection (1)(a) of that statute, not extended to the subsection of the statute we did not address in Barnett Bank....

...[10] Ordinarily, unless a party asserts a statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in its answer, the statute is waived. See, e.g., Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h)(1). In cases such as this one, however, where the time period set forth in section 733.702 has not yet expired when the answer is filed, the party relying on the statute should move the court to allow the filing of a supplemental pleading to assert the statute as an affirmative defense....

...to be amended or material supplemental matter to be set forth in an amended or supplemental pleading."). [11] No party petitioned this Court for review in either Comerica or Estate of Petz, despite the presence of a certified conflict. [12] As with section 733.702, we determine that an estate may waive the time period set forth in section 733.710 in a separate action outside of the probate proceedings. However, unlike section 733.702, a creditor that has obtained a judgment in a separate action cannot recover against the estate unless the creditor has filed a claim in the probate proceedings within two years of the decedent's death. This is so because the probate court lacks the authority to extend the time period set forth in section 733.710. [13] Sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes, do not bar a creditor from stating a cause of action to recover up to policy limits from decedent's casualty insurance even though the creditor has not filed a timely claim in the probate proceedings. See § 733.702(4)(b), Fla....

...for rehearing which was subsequently denied. The Fourth District reversed and held that the circuit court had no authority to order payment because the claim was not filed within three months of publication of notice of administration as required by section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983). Section 733.702 provides, in pertinent part: (1) No claim ......

...e of the first publication of the notice of administration, even though the personal representative has recognized the claim or demand by paying a part of it or interest on it or otherwise. We must decide whether the three-month limitation period in section 733.702 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim or a statute of limitations....

...motion to dismiss. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.110(d). Failure to plead that the statute of limitations has expired constitutes waiver. Aboandandolo v. Vonella, 88 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1956); Tuggle v. Maddox, 60 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1952). Thus, the estate contends that section 733.702 is a statute of nonclaim which automatically bars Barnett Bank's claim, while Barnett Bank asserts that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations which the estate waived by its failure to object. We hold that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations....

...Accord, Harbour House Properties, Inc. v. Estate of Stone, 443 So.2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Picchione v. Asti, 354 So.2d 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Stern v. First National Bank, 275 So.2d 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Similarly, other cases have used the nonclaim terminology when referring to section 733.702 and its predecessors, but have treated the statute as a statute of limitations by either requiring the estate to affirmatively plead the statute of limitations or allowing the creditor to justify noncompliance with the time period set forth in the statute....

...Culmer, 193 So.2d 701 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967), overruled on other grounds, Rinker Materials Corp. v. Palmer First National Bank, 361 So.2d 156 (Fla. 1978). We reject the estate's contention that Twomey v. Clausohn, 234 So.2d 338 (Fla. 1970), requires us to find that section 733.702 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim....

...laim must be filed. We fully recognize the strong public policy in favor of settling and closing estates in a speedy manner. Estate of Brown, 117 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1960). However, as the facts of this case demonstrate, justice requires us to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations. Valid grounds, such as estoppel or fraud, may exist that would and should excuse untimely claims. A creditor would lose the right to assert these potentially valid claims were we to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of nonclaim. Our holding that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations confirms the fact that estates and creditors must adhere to well-established practices when dealing with untimely claims....

...Contrary to his agreement with Anna Spohr, his will left his entire estate to his surviving spouse, Janet Spohr. The first publication of the notice of administration of Mr. Spohr's estate in Palm *227 Beach County occurred on January 9, 1987. Under section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985), this meant that claims against the estate had to be filed by no later than April 9, 1987....

...e, asserting a cause of action based upon the marital settlement agreement. Janet Spohr intervened as a defendant and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court held that the timely filing of the lawsuit did not satisfy the requirements of section 733.702 for filing a claim against the estate and therefore entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment. The court reasoned that section 733.702 was only applicable to claims which arose before the death of the decedent and that Mr....

...Spohr's failure to devise at least half of his estate to his ex-wife and his children did not occur until after his death. Therefore, it was unnecessary for the court to decide whether the filing of the lawsuit met the requirements of filing a claim against the estate. Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985), reads in pertinent part: (1) No claim or demand against the decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any of its subdivisions, whether due or not, direct...

...orida Statutes (1945), the predecessor of the current nonclaim statute. The court below distinguished Hofer by pointing out that section 733.16 did not contain the present language that refers to claims "that arose before the death of the decedent." § 733.702(1), Fla....

...Claims against an estate are not limited to obligations of the decedent that could have been enforced against him while living. Claims are defined as "liabilities of the decedent, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, and funeral expenses." § 731.201(4), Fla. Stat. (1985). The nonclaim statute, section 733.702, includes claims "whether due or not, direct or contingent, or liquidated or unliquidated." A contingent claim is "one where the liability depends on some future event, which may or may not happen, which renders it uncertain whether there ever will be a liability." *228 Van Sciver v....

...beneficiaries could be substantially delayed or disrupted. Because of our holding that the filing of a claim was required, we must also address the question of whether the filing of the lawsuit within the nonclaim period constituted compliance with section 733.702....

...The strongest authority for permitting the institution of a lawsuit to take the place of the filing of a statement of claim is Steigman v. Danese, 502 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 511 So.2d 998 (1987). In that case the court held that the requirements of section 733.702 had been sufficiently met when the suit was filed and all interested parties had been served within the three-month statutory period....

...tive is acquired. This legal principle seems to have been disregarded by the court in Steigman v. Danese, 502 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). In this case the court suggests that the filing of a civil action within the statutory period permitted by F.S. 733.702 satisfies the filing requirement of F.S....

...s that the court's approach is incorrect. Filing a court action as an alternative to, or as the equivalent of, the filing of a claim in the probate court was permitted under prior law, specifically former F.S. 733.16(1). It is not now allowed. See F.S. 733.702(2)....

...733.703 relates to the form and manner of representing the claim in probate court. 1 Fla. Probate Code Manual (D & S) ch. 7, at 29-30 (Mar. 1990). Like Professor Smith, we do not believe that the institution of a lawsuit constitutes the filing of a statement of claim under section 733.702. The primary purpose of section 733.702 is to promote an early determination of claims against an estate in order that the claims may be paid and the remaining assets distributed to the beneficiaries in an expeditious manner....

...I find the majority's termination of the rights of the first wife and of the children of the first marriage of this decedent is contrary to justice and unnecessary to carry out the legislative intent of the nonclaim statutes. I agree with the majority that the purpose of sections 733.212 and 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985), is to promote the early determination of claims against an estate in order that the claims may be paid and the remaining assets distributed to the beneficiaries in an expeditious manner....

...gun. The notice shall require all interested persons to file with the court, within 3 months of the first publication of the notice: (a) All claims against the estate. § 733.212(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1985) (emphasis added). The pertinent provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985), read as follows: 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims....

...I disagree with the majority's approval of Professor David T. Smith's commentary in a Florida Probate Code manual. I find that the filing of a civil action in the circuit court that has jurisdiction of the probate proceeding, within the statutory period permitted by section 733.702, satisfies the filing requirements of sections 733.212 and 733.702....

...n in both civil and probate proceedings. In conclusion, Anna Spohr's complaint was filed with the circuit court of the fifteenth circuit to enforce the provisions of a judgment of that same court, and that filing, within the time period specified in section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985), was in accordance with the provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...See § 95.051, Fla. Stat. (1995). [8] See § 95.11, Fla. Stat. (1995). [9] See Major League Baseball, 790 So.2d at 1078. [10] See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447, 449 (Fla. 1986) ("[J]ustice requires us to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations....

...es shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as provided in this section. (2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702 within 2 years after the person's death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s....

...ty interest or the lien of any person in possession of personal property or the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien." [e.s.] Section 733.710 is found in part VII of chapter 733, entitled "Creditors' Claims." Also found in part VII is section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1991). Section 733.702(1) states in part: "(1) If not barred by s....

...on, 30 days after the date of service of such copy of the notice on the creditor, even though the personal representative has recognized the claim or demand by paying a part of it or interest on it or otherwise." The introductory adverbial phrase in section 733.702(1), "[i]f not barred by s. 733.710," means that the 2-year period of section 733.710 is paramount over the limitations period in section 733.702(1). Reading the two sections together, it appears that section 733.702 fixes the basic time frame for filing of claims in decedent's estates being probated in Florida, but section 733.710 sets an absolute deadline beyond which no claim may be entertained....

...At the same time, the text is formulated to extinguish any liability that the estate, the beneficiaries or the PR might have had for any claim or cause of action against the decedent. Hence, rather than merely fixing a period of time in which to file claims, as section 733.702 does, in reality it creates an immunity from liability arising from the lapse of the period stated....

...The only exception to section 733.710's immunity from liability is found within its own subsection (2), which exempts from the bar of subsection (1) claims that were actually filed within the 2 year period but as to which the PR has failed to make payment or file an objection. [2] We also take note of section 733.702(3), which states that: "[a]ny claim not timely filed as provided in this section is barred even though no objection to the claim is filed on the grounds of timeliness or otherwise unless the court extends the time in which the claim may be filed." [e.s.] *166 It is apparent that section 733.702(3) is unlike an ordinary statute of limitations [3] in that it contains express language barring untimely claims without any necessity for the PR to object to the tardiness in filing. At the same time, this subsection also contains authority for the probate court to extend the nonclaim period of section 733.702(1). [4] The claimant must show fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice to empower the probate court to grant the extension. But the legislature was careful to add in section 733.702(5) that "nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in s. 733.710." There is no extension provision, moreover, in section 733.710. In fact, there is no authority anywhere in the probate code to extend the 2-year period of section 733.710. Reading the limited grant of extension authority in section 733.702(3) to enlarge the section 733.710 period of repose would be contrary to the structure and text of part VII of the probate code....

...Enlarging the repose period would also frustrate the obvious purpose underlying section 733.710 to provide an absolute bar date on the estate's liability for claims in decedent's estates being probated in Florida. Paradoxically, it would tend to make section 733.710 all but indistinguishable from section 733.702....

...efenses for the opponent of the claim to plead and prove, while jurisdictional statutes of nonclaim operate to bar untimely claims without any action by the opponent and deprive the court of the power to adjudicate them. It was not always true about section 733.702 that it was merely an ordinary limitations period. Before 1984, the text lacked any provision that an untimely claim was barred without any court order. Therefore, in Read, the court held that the pre-1984 version of section 733.702 was an ordinary statute of limitations. In 1984, however, the legislature added the provision to the effect that untimely claims are barred even without any court order. Section 733.702(3) is now properly regarded as a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim, rather than an ordinary statute of limitations, and nothing in legislative response to Pope has altered that 1984 recasting of section 733.702 from a general limitations to a jurisdictional nonclaim provision. In re Estate of Parson, 570 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); and Thames v. Jackson, 598 So.2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). [5] This is true even though the claims filing period of section 733.702 may be enlarged by the court when the required factual basis for doing so has been established....

...time, as here, more than 2 years after the death of the person whose estate is undergoing probate. It does not depend on the PR timely objecting to a late claim, and the claimant cannot avoid it by showing, as he could for the nonclaim period under section 733.702, fraud or estoppel or insufficiency of notice. The absence of a provision authorizing enlargements of the repose period, together with the provision in section 733.702(5) negating any use of the enlargement provision to extend the repose period, make it clear to us that the lapse of the 2-year period erects an absolute jurisdictional bar to late-filed claims that the probate judge lacks the power to ignore....

...First the court reasoned that the legislative history—consisting of legislative committee reports—refer to the proposed 1989 legislation as limitations on claims against decedent's estates. Next the court applied Read, which it described as construing the "analogous" section 733.702, and found that Read had held section 733.702 to be a "true" statute of limitations as to which estoppel or fraud could prevent the opponent of the claim from asserting the statute....

...o suggest that—despite its text—the proposed new section 733.710 would not be one of repose but of ordinary limitation. We also conclude that the third district's reliance on Read is misplaced. As we showed earlier in this opinion, Read dealt with section 733.702 as it was written before the 1984 amendment and before the Pope decision. The pre-1984 version of section 733.702 was a statute of limitations according to Read that could be waived by conduct of the opponent of the claim. But that hardly has any meaning as to the intent of the 1991 section 733.710, which itself contains no provision for enlargement and as to which section 733.702(5) expressly disclaims any power to enlarge....

...[2] This exception does not apply in this case because SDI failed to file its claim in the probate court within 2 years from the decedent's date of death. [3] See, e.g., § 94.11, Fla.Stat. (1995) (actions " shall be commenced " within a prescribed periods of time). [4] See § 733.702(3), Fla.Stat....

...The decedent in that case died in 1986, 589 So.2d at 226, by which time language had been adopted providing that untimely claims are forever barred without court order. See 733.705(3), Fla. Stat. (1985). Because the PR filed a motion for summary judgment in the civil action raising the bar of section 733.702 and 733.705, the court did not have occasion to consider whether the limitations provisions in question were ordinary statutes of limitations or jurisdictional statutes of nonclaim....

...es shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as provided in this section. (2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702 within 2 years after the person's death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s....

...Most significantly, the language of the statute contains none of the magic words of finality which show the legislature's intention to foreclose the equitable claims which are precluded by a true statute of repose. The point is demonstrated by the cases construing section 733.702, the analogous statute concerning the time for filing claims after notice....

...[w]ithin three months from the time of the first publication of the notice of administration ..." is a statute of limitations. Valid grounds, such as estoppel or fraud, may exist that would and should excuse untimely claims. A creditor would lose the right to assert these potentially valid claims were we to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of nonclaim....

...Droze seek review of a summary final order which dismissed their fourth amended complaint with prejudice. Appellants contend the dismissal was improper if predicated on any of the following grounds: (1) the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint, (2) the failure to comply with the provisions of sections 733.702 and 733.703, Florida Statutes, and (3) the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches....

...Danese to state a cause of action for "resulting trusts," Count III states a cause of action for constructive trust, and Count IV states a cause of action for constructive fraud. Appellants' second argument is addressed to their purported failure to comply with the provisions of sections 733.702 and 733.703, Florida Statutes. Section 733.702 provides in relevant part: 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims....

...personal representative, in the manner provided for service of informal notice under s. 731.301(2)(a), and note the fact on the original. In Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1986), the supreme court held that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations. And, while recognizing the strong public policy favoring speedy settlement and closing of estates, the court also observed that — justice requires us to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations. Valid grounds, such as estoppel or fraud, may exist that would and should excuse untimely claims. A creditor would lose the right to assert these potentially valid claims were we to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of nonclaim. Our holding that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations confirms the fact that estates and creditors must adhere to well-established practices when dealing with untimely claims....

...appointment of personal representative could be considered a presentation of her claim. Similarly, in Koschmeder v. Griffin, 386 So.2d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), the inference arises that filing a civil action within the statutory period prescribed by section 733.702 satisfied the filing requirements of section 733.703....

...In this case, the first Notice of Administration was published on November 19, 1984, and this suit was filed December 21, 1984. Service of process was effected upon all parties interested in the estate within the 3-month statutory period. Thus, for purposes of the time constraints of sections 733.702, appellants' complaint was timely filed....

...law exclusively. Our holding in Anstis is therefore not directly implicated by the narrow federal issue we face today. Vernon goes farther than was necessary to explain our quite proper application there of the Florida probate nonclaim statute. See § 733.702, Fla....

...ional provisions which the parties may not ordinarily waive, while the latter are procedural bars which may be waived by the failure to plead or assert them. Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1986). Until 1986, section 733.702 was considered a statute of limitations; in that year, however, the legislature deliberately changed the wording of the statute to make it a jurisdictional nonclaim statute....

...Appellants, John and Dorothy Pezzi (plaintiffs), appeal a final summary judgment in favor of appellee, Mary Jane Brown, personal representative of the estate of Leroy Simmons, Jr. (appellee Brown). The final summary judgment was based on plaintiffs' failure to comply with sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes (1995), which place limitations on recovery against a probate estate and the estate's personal representative....

...It is undisputed that this cause of action was not barred by the general four-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence cases. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). However, the trial court in effect determined that the cause of action was otherwise barred by sections 733.702 and 733.710 because plaintiffs did not file a timely claim with the decedent's estate and did not bring the action within two years after Simmons' death....

...n two years after the tortfeasor's death, where the plaintiff seeks to recover damages only from the tortfeasor's liability insurance policy and not from the assets of the estate. The resolution of this issue depends on an interpretation of sections 733.702 and 733.710, which place limitations on creditors' claims against probate assets, and the relationship of these sections to section 95.011, which places general time limitations on bringing causes of actions. Sections 733.702 and 733.710 are part of Chapter 733, Florida's probate code. Section 733.702 operates as a statute of limitations for claims made against an estate. See Spohr v. Berryman, 589 So.2d 225, 227 (Fla. 1991). Subsection 733.702(1) requires all claims against an estate to be filed within three months after the time of the first publication of the notice of administration. *885 Subsection 733.702(2) provides that no cause of action "shall survive the death of the person against whom the claim may be made" unless the claim is filed within the specified time limits. However, pursuant to subsection 733.702(4)(b), this limitation does not affect or prevent "[t]o the limits of casualty insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which he is protected by the casualty insurance." (Emphasis supplied). Pursuant to the exception set forth within subsection 733.702(4)(b), a plaintiff is not barred from pursuing a cause of action to establish liability of the decedent or personal representative and recovering up to the limits of the applicable insurance coverage....

...Griffin, 386 So.2d 625, 627 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Kent Ins. Co. v. Estate of Atwood, 481 So.2d 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). It is undisputed that plaintiffs in this case never filed a claim with the estate or requested an extension to file a claim. Therefore, by virtue of section 733.702, plaintiffs could hold neither the estate nor the personal representative, individually, liable for plaintiffs' damages. Plaintiffs could recover only to the extent of the applicable liability insurance. See Estate of McKinney v. Sofka, 585 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (section 733.702 does not apply to claims against casualty insurance), review denied, 599 So.2d 655 (Fla....

...suit to establish liability of the decedent tortfeasor. Because plaintiffs' complaint was filed more than two years after the date of Simmons' death, we must also consider whether section 733.710 erects a bar to plaintiffs' cause of action, although section 733.702 does not....

...Sirmons v. State, 634 So.2d 153 (Fla.1994) (Kogan, J., concurring) (citing Lee v. Gulf Oil Corp., 148 Fla. 612, 4 So.2d 868 (1941)). The language in section 733.710 limiting the liability of specific parties should be contrasted with the language in section 733.702, providing that no cause of action shall survive unless a claim is timely filed or the claim comes within one of the exceptions set forth in subsection 702(4)....

...rning general limitations on bringing causes of action, providing that a cause of action shall be barred unless brought within a specified period of time. *886 Defendants correctly note that section 733.710 does not contain the exception provided in section 733.702 for proceedings to establish liability to the extent of a decedent's insurance coverage. However, sections 733.702 and 733.710, which relate to the same subject matter, should be read in pari materia. See Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 454-55 (Fla.1992). "[S]ection 733.702 fixes the basic time frame for filing of claims in decedent's estates being probated in Florida, but section 733.710 sets an absolute deadline beyond which no claim may be entertained." Comerica Bank & Trust F.S.B. v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So.2d 163, 165 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). [2] The exception in section 733.702 is an exception to the general statement that disallows causes of action where no claim has been filed within the specified time periods....

...provides an absolute limitation on liability of specified entities (or individuals). In this case, where the decedent's estate, the personal representative, and the beneficiaries could not be held personally liable as a result of the application of section 733.702, section 733.710 has no additional impact on plaintiffs' cause of action....

...There is no indication that section 733.710 represented a legislative decision to undermine the rights of plaintiffs to recover under tortfeasors' insurance policies. Our interpretation here is consonant with the purpose of the time limitations in sections 733.710 and 733.702, which are designed to promote "the public policy of providing for the speedy settlement of estates" in order that "the payment of claims and the distribution to the beneficiaries [not] be substantially delayed or disrupted." Spohr, 589 So.2d at 228; In re Brown's Estate, 117 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla.1960)....

...ce coverage would not foster the goals of Chapter 733. Plaintiffs seek recovery only to the extent of Simmons' liability insurance coverage and not from his estate's assets, the personal representative individually, or the beneficiaries. [3] Neither section 733.702 nor section 733.710 precludes plaintiffs from bringing this cause of action and recovering to the extent that Simmons was covered by liability insurance....

...Accord Iamaio v. Kite, 531 So.2d 400, 401 (Fla.2d DCA 1988). The alleged agreement in the case at bar is not contemplated by this definition. [4] Appellees additionally claim that any action for damages against Donoyan's individual estate is barred by Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1987), which requires that such actions be brought within three months of the notice of administration of the estate. However, section 733.702(1)(b) authorizes the maintenance of such actions if filed within three years of the decedent's death in the absence of notice of administration never being published....

...Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla.1986) and Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 178 So.2d 9 (Fla.1965). In Barnett Bank, the supreme court indicated that estoppel could be a defense that would excuse a claim that was untimely under the statute of limitations contained at section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...'s fees, filed pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1987). Appellant argues that although it failed to file its claim with the estate within three months from the date of the first publication of the notice of administration, as required by Section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ative thirty-day period for filing objections under section 733.705(2) was similarly inapplicable. Appellant also relies upon Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1986), wherein the Florida Supreme Court held that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations. Thus, any claim filed beyond the time set forth in section 733.702 is barred only if the statute of limitations period was raised as an affirmative defense, or, if the defense appeared on the face of the prior pleadings, by motion to dismiss....

...died after July 1, 1988. Ch. 88-340, § 8, Laws of Fla. The decedent in question died on February 14, 1988, therefore, the 1987 version of the Florida Statutes is controlling. We note, however, that the 1988 amendment added one significant change to section 733.702....

...1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988), in which the Supreme Court held that an Oklahoma statute similar to Florida's 1987 statute was a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim, not a statute of limitations. See also the 1988 amendments to chapter 733, particularly section 733.702(3), discussed supra at n....

...civil division. There appellee could plead the statute of non-claim as a bar just as any other defendant might plead a statute of limitation. In their second point appellants contend the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based upon Section 733.702, the statute of non-claim, because said statute should have been pleaded as an affirmative defense rather than as a ground for a motion to dismiss....

...led in the proceeding probating the Estate of William Selewacz, deceased. This brings us to appellants' primary point that the trial court erred in dismissing appellants' complaint on the ground that the claim was barred by the statute of non-claim, Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Kingsley, 100 So.2d 445; 33 Fla.Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, § 16. Furthermore, an option to purchase 20,400 shares in a corporation is not an option to buy specific identifiable property. Accordingly, appellants' claim under the option contract is not one exempt from the purview of Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1979), and appellants' failure to file a claim before the statute of non-claim has run renders the claim unenforceable....

...Before NESBITT, GODERICH, and GREEN, JJ. GREEN, J. The Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") appeals an order of the probate court setting aside an order granting enforcement of its lien against the estate of Kevin Johnson a/k/a Robert Watson ("estate") pursuant to section 733.702, Florida Statute (1991)....

...ant to the "Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act" ("FTPLA"), section 409.910, Florida Statute (1991), on December *84 21, 1992, and prior to the opening of the estate, we conclude that it was nevertheless a timely creditor's claim also for purposes of section 733.702....

...l newspaper specifically directing all creditors and persons having claims or demands against the decedent's estate to file their claims within three months of the date of the publication of the notice or have their claims forever barred pursuant to section 733.702. Specifically, this statute provides in relevant part that: 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims.— (1) If not barred by § 733.710, no claim or demand against the decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any of its subdivisions, whether due or...

...a petition for extension. A copy of this notice was sent by the clerk of court to AHCA on August 11, 1994, pursuant to its formal caveat of creditor. Despite this notice of administration, AHCA did not file an additional creditor's claim pursuant to section 733.702....

...motion to set aside the order granting enforcement of lien. In an order dated March 23, 1998, the successor probate judge below set aside the order granting enforcement of AHCA's lien and concluded that AHCA had never filed a timely lien pursuant to section 733.702; therefore, it was forever barred from recouping any payment from the estate. This appeal followed. AHCA argues that the trial court erred because section 733.702 is a statute of limitations and thus, an affirmative defense which has been specifically superseded or abrogated by the Florida Legislature in section 409.910....

...Thus, we find no merit to AHCA's contention that the court below lacked jurisdiction to entertain and grant the estate's motion to set aside the order granting enforcement of lien and we turn our attention to the remaining and central issue of this appeal. III AHCA maintains that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations and thus, an affirmative defense which has been specifically abrogated by section 409.910(1), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...It is intended that if the resources of a liable third party become available at any time, the public treasury should not bear the burden of medical assistance to the extent of such resources. ... (emphasis added) The estate, however, counters that section 733.702 is a jurisdictional non-claim statute which bars any untimely claim against the estate and thus, cannot be abrogated by section 409.910....

...There must be hopeless inconsistency before rules of construction are applied to defeat the plain language of one of the statutes. See Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So.2d 1064, 1068 (Fla.1995). In accordance with these established principles, we deem it unnecessary for us to consider whether section 733.702 of the probate code is a statute of limitations which has been abrogated by section 409.910 of the FTPLA because we conclude that these statutes may be reconciled to give effect to the intent and provisions of each in this case. When so harmonized, we find that AHCA's verified claim, initially filed on December 21, 1992, pursuant to section 409 .910(6)(c)2, was sufficient to timely perfect its lien against the estate pursuant to section 733.702. Both sections 409.910 and 733.702 require AHCA to file its verified claim of lien in order to place all interested persons on notice of its creditor's lien. Although section 409.910 requires the claim to be filed with the clerk of the court, section 733.702(1) is silent as to where a creditor's verified claim is to be filed in order to be perfected. By rule, however, the Florida Supreme Court has prescribed that a creditor's statement of claim against an estate pursuant to section 733.702(1) be verified and filed with the clerk of court and states the following: (1) the basis for the claim; (2) the amount claimed; (3) the name and address of the creditor; (4) the security for the claim, if any; and (5) whether the claim is due or involves an uncertainty and, if not due, then the due date and, if contingent or unliquidated, the nature of the uncertainty. Fla. Prob. R. 5.490. We further note that neither section 409.910 nor 733.702(1) requires personal service of the verified creditor's lien upon anyone to be effective. The probate rules, however, require the creditor filing a claim pursuant to section 733.702 to also furnish the clerk with an additional copy of its claim for the clerk to mail to either the personal representative or the attorney for the personal representative....

...e validity of the creditor's claim. See id. at (d). In this case, since AHCA has had its verified and recorded claim on file with the clerk of court pursuant to section 409.910 since December 21, 1992, and prior to the expiration period contained in section 733.702, we believe that the real and dispositive issue on this appeal is whether the section 409.910 claim was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 733.702....

...In reviewing the contents of AHCA's 1992 verified claim of lien and the subsequent amendments thereto, we find that it fulfilled all of the requirements of rule 5.490(a). [3] Thus, having filed and perfected its claim of lien with the clerk of court prior to the time limitations contained in section 733.702, AHCA is entitled to have its lien satisfied....

...Section 733.710 is generally designed to limit, reduce, extinguish or nullify all claims so as to hasten the closing of a decedent's estate. It cannot be logically harmonized with section 409.910 because the purpose of each is opposite to the other. They are plainly inconsistent. Secondly, it is true that section 733.702 does not direct a creditor to the proper court in which to file a claim....

...e filed with the clerk of the division of the court responsible for administering probate. Under the test announced in Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 (Fla.1992), section 733.710 constitutes a non-claim statute or a "statute of repose." This is because section 733.702(5) expressly prohibits any court from granting an extension of the time to file a claim against the decedent's estate on any grounds including fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice of the claim beyond two years following the death of the decedent....

...ever exists, because such statutes generally begin to run from the date of a discrete act on the part of the defendant. See Kush, 616 So.2d at 418 ( citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30, at 168 (5th ed. 1984)). Section 733.702 contains other provisions which, if complied with, reduce the time period for the filing of the creditor's claim, but any extended discussion as to whether section 733.710 is a Statute of Limitations or a Statute of Non-claim is entirely irrelevant to a proper resolution of this case. In a word, that is because sections 733.702(4)(a) and 733.710(3) exclude a "security interest, or other lien" on the property of a decedent....

...of Joseph Robbie, one of the Robbie defendants. The Estate of Joseph Robbie ("the Estate") moves to dismiss Counts II through VII against it on the basis that the Plaintiffs have failed to timely file a claim against the Estate under Florida Statute § 733.702....

...[7] The Plaintiffs assert that the claims against the Estate are not barred for two reasons: (1) that pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1), the Plaintiffs ninety day time period for filing a motion for substitution of parties has not yet started to run; and (2) that Plaintiffs' claims are not barred under Fla.Stat. § 733.702....

...Martinez, 734 F.Supp. 997 (S.D.Fla. 1990)). It is unnecessary, however, for this Court to decide whether any of these circumstances actually satisfy the standing requirements of the Hunt test because none of these instances now confronts this Court. [7] Fla.Stat. § 733.702 (West 1991) provides that no claims against the decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent are binding on the estate, the personal representative, or any beneficiary unless a claim is filed in the estate proceedings with...

...Rohan Kelley of Rohan Kelley, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellees. HERSEY, Judge. This appeal from an order in the probate division denying a motion to strike an untimely claim filed against a decedent's estate presents the issue of whether one of the exceptions to the non-claims statute, Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1981), preserves the claim involved in these probate proceedings....

...e and for the benefit of those interested in decedents' estates. Implementation of this policy may at times, as here, produce a somewhat harsh result but the policy is sound and worthy of preservation. Finding that no exception to the application of Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1981), has been demonstrated in the record on appeal, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant the motion to strike appellees' claim....

...in a judgment against Charles and his insurer, Kent. Kent appealed. Following the entry of judgment against Kent, a petition for administration of Vealon's estate was filed. Notice of administration was timely published, providing that, pursuant to Section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981); all claims against the estate had to be presented within three months....

...n defending it, and that the claim was therefore barred by laches. We disagree. Kent is not precluded from its contribution claim either by the closing of the estate or by its failure to assert the action within the three-month period established by Section 733.702(1)(a). Pursuant to Section 733.702(3)(b), the three-month limitation does not affect or prevent "[t]o the limits of casualty insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or personal representative for which he is protected by casualt...

...of Syprett, Meshad, Resnick & Lieb, P.A., Sarasota, for appellant State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. James W. Whatley of Kanetsky, Moore, DeBoer, Horlick & Whatley, P.A., Venice, for appellee Kulow. GRIMES, Judge. This case involves a difficult interpretation of the nonclaim statute, section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...2, in unsuccessful efforts to obtain the overpayment. In the meantime, the personal representative published the initial notice of administration on June 19, 1982. As a result, the last day for creditors to file claims against the estate pursuant to section 733.702 was September 19, 1982....

...In re Estate of Williams, 381 So.2d 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), in which this court affirmed the probate judge's refusal to strike an untimely claim on the premise that the nature of the demand was not such as to be encompassed by the claim filing requirements of section 733.702(1)....

...ative, within four months after performance by the personal representative is due; (2) any other claim, within 4 months after it arises. Since this provision was not carried over into the Florida Probate Code, we must decide the case by interpreting section 733.702(1) which reads as follows: (1) No claim or demand against the decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any of its subdivisions, whether due or not, direct or contingent, or liqui...

...osecution. No such protection of appellant's interests are warranted on the facts of this case. Thus, Nicole's claim is not barred (as to appellant) by the statute of limitations. Appellant also contends that Nicole's claim of heirship was barred by section 733.702(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides that no claim or demand against a decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent is binding unless presented within three years of the decedent's death. This argument was not raised below, so should not be considered on appeal. The argument is without merit at any rate, as Nicole's claim of heirship is not the type of "claim" contemplated by section 733.702(1)(b)....

...Notice of administration was commenced on February 25, 1982. After the personal representative was appointed, he brought the monthly rental payments to Harbour House current and continued to pay the rent as it accrued. Before the time for filing a claim against the estate, as required by section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981) had expired, the personal representative and Harbour House entered into an agreement....

...h precipitated this appeal. It is obvious that the creditor's attorney was somewhat confused about the niceties of how to proceed properly in protecting his client. However, with the facts presented to the trial court, that became wholly irrelevant. Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1981) and its predecessors are not nonclaims statutes but guidelines for judicial procedure which may be relaxed in the sound discretion of the probate court for good cause shown....

...The creditor's response to the motion to strike its claim became the functional equivalent of a motion to excuse the untimely filing of a claim against the estate. It is true that recognition or payment of a claim by a personal representative, standing alone, will not excuse the untimely filing of a claim. Section 733.702(1)(a) expressly states that the personal representative's recognition of a claim will not excuse a creditor from the requirement of presenting a timely and proper written claim against an estate....

...In this consolidated appeal, Rexwood Thames, the appellant, challenges two orders, one striking his claim against the estate of E. Thornton Jackson, Jr., and another denying his motion for an extension of time for filing a claim. We reverse. At issue in this appeal is the continued viability of section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), prescribing a time limit for filing claims against a decedent's estate, in light of Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc....

...Appellant moved for rehearing on the authority of Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). Rehearing was denied, and the lower court also denied appellant's petition for an extension of time. Section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that no claim against an estate, which arose prior to the decedent's death, is binding on the estate, on the personal representative, or on any beneficiary *123 unless presented with three months from the first publication of notice of administration. In Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1986), the Florida Supreme Court held that the 1983 version of section 733.702(1)(a), which was identical to the 1985 version described above, was a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim....

...to untimely claims. The holding in Barnett Bank was consonant with the prior holdings of lesser courts, but the ratio decidendi of the case was a concern for a just result: ... as the facts of this case demonstrate, justice requires us to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations. Valid grounds, such as estoppel or fraud, may exist that would or should excuse untimely claims. A creditor would lose the right to assert these potentially valid claims were we to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of nonclaim. Our holding that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations confirms the fact that estates and creditors must adhere to well-established practices when dealing with untimely claims......

...This procedure guarantees that claims such as fraud and estoppel are properly adjudicated. 493 So.2d at 449. Subsequently, this court held in In Re Estate of Parson, 570 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), that amendments to section 733.705 revealed a legislative intent to reclassify section 733.702, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...In Re Rules of Probate and Guardianship Procedure, 537 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1988). Subsequently, the portions of Rule 5.240 regarding notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors was deleted, effective October 1, 1991, in order to make the rule consistent with amendments to sections 733.212 and 733.702, which were in turn amended to comply with the dictates of Pope....

...quirements of a petition for an extension of time. It became effective on January 1, 1989. This section was added because, the committee notes explain, it was contemplated that creditors who have missed the filing deadline imposed by Florida Statute 733.702 would be filing a petition to extend the time for filing a claim under the authority of Pope; this rule provided for specificity in the factual allegations of a petition based on that case. Rule 5.495 has subsequently been *124 deleted because the right to petition for an extension of time to file a claim is now set forth in section 733.702. In Re Amendments to the Florida Probate Rules, 584 So.2d at 970. As noted above, section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985), provided that no claim against an estate would be binding unless presented within three months from the time of the first publication of notice or within three years after the decedent's death when no notice of administration was published. Chapter 733 required only publication notice. Section 733.702 was subsequently amended, by Chapter 89-340, Section 5, Laws of Florida, to provide that in the instance where a creditor is required to be served with a copy of the notice of administration, a claim must be filed within 30 days after the date of service....

...The changes brought by Chapter 89-340, Section 5 became effective on July 5, 1989. Following Pope, the court in Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Estate of Jara, 526 So.2d 745 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), reversed an order denying a motion for an extension of time on the authority of sections 733.212 and 733.702, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...was known or readily ascertainable to the personal representative. In In Re Estate of Barnett, 549 So.2d 1166, 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), the court observed, while construing the 1987 version of the statute, that Pope places the constitutionality of section 733.702 "in doubt." Estate of Barnett was factually distinguishable, however, from Pope and the instant case because the creditor in Estate of Barnett had been personally served with notice....

...The argument advanced by the appellee that Pope should not be given retroactive effect is not well founded, for it incorrectly assumes that we seek to apply a new rule announced by the Supreme Court regarding the Florida Probate Code. Instead, we adopt the reasoning employed in Pope with respect to the 1985 version of section 733.702, and in so doing, we conclude that the statute violates due process and cannot, standing alone, operate as a bar to appellant's claim....

...es shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as provided in this section. (2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702 within 2 years after the person's death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s....

...erms, it applied to unadministered estates. The decedent's estate in the case at bar has obviously been an administered one. [2] It will be recalled that concern regarding fraud and estoppel was the basis for the holding in Barnett Bank, supra, that Section 733.702(1)(a) was a statute of limitations rather than a statute of nonclaim. Fraud and estoppel were made exceptions to the time requirement found in section 733.702 by Chaper 88-340, section 6, Laws of Florida, and this change was made effective with respect to persons dying after July 1, 1988....

...We agree with Appellant that the trial court erred in granting an extension to file the claim, and reverse. Claims against estates must be filed within a certain time frame unless an extension is granted; extensions may be granted "only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period." § 733.702(1) & (3), Fla. Stat. (2000). Appellee's claim would have been untimely but for an extension of time. The trial court granted the extension on the grounds of waiver and estoppel. Waiver is not a permissible ground for extension of time under section 733.702(3)....

...ombrowsky, even though she was unable to effect service of process upon the decedent. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.050. Thus, Notar complied with section 95.11(3)(a). Dombrowsky's death obligated Notar to comply with another statute of limitations, however. Under section 733.702(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), any claim against a decedent's estate must be presented within three years after the decedent's death if no notice of administration has been published prior to that time....

...The personal representative's attorney denied knowledge *47 of the specific, pending New York litigation. Although an authorized representative of plaintiff signed the certified mail receipt, plaintiff did not timely file its claim against the estate. Under section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1993), no claim or demand against a decedent's estate is binding on the estate unless notice is filed within the later of three months of the first publication of the notice of administration or, as to any credit...

...With informal notice, service is by regular mail, rule 5.041(b); with formal notice, service is by certified mail, return receipt required, rule 5.040(a)(3)(A). In addition to arguing that notice was improperly sent, plaintiff also argues that it was entitled to an extension to file its claim against the estate. Under section 733.702(3), Florida Statutes (1993), the only grounds constituting exceptions to late filing are fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice....

...Sun Bank/Miami N.A., 609 So.2d 98, 103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)(holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court finding that the claimant was not a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor). A creditor who fails to file its claim within the applicable period set forth in section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (2000) [2] cannot recover against the estate unless the creditor obtains an extension of time for filing the claim. Section 733.702(3), Florida Statutes (2000), provides that the extension may be granted only upon the grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period....

...e was a reasonably ascertainable creditor. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying the petition to strike Cadle's claim against the estate. AFFIRMED. WARNER and STEVENSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Phyllis Strulowitz predeceased Harold Strulowitz. [2] Section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (2000), provides in pertinent part: [N]o claim or demand against the decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent ......

...ng contribution in each of the three cases. On September 15, 1978, appellants filed statements of claim in the Estate. The trial court dismissed the second amended third party complaint for failure to file the "claims within the time prescribed by F.S. 733.702 (1977)." The issue presented on appeal is whether an alleged tortfeasor is entitled to contribution under F.S. 768.31 (1977) from the estate of a joint tortfeasor notwithstanding that the notice of claim was not filed within the time prescribed by the non-claim statute. Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1977), provides: Limitation on presentation of claims....

...NOTES [1] Failure to file a claim or civil action within the three-month period when insurance exists does not bar a civil action but it does bar the right to enforce any personal liability of the decedent against the estate except to the extent of the insurance. F.S. 733.702(3)(b)....

...The filing of the second amended complaint was not the filing of the action but was merely an amendment as to damages. The trial court in its order and the parties to this review have alluded to the question of whether or not claims were filed or properly filed in the estates of Daughtry and Allbritton and the effect of the Section 733.702, Florida Statutes, limitations on presentation of claims in the estates. That question, however, is not before us on this review, but we note that Section 733.702(3) states as follows: Nothing in this section affects or prevents: (a) * * * (b) To the limits of casualty insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which he is protected by the casualty insurance....

...1987), this court ruled, inter alia, that a civil complaint naming the estate, filed and actually served upon all parties interested in the estate within three months of publication of the first notice of administration, was sufficient to satisfy the provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes....

...eal, the Florida Supreme Court decided Spohr v. Berryman, 589 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1991), expressly disapproving this court's Steigman decision, and holding that the filing of a civil lawsuit within the nonclaim period does not constitute compliance with section 733.702....

...The final assertion presented by the motion to dismiss is that the cause of action is barred by the appropriate statute of limitations. Defendant asserts that the applicable statute of limitations is the Indiana Code at Section 29-1-14-1. Plaintiff alleges that Section 733.702, Florida Statutes is appropriately applied. The Court cannot agree with Plaintiff that the applicable statute of limitations in this cause is to be found at Section 733.702....

...first be provided. On April 19, 1988, the United States Supreme Court decided Tulsa Prof. Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). There, the court addressed an Oklahoma probate statute which, similar to section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1987), provided that the claims of estate creditors would be barred unless filed within the time specified in a newspaper *702 publication....

...(ii) facts sufficient to obtain relief under Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). The committee note indicates that the rule is designed to provide a procedure for the filing of claims by estate creditors who have missed the filing deadline imposed by section 733.702. [1] We now turn to the specific facts of the case before us. The decedent died on September 1, 1988, and the notice of administration was published for the first time on September 28, 1988. The section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1987), three-month period within which estate creditors could file their claims expired on December 28, 1988, but the appellee did not file a claim until January 13, 1989. The appellant responded by moving to strike the claim, because it had not been filed within the time prescribed by section 733.702....

...ither of these alternative requirements. Neither the appellee's petition nor its post-hearing memorandum suggest that the appellee lacked timely, actual knowledge of all information necessary for it to have filed its claim within the time allowed by section 733.702....

...Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). The Pope case holds unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute of nonclaim similar to Florida's on the ground that the notice by publication which the statute required denied due process to known creditors. Section 733.702, Florida Statutes, is thus invalid as a basis for terminating the claim of a known creditor....

...This rule does not require sending notice of administration to creditors in estates where the time for filing claims has expired before the effective date of this rule. However, no opinion is offered whether such claims are barred by the provisions of F.S. 733.702. On the date the amended rule became effective, the time for filing under Section 733.702, Florida Statutes, had expired....

...rted waiver and none is inferable on the facts here. The judgment below should be affirmed. NOTES [1] The text of the committee note is as follows: It is contemplated that substantially more creditors who have missed the filing deadline imposed by F.S. 733.702 will be filing a petition to extend the time for filing claim, under the authority of Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc., v....

...issory note, now due. Although the note has not been reduced to judgment and appellant has thus far not made actual payment, the issue is critical at the present. Depending on time sequence and future adjudications, the non-claim statute, Fla. Stat. § 733.702 (Supp. 1974), would bar a future recovery. [1] The non-claim statute reads in part: "733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims....

...The non-claim statute in force at that time did not allow for the filing of contingent claims. The present statute does so allow, and the appellant properly sought to have her claim recognized within the time period prescribed in Fla. Stat. § 733.16(1) (1973), now replaced by Fla. Stat. 733.702 (Supp....

...1974) The non-claim statute is designed to facilitate estate probations, to afford a prompt statement of claims, (witness the shortening of the time limitation on claims from two years in the 1920 Florida Statutes § 3739 to four months, Fla. Stat. § 733.702 (Supp....

...This unique circumstance brings into play chapter 733, Florida Statutes (1988), Florida's Probate Code, which we determine requires that appellants pursue their cause of action against the estate of T. Mabry Carlton, Jr., within the time *242 requirements of chapter 733 or lose their cause of action forever. Section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1988) specifically provides that no claim or demand against a decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent, whether the claim be due or not, direct or contingent, or liquidated or unliquidated, a...

...for fraud or other wrongful acts or omissions of the decedent, is binding on either the estate, the personal representative or any beneficiary unless presented against the estate within the time limitations and in the manner required by chapter 733. Section 733.702(3) provides that any claim not timely filed as required by section 733.702 is forever barred, and no independent action or declaratory action may be taken upon such a barred claim....

...This rule does not require sending notice of administration to creditors in estates where the time for filing claims has expired before the effective date of this rule. However, no opinion is offered whether such claims are barred by the provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes. Committee notes revised. Citation form changes in committee notes. 1991 Revision: Subdivision (a) modified to make it consistent with recent changes to sections 733.212 and 733.702, Florida Statutes....

...§ 733.2123, Fla. Stat. Adjudication before issuance of letters. § 733.302, Fla. Stat. Who may be appointed personal representative. § 733.303, Fla. Stat. Persons not qualified. *970 § 733.305, Fla. Stat. Trust companies and other corporations and associations. § 733.702, Fla....

...the estate, or (ii) facts sufficient to obtain relief under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). Committee Notes Rule History 1988 Revision: New rule. 1991 Revision: The right to petition for an extension of time to file a claim is set forth in section 733.702, Florida Statutes, as recently amended....

...The appellees filed a second motion to dismiss on July 22, 1982, again alleging that appellant had not filed a claim in the estate and the time for filing claims had expired. The nonclaim period having expired March 10, 1982, the trial court dismissed the suit against appellees, and this appeal followed. Section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides that no claim that arose before the death of a decedent shall be binding on the estate or personal representative unless presented within three months of the first publication of the notice of administration. Section 733.702(2), directly applicable to the facts of this case, provides: No cause of action heretofore or hereafter accruing, including, but not limited to, actions founded upon fraud or other wrongful act or omission, shall survive the death of...

...The 1974 Florida Probate Code drafters opted to follow many reforms recommended by the Uniform Probate Code. [1] The general comment to article 3, part 8, Uniform Probate Code, stresses the need for uniformity of law from state to state in the area of creditors' claims. Notwithstanding, section 733.702(2) is completely contrary to the recommendation of the Uniform Probate Code, section 3-804(2), which reads: The claimant may commence a proceeding against the personal representative in any Court where the personal representative may...

...North County moved for rehearing, which was subsequently denied. This timely appeal followed. All claims against an estate, whether due or not, and whether direct or contingent, must be filed in a probate proceeding within ninety days after the first publication of notice of administration. § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). The court can extend this time only upon a showing of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period. § 733.702(3); American & Foreign Ins....

...In the Hernandez suit Moyer's estate had filed a crossclaim for contribution against Gates Learjet and Gates Learjet had also counter-crossclaimed against Moyer's estate. Moyer's personal representative obtained partial summary judgment on the counter-crossclaim as well. The basis for the partial summary judgments was that Section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes, barred the claims against the estates except insofar as they were covered by insurance, if any....

...In granting the subject partial summary judgments the trial court properly relied both on the "non-claim" statute and on this court's opinion in Koschmeder v. Griffin, 386 So.2d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). In the present case the appellant contends that section 733.702(1) applies only to claims or demands against the decedent's estate that arose before the decedent's death, and that its counterclaims and cross-counterclaim did not arise until after the respective decedents' deaths....

...In that opinion this court denied the petition for writ of certiorari, thus affirming the trial court's entry of partial final summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs/countercrossdefendants — the personal representatives of the aviators who died in the crash of Bass Aviation's airplane. Our authorities were section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1983), and Koschmeder v....

...im, nor has Claimant filed a written reply to the Motion to Strike Claim. "20. The Claimant also failed to move ore tenus at the hearing on the Motion to Strike, for an order enlarging time to file her Statement of Claim. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW "1. Sec. 733.702 F.S....

...29, 1989 which is three (3) months following the August 29, 1989 date of first publication of the Notice of Administration in this estate. "3. The Court has the authority to extend the time for filing claims past the bar date in accordance with Sec. 733.702(3)....

...Finally, the Pollution Control Act was never pled, and therefore, was not applicable. Even if the Act was applicable, however, it has no specific limitation period. Consequently, the Act would be subject to the general statute of limitations, section 95.11, Fla. Stat., which is further limited by the specific provisions of section 733.702, Fla....

...Stat., of the probate code. See, e.g., Velzy v. Estate of Miller, 502 So.2d 1297, 1299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) ("Even if appellant's action had not been barred by section 95.11(3)(i) and (j), [the action] is barred by her failure to file a claim ... as required by section 733.702."); Wall v....

...TAYLOR, J. The issue in this case is whether the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 USC § 9601 et seq., preempts Florida's nonclaim statute for filing claims against estates, Fla. Stat. section 733.702 (1995)....

...On April 28, 1997, Borax filed a third party complaint against the Estate in the federal proceeding. Additionally, Borax filed a claim against the Estate in the Florida probate proceedings on May 15, 1997, along with a petition for extension of time to file its claim pursuant to sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes....

...On June 16, 1997, Borax moved for summary judgment in federal court, arguing that the decedent was personally liable as an "operator" under CERCLA. Borax further argued that the limitations period in the Florida probate code is preempted by CERCLA's three-year statute of limitations, and that barring its claim under section 733.702 violated due process because Borax was not given actual or effective constructive notice of the Estate....

...on October 20, 1997. Following the evidentiary hearing, the probate court granted the Estate's petition to strike Borax's untimely filed claim and denied Borax's petition for an extension to file a claim. The court ruled that CERCLA does not preempt section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1995). It also concluded that Borax was a contingent claimant not entitled to actual notice of decedent's death; that the publication notice to creditors provided by the personal representative comported with sections 733.212 and 733.702, Florida Statutes, which statutes satisfy constitutional due process mandates; that Borax was not a reasonably ascertainable creditor nor known to the personal representative; that the trust fund theory was inapplicable as an exception to the non-claim statute for a contingent claimant not identifying a specific piece of property; that lack of interference with administration of the Estate did not constitute grounds for an extension under section 733.702, Florida Statutes; and that granting an extension would unduly interfere with the Estate's administration....

...instead it chose to exclude the decedent from its original suit against several other parties. Additionally, as pointed out in Witco, Borax could have conducted its computer inquiry, notified the estate within the three month period allowable under section 733.702, and filed a contribution action within the three years provided by CERCLA....

...the claimants except Robert O. Vickery and Julius H. Vickery, who were served by certified mail on May 23, 1988, after the Personal Representative became aware of the pending claims. The period for filing claims in the estate under Florida Statutes § 733.702, expired on November 11, 1987....

...e will which was admitted to probate. The Personal Representative filed Motions to Strike each of the statements of claim on the grounds that the claims were not timely filed and were, therefore, barred pursuant to the provisions of Florida Statutes § 733.702....

...However, such claims were contingent upon Rose Vickery executing a mutual will. As contingent claims arising before the 1987 death of Rose Vickery, each appellant had three months from the date of the first publication of the notice of *558 administration to present a claim. § 733.702(1), Fla....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District. January 12, 1989. *161 Mark P. Lang & Susan E. Sewell of Mark P. Lang, P.A., Orlando, for appellant. John D. Mahaffey, Jr., Orlando, for appellee. DAUKSCH, Judge. This is an appeal from a dismissal under section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985). That statute provides: 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims....

...er to the complaint, the estate is estopped from later claiming a right to have the complaint dismissed. The complaint was served within three months of first publication of the notice of administration, although no specific claim under the statute, section 733.702, was filed in the probate division....

...ses of creditors of the decedent who are reasonably ascertainable and shall serve on those creditors a copy of the notice within 3 months after the first publication of the notice. Impracticable and extended searches are not required ... Pursuant to section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1995), creditors had three months after the time of the first publication of the notice of administration to file their claim against the estate or it was time barred....

...tual notice of the filing of the decedent's estate. All claims against an estate, whether due or not, and whether direct or contingent, must be filed in a probate proceeding within ninety days after the first publication of notice of administration. § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). The court can extend this time only upon a showing of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period. § 733.702(3); American & Foreign Ins....

...riod, and must have filed their claim within 90 days after publication notice. Since the claim was not filed in a timely manner, the trial court was without discretion to grant Appellees' motion for an extension of the claims period. Florida Statute § 733.702(3) states that: Any claim not timely filed as provided in this section is barred ......

...Wayne Tosko of Mahaffey & Baker, P.A., Orlando, for appellants. G. Charles Wohlust of DeWolf, Ward & Morris, P.A., Orlando, for appellee. ORFINGER, Judge. This is an appeal from a final order dismissing defendants' counterclaim for failure to comply with the requirement of the non-claim statute, section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...d that the counter-plaintiffs had failed to file a claim in the estate within the three month period for filing claims following the first publication of the notice of administration on February 25, 1982. The court granted the motion on the basis of section 733.702(2), Florida Statutes (1981) and dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice. Section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1981) provides that no claim or demand against a decedent's estate that arose before decedent's death shall be binding on the estate unless presented within three months from the time of the first publication of the notice of administration. Section 733.702(2) then provides: No cause of action heretofore or hereafter accruing, including, but not limited to, actions founded upon fraud or other wrongful act or omission, shall survive the death of the person against whom the claims may be m...

...re pending at the time of his death. Nevertheless, the legislature has seen fit to impose the requirement, and we are bound to give it effect. In Harbour House Properties, Inc. v. Estate of Stone, 443 So.2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) the court held that section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1981) and its predecessors were not non-claim statutes but were only "guidelines for judicial procedure which may be relaxed in the sound discretion of the probate court for good cause shown." [1] The court then hel...

...nd one in which he was a 50% partner. Shearson claimed that at the time of Mr. Vernon's death there were some unsettled margin debts on the accounts. Shearson then failed to file its claim on Mr. Vernon's estate within the time parameters set out in section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1989), and when the claim was filed Shearson argued that an arbitration clause in the contract with Mr....

...statute is the cause of controversy. As we decided in Anstis Ornstein, it is the court which should decide whether an arbitration claim has been barred by a statute of limitations. In the case at bar the trial court should have applied the bar from section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1989), and thereby enjoined arbitration....

...Vernon's estate should have been stricken as well as it was untimely. We reverse the trial court's denial of the appellants' motion to enjoin arbitration and to strike the administrative claim. The case is remanded and the trial judge is instructed to apply the provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1989), and make a judicial finding as to the timeliness of Shearson's claim, consistent with this opinion....

...This rule does not require sending notice of administration to creditors in estates where the time for filing claims has expired before the effective date of this rule. However, no opinion is offered whether such claims are barred by the provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes. Committee notes revised. Citation form changes in committee notes. 1991 Revision: Subdivision (a) modified to make it consistent with recent changes to sections 733.212 and 733.702, Florida Statutes....

...ž 733.2123, Fla.Stat. Adjudication before issuance of letters. ž 733.302, Fla.Stat. Who may be appointed personal representative. ž 733.303, Fla.Stat. Persons not qualified. *89 ž 733.305, Fla.Stat. Trust companies and other corporations and associations. ž 733.702, Fla.Stat....

...to expect D.G. to file a civil action based on those criminal charges, D.G. was a reasonably ascertainable creditor and should have received actual notice from the Personal Representative. As such, the trial court granted D.G.'s petition pursuant to section 733.702(3), [1] specifically finding that because the Decedent knew D.G.'s identity, the Personal Representative could have ascertained D.G.'s identity and should have provided D.G....

...uct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether D.G.'s identity was known to *519 or reasonably ascertainable by the Personal Representative of the Estate. Reversed and remanded. CANADY, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, Concur. NOTES [1] Section 733.702(3), Florida Statutes (2004), states in part, "An extension may be granted only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period."

...March 18, 1996 Mary Ann Shearer, a Medicaid recipient, dies. April 24, 1997 Dennis Shearer is appointed personal representative. May 5, 1997 Parties agree that Notice of Administration is published this date, triggering the 3-month claims period under § 733.702....

...Shearer accepted Medicaid benefits. § 414.28(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). Medicaid had three months after the publication of the notice of administration of her estate to timely file a claim against the estate to recoup the monies expended on her behalf. § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). Any claim not timely filed is barred unless the probate court grants an extension upon the grounds of fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice of the claims period. § 733.702(3), Fla....

...mained the same). Here, because the amounts claimed in the amendment were for separate and distinct services requiring different proofs, untimely amendment should not have been permitted. [4] REVERSED. W. SHARP, and GRIFFIN JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Subsection 733.702(1) provides in pertinent part: (1) If not barred by s....

...During all of this time the litigation was continuing in the New York courts. In March 1992 the claimant filed a petition to reopen the Florida estate so he could pursue his claim. The trial court dismissed the petition with prejudice, and claimant brought this appeal. [1] Section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1987), which was applicable at the time, required claims against a decedent's estate to be filed within three months from the first publication of the notice of administration....

...This is an appeal from a summary final judgment entered in an action against the estate of Alfred DeMaris upon the basis that the plaintiff was barred from proceeding with the action because of his failure to file a claim in the estate pursuant to Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...No reply upon the basis of estoppel was asserted. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.100. Plaintiff produced nothing in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Therefore, summary judgment was properly entered. A second point presented by appellant urges the unconstitutionality of Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Thus the order of the trial judge disallowing appellant's claim was in error and is reversed. Reversed. GRIMES, C.J., and HOBSON, J., concur. NOTES [1] See, for example, Section 732.212 (time for filing surviving spouse's election of elective share); Section 733.702 (period within which claims must be filed); Section 732.801 (time for filing a disclaimer); and Section 733.212 (time for objecting to probate if served with notice)....

...Ronald Barrow, as personal representative of Lori Barrow's estate, appeals the dismissal of a wrongful death action against Jeffrey Odom, the personal representative of Edward Odom's estate. These actions were dismissed due to appellants' failure to file claims against Odom's estate within the time prescribed by section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...operator, Edward Odom. A petition for the administration of Odom's estate was filed on June 28, 1983, and Letters of Administration were issued on August 26, 1983. Notice to creditors of Odom's estate was published first on September 2, 1983. Under section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), creditors of Odom's estate had a period of three months or until December 2, 1983, to file claims....

...Although the record demonstrates that at least as of November 7, 1983, counsel for appellants had known of the pending administration of Odom's estate, it does not appear whether he had actual notice regarding the expiration of the nonclaim period. Appellants assert that section 733.702, Florida Statutes, the basis for the dismissals below, falls within the purview of Mullane v....

...und the statute in that case to be a statute of limitations. We have not overlooked the Florida Supreme Court's recent decision in Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Leon Henry Read, Jr., Deceased, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1986), holding that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim, and that valid grounds might exist (such as estoppel or fraud) that would excuse untimely claims....

...Appellant filed its claim in the appellee estate on September 12, 1990. The personal representative of appellee never filed an objection to the claim. The difficulty in this case lies in the fact that, from the time of decedent's death in 1985, until 1988, when it was amended, the claims statute, section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985), was deemed to be a statute of limitation, not a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim....

...A statute of limitations must be affirmatively pled to bar an otherwise valid claim. Barnett Bank v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1986); Goggin v. Shanley, 81 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1955). The trial judge also was apparently under the impression that section 733.702(3), Florida Statutes (1989), controlled when he denied appellant's claim even though no objection to the claim had been filed....

...out first determining whether the claimant was a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor. We hold that if a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor is never served with a copy of the notice to creditors, the statute of limitations set forth in section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes, never begins to run and the creditor’s claim is timely if it is filed within two years of the decedent’s death....

...Appellant alleged that the guardianship was a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor of Harry’s estate and sought a determination to that effect. The personal representative of Harry’s estate filed a response to appellant’s petition, asserting in relevant part that the claim was time-barred under sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes....

...The personal representative later filed an amended motion to strike the statement of claim. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court entered its Order Striking Untimely Filed Claim, ruling that the statement of claim was untimely under sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes, and established case law....

...2d DCA 2012), and Morgenthau v. Estate of Andzel, 26 So.3d 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). This appeal followed. On appeal, appellant argues that if the notice to creditors is not served on a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor, then the applicable limitations period of section 733.702(1) never begins to run and the known or reasonably ascertainable creditor is bound only by section 733.710’s two-year statute of repose....

...inable ... and shall promptly serve a copy of the notice on those creditors.” To preserve a claim against a decedent’s estate in Florida, a creditor must file a written statement of the claim within the statutorily prescribed time periods. See §§ 733.702, 733.710, Fla. Stat. (2006). Section 733.702 is a statute of limitations that cannot be waived in a probate proceeding by failure to object to a claim on timeliness grounds, while section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in a probate proceeding. See May v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143, 1145 (Fla.2000). Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (2006), 1 provides in relevant part: (1) If not barred by s....

...es shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as provided in this section. (2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702 within 2 years after the person’s death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s. 733.705. This court has held that under sections 733.702 and 733.710, any claims of known or reasonably ascertainable creditors, though filed after the three-month period following publication of notice of administration, should not be stricken as untimely if filed prior to the earlier of 30 days a...

...d the order on appeal. We stated: Due process considerations require that Appellants be furnished notice so that they can determine that the time for filing claims has commenced. However, regardless of whether or not the claimants had actual notice, section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes, does not bar the claim of a creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice of administration, unless barred by section 733.710, until the later of the 3-month period following publication or 30 days after seiuice of notice on the creditor....

...Any such claims, though filed after the 3-month period, should not have been stricken as untimely if filed prior to the earlier of 30 days after service of notice of administration or 2 years after the decedent’s death. Id. at 27 (citation omitted). Our decision in Puzzo is consistent with the plain language of sections 733.702 and *393 733.710....

...ifference. The holding of Puzzo makes clear that a claim of a reasonably ascertainable creditor, who was never served with notice to creditors, is timely if it is filed within two years of the decedent’s death. Because such a claim is timely under section 733.702(1), it would be unnecessary for a reasonably ascertainable creditor to file a motion for extension of time under section 733.702(3)....

...The First and Second Districts have reached a contrary conclusion, ruling that even a reasonably ascertainable creditor who was not served with a notice to creditors is required to file a claim within the publication period of three months unless the creditor files a motion for an extension of time under section 733.702(3) within the two-year repose period of section 733.710....

...erved with a copy of the notice to creditors, Mr. Lubee was required to file his claim in the probate proceeding within the three-month window following publication. Alternatively, Mr. Lubee could seek an extension from the probate court pursuant to section 733.702(3) within the two-year window of section 733.710....

...Lubee’s claim in the probate proceeding was untimely and therefore barred. As a result, the issue of whether or not Mr. Lubee was a readily ascertainable creditor was immaterial. 77 So.3d at 884 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Unlike Puzzo, Lubee and Morgenthau are inconsistent with the plain language of section 733.702(1)....

...istration or 2 years after the decedent’s death.” Puzzo, 637 So.2d at 27 . We certify conflict with Lubee and Morgenthau . Reversed and Remanded; conflict certified. DAMOORGIAN, C.J., and KLINGENSMITH, J., concur. . The 2006 versions of sections 733.702 and 733.710 are applicable in this case because they were in effect at the time of Harry’s death on February 16, 2007....

...See § 95.051, Fla. Stat. (1995). . See § 95.11, Fla. Stat (1995). . See Major League Baseball, 790 So.2d at 1078 . . See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447, 449 (Fla.1986) ("[J]ustice requires us to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations....

...Due process considerations require that Appellants be furnished notice so that they can determine that the time for filing claims has commenced. See Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). However, regardless of whether or not the claimants had actual notice, section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes, does not bar the claim of a creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice of administration, unless barred by section 733.710, until the later of the 3-month period following publication or 30 days after service of notice on the creditor....

...The term does not include expenses of administration or estate, inheritance, succession, or other death taxes." § 731.201(4), Fla. Stat. (1989). A judgment is a "liability" and nothing in the general definition of "claim" gives a judgment any special status. Section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that a claim or demand against an estate that arose before the death of the decedent is not binding on the estate unless filed within the relevant statutory period....

...of the personal representative, we reverse. In Thames, this court, in conformity with the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988), held that section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985), which provides a time limit for the filing of claims against a decedent's estate, violated due process and could not, standing alone, serve as a bar to the claims of known or reasonably ascertainable creditors. Appellants assert that the probate court erred (1) in misconstruing this court's holding in Thames by finding that section 733.702 (1983) was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the present case and; (2) in reopening the estate in view of appellees' failure to file a claim despite their actual knowledge of the opening of the estate at the time of its opening....

...ee-month non-claim period. On May 15, 1985, appellees filed a notice of the civil action in the probate court. Appellees, however, failed to file a claim against the estate in the probate court within the three-month claims filing period provided by section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...denied, 511 So.2d 998 (Fla. 1987). In Steigman, this court had held that the civil complaint was filed and served upon all parties interested in the estate within the three-month statutory period and, therefore, for purposes of the time constraints of section 733.702, the complaint would amount to a timely filed claim....

...Berryman, 589 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1991), disapproved this court's decision in Steigman to the extent that it was inconsistent with Spohr. In Spohr, the Florida Supreme Court held that the institution of a civil action does not constitute the filing of a claim under section 733.702....

...tion to reopen the estate. At the hearing on the estate's motion, appellees argued that Spohr did not require a denial of appellees' petition to reopen the estate because this court, in Thames v. Jackson, 598 So.2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), held that section 733.702 was unconstitutional. The probate court entered an order which granted appellees' petition to reopen the estate and denied the estate's motion for entry of order pursuant to mandate. The probate court found that, because Thames held that section 733.702 violated due process of law, section 733.702 was unconstitutional and could not operate as a bar to appellees' claim. Appellants argue that the probate court misconstrued the holding of Thames, since section 733.702 is unconstitutional only when applied to known or reasonably ascertainable claimants....

...te. The probate court entered an order *427 striking the creditor's claim and denied the creditor's petition for an extension of time to file a claim. This court adopted the reasoning employed by the United States Supreme Court in Pope and held that section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985), violated due process and could not, standing alone, operate to bar the claim of a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor. Thames, 598 So.2d at 125. The court recognized, however, that Rule 5.495 requires that a creditor establish the absence of actual knowledge in order to file a claim that would otherwise be barred under section 733.702....

...It is undisputed that appellees in the instant case had actual knowledge of the opening of the estate. Appellees, in fact, sued the estate, naming and serving the appropriate personal representative, within the three-month non-claim period prescribed by section 733.702, Florida Statutes....

...to file a claim for a creditor who was known to the personal representative, but was not served with a copy of the notice of administration. Rule 5.495 was repealed by the Florida Supreme Court, effective October 1, 1991, in view of an amendment to section 733.702 providing for the right to petition for an extension of time to file a claim....

...That opinion is being issued simultaneously and the two opinions should be considered together. The facts will not be repeated in this opinion. In our companion opinion, we affirmed the trial court order that struck as untimely appellant's claim against the decedent's estate (section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1983))....

...da Certificate of Boat Title issued in 1979; (2) the cause of action was barred by the general statute of limitations, section 95.11(3)(i) and (j), Florida Statutes (1983); and (3) a claim was not timely filed in the decedent's estate as required by section 733.702....

...The record amply demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in regard to the issues raised by appellees' affirmative defenses. Summary judgment for appellees was properly entered as a matter of law since appellant's action was barred both by sections 95.11(3) (i) and (j) and 733.702....

...Even if appellant's action had not been barred by section 95.11(3)(i) and (j), appellant's partition action is barred by her failure to file a claim in decedent's estate within three months of the first publication of notice of administration published September 7, 1984, as required by section 733.702....

...Appellant's claim was not filed until January 16, 1985. In the companion appeal, we affirmed the trial court's order that struck her claim against the estate as untimely. Absent a timely, valid claim filed in decedent's estate, appellant is barred under the provisions of section 733.702 from bringing the cause of action below for partition....

...estate. Those cases, Hodges, Estate of Peterson, Grossman, Fisher and Landers, as well as Staley v. Jackson, 154 So.2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963) and Buck v. McNab, 139 So.2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), have recognized an exception from the requirements of section 733.702 and its predecessor statutes on a theory variously referred to as the "trust exception," the "equitable title or beneficial ownership exception" or the "specifically identifiable property exception." Those exceptions to the "nonclaim"...

...sions of the statute and depended upon either the specific language of the statute or the absence of specific language at the time those cases arose. However, the legislature amended the Florida Probate Code in 1974 and 1975, and adopted what is now section 733.702....

...Some of those exceptions still exist in specific provisions of the statute, while others have been, in our opinion, completely eliminated. We take this opportunity to attempt to state what we believe to be the correct posture of the law today regarding exceptions to the current "nonclaim" [1] statute, section 733.702, enacted in substantially its present form in 1974 and 1975....

...That particular exemption, however, was eliminated by the 1974 amendments to the Probate Code. Former section 733.19 now exists as section 733.706, but does not exempt claims to specific property as did section 733.19. Since the elimination of that exception, the express provision of section 733.702(1)(a) that "no claim for personal property in the possession of the personal representative ......

...of the first publication of the notice of administration... ." takes on new significance. It seems now that the clearly expressed legislative intent is to bar all claims that arose before the death of the decedent that are not filed as required by section 733.702 [2] . The most significant new language of section 733.702 added by the 1974 and 1975 amendments is probably "that arose before the death of the decedent." This court first considered that new language in In Re Estate of Kulow, 439 So.2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). While the opinion in Estate of Kulow does not expressly hold that the new wording applies to all of the following provisions of 733.702(1)(a) (with the obvious exception of claims for burial or funeral expenses), we believe the result reached and the reasoning used supports that position....

...f the actual owner either by way of an express trust or some other clearly defined means. In other words, if a decedent asserted beneficial ownership of the property before his death, a claim to the property would be barred unless filed according to section 733.702....

...If, however, the decedent was merely in possession of the property but made no such assertion of ownership prior to his or her death, the assertion of ownership being made by the personal representative or heirs for the first time after the decedent's death would not require the filing of a claim. § 733.702. We believe our conclusion as to legislative interest is further supported by the language of section 733.702(2) which states: *1301 No cause of action heretofore or hereafter accruing, including, but not limited to, an action founded upon fraud or other wrongful act or omission, shall survive the death of the person against whom the claim ma...

...NOTES [1] Our supreme court in Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Leon Henry Read, Jr., Deceased, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1986), held the statute to be a statute of limitation rather than a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim. [2] There are still a few specific exceptions set out in section 733.702(3) and 733.706, but those exceptions are clearly stated.

...Watts performed on Susan Mack's ankle. The Macks filed a malpractice action against the Estate on January 30, 2006. In February 2009, the Estate filed a petition in the probate court to limit the Macks' claim in the malpractice action to the proceeds of malpractice insurance, see section 733.702(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and the Macks filed petitions seeking to strike the Estate's objections to their claims. We agree with the trial court that the Macks' claims against the estate are barred by sections 733.702(1)(3), [1] and *698 733.710(1), [2] Florida Statutes (2005). The Macks' claims were filed more than three months from the date the notice to creditors was first published. See § 733.702(1). Further, the Macks did not file a request for an extension of time under section 733.702(3) until after the running of the two-year non-claim period in section 733.710(1)....

...ecedent's estate in Florida should be exposed by claims on the decedent's assets." Id. (quoting Comerica Bank & Trust, F.S.B. v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So.2d 163, 167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). Here, the Macks' claims were untimely filed under section 733.702(1). Although section 733.702(3) provides for an extension, the claim and motion for an extension must be filed before the operation of the two-year non-claim provision. May, 771 So.2d at 1157. We also reject the Macks' assertion that their claim was timely filed when measured from the date of publication of a second notice to creditors by the estate. The time period under section 733.702(1) runs from "the time of the first publication of the notice to creditors." As the Supreme Court held in Estate of Williamson v. Murphy, 95 So.2d 244, 247 (Fla.1957), a second publication will be deemed "unnecessary surplusage" which has no "affect [on] the validity or effectiveness of the first notice published." AFFIRMED. WOLF and ROBERTS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (2005) provides in pertinent part: (1) If not barred by s....

...Ruffin had been speeding and was solely responsible for the accident. It is undisputed that, pursuant to section 733.212, Florida Statutes, governing notice to creditors, reasonably ascertainable creditors must receive actual notice that the probate proceedings are pending. Additionally, section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes, *445 limits the time a creditor can successfully present probate claims to the later of three months after the time of the first publication of the notice to creditors or, as to any creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice to creditors, thirty days after the date of service. § 733.702(1), Fla....

...NOTES [1] The doctrine of common-law marriage was abolished in Florida for common-law marriages entered into after January 1, 1968. See § 741.211, Fla. Stat. (2001). [2] Delgado requested the extension because more than three months had passed since publication of the first notice to creditors. See § 733.702(1), Fla....

...claim by failing to file a legally sufficient statement of claim against the Bradley estate. To preserve a claim against a decedent's estate in Florida, a claimant must file a written statement of the claim within statutorily prescribed time periods. See §§ 733.702, 733.703, 733.710, Fla. Stat. (1991). These time prescriptions do not apply to claims brought against an estate for bodily injury to recover only 3 from decedent's liability insurance coverage. See § 733.702(4)(b), Fla Stat....

...only to the extent they exceed the limits of defendant's liability coverage. May concedes that the formal statement of claim filed by Prockup was untimely because it was filed more than three months after first publication, as required by section 733.702 and more than two years after Oscar Bradley's death, as required by section 733.710....

...No such extenuating circumstances are present in this case. Waiver of Defense by Estate May contends the personal representatives of the estate waived any objections to the sufficiency or timeliness requirements specified in sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes, (1) by failing to object to Prockup's claims in either the probate proceeding or the wrongful death/personal injury action; (2) by acknowledging the validity of the claims by filing a proof of claim and making...

...ime period do not constitute a legally sufficient claim, there is no question but that Prockup's notice of claim was filed outside the statutory time period prescribed by these two statutes. May's first two arguments are foreclosed, at least as to section 733.702. Regarding the failure to object, the plain language of section 733.702 indicates that failure to object does not waive the timeliness requirements. "Any claim not timely filed as provided in this section is barred even though no objection to the claim is filed on the grounds of timeliness or otherwise unless the court extends the time in which the claim may be filed." § 733.702(3), Fla. Stat. (1991). The only grounds upon which the court may grant such an extension are fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period, none of which is at issue in this case. See § 733.702(3), Fla. Stat.(1991). The failure to object in the probate proceedings, therefore, does not constitute a waiver. Nor does partial payment of a claim operate to bar the timeliness requirements of section 733.702, again according to the plain language of the statute: "No claim ......

...copy of the notice of administration, 30 days after the date of service of such copy of the notice on the creditor, even though the personal representative has recognized the claim or demand by paying a part of it or interest on it or otherwise." § 733.702(1), Fla....

...ion to dismiss. Under this characterization, May would be correct in his assertion that the estate's failure to raise the untimeliness issue constitutes waiver. The only intermediate appellate court to directly rule on this issue held that section 733.702 acts as a "jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that automatically bars untimely claims." See In re Estate of Parson, 570 So.2d 1125 (Fla....

...In Parson, a funeral home appealed a probate court order denying its objection to the personal representative's petition for discharge, thereby denying as well the home's untimely claim for funeral expenses incurred on behalf of the deceased. The home argued that although it failed to filed its claims within the section 733.702 time period, the personal representative's failure to object until 15 months after the claim was filed required that the objection be disallowed. The home argued that section 733.702 was a statute of limitations, so that any claim filed beyond the statutory time period was barred only if the timeliness issue was raised as an affirmative defense or motion to dismiss, citing Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v....

...egislature's intent to create a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim, which, under the circumstances specified in the statutes, automatically bars untimely claims." 570 So.2d at 1126. In dicta, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that section 733.702 is now properly regarded as a statute of nonclaim rather than a statute of limitations, citing Parson. See Baptist Hospital of Miami v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560, 563-64 (1995). These pronouncements are contrary, however, to the Supreme Court's statement, albeit in dicta also, that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations....

...within the prescribed time. The Florida Supreme Court held that the filing of a complaint did not satisfy the statute. Although no question of waiver was at issue, the court after quoting the statute, stated that "[w]hile known as a statute of nonclaim, [section 733.702] is nevertheless a statute of limitations," citing Barnett Bank 9 of Palm Beach County v....

...r cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except, as proved in this section. (2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to § 733.702 within 2 years after the person's death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to § 733.705. (3) This section shall not affect the lien of any duly recorded...

...The personal representative appealed, arguing that section 733.710 was a statute of repose that erased any liability on claims filed after the repose period. The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed and reversed. The court reasoned in part that section 733.702 by its terms is subordinate to section 733.710, and that if section 733.702 was a statute of repose, section 733.710, which was "paramount," must also be a statute of repose rather than a statute of limitations....

...ontrolling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida. Therefore, we certify the following question of law, based on the facts and procedural history recited above, to the Supreme Court of Florida for instructions: WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION 733.710 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES CONSIDERED SEPARATELY AND/OR TOGETHER OPERATE AS STATUTES OF NONCLAIM SO THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION EXISTS, CLAIMS NOT FORMALLY PRESENTED WITHIN THE DESIGNATED TI...

...n, exists only when the trustee of the trust is made a party to the probate proceeding and is granted a right to challenge any claim, or in the event there is no probate proceeding, personally fulfills the publication and notice requirements of F.S. § 733.702....

...The notice shall notify all persons having claims or demands against the settlor which such person seeks to recover from the trust to serve their claims with the trustee serving at the time of or as a result of the settlor's death within the time periods set forth in s. 733.702 with respect to notice of administration, or be forever barred....

...s claim against an estate under Chapter 733, Florida Statutes. In particular, we address whether the claim of a creditor who is not served with a copy of the notice to creditors but whose claim is known or reasonably ascertainable is barred under section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (2006), if not filed within three months after the first publication of the notice to creditors absent an extension, or whether the claim is timely if filed within two years of the decedent’s death under section 733.710, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Jones, 126 So. 3d 390, 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held “that if a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor is never served with a copy of the notice to creditors, the statute of limitations set forth in section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes, never begins to run and the creditor’s claim is timely if it is filed within two years of the decedent’s death.” The Fourth District certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decisions of the First and Second District Courts of Appeal in Morgenthau v....

...2d DCA 2012), which held that even a reasonably ascertainable creditor who was not served with a copy of the notice to creditors is required to file a claim within three months after the first publication of the notice, unless the creditor files a motion for an extension of time under section 733.702(3) within the two-year period of repose set forth in section 733.710. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Because we conclude that the limitations periods prescribed in section 733.702(1) are not applicable to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors who are never served with a copy of the notice to creditors and that the claims of such creditors are timely if filed within two years of the decedent’s death u...

...Carol Jones, the personal representative of Harry’s estate and the Petitioner before this Court, filed a response to Golden’s petition asserting that Katherine was not a reasonably ascertainable creditor of Harry’s estate and that her guardian’s claim was time-barred under sections 733.702 and 733.710....

...After a hearing on the petition, the probate court entered an order striking the guardian’s 1. In 2008, a guardian was court appointed for Katherine Jones because she was adjudicated to lack capacity. -3- 2009 claim as untimely under sections 733.702, 733.710, on the authority of the decisions of the First and Second District Courts in Morgenthau and Lubee. On appeal, Golden argued that because the notice to creditors was not properly served on Katherine, a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor, the three-month limitations period set forth in section 733.702(1) never began to run, and the claims of Katherine’s guardianship could only be barred by the two-year statute of repose in section 733.710....

...representative, the name and address of the personal representative’s attorney, and the date of first publication. The notice shall state that creditors must file claims against the estate with the court during the time periods set forth in s. 733.702, or be forever barred. (2) Publication shall be once a week for 2 consecutive weeks, in a newspaper published in the county where the estate is -5-  administered or, if th...

...Service is not required on any creditor who has filed a claim as provided in this part, whose claim has been paid in full, or whose claim is listed in a personal representative’s timely filed proof of claim. .... (4) Claims are barred as provided in ss. 733.702 and 733.710. § 733.2121, Fla....

...An extension may be granted only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period. .... -6-  (6) Nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in s. 733.710. § 733.702, Fla....

...claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as provided in this section. (2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702 within 2 years after the person’s death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s. 733.705. § 733.710, Fla. Stat. (2006). We have held that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations and that section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim, which cannot be waived or extended....

...Id. Lubee asserted that because he was a readily ascertainable creditor entitled to be served with a copy of the notice to creditors, he was only required to file his claim -8- within thirty days after service of the notice under section 733.702(1) or within two years of the decedent’s death under section 733.10....

...r or not was immaterial. The court explained: Because a notice to creditors was published on November 16, 2007, creditors not entitled to actual notice were required to file their claims on or before February 16, 2008. See § 733.702(1)....

...Because he was not served with a copy of the notice to creditors, Mr. Lubee was required to file his claim in the probate proceeding within the three- month window following publication. Alternatively, Mr. Lubee could seek an extension from the probate court pursuant to section 733.702(3) within the two-year window of section 733.710....

...Estate of Andzel, 26 So. 3d 628, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); cf. Miller v. Estate of Baer, 837 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (affirming order enforcing claim against estate where creditor failed to file claim within three-month window of section 733.702(1) but did file motion for extension of time within two-year window of section 733.710)....

...It is undisputed that he did neither. Mr. Lubee’s filing of his claim in the probate proceeding within two years of the decedent’s death did not amount to a request for an extension of time and did not otherwise comply with the requirements of section 733.702....

...itor was immaterial[.] Id. at 883-84 (emphasis added). -9-  In Golden, the Fourth District rejected the analyses in Morgenthau and Lubee, finding the decisions inconsistent with the plain language of section 733.702(1), which allows a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor to file a claim against an estate “on or before the later of the date that is 3 months after the time of the first publication of the notice to creditors or ....

...4th DCA 1994), in which the court stated: Due process considerations require that Appellants be furnished notice so that they can determine that the time for filing claims has commenced. However, regardless of whether or not the claimants had actual notice, section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes, does not bar the claim of a creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice of administration, unless barred by section 733.710, until the later of the 3-month period following publication or 30 days after service of notice on the creditor....

...icken as untimely if filed prior to the earlier of 30 days after service of notice of administration or 2 years after the decedent’s death.” Id. (quoting Puzzo, 637 So. 2d at 27). C. Resolving the Conflict Section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes, provides two distinct and different limitations periods for the filing of claims against an estate: one for creditors “required to be served with a copy of the notice to creditors,” i.e., known or reasonably ascertainable creditors, and a second for unknown and not reasonably ascertainable creditors (hereinafter “unknown creditors”). The limitations period applicable to unknown creditors, set forth in section 733.702(1), begins to run upon publication of the notice to creditors and ends three months after the date of the first publication. Creditors who are known or reasonably ascertainable need not rely on publication for notice of the pending administration of an estate....

...Once - 11 - served with a copy of the notice, a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor must file any claim within the later of “3 months after the time of the first publication of the notice to creditors or . . . 30 days after the date of service on the creditor . . . .” § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. Under the plain language of section 733.702(1), where a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor is never served with a copy of the notice to creditors, the applicable limitations period never begins to run and cannot bar that creditor’s claim. “[A]s to any creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice to creditors,” the limitations period can only be triggered by “service on the creditor” of the required notice. § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. A known or reasonably ascertainable creditor is absolved from the limitations of section 733.702(1) by virtue of the fact that the personal representative failed to serve the creditor with the required notice....

...three-month window after publication of the notice is where the last day of the three-month window occurs more than thirty days after service of the required notice. Accordingly, if a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor is not served with a copy of the notice, section 733.702(1) does not govern the timeliness of that creditor’s claims....

...ection 733.710. Thus, the claim of a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor who was never served with a copy of the notice to creditors is timely if filed within two years of the decedent’s death. Further, because the limitations periods in section 733.702 are inapplicable under such circumstances, it is not necessary for the creditor to seek an extension of time under section 733.702(3) since that section applies only to claims that are untimely under section 733.702. The decision of the First District in Morgenthau—on which the Second District relied in Lubee—is based on a misinterpretation of the limitations provisions in section 773.702(1).2 The First District interpreted that sect...

...The Morgenthau court’s analysis may also have been hampered by the fact that Morgenthau conceded that his claim was “untimely.” Morgenthau, 26 So. 3d at 630. - 13 - of the notice. But that’s not what the statute says. As explained above, the plain language of section 733.702 specifies that as to a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor, a claim is timely if “filed in the probate proceeding on or before the later of the date that is 3 months after the time of the first publication of the notice to creditors or, as to any creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice to creditors, 30 days after the date of service on the creditor.” § 733.702(1), Fla....

...733.710—there is insufficient state action to implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 485-87. However, where a time bar is triggered - 14 - by legal proceedings—such as the limitations periods in section 733.702—there is sufficient state action to implicate the Due Process Clause....

...personal representatives on June 14; ● a second notice to creditors was published on June 20; and ● Karen filed her statement of claim on September 21, 2012, more than three months after the first publication date.3 3 Under section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (2015) “no claim or demand against the decedent’s estate that arose before the death of the decedent ....

file a claim in the probate division under section 733.702, Florida Statute (1997), before the substitution

...to strike the claim as untimely, finding that the Smiths did not demonstrate they were known or reasonably ascertainable creditors. 1 In general, a claim against an estate must be filed within three months of the time of the first publication of notice to creditors. See § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). This time limitation may be extended by the court if there is evidence of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period. See id.; § 733.702(3)....

...Dorothy then included *78 Reita as a defendant in the divorce action and brought claims against her individually and as personal representative of Herbert’s estate. The trial court entered summary judgment finding that Dorothy’s claims were barred by the provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985), which controls and limits claims against decedents, their estates and beneficiaries....

...This rule does not require sending notice of administration to creditors in estates where the time for filing claims has expired before the effective date of this rule. However, no opinion is offered whether such claims are barred by the provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes. Committee notes revised. Citation form changes in committee notes. 1991 Revision: Subdivision (a) modified to make it consistent with recent changes to sections 733.212 and 733.702, Florida Statutes....

...1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)). If the personal representative fails to serve notice upon a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor, the creditor may seek an extension of time in which to file his claim based on fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice of the claims period. § 733.702(3), Fla....

...Section 733.705(5) contemplates the use of an independent action after the probate court permits the filing of an untimely claim. It states, "A claimant may bring an independent action or declaratory action upon a claim which was not timely *1030 filed pursuant to s. 733.702(1) only if the claimant has been granted an extension of time to file the claim pursuant to s. 733.702(3)." The term "independent action" requires the filing of a separate action upon a claim against the estate....

...P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee. HAWKES, C.J. Appellant serves as the personal representative of the estate of Samuel Gus Felos. As personal representative, she challenges the denial of her petition to strike a claim filed against the estate by Wald as untimely under section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (2009). The probate court denied the petition, finding the time constraints of section 733.702(1) inapplicable because the notice to creditors was improperly served on Wald....

...Some time after obtaining the judgment, Wald filed a claim against the probate estate. In response, the personal representative filed a petition to dismiss the claim. The personal representative argued Wald's claim was untimely as it was not filed within the statute of limitations established in section 733.702(1)....

...30 days after personal service of the notice upon the creditor. The personal representative argued she had served notice on Wald's attorney as required by Florida Probate Rule 5.041(b) (2009) on May 23, 2007, thus triggering the time constraints of section 733.702(1)....

...It found service of the notice was ineffective because it was served upon Wald's "personal injury" attorney, rather than upon his "probate" attorney. The court went on to reason that because service of the notice was ineffective, Wald's claim was not governed by the 30-day time constraint of section 733.702(1)....

...Since the claim was not constrained by the 30-day claim period, the court denied the personal representative's petition to strike the claim as untimely. This appeal followed. There are two reasons why the probate court erred in finding the time constraints of section 733.702(1) inapplicable....

...Given the foregoing, it seems bizarre to declare service invalid simply because the attorney who was served later claims he is not the "probate" attorney but the "personal injury" attorney. This not only adds terms and conditions not found in the Rule, but also puts the Rule at odds with section 733.702(4)....

...e forever barred. Wald argues his tardiness should be overlooked because he had not labeled the attorney as his "probate attorney." Semantics should not be allowed to render Rules meaningless and statutes uncertain. The time constraints contained in section 733.702(1) are important and should not be skirted by legal gamesmanship....

...e of limitations. Therefore, any failure was not in the service of the notice, but in the untimely filing of the claim. Since there was no excuse for Wald's failure to file the claim in a timely manner, it should have been declared time barred under section 733.702(1)....

...), and the order under review in the present case, like the order reviewed in Elliott, purported to determine whether the personal representative could foreclose a claim as untimely for failure to file within the 30-day period for filing claims. See § 733.702(1), Fla....

...See also Smoak v. Graham, 167 So.2d 559, 561 (Fla.1964). In the present case, however, the judgment entered against the estate after Mr. Felos died cannot be deemed a "claim or demand against the decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent." § 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...gment against it by deeming untimely underlying claims after they had merged into the judgment. Denial of the petition to strike a claim predicated on the judgment does not alter the estate's legal position. The appeal should be dismissed. NOTES [1] Section 733.702(1) includes all claims within its scope, "even if the claims are unmatured, contingent or unliquidated." [2] Filing a probate claim is a relatively simple act and requires nothing more than submitting a written statement of the case....

...Attorney, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellees. WOLF, J. Appellant asserts the trial court erred in striking his claim against an estate based on a finding the claim was untimely filed pursuant to the probate statutes. Because appellant failed to file a request for extension pursuant to section 733.702, Florida Statutes (2007), we affirm....

...or filing claims expired on June 13, 2008 and the claim by Anthony R. Morgenthau was filed on April 13, 2009; it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the claim filed by Anthony *630 R. Morgenthau on April 13, 2009, was untimely pursuant to the provisions of Section 733.702 of the Florida Probate Code....

...In the underlying action, appellant filed a Statement of Claim alleging he was a readily ascertainable creditor of the estate. A readily ascertainable creditor is entitled to prompt actual notice of a decedent's death. § 733.212, Fla. Stat. (2007). Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (2007), governs the filing of claims against an estate and provides in pertinent part: (1).......

...An extension may be granted only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period. (Emphasis added). In addition, section 733.705, Florida Statutes (2007), requires a claimant may only bring an independent action against an estate based on an untimely claim filed pursuant to section 733.702(1) if the claimant has been granted an extension by the probate court....

...This provision and the issue of timeliness has a long history with both the Florida Supreme Court and the state Legislature. This history is recounted in May v. Illinois Nat. Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143, 1150-53 (Fla.2000), in which the supreme court stated in pertinent part: In analyzing the nature of section 733.702, we begin with a review of Barnett Bank v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla.1986), because in that case, we were called upon to determine "whether the three-month limitation period in section 733.702 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim or a statute of limitations." Id. at 448.... . . . . Upon reviewing the ... provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1983), we held that section 733.702 "is a statute of limitations." Barnett Bank, 493 So.2d at 448....

...In so holding, we stated: We fully recognize the strong public policy in favor of settling and closing estates in a speedy manner. Estate of *631 Brown, 117 So.2d 478 (Fla.1960). However, as the facts of this case demonstrate, justice requires us to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations. Valid grounds, such as estoppel or fraud, may exist that would and should excuse untimely claims. A creditor would lose the right to assert these potentially valid claims were we to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of nonclaim. Our holding that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations confirms the fact that estates and creditors must adhere to well-established practices when dealing with untimely claims.... . . . . In 1988, the Legislature amended section 733.702, Florida Statutes....

...This amendment clearly addressed the policy concerns we expressed in Barnett Bank, in that the amended language allows for an extension of the time limitation on the grounds of fraud or estoppel. Indeed, legislative history shows that the Legislature added the above-quoted language to section 733.702 in response to our decision in Barnett Bank, with the intent to make the statute "an absolute bar" to untimely filed claims, subject to an extension of the time limitation on the grounds of fraud or estoppel. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Jud., HB 645 (1988), Staff Analysis & Economic Impact Statement 6 (April 7, 1988) (on file with comm.). In 1989, the Legislature again amended section 733.702, Florida Statutes. See ch. 89-340, § 5, at 2178-79, Laws of Fla. Among other things, the Legislature added "insufficient notice of the claims period" as a basis for extending the time limitation under section 733.702....

...Indeed, legislative history shows that the Legislature undertook many changes to the Florida Probate Code in response to the Pope decision. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Jud., HB 1408 (1989), Staff Analysis & Economic Impact Statement 2, 6 (final June 15, 1989) (on file with comm.). Based on to the amendments to section 733.702 discussed above, several district courts of appeal in Florida have determined that the statute now bars untimely claims, even in the absence of an objection, unless an extension is granted. See Comerica Bank & Trust, F.S.B. v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So.2d 163, 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) ("It is apparent that section 733.702(3) is unlike an ordinary statute of limitations in that it contains express language barring untimely claims without any necessity *632 for the [personal representative] to object to the tardiness in filing.") (footnote omitted); HCA New Port Richey Hospital v. Estate of Boschelli, 588 So.2d 1012, 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (noting that since this Court decided Barnett Bank, the Legislature amended section 733.702 to make the statute "a bar to untimely filed claims, even in the absence of an objection, unless the court grants an extension ").... (Emphasis added). Here, appellant filed a statement of claim past the three month filing window. As such, according to section 733.702(1), the claim was untimely as appellant did not receive actual notice of the claim and was, thus, a creditor who fell in the three month filing window following publication....

...argue his Statement of Claim should be converted or modified to be read as a motion requesting an extension of time. The proper procedural course for untimely claims is the filing of an extension request prior to the filing of a statement of claim. § 733.702(1)-(3), Fla....

...onsidered after the probate court's grant of an extension. Because appellant chose to file only a Statement of Claim and never requested an extension of time to file that claim, the probate court was bound by the relevant statutes to deny the claim. § 733.702(1)-(3), Fla....

...r she was a readily ascertainable creditor who had not received the required actual notice. Thus, if this rule were still in existence, reversal would be required. However, Rule 5.495 was repealed on October 1, 1991, due to the statutory addition of section 733.702 regarding timeliness of claims. In re Amendments to the Florida Probate Rules, 584 So.2d 964, 970 (Fla.1991); see also In re Estate Danese, 641 So.2d 423, 427 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Thus, section 733.702 controls requiring a claimant seek and receive an extension prior to the filing of a statement of claim, which appellant failed to do....

...the federal class [action]." However, the circuit court's reliance on the decision in Shaw for this proposition was misplaced. In the Shaw case, the result was controlled by the former Florida Probate Law's section 733.16, the predecessor to current section 733.702....

...733.16(1)(a) to the requirement of filing a claim against the estate. 340 So.2d at 507. The statutory exception in the former Florida Probate Law for actions pending at the death of the decedent was not carried forward in the Code. On the contrary, section 733.702(2) provides: No cause of action, including, but not limited to, an action founded upon fraud or other wrongful act or omission, shall survive the death of the person against whom the claim may be made, whether or not an action is pend...

...nership in the accounts before his death, we conclude that the trust exception is inapplicable. Consequently, the co-tenant was required to file a statement of claim in the probate proceeding for the decedent’s estate within the time allowed under section 733.702, Florida Statutes (2002), or her claim arising from her previous joint ownership of the two accounts with the decedent would be barred....

...Scott filed a petition for administration of the Decedent’s estate in the Pasco County Circuit Court, and letters of administration were issued to her. The date of the first publication of notice to creditors for the Decedent’s estate was July 31, 2003. In accordance with section 733.702, creditors of the Decedent were required to file their claims within the later of three months of the first publication of the notice, i.e., on or before October 31, 2003, or as to reasonably ascertainable creditors, thirty days after service on the creditor....

...personal representative to act in accordance with this Court’s *16 determination and declaration of those rights.” Ms. Reyes moved to dismiss both petitions on the ground’ that Mrs. Scott had failed to file a creditor’s claim as required by section 733.702(1), and that any claim she might have had based on the ownership of the two accounts was therefore barred....

...Scott’s petition for an extension of time to file a claim under an abuse of discretion standard. Miller v. Estate of Baer, 837 So.2d 448, 450 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Scutieri v. Estate of Revitz, 510 So.2d 1003, 1004 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). DISCUSSION Generally speaking, the provisions of section 733.702 bar any claim or demand against a decedent’s estate that arose before the death of the decedent which is not filed in the probate proceeding on or before the later of the date that is 3 months after the time of the first publication...

...editor required to be served with a copy of the notice to creditors, 30 days after the date of service on the creditor, even though the personal representative has recognized the claim or demand by paying a part of it or interest on it or otherwise. § 733.702(1); see Fla. Prob. R. 5.490. The requirements of section 733.702 apply to claims that are unmatured, contingent, or unliquidated as well as to claims for personal property in the possession of the personal representative. § 733.702(1). The bar imposed by section 733.702 is a statute of limitations, not a statute of non- *17 claim....

...May v. Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143, 1150-54 (Fla.2000). However, a claim not filed as required by the statute is “barred even though no objection to the claim is filed unless the court extends the time in which the claim may be filed.” § 733.702(3); May, 771 So.2d at 1152-53 . The statutory grounds for an extension of time to file a claim are limited to fraud, estoppel, and insufficient notice of the claims period. § 733.702(3). Some exceptions to the general requirement to file a claim are recognized by statute. See § 733.702(4)....

...e statute. Before the Florida Probate Code (the Code) became effective on January 1, 1976, Florida courts had recognized an exception to the requirements for creditors to file claims in the probate proceeding imposed by the statutory predecessors of section 733.702....

...In Velzy, 502 So.2d 1297 , this court reexamined some of the earlier decisions that have applied the trust exception in the light of the changes to Florida law governing creditors’ claims in probate effected by the adoption of the Code, especially section 733.702....

...We concluded.that the elimination of this exception, when read together with the new statutory language, reflected “the clearly expressed legislative intent [] to bar all claims that arose before the death of the decedent that are not filed as required by section 733.702,” subject to the statutory exceptions....

...f the actual owner either by way of an express trust or some other clearly defined means. In other words, if a decedent asserted beneficial ownership of the property before his death, a claim to the property would be barred unless filed according to section 733.702....

...If, however, the decedent was merely in possession of the property but made no such assertion of ownership prior to his or her death, the assertion of ownership being made by the personal representative or heirs for the first time after the decedent’s death would not require the filing of a claim. § 733.702....

...In this case, the Decedent’s actions were sufficient under Velzy to require Mrs. Scott to file a timely claim or be barred. We agree with Ms. Reyes’ argument that Mrs. Scott could not evade the requirement that she file her claim within the time limit imposed by section 733.702 by recasting her creditor’s claim as a request to have the probate court determine the ownership of the accounts....

...Scott’s petition for an extension of time to file her claim. Affirmed. NORTHCUTT and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur. . The document examiner’s report did not identify the perpetrator of the alleged forgery. However, in one of her briefs filed in this court, Mrs. Scott names the Decedent as the forger. . Although section 733.702 and its predecessor statutes have frequently been referred to as the ''nonclaim statute,” it is in fact a statute of limitations....

...Suspension of statutes of limitation in favor of the personal representative. § 733.212, Fla. Stat. Notice of administration; filing of objections. § 733.2121, Fla. Stat. Notice to creditors; filing of claims. § 733.701, Fla. Stat. Notifying creditors. § 733.702, Fla....

...This rule does not require sending notice of administration to creditors in estates where the time for filing claims has expired before the effective date of this rule. However, no opinion is offered whether such claims are barred by the provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes. Committee notes revised. Citation form changes in committee notes. 1991 Revision: Subdivision (a) modified to make it consistent with recent changes to sections 733.212 and 733.702, Florida Statutes....

...2005 Revision: Subdivision (a) amended to clarify approved methods of service on creditors. Committee notes revised. Statutory References ch. 50, Fla. Stat. Legal and official advertisements. § 731.301, Fla. Stat. Notice. § 733.2121, Fla. Stat. Notice to creditors; filing of claims. § 733.702, Fla....

...file a legally sufficient statement of claim against the Bradley estate. To preserve a claim against a decedent’s estate in Florida, a claimant must file a written statement of the claim within statutorily prescribed time periods. See §§ 733.702, 733.703, 733.710, Fla. Stat. (1991). These time prescriptions do not apply to claims brought against an estate for bodily injury to recover only from decedent’s 5 liability insurance coverage. See § 733.702(4) (b), Fla Stat....

...only to the extent they exceed the limits of defendant’s liability coverage. May concedes that the formal statement of claim filed by Prockup was untimely because it was filed more than three months after first publication, as required by section 733.702 and more than two years after Oscar Bradley’s death, as required by section 733.710....

...No such extenuating circumstances are present in this case. Waiver of Defense by Estate May contends the personal representatives of the estate waived any objections to the sufficiency or timeliness requirements specified in sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes, (1) by failing to object to Prockup’s claims in either the probate proceeding or the wrongful death/personal injury action; (2) by 11 acknowledging the validity o...

...eriod do not constitute a legally sufficient claim, there is no question but that Prockup’s notice of claim was filed outside the statutory time period prescribed by these two statutes. May’s first two arguments are foreclosed, at least as to section 733.702. Regarding the failure to object, the plain language of section 733.702 indicates that failure to object does not waive the timeliness requirements. “Any claim not timely filed as provided in this section is barred even though no objection to the claim is filed on the grounds of timeliness or otherwise unless the court extends the time in which the claim may be filed.” § 733.702(3), Fla. Stat. (1991). The only grounds upon which the court may grant such an extension are fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period, none of which is at issue in this case. See § 733.702(3), Fla. Stat.(1991). The failure to object in the probate proceedings, therefore, does not constitute a waiver. Nor does partial payment of a claim operate to bar the timeliness requirements of section 733.702, again according to the plain language of the statute: 12  No claim ....

...the notice of administration, 30 days after the date of service of such copy of the notice on the creditor, even though the personal representative has recognized the claim or demand by paying a part of it or interest on it or otherwise.” § 733.702(1), Fla....

...n to dismiss. Under this characterization, May would be correct in his assertion that the estate’s failure to raise the untimeliness issue constitutes waiver. The only intermediate appellate court to directly rule on this issue held that section 733.702 acts as a “jurisdictional statue of nonclaim that automatically bars untimely claims.” See In re Estate of Parson, 570 So.2d 1125 (Fla....

...jection to the personal representative’s petition for discharge, thereby denying as well the home’s untimely claim for funeral expenses incurred on behalf of the deceased. The home argued that although it failed to filed its claims within the section 733.702 time period, the personal representative’s failure to object until 15 months after the claim was filed required that the objection be disallowed. The home argued that section 733.702 was a statute of limitations, so that any claim filed beyond the statutory time period was barred only if the timeliness issue was raised as an affirmative defense or motion to dismiss, citing Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v....

...islature’s intent to create a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim, which, under the circumstances specified in the statutes, automatically bars untimely claims.” 570 So.2d at 1126. In dicta, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that section 733.702 is now properly regarded as a statute of nonclaim rather than a statute of limitations, citing Parson. See Baptist Hospital of Miami v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560, 563-64 (1995). These pronouncements are contrary, however, to the Supreme Court’s statement, albeit in dicta also, that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations....

...prescribed time. The Florida Supreme Court held that the filing of a complaint did not satisfy the statute. Although no question of waiver was at issue, the court after quoting the statute, stated that ‘[w]hile known as a statute of nonclaim, [section 733.702] is nevertheless a statute of limitations,” citing Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla....

...be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except, as proved in this section. (2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s.733.702 within 2 years after the person’s death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s.733.705. (3) This section shall not affect the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or security interest...

...The personal representative appealed, arguing that section 733.710 was a statute of repose that erased any liability on claims filed after the repose period. The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed and reversed. The court reasoned in part that section 733.702 by its terms is subordinate 16 to secti9on 733.710, and that if section 733.702 was a statute of repose, section 733.710, which was “paramount,” must also be a statute of repose rather than a statute of limitations....

...and we can find no clear, controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida. Therefore, we certify the following question of law, based on the facts and procedural history recited above, to the Supreme Court of Florida for instructions: WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION 733.710 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES CONSIDERED SEPARATELY AND/OR TOGETHER OPERATE AS STATUTES OF NONCLAIM SO THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION EXISTS, CLAIMS NOT 17 ...

...of Florida law concerning the requirements for filing a written statement of a claim in a state probate proceeding within statutorily prescribed time periods. See May v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co.,190 F.3d 1200(11th Cir. 1999). The questions were as follows: WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION 733.710 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES CONSIDERED SEPARATELY AND/OR TOGETHER OPERATE AS STATUTES OF NONCLAIM SO THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION EXISTS, CLAIMS NOT PRESENTED WITHIN THE DESIGNATED TIME PE...

...ARE NOT BINDING ON THE ESTATE, OR DO THEY ACT AS STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS WHICH MUST BE PLEADED AND PROVED AS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN ORDER TO AVOID WAIVER. In its response, the Florida Supreme Court held that: (1) section 733.702(3), Florida Statutes (1991) is a statute of limitations that bars untimely claims even if the issue of timeliness is not asserted in an objection in the probate proceedings, but that such limitation may be extended by the probate c...

...Co., 771 So.2d 1143, (2000). In light of these conclusions, the Court held that the filing of the petition and counter-petition “satisfied the nonclaim period set forth in section 733.710,” but “did not satisfy the limitation period set forth in section 733.702(1), and we are not aware of any extension or pending request for extension in any probate court.” Thus the Supreme Court’s decision effectively bars the claim made against the estate. The motion of appellant David R....

...May, as Administrator Ad Litem of the Estate of Oscar T. Bradley, Deceased, for leave to file a supplemental brief is DENIED. It alleges the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion “raises the possibility that Prockup can demonstrate compliance with section 733.702 if the probate court extends the time for filing claims.” Under the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion, however, an extension could be granted only on facts showing “fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice.” Not only has no suc...

...the requirements for filing a written statement of a claim in a state probate proceeding within statutorily prescribed time periods. See May v. Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co., 190 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir.1999). The questions were as follows: WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION 733.710 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES CONSIDERED SEPARATELY AND/OR TOGETHER OPERATE AS STATUTES OF NONCLAIM SO THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION EXISTS, CLAIMS NOT PRESENTED WITHIN THE DESIGNATED TIME PERIOD ARE NOT BINDING ON THE ESTATE, OR DO THEY ACT AS STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS WHICH MUST BE PLEADED AND PROVED AS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN ORDER TO AVOID WAIVER. In its response, the Florida Supreme Court held that: (1) section 733.702(3), Florida Statutes (1991) is a statute of limitations that bars untimely claims even if the issue of timeliness is not asserted in an objection in the probate proceedings, but that such limitation may be extended by the probate cou...

...n "satisfied the nonclaim period set forth in section 733.710," but "did * Honorable Julian Abele Cook, Jr., U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation. not satisfy the limitation period set forth in section 733.702(1), and we are not aware of any extension or pending request for extension in any probate court." Thus the Supreme Court's decision effectively bars the claim made against the estate. The motion of appellant David R. May, as Administrator Ad Litem of the Estate of Oscar T. Bradley, Deceased, for leave to file a supplemental brief is DENIED. It alleges the Florida Supreme Court's opinion "raises the possibility that Prockup can demonstrate compliance with section 733.702 if the probate court extends the time for filing claims." Under the Florida Supreme Court's opinion, however, an extension could be granted only on facts showing "fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice." Not only has no such extensio...

...After the Paynes allowed the appeal time to expire, the Estate continued to defend the federal lawsuit. There is no indication in our record that the Estate ever alleged an affirmative defense of limitations or otherwise argued to the federal court that the claim did not survive under section 733.702(2), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...2 The Paynes then filed a second claim (the 1993 claim) in the probate proceeding in August 1993, based on the new judgment. The 1993 claim was not described as an amendment to the 1990 claim. It was not accompanied by a motion to extend time under section 733.702(3), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...On September 17, 1993, the probate court struck this claim. The Paynes then retained the Florida law firm currently representing them in this appeal. The new law firm filed a motion for rehearing, which was also a motion for extension of time to file the 1993 claim pursuant to section 733.702(3), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...There is no question that the Estate was fully aware of the Paynes’ overall claim at all times. The Estate can show no prejudice caused by the erroneous procedures employed by the Paynes’ Michigan counsel. Nevertheless, the Paynes are seeking an extension not only beyond the period authorized in section 733.702, but also beyond the two-year period established in section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1989). Section 733.702(3) permits an extension only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period....

...733.104 Suspension of statutes of limitation in favor of the personal representative. F.S. 733.212 Notice of administration; filing of objections and claims. F.S. 733.508 Accounting upon removal. F.S. 733.604 Inventory. F.S. 733.701 Notifying creditors. F.S. 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims....

...This rule does not require sending notice of administration to creditors in estates where the time for filing claims has expired before the effective date of this rule. However, no opinion is offered whether such claims are barred by the provisions of F.S. 733.702....

...733.212 Notice of administration; filing of objections and claims. F.S. 733.2123 Adjudication before issuance of letters. F.S. 733.302 Who may be appointed personal representative. F.S. 733.303 Persons not qualified. F.S. 733.305 Trust companies and other corporations and associations. F.S. 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims....

...Paragraph (e) added to implement the procedure found in F.S. 733.-704. Editorial changes. Committee notes expanded. Citation form change in committee notes. Statutory References F.S. 731.111 Notice to creditors. F.S. 733.212 Notice of administration; filing of objections and claims. F.S. 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims....

...wed for filing claims against the estate, or (ii) facts sufficient to obtain relief under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). Committee Notes It is contemplated that substantially more creditors who have missed the filing deadline imposed by F.S. 733.702 will be filing a petition to extend the time for filing claim, under the authority of Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc....

...1.540(b)(1) or matters relating to judgments in (4) and (5) of that rule have application in this context. Rule History 1988 Revision: New rule Statutory References F.S. 731.111 Notice to creditors. F.S. 733.212 Notice of administration; filing of objections and claims. F.S. 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims....

...733.104 Suspension of statutes of limitation in favor of the personal representative. F.S. 733.212 Notice of administration; filing of objections and claims. F.S. 733.508 Accounting upon removal. F.S. 733.604 Inventory. F.S. 733.701 Notifying creditors. F.S. 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims....

...This rule does not require sending notice of administration to creditors in estates *1294 where the time for filing claims has expired before the effective date of this rule. However, no opinion is offered whether such claims are barred by the provisions of Florida Statute § 733.702....

...733.212 Notice of administration; filing of objections and claims. F.S. 733.2123 Adjudication before issuance of letters. F.S. 733.302 Who may be appointed personal representative. F.S. 733.303 Persons not qualified. F.S. 733.305 Trust companies and other corporations and associations. F.S. 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims....

...Paragraph (e) added to implement the procedure found in F.S. 733.-704. Editorial changes. Committee notes expanded. Citation form change in committee notes. Statutory References F.S. 731.111 Notice to creditors. F.S. 733.212 Notice of administration; filing of objections and claims. F.S. 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims....

...at addressed above, we add the following observations concerning other arguments presented to us. Contrary to the argument of appellant, we do not conclude that the claim, which arose during the administration of the estate, is time barred by either section 733.702 or section 733.710. Section 733.702, in its terms, applies to claims that arose before the death of the decedent and does not apply to claims against casualty insurance....

...Suspension of statutes of limitation in favor of the personal representative. ¾⅜⅞ 733.212, Fla.Stat. Notice of administration; filing of objections and claims. 733.508, Fla.Stat. Accounting upon removal. 1⅜£⅛ 733.604, Fla.Stat. Inventory. ⅞⅛⅛ 733.701, Fla.Stat. Notifying creditors. ⅜§⅛ 733.702, Fla.Stat....

...This rule does not require sending notice of administration to creditors in estates where the time for filing claims has expired before the effective date of this rule. However, no opinion is offered whether such claims are barred by the provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes. Committee notes revised. Citation form changes in committee notes. 1991 Revision: Subdivision (a) modified to make it consistent with recent changes to sections 733.212 and 733.702, Florida Statutes....

...§ 733.2123, Fla.Stat. Adjudication before issuance of letters. § 733.302, Fla.Stat. Who may be appointed personal representative. § 733.303, Fla.Stat. Persons not qualified. § 733.305, Fla.Stat. Trust companies and other corporations and associations. § 733.702, Fla.Stat....

...Citation form change in committee notes. 1992 Revision: Committee notes revised. Citation form changes in committee notes. Statutory References 731.111, Fla.Stat. tors. Notice to eredi- 733.212, Fla.Stat. ministration; filing of claims. Notice of ad-objections and 733.702, Fla.Stat....

FARMER, J. Decedent died March 22, 2001. An estate was opened in November 2001, and Notice of Administration was published in November and again in December 2001. All claims were required to be filed by March 6, 2002. See § 733.702(1), (3), Fla....

...733.212 Notice of administration; filing of objections and claims. *1093 F.S. 733.2123 Adjudication before issuance of letters. F.S. 733.302 Who may be appointed personal representative. F.S. 733.303 Persons not qualified. F.S. 733.305 Trust companies and other corporations and associations. F.S. 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims....

...1984 Revision: Extensive editorial changes and requires furnishing of copy of claim to the attorney for the personal representative. Committee notes revised. Statutory References F.S. 731.111 Notice to creditors. F.S. 733.212 Notice of administration; filing of objections and claims. F.S. 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims....

...to Determine and Perfect Surviving Spouse’s Community Property Interest in Estate Assets.” The circuit court struck the wife’s petition, which the wife filed more than two years after the decedent’s death, for three reasons: (1) pursuant to section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (2015), the petition was an untimely claim against the estate; (2) the petition was further barred by the two-year statute of repose contained in section 733.710(1), Florida Statutes (2015); and (3) no exception t...

...ate and, pursuant to the will, appointed the wife as the estate’s personal representative. The circuit court also issued letters of administration to the wife. On March 31, 2015, the wife published a notice to creditors. The notice, pursuant to section 733.702(1), stated in pertinent part: All creditors of the decedent and other persons having claims or demands against decedent’s estate, on whom a copy of this notice is required to be served, must file their cl...

...or demands against decedent’s estate must file their claims with this court WITHIN 3 MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF THE FIRST PUBLICATION OF THIS NOTICE. ALL CLAIMS NOT FILED WITHIN THE TIME PERIODS SET FORTH IN FLORIDA STATUTES SECTION 733.702 WILL BE FOREVER BARRED. See § 733.702(1), Fla....

...personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as provided in this section.”). On June 30, 2015, the three-month claims period under section 733.702(1) expired....

...distribution under the laws of succession of this state.”). The decedent’s daughters filed a motion to strike the wife’s petition. The daughters’ motion and supplemental memorandum argued that the wife’s petition was untimely under sections 733.702(1), 733.710(1), and 732.223. Section 732.223 states: If the title to any property to which ss....

...d therefore was not a “claim” under section 731.201(4). Third, the wife argued that if her petition was a claim, then her community property interest fell within the common law “trust exception” and the statutory “lien exception” to section 733.702(1)’s and section 733.710(1)’s deadlines....

...wife’s community property interest as a trustee, and the community property interest was exempt from the statutory deadlines. b. The Statutory “Lien Exception” As a second exception to the statutory deadlines, the wife relied upon the lien exceptions contained in sections 733.702(4)(a) and 733.710(3), Florida Statutes (2015). Section 733.702(4)(a) states: “Nothing in this section affects or prevents ....

...Section 733.710(3) states: “This section shall not affect the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or security interest or the lien of any person in possession of personal property or the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien.” The wife, applying sections 733.702(4)(a) and 733.710(3), argued that even if her community property interest was considered as a claim, then the vesting of community property interest gave rise to an equitable lien which should be excepted from sections 733.702(1) and 733.710(1). 3....

...The Circuit Court’s Order The circuit court ultimately entered the order, now on appeal, granting the decedent’s daughters’ motion to strike the wife’s petition. The order’s conclusions of law state, in pertinent part: The Petition is an untimely claim against the estate pursuant to section 733.702(1), Fla....

...s after Decedent’s death. (paragraph numerals omitted). 6  4. This Appeal and Our Review This appeal followed. To the extent our review involves interpretation of sections 733.702’s and 733.710’s deadlines, or an examination of whether the wife qualifies for an exception to those deadlines, our review is de novo. See Headley v....

...not in the nature of a claim, and thus not subject to any statutory deadlines. The wife further argues that if her petition was a claim, then her community property interest fell within the common law “trust exception” and the statutory “lien exception” to section 733.702(1)’s and section 733.710(1)’s deadlines. The daughters argue that the circuit court properly struck the wife’s petition as untimely pursuant to both section 733.702(1) and section 733.710(1) because the wife’s petition is a claim....

...had to pursue. 7  Second, to the extent the decedent possessed the community property in his name at the time of his death, the wife’s failure to make a claim upon her community property interest within section 733.702(1)’s three-month claim period barred her later-filed untimely claim (in the form of her petition). See § 733.702(1), Fla....

...Similarly here, the wife did not allege the existence of an express trust or any other clearly defined means by which the decedent held the community property interest on her behalf. 8  Fifth, the wife’s reliance upon the lien exceptions contained in sections 733.702(4)(a) and 733.710(3) is similarly unavailing....

...To begin with, the wife cites no authority for her argument that the vesting of her community property interest gave rise to an equitable lien falling under either exception. Even if we were to consider that the vesting of her community property interest gave rise to an equitable lien falling under section 733.702(4)(a)’s exception (“Nothing in this section affects or prevents ....

...ate court pursuant to section 732.223. Because the wife’s community property interest was a “claim” as defined in section 731.201(4), the wife had three months after the time she published the notice to creditors to file her claim according to section 733.702(1), and in any event had two years after the decedent’s death to file her claim according to section 733.710(1)....

...after the date of service on the creditor . . . . 3This conversation occurred ten days after the Decedent’s death and one day after Ms. Manes filed the emergency petition for intestate administration. 5 §733.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). This time limitation for filing a claim includes causes of action founded upon the wrongful act of the decedent. §733.702(2). If the court does not extend the time for filing an otherwise untimely claim, the claim is barred. §733.702(3). “An extension may be granted only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period.” Id. Pursuant to section 733.2121, Florida Statutes (2013), the personal representative is required to promptl...

...Soriano had a claim or a potential claim. The trial court properly denied Ms. Soriano’s petition because, as a mere conjectural creditor, she was not entitled to personal service of the notice to creditors, her petition was untimely, and her asserted claim was barred by section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes. Affirmed. 10 

appeals the granting of appel-lee’s motion. Section 733.702(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1987) reads in relevant

...On the same day, the trial court entered its Order Denying Authorization of Sale of Real Property. The court adjudged that the Personal Representative was not authorized to sell because “no cause of action was timely filed by the purchaser in accordance with F.S. 733.702(1), F.S. 733.702(6) and F.S....

...ance so long as it furnishes sufficient information of the extent and character of the claim”). 771 So.2d at 1160-61 (second alteration in the original). We further conclude that a claim by Mr. Zilewicz was timely filed in accordance with sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes (2003). In May, 771 So.2d at 1150 , the court held that section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1991), is a statute of limitations that operates as a bar to claims not “ ‘filed within the later of 3 months after the time of the first publication of the notice of administration or, as to any creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice of administration, 30 days after the date of service of such copy of the notice on the creditor.’ ” Section 733.702(1) has since been amended to substitute “on or before” for “within,” thus allowing claims to be filed before the notice of administration. Ch. 2002-82, § 6, Laws of Fla. (eff. April 23, 2002). The amendment is pertinent to the instant case and renders the claim timely under section 733.702....

...onconjeetural claimants). Cianci therefore contends that the trial judge was correct in granting her an extension for the filing of her claim inasmuch as this is one of the statutory relief provisions in section 733.212, Florida Statutes (1999). See § 733.702(3), Fla....

dispute that the claim was untimely filed. Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1977). Generally, absent

...contrary is time-barred by section 733.710, Florida Statutes (2021). This argument implicates certain jurisdictional concerns. Under Florida law, the timing of probate claims is governed by two separate statutory provisions. The first, codified in section 733.702, Florida Statutes, bars any claim or demand against an estate that arose before the death of the decedent which is not filed in the probate proceeding on or before the later of the date that is [three] months after the...

...with a copy of the notice to creditors, [thirty] days after the date of service on the creditor, even though the personal representative has recognized the claim or demand by paying a part of it or interest on it or otherwise. § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat.; see Fla. Prob. R. 5.490(e). Long construed as a statute of limitations, this provision applies to all claims for personal property in the possession of the personal representative. § 733.702(1), Fla....

...liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as provided in this section. (2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702 within [two] years after the person’s death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s....

...2d 1143, 1156 (Fla. 2000). In the instant case, it is axiomatic the children asserted ownership to the painting within two years of their father’s death. Barbara, however, contends they failed to formally file a claim, as required under section 733.702, Florida Statutes....

...3 a copy of the notice of administration on them. (Emphasis added.) The notice of the administration of the estate is to inform creditors that they must file claims against the estate during the time periods set forth in section 733.702 or their claims will be barred unless the court grants an extension of time....

...section 733.710. Golden v. Jones, 126 So. 3d 390, 391-92 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). The first publication of the administration of Elizabeth's estate appeared on December 11, 2020; therefore, creditors had to file their claims by March 11, 2021. See § 733.702(1) (providing that a creditor has three months after first publication of the opening of the estate to file a claim or, if the creditor is entitled to notice of administration, thirty days after service of the notice on them). Jennifer and Geoffrey did not file their claims within that ninety-day period. However, they sought extensions of time from the court because of the lack of notice. See § 733.702(3) ("An extension may be granted only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period." (emphasis added)). Regarding whether Geoffrey was a reasonably ascertainable creditor entitled to notice, the estate...

...estate, the personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent . . . except as provided in this section. (2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702 within 2 years after the person's death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s....

...This was an action on a promissory note. The note contained a recital that it was secured by real property. Appellant, the payee and holder of the note, failed to file a claim against the estate of the payor of the note within the time permitted by section 733.702(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...There were no allegations in the pleadings that the note was forged or that it had been paid, or that it contained a falsity of any kind. It therefore seems evident that the complaint was stricken solely for failure to comply with the non-claims statute. That was error. Section 733.702(4) excludes proceedings to enforce hens and mortgages from the operation of the non-claims statute....

...This rule does not require sending notice of administration to creditors in estates where the time for filing claims has expired before the effective date of this rule. However, no opinion is offered whether such claims are barred by the provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes. Committee notes revised. Citation form changes in committee notes. 1991 Revision: Subdivision (a) modified to make it consistent with recent changes to sections 733.212 and 733.702, Florida Statutes....

...§ 733.2123, Fla. Stat. Adjudication before issuance of letters. § 733.302, Fla. Stat. Who may be appointed personal representative. § 733.303, Fla. Stat. Persons not qualified. § 733.305, Fla. Stat. Trust companies and other corporations and associations. § 733.702,-Fla — Stat....

...ess requirements. Rule History 2002 Revision: New rule to implement procedures consistent with new section 733.2121, Florida Statutes. Statutory References § 731.301, Fla. Stat. Notice. § 733.2121, Fla. Stat. Notice to creditors; filing of claims. § 733.702, Fla....

...aw addressing the issue of whether this cause of action is barred under the law of the State of Indiana. Previously, Defendant asserted that the applicable statute of limitations is the Indiana Code at Section 29-1-14-1, while Plaintiff alleged that Section 733.702, Florida Statutes was appropriately applied. The Court did not agree with Plaintiff that the applicable statute of limitations in this cause is to be found at Section 733.702....

...representative, and (3) notice of administration was published. The creditor did not file his claim in the probate case within three months of the first publication of notice of administration, and the creditor’s claim was held to be barred under section 733.702, Florida Statutes....

...However, the decedent was never a party in the creditor’s pending action against the conservator and therefore Rule 1.260(a)(2) was not applicable. The creditor also argues the son is estopped as personal representative from asserting the bar of section 733.702....

...filed an action on the note against the conservator before the estate proceedings were opened; he, likewise, should have timely filed a claim in the estate proceeding. The trial court was correct in holding that the creditor’s claim was barred by section 733.702, Florida Statutes, because it was not timely filed in the probate estate....

...s for dismissal should have been the subject of an affirmative defense. In addition, it appears that the counterclaim was not subject to the limitations provisions of the probate act, at least in an amount up to the amount claimed by the estate. See § 733.702(3)(d), Fla.Stat.(1987)....

...onal Representative of the Estate of Shirley J. Ansley, Deceased, and the Estate of Shirley J. Ansley, Deceased (jointly, "Defendants"), for allegedly unpaid federal income tax liabilities. Defendants seek summary judgment based on Florida Statutes, § 733.702, which Defendants argue bars the Government's claim as untimely. The Government asserts that as the sovereign it is not subject to the limitations period set out in § 733.702....

...In response to the Government's motion for summary judgment, Defendants attempt to attack the validity of the Government's tax assessment against Defendants. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Defendants move for summary judgment based on Florida Statutes, § 733.702 which sets out a time frame during which claims against a decedent's estate must be presented. Section 733.702 bars any claims made outside the time frame. Defendants argue that § 733.702 bars the Government's claim for unpaid taxes because the Government did not make the claim against the decedent's estate within the applicable time frame. The Government does not argue that it made its claim within the three month time frame set out in § 733.702; instead, it argues that as a sovereign it is not bound by a limitations period created by Florida Statutes. In United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416, 60 S.Ct. 1019, 84 L.Ed. 1283 (1940), a case involving the application of the predecessor of § 733.702, the Supreme Court held that the United States "is not bound by state statutes if limitations or subject to the defense of laches in enforcing its rights." The Court went on to explain that when the United States asserts a claim in its gov...

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 733.702, Florida Statutes (2001); Spohr v....

...aw concerning the requirements for filing a written statement of a claim in a state probate proceeding within statutorily prescribed time periods. See May v. Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co., 190 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir.1999). The question is as follows: WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION 733.710 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES CONSIDERED SEPARATELY AND/OR TOGETHER OPERATE AS STATUTES OF NON-CLAIM SO THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION EXISTS, CLAIMS NOT PRESENTED WITHIN THE DESIGNATED TIME PERIOD ARE NOT BINDING ON THE ESTATE, OR DO THEY ACT AS STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS WHICH MUST BE PLEADED AND PROVED AS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN ORDER TO AVOID WAIVER. In its response, the Florida Supreme Court held that: (1) section 733.702(3), Florida Statutes (1991) is a statute of limitations that bars untimely claims even if the issue of timeliness is not asserted in an objection in the probate proceedings, but that such limitation may be extended by the probate cour...

...Co., 771 So.2d 1143 (2000). In light of these conclusions, the Court held that the filing of the petition and counter-petition “satisfied the nonclaim period set forth in section *1283 733.710,” but “did not satisfy the limitation period set forth in section 733.702(1), and we are not aware of any extension or pending request for extension in any probate court.” Thus the Supreme Court’s decision effectively bars the claim made against the estate....

...The motion of appellant David R. May, as Administrator Ad Litem of the Estate of Oscar T. Bradley, Deceased, for leave to file a supplemental brief is DENIED. It alleges the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion “raises the possibility that Prockup can demonstrate compliance with section 733.702 if the probate court extends the time for filing claims.” Under the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion, however, an extension could be granted only on facts showing “fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice.” Not only has no such e...

...We disagree with the personal representative’s argument, and affirm the decision of the trial court. Bertha L. Williams died and her estate was probated in Charlotte County, Florida. Notice of administration was properly published, and the last day for filing claims under Section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), was February 18, 1978....

...Leroy Whitley, however, filed a statement of claim for funeral expenses on August 14, 1978. The personal representative made a motion to strike the claim of Whitley, which was denied by the trial court. The thrust of the personal representative’s argument is that there is an inherent conflict between Section 733.702(1)(a) and Section 731.201(4), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...The personal representative seeks to have this court interpret those two sections in a manner which would require the filing of claim for funeral expenses within three months of the time of the first publication of the notice of administration. We decline to accept this interpretation. Section 733.702(l)(a) provides: No claim or demand against the decedent’s estate that arose before the death of the decedent ....

...Clausohm, 234 So.2d 338 (Fla.1970), is not applicable to the present appeal since it was based upon the 1965 version of the nonclaim statute which was not limited to claims or demands arising before the death of the decedent. Since the more specific provisions of Section 733.702(1)(a) control the present appeal, *737 the trial court properly denied the motion to strike the claim of Whitley for funeral expenses....

...the personal representative of the estate shall be deemed to be an interested person. In any proceeding affecting the expenses of the administration and obligations of a decedent's estate, or any claims described in [section] 733.702(1), the trustee of a trust described in [section] 733.707(3) is an interested person in the administration of the grantor's estate....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. § 733.702, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1984); see Velzy v. Estate of Miller, 502 So.2d 1297

...s attach a copy of a judgment or order to her statement of claim. Shortly after the estate was opened, the personal representative of the decedent’s estate caused a notice to creditors to be published in a local newspaper, as required by section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (2022)....

...the notice to creditors. In Jones v. Golden, 176 So. 3d 242, 243 (Fla. 2015), the Florida Supreme Court held that claims of known or reasonably ascertainable creditors of an estate who were not served with a copy of the notice to creditors under section 733.702(1) are timely filed under section 733.710, Florida Statutes, if filed within two years of the decedent’s death....

was not timely filed and therefore barred by Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1977). After hearing argument

...The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of a trial court saying as much. Tsuji v. Fleet, 326 So. 3d 143, 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). It did so notwithstanding a contrary decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal that had found in another law, section 733.702(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), a reason to disregard section 733.710(1)’s prohibition where, as here, a plaintiff in a negligence action sought money damages from the decedent’s insurer rather than from the decedent himself (o...

...2d at 886, and this Court’s statements approving that decision in May v. Illinois National Insurance Co., 771 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2000). 3 The 3. In May, we answered a fairly technical certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit: whether sections 733.702 and 733.710, alone or together, function as statutes of nonclaim (such that, absent an exception, claims not presented within the periods they designate would not be binding on an estate) or as statutes of limitation (such that a party seeking to invoke them would have to plead and prove its applicability as affirmative defenses to avoid waiver). 771 So. 2d at 1145. We said section 733.702 is a statute of limitations that cannot be waived in a probate proceeding by failure to object to a claim on timeliness grounds, and section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in a probate case....

...We also remarked that “it is well settled that the total failure to file a timely claim against an estate does not prevent a creditor from recovering up to the policy limits of a decedent’s casualty -4- petitioners argued that a plaintiff—under section 733.702(4)(b)— can bring claims against a decedent’s estate over two years after the decedent’s death if the plaintiff seeks recovery from only the decedent’s casualty insurance. The trial court agreed with LBC and ruled that...

...the petitioners failed to file the claims within two years of Morton’s death. And because the petitioners could not file suit to hold the estate liable, LBC also could not be held vicariously liable. The petitioners moved for rehearing, arguing that the trial court overlooked section 733.702(4)(b)’s casualty insurance exception and this Court’s decision in May, 771 So....

...We first address whether section 733.710, Florida Statutes, bars the petitioners’ claims against Fleet, the personal representative of Morton’s estate.5 It does. In reaching that conclusion, we consider the petitioners’ arguments about how section 733.702 informs our reading of section 733.710. 4....

...1992). -7-  B Part VII of chapter 733 of the Florida Probate Code has two sets of limits that, together, bring order to creditors’ claims against estates: one resides in section 733.702 and the other in section 733.710. Section 733.702 “fixes the basic time frame for filing of claims in decedent’s estates being probated in Florida.” May, 771 So....

...before the later of the date that is 3 months after the time of the first publication of the notice to creditors or, as to any creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice to creditors, 30 days after the date of service on the creditor . . . . § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. We have described this as a statute of limitations, May, 771 So. 2d at 1150, and it bars untimely claims even if “no objection to the claim is filed.” § 733.702(3), Fla....

...l act or omission, shall survive the death of the person against whom the claim may be made, whether or not an action is pending at the death of the person, unless a claim is filed within the time periods set forth in this part. § 733.702(2), Fla. Stat. This provision sweeps more broadly than subsections (1) and (3), as it incorporates not only the periods outlined in section 733.702, but also those elsewhere in part VII of chapter 733 of the Florida Statutes, such as section 733.710(1). Subsection (4) then enumerates three exceptions to the limitations found in subsections (1), (2), and (3). Of relevance to this case, the Legislature provided that: “[n]othing in [section 733.702] affects or prevents[,] . . . [t]o the limits of casualty insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish liability that is protected by the casualty insurance.” § 733.702(4)(b), Fla. Stat. 6 6. The other two exceptions are: section 733.702(4)(a), Florida Statutes (“A proceeding to enforce any mortgage, security interest, -9- Importantly, however, subsection (5) makes clear that: “Nothing in [section 733.702] shall extend the limitations period set forth in s. 733.710.” § 733.702(5), Fla....

...been issued, except as provided in this section. § 733.710(1), Fla. Stat. There are only two exceptions to this statute of repose or nonclaim. Subsection (2) provides that section 733.710(1) “shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702 within 2 years after the person’s death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s. 733.705.” § 733.710(2), Fla. Stat. And subsection (3) provides that section or other lien on property of the decedent.”), and section 733.702(4)(c), Florida Statutes (“The filing of a cross-claim or counterclaim against the estate in an action instituted by the estate; however, no recovery on a cross-claim or counterclaim shall exceed the estate’s recovery in that actio...

...at 45 (quoting Liability, Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 751) (emphasis removed), which they describe as the “breach-of-duty” sense of the word. And here, the petitioners say, they seek only damages up to the limits of any casualty insurance coverage under section 733.702(4)(b), meaning they do not seek to hold Fleet “liable” for claims against Morton in the “pay-money” sense of the word....

...against Morton under section 733.710(1). There is also the fact that the Legislature uses “liable” and “liability” throughout the code in a way that is hard to square with the petitioners’ proposed understanding of the term. Take section 733.702(4)(b) itself: the Legislature excepted “any proceeding to establish liability that is protected by the casualty insurance” from the timeliness bars set out elsewhere in section 733.702....

...effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible.” Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of New York, 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003). They say that the First District’s reading of section 733.710(1) renders duplicative section 733.702(2), which extinguishes any cause of action not filed within the periods set forth in part VII of chapter 733, including section 733.710(1)’s two-year time bar. If, according to the petitioners, section 733.710(1) bars their claims, then the Legislature would have had no reason to extend the reach of section 733.702(2) to also extinguish a cause of action filed beyond section 733.710(1)’s two-year time bar. 9 The petitioners also argue that the First 9. The petitioners further argue that we should not read section 733.710(1) to protect unenumerated parties, as that would also result in overlap with section 733.702(2), which protects any defendant facing an untimely claim....

...Instead, as a consequence of our conclusion that section 733.710(1) bars the petitioners’ claims against Fleet, the exoneration rule operates to bar the petitioners’ claims against LBC. See infra Section III. And it would be Florida’s - 19 - District renders inoperative part of section 733.702(4)—the one that says nothing in section 733.702(2), including its extinguishment of causes of action filed outside the period provided in subsection 733.710(1), affects or prevents exceptions listed in subsection (4). The canon against surplusage, which is in any event not “an absolute rule,” Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 385 (2013), is also not “a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature,” United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985). Section 733.702(4)(b) provides an exception to the limits provided elsewhere in section 733.702, and section 733.710(1) stands as the ultimate backstop that “automatically bars untimely claims” filed against the estate, its personal representative, or any beneficiaries more than two years after the decedent’s death abs...

...P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 106 (2011) (“[T]he canon against superfluity assists only where a competing interpretation gives effect ‘to every clause and word of a statute.’ ”) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). Under the petitioners’ proposed reading, the other two exceptions found in section 733.702(4) would also be exceptions to section 733.710(1). One of these exceptions provides “[n]othing in this section affects or prevents . . . [a] proceeding to enforce any mortgage, security interest, or other lien on property of the decedent.” § 733.702(4)(a), Fla....

...or the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien.” § 733.710(3), Fla. Stat. While the scope of the two exceptions is not identical, the petitioners’ proposed reading creates significant overlap, meaning it fails to give independent effect to every provision in both section 733.702 and section 733.710. In the end, the canon against surplusage does not tip the scales in the petitioners’ favor—especially since some degree of surplusage would result under either party’s reading....

...There, the district court reviewed a final summary judgment dismissing as untimely the plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claim against an employer filed more than two years after the death of the deceased employee. Id. “[B]ased on the two-year statute of limitations . . . in sections 733.702(5) and 733.710,” the trial court had entered judgments for both the employee and the employer. Id. - 29 - at 48, 48 n.1. On appeal, the First District affirmed. After holding that the dismissal of the untimely liability action against the employee under sections 733.702(5) and 733.710(1) exonerated the employee, the district court concluded that the vicarious liability action against the employer was barred under the exoneration rule. Id....

...AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. LABARGA, J., dissenting. I agree with the majority that if the claims against the decedent’s estate are barred by the statute, then LBC cannot be vicariously liable. However, because I would hold that sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes, do not bar the claim against Morton’s estate, I dissent. To conclude that sections 733.702 and 733.710 bar suit, the majority pleads for exacting specificity where none is needed....

...noting that those instances have been accompanied by more precise language. See majority op. at 17. But again, such precise language is unnecessary when the context commands a certain interpretation. Nor does looking to the term “liability” in section 733.702(4)(b) refute the pay-money interpretation of liable in 733.710. Correctly, the majority interprets “liability” in section 733.702(4)(b) as meaning something different than pay-money liability but finds “no reason” why “liable” should be read differently between the statutes. Again, context is key....

...Section 733.710 focuses on liability of the estate and its proxies for claims against the decedent, implicating only pay-money liability. See § 733.710, Fla. Stat. (“[n]either the decedent’s estate, the personal representative . . . nor the beneficiaries shall be liable.”). On the other hand, section 733.702 - 34 - focuses not on the liability of parties, but on causes of action. See § 733.702(1)-(3) (“no claim or demand . . . [n]o cause of action . . . [a]ny claim.”). A cause of action, of course, may implicate both breach-of-duty and pay-money liability; the term “liable” in section 733.702(4)(b) reflects that context....

...When the words of the statute so obviate any need for clarification, it is easy to imagine that the Legislature felt that extra explanation was unnecessary. For these reasons, I would hold that the term “liable” in section 733.710 refers to pay-money liability, that sections 733.702 and 733.710 do not bar suit against Morton’s estate, and accordingly that suit may be brought against LBC under a theory of vicarious liability. Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Certified Conflict of Decisions/Direct Conflict of Decisions First District – Case No....

...e 1,1981. It is alleged Delores, as personal representative of Verus’s estate, first published a notice of administration on June 12, 1981. See § 733.212, Fla.Stat. If this allegation is true, the three-month period for the filing of claims under § 733.702, Fla.Stat....

...The appellants filed a motion for leave to file supplemental affirmative defenses on August 19, 1982, which was denied on August 20, 1982. The second amended complaint was an action upon the note only and the mortgage foreclosure was abandoned. Accordingly, pursuant to § 733.702(l)(a), American has no valid claim against Verus’s estate if it did not file a claim against her estate within three months after the initial publication of the notice of administration. The late filing of the affirmative defense that the claim is barred by § 733.702 does not prejudice American because even on such short notice it could have proved the timely filing of a claim if a claim was filed....

...irst be provided. On April 19, 1988, the United States Supreme Court decided Tulsa Prof. Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 , 108 S.Ct. 1340 , 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). There, the court addressed an Oklahoma probate statute which, similar to section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1987), provided that the claims of estate creditors would be barred unless filed within the time specified in a newspa *702 per publication....

...(ii) facts sufficient to obtain relief under Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). The committee note indicates that the rule is designed to provide a procedure for the filing of claims by estate creditors who have missed the filing deadline imposed by section 733.702. 1 We now turn to the specific facts of the case before us. The decedent died on September 1, 1988, and the notice of administration was published for the first time on September 28, 1988. The section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1987), three-month period within which estate creditors could file their claims expired on December 28, 1988, but the appellee did not file a claim until January 13,1989. The appellant responded by moving to strike the claim, because it had not been filed within the time prescribed by section 733.702....

...end the time for filing its claim. 3 JOANOS, J., concurs. BOOTH, J., dissents with written opinion. . The text of the committee note is as follows: It is contemplated that substantially more creditors who have missed the filing deadline imposed by F.S. 733.702 will be filing a petition to extend the time for filing claim, under the authority of Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc., v....

...Notice of administration; filing of objections and claims. § 733.2121, Fla. Stat. Notice to creditors; filing of claims. § 733.508, — Flat-Stat. Accounting upon removal. § 733.604,-Fla. Stat. Inventory. § 733.701, Fla. Stat. Notifying creditors. § 733.702, Fla....

...This rule does not require sending notice of administration to creditors in estates where the time for filing claims has expired before the effective date of this rule. However, no opinion is offered whether such claims are barred by the provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes. Committee notes revised. Citation form changes in committee notes. 1991 Revision: Subdivision (a) modified to make it consistent with recent changes to sections 733.212 and 733.702, Florida Statutes....

...Rule History 2002 Revision: New rule to implement procedures consistent with new section 733.2121, Florida Statutes. 2003 Revision: Committee notes revised. Statutory References ch. 50, Fla. Stat. Legal and official advertisements. § 731.301, Fla. Stat. Notice. § 733.2121, Fla. Stat. Notice to creditors; filing of claims. § 733.702, Fla....

...Statutory References § 731.104, Fla. Stat. Verification of documents. § 731.111, Fla. Stah-N-etiee to creditors- § 733.212, Fla.-Stah-N-otiee of administration; — filing of— objections and claims- § 733.2121, Fla. Stat. Notice to creditors; filing of claims. § 733.702, Fla....

appeal are: (1) whether the nonclaim statute, Section 733.702, Florida Statutes, bars the complaint of American

...(2005). The personal representative thereafter filed a wrongful death action on behalf of the Estate against Mr. Buswell and Patco Transport seeking to recover the medical and funeral expenses. Tampa General filed a lien in the probate case, pursuant to section 733.702, to preserve its rights against any recovery made by the Estate in the wrongful death action....

...Appellant, Katherine Herman, appeals the trial court’s order denying her petition for an order striking Appellee’s, Nancy Herman Bennett’s, claim for being untimely filed. Because the trial court erred in determining that Appellee’s claim was timely filed under section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (2017), we reverse. BACKGROUND Appellant was appointed as personal representative of the estate of her deceased father, Steve Allen Herman, and filed a petition to determine the beneficiary of an annuity contract....

...On April 5, 2018, Appellee, the decedent’s sister, filed an answer to the petition and a statement of claim against the estate. Appellant, in turn, filed a petition for an order striking untimely filed claim, arguing that Appellee’s claim was barred under section 733.702, Florida Statutes (2017), which provides that a claim against an estate must be filed: on or before the later of the date that is 3 months after the time of the first publication of the notice to creditors or, as to any c...

...of the notice by mail on January 21st, the time for filing any claims expired on April 4th, rendering her April 5th claim time barred. Appellee countered that her claim was timely filed because the computation of the three-month period set forth in section 733.702(1) is governed by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514, pursuant to which the time period began the day after the event triggering it and ended on April 5th. The trial court found that it is unclear from the language of section 733.702(1) if the three-month creditor’s claim period begins to run on the first day of publication or the day after and, thus, resorted to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514 for guidance....

...of a statute meaningless; additionally, the court may not construe an unambiguous statute in a way that would extend, modify, or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. Bennett v. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., Inc., 71 So. 3d 828, 838 (Fla. 2011). Section 733.702 is titled “Limitations on presentation of claims” and provides in pertinent part as follows: (1) If not barred by s....

...section is barred even though no objection to the claim is filed unless the court extends the time in which the claim may be filed. An extension may be granted only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period. . . . § 733.702, Fla. Stat. (2017) (emphasis added). In the case before us, the pertinent facts are not in dispute and the issue is whether the three-month limitations period of section 733.702(1) begins to run on the date of the first publication of the notice to creditors (as contended by Appellant) or on the day after the date of the first publication (as argued by Appellee and determined by the trial court). The resolution of the issue turns on section 733.702(1)’s language of “the date that is 3 months after the time of the first publication of the notice to creditors.” Contrary to the trial court’s finding and Appellee’s argument, the language of section 733.702(1) is clear and unambiguous: “the date that is 3 months after the time of first publication” is the date that is three calendar months after the date of first publication; it is not the date that is three months after the day after the time of first publication. See also Jones v. Golden, 176 So. 3d 242, 245, (Fla. 2015) (reiterating that section 733.702(1) is a statute of limitations and explaining that the three-month limitations period “begins to run upon publication of the notice to creditors and ends three months after the date of the first publication”); Spohr v. Berryman, 589 So. 2d 225, 226 (Fla. 1991) (“The first publication of the notice of administration . . . occurred on January 9, 1987. Under section 733.702 . . ., this meant that claims against the estate had to be filed by no later than April 9, 1987.”); Mack v. Perri, 24 So. 3d 697, 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“The time period under section 733.702(1) runs from ‘the time of the first publication of the notice to creditors.’”); In re Hill, 582 So. 2d 701, 702 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (noting that where “the notice of administration was published for the first time on September 28, 1988,” “[t]he section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1987), three-month period within which estate creditors could file their claims expired on December 28, 1988 . . . .”); Coley v. Estate of Odom, 500 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1st 4 DCA 1986) (“Notice to creditors of Odom’s estate was published first on September 2, 1983. Under section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), creditors of Odom’s estate had a period of three months or until December 2, 1983, to file claims.”); Lubee v. Adams, 77 So....

...2d DCA 2012), disapproved of by Jones v. Golden, 176 So. 3d 242 (Fla. 2015) (“Because a notice to creditors was published on November 16, 2007, creditors not entitled to actual notice were required to file their claims on or before February 16, 2008. See § 733.702(1).”); Miller v....

...time barred”); Estate of Shearer ex rel. Shearer v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 737 So. 2d 1229, 1230-31 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (“Parties agree that Notice of Administration is published [May 5, 1997], triggering the 3-month claims period under § 733.702....

...statute that does not specify a method of computing time,” “[w]hen the period is stated in days or a longer unit of time,” “exclude the day of the event that triggers the period.” Fla. R. Judicial Admin. 2.514(a)(1)(A) (2017). * Accordingly, we hold that the three-month limitations period of section 733.702(1) begins to run on the day of the first publication of the notice to creditors. * Effective January 1, 2019, rule 2.514 was amended to read in pertinent part that “[w]hen the period is stated in days or a longer unit of time...

...Appellants ask this court to address the question of whether the timely filing of a complaint in a civil proceeding satisfies the probate statutory requirement that claimants must file their claims in the decedent’s probate proceeding within a prescribed time frame and manner. § 733.702, Fla. Stat. (1987). The trial court, in a two-step process, concluded section 733.702 was applicable and the filing of the civil complaint did not satisfy the statutory requirement....

...We find the case does not come within the provisions of the nonclaim statute and reverse. In order to expedite and facilitate the settling of estates, statutory obligations are placed on all parties to probate proceedings. See Barnett Bank v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla.1986). Section 733.702 (1987) requires that claimants, whose claims arose before the death of the decedent, file their claims within a prescribed manner (emphasis added)....

...Atlantic National Bank of Jacksonville, 18 Fla.Supp. 150 (Cir.Ct. Duval County 1961). Those opinions held probate claims filed subsequent to running of the statutory filing time limit, involving contracts entered into prior to death, were barred by section 733.16, the predecessor of section 733.702....

...te creditors [Phillip J. Scutieri, Jr., Jacqueline M. Simmons, Sundale Associates, Ltd., The Sunrise Club, Inc., and Associated American Development Corp.] for leave to file a statement of claim nunc pro tunc which was otherwise untimely filed under Section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1985). We reverse based on the following briefly stated legal analysis. First, we have held that "Section 733.702, Florida Statutes [(1985)] and its predecessors are not nonclaims statutes but guidelines for judicial procedure which may be relaxed in the sound discretion of the probate court for good cause shown." Harbour House Properties, Inc....

...ecedent’s estate within three months of the first publication of the notice to creditors or within thirty days of being served with it, whichever is later. Any claim not timely filed within that time is barred unless the court grants an extension. § 733.702(3), Fla....

...A petition for administration of the estate was filed, and the trial- court admitted the will to probate. A notice to creditors was filed and published for the first time on February 14, 2013. Additionally, on April 11, 2013, the Bank was served a copy of the notice by certified mail. Thus, under section 733.702(1), the Bank’s deadline to file a claim was May 15, 2013....

...On June 22nd, the claims were finally accepted as filed, listing a filing date of May 23rd. Based on this filing date, the claims were untimely. There.were no circumstances meriting an extension “upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period.” § 733.702(3), Fla....

...Suspension of statutes of limitation in favor of the personal representative. § 733.212, Fla. Stat. Notice of administration; filing of objections. § 733.2121, Fla. Stat. Notice to creditors; filing of claims. § 733.701, Fla. Stat. Notifying creditors. § 733.702, Fla....

...nting appellee’s petition for payment, which the court denied. Appellant contends, as he did in his untimely petition for rehearing, that appel-lee’s failure to file its notice of claim within a three month period provided by section 733.701 and 733.702, Florida Statutes (1983) forever barred its claim for payment of the promissory note. Appellee argues that appellant’s failure to take any timely action in the probate court precludes appellant from raising this point on appeal. Section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1983) provides: (1) No claim or demand against the decedent’s estate that arose before the death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any of its subdivisions, whether due or not, direct or conting...

...mants such as Burgis of the procedural vehicle it provided. Rule 5.495 was deleted effective October 1, 1991 specifically because, as set forth in the Committee Notes, “The right to petition for an extension of time to file a claim is set forth in section 733.702, Florida Statutes, as recently amended.” The amended statute specifically provides for an extension of the time in which a claim may be filed “upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period.” § 733.702, Fla.Stat....

...We conclude that the objections to the final accounting were well taken and should have been sustained, and reverse the order appealed from. The beneficiaries first object to a payment of $17,000 by the co-personal representative William J. Crosby II to himself in the absence of a claim filed by him as required by section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985) which provides: (1)No claim or demand against the decedent’s estate that arose before the death of the decedent ......

...The holding in Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla.1986) that-the cited statute is one of limitation and not of non-claim does not alter the fact that a creditor must file a claim. The specific exceptions to that requirement in section 733.702(l)(a) do not come into play here because the beneficiaries did not approve the settlement nor did the personal representative file a proof of claim that he had paid or intended to pay this sum....

...rsonal representative of the Estate of Edward B. Caufield, deceased. Because we find that Mr. Lubee was required to file his claim in the probate proceeding within three months of the date of first publication of the notice to creditors, pursuant to section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (2006), or file a motion for extension of time in which to file his claim, pursuant to section 733.702(3), we affirm the court’s order....

...Lubee did not file his claim in the probate proceeding within three months following the publication of notice to creditors and that he did not file a motion for extension of time or otherwise seek an extension. There is also no dispute that Mr. Lubee was not served with a copy of the notice to creditors pursuant to sections 733.702(1) and 733.2121(3)(a)....

...mely filed his claim within the two-year window of section 733.710. Because a notice to creditors was published on November 16, 2007, creditors *884 not entitled to actual notice were required to file their claims on or before February 16, 2008. See § 733.702(1)....

...Because he was not served with a copy of the notice to creditors, Mr. Lubee was required to file his claim in the probate proceeding within the three-month -window following publication. Alternatively, Mr. Lubee could seek an extension from the probate court pursuant to section 733.702(3) within the two-year window of section 733.710....

...See Morgenthau v. Estate of Andzel, 26 So.3d 628, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); cf. Miller v. Estate of Baer, 837 So.2d 448, 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (affirming order enforcing claim against estate where creditor failed to file claim within three-month window of section 733.702(1) but did file motion for extension of time within two-year window of section 733.710)....

...It is undisputed that he did neither. Mr. Lubee’s filing of his claim in the probate proceeding within two years of the decedent’s death did not amount to a request for an extension of time and did not otherwise comply with the requirements of section 733.702....

...agraph (l)(b) [including objections to a will] by persons to whom notice was mailed, that are not filed within 3 months following the date of first publication of the notice are forever barred. Claims under paragraph (l)(a) are barred as provided in § 733.702....

...this case by virtue of the personal representative’s extension of time for filing objections. We agree with respondents. In Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla.1986), the Supreme Court of Florida held *473 that section 733.702, Florida Statutes, which requires the filing of claims against an estate within three months of the filing of the notice of administration, is a statute of limitations which can be waived or es-topped, and not a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim....

...She filed three consecutive Notices of Extending Time for the Beneficiaries to File Objections to the will in this case. The respondents claims to have relied on these notices as having legal effect. The statutes provide support for respondents’ position, particularly in light of the holding in Barnett as to section 733.702....

that is protected by the casualty insurance.” § 733.702(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013). That provision is eminently

lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations, § 733.702, Fla. Stat. (2011), and the statute of repose

...Demps was appointed as the personal representative of the Estate in January 2017. The Estate published the requisite notice of administration giving notice to creditors on February 3 and 10, 2017. Thus, creditors had no later than May 3, 2017, to file a claim.1 1 Pursuant to section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (2016), claims against an estate arising before the death of the decedent are not binding on the estate, on the personal representative, or on any beneficiary “unless filed in the probate proceeding...

...tement of claim as untimely, citing the two- year statute of nonclaim in section 733.710, Florida Statutes (2016) (automatically barring claims not filed within two years of the decedent’s death), and the three- month filing deadline set out in section 733.702, Florida Statutes (2016) (a statute of limitations barring claims not filed within three months of the first publication of the notice to creditors)....

...4th DCA 2013). Palm Garden asserts that its claim for arbitration costs arose after Mr. Demps’s death and is based solely on the actions of the Estate, not for any acts or omissions on Mr. Demps’s part during his lifetime. Accordingly, it argues that its claim was not subject to the statute of limitations of section 733.702 or the statute of nonclaim, section 733.710. We turn first to section 733.702(1), Fla....

...is binding on the estate, on the personal representative, or on any beneficiary unless filed in the probate proceeding on or before the later of the date that is 3 months after the time of the first publication of the notice to creditors . ... The term “claim,” as used in section 733.702, is defined as “a liability of the decedent, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, and funeral expense. The term does not include an expense of administration or estate, inheritance, succession, or other death taxes.” § 731.201(4), Fla. Stat. (2016). Any claim not filed within section 733.702(1)’s prescribed timeframe is barred, absent an extension by the court for one of three grounds not pertinent here. § 733.702(3), Fla. Stat. The reference in section 733.702(1) to claims arising before the death of the decedent “is intended to make clear that it is unnecessary to file a statement of claim in order to prosecute an action against the estate that is predicated upon events that take place after the decedent’s death.” Spohr v. Berryman, 589 So. 2d 225, 227 (Fla. 1991). With that in mind, we agree with Palm Garden that section 733.702 is inapplicable....

...Demps’s death, not before, and stemmed solely from the Estate’s action of filing suit. Had it not filed suit, there would not have been a binding arbitration or an award of costs to Palm Garden when the Estate lost. Accordingly, Palm Garden was not required to file a statement of claim under section 733.702. 5  Having determined that section 733.702 is inapplicable, we turn next to section 733.710(1), which provides that “2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent’s estate, the personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent ....

...The inventory that specifically described the 46-foot Matthews boat and estimated its value at $100,000 was filed on November 6, 1984. Subsequent pleadings show that the estate had a buyer for the boat at a price of $70,000. Appellant’s claim to a fifty percent interest in the boat was filed on January 16, 1985. Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1983), requires all claims or demands against a decedent’s estate that arose before the death of the decedent to be filed within three months from the publication of notice of administration. In Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Leon Henry Read, Jr., Deceased, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla.1986), our supreme court construed section 733.702 as a *1297 statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim....

...ant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.100. The personal representative of the appellee estate in this case did file such an objection to the claim and a motion to strike the claim. The motion to strike was based upon failure to timely comply with section 733.702. Appellant’s response to the motion to strike was based solely on her allegation that she had filed a separate action for partition of the boat and that the claim under section 733.702 was a formality and not in fact a creditor’s claim....

applicable provisions barring this claim. Section 733.702(l)(a) states that no claim against an estate

PER CURIAM. Appellant Debra Harrison appeals the trial court’s order denying her amended claim as a creditor against her ex-hus *1151 band’s estate. Although the amended claim was filed outside the three month statutory filing period, see § 733.702, Fla....

who were late presenting their claims under section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985), appeal the trial

...llee $10,000.00. This point has merit. The claim for the $10,-000.00 was never pleaded in appellee’s claim against the estate. The final judgment allowing appellee to amend his pleadings circumvents the probate code’s strict statute of nonclaim. § 733.702(l)(a), Fla....

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See section 733.702(2), Florida Statutes (1995). BOOTH, JOANOS and VAN NORTWICK

The requirements of section 733.702(3) have not been satisfied. See § 733.702(3), Fla.Stat. (1993);

...Here, too, the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the marital settlement agreement; thus, there is no reason to require the Estate to file a new suit. Moreover, the instant case does not involve a claim against the Estate, which must be brought by the filing of a claim in the probate proceedings. See § 733.702(1), Fla....

Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla.1986), that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations, not a statute

Cooey, 132 Fla. 716, 182 So. 202 (1938); Section 733.-702, Florida Statutes (1975).

...neither. See 66 Am.Jur.2d Records and Recording § 165 (1973). Fourth, contrary to appellant’s apparent contention, appellee’s mortgage lien was not impaired by the failure to file a claim therefor against the deceased mortgagor’s estate. See § 733.702(3)(a), Fla....

...Significantly, Souder never petitioned the trial court for an extension of time in which to file his claims against the estate. After a hearing held on October 1, 2013, the probate court entered an order striking Souder’s claims, determining that they were untimely under section 733.702, Florida Statutes (2011)....

...We agree with the Lubee and Morgenthau decisions and conclude that even assuming Souder was a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor, his claims were time-barred because they were filed beyond the three-month creditors’ claim period set forth in section 733.702(1), and no petition seeking an extension of time in which to file claims was filed. Section 733.702(1) provides that: [N]o claim or demand against the decedent’s estate that arose before the death of the decedent ......

...If the personal representative or any other interested person serves on the creditor a notice to file a petition for an extension, the creditor shall be limited to a period of 30 days from the date of service of the notice in which to file a petition for extension. § 733.702(3), Fla....

...days following service. Creditors who are not served a copy of the notice to creditors are required to file their claims within the three-month window following publication or, alternatively, may seek an extension from the probate court pursuant to section 733.702(3) within the two-year window set forth in section 733.710....

...personal representative, the name and address of the personal representative's attorney, and the date of first publication. The notice shall state that creditors must file claims against the estate with the court during the time periods set forth in s. 733.702, orbe forever barred....

...The court dismissed the counts against Stanley, also with prejudice, in the same order in which it dismissed the counts against the estate. The only reason given for the dismissal was: The court finds that the Plaintiffs failure to timely comply with the claim provision of § 733.702, Fla....

...The court distinguished these counterclaims from the offset which was allowed, noting that the settlement agreement contained a damage provision relating only to the one home for which the court permitted an offset. However, this distinction has no import in the present context under section 733.702(4)(d), Florida Statutes, which indicates that the existence of a probate proceeding does not preclude a creditor from filing a cross-claim or counterclaim in a separate action instituted by the estate, although the creditor’s recovery may not exceed the estate’s recovery in such an action....

...And despite the appellee’s contention here, the appellant’s counterclaims were neither contingent nor unmatured, as the factual allegations would make these monies presently due and owing. Because such recovery, up to the amount of the estate’s recovery in the action below, is permitted under section 733.702(4)(d), the court should have considered the appellant’s request for a further offset by these counterclaims....

...North County moved for rehearing, which was subsequently denied. This timely appeal followed. All claims against an estate, whether due or not, and whether direct or contingent, must be filed in a probate proceeding within ninety days after the first publication of notice of administration. § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). The court can extend this time only upon a showing of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period. § 733.702(3); American & Foreign Ins....

first publication of notice of administration. § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). The court can extend this

...cash funds, which the estate herein admittedly still holds, were sufficiently identifiable so as not to constitute a part of the said estate and to authorize the imposition of a trust on such funds without the creditor being required to comply with Section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

compliance with the probate claims statute, Section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1975). We do not believe

DAUKSCH, Judge. The personal representative in the estate of the deceased paid hospital and doctors bills even though those creditors had not filed claims against the estate within the proper statutory time. Section 733.-16, Florida Statutes (1973); Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1975)....

PER CURIAM. A claim for guardianship fees not filed until six years after the guardianship terminated with the death of the ward is barred by section 733.702(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), which requires that a claim against an estate that arose before the death of the decedent be presented within three years where no notice of administration is published....