Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...West American then filed a contribution claim against Yellow Cab to recover the settlement monies paid to its insured. Because a jury determined Yellow Cab to be one hundred percent at fault, the district court concluded that West American was not a joint tortfeasor and therefore it could not sue Yellow Cab under section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Marin could sue her husband because the doctrine of interspousal immunity has now been abrogated. Waite v. Waite, 618 So.2d 1360 (Fla. 1993). [3] Thus, we reject the argument that our interpretation of section 768.81(3) when coupled with the right to setoff under section 768.31(5) will lead to a double reduction in the amount of damages. This possibility may be avoided by applying the setoff contemplated by section 768.31(5) against the total damages (reduced by any comparative negligence of the plaintiff) rather than against the apportioned damages caused by a particular defendant....

...The Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act also abrogates the common law rule: "When a release ... is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury ... (a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability ... unless its terms so provice... ." § 768.31(5) Fla....

...(1977). Clearly there is no prohibition against a general release in section 768.041(1), Florida Statutes (1977). Indeed, the Uniform Act expressly authorizes discharge of all possible tortfeasors as long as the "terms" of the release "so provide." § 768.31(5)(a), Fla....

...Thus, as long as the parties express their intent to discharge all possible tortfeasors, they are free to do so. We need not decide whether a release which runs to a named tortfeasor plus all others also discharges the latter from liability for contribution. § 768.31(5)(b) Fla....

...at public importance: (A) IS A NON-SETTLING DEFENDANT IN A CASE TRIED UNDER SECTION 768.81(3) ENTITLED TO SETOFF OR REDUCTION OF HIS APPORTIONED SHARE OF THE DAMAGES, AS ASSESSED BY THE JURY, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 768.041(2), 46.015(2) OR 768.31(5)(a), BASED UPON SUMS PAID BY SETTLING DEFENDANTS IN EXCESS OF THEIR APPORTIONED LIABILITY AS DETERMINED BY THE JURY? (B) DOES THE RULE AS TO SETOFF APPLY EQUALLY TO BOTH ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES? Id....

...al amount paid by the settling defendants. The trial court denied the requested setoff. On appeal, TMRMC contended that the trial court erred in denying the requested setoff. The district court of appeal held that sections 46.015(2), 768.041(2), and 768.31(5), *251 Florida Statutes (1991) (the setoff statutes), required that "the $300,000 paid in settlement by other defendants must be applied in reduction of the total damage award returned by the jury." Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Ctr., Inc., 634 So.2d at 658....

...ies who contributed to the accident regardless of whether they are joined as defendants. Footnote 3 of our opinion in Fabre states: Thus, we reject the argument that our interpretation of section 768.81(3) when coupled with the right to setoff under section 768.31(5) will lead to a double reduction in the amount of damages. This possibility may be avoided by applying the setoff contemplated by section 768.31(5) against the total damages (reduced by any comparative negligence of the plaintiff) rather than against the apportioned damages caused by a particular defendant....

...tage of fault by which that party contributed to the accident, Fabre, 623 So.2d at 1185, a plaintiff cannot sue one party for the noneconomic damages caused by another party. Therefore, section 768.041 does not apply to noneconomic damages. Finally, section 768.31 provides, in pertinent part: (5) RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE....

...injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater... . § 768.31, Fla. Stat. (1989) (emphasis added). Under section 768.31, settlement proceeds are set off where defendants are "liable for the same injury or the same wrongful death." Id....

...As a California court recognized in Espinoza, "[t]he payment of such a claim by one tortfeasor is not the payment of a claim for which `the others' might ever be held jointly and severally liable. Thus, there is no longer any such claim `against the others' to `reduce.'" 11 Cal. Rptr.2d at 502. Hence, section 768.31 does not apply to noneconomic damages....

...OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. WELLS, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which KOGAN, J., concurs. ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with an opinion. *255 WELLS, Justice, concurring specially. I concur with the majority's reconciliation of sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5), and 768.81(3), Florida Statutes (1991), in this case in which the parties stipulated that the settling defendants would remain on the verdict form although Fabre v....

...ANSTEAD, Justice, specially concurring. While I concur in the majority's opinion because it makes very good sense, I have some concern that the legislature has not acted to express or clarify its intent as to the continuing application of the provisions of sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2), Florida Statutes (1991), in view of the enactment of section 768.81(3), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...ce, who was found to be 85% responsible for the claimant's injury. As a practical matter, of course, this right to "contribution" is also limited, as all tort rights are, by the financial solvency of the contributing tortfeasors. Sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2) are actually parts of the legislative contribution scheme....

...Since the "problem" of a tortfeasor paying more than his fair share has been eliminated by the enactment of section 768.81(3), the "solution" to the problem by the scheme of contribution and setoff is no longer needed. The underlying purpose of the contribution scheme and sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2) is simply no longer served in such a case....

...It would be far better, however, since this is an area in which the legislature has broad discretion and authority, and has been very active, for the legislature to expressly indicate the limitations on the continuing use of the contribution scheme, including the setoff provisions of sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2)....

...9 Moreover, the jury’s answers to questions posed by the trial court in the verdict form suggests that the jury found the misrepresentation to be just one factor indicative of fault and not the sole basis of liability. The Florida Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.31(3)(a) (West Supp.1984), provides that in determining contribution among tortfeasors, the basis of allocation of liability shall be the “relative degrees of fault” attributed to each party....

..., casts the entire burden of a loss for which several may be responsible upon only one of those at fault, and for these reasons this Court recedes from its earlier decisions to the contrary. During the pendency of this appeal, the Legislature passed Section 768.31, [*] Florida Statutes, the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, which was signed into law by the Governor on June 13, 1975, which Act took effect upon becoming law....

...onted with the problem of determining what procedure will most fully effectuate the principle that each party should pay the proportion of the total damages he has caused to the other party, and we considered several alternatives. [2] However, since Section 768.31 became effective during the pendency of this cause, the procedure adopted therein by the Florida Legislature relative to contribution among joint tortfeasors applies sub judice....

...ts. The negligence attributed to the defendants will then be apportioned on a pro rata basis without considering relative degrees of fault although the multi-party defendants will remain jointly and severally liable for the entire amount. In view of Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, the question which was certified by the trial court to the District Court of Appeal should have been answered in the negative although not for the reasons stated by the District Court of Appeal....

...BOYD, Judge (concurring specially). Because the new statute cited in the majority opinion prevails in this matter, I would not include language relative to proposed changes in judicial policy considered by the Court in this case prior to the enactment of the statute. As enacted, Section 768.31(3), Florida Statutes, provides: "(3) Pro Rata Shares....

...n to pay more damages than the amount for which it is responsible. Florida, like most other jurisdictions, has recognized a right of contribution on behalf of a tortfeasor who pays for the wrongdoings of additional tortfeasors. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.31 (1997); see 27 American cites In re Crash Disaster Near Cerritos, California, on August 31, 1986, 982 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir.1992), to support its argument that liability has been apportioned in a Warsaw Convention context before....

...Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir.1988) (in banc) (Tjoflat, J. specially concurring). 4 . The district court also concluded that the medical payments by Bay County could be viewed as a settlement by a joint tortfeasor and that under Fla.Stat. § 768.31 the damages against Grigsby would be reduced by the terms of the settlement....

...Alan R. Dakan of High, Stack, Davis & Lazenby, Miami, for appellee. ADKINS, Justice. We have for review on direct appeal a final judgment of a trial court which passed on the constitutional validity of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...ween the $25,000 paid by the Village and its full one-third share. Since Miami Shores paid more than its pro rata share, it filed a petition for an order of contribution against the Village pursuant to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975). The Village moved to dismiss the petition on the ground, inter alia, that Section 768.31 was unconstitutional in its application to municipal corporations....

...The circuit court denied the motion and entered final judgment in favor of Miami Shores. From that final judgment the Village brings this appeal. The Village's first contention is simply that the Act does not apply to municipal corporations. Its argument revolves around the following language of Section 768.31: (2) RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION....

...ty of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the particular statute involved. After reviewing the Act under consideration here, we are persuaded that the term "persons" includes municipalities. The legislative purpose behind the enactment of Section 768.31 was to provide for a right to contribution among all joint tortfeasors in order to eliminate the unfairness of the common law rule. From a reading of the entire Act, we must conclude that the Legislature was concerned not with the status of the defendants in a tort action, but rather with their relationship as joint tortfeasors. Prior to the enactment of Section 768.31, this Court had consistently recognized that a municipal corporation could *277 be a tortfeasor....

...We must assume that the Legislature was aware of this possibility and, thus, we find it to be significant that the Legislature chose not to specifically exclude municipalities from the operation of the Act. Another indication of the legislative intent to include municipalities within the scope of Section 768.31 can be found by examining the Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Act, Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Chapter 75-108, Laws of Florida. Since Section 768.28 equates municipal corporations with all other private individuals for purposes of tort liability and since that statute was passed during the legislative session immediately prior to the enactment of Section 768.31, we are persuaded that the Legislature intended to include municipal corporations when it used the term "persons" in the later enactment. For the reasons expressed, we hold that municipal corporations are subject to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. We now turn to the Village's constitutional assault on Section 768.31. Although the Village raises six separate arguments, we find that only one requires extensive discussion. The Village contends that Section 768.31, as applied to the facts of this case, affects vested rights retroactively in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions....

...In order to understand this argument, a brief recitation of the time sequence in this case is necessary. The events which gave rise to the tort action in this case occurred on December 23, 1973, and the litigation against Miami Shores, the Village, and Federal Laboratories, Inc., was commenced on August 29, 1974. Section 768.31 became law on June 13, 1975, and was in effect prior to final judgment being entered against the three defendants. Section 768.31(7) provides: (7) PENDING CAUSES OF ACTION....

...in those cases wherein vested rights are adversely affected or destroyed or when a new obligation or duty is created or imposed, or an additional disability is established, in connection with transactions or considerations previously had or expiated. Id. at 709. Thus, the issue in this case is whether Section 768.31 affects vested rights or establishes a new obligation or duty....

...The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act does not affect any vested rights of tortfeasors or create any new obligations in respect to their tort liability. Since the common tort liability was enforceable against all or any of the joint offenders at the election of the injured party, Section 768.31, by altering the common law rule of no contribution, does not increase the liability of any of the participants in the offense....

...S & S was vicariously liable for Rountree's negligence and AHA, in turn, stepped in to S & S's shoes as a subrogee. Our conclusion that section 768.81 applies to vicariously liable parties as well as active tortfeasors also harmonizes with Florida's contribution statute. See § 768.31(2)(e), Fla....

...Appellant also asserts that an employer who has paid benefits to an employee under the act and whose negligence and wanton misconduct was a proximate cause of the employee's injuries is jointly and severally liable in tort to a third party tortfeasor under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...sor who was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct which contributed to the injuries. We hold that the questioned statute (Section 440.11, Florida Statutes) is constitutional, that an employer is not liable in tort to a third party tortfeasor under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, under the circumstances argued and that an active tortfeasor does not have a right to implied indemnification for damages he has paid to an injured third party from a joint tortfeasor who was guilty of willful or wanton conduct which contributed to the injuries....

...The employees sued Seaboard as a third party tortfeasor. Seaboard filed a third party claim in the actions against West Robinson seeking contribution and implied indemnity against the driver of the bus, the employer and the insurance carrier. The basis of the claim for contribution was 768.31, Florida Statutes, (the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act), the constitutionality of which was raised insofar as it failed to require liability in accordance with fault....

...440.11 is as follows: "(1) The liability of an employer prescribed in § 440.10 shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to any third party tortfeasor and to the employee, ... on account of such injury or death, ..." [2] The pertinent language of § 768.31 is as follows: "(a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them....

...uct liability tortfeasors to indicate that the state would adopt Sindell as well. Florida has enacted the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, which permits contribution according to the degree of fault of each tortfeasor. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.31(3) (Supp.1981)....

...dant-doctor and defendant-hospital; and erred further in instructing the jury that it could not apportion the negligence and damages as between the defendant-doctor and the defendant-hospital, is put to rest by Chapter 75-108, Laws of 1975, creating § 768.31, Fla....

...284, 724 P.2d 1122 (1986), or by the doctrine of laches, which looks to the provisions of the most closely-related statute of limitations. See Wadlington v. Edwards, 92 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1957). [5] Florida's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 768.31(2)(a), Fla....

...Although summons was issued against McMillan and F&C prior to submission of the second petition, the summons was improperly issued for the same reason: McMillan and F&C were not parties to the suit. Therefore the trial court did not err in denying defendants' petitions for contribution. See also Section 768.31(4)(a)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...to pay more damages than the amount for which it is responsible. Florida, like most other jurisdictions, has recognized a right of contribution on behalf of a tortfeasor who pays for the wrongdoings of additional tortfeasors. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.31 (1997); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A (1982 App.) (noting that, by 1982, eighty percent of states had recognized right of contribution)....

...contemplated by the contribution statute. *206 At common law, the right of contribution did not exist among joint tortfeasors. This common law restriction was abolished in Florida with the adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasor's Act. Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1985) states in pertinent part as follows: Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them. § 768.31(2)(a), Fla....

...The statute provides that the right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. § 768.31(2)(b), Fla....

...t is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement, or in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable. See § 768.31(2)(d), Fla....

...Thus, the party seeking contribution must plead and prove, among other necessary allegations, his own negligence and the negligence of the other tortfeasor. See Farmer's Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co., 8 Wis.2d 512, 99 N.W.2d 746 (1959); Alamida v. Wilson, 53 Hawaii 398, 495 P.2d 585 (1972). Section 768.31, Florida Statutes clearly requires that there be a common liability....

...h written and audio, offers no assistance in understanding the text. In any case, we find the meaning of this statute from its text. [3] After comparative negligence, the legislature allowed joint tortfeasors to seek contribution from one another in section 768.31, Florida Statutes, but expressly excluded intentional tortfeasors from either seeking or making contribution from negligent tortfeasors....

...da law governs whether and to what extent that award should be reduced by setoff. See Scheib v. Florida Sanitarium Benevolent Ass'n, 759 F.2d 859 (11th Cir.1985). Florida has adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. See Fla.Stat. Sec. 768.31 et seq. (1985). Section 768.31(5) provides that 15 [w]hen a release or covenant to sue or not to enforce a judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for ......

...Both the United States and the state court defendants were sued for the same wrongful death. Both suits sought to recover those damages that the Florida legislature has authorized in Fla.Stat. Sec. 768.21 (1985). The state court defendants settled out of court. Section 768.31(5) unequivocally requires that the claim against the United States be reduced by the amount of that settlement. 17 Appellee's argument that section 768.31(5) does not require a setoff is based principally on the district court's finding that the injury attributable to the United States was separate from any injury that may be attributable to the state court defendants....

...ruling departs from the essential requirements of law and results in irreparable harm. We agree. *168 The Florida Legislature adopted in 1975 the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, thus creating a statutory right of action for contribution. Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, provides that contribution may be had under the following circumstances: (2) RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION....

...789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The District Court has certified the following question for our determination: "Does the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity control over the uniform contribution among joint tortfeasors act (75-108 Laws of Florida, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes) to prevent one tortfeasor from seeking a contribution from another tortfeasor when the other tortfeasor is the spouse of the injured person who received damages from the first tortfeasor?" We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution....

...Schreier also complains that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the cross-claim of Donald Schreier and Liberty Mutual which sought contribution. The trial court appropriately entered summary judgment in favor of Clifford B. Martin, Paul H. Martin and Allstate Insurance Company pursuant to the provisions of Section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...The rights of both the settling and non-settling joint tort-feasors would be adversely effected if we were to allow plaintiffs to privately and unilaterally apportion the proceeds of a settlement agreement containing a general release. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983), provides that when two or more persons become jointly or severably liable for the same injury, a tortfeasor who pays more than his pro rata share of the liability has a right of contribution against the other tortfeasor. In order to encourage settlements, the legislature created subsection (5) of section 768.31, which provides that a joint *1351 tort-feasor who is given a release in good faith cannot be sued for contribution....

...ll of the other entities who contributed to the accident, regardless of whether they ... could have been joined as defendants." 623 So.2d at 1185. The contribution provision in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act states in pertinent part: 768.31 Contribution among tortfeasors.___ * * * * * * (3) PRO RATA SHARES.___In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability: (a) Their relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability. § 768.31(3), Fla....

...559 (M.D.Fla.1993) (order entering summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, a rape victim, in suit alleging defendant/property interests' negligent failure to warn or to *22 provide adequate protection, upon finding that the jury may not apportion fault under the "contribution among tortfeasors" law, § 768.31, among the negligent tortfeasors and the alleged rapist, an intentional tortfeasor); Kansas State Bank & Trust Co....

...from either the intentional actor or the negligent party whose negligence caused the intentional act. At the same time, the contribution statute prevents an intentional actor who pays the plaintiff from collecting against a negligent co-tortfeasor. § 768.31(2)(c), Fla....

...l parties to an action according to their relative degrees of negligence. However, the court concluded that it was precluded from doing so because of the recently enacted Uniform Contribution among Tortfeasors Act. Ch. 75-108, Laws of Fla. (creating section 768.31, Florida Statutes)....

...Instead, it held that a "plaintiff is entitled to a measurement of his full damages and the liability for these damages should be apportioned in accordance with the percentage of negligence as it relates to the total of all the defendants"; however, because of section 768.31, "[t]he negligence attributed to the defendants [is] then [to] be apportioned on a pro rata basis," and the "defendants will remain jointly and severally liable for the entire amount." 318 So.2d at 393-94....

...nt, is not the equivalent of an adjudication on the merits that will serve as a bar to continued litigation against the passive tortfeasor. [1] Our decision comports with Florida's public policy. This policy, as documented in sections 768.041(1) and 768.31(5), Florida Statutes, [2] encourages the settlement of civil actions....

...[2] Section 768.041(1), Florida Statutes (1987), states: (1) A release or covenant not to sue as to one tortfeasor for property damage to, personal injury of, or the wrongful death of any person shall not operate to release or discharge the liability of any other tortfeasor who may be liable for the same tort or death. Section 768.31(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), states: (5) RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE....

...cation and/or contribution among active joint tortfeasors contrary to the law of the State of Florida." The predicate for Hester's appeal is that his third party complaint is now governed by the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. Fla. Stat. § 768.31 (1975)....

...the setoff statutes applied only where the liability continued to be joint and several. [2] See id. at 252-53. Justice Anstead, in his specially concurring opinion in Wells, explained the interplay between the statutory schemes: Sections 46.105(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2) are actually parts of the legislative contribution scheme....

...Since the "problem" of a tortfeasor paying more than his fair share has been eliminated by the enactment of section 768.81(3), the "solution" to the problem by the scheme of contribution and setoff is no longer needed. The underlying purpose of the contribution scheme and sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2) is simply no longer served in such a case....

...release or a covenant not to sue to any person in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment. Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (2000), entitled the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, provides in pertinent part: (5) Release or covenant not to sue.-When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in goo...

...Historically, no right of contribution has existed between joint tortfeasors. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. American District Electric Protective Co., supra . However, the right of one tortfeasor to contribution from a joint tortfeasor is now controlled by the "Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act," Fla. Stat. § 768.31, a statute enacted by the Legislature in 1975....

...though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them." At this posture of the case, there are sufficient allegations of negligence *693 against the Canal Authority to show a right of contribution in favor of Florida Power and in view of § 768.31, supra, Florida Power's third party complaint for contribution against the Canal Authority should be reinstated....

...Therefore, both are affirmed. On interlocutory appeal from an order dated May 15, 1975, denying a motion for entry of an order for contribution from defendant Four Wheel Parts, St. Paul contends that the trial court erred in entering such order, citing as authority, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, and Lincenberg v....

...entered the order, May 15, 1975, the statute had not become effective, and the Lincenberg case had not yet been decided. [2] We are compelled, however, to reverse the order even though it was not improper when entered. As provided in subsection 7 of Section 768.31, supra, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, applies to "all causes of action pending on June 12, 1975, wherein the rights of contribution among joint tortfeasors is involved ..." The record demonstrates that this interlocut...

...It also involves a motive for cooperation between parties to the agreement which should be disclosed to the jury. Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1973). See Maule Industries, Inc., v. Rountree, 284 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1973); Imperial Elevator Company, Inc., v. Cohen, 311 So.2d 732 (Fla.3rd DCA 1975). [2] Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, became effective on June 12, 1975, and Lincenberg v....

...t entered on a directed verdict is the general pronouncements regarding the direction of verdicts." "A trial court may direct a verdict against a plaintiff only if no evidence is introduced on which the jury may lawfully find for the plaintiff." Id. Section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1991), the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, provides: RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE....

...1st DCA 1975). The proffered release shows that the injured plaintiff gave complete satisfaction to appellee as well as appellant as joint tort-feasors, giving appellant the right to contribution. Woods and G.E.I.C.O. v. Withrow, 413 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 1982); § 768.31, Fla....

...easor, nor jointly and severally liable, with the contribution defendant), cert. denied, 378 So.2d 350 (Fla.1979); see also Restatement of Restitution § 86 at 389-90 (1937) (noting need for common liability to trigger right of contribution); accord § 768.31, Fla....

...The pathologist's insurer, Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, settled the case prior to trial and then filed suit against the surgeon/codefendant for contribution. However, the trial court dismissed it because of the Patient's Compensation Fund's failure to comply with section 768.31(4)(d)(2), Florida Statutes (1985) and we upheld that ruling in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v....

...ie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So.2d 45, 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963) (citing Seaboard Air Line Railroad v. American District Electric Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932)). Subsequently, the Florida statute on contribution among tort-feasors section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975) was enacted. This legislation was in derogation of the common law and it permitted contribution on a pro rata basis. As we have already discussed, although the Patient's Compensation Fund was entitled, as an insurer, to seek contribution under section 768.31(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1975), it was denied that statutory contribution because of a violation of the statute's payment provision....

...Here, the Patient's Compensation Fund was attempting to assert a right of contribution via the vehicle of subrogation instead of its statutory right as an insurer. However, because the pathologist's right to contribution was lost, by reason of the violation of the statute's payment provision, section 768.31(4)(d)(2), the Patient's Compensation Fund, as subrogee to the pathologist's right to statutory contribution, would have no contribution right to subrogate....

...ants. Marjorie D. Gadarian, of Jones, Paine & Foster, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellees. DAUKSCH, Judge. This is a personal injury case wherein Appellant was the Plaintiff seeking contribution from the Appellee as a joint tortfeasor as defined in Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...rida the following determinative question passed upon by this opinion as being of great public interest: DOES THE COMMON-LAW DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY CONTROL OVER THE UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS ACT (75-108 LAWS OF FLORIDA, SECTION 768.31, FLORIDA STATUTES) TO PREVENT ONE TORTFEASOR FROM SEEKING A CONTRIBUTION FROM ANOTHER TORTFEASOR WHEN THE OTHER TORTFEASOR IS THE SPOUSE OF THE INJURED PERSON WHO RECEIVED DAMAGES FROM THE FIRST TORTFEASOR? [1] REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith....

...Jones, supra, principally because we are here deciding for the first time that the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity does not affect the right to contribution under the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors' Act (75-108 Laws of Florida, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes)....

...The legislature is presumed to be aware of relevant judicial decisions and undoubtedly was aware of the Bencomo decision when it adopted Chapter 75-108; had it intended to carve out any exception to the applicability of the contribution act it certainly could have done so, but chose not to do so. (See, for example, section 768.31(2)(g), Florida Statutes). The interpretation which this court has given the contribution act serves to promote the express legislative intent (sec. 768.31(6), Florida Statutes)....

...For these reasons and for those expressed in the majority opinion I concur in a reversal and in the certification. ALDERMAN, Judge, dissenting: The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the doctrine of interspousal immunity bars a right of contribution that would otherwise exist under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes....

...Scheib pursuant to settlement agreements between Scheib and joint tortfeasors, Dr. Paul R. Garrett (Dr. Garrett) and Florida Sanitarium and Benevolent Association (Florida Hospital), should be set off under the provisions of sections 768.-041(2) and 768.31(5), Fla.Stat....

...The district court therefore entered judgment for Scheib as follows: *862 Scheib's argument that the district court erred in setting off the amounts received by her from Florida Hospital and Dr. Garrett ($476,000) pursuant to Fla.Stat. section 768.041(2) (the setoff statute) 4 and section 768.31(5) (Florida’s enactment of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act) 5 is premised upon the fact that the trial court awarded nothing to Scheib for pain, suffering, disability, loss of enjoyment of life, or any intangible element of damage....

...The court refused to set off against the husband’s jury verdict the amounts received by the wife in a settlement which exceeded her share of the jury verdict, insisting that damages for separate causes of action must be separate. The Florida courts have consistently applied the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31(5), Fla.Stat....

...corporation in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly. 5 . Section 768.31(5), Fla.Stat....

...h the estate in the sum of $40,000, which was approved by the trial court. The release of the active tortfeasor does not of course serve also to discharge the tortfeasor vicariously liable because the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, specifically Section 768.31(5), has been interpreted to apply to all tortfeasors, whether their liability is active or derivative....

...Ward, and Gold, Vann & White, P.A., alleging that, since the amount it paid in settlement exceeded Dr. Cox's pro rata share of liability, it was entitled to contribution. The trial court dismissed with prejudice this cause of action, holding that the Fund had failed to comply with section 768.31(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), [1] authorizing contribution between joint tortfeasors. The trial judge concluded that the portion of the settlement given by the Fund did not constitute payment under section 768.31(4)(d) because it was not paid in cash. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that section 768.31(4)(d)(2) "requires a party who has satisfied a claim during the pendency of an action to both (1) fully pay the claim and (2) commence an action for contribution within one year after the agreement was made." Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v....

...l court was correct in granting dismissal with prejudice." Id. [2] In early March of 1985, while the appeal was pending, the Fund paid the note. In April, 1985, the Fund instituted another action for contribution, asserting that it had complied with section 768.31(4)(d) by paying the patient and his wife cash....

...That decision is clearly not controlling since the parties in this case are considered joint tortfeasors. In this state, a joint tortfeasor has no right to contribution except that provided by statute, and an insurer cannot have a greater right than the insured through the remedy of subrogation. Section 768.31(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1985), provides *198 that a liability insurer, upon discharge of its insured, is subrogated to the insured's right of contribution....

...There are no allegations or contentions in these proceedings that the parties were not joint tortfeasors. For the reasons expressed, we approve the district court's decision. It is so ordered. EHRLICH, C.J., and McDONALD, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 768.31(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), provides, in pertinent part: (d) If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he has ......

...rap could fall on him. As far as Count VI is concerned, the evidence falls far short of that necessary to demonstrate that Walker was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct. Count V merits more consideration. This was a claim for contribution under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), under which Seaboard asserted that the parties were joint tortfeasors and that by virtue of a judgment against it, Seaboard was entitled to recover half of the amount paid to Warder....

...The effective date of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was June 12, 1975. The act provided that it would apply to all causes of action pending on the effective date wherein the rights of contribution among joint tortfeasors were involved and to cases thereafter filed. Section 768.31(7)....

...Leesburg Hospital Association, Inc. v. Carter, 321 So.2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). It was not necessary that Warder have a judgment against both Seaboard and Walker for Seaboard to pursue its claim for contribution against Walker in a separate action. Section 768.31(4)(a)....

...While pointing out that Florida's new Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act did not apply to the case before it, the court observed that had it applied there was a provision in the statute which would have dictated the same conclusion the court reached without the benefit of the statute. The court referred to Section 768.31(4)(f), Florida Statutes (1977), [6] which states: The judgment of the court in determining the liability of the several defendants to the claimant for an injury or wrongful death shall be binding as among such defendants in determining their right to contribution. In view of Jackson v. Florida Weathermakers, supra , and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Curtiss, supra , as well as Section 768.31(4)(f), we hold that Seaboard's claim for contribution under Florida's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was precluded by the judgment upon directed verdict in favor of Walker entered in the Warder suit to which Seaboard was a party....

...ected the shipper's argument that the railroad's acceptance of the defectively loaded car constituted an independent intervening cause. [5] The statute has now been amended to provide for the allocation of liability based upon degrees of fault. Sec. 768.31(3)(a), Fla....

...176, 126 N.W.2d 239 (1964). At least where both tortfeasors are parties to the same action, each of them would have the opportunity to try to participate in an adversarial manner in any determination which might lead to the exoneration of the other. [7] Even though Sec. 768.31(4)(f) would not apply to Seaboard's claims under Counts II, III, and IV, the rationale of these two cases reflect another reason why a directed verdict for Walker should have been entered upon these counts....

...We affirm the summary judgment as to contribution, but reverse as to indemnity and the right to amend third party plaintiff's complaint. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinions expressed herein. NOTES [1] § 768.31, Fla....

...We note in passing that, because the decision in Paoli conflicts with that in Mieure v. Moore, 330 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), upholding inter-spousal immunity in the face of the Uniform Act, the question presented has been certified to the supreme court. [4] § 768.31(2)(f), Fla....

...Issen, 318 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1975) and subsequent statutory developments. In Lincenberg, the court decided that the doctrine of comparative negligence was not incompatible with the 1975 version of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), which required that fault could not be the basis for determining a defendant's contribution. The present contribution statute provides that relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for determining contribution. Section 768.31(3)(a) Florida Statutes (1979)....

...es a pure apportionment of damages. See Lincenberg at 392, n. 2. SCL further argues that the driver's settlement release which was executed by Webb and Strong for $14,000 should act as a settlement by Webb and Strong for 75% of their claim. However, Section 768.31(5)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that such a release "reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release." The plain language of the statute supports the trial judge's decision that the judgment should be reduced by $14,000, not by 75% of the total award....

...See Fla.App., 308 So.2d at 652-54. [4] Hanna v. Martin, 49 So.2d 585, 587 (Fla. 1950). [5] We note that the 1975 Legislature has reaffirmed the policy expressed in Section 768.041(1), Fla. Stat. (1973), by the enactment in Chapter 75-108, Laws of Florida, of a new Section 768.31(5) (a), Fla....

...First, virtually all third party claims involve situations in which a cause of action does not technically exist at the time the third party complaint is filed. For example, the statutory right of contribution does not exist until the tortfeasor "has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability... ." § 768.31(2)(b), Fla....

...For example, in the absence of third party practice, parties with potential subrogation rights can lose those rights while the initial litigation is pending because of the statute of limitations. By statute, a claim for contribution can be brought within one year after the payment. § 768.31(4), Fla....

...plaintiff's injury. Thus, a defendant could not reduce his or her liability by pointing to wrongdoing (negligent or intentional) which occurred in a separate transaction, and he or she could not seek contribution except from a joint tortfeasor. See § 768.31(2)(a) & (c), Fla....

...Chadbourne, Inc., 338 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). [9] The jury allocated 50 percent of the fault to the Department and 25 percent to each of the two inmates. [10] The common law rule has also been retained in Florida's Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors statute. Although section 768.31(2)(a) and (3) permits two or more persons jointly or severally liable to seek contribution among them based on their relative degrees of fault, contribution is denied intentional tortfeasors. § 768.31(2)(c), Fla....

...perform such duties (here the County) would be a joint tortfeasor, from whom a defendant (as a joint tortfeasor) could become entitled to contribution. Licenberg v. Issen, 318 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1975); Paoli v. Shor, 345 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Nevertheless, our Supreme Court in Shor v. Paoli, 353 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1978), held that the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity does not prevent a tortfeasor from seeking contribution from another tortfeasor under the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors' Act (Section 768.31, Florida Statutes [1975]) even though the other tortfeasor is the spouse of the successful plaintiff....

...Florida is thus a member of the small but growing minority of jurisdictions which have adopted the doctrine that family immunity is merely a bar to the right to sue another and does not affect the status of the negligent family member as a joint-tortfeasor, which, under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979), is indispensable to liability for contribution....

...Seaboard filed a post-trial motion for contribution from Frier's and Hartford and attached to the motion the agreement entered into by Frier's, Hartford and Parker. The motion alleged that the agreement was not based upon any consideration and "... attempts to abrogate the provisions of Florida Statute 768.31 ..." The trial court granted Seaboard's motion for contribution and ordered that Frier's and Hartford pay Seaboard $75,000, plus one-half the costs and interest. Frier's and Hartford contend that the trial court erred in failing to apply Section 768.31(5)(b) and ordering contribution. Subsection 768.31(5) of Florida's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act reads as follows: "(5) Release or covenant not to sue....

...e admissible into evidence. Ward v. Ochoa, supra; Maule Industries, Inc. v. Roundtree, 284 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1973). The agreement between Parker, Frier's and Hartford is obviously a Mary Carter agreement. It is also a covenant not to enforce judgment. Section 768.31(5)(b) clearly states that when a covenant not to enforce judgment is given in good faith, "......

...s of the counter-claim, they do not state causes of action. Contribution, the claim asserted in count VII, is exclusively a statutory remedy. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 559 So.2d 195, 197 (Fla.1990). Section 768.31, The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, provides: (2) Right to contribution.— (a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the *174 same injury to perso...

...Partial abrogation of the doctrine of parent-child immunity will disrupt the unity and harmony of that interlocking network of relationships we call the family. NOTES [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. [2] We do not consider this issue, but leave it to the trial court to reexamine the apportionment on remand. [3] § 768.31, Fla. Stat. (1975). [4] Ch. 76-186, § 1, Laws of Fla., amending § 768.31(3)(a), Fla....

...At this point, the Court stated in footnote 2 that among the alternatives considered was pure apportionment whereby the plaintiff may recover judgment against codefendants only for the percentage of damages caused by the negligence of each individual defendant. However, the Court noted that the legislature had just passed section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), which provided for contribution among joint tortfeasors and interpreted the statute as retaining the "full, joint, and several liability of joint tortfeasors to the plaintiff." Thus, the Court held: The plaint...

...an entire accidental loss on one of the parties whose negligent conduct combined with the negligence of the other party to produce the loss." Id. at 436. In furtherance of the principles set forth in Hoffman, this Court, recognizing the enactment of section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), removed the common law bar against contribution between joint tortfeasors in Lincenberg v....

...The plaintiff in Lincenberg was faultless. The opinion never squarely addressed the issue of whether joint and several liability was consistent with Florida's new system of comparative negligence. Although some reference was made in dicta concerning the effect of section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), those statements were never intended *203 to mean that section 768.31 codified joint and several liability. Section 768.31 adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which sets out the scheme governing the allocation and the limits of a joint tortfeasor's contribution rights. [1] A literal reading of this statute makes it clear that only when joint and several liability is found will the statute apply. § 768.31(2)(a)....

...152, 154, 646 P.2d 579, 581 (Ct.App.) (act does not purport to determine whether a person is jointly or severally liable to a plaintiff), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982), affirmed sub nom., Taylor v. Delgarno Transportation, Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983). See also § 768.31(6), Fla....

...1st DCA 1981) (joint and several liability applies despite adoption of comparative negligence), review denied, 419 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1982), approved as modified, 438 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1983). None of these cases involved a situation where the plaintiff's fault exceeded that of the targeted joint tortfeasor. Section 768.31 does not prevent a change in the doctrine of joint and several liability or when it is to be applied....

...merica. For purposes of this opinion, both parties shall be referred to as Disney. [3] One weakness in this argument is that the social upheaval, if it occurred, took place in Hoffman v. Jones , which predated Lincenberg. The subsequent amendment to section 768.31 in which contribution was changed from a pro rata to a percentage basis, by itself, could hardly be deemed to have such momentous consequences....

...§ 33.001(b) (Vernon 1986). [5] We note that the same legislation included the creation of an Academic Task Force to study and make recommendations to the legislature concerning all aspects of tort and insurance law. [1] At the time this Court decided Lincenberg, § 768.31 mandated that contribution shares had to be allocated on a pro rata basis without consideration of the parties' relative degrees of fault. § 768.31(3)(a), Fla....

...ault. In 1976, however, the legislature amended the statute to conform more closely with the theoretical underpinnings of Hoffman. Ch. 76-186, § 1, Laws of Fla. The statute now provides that contribution is to be based on relative degrees of fault. § 768.31(3)(a), Fla....

...ns in their memorandum filed on May 2, 1985. As explained in the order dated March 11, 1985, this Court's decision to dismiss the crossclaims was made pursuant to the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, as enacted in Florida, Fla.Stat. Ann. § 768.31 (West) (1975), and applied by this Court in this admiralty action....

...Upon motion by the third party defendants, the trial court granted summary judgment denying K-Mart any relief. K-Mart argues it is entitled to indemnification based on either a theory of common law indemnity or contractual indemnity, and to contribution pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...of implied warranty by a retailer who does not manufacture the product, constitutes "wrongful conduct" in this context. Therefore, K-Mart should not be barred from pursuing its indemnity rights against Chairs based on a contract theory. Contribution Section 768.31 abrogates the common-law rule that a release of one or more joint tortfeasors discharges all other joint tortfeasors....

...The retailer held strictly liable to his customer in these circumstances will be entitled to recover common law indemnity from the manufacturer of the defective product. [5] University Plaza Shopping Center, Inc. v. Stewart, 272 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1973). [6] § 768.31(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981). [7] § 768.31(5), Fla....

...or recognizing the right of the plaintiff to seek recovery on the basis of apportionment of fault while denying the right of fault allocation as between negligent defendants." Id. at 391. However, recognizing that the legislature had recently passed section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, we declined consideration of the abrogation of joint and several liability in deference to legislative attention to these issues....

...Dunn 31,984.97 Sobik 50,201.99 Claimants then executed a release in favor of Jackson and his carrier. Subsequently, Sobik's carrier filed a claim for contribution against Jackson's carrier under the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31 et seq., Florida Statutes (1977), contending that the release given Jackson was not given in good faith pursuant to Section 768.31(5) [2] and that Jackson's carrier was responsible for a pro rata share of the common liability instead of the $1,000.00 paid by Jackson to the claimants....

...ed by the commissioners to provide that a release given in good faith completely released the tortfeasor involved from all claims, including contribution claims, and that the amount of the claim would be reduced only by the amount of the settlement. Section 768.31(5) contains similar provisions....

...aith requirement is conscientiously enforced settlements may be discouraged. [5] By settlement and the release granted incident thereto a tortfeasor is relieved of all liability, including liability to another tortfeasor having a contribution claim. Section 768.31(5), supra....

...*985 Dionese is admittedly not on all fours with the factual situation presented by the instant case. However, in the course of that opinion, the Supreme Court enumerated several reasons why allocation in the settlement agreement is desirable, which we find persuasive herein. First of all, to encourage settlement, section 768.31(5) provides that a joint tortfeasor who is given a release in good faith cannot be sued for contribution....

...y v. Hirst, 30 Fla. 1, 11 So. 506 (1892); National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Holland, 269 So.2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), cert. denied, 273 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1973). It is also true, as Roy states, that Florida's contribution among tortfeasors statute, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983), denies willful joint tortfeasors the right to contribution....

...On appeal, this judgment was affirmed per curiam without opinion. First Arlington Inv. Corp. v. Ulmer, 446 So.2d 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). On November 15, 1984, the court entered final summary judgment against Auto-Owners because it did not obtain a release from Ulmer as required by section 768.31(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1987), and therefore could not maintain a suit for contribution against St....

...btain a complete exoneration or release of Ulmer. While unknown to the common law, the doctrine of contribution is a statutory recognition of the need for an equitable apportionment of the common liability of multiple tortfeasor to an injured party. Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1987), provides for such an apportionment by requiring each tortfeasor to pay his or her share of a settlement or judgment....

...Finally, illustration six [2] to comment c of Section 174 reveals appellees' liability to Anderson. For purposes of contribution, neither Florida nor Georgia law required Anderson to join appellees as defendants, nor required appellant to implead appellees. Section 768.31, Fla....

...We found that the public policy in protecting an insurer from collusive law suits which supported such clauses was not served within the context of contribution claims against a joint tortfeasor, and held that the policy behind the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, § 768.31, Fla....

...Paoli, 353 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1977). Distinguish Reid v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 352 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 1977). In Florida Farm Bureau v. GEICO, supra, we certified the question of whether a family exclusion clause in an automobile liability policy would control over § 768.31, where the tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought is the husband of the injured plaintiff, to the Florida Supreme Court as being a question of great public interest....

...Furthermore, "[t]here [was] no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally (wilfully or wantonly) caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death." Insurance Co. of North America v. Poseidon Maritime Servs., 561 So.2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (citing § 768.31(2)(c), Fla.Stat....

...First Morales argued that under section 768.50, Florida Statutes (1981), [1] he was entitled to a set-off of collateral sources of approximately $120,000 received by Scherer from Medicare and Social Security payments. Second, Morales argued that under section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1989), [2] the $100,000 which was to be paid to Scherer in accordance with the pretrial settlement agreement should be deducted from the judgment....

...practice, which is the time a malpractice action accrues for purposes of applying the statute of limitations, section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (1989). Next, we turn to the district court's finding that Morales was not entitled to a reduction under section 768.31(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), of the $100,000 pretrial settlement paid to Scherer. Section 768.31(5)(a) provides that a release given to one of two or more tortfeasors shall reduce the claim against any other tortfeasor "to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release ..., or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater." § 768.31(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989). Schultz was a joint tortfeasor in this action. Scherer received $100,000 to dismiss Schultz. The $100,000 was paid to satisfy the claim at issue here, not a separate claim. This arrangement clearly falls within the plain meaning of section 768.31(5)(a), contrary to the district court's finding....

...of the limitation arises post judgment. The judgment against Morales was paid up to his liability and should be satisfied. Judgment for the remaining $40,000 should be entered solely against the fund. NOTES [1] This statute was repealed in 1985. [2] Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989), addresses contribution among tortfeasors....

...See Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1975). The 1975 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Ch. 75-108, became effective several months after plaintiffs' cause of action was reduced to judgment and therefore has no application to this case. Section 768.31(7), Florida Statutes, 1975....

...Spaulding v. Florida Gas Company, 249 So.2d 695 (1 Fla.App. 1971). [8] Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Curtiss, 327 So.2d 82 (1 Fla.App. 1976). [9] Sunspan Eng. & Const. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffold Co., 310 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1975). [10] Florida Statute 768.31. [11] Florida Statute 768.31(2) (a)....

...Van Buren School Dist. No. 42, 264 Ark. 810, 575 S.W.2d 445, 448 (1979). Waxman additionally argues that the comparative negligence defense was common to both himself and St. Mary's and that the jury ultimately found the plaintiff 12% negligent. Since Section 768.31(3)(a), Florida Statutes, Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1982), provides that joint tortfeasors are responsible for their pro rata share of the entire liability, if Waxman is liable for the full $150,000, he argues that he will pay more than his pro rata share....

...contribution. In the motion for leave to amend, EAC explained that discovery since the filing of the original cross-claim revealed that EAC possessed a viable contribution claim against Roberts under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasor's Act, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...h employer. Section 440.11(1), Florida Statutes (1975). The legislature further provided that there is a right *608 of contribution between joint tort-feasors "when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury." Section 768.31(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Marti, 408 So.2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1982). We have jurisdiction based on conflict, article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and approve Wilson. In Popovich we examined the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), and upheld a judgment defendant's right to appeal alleged errors in judgments exonerating codefendants. Because section 768.31(4)(f) renders the judgment of the court as to liability among several defendants binding upon those parties in terms of contribution, this Court reasoned that a party is aggrieved upon the exoneration of a codefendant and must therefore be accorded a right to appeal....

...DHS Films, Inc., 392 So.2d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). As a party to the action during the resolution of liability between Collom and Wilson, Holton was aggrieved by Wilson's initial exoneration by summary judgment and should have joined in Collom's appeal. Under section 768.31(4)(f), Florida Statutes (1983), if the judgment apportions liability between the parties, it is also determinative of contribution rights between the parties....

...dant Fair. The issue focused upon by the First District, in Christiani v. Popovich, 363 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and subsequently this court, was whether the operators and Midway were entitled to appeal the judgment exonerating the Fair. Because section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975) rendered the findings of liability determinative of contribution rights, we held that the operators and Midway, who happened to have the status of judgment defendants, should be accorded the right to appeal the Fair's exoneration....

...Finally, we must make a point as to the scope of this ruling, and distinguish between contribution and indemnity. Since a claim in contribution is predicated on a finding of common liability, the resolution of liability as between the plaintiff and one of the defendants binds the other defendant. See § 768.31(4)(f), Fla....

...The Huets alleged that if they are deemed liable to the Tromps for any damages arising from the damage to or loss of use of the vehicle, they are entitled to recover from Mike Shad Ford the amount of damages that are adjudged to be due in excess of the Huets' pro rata share of liability, pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes....

...City of Jacksonville, 347 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Hester v. Gatlin, 332 So.2d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). [2] The appellees argue that they would be "prejudiced" if the release were reformed because of their inability to secure contribution from Mysorewalla and Preferred under § 768.31(5)(b), Fla....

...Vicki accepted the offer of settlement and executed a release in favor of the defendants. The release did not mention her mother or anyone in privity with her. Doris Woods and her insurer then moved for summary judgment on the defendants' claim for contribution, relying on subsection 768.31(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1979). Contribution among tortfeasors is governed by section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979), which codifies Florida's version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. Subsection (2) states the conditions governing the right of contribution among tortfeasors. Subsection 768.31(2)(d) provides: *1181 A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement or i...

...On appeal the district court reversed the summary judgment. It held that there was a right to contribution against a parent as a joint tortfeasor, and that in light of the family immunity's bar on direct actions between child and parent the requirements of subsection 768.31(2)(d) had been satisfied....

...Woods raises two issues for our consideration. The first is whether there is a right of contribution against a joint tortfeasor who is the parent of the injured minor. The second is whether a tortfeasor who fails to comply with the provisions of subsection 768.31(2)(d) may obtain contribution against the parent of the injured minor....

...ontribution will not be allowed. The second issue deals with the district court's decision reversing the ruling of the trial court that contribution would not be allowed because the settlement and release did not meet the statutory requirement of subsection 768.31(2)(d)....

...Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 2; Commissioner's Comment (1955 Revision), 12 U.L.A. 87-88 (Master Ed. 1975); Note, Contribution Act Construed — Should Joint and Several Liability Have Been Considered First?, 30 U. Miami L.Rev. 747 (1976). Subsection 768.31(4) provides that the right of contribution may be enforced either by separate action or in the same action as the initial claim when two or more defendants are adjudged liable....

...ave extinguished the "full responsibility to the claimant." A tortfeasor who settles without extinguishing the entire liability, and whose payment later turns out to be less than his fair share, is not subject to actions for contributions to others. § 768.31(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1979). A tortfeasor who settles without extinguishing the liability of another tortfeasor, and whose payment later turns out to be more than his fair share, has no right of contribution against the other. Id.; § 768.31(2)(d), Fla....

...Woods were without liability insurance coverage, then there would be no right to contribution. On the *1184 other hand, if Mrs. Woods were protected by liability insurance, since the release granted respondents did not relieve her liability, she would not be liable for contribution under subsection 768.31(2)(d)....

...SUNDBERG, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON and McDONALD, JJ., concur. ALDERMAN, J., concurs in result only. BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion. BOYD, Justice, dissenting. In Shor v. Paoli, 353 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1977), this Court held that under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979), a tortfeasor could seek contribution from another person whose negligence had contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, even though the other person was immune from a direct action by virtue of a family relationship (marriage) with the plaintiff....

...If we are to adhere to Shor and apply the Contribution Act to the parent's contributory negligence, then there can be no recovery of contribution in this case, because the settlement between the tortfeasor and the child did not "extinguish" the liability of the other contributorily negligent party, i.e., the mother. § 768.31(2)(d), Fla....

...Rehearing was ordered on the court's own motion, the court indicating that the earlier "panel opinion," 392 So.2d at 258, in Quest was in conflict with 3-M Electric Corp. Quest was certified to this Court and has been published as Joseph v. Quest , No. 60,237, ___ So.2d ___ (Fla. April 29, 1982). [2] § 768.31(2), Fla....

...joint tortfeasors." It did not take long for the change to come to pass. The legislature passed the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and specified that it should apply to all causes of action pending at the time of its passage. Fla. Stat. § 768.31 (1975)....

...Diaco and Hochberg resolving the wrongful death action as to all parties named in Robarts' complaint. In the agreement, as consideration for the settlement, the two doctors paid Robarts $250,000 and assigned to her any right to contribution from St. Joseph's they *913 might have under section 768.31 et seq., Florida Statutes (1989), Florida's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act....

...his release. (b) Joseph F. Diaco and Bernard M. Hochberg, hereby assign and transfer to Edna H. Robarts, Personal Representative of the Estate of Gene F. Robarts, deceased, any and all rights or claims that exist in their favor in contribution under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, and/or in indemnity against St....

...Robarts, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gene F. Robarts, deceased, or her attorneys as to the value, if any, of the assignment of their claim against St. Joseph's Hospital, *914 Inc., or the legal viability of that assignment. The essential and pertinent parts of section 768.31 are as follows: (2) RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION....

...or the wrongful death action by means of the settlement agreement and that any additional recovery by means of the assignment would be in excess of full and fair compensation and, therefore, unconscionable; (2) that a claim for contribution based on section 768.31 is an action arising out of a tort claim and, under Florida law, is generally not assignable; and (3) that the settlement executed by Robarts and the attempted assignment to her, by their own terms, extinguished any rights Robarts might claim to contribution against St....

...nt, *915 but we disagree with his findings and conclusions that the assignment to Robarts is invalid and conveys to her no actionable rights against St. Joseph's. We find, therefore, that the trial judge erred in dismissing Robarts' complaint. Under section 768.31(2)(b), a joint tortfeasor is entitled to contribution only for the amount that he has paid which exceeds his pro rata share of the common liability. While the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, adopted by Florida as section 768.31, is silent as to the assignability of the right to contribution it creates, rights to contribution are generally recognized as being assignable....

...tween those parties. Such a plaintiff may, by way of such an assignment, ultimately recover more than what his full compensation for damages resulting from the tort alone would have been. However, that plaintiff cannot, because of the limitations of section 768.31(2)(b) and (3), recover more from a nonsettling joint tortfeasor on the assignment than the assigning tortfeasor paid in excess of his pro rata share of liability for the tort....

...Further, for such a right of contribution to exist, a nonsettling joint tortfeasor must also have been released from all liability to the injured party for the tort. Likewise, such a tortfeasor cannot be held responsible or obligated for any part of a settlement paid which is in excess of what is reasonable. Section 768.31(2)(d). Therefore, under the scheme prescribed by section 768.31, all liability for the tort claim must have been extinguished as to any joint tortfeasors against whom a right of contribution is sought to be exercised....

...That right of contribution is a right separate and apart from the tort, created by statute and, therefore, assignable. Notarian v. Plantation AMC Jeep, Inc., 567 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Finally, we must address and reject appellees' argument that the very terms of the settlement agreement itself and section 768.31(5)(b) extinguish any rights, including the assigned right of contribution, that Robarts might have had....

...and defeat the clear intent of the instrument when read as a whole. It is clear to us, for several reasons, that the language in paragraph (a) does not release St. Joseph's from Robarts' assigned claim for contribution. As we hereinbefore discussed, section 768.31(2)(d) mandates that a claim for contribution cannot exist in favor of a settling tortfeasor unless the settlement also releases the joint tortfeasors against whom the contribution is sought....

...estate. Paragraph (c) also has a concluding sentence that states: "Provided that such designation does not affect the validity of this assignment." We must also address, in analyzing appellees' final argument, an apparent incongruity that appears in section 768.31. As we have observed, section 768.31(2)(d) clearly requires that before a right of contribution arises in favor of a settling tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the liability, any joint tortfeasor who might be subject to contribution must also be released from liability for the underlying tort by the settlement agreement. Section 768.31(5), however, provides the following: (5) RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE....

...or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and, (b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor. (Emphasis supplied.) Read literally, section 768.31(5)(b) could be construed to take away the very right of contribution that section 768.31(2)(d) creates. Clearly, this was not the intent of the legislature in enacting those sections, so we must construe *917 the legislative intent and choice of words to reach a reasonable result. We, therefore, construe section 768.31(5)(b) to release from any liability for contribution only those tortfeasors who, as a signatory party to a settlement agreement, have paid something to the party injured by the tort and have received back from that injured party a release from liability....

...We hold that where a settlement is entered into by an injured party and a joint tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the liability for the tort, and the settlement gratuitously releases other joint tortfeasors, those gratuitously released joint tortfeasors are not, by reason of the wording of section 768.31(5)(b), released from the obligation of contribution created by section 768.31(2)(d) to their joint tortfeasor who has entered into, paid for and procured the settlement. Our interpretation of the appropriate interrelationship between sections 768.31(2)(d) and 768.31(5) is supported by Dean v....

...,000.00, he secured the release for himself and bought the possible right to proceed against any other joint tortfeasors for contribution. See Lincenberg v. Issen, Fla. 1975, 318 So.2d 386." 336 So.2d at 395. Also on point with our interpretation of section 768.31(5) is the Colorado Court of Appeals decision in Miller v....

...o the settlement. Colorado had adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. The Millers sued the Jarrells for contribution. The Jarrells moved to dismiss the Millers' action for contribution arguing that Colorado's equivalent to Florida's section 768.31(5)(b) barred the action for contribution since the release procured by the Millers released the Jarrells as well as the Millers. The Colorado court disagreed, interpreting the Colorado equivalent of our section 768.31(5)(b) even more narrowly than we find necessary....

...The reason for this is obvious: the Grazianos are the insiders who actually committed the fraud and the thefts. They suffered no economic losses. As intentional tortfeasors, they clearly are not entitled to contribution from these defendants for the damages that they rightfully owe to the customers. See § 768.31(2)(c), Fla....

...laim against the general contractor; and a counterclaim against Mario and Maria Vigoa, the appellees herein, the parents of the injured minor child. The said counterclaim states that 3-M Electric has a right of contribution against the parents under § 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975) based upon the allegation that they negligently failed to adequately and reasonably care for, protect and supervise the minor child....

...[3] Fireman's Fund also asks the Court to dismiss the case on the grounds that: (1) the claims asserted by Twin City, Liberty Mutual, and J.C. Penney are barred under the one-year statute of limitations applicable to cases under Florida's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Fla. Stat. § 768.31(4)(d); and (2) there can be no action for contribution when a joint tortfeasor settles but the settlement does not extinguish all liability of the non-settling joint tortfeasor....

...rtion of the entire judgment against tortfeasors who were jointly and severally liable. Rather, as Florida law makes clear, the appropriate remedy when one joint tortfeasor has paid more than his or her share is to seek contribution. Fla. Stat. Ann. §768.31(2) (West 2000)....

...h Howard; and (2) if the wrongful death action is permissible, then a set-off is required. We disagree with Safecare and find the district court's rationale and holding correct. First, the district court correctly found that sections 768.041 [2] and 768.31(5), [3] Florida Statutes (1989), provide that a jointtortfeasor is not released by the execution of a release in favor of another tortfeasor....

...257, 65 So. 8 (1914). If the injured party has been paid and by operation of law both tortfeasors have been released, under our rationale in Variety it would necessarily follow that the estate would have had no cause of action against a joint tortfeasor. Subsection 768.31(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), modified the rule that the release of one tortfeasor released the other and in its stead allowed a set-off in the amount paid by the settling tortfeasor when the second tortfeasor was sued....

...corporation in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly. [3] Section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1989), reads in part: When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death: (a) It d...

...a revocation of the order of discharge "if it becomes necessary that further administration of the estate be had for any cause." With regard to the finding of laches below, Kent commenced its contribution action well within the period established in Section 768.31(4)(c), which gives tortfeasors one year after appellate review of a judgment for injury within which to file a separate action for contribution....

...ed was caused by the negligence of Superior. Superior and New Hampshire filed a third party action against David Petrik who was driving the vehicle in which the plaintiffs were passengers at the time of the accident, seeking contribution pursuant to Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975). The court dismissed the third party complaint stating: "It states a cause of action for contribution among joint tortfeasors under Section 768.31, F.S. Section 768.31(4)(d), F.S., prevents the use of third party practice to achieve that contribution, despite Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co....

...ay cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him... ." The pertinent sections of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), state: Section 768.31(2)(a) — "Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them." Section 768.31(2)(b) — "The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share... ." Section 768.31(4)(a) — "Whether or not judgment has been entered in an action against two or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced by separate action." Section 768.31(4)(d) — "If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he has either: 1....

...the liability and commenced his action for contribution." The Second District Court of Appeal dealt with the same question in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Fouts, 323 So.2d 593 (Fla.2d DCA 1975). In that case, the court stated: "Fla. Stat. § 768.31 (1975) does not specifically provide for the enforcement of contribution by way of third party practice....

...Corp., Fla.App.2d, 1969, 226 So.2d 836." In Florida Power Corporation v. Taylor, 332 So.2d 687 (Fla.2d DCA 1976), the Second District Court of Appeal reinstated the defendant's third party action for contribution against a tortfeasor not sued by the plaintiff. Section 768.31(4)(a) does not state that contribution must be enforced by separate action....

...een co-fiduciaries. In response to NCNB's motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaims, defendants argue for the first time that any right of contribution they seek arises under state, not federal, law. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, provides that the Act "shall not apply to breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obligation." Fla.Stat. § 768.31(2)(g) (1987)....

...See also Eason v. Lau, 369 So.2d 600, 602 (1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 1365 (Fla.1979). If, as defendants Fairchild and the Fairchild Directors contend, they were not "fiduciaries" at the time of the challenged conduct, no liability can be imposed and Section 768.31 will not be invoked....

...[8] In this court's order of September 19, 1990, I requested that the parties submit briefs addressing the preemptive effect of ERISA on defendant Industries' counterclaim for contribution under Florida law. (doc. 142). Because I have concluded that Section 768.31 is inapplicable to this action, I find it unnecessary to address the preemptive effect of ERISA....

...Everett Boyd of Ervin, Varn, Jacobs, Odom & Kitchen, Tallahassee, for appellants. M. Howard Williams, Timothy D. Harley, of Williams, Gibson & Harley, Tallahassee, for appellees. BOYER, Judge. The primary issue to be resolved by this appeal from a partial summary judgment relates to the effect, if any, of chapter 75-108 (F.S. 768.31), known as the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act on F.S....

...(which finding was in accordance with an oral stipulation among the parties before the court); that the voluntary dismissal with prejudice as to Virgo was "tantamount to a release"; that F.S. 768.041 was neither expressly nor impliedly repealed by F.S. 768.31 and that F.S....

...768.041 and that accordingly under that statute a release of one tortfeasor does not, and did not, operate as a release or discharge of the other joint tortfeasors. However, appellants contend that F.S. 768.041 was repealed by chapter 75-108, Laws of Florida (F.S. 768.31) entitled the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. We must, therefore, examine the affect of that statute. F.S. 768.31(2)(g) specifically provides that: *602 "This act shall not apply to breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obligation." As already stated, the parties agree in their briefs that the type of tort charged in the amended complaint sub judice involves moral turpitude and an alleged breach of trust or fiduciary obligation....

...The Florida legislature adopted the uniform act verbatim. (See 12 Uniform Laws Annotated at pages 57 though 107) It syllogistically follows, therefore, that if the tort charged sub judice involved breach of trust or other fiduciary obligation and that F.S. 768.31 (the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act) is not applicable to breaches of trust or other fiduciary obligation and if 768.041 is applicable to all torts, as held by the Supreme Court in the Batchelor case, then the conclusion is inescapable that F.S. 768.31 is inapplicable and F.S. 768.041 is controlling. F.S. 768.041 being controlling, the common law rule is inapplicable; therefore the release of Virgo did not operate as a release or discharge of the other joint tortfeasors. Further, even if F.S. 768.31(2)(g) did not contain the recitation that the "act" shall not apply to breaches of trust or other fiduciary obligations, still that act (F.S. 768.31) did not repeal F.S....

...e only governing rule, or that it revises the subject matter of the former. Beasley v. Coleman, 136 Fla. 393, 180 So. 625. * *" (161 So.2d at page 46) We recognize the similarity between the subject matter treated in F.S. 768.041(1) and subsection F.S. 768.31(5) of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, which provides: "Release or covenant not to sue....

...aled." But we simply find no inconsistency. F.S. 768.041(1) provides that a release or covenant not to sue as to one tortfeasor shall not operate to release or discharge the liability of any tortfeasor who may be liable for the same tort or death. F.S. 768.31(5) provides essentially the same but goes on to provide the effect of such a release. Since, however, F.S. 768.31 does not apply to breaches of trust or other fiduciary obligations that act simply has no application to the case sub judice....

...McSmith, Inc., 294 So.2d 27 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); State Department of Public Welfare v. Galilean Children's Home, 102 So.2d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958); accord, State ex rel. Myers v. Cone, 139 Fla. 437, 190 So. 698 (1939)." Applying that decision sub judice, F.S. 768.31 does not constitute a complete revision of the subject because, as observed already, it is inapplicable by its own wording to breaches of trust or other fiduciary obligations; the legislature is presumed to have known of the existing law, F.S....

...768.041; and each statute yet has a field of operation. In summary, we hold: (a) A dismissal with prejudice is tantamount or equivalent to a release. (b) The common law rule relating to release of a joint tortfeasor was abrogated by F.S. 768.041. (c) F.S. 768.041 was not repealed by F.S. 768.31 and is therefore yet in full force and effect. (d) F.S. 768.31 does not apply to breaches of trust or other fiduciary obligations....

...1st DCA 1978). The district court held that a judgment defendant has a right of appeal from an alleged error in judgment which exonerated codefendants of liability to the plaintiffs under the contribution among joint tort-feasors statutory provision, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...heir codefendant Pensacola Interstate Fair, Inc., and the judgment entered as a result of the directed verdict in favor of the codefendant Gulf Power Company. On appeal, the district court held that (1) the contribution among joint tort-feasors act, section 768.31, was applicable; (2) Christiani and Goodings may appeal alleged errors in judgments which exonerated the codefendants Pensacola Interstate Fair, Inc., and Gulf Power Company; and (3) the trial court erred in granting the summary judgme...

...Travis argued this indicated he was not included in the definition of "Defendants." In this case, the trial court's ruling was based on the language found in the settlement agreement and general release. In order for Soncoast to litigate a contribution action against Travis, Travis must be covered by the general release. See § 768.31(2)(d), Fla....

...d and this action is remanded with directions to enter summary judgment on the cross-claim in favor of Liberty Mutual. By way of a separate interlocutory appeal, Case No. 82-1479, Liberty Mutual argues its right to seek contribution from Jones under section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Kieffer of Sanders, McEwan, Mims & McDonald, Orlando, for appellee Arthur Cassell d/b/a Cassel's Garage. ORFINGER, Judge. The issue presented by this appeal is how long the trial court continues to have jurisdiction to entertain a motion for contribution under section 768.31(4) of Florida Statutes (1979), the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, after the final judgment determining liability is rendered....

...[1] While the statute prescribes a time limitation within which to file a separate action where a judgment has been entered against the tort feasor seeking contribution, [2] no time is specified within which a motion for contribution may be filed. Section 768.31(4)(b) states: When a judgment has been entered in an action against two or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced in that action by judgment in favor of one against other judgment defendants, by motion upon notice to all parties to the action....

...Sub judice, since contribution was sought by motion filed in the original action, we do not discuss any issue which might be raised with regard to the filing of a separate action for contribution, and specifically, when the right to file such action terminates. [2] § 768.31(4)(c), Fla....

...after the judgment has become final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review. [3] The Zack court may have extended the jurisdiction of the trial court for thirty days following rendition of the final judgment because of the language in section 768.31(4)(c) which permits the filing of a separate action for contribution within one year after the judgment has become final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review. No similar language is contained in section 768.31(4)(b)....

...attempt to access such documents through claiming an at-issue waiver or selective disclosure. Id., at 512 . . In Home Ins. Co. v. Advance Machine Co., the Florida appellate court determined that the mere bringing of a lawsuit pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 768.31 for contribution (among tortfeasors) toward a settlement-when such statutoiy-based action requires an allegation that the settlement was reasonable-is not enough, in itself, to constitute a waiver of attorney-client privilege as to the plai...

...ble by the plaintiff. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So.2d 386, (Fla., opinion filed July 30, 1975). If one of the several defendants is required to pay more than his pro rata share of the common liability, his remedy is in the nature of contribution. See Section 768.31, Florida Statutes....

...[3] $450,000 damages sustained, less the amount of damages attributable to Erick's negligence, $90,000. [4] $20,000 damages sustained, less the amount of damages attributable to Erick's negligence, $4,000. [5] Final judgment shall reflect a credit for the amount which Milliron has already paid pursuant to sec. 768.31 (5) (a), F.S....

...the grounds that the state, by reason of the indemnification agreement with Batton, had no common liability for Batton's injury. The common law doctrine precluding contribution among joint tort-feasors was abrogated by the legislature's enactment of section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act....

...y states that a cross-claim "is always permissive." The reason that the cross-claim is permissive is grounded in the substantive law because the right to contribution does not accrue until "two or more persons become jointly or severally liable...." § 768.31(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1993). After the judgment has been so entered, "contribution may be enforced ... by motion notice to all parties to the action." § 768.31(4)(b), Fla.Stat....

...damages, notwithstanding the fact that appellant was only liable for a percentage of the damages; i.e., comparative negligence. Logic and reason dictate that appellant be permitted to file a claim against Lariosa, as a joint tortfeasor, pursuant to Section 768.31, Florida Statute (1975)....

...[4] Under the common law of 1968, of course, the employer had no right of contribution against a joint tortfeasor, much less against a vice principal. See Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1975); Kellenberger v. Widener, 159 So.2d 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963); § 768.31, Fla....

...H.J. Wilson Co., 482 So.2d 341 (Fla.1986); Cold Storage Cafe, Inc. v. Barone, 779 So.2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Dr. Kaufmann argues that this principle applies only when a codefendant is seeking to protect his statutory right to contribution under section 768.31, Florida Statutes (2000), and not when a defendant merely seeks to preserve his ability to include a codefendant *327 as a Fabre defendant on the verdict form....

...sing their amended third-party complaint against John W. Adams, D.O., with prejudice. On appeal we examine the appellants' contention that they are entitled to contribution from Dr. Adams under Florida's "Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act," section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Huprich with the wrong prescription, the subsequent failure of Dr. Adams to recognize the error would not render him a joint tortfeasor. This motion was granted and the third-party complaint dismissed with prejudice on the authority of Stuart and this appeal ensued. Section 768.31(2)(a) provides a right of contribution "when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury." In Stuart, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the doctrines of indemnity and contribution among subsequent tortfeasors are not cognizable under Florida law....

...NOTES [1] We note that a factual situation could exist which might support an action against a doctor and a pharmacist as joint tortfeasors; thus, we limit our affirmance to the narrow issue presented in this case. [2] Our conclusion that appellants do not have a cause of action against Dr. Adams under section 768.31(2)(a) does not preclude them from attempting to establish the defense that Dr....

...ion of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of the rendering of the judgment and enter judgment accordingly ... To the same effect is Section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1989), which states in part: When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death: (...

...other tortfeasor for the damages recoverable in the same cause of action. Accordingly, since there are two *234 different actions involved here — a personal injury action and a wrongful death action — the set-off provisions of sections 768.041 and 768.31 should not apply....

...On the other hand, Safecare contends that it is not that clear that set-off is only appropriate in a situation involving recovery by a plaintiff against one of multiple tortfeasors in a single cause of action. Rather, it asserts, sections 768.041 and 768.31 suggest that set-off may be appropriate whenever the plaintiff has received a partial recovery from one of multiple defendants who may be liable in tort for the same injury, whether that injury results in a personal injury action or a claim for wrongful death....

...Howland and Krieger and Mark Freeman, Miami, for appellees. Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and COPE, JJ. SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge. Contrary to the ruling below, we hold that an alleged joint tortfeasor's settlement with the plaintiff was not made in good faith under section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1989) so as to bar a non-settling party's contribution claim....

...as a co-defendant, although she was protected by an Aetna homeowners liability policy with $50,000 limits. International, however, did file a third party action for contribution against Lorraine under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31(2), Florida Statutes (1989), [1] on the theory that she had negligently supervised the child [2] and was thus liable as a joint tortfeasor....

...se against Lorraine holding that the $5,000 settlement was "given in good faith" and therefore "discharge[d] the tortfeasor [Lorraine] to whom it [was] given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor [International Action Sports]." § 768.31(5)(b), Fla....

...itted at oral argument [8] — that the only purpose of Aetna's $5,000 payment to Christine was to eliminate Lorraine's unlimited and Aetna's $50,000 exposure on International's contribution claim. By definition, such a situation cannot qualify under section 768.31(5) since, as we view it, the act requires that the settling parties act in good faith with respect to the nonsettling ones....

...See generally Frier's, 355 So.2d at 208. It is beyond peradventure that this settlement does not conform to these standards. Accordingly, the order below is reversed for reinstatement and appropriate disposition of International's third party contribution claim. Reversed. NOTES [1] 768.31 Contribution among Tortfeasors....

...Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal.3d 488, 497-98, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 262, 698 P.2d 159, 165 (1985) in favor of the contrary rule which we adopt here. [9] See supra note 8. [10] Both California's Code Civ.Proc. § 877 and Florida's § 768.31 adopt the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.

...Regarding the appropriate statute of limitation for Showell's claim for contribution, we hold that the three-year statutory period allowed in § 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (1975), for claims against the State controls over the one-year statutory period allowed in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 768.31(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1978)....

...d not show negligence on the part of either Indian River County or the Department of Transportation. Appellant's third point urges that Indian River County and the Department of Transportation are liable for contribution or for indemnity pursuant to Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...The court finds that third-party defendant's motion to strike is without merit and, accordingly, is hereby DENIED. The Government's Rule 12(b) arguments, however, mandate further consideration and are discussed below. *113 I. CONTRIBUTION Florida's law on contribution is governed by Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983), which provides that: (2)(a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for the same wrongful dea...

...ry in this case to look at the Florida substantive law in each instance. As to contribution, the proper application of Lockheed to this case requires an interpretation of the governing substantive law, the Florida Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983)....

....S.C. § 8116(c) with § 440.11, Fla.Stat. ] Therefore, this court finds that, under Florida law, no right to contribution exists in favor of Upjohn against the United States because the parties cannot be "jointly or severally" liable as required by Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Appellant is not attempting to avoid liability, rather he is seeking contribution. One would not be entitled to contribution unless he or she were ultimately held liable. Florida has adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATFA), section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983), which provides in pertinent part: (2) Right to contribution, — (a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person o...

...Absent such liability on the part of the person from whom indemnity or contribution is sought, how can it be said, in evoking the equitable remedy, that the one seeking relief has borne an unfair share of the loss for which all are liable?" There is nothing in section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983), specifically prohibiting or permitting contribution in such a case....

...This court reversed holding that the state was open to suit for contribution, since the indemnity agreement did not provide immunity from suit by a joint tortfeasor. In so holding this court stated: The common law doctrine precluding contribution among joint tort-feasors was abrogated by the legislature's enactment of section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act....

...Armor Elevator Co., 360 So.2d at 1129. While Batton is instructive, it is not dispositive of the present issue as Batton refers to different theories of negligence, not one party liable under a strict liability theory and another allegedly liable for negligence. [4] Section 768.31(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1983), states: A liability insurer who by payment has discharged in full or in part the liability of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation as insurer is subrogated to the tortfeasor's r...

...Neither are Brothers being subjected to paying a double recovery or to pay more than the total limit of their liability. Under Florida law, as alleged co-tortfeasors they also are jointly and severally liable for the full extent of the alleged fraud — $7.1 million. And under Florida law § 768.31(2)(c) and (g), there is no right of contribution for intentional torts or for breaches of trust or other fiduciary obligation....

...The trial court dismissed the second amended third party complaint for failure to file the "claims within the time prescribed by F.S. 733.702 (1977)." The issue presented on appeal is whether an alleged tortfeasor is entitled to contribution under F.S. 768.31 (1977) from the estate of a joint tortfeasor notwithstanding that the notice of claim was not filed within the time prescribed by the non-claim statute....

...Gulf Power in maintaining and operating its power line. The pleadings were settled and the case was tried before June 12, 1975, when the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act took effect. [1] Chapter 75-108, Laws of Florida (1975), as amended, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...[2] *5 Before us now are the consolidated appeals by the Christianis and Midway from the final summary judgment entered for defendant Fair and from the judgment entered on the directed verdict for defendant Gulf Power. Those appeals present the following issues: First, whether the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, is applicable although it was not effective until June 12, 1975, several months after the summary judgment for Fair and after the trial which resulted, on June 18, 1975, in the entry of judgment for Gulf Power and for plaintiff against the remaining defendants....

...for contribution. I. The Contribution Among Joint Tort-feasors Act is by its terms applicable "to all causes of action pending on June 12, 1975, wherein the rights of contribution among joint tortfeasors are involved and to cases thereafter filed." Section 768.31(7), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...3d DCA 1976); Warn Industries v. Geist, 343 So.2d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1977). See also Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1975); Shealy v. Clark Constr. Co. of Ocala, Inc., 323 So.2d 11 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). Section 768.31(7) applies the Contribution Act to all "pending" cases in which the rights of contribution among the joint tortfeasors are "involved." The quoted language does not mean that the Act applies only when contribution rights were "involved" in the sense of having been raised by pleadings prior to June 12, 1975....

...e with contribution. See, e.g., Home Indemnity Co. v. Edwards, 360 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Appellants have not urged that there was error in the trial court's rulings insofar as they dismissed appellants' indemnity claims. Yet application of Section 768.31 requires consideration of whether appellants' inchoate contribution claims were extinguished by the judgments now properly before us by timely appeals, and whether appellants may here and now complain of that effect....

...tely and ultimately responsible to satisfy plaintiff's judgment fully, and it is of no legitimate interest to him that a codefendant may have been improperly exonerated. In the only reported decision we have found directly addressing the issue since Section 768.31 became effective, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the contribution statute does not change prior law in this respect; and that a judgment defendant may not appeal and assign error in the judgment's exoneration of a codefendant....

...We now hold that a right to appeal is a necessary consequence of Florida's Contribution Act, which destroys the judgment defendant's inchoate contribution rights — rights which may mature on payment of the judgment — against an exonerated codefendant. Section 768.31(4)(f) provides: The judgment of the court in determining the liability of the several defendants to the claimant for an injury or wrongful death shall be binding as among such defendants in determining their rights to contribution. Our disagreement with North Store stems from recognition that, whether inchoate contribution claims are conventionally pleaded or not, Section 768.31(4)(f) renders a judgment for plaintiff against some but not all defendants binding on all defendants for contribution purposes....

...d by a judgment, is discharged of liability by satisfaction of a later judgment against the contribution claimant. We need not here decide that issue or further discuss it except to point out again, as we did in Liberty Mutual, 327 So.2d at 87, that Section 768.31(4)(f) may require a different result from that in Anderson v....

...9 (1964). The Florida Act, by explicitly binding codefendants to the consequences of a judgment, may imply that absent tort-feasors are not so bound. The issue here is simpler. We are concerned with the direct effect, not with the reverse implications, of Section 768.31(4)(f)....

...s between the defendants, so that they are free to litigate those issues later; or the judgment defendant must be allowed an appeal to test the correctness of the adjudication by which he lost his contribution claim against the exonerated defendant. Section 768.31(4)(f) forecloses the first choice....

...ions were rendered is that none of those statutes contained a specific provision, as does Florida's, rendering a judgment on plaintiff's claim against multiple defendants "binding as among such defendants in determining their right to contribution." Section 768.31(4)(f), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...[8] We think the absence of a cross-claim is not determinative of the conclusive effect of a judgment exonerating a codefendant or of the judgment defendant's right to appeal. The Florida Act makes the judgment conclusive on contribution issues irrespective of the presence or absence of cross-claims, Section 768.31(4)(f), and provides for enforcement of contribution rights between judgment defendants "by motion upon notice to all parties to the action." Section 768.31(4)(b)....

...ttee substitute for S.B. 98 occurred in the House on May 28, Fla.H.R.Jour. 442 (1975), and in the Senate on May 30, Fla.S.Jour. 1018 (1975), Florida Statutes (1975) translated "passage" as June 12, 1975, the date the bill was signed by the Governor. Section 768.31(7). [2] The satisfaction of a judgment against one alleged joint tortfeasor terminates claimant's cause of action against another. E.g., Walker v. U-Haul Co., Inc., 300 So.2d 289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), cert. denied, 314 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1975). [3] Section 768.31(2)(b) provides: "The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability......

...ability to Finlay and was thus entered into as a result of a mutual mistake. The trial court entered summary judgment for the County. Milford appeals and we reverse. Milford concedes that her right of contribution from the County derives solely from Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979), see South Carolina Insurance Company v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 425 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), and is, therefore, conditioned on her (as the settling tortfeasor) having extinguished in the settlement the liability of the other tortfeasor, the County. § 768.31(2)(d), Fla....

...arents' alleged negligent failure to properly supervise, control and protect their minor son, which negligence either caused or contributed to causing the drowning death of the child. The parents moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the grounds that section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1981) does not permit a counterclaim for contribution and defendant does not have the right to contribution pursuant to said statute....

...o causing injuries to their minor child. The only question which now needs to be addressed by this court is whether the trial court can dictate the time and manner in which contribution can be pursued. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 768.31, allows the defendant to file a permissive counterclaim for contribution....

...LaShae's father, Billy Roy Frazier, as the decedent's personal representative, brought a wrongful death action against Metro-Dade on behalf of the decedent's survivors and the estate. § 768.20, Fla.Stat. (1995). In turn, Metro-Dade brought a claim for contribution against the mother. § 768.31, Fla.Stat....

...[3] However, Metro-Dade contends that this award of $73,500 must be further reduced by a set-off for its claim for contribution from the mother. Metro-Dade argues that it is entitled to a set-off for the amount, in excess of its pro rata share, for which it is jointly and severally liable to the father. § 768.31, Fla.Stat....

...Likewise, the provisions of section 768.81 that eliminate joint and several liability do not apply. Gurney, 588 So.2d at 246 (holding that where section 768.81 does not apply because of the priority of section 768.20, then the doctrine of joint and several liability applies pursuant to section 768.31)....

...Metro-Dade is thus jointly and severally liable for payment of a portion of the father's damages that are actually attributable to the mother's negligence. Therefore, Metro-Dade is entitled to contribution from the mother and a set-off against the mother's recovery. § 768.31, Fla.Stat....

...Amended Complaint, the Motion is due to be denied. C. Common Law Contribution SOIC also seeks to dismiss Count III of the Second Amended Complaint for contribution on the ground that “‘contribution is exclusively a statutory remedy’ ” under section 768.31 of the Florida Statutes, see Motion at 22-23 (citations omitted), that is only available “when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for the same wrongful death .... ” Fla. Stat. § 768.31 (2)(a); see also State Nat’l Ins....

...3d DCA 1984) (affirming the dismissal of a contribution claim premised on a contract dispute). SOIC seems to contend that because ZAIC has not alleged that ZAIC and SOIC *1290 are joint tortfeasors, contribution is not an available remedy. M. Although under section 768.31 “[cjontribution is only available to joint tortfeasors,” see Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 731 So.2d at 641 n.2, SOIC’s argument is inapposite because ZAIC does not seek contribution under this statute, and in fact, acknowledges that it “could not have brought its contribution claim pursuant to Fla. Stat. 768.31.” See Response at 17....

...Subsequent to the order of the trial court, here under review, the Nordeens settled with Gordon and Delcher. The appellees contend that this in and of itself, because of the provisions of the new Uniform Contribution Among Tort Feasors Act, enacted by the 1975 Legislature, and particularly § 768.31(5)(b), [1] releases them from any action seeking contribution....

...ird-party complaint because it is apparent on the face thereof that the Railroad was at least an active tort feasor. Florida East Coast Railway Company v. Soper, Fla.App. 1962, 146 So.2d 605. We further affirm the action because of the provisions of § 768.31(5)(b), of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort Feasors Act, it being conceded that the original plaintiffs had settled their original claim against Gordon....

...tor, alleging negligence and breach of warranty in the construction of the building. Turchin filed third-party actions against seven subcontractors of the condominium project, the seven appellees. The third-party complaints sought contribution under section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1981), if it were found that active negligence of the subcontractors combined with active negligence of Turchin or, in the alternative, indemnity if it were found that active negligence of the subcontractors resulted in vicarious liability on Turchin's part....

...the sums paid by Empire in the settlements which were the subject of the contribution award were paid directly to insurer members of FIGA. In the final judgment here appealed, the trial court found, among other things, that the contribution statute, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1985) (the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act) was applicable; that FIGA was not entitled to a reduction of the contribution judgment; and that Empire was entitled to judgment against McKenzie and FIGA for th...

...eral plaintiffs exceeded amounts that were reasonable. Only the first point requires extended discussion. Much of the argument in the briefs of both parties concerns the trial court's ruling that Empire is entitled to contribution under the statute, section 768.31, as opposed to the remedy of subrogation....

...Florida's Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasor's Act preserves all rights of indemnity under existing law, and further specifies that "when one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution... . Section 768.31(2)(f), F.S....

...After this litigation was concluded, Fannie Livingston made a claim against Schneider, Alco, and Indiana Insurance, which was voluntarily settled by Indiana's payment of $100,000 to Livingston. Indiana Insurance, as subrogee of Alco, then sued Lorf and her carrier, Allstate, for contribution based specifically on Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...In each suit Alco and Indiana Insurance sued Lorf for contribution. In each suit the negligence of Lorf was the issue. It is noteworthy that the suit in question was specifically brought by Indiana Insurance as subrogee of its insured, Alco. The cause of action was for contribution under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Withrow and Cavalier filed a counterclaim against Doris T. Woods and GEICO alleging that Doris negligently caused the collision, and sought contribution. During the proceedings, Cavalier paid Vicki $10,000, the full limits of the policy, and secured a release for itself and its insureds. Relying on section 768.31(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1979) [1] , Woods and GEICO moved for a summary judgment because the settlement and consequent release had not extinguished their liability as required by that statute....

...Pursuant to Rule 9.030(a)(2)(A)(vi), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, March 27, 1980, we hereby certify this decision to be in direct conflict with the decision in 3-M Electric Corporation v. Vigoa, supra . [2] REVERSED and REMANDED. FRANK D. UPCHURCH and SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 768.31(2), Fla....

...The court ruled that the agreement, although valid between the executing parties, was properly excluded as it was self-serving and inflammatory. The court also ruled that Westinghouse was not bound by the agreement, as it was not a party thereto, and was entitled to 25% contribution from Sears under Sections 768.041, 768.31, Florida Statutes (1981) pursuant to the jury's apportionment of liability....

...Andrews, 354 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). The court correctly ruled Westinghouse was entitled to contribution from Sears for 25% of the compensatory damages and taxable costs. Sears' argument that Westinghouse is precluded from receiving contribution pursuant to Section 768.31(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1981) is without merit. Section 768.31(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1981) applies only to intentional tortfeasors and there was no evidence or verdict [1] finding Westinghouse intentionally committed a negligent act....

...We agree with the holding of the First District Court of Appeal in the case of Frier's, Inc. v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company, 355 So.2d 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) wherein they held that an agreement similar to the one in the instant case constitutes a covenant not to enforce judgment pursuant to Section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1981) which only discharges a tortfeasor from liability if the covenant is given in good faith....

...ry Williams be reduced to reflect the contributory negligence of Mary Williams. Florida follows the rule of comparative negligence, with liability equitably apportioned on the basis of fault. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla.1973). Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.31 (West)....

...the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly. § 768.041(2), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added); accord § 46.015(2), Fla. Stat. (2012) (containing materially identical language); see also § 768.31(5), Fla....

...e complaint. Because the indemnity agreement stated that Whitehurst would indemnify FDOT unless FDOT was solely negligent, FDOT demanded contractual indemnity under the agreement. FDOT also claimed a right to contribution from Whitehurst pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes....

...fication. We affirm dismissal of the contribution count. The complaint failed to allege all of the elements required for a cause of action for contribution. To support an action for contribution, the pleading must adequately allege common liability. § 768.31(2)(a), Fla....

...nd that the doctrine of family immunity precluded contribution. It is well established in Florida, that spouses may not sue each other nor may children sue their parents for tort. Orefice v. Albert, 237 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1970). Under the provisions of Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, referred to as the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, contribution is permitted when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to a person....

...V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. (1980); Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v) and 9.120. Accordingly, the order dismissing the counterclaim and the third-party complaint for contribution from the parents is REVERSED. FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr. and SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 768.31(2)(a), Fla....

...plicable liability insurance he carried, if any, the surviving tortfeasors will be held for damages in excess of their pro rata shares. Thus, by applying the nonclaim statute, we frustrate the objective of the joint tortfeasors contribution statute, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The taxi company had been discharged from the suit by the release; the County failed to demonstrate that the settlement was made in bad faith. Florida East Coast Railway v. Thompson, 93 Fla. 30, 111 So. 525 (1927); Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Gordon, 328 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...third-parties." Trammell Crow's response to Plaintiff's motion makes it clear that this affirmative defense rests on Section 768.81. The second count in Horizons' Third Party Complaint (Dkt. 53) against Mr. Constanzo is also based on Section 768.81. [2] Plaintiff argues that the jury may not apportion fault pursuant to Section 768.31 against Mr....

...Schoenwald, for $2,900,000, which was settled on appeal for $3,000,000. St. Paul, the insurer of the urologist, subsequently filed this contribution action against the obstetrician, arguing that his settlement with plaintiffs was not in good faith as required by section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1987), the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, and thus not a bar to contribution....

...s no issue of fact. He also argues that the determination of good faith in a contribution action should be decided by the court, not a jury. After reviewing the law in Florida, as well as in other jurisdictions, we have concluded that he is correct. Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1987), the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, provides in subsection (5): RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE....

...providing that there is contribution, with some exceptions, one being that a tortfeasor who settles "in good faith" is not liable for contribution. The Uniform Act is thus a modification of the common law equitable doctrine of contribution. In fact, section 768.31(3) provides: PRO RATA SHARES....

...[2] In a case where the finder of fact, judge or jury, has determined the liability of several defendants to the claimant, the Uniform Act provides that the "judgment of the court in determining the liability of the several defendants" is binding for purposes of contribution. Section 768.31(4)(f).

...ecision is given the greatest of deference because of his unique position. The reason the trial judge felt the jury had been misled by the instruction and the verdict form was because the instruction, and special verdict, were, he said, "contrary to section 768.31(2)(c)." We presume it was his determination the wording of the Standard Jury Instruction was not in sufficient *1211 conformity with the statute so as to properly explain the law to the jury. The statute says: 768.31 Contribution among tortfeasors....

...Contribution In its third party complaint against Dr. Kimmel, Gulfstream alleged that if it were found negligent, Dr. Kimmel's negligence may have contributed to the horse's injury. Gulfstream's claim for contribution was based upon the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act. § 768.31, Fla....

...or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them. § 768.31(2)(a)....

...not believe they were entitled to contribution from Arai because they were not paying Arai’s portion of the Williamses’ injuries. In light of these two considerations, coupled with the plain meaning of Fla.Stat. §§ 46.015(1), 768.-041(1), and 768.31(5), 3 prohibiting the release of non-party tortfeasors, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Arai....

...Following the blank space, the printed form of the release continued, “and any other person, corporation, association or partnership, which might be charged with responsibilities for injury to the persons or property_” Id. at 433 . The Supreme Court of Florida noted that Fla. Stat. §§ 768.041 (1) and 768.31(5) had abrogated the common law rule that a release of one tortfeasor discharges all other tort-feasors who may be liable for that tort....

...and damages; and how, in light of the statute, such damages would be otherwise apportioned. Williams v. Lopez, No. 88-1638 CA 05 at 2 (October 11, 1988). 3 . Neither the parties on appeal nor the district court discuss the applicability of Fla.Stat. § 768.31 (1975) to this case. Section 768.31(5) addresses the release of nonparty tortfeasors in the contribution context: When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or...

...joint tortfeasors. See Jackson v. Florida Weathermakers, Inc., 55 So.2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1951), citing Crenshaw Brothers Produce Co., Inc. v. Harper, 142 Fla. 27, 194 So. 353, 359 (1940). Since contribution among joint tortfeasors is now authorized by Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1976 Supp.), it is necessary to re-examine the doctrine which prohibits a defendant from challenging the exoneration of a codefendant in light of the instant circumstances....

...ose taken in New York and California. Like those states, Florida did not recognize contribution between joint tortfeasors at common law, but the legislature has now enacted a statute allowing contribution in certain specified instances. According to Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1976 Supp.), contribution is to be allowed where "two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for the same wrongful death... ." Further, the right of contribution exists only to the extent that one tortfeasor has paid more than his pro rata share "of the common liability." Section 768.31(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1976 Supp.)....

...Additionally, Miss Ludwig sued Commercial Carrier and Mr. Portwood. Commercial Carrier and its driver answered both lawsuits. They raised the defense of joint enterprise and also filed a cross-claim against Miss Ludwig and her grandparents for contribution pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989), seeking a pro rata share of any damages they might ultimately pay to Miss Kane....

...to reflect the imputation of Miss Ludwig's negligence to Miss Kane. Moreover, the posttrial motion requested that the defendants receive the benefit of the $100,000 settlement as a settlement with a joint tortfeasor pursuant to sections 768.041 and 768.31 of the Florida Statutes (1989)....

...The Function of the Joint Enterprise Doctrine in a Modern Tort Case In a tort system which permits contribution among joint tortfeasors and setoff for their settlements, the functions of joint and several liability and the joint enterprise doctrine are closely related. See §§ 768.041, 768.31, Fla....

...In light of the several methods which the legislature has created in chapter 768 to avoid the unfair aspects of joint and several liability, we believe the judicially created joint enterprise doctrine should be conservatively employed to permit full usage of the legislative solutions. §§ 768.041, 768.31, Fla....

...pter 768, we see no reason to permit these facts to shift the risk of the driver's collectibility from the joint tortfeasor to the passenger. Accordingly, Commercial Carrier is entitled only to the remedies available to it under sections 768.041 and 768.31 of the Florida Statutes (1989)....

...The plaintiff was 14% at fault, her fiance was 85%, and Disney World was 1%. Under joint and several liability, Disney World was obligated to pay 86% of the damages. The harshness of this result was relieved to the extent that Disney World had a right to seek contribution from the plaintiff's fiance under section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...[7] As part of the risk of collectibility, we include the risks related to an insufficient settlement from a tortfeasor prior to verdict. Under statutory contribution, a good faith settlement by a joint tortfeasor prior to verdict requires the remaining tortfeasor to pay slightly more than its pro rata share of the judgment. § 768.31(5), Fla....

...operated by defendant Farmer, and insured by defendant Scottish and York International Insurance Group. Defendants filed a general denial and counterclaim against the plaintiffs for contribution under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Insurance Company of North America, 301 So.2d 21 (Fla.2d DCA 1974); Midstate Hauling Company v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 189 So.2d 826 (Fla.4th DCA 1966); Bumby & Stimpson, Inc. v. Peninsula Utilities Corporation, 179 So.2d 414 (Fla.3d DCA 1965). Under Section 768.31(4), Florida Statutes (1977), a judgment for contribution may be maintained whether or not the judgment has been entered in any action against two or more tortfeasors or by separate action....

...In fact, this Court has already entertained two earlier appeals related to this litigation. Home Insurance Company v. Advance Machine Company, 443 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Home Insurance Company v. C & G Sporting Goods, Inc., 453 So.2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). [4] The Act, as adopted in Florida, appears in Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1985), pertinent portions of which are set forth as follows: 768.31 Contribution among tortfeasors....

...been extinguished. See Corbett v. General Engineering & Machinery, 160 Fla. 879, 37 So.2d 161 (1948) (holding that extension of a statute of limitations does not revive an already extinguished action). However, we need not decide that question. [6] Section 768.31(2)(a) & (4)(d), Florida Statutes (1985) (reproduced at footnote 4, supra)....

...in the usual case because of that provision of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act which states: "This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states that enact it." Section 768.31(6), Florida Statutes....

...ctions. 18 Am.Jur.2d, Contribution, Sec. 73. It can hardly be said that VTN and COASTAL are liable under the same set of circumstances, let alone a series of circumstances, nor do they share a common burden. VTN relies upon the fairly new statute, F.S. 768.31, to rescue it from its dilemma but such reliance is unfounded....

...lans and specifications. Appellee paid and satisfied the Bob Wade Ford judgment in 1977. In 1982 appellee filed a complaint against appellant for contribution. After that complaint was dismissed on the basis of the statute of limitations (apparently section 768.31(4)(c), Fla....

...d judgment plus interest and costs. *1006 On this appeal appellant claims that the Bob Wade Ford judgment was recovered either on the theory of negligence, in which case the one year statute of limitations as to contribution among joint tortfeasors (§ 768.31(4)(c), Fla....

...[1] Appellant argues that North is not applicable because North relates to subrogation and the trial judge in this case entered judgment expressly on the theory of contribution, and recovery on that theory is barred by the one year statute of limitations in section 768.31(4)(c), Florida Statutes....

...action, is not barred by statutes of limitation applicable to actions at law but only by laches. However, see section 95.11(6), Florida Statutes. [2] North was written before Florida, in 1975, adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31, Florida Statutes....

...In 1975, the Florida Legislature adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which provides in material part that "[t]he right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than her or his pro rata share of the common liability." See § 768.31(2)(b). Fla. Stat. A party may now initiate a claim for contribution, even though a judgment has not yet been entered against the joint tortfeasor. See § 768.31(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). Section 768.31(4), Florida Statutes provides that a complaint for contribution must be filed within one year of the date of *232 the settlement in which the claimant has agreed to make payment on the common liability....

...Dye filed a negligence action against Pennington and his insurer, Westfield Insurance Company, and her husband and his insurer, Grange Mutual Casualty Company. Pennington and Westfield filed a cross-claim against Arlie Dye and Grange Mutual for contribution among joint tort-feasors under section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1981), alleging that Arlie was negligent in causing or contributing to the accident....

...in Christiani v. Popovich, 363 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and held that the right of a judgment defendant to appeal from a judgment exonerating another codefendant is a necessary consequence of Florida's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31(4)(f), Florida Statutes, which destroys inchoate contribution rights against an exonerated codefendant....

...A claim for indemnity in a situation similar to this was the subject of Supreme Court consideration in Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So.2d 703 (Fla. 1977). Under the clear dictates of that decision, there is no valid claim for indemnity between these parties. The contribution claim is a distinct matter. This claim is based on § 768.31, Fla....

...KNIGHT, will give a complete release and covenant not to enforce judgment in favor of the defendants HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, ROY LOVETT and LITTLE FOOD TOWN, INC., said release and covenant not to enforce judgment shall be made pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 768.31(5) and shall reduce any judgment accordingly....

...If a verdict is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants jointly, and if any proceeding or action is taken against the defendants HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, LITTLE FOOD TOWN, INC. or ROY LOVETT, by any other defendants for contribution pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 768.31, then the plaintiffs agree to indemnify or reimburse HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, LITTLE FOOD TOWN, INC....

...The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs for $45,000 plus costs, subject to a credit for the $45,000 already paid, and directed Best to reimburse Little Food Town for one-half the judgment. At the outset, there are two considerations which may be disposed of summarily. Best concedes that under Section 768.31(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), Little Food Town could properly assert its claim for contribution by way of motion despite the fact that it had voluntarily dismissed its cross-claim against Best during the trial....

...with Best's characterization that the agreement constituted a settlement between Little Food Town and the plaintiff. There was no right of contribution among tortfeasors in Florida until the passage of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Under this statute, one of several persons liable in tort for the same injury or wrongful death has a right to recover from the other tortfeasors whatever he has paid in excess of his pro rata share of the common liability. Pertinent to the instant case, section (1)(d) of the uniform act, which is codified as Section 768.31(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1975) provides: "(2) Right to contribution....

...settled with the plaintiffs without obtaining an extinguishment of Best's liability to the plaintiffs. On the other hand, Little Food Town argues that since the $45,000 it agreed to pay would be deducted from any verdict obtained against Best under Section 768.31(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), this was equivalent to an extinguishment of Best's liability....

...ict did not exceed the amount of the settlement Best now owes nothing to the plaintiffs. The provision which causes the $45,000 payable by Little Food Town to be a reduction of the claim against Best to that extent is section (4) of the uniform act (Section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1975)) which reads as follows: "(5) Release or covenant not to sue....

...stated that a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment does not "discharge" any other tortfeasor for liability but simply reduces the claim by the stipulated amount. It is further significant that section (4)(b) of the uniform act (Section 768.31(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1975)) provides that where one of several tortfeasors has settled a claim against him, he is relieved of liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor....

...The issue presented deals with the proper interpretation and application of the comparative fault statute, section 768.81, Florida Statutes (1987), the imputation to a nonnegligent parent of the comparative negligence of the other parent in the death of a child, and the contribution among joint tort-feasor statute, section 768.31, Florida Statutes....

...Although section 768.81 eliminates the doctrine of joint and several liability to actions to which its provisions apply, since we have concluded that section 768.81 does not apply because of the priority of section 768.20, then the doctrine of joint and several liability applies pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes. Therefore, Mr. Cain is liable for his share of the damage award for which the Gurneys are liable. Section 768.31(2)(b), Fla....

...k of supervision. The jury found the school board 60% negligent and each parent 20% negligent. Each parent's award was first reduced by their own 20% negligence, and then further reduced for their contribution toward the other spouse's damages under section 768.31. Noting that Shor v. Paoli, 353 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1977), affirming, 345 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) held that the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity did not control over section 768.31, this court extended Shor 's reasoning to wrongful death actions where the parents sue for the wrongful death of their child....

...In the supreme court's recent decision in Village of El Portal v. City of Miami Shores, Florida, 362 So.2d 275 (Case No. 51,233, Opinion filed May 31, 1978) the court dealt with the question of what is a vested right. The issue in the Miami Shores case was whether the statute there in question [§ 768.31, Fla....

...its pro rata share of a common liability and seeks contribution from those it alleges negligently contributed to the losses suffered. In response, the Trustee argues that he is not seeking contribution in this action and, therefore, Florida Statutes § 768.31(2)(c) is not applicable....

...Ferguson, United States District Judge, within ten (10) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. See Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). NOTES [1] Counts III and IV seek recovery costs and contribution under § 376.313(3), Fla.Stat. Count V is a contribution claim under § 768.31, Fla....

...sserts a medical malpractice claim against the other joint tortfeasor. *1065 The instant case represents an authorized third party complaint by which the defendant seeks contribution (in event of an adverse judgment against it) as provided for under Section 768.31 Florida Statutes, 1976 Supp., and alternatively seeks indemnification against the third party defendant if the facts should so warrant. As to contribution, although subsection (4)(c) of Section 768.31 permits contribution to be sought by separate action, within a stated time after judgment rendered against the party seeking contribution, that would not prevent or preclude the defendant Mt....

...INA paid $100,000 in settlement and Srzentic executed releases in favor of all defendants. In 1988 INA, as subrogee of Genovese, brought suit for contribution against Poseidon, as employer of Jeff Davis. INA concedes that contribution may not be had for intentional wrongdoing, see § 768.31(2)(c), Fla....

...edical negligence, the conduct attributed to Davis is within the statutory exclusion: "There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally (willfully or wantonly) caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death." § 768.31(2)(c), Fla....

...It is premised in part upon New England's release of Broward for claims based on passive negligence; yet, the release was not properly before the court on the motions to dismiss. Assuming the release is valid, however, I see no reason why Broward's crossclaims should not ultimately be dismissed. Under Section 768.31(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), Broward could not make a claim for contribution against the settling tortfeasors....

...On June 22, Charles Fuquay's insurer paid Linda Fuquay the maximum sum ($15,000) payable under the terms of his personal liability insurance in consideration for a complete release to him of any liability to her in connection with the 1975 accident. Pursuant to 1979 Fla.Stat. § 768.31(5)(b), the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Charles Fuquay now moves to dismiss General Motors' counterclaim on the grounds that the settlement and release executed between him and his former wife discharges him from liability to General Motors for contribution on any judgment in favor of Linda Fuquay on the principal claim. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on June 26, 1981. In pertinent part, Fla.Stat. § 768.31 reads as follows: (5) RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE....

...tors' claim for contribution. This is apparently a question of first impression under Florida Law. Absent Florida case authority directly on point, the Court now holds that a joint tortfeasor may extinguish his liability for contribution pursuant to § 768.31(5) by settling *1067 with his plaintiff spouse, even though the spouse could not have sued the settling tortfeasor directly....

...Defendant counterclaimed against the mother for contribution, but settled with the child and secured a release. The release did not affect the mother's potential liability to the child. The mother moved for summary judgment on the basis of 1979 Fla.Stat. § 768.31(2)(d), which provides that "[a] tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury ......

...Defendant argues that any settlement between Charles and Linda Fuquay of a nonexistent claim would likewise be "meaningless and superfluous" and should not bar General Motors' claim for contribution. As Charles Fuquay points out, however, the section of § 768.31 under consideration in Withrow dealt with the means by which a contribution claim is continued, not discharged. The distinction is important. Section 768.31(2)(d) aims to make any claim for contribution against a joint tortfeasor await a final settlement of that defendant's liability for plaintiff's injury....

...ectly. Neither case, however, addressed the issue of whether a joint tortfeasor, whom plaintiff admittedly could not have sued directly, might nonetheless extinguish a liability for contribution by "settling" with plaintiff according to the terms of § 768.31(5)....

...General Motors could recover no more than that amount from Charles in contribution, given his testimony (which the Court credits and General Motors does not seriously dispute) that he is otherwise without assets. Under the terms of the statute, General Motors will receive an offset for the amount paid in settlement. See § 768.31(5)(a)....

...Should General Motors be found liable for Linda's injuries in an amount less than $15,000, Charles's insurer has thrown money away. In any event, settlement precludes Charles Fuquay from seeking contribution from General Motors, should it turn out the settlement exceeds his pro rata share of liability. § 768.31(2)(d)....

...4th DCA 1979) for the proposition that plaintiff may not arbitrarily decide who bears the burden of the loss by manipulating the terms of settlements with co-defendants. But the Sobik court put little restriction on "good faith" as that term appears in § 768.31(5), limiting its holding to the narrow circumstances of the case....

...more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire liability. § 768.31(2)(a) & (b), Fla....

...Kelsey of Kelsey Appellate Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellees. LEWIS, J. Healthcare Staffing Solutions, Inc., successor by merger to StarMed Staffing, Inc. ("StarMed") [1] , appeals an Amended Final Judgment finding it liable to University Medical Center ("UMC") in an action for contribution under section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1997), and equitable subrogation....

...1st DCA 1993). Its parameters are set forth in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("the Contribution Act"), which provides that "[n]o tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond her or his own pro rata share of the entire liability." § 768.31(2)(b), Fla....

...is not extinguished by the settlement or in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable. .... (3) PRO RATA SHARES. — In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability: (a) Their relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability. § 768.31, Fla....

...he injury that gave rise to the original tort claim, and the percentage of fault attributable to each of those persons. See id. Because the right to contribution exists only where two or more persons have become liable in tort for the "same injury," section 768.31(2)(a), the term "liability," as used throughout the Contribution Act, refers to liability for the injury that gave rise to the original tort claim. Naturally, then, the "entire liability" as used in section 768.31(2)(b) refers to the responsibility born by all of the tortfeasors who contributed to any degree to the original plaintiff's injury....

...1st DCA 1986) (defining "common liability" as "the joint causing of damage or injury"). The Contribution Act requires that a trial court apportion each tortfeasor's liability according to his or her relative degree of fault in causing the injury giving rise to the tort claim. § 768.31(3)(a)....

...at section 768.81. Compare § 768.81(3), Fla. Stat. (1997) (providing that, in cases where the comparative fault statute applies, "the court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such party's percentage of fault") with *731 § 768.31(3)(a) (providing that the tortfeasors' "relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability")....

...FBOR's sovereign immunity should not have entered into the analysis. Because the trial court failed to consider StarMed's evidence of the negligence attributable to FBOR, we are unable to determine whether StarMed was ordered to pay more than its pro rata share of the entire liability in violation of section 768.31(2)(b)....

...third party complaint with prejudice. Pending the appeal from this order, the legislature passed the Uniform Contribution among Tortfeasors Act and specified that it should apply to all causes of action pending at the time of its passage. Fla. Stat. § 768.31 (1975). Thereafter, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of no contribution among joint tortfeasors no longer applied to Florida. Lincenberg v. Issen, Fla. 1975, 318 So.2d 386. Fla. Stat. § 768.31 (1975) does not specifically provide for the enforcement of contribution by way of third party practice....

...In return, ASI received a complete release for the Jacobses and itself. That release, however, specifically excepted Goldstein's legal claims against Wal-Mart and Kransco. Wal-Mart and Kransco then filed a cross-claim against the Jacobses for contribution. See § 768.31, Fla. Stat. (1993). At issue in the contribution cross-claim is whether ASI on the Jacobses' behalf secured a release from Goldstein in good faith or bad faith. Section 768.31(5) provides that when a release is given to one or more tortfeasors in "good faith," these tortfeasors are discharged "from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor." See generally Gold, Vann & White, P.A. v. DeBerry, 639 So.2d 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (discussing operation of and shifting burdens of proof in section 768.31(5) with regard to releases)....

...Agreeing with the district court that "an adversarial, not a fiduciary, relationship existed between the parties," the supreme court also agreed that the insurance company "was entitled to the privilege and immunity to the same extent as any other litigant." Id. (Emphasis added). Section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes requires that the settling parties act in good faith with respect to the non-settling ones....

...unications not subject to disclosure. This concern, however, is unfounded. If the contribution issue goes to trial, the burden would shift to Wal-Mart and Kransco to prove "bad faith" only if ASI first makes a prima facie showing of good faith under section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes....

...High, Stack, Lazenby, Bender, Palahach & Lacasa and Alan R. Dakan, Miami, for appellant. Friedman, Britton, Cohen, Kaufman, Zinkow, Benson & Schantz, Miami, for appellee. *1151 Before PEARSON, BARKDULL and SCHWARTZ, JJ. PER CURIAM. A tort-feasor seeking contribution pursuant to Section 768.31(4) Florida Statutes (1977) against an alleged joint tort-feasor or co-defendant, must either file in the original action brought by plaintiff by a motion for contribution prior to the expiration of thirty days after any final judgment...

...Factory Insurance Assoc., 328 So.2d 448, 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. denied, 341 So.2d 1086 (Fla. 1976). Although the issue in this case is the propriety of the grant of summary judgment to Ford Motor Co., determination of that issue implicates the proper application of section 768.31(4)(f), Florida Statutes (1989), which provides: (f) The judgment of the court in determining the liability of the several defendants to the claimant for an injury or wrongful death shall be binding as among such defendants in determining their right to contribution. In Christiani v. Popovich, 363 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), the court considered a grant of summary judgment to one codefendant and a directed verdict as to another codefendant, in the context of section 768.31(4)(f)....

...Before BARKDULL, NESBITT and COPE, JJ. COPE, Judge. Nicholas and Angela Baudo appeal an adverse summary final judgment entered on the basis of a release given to other tortfeasors. We conclude that the trial court ruling is contrary to sections 768.041 and 768.31, Florida Statutes (1991), and reverse....

...this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly. See also § 46.015, Fla. Stat. (1991) (expanding concept to non-tort cases). Similarly, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1991), provides in part: (5) RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE.—When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury...

...It involved an offer of judgment and nowhere mentions the statutes governing releases. Defendants rely on Rucks v. Pushman, 541 So.2d 673 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 549 So.2d 1014 (Fla.1989). The Rucks case is also inapposite because it does not mention, much less analyze, sections 768.31 and 768.041, Florida Statutes....

...dsore in Lawsuit I. Again, the statutes are dispositive. Defendants in Lawsuit II "are entitled to a credit for any amounts paid to the claimant in settlement for the injury." Price v. Beker, 629 So.2d at 912 (citation omitted); see §§ 768.041(2), 768.31(5), Fla....

...GEICO's policy purported to provide such coverage, but the exclusion quoted in the majority opinion has the effect of taking away coverage for part of Sutton's damages. If GEICO had insured Roberts, it would have no contribution claim against Amick or Aetna. (The Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, § 768.31, Fla....

...ses the discretionary function exception. VII. CROSS-CLAIMS A. Contribution The basis for the Government's motion for summary judgment as to the Waste Haulers' cross-claim for contribution is the Florida Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Fla.Stat. § 768.31. Pursuant to § 768.31, contribution is available only against a party who is liable in tort to the underlying plaintiff....

...iled a complaint for contribution against Walker in circuit court on November 13, 1998, contending it was entitled to contribution because it had paid more than its pro rata share of the common liability of those released in the underlying suit. See § 768.31(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). Walker answered the complaint by denying the allegations and moving for summary judgment on the ground that Virginia Insurance's contribution claim was barred by the statute of limitations in section 768.31(4)....

...Walker responded that the presuit screening requirements were inapplicable to contribution claims and thus any effort to comply with the requirements had no effect on the statute of limitations in this case. The circuit court granted Walker's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the statute of limitations in section 768.31(4)(d) had not been tolled during the time that Virginia Insurance was attempting to comply with the presuit screening procedure in section 766.106 and thus the complaint for contribution was not timely....

...on this issue. DISCUSSION The conflict issue involves the intersection of statutory provisions of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and the Florida Medical Malpractice Act when an action for contribution is based on medical malpractice. Section 768.31, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, governs the procedure to be followed by petitioners who file contribution claims based on an injury to person or property or a wrongful death. Section 768.31(4)(d)2 specifically provides that an action for contribution is barred unless the tortfeasor seeking contribution commences the action for contribution within one year after paying an agreement for liability....

...ntrols when there is a question concerning the applicable statute of limitations for a contribution action based on an underlying medical malpractice claim. More specifically, we must determine whether the one-year statute of limitations outlined in section 768.31(4)(d)2 relating to contribution actions was tolled during compliance with the presuit screening procedure in chapter 766....

...Huntington Nat'l Bank, 609 So.2d 1315, 1317 (Fla.1992). Section 766.106(1)(a), which outlines the presuit procedures for medical malpractice actions, defines a claim for medical malpractice as "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." Section 768.31(2)(a) provides that a right to contribution occurs where "two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for the same wrongful death." Further, "there is a right of contribu...

...e tortfeasors] even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them." Id. While neither statute explicitly references the other, the language of each statute implicitly refers to the other. For instance, the "injury" referred to in section 768.31(2)(a) can arise in any number of tortious contexts, including medical malpractice....

...order to properly proceed under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, a contribution claimant raising an issue related to medical malpractice must establish that the tortfeasor does in fact share a portion of liability for the injury. See § 768.31(2), Fla. Stat. (1997); see also Chiang v. Wildcat Groves, Inc., 703 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (stating that it is "well-settled Florida law that to support an action for contribution under section 768.31(2)(a), the pleading must allege common liability")....

...s right of contribution "unless she or he has ... [a]greed, while action is pending against her or him, to discharge the common liability and has within 1 year after the agreement paid the liability and commenced her or his action for contribution." § 768.31(4)(d)2, Fla. Stat. (1997). While medical malpractice claims are not specifically mentioned in this provision, the common liability required by section 768.31(4)(d) must be established pursuant to the Medical Malpractice Act where the contribution action is based on medical malpractice....

...tribution on the ground that the chief complaint is essentially a breach of warranty action based on the *179 law of contract. He contends that the right of contribution, as provided in Florida's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Fla.Stat. § 768.31, does not exist in this case and that as to him the third-party complaint should be dismissed....

...engers which was made the basis of a final judgment in their favor. The jury also returned a cross-claim verdict upon special interrogatories which found that appellant was 80% negligent and appellee Van Buren, 20% negligent. Thereafter, pursuant to Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), appellee U.S.F....

...THORPE, shall be liable for 20% of the payment of the judgments and costs in favor of the Plaintiffs against these defendants." From the above order, this appeal is taken. Appellant contends that the court erred in ordering contribution between appellees and appellant on a 20%-80% basis in that Section 768.31(3), Florida Statutes (1975) requires contribution on a pro rata basis, and not on the basis of relative degrees of fault. [1] Based upon the record on appeal, we must reject appellant's contention. Section 768.31(3) provides: "(3) Pro Rata Shares....

...3d DCA 1966); In re Guardianship of White, 140 So.2d 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962). Accordingly, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. Affirmed. NOTES [1] The above statutory section has since been changed to provide that relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability. See Section 768.31(3), Florida Statutes (1976 Supp.).

...feasor for property damage to, personal injury of, or the wrongful death of any person shall not operate to release or discharge the liability of any other tortfeasor who may be liable for the same tort or death. § 768.041(1). To the same effect is section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes, which provides: When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one or two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death: (a) It does not...

...lseth, and the Hospital Authority, which explicitly stated that there were "other defendants in this case that are not parties to this agreement," did not release Fernandez and the BOR from any residual liability. In spite of the fact, however, that section 768.31(5) insulates the potential liability of Fernandez and the BOR from the effect of the release, we are persuaded that the trial court erroneously imposed a vicarious liability upon them for the unfortunate incident....

...Quest is not controlling because the injuries claimed *686 were not those of the deceased child but of the parents as survivors. In Shor v. Paoli, 353 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1977), affirming, 345 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), the supreme court recognized that the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity did not control over section 768.31, Florida Statutes, the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, where one tortfeasor seeks contribution from the tortfeasor-spouse of the injured person....

...Morgan's cross-appeal challenges the trial court's application of the following statute to diminish the amount of Morgan's verdict against Eller by the amount of Morgan's settlement with Central prior to trial, since Morgan's claim was against both Eller and Central: 768.31 Contribution among tortfeasors....

...Eller defends the set-off based on the fact that, prior to the trial in this action, both Eller and Central Truck were defendants in the claims of Morgan. The Morgans settled with Central Truck for $125,000. Thus, Central Truck was discharged from any liability to the Morgans, and, by virtue of Florida Statutes § 768.31(5)(b), from any liability to Eller for contribution. Seaboard *582 v. Gordan, 328 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). However, under § 768.31(5)(a), any verdict which Morgan received against Eller is reduced by the amount of the settlement with Central Truck....

...It was also the Court's understanding based upon the agreement of the parties, that following a verdict and depending upon the verdict, there would be a supplemental hearing before the Court to determine other matters affecting the judgment, ... . The possible reduction per F.S. 768.31(5) was not discussed specifically, but the Court is of the opinion that it was not excluded by the pre-trial understanding....

...olve either of the parties from their respective or proportionate liabilities to a third party. *512 There was no right to contribution from a joint tortfeasor in Florida prior to the 1975 enactment of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 768.31, Fla. Stat. The release form which Bisaccio signed was in common use before the right of contribution came into being and was not designed to apply to contribution. We have not overlooked appellee's argument that § 768.31(5)(b) applies to discharge Brown from liability, but we fail to see where that section provides any comfort to the appellee under the circumstances involved herein....

...much of the entire damages plaintiff sustained as the defendant's negligence bears to the combined negligence of both the plaintiff and defendant. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973). Since Hoffman v. Jones , the legislature has adopted section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1977), the "Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act." In addition to the issue of comparative negligence, under section 768.31, if Mrs....

...Neill, Jr., of Neill, Griffin, Jeffries & Lloyd, Chartered, Fort Pierce, for appellees. PER CURIAM. The question on this appeal is whether the trial court erred by dismissing, with prejudice, a complaint for contribution because the Florida Patient's Compensation Fund had failed to satisfy the criteria of section 768.31(4)(d)(2), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...basis that the amount they paid in settlement was in excess of their insured's pro rata share. The defendants filed various motions, one of which was a motion to dismiss. It asserted that the Fund, in seeking contribution, failed to *771 comply with section 768.31(4)(d)(2), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...The trial court found that the promissory note did not constitute payment and, therefore, granted the dismissal with prejudice as to the Fund; Physician's Protective Trust Fund, which had actually paid its portion of the settlement, was granted leave to amend. Section 768.31(4)(d)(2) provides as follows: If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he has ....

...[emphasis supplied.] Commissioner's Comment to Subsection 3(d) of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1955 Revised Act), Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 12, Masters Edition at 90 (1975). It is reasonable to assume that the Legislature, in adopting the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1985), knew of the commissioner's comment....

...truction that its prototype has been given in the sister state.). Indeed, the statute expressly commands that "[t]his act shall be interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states that enact it." § 768.31(6), Fla. Stat. (1985); see also Valentine v. Hayes, 102 Fla. 157, 135 So. 538 (1931); In re Estate of Swanson, 397 So.2d 465 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). We conclude, therefore, that section 768.31(4)(d)(2) must be construed to implement the plain intent of the drafters which, by the act's enactment, was ratified by the Florida Legislature....

...any who would be potentially liable for the same tort. The decision in Hellens discussed only joint and several tortfeasors, and not subsequent and sequential tortfeasors, as Defendants are alleged to be in the present case. Plaintiff also relies on section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1999), which provides: When two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them....

...Her argument ignores that the plain language of the statute, which by its terms, is limited to joint tortfeasors. The language of the statute does not extend to subsequent and sequential tortfeasors. Plaintiff also contends that sections 768.041 and 768.31 apply to subsequent and sequential tortfeasors as well as joint and several tortfeasors....

...Plaintiffs did not name as defendants the defendants in this case (hereinafter "the Arai defendants"), who manufactured the helmet that Timothy Williams was wearing when the accident occurred. Nevertheless, the state court defendants named the Arai defendants as third-party defendants and sought contribution under section 768.31 of the Florida Statutes....

...On June 13, 1994, he served presuit notices on those parties. On December 2, 1994, appellant, f/u/b/o PPTF, filed a complaint against the appellees for statutory contribution and equitable subrogation. Appellees moved for summary judgment arguing that the one year limitation contained in section 768.31(4)(d), Florida Statutes, barred appellant's claim for contribution, and that appellant's complaint failed to state a cause of action for equitable subrogation....

...Appellant argues that he timely filed his complaint against appellees because he properly followed the medical negligence presuit process. He contends that section 766.106, Florida Statutes, tolled the one year limitation period for instituting his contribution action. Section 768.31(4)(d), Florida Statutes, provides, If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he has ......

...We affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of appellees. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed his claim for equitable subrogation with prejudice. He argues that the one year statute of limitation contained in section 768.31, Florida Statutes, does not apply to equitable subrogation claims....

...In the face of all these recent court pronouncements, it is obvious that the doctrine of joint and several liability among codefendants is alive, well and binding upon this court. A codefendant must resort to contribution among joint tortfeasors under section 768.31, Florida Statutes, in order to obtain relief....

...[1] Accordingly, *63 we hereby certify the following question to the Supreme Court: DOES THE HOLDING IN LINCENBERG v. ISSEN DICTATE AN AFFIRMANCE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IN THIS CASE? AFFIRMED. DELL and WALDEN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Lincenberg was also discussing an outmoded version of section 768.31, Florida Statutes. The current statute permits allocation of liability based on relative degrees of fault. § 768.31(3)(a)....

...e judgment in favor of the Fleurys on their claim against the City. However, we do find error in the judgment in favor of the City of Riviera Beach on their claim of contribution against the Fleurys, which requires further consideration of the case. Section 768.31(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), provides that a release, given in good faith to one of two persons liable in tort for the same injury, discharges the tortfeasor to whom the release is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor....

...It alleges in count three that the city's negligence was active or primary and the negligence, if any, of First Church was passive or secondary. The third-party complaint also stated a cause of action in both counts under the recently enacted "Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act," Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), should the trier of fact find First Church and the city to be joint tortfeasors....

...nal. It is undisputed that any contribution claims by the insureds, Powell and Nixon, against Best and Sanyei, would be barred, because no attempt was made to enforce a contribution claim within one year from finality of the judgment, as required by section 768.31(4)(c), Florida Statutes: If there is a judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, any separate action by him to enforce contribution must be commenced within 1 year after the judgment has become final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review. Neither the judgment debtor nor the insurer, claiming by virtue of subrogation to the rights of its tortfeasor-insureds, has a right of action against a joint tortfeasor for pro rata contribution independent of the right bestowed by section 768.31....

...[1] We reject these arguments because a cause of action by an insurer for contribution from a joint tortfeasor exists only by virtue of the right and remedy created by the statute. Therefore, the insurance company, in pursuing a contribution claim under section 768.31, stands in the shoes of its insured....

...Continental Insurance Co., 326 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1976), sets the course for us to follow. However, we consider that case to be inapposite. It involved a dispute between two insurance companies over payment of a claim for their mutual insured. It did not involve a claim under section 768.31....

..., and possible bad faith, by extending the limitations period for the insurance company alone so that they may litigate with their insureds. We conclude that the trial court did not err by ruling that the one year limitations term of Florida Statute 768.31(4)(c) applies to insurers and by dismissing the complaint accordingly....

...GLICKSTEIN, J., dissents with opinion. GLICKSTEIN, Judge, dissenting. This is an appeal from a final order dismissing appellant's action for contribution against appellees, the trial court finding that the suit was barred by the one year statute of limitations contained in section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Sanyei filed a motion to dismiss alleging, among other things, that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. On September 23, 1987, the trial court dismissed the case finding that the action was barred by the one year statute of limitations found at section 768.31, Florida Statutes and that the action had to have been brought by March 31, 1987. West American argues that the trial court erroneously determined that its suit against Best Products and Sanyei was barred by section 768.31(4)(c), Florida Statutes, which provides that: If there is a judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, any separate action by him to enforce contribution must be commenced within 1 year after...

...time for appeal or after appellate review. It claims that this section is not applicable to it because it is not the tortfeasor but rather it is the equitable subrogee of the plaintiffs below. As equitable subrogee of the plaintiffs and pursuant to section 768.31(2)(e), Florida Statutes, West American contends it was entitled to seek contribution from appellees Best Products and Sanyei. Section 768.31(2)(e), Florida Statutes, provides: A liability insurer who by payment has discharged in full or in part the liability of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation as insurer is subrogated to the tortfeasor's right...

denied, 337 So.2d 809 (1976). See also Fla.Stat. § 768.31. On remand, the trial court should enter judgments

...e of fault attributable to that defendant. In a footnote, the court provided examples of how to calculate the amount of damages: 3. Thus, we reject the argument that our interpretation of section 768.81(3) when coupled with the right to setoff under section 768.31(5) will lead to a double reduction in the amount of damages. This possibility may be avoided by applying the setoff contemplated by section 768.31(5) against the total damages (reduced by any comparative negligence of the plaintiff) rather than against the apportioned damages caused by a particular defendant....

...ent. Following a hearing on Wink's motion to dismiss, the trial court entered its order dismissing T & S's third-party complaint. The trial court found that the Florida Legislature abolished joint and several liability for joint tortfeasors and that section 768.31, Florida Statutes (2006), mandates that a court enter judgment against a party on the basis of that party's percentage of fault, and not on the basis of joint and several liability....

...Since the Act was, at least in part, procedural, it was subject to the rule making authority of the supreme court, and rule 1.180 permitted the third-party action as part of the original plaintiff's case. All of these cases, however, were decided before the current version of section 768.31 was enacted....

...d Travelers’ indemnity claim. See Houdaille Industries, Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So.2d 490 (Fla.1979). The finding that Burger King’s negligence was the sole cause of Griffin’s injuries similarly eliminated Travelers’ claim for contribution. See § 768.31, Fla.Stat....

...se has been given "in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for," the court "shall setoff this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled ...," and the court must enter judgment accordingly. Further, section 768.31(5)(a) provides that a release or covenant not to sue does not discharge any other tortfeasors from liability, "but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; ... ." It is important to note that under both statutes, sections 768.041(2) and 768.31(5)(a), in order for a setoff to be made the payments made in settlement must be in satisfaction of the claim at issue in the lawsuit, not a separate claim....

...liminated by reference to footnote 3 of the Fabre II opinion, which we think can be best explained here by quoting in its entirety: Thus, we reject the argument that our interpretation of section 768.81(3) when coupled with the right to setoff under section 768.31(5) will lead to a double reduction in the amount of damages. This possibility may be avoided by applying the setoff contemplated by section 768.31(5) against the total damages (reduced by any comparative negligence of the plaintiff) rather than against the apportioned damages caused by a particular defendant....

...Therefore, we certify as one of great public importance the following questions: (A) IS A NON-SETTLING DEFENDANT IN A CASE TRIED UNDER SECTION 768.81(3) ENTITLED TO SETOFF OR REDUCTION OF HIS APPORTIONED SHARE OF THE DAMAGES, AS ASSESSED BY THE JURY, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 768.041(2), 46.015(2) OR 768.31(5)(a), BASED UPON SUMS PAID BY *660 SETTLING DEFENDANTS IN EXCESS OF THEIR APPORTIONED LIABILITY AS DETERMINED BY THE JURY? (B) DOES THE RULE AS TO SETOFF APPLY EQUALLY TO BOTH ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES? REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to enter an amended judgment in accordance with this opinion....

...or corporation in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly. Section 768.31(5), and 5(a) Florida Statutes (1991), read: (5) RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE....

...under the Allstate Insurance Policy for the defense of the counterclaim in the Circuit Court case of M.H. v. B.S. (Case No. 87-22 72(15)) (State of Florida). NOTES [1] The essence of the counterclaim was for contribution pursuant to Florida Statute 768.31....

...Appellant appealed, and in Healthcare Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 5 So.3d 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), this court reversed the judgment based on the trial court’s failure to consider FBOR’s fault in determining Appellant’s “pro rata share of the entire liability” under section 768.31(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...On remand, after a non-jury trial, the trial court apportioned fault for the underlying malpractice claim as follows: 70% to FBOR, 25.5% to Appellant, 4.5% to UMC, and 0% to Wilkinson. The trial court concluded that it would be inconsistent with this court’s prior opinion to construe the phrase “entire liability” in section 768.31(2)(b) to mean the amount of the settlement and, instead, concluded that the phrase meant the potential value of the underlying malpractice claim....

...Appellant does not contest the trial court’s finding that the potential value of the underlying malpractice claim was $15 million, nor does it contest the trial court’s apportionment of fault. Rather, the narrow issue framed in this appeal is whether the phrase “entire liability” in section 768.31(2)(b) means the potential value of the underlying malpractice claim (as determined by the trial court and urged by UMC) or the amount of the settlement (as urged by Appellant). This is an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. See Healthcare Staffing Solutions, 5 So.3d at 729 . Contribution is a statutory remedy, the parameters of which are set forth in section 768.31, Florida Statutes....

...ommon liability, and the tortfeasor’s total recovery is limited to the amount paid by her or him in excess of her or his pro rata share. No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond her or his own pro rata share of 'the entire liability. § 768.31(2)(b), Fla....

...Marin, 623 So.2d 1182 (Fla.1993) (requiring liability to be apportioned to all participants in an accident, including those not joined as defendants), receded from on other grounds by Wells v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 659 So.2d 249 (Fla.1995). Section 768.31 does not define the phrase “entire liability.” Nor was that phrase defined in the Uniform Act on which section 768.31 was based. See Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 1 (1955). Indeed, the commentary on' the provision of the Uniform Act that was codified verbatim in section 768.31(2)(b) explains only that: This provision is supported by several dozen decisions dealing with contribution in surety and other contract cases, and a court would almost certainly reach the result without the provision....

...we been able to locate a decision under the Uniform Act that expressly construes that phrase. But cf. City of Tucson v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 236 , 798 P.2d 374, 379 (1990) (construing the phrase “common liability” in the Arizona version of section 768.31(2)(b) to mean “an amount representing the total damages caused by the negligence of all the defendants” and explaining “[t]his amount can be established either by verdict or through settlement”). One purpose of section 768.31 was to encourage settlement and avoid lengthy litigation of claims....

...Accordingly, in these circumstances, consistent with the common understanding of the words “entire” and “liability,” 1 we conclude that the dollar amount paid to settle the underlying claim and to release the tortfeasors from any further liability for the claim represents the “entire liability” for purposes of section 768.31....

...This is not to say that the potential value of the underlying claim is irrelevant in every contribution action. Indeed, the contribution statute provides that a contribution plaintiff “is not entitled to recover contribution ... in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable.” § 768.31(2)(d), Fla....

...he underlying malpractice claim was $15 million rather than $6.15 million. The effect of this error was that Appellant was ordered to pay more than its pro rata share of the entire liability, which is 25.5% of the $6.15 million, or $1,568,250. 2 See § 768.31(2)(b), Fla....

...f this case. Indeed, UMC properly conceded below based on the law of the case implicit in the reversal of the initial judgment that the equitable subrogation claim is subject to the same apportionment analysis as the contribution claim. . See, e.g., § 768.31(3)(c), Fla....

...of Miami, Inc., 575 So.2d 1300, 1304 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (noting that “the initial determination of pro rata shares is based on relative degrees of fault, but is still subject to variance by virtue of the equitable principles of Paragraphs 3(b) and 3(c)’’ of section 768.31); and cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 886A, cmt. c. (1979) (discussing language nearly identical to section 768.31(2)(b) and noting that, based on the equitable nature of contribution, "when there are three tortfeasors and one of them is clearly insolvent or beyond the jurisdiction, the amount of contribution fairly allowable between the other two...

...Denial of Leave to File a Counterclaim for Contribution Issue A. Pretrial Proceedings Subsequent to filing his initial answer to the Regalados’ complaint, Mr. Claudio timely sought leave of court to amend his answer to include a claim for contribution against Mrs. Regalado pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes (2006), the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act....

...A Counter-Defendant versus a Fabre Defendant There is no dispute about the timeliness of Mr. Claudio’s attempt to file an amended answer to the Regalados’ complaint. He moved for leave to amend his answer to the complaint to add a counterclaim against Mrs. Regalado for contribution pursuant to section 768.31....

...e. Under either of these methods, Mr. Claudio’s monetary liability to Mr. Regalado will be halved, Mr. Regala-do’s award will not be affected, but Mrs. Regalado’s award will be reduced to zero. A. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act Section 768.31, Florida Statutes The relevant portions of the statute are the following: (2) RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION.— (a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same inju...

...(c) If there is a judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfea-sor seeking contribution, any separate action by her or him to enforce contribution must be commenced within 1 year after the judgment has become final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review. B. Discussion Based on section 768.31, Mr....

...A separate contribution action vests the court with personal jurisdiction over the contribution defendant just as a counterclaim will if made in the same suit because contribution is limited to a party who is alleged or has been found to be jointly liable in tort for the same injury or wrongful death. See § 768.31(2)(a)....

...It was error to enter final judgment in favor of Mr. Regalado, individually, without accounting for Mrs. Regalado’s contribution to his damages as a joint tortfeasor with Mr. Claudio. 8 We recognize that a contribution issue can be determined in a separate action. See § 768.31(4)(a), (c)....

...parent’s award. 14 This must be *459 done to fully compensate Mr. Regalado and avoid Mr. Claudio’s paying more than his 50% liability. Similarly in Gurney, 588 So.2d 244 , the Fourth District discussed the proper application of sections 768.81, 768.31, and 768.20....

...The Gurney court noted that in Johnson , the jury had found each parent 20% negligent and the school board 60% negligent, and each parent’s award was reduced not only by their own negligence but further by their contribution toward the other parent’s damages under section 768.31....

in 1975. See ch. 75-108, Laws of Fla. (creating § 768.31, Fla. Stat. (1975)).4 *795The law in Florida also

...on June 13, 1975 and applied to all causes of action pending as of that date. Id. at 391-92. Rather than rely on the newly enacted statute, however, the Supreme Court independently rejected the common law rule. *1348 As adopted by Florida (Fla.Stat. § 768.31), the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("UCATA") provides, in pertinent part: (2)(a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or pr...

...es of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability. (b) If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share. (c) Principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.31 (West 1997 & Supp....

...n the determination of pro rata shares. Florida's statute dictates that, "In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability: their relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability." *1349 Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.31(3)(a) (West 1997)....

...Florida adopted the remainder of the pro rata share provision verbatim from the model Act: "If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share. Principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply." Fla.Stat. Ann. § 768.31(3)(b)-(c) (West 1997)....

...ion that the Flight 965 pilots engaged in "willful misconduct" to invoke UCATA's denial of a right of contribution to "any tortfeasor who has intentionally (willfully or wantonly) caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death." Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.31(2)(c) (West 1997)....

...section 768.54. On the cross appeal, Scherer argues that the trial court erred in awarding Morales a set-off of $100,000 for pretrial settlement. According to Scherer, the settlement she made with Morales does not comport with the intended scope of section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes....

...This section provides in part that a release or covenant not to sue reduces the claim against any other tortfeasor "to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater." § 768.31(5), Fla....

...in a five-year period resulting in a judgment or settlement in excess of $10,000. Although the agreement for dismissal was between Scherer and Morales, the dismissal actually enured to the benefit of the other doctor. The situation anticipated under section 768.31(5) does not include such an arrangement. Since the pretrial settlement agreement does not fall within the plain meaning of section 768.31(5), we reverse the set-off award of $100,000 for the pretrial settlement....

...Next, we affirm the portion of the trial court's order dismissing the Appellants' contribution claim against Double A because that claim is also precluded by the Workers' Compensation Act. The right to seek contribution is statutory, and is found in section 768.31(2)(a), Florida Statutes: "Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of cont...

...1.180 third party action presents a claim for contribution, and is therefore dependent upon a potential common liability arising from a common burden. See VTN Consolidated Inc. v. Coastal Engineering Associates, Inc., 341 So.2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied 345 So.2d 428 (Fla.1977); also see § 768.31(2)(b), Florida Statutes....

dealing with a different section of the statute, section 768.31(4)(d)(2), instead of section 768.-54(2)(b)

...d) of Torts: Apportionment Liab. § 26 cmt. a. (2000). In Florida, these general principles were codified in statute when the Legislature adopted the “Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act” in 1975. See ch. 75-108, Laws of Fla. (creating § 768.31, Fla....

...onal act designed to result in or that is *829 substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee. (Emphasis added). The third-party claim here was an action for contribution under the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors’ Act,, section 768.31(2)(a) (1993)....

ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Chief Judge. Architect Salley and his associates appeal from an order dismissing their amended cross-claim for contribution under Section 768.31, Fla.Stat....

...ssignment of duties to be performed and has no authority over the police personnel.” *1296 Miami-Dade County’s three-count cross-claim alleges that (1) Miami-Dade County is entitled to contribution from Blue Martini pursuant to Florida Statutes, section 768.31; (2) Miami-Dade County is entitled to indemnification from Blue Martini pursuant to Florida Statute, section 30.2905; and (3) Blue Martini’s failure to indemnify is in bad faith which entitles Miami-Dade County to punitive and compensatory damages....

...along with a motion for determination of judgment liability and motion for set-off, requesting the trial court to determine the amount of his judgment liability, order him responsible only for his pro rata share of the judgment entered, pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989), and to credit him with the amount already paid by Voorhis, if any....

...The motion for set-off was granted, and the final judgment was amended to $295,-500, to reflect $100,000 already paid by Voorhis. The motion for determination of judgment liability, however, was denied, the court finding that Voorhis had been “discharged under section 768.31(5) by a covenant not to enforce judgment given by the plaintiff under a ‘high/low’ agreement.” In October of 1990, Weddle satisfied both of the supplemental final judgments for costs, in full, and satisfied the amended final judgment in the amount of $295,500. He now appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion for determination of judgment liability. Section 768.31(5) of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act provides as follows: RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE....

HENDRY, Judge. The sole issue raised for consideration in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the appellants’ cross-claim for contribution under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, against Metropolitan Dade County, d/b/a Metropolitan Transit Agency....

...in the amount of $12,835.88, plus interest and attorney fees. STORER bases this claim on 26 U.S. C. § 7426. Second, STORER claims that if it is held liable to CREDITBANK, then it is entitled to contribution from the UNITED STATES, pursuant to F.S. § 768.31....

judgment that the cause was time-barred under Section 768.-31(4)(d)2, Florida Statutes (1979). Affirmed.

...were or may be liable to Dr. Chiang in contribution as joint tortfeasors for all or part of the damages which Kitsehke may recover against Dr. Chiang. Dr. Chiang based his contribution claim on Florida’s Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31....

...440.10 shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to any third-party tortfeasor and to the employee.” (Emphasis added.) 3 They reasoned, therefore, that by virtue of this immunity they could not share a “common liability” with Dr. Chiang for Kitsehke’s injuries under section 768.31(2)(b)....

...Whitehurst’s employee alleged that a department employee negligently struck him with a vehicle during a repaving project Whitehurst was performing for the department. The department brought a third-party contribution claim against White-hurst pursuant to section 768.31 alleging that Whitehurst was responsible for the injuries to its worker because “Whitehurst’s negligent acts ......

...oyee.” Id. The trial court dismissed the contribution claim with prejudice without explanation or comment. In upholding the dismissal, the court in Whitehurst also relied on well-settled Florida law that to support an action for contribution under section 768.31(2)(a), the pleading must allege common liability but that such common liability cannot exist where the employer is immunized under section 440.11(1)....

...e remedy of workers’ compensation found in section 440.11(1). Accordingly, if a third-party tort-feasor can legally circumvent the immunity provisions of section 440.11(1) and establish an employer’s “common liability” for contribution under section 768.31(2)(b) by sufficiently alleging that an employer’s acts resulting in injury to an employee during the course of employment rose to the level of an intentional tort or virtual certainty of injury or death as required by Whitehurst, we...

...red during the course of his employment. See, e.g., Walker v. I.T.D. Indus., Inc., 437 So.2d 230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). If they are successful in this endeavor, they will then be able to insulate themselves from the “common liability” provisions of section 768.31(2)(b)....

...sition they espoused in the workers’ compensation proceeding. If so, they would then be entitled to immunity under the provisions of section 440.11(1) and Dr. Chiang would be precluded from seeking contribution from them as joint tortfeasors under section 768.31(2)(b) because of the absence of “common liability” engendered by such im *1090 munity....

...Because, as will be noted, the accident which is at the center of this appeal occurred in November of 1990, we use the applicable provisions of the 1990 version of the workers' compensation law, see chapter 440, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), and the 1989 version of the contribution act, see section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989), as the bases for our opinion....

...Smith, 359 So.2d 427 (Fla.1978), relied on in State, Department of Transportation v. V.E. Whitehurst & Sons, Inc., 636 So.2d 101, 105 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 645 So.2d 456 (Fla. 1994), for the proposition that "common liability" for a third-party contribution claim cannot exist under section 768.31 (2)(a) where the employer is immunized under section 440.11(1)....

...defendant Bayfront Medical Center on the third party complaint for indemnity and contribution. We affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the summary judgment for appellee/third party defendant on Count II which sought contribution pursuant to Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...ate rights would be counterproductive. Neither Belcher nor Popovich intended to deprive a litigant who settles after entry of summary judgment the right to appeal a trial court’s ruling resulting in the denial of a statutory right to contribution. Section 768.31(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1981), adequately protects the interests of co-defendants by limiting recovery to reasonable amounts. For these reasons we find no impediment to Rinek’s appeal. Next, we reject appellees’ contention that as their liability was extinguished not by the settlement, but by summary judgments, section 768.31 does not subject them to claims for contribution, see Popo-vich....

...ay as a result of the accident out of which this suit arises, (emphasis supplied) COUNT II 10. The Third Party Plaintiffs reallege Paragraphs 1 through and including 9 as though fully set forth herein. 11. That pursuant to Florida Statutes Annotated § 768.31, the Third Party Plaintiffs are entitled to contribution from the Third Party Defendants should judgment be entered against the Third Party Plaintiffs in favor of the Plaintiff pro rata in accord with equitable principles....

...This ruling is inconsistent with the trial court’s finding that Publix and Madeira consciously and knowingly for three years ignored expert advice to replace the roof, thereby resulting in damage to Southern Ornamentals. If Jewelcor is barred from contribution from Publix and Madeira under section 768.31(c), Florida Statutes (1985), then Publix and Madeira are similarly barred....

...The District Court of Appeal affirmed finding no merit to petitioner’s argument that the reasoning of Hoffman v. Jones, supra, required abrogation of the rule of “no contribution” among joint tortfeasors. Since the filing of the petition sub ju-dice, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act which provides that it shall be applicable to all causes of action pending at the time of its passage wherein the rights of contribution among joint tortfeasors ar...

...the statute in Lincenberg v. Issen et al., 318 So.2d 386 (Fla.1975), rehearing denied October 8, 1975. Accordingly, the decision of the District Court of Appeal under review is vacated and the cause is remanded for further consideration in light of Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, and Lincenberg v....

...minor child. Plaintiff further alleges that the cause of the wall’s collapse was negligent maintenance on the part of the defendant. The defendant’s suit against Raymond Dyson was filed pursuant to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1976)....

Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1981), states: (5) Release

COPE, Judge. Nicholas and Angela Baudo appeal an adverse summary final judgment entered on the basis of a release given to other tortfea-sors. We conclude that the trial court ruling is contrary to sections 768.041 and 768.31, Florida Statutes (1991), and reverse....

...this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly. See also § 46.015, Fla. Stat. (1991) (expanding concept to non-tort eases). Similarly, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1991), provides in part: (5) RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE.—-When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same inju...

...It involved an offer of judgment and nowhere mentions the statutes governing releases. Defendants rely on Rucks v. Pushman, 541 So.2d 673 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 549 So.2d 1014 (Fla.1989). The Rucks case is also inapposite because it does not mention, much less analyze, sections 768.31 and 768.041, Florida Statutes....

...e in Lawsuit I. Again, the statutes are dispositive. Defendants in Lawsuit II “are entitled to a credit for any amounts paid to the claimant in settlement for the injury.” Price v. Beker, 629 So.2d at 912 (citation omitted); see §§ 768.041(2), 768.31(5), Fla....

...The reasoning for this argument can be analogized to joint and several liability with the right to contribution, whereby a party can occasionally be forced to pay more than his share of a judgment, but can then recover in a separate action against his co-tortfeasors for the amount by which he overpaid. See § 768.31(2), Fla....

...III. Analysis One Beacon contends that, under Florida law, contribution is unavailable between insurers. (Doc. 105 at 4). One Beacon bases this on its contention that it and Liberty Surplus are not joint tortfea-sors, as required by Florida Statute § 768.31(2), part of Florida’s Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act....

...III. Analysis One Beacon contends that, under Florida law, contribution is unavailable between insurers. (Doc. 105 at 4). One Beacon bases this on its contention that it and Liberty Surplus are not joint tortfeasors, as required by Florida Statute § 768.31(2), part of Florida's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act....

...t a slower speed because of the road conditions. From this the fact-finder could conclude that Dunnigan was negligent in not having her car under control when she collided with the Kirkham vehicle. See 114 So.2d at 621 . Lee seeks contribution under Section 768.31(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), contending that he and Dunnigan were joint tortfeasors....

...We also affirm the order denying Mathias leave to amend his third-party complaint to include a claim for equitable subrogation. We reverse, however, that portion of the trial court’s order entering summary judgment on Mathias’s contribution claim. Section 768.31(2)(b) of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act provides in pertinent part: “The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total reco...

...separately and successfully. Anderson v. Gabrielson, 267 Minn. 176 , 126 N.W.2d 239, 242, n. 9 . In Florida, the reverse implica- *331 Rons of § l(4)(f) will no doubt bear on that issue. Id. at 87. Section l(4)(f) has as its modern day counterpart section 768.31(4)(f) and they both provide in identical language as follows: “The judgment of the court in determining the liability of the several defendants to the claimant for an injury or wrongful death shall be binding as among such defendants...

...At least where both tortfeasors are parties to the same action, each of them would have the opportunity to try to participate in an adversarial manner in any determination which might lead to exoneration of the other. While admittedly this comment was dicta, we believe that it represents a proper construction of section 768.31(4)(f)....

remanded for further consideration in light of Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, and Lincenberg v. Issen

...If the probate judge had followed the jury’s verdict there would have been a total set off. In any event, the apportionment of a settlement comes too late if done after the jury verdict because the non-settling tort-feasors lose the right to settle, thus frustrating the purpose of section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1987)....

HERSEY, Judge. Volkswagen of America, Inc., appeals a summary final judgment entered on its third-party complaint seeking contribution from joint tortfeasors pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes, the “Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.” We reverse....

Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Fla.Stat. § 768.31 (1975), specifically subsection (5)(b), settlement

...Regala-do the full million dollar award in the jury’s verdict without halving it. To obtain this reduction, Mr. Ortiz posits various theories. We address only his argument based on the doctrine of contribution *62 among joint tortfeasors, as provided in section 768.31, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...ssed Mr. Ortiz in addition to Andy. In any event, the trial court allowed, with the Regalados’ counsel’s concurrence, the contribution issue to be argued after trial at which time both Mr. Ortiz and Andy presented their arguments. B.The Statute, Section 768.31 To begin our discussion, we quote the portions of section 768.31 relevant to our inquiry: (2) RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION.— (a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for the same wrongfu...

...2d DCA 2007) (citing Fabre, 623 So.2d at 1187). A contribution action is necessarily against a party because contribution is limited to a party who has been found to be jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury or wrongful death. See § 768.31(2)(a)....

...made to his predecessor. All three judges erred in not allowing a contribution from Mrs. Re-galado as a joint tortfeasor responsible for Mr. Regalado’s damages. 10 We recognize that a contribution issue can be determined in a separate action. See § 768.31(4)(a), (c)....

case was decided prior to the amendment of Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1977). See Thayer v. State

...Carpenter sued Saf-T-Green, which raised as an affirmative defense that the scaffolding gave way due to the negligence of Bachman. On July 19, 1993, Saf-T-Green settled with Carpenter and assigned to Carpenter all of its contribution rights arising under section 768.31, Florida Statutes....

...Bachman sought summary judgment, arguing that the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations and that the assignment was invalid. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and, in so doing, erred. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31, does not expressly create a right of assignability....

...537 , 626 N.E.2d 1088 (1993) (finding right of contribution freely assignable when construing contribution statute similar to Florida’s). We find our sister court’s rationale in Robarts persuasive, and hold that Saf-T-Green could assign to Carpenter its right of contribution under section 768.31....

...However, as the Robarts court found, the right of contribution arises only when the tort liability has been settled. Robarts, 581 So.2d at 915 . Thus, the statute of limitations for a negligence claim is not at issue in this case; the applicable statute of limitations is the one-year time period provided in section 768.31 for contribution. 2 Under 768.31, Saf-T-Green — or its assignee — had one year from July 19, 1993, the date of the settlement agreement, to seek contribution from Bachman....

...eductible on its insurance policy with USF & G. 1 Appellant has not alleged that USF & G did not have the authority to enter into the settlement agreement with the Empies on appellant’s behalf. Contribution among tortfeasors is governed by section 768.31, Florida Statutes, which provides as follows, in pertinent part: (2)(b) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share....

...portion of the common liability apart from its insurer’s settlement of the Empie lawsuit. Therefore, appellant has failed to raise a legitimate issue as to whether USF & G, in its subrogation to appellant’s right of contribution, pursuant to 768.31(2)(e) did not have full authority to accept the payment from appellee’s insurer in full and final settlement of this case. As recognized in West American Insurance Company v. Best Products Company, 541 So.2d 1302 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), in pursuing a contribution claim under section 768.31, an insurance company stands in the shoes of its insured....

...time at this stage of the proceedings to the detriment of a third party. Consequently, we can find no fault with the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in this matter. This equitable resolution is consistent with the provisions and intent of section 768.31 and, although not directly on point, with the result reached in F.H. W. and C., Inc. v. American Hospital of Miami, Inc., 575 So.2d 1300 (Fla. 3d DCA) review dismissed, 582 So.2d 622 (Fla.1991). In that case, the court relied upon the equitable considerations set forth in section 768.31(3), which recognizes that principles of equity do apply to contribution generally....

counter claim the city asked for contribution per Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1981). After discovery which

third-party action for contribution pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes, against the truck owner

...We will assume for the sake of this discussion, although it has not been established judicially, that Debtor also was liable. The Florida statute creating a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors, expressly excludes “breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obligation.” Fla.Stat. 768.31(2)(g)....

...r paid $10,000 to the petitioning child without the necessity of judicial proceedings. Florida’s contribution statute requires that contribution be allocated pro rata according to the relative degrees of responsibility of the wrongdoers. Fla.Stat. 768.31(3)(a)....

...ds, principal and other debts to the financial institution on its demand whether the officer has duly qualified or not, and the receipt of the financial institution relieves the person or corporation from further responsibility therefor. . Fla.Stat. 768.31(2)(g) provides: (2) Right to CONTRIBUTION....

...erty, or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them. (g) This act shall not apply to breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obligation. . Fla.Stat. 768.31(3)(a) provides: (3) Pro rata shares....

...A verdict was rendered jointly and severally against Abaunza and the hospital, and final judgment was entered thereon. The hospital paid the entire judgment and then filed a claim for contribution against Abaunza and his professional association pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989)....

BERANEK, Judge. This appeal raises the question of whether an action to enforce contribution by a joint tortfeasor under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979), is a compulsory counterclaim and whether Subsection 4 of the Statute is violative of Article V, Section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution....

...We reverse the trial court’s contrary determination. Appellants’ complaint for contribution arose out of a prior suit against him for injuries arising from an automobile accident. After jury trial, the present appellant satisfied the entire judgment and filed suit for contribution under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979), against Harry Huddle and his insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company....

...The Poughs sued Ryder for personal injuries to themselves and their children resulting from the collision of their car, driven by Mr. Pough, with a vehicle owned by the truck line. Defendant and its insurer filed a general denial and a counterclaim for contribution under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Insurance Company of North America, 301 So.2d 21 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Midstate Hauling Company v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 189 So.2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966); Bumby & Stimpson, Inc. v. Peninsula Utilities Corporation, 179 So.2d 414 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). Under Section 768.31(4), Florida Statutes (1977), a judgment for contribution may be maintained whether or not the judgment has been entered in any action against two or more tortfeasors or by separate action....

...Consequently, we treat this petition for common law certiorari as a plenary appeal. Fla.R.App.P. 9.040(c). Appellant here filed no counterclaim. Instead, he brought a separate action within a year after rendition of judgment in the initial tort case. Subsection (2)(b) of Section 768.31 is as follows: The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more *1250 than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share....

...ically distinguishable from the liability tort case. This is the view of the majority of jurisdictions that have passed on the matter. See Annot., 57 A.L.R.3d 857 , Limitation Applicable to Indemnity Action, § 3 (1974), and cases cited. Pursuant to Section 768.31(4), the appellant paid the entire judgment and brought an action for contribution....

...It also acknowledged the trial court’s previous finding that the payment was made under threat of levy and execution of judgment, and entered judgment against appellant in the amount of $254,128 plus interest. The trial court never mentioned in its final judgment section 768.31(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1987), which provides: A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from, another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death is not extingui...

...We conclude the statute to be dispositive. 4 The satisfaction of *4 judgment between appellee and Whittier expressly did not satisfy the obligations of the other defendants. If the satisfaction of judgment is a settlement, which we conclude it to be, then section 768.31(2)(d) precludes appel-lee from recovering contribution from appellant. The act itself suggests that a satisfaction would support an action for contribution. Section 768.31(4)(b) reads in part: “When a judgment has been entered in an action against two or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced in that action.” Also, Florida Standard Jury Instruction MI 1.1...

...5 Extinguishing liability is the operative language of the statute. See Rinek v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 442 So.2d 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (the fact that liability is extinguished by a summary judgment rather than a settlement does not preclude a right of contribution under section 768.31), petition for rev. denied, 451 So.2d 848 (Fla.1984). Section 768.31(2)(d) does not distinguish between pre- and post-judgment settlements....

...nd execution but that the agreement between appellee and Whittier made contribution premature at that time. . We are uncertain of the trial court's use of the term "bad faith” in its final judgment, but it is clearly not the focus of our decision. Section 768.31(2) does not set forth good faith as necessary to maintain a claim for contribution....

...imant) paid (name) to satisfy [the judgment] ... resulting from (identify injury or incident giving rise to claim or judgment).” (emphasis added). . While no Florida case specifically holds that a satisfaction of judgment is a "settlement” under section 768.31 (2)(d), the Supreme Court of Alaska analyzed whether a post-judgment agreement was a satisfaction of judgment that would extinguish the liability of all the tortfeasors, enabling a settling tortfeasor to seek contribution under the Alaska Uniform Contribution Act....

...See Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12 U.L.A. 80 (Supp.1994). Even so, Criterion is instructive on the issue in the instant case, as the court was interpreting the Act, and Florida has a "Uniformity of Interpretation” clause in its Act. § 768.31(6), Fla.Stat....

...§ 46.015 (governing setoff for a covenant not to sue); § 679.340 (governing setoff against a deposit account); § 766.118(7) (governing setoff for non-economic damages in medical malpractice actions); § 768.041 (governing setoff for a covenant not to sue in a tort action); cf. § 768.31 (governing contri- *156 button among tort defendants)....

...motor vehicle not owned by the covered insured)). On remand, Travelers filed a complaint for contribution against Integon. It insisted to the trial court, as it insists on appeal, that it has a cause of action against Integ-on for contribution under section 768.31, Florida Statutes, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act....

...The trial court ruled orally that Travelers had failed to state a cause of action because Travelers and Integon were not joint-tortfeasors. First, in the earlier opinion, we applied only North Carolina law, which the parties agreed was controlling, and in no way intimated that Travelers had a cause of action under section 768.31....

...Boynton, 486 So.2d 552 (Fla.1986). That does not mean, however, that insurers stand in the shoes of the tortfeasor when one insurer seeks contribution from the other as an alleged co-obligor. Nor does it mean that in a case controlled by North Carolina law, a cause of action under section 768.31 may be brought....

...es he has caused the other party. Id. at 439. However, in Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1975), receding (in the light of Hoffman v. Jones ) from the rule of no contribution among joint tortfeasors, the court applied the then newly-enacted Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975) as the rule in Florida, holding that the full, joint, and several liability of joint tortfeasors to the plaintiff was retained, providing only for a contribution among them on a pro rata basis....

...however, for in 1976 the contribution statute was amended to specifically provide that in determining pro rata shares for purposes of contribution, "the relative degrees of fault" of joint tortfeasors would be the basis for allocation of liability. Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, as amended, Chapter 76-186, Laws of Florida (1976)....

...As an affirmative defense to the contribution claim, Zaldivar alleged that he had entered into a settlement with the injured party for his insurance policy limits and received a release of all claims. A copy of the release was attached to the answer. Therefore, he asserted that claims of contribution were barred by § 768.31, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Further, there was no effort to formulate or set up an alternative settlement plan, such as a structured settlement from funds available to Luis Zaldi-var other than his automobile liability insurance policy. The trial court entered a judgment on the pleadings, and this appeal followed. Under § 768.31, Florida Statutes (1991), a release given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury has the effect of discharging the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor....

fault. Ch. 75-108, Laws of Fla. (1975); see also, § 768.31 Fla. Stat. (1993). In Shor v. Paoli, 353 So.2d

SHARP, Judge. The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in granting Allstate Insurance Company’s motion to dismiss and in denying appellants’ motion for contribution pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979), filed against John Carroll, Allstate’s insured....

...The jury found that John Carroll was 47% negligent and that Janice was 53% negligent. The jury set Ruth’s damages at $29,200.00. At the commencement of the suit, appellants filed an amended counterclaim seeking contribution against John Carroll, pursuant to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 768.31, Fla.Stat....

...Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 362 So.2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) the motion to dismiss is denied. In so ruling we hold that the right of one co-defendant to appeal a judgment which exonerates another co-defendant is inherently implied in Florida’s Contribution Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Co., 362 So.2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) the motion to dismiss is denied. In so ruling we hold that the right of one co-defendant to appeal a judgment which exonerates another co-defendant is inherently implied in Florida’s Contribution Act, Florida Statutes (1977) § 768.31....

...Columbia County Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff’s Office) appeals a final judgment determining that its contribution action against The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) was time barred for failure to comply with the limitations provision in section 768.31(4)(d)2., Florida Statutes (1987)....

...The trial court entered a final judgment finding that this contribution action filed on October 8, 1984, more than one year after American Druggists’ agreed to discharge, and paid, the common liability the Sheriff's Office and FDLE owed to the estate, was time barred under section 768.31(4)(d)2. The Sheriff’s Office’s cause of action against FDLE for a pro rata contribution is governed by the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.-31, et seq. Section 768.31(4)(d)2....

...d on October 8, 1984, timely. We agree. It is apparent that the trial court viewed the settlement proposal arrived at by correspondence and telephone conversations between counsel for the respective parties as satisfying the statutory requirement of section 768.31, which provides that the time for filing a suit to enforce contribution begins when the tortfeasor “agreed” to discharge the common liability....

...Even if it be considered that a binding “agreement” occurred when the executor signed the release, since this event occurred less than a year prior to the time suit was filed, the action for contribution was timely. REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. MINER and WOLF, JJ., concur. . Section 768.31 (4)(d)2....

...Hester is, we believe, a sound and accurate decision, but it did not address or dispose of the question involved in this action. At issue here and in Hester is the right of contribution between joint tortfeasors under the Florida “Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act” — specifically under sections 768.31(2)(d) and 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1982)....

...ant might recover. This court simply held, in Hester , that the above-quoted language of the release did, in fact, extend to the owner/operator/insurer of vehicle 1 (primary defendants in Hester), although not specifically named therein, pursuant to section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes....

...he third-party complaint for contribution. Hester did not involve, decide, or address the question of the right of the owners/operators/insurers of vehicles 3 and 4 to contribution from the owner/operator/insurer of vehicle 1 under the provisions of section 768.31(2)(d)....

...That is the precise question in this case. It is perhaps fundamental but we find it necessary to point out that since there was no right of contribution between joint tort-feasors at common law, appellant had no right of contribution from appellee apart from that provided by section 768.31 with conditions therein....

...paid a consideration and released someone (either the paying party only or other possible responsible parties) from further liability. The rights between the tort-feasors as to contribution still remain open. Their respective rights are dependent on section 768.31 and who the claimant has actually released or exonerated from further liability to him....

...On securing the extinguishment of the claimant’s right to any damages or compen *1201 sation from the appellee, appellant acquired the right of pro rata contribution by appel-lee. We therefore REVERSE the judgment of dismissal and REMAND for further proceedings consistent herewith. SCHEB and DANAHY, JJ., concur. . 768.31 Contribution Among Tortfeasors....

...ot to sue as to one tortfeasor for property damage to, personal injury of, or the wrongful death of any person shall not operate to release or discharge the liability of any other tortfeasor who may be liable for the same tort or death. In addition, section 768.31(5) provides: RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE....

...ion 768.041(1). The court rejected that argument and held passive tortfeasors were, indeed, covered by the statute. [2] The Restatement (Second) of Judgments, section 51, treats consent judgments pretty much the same way that sections 768.041(1) and 768.31(5) treat settlements....

...We elect to treat the consent judgment here the same way for the policy reasons set out in the comments. By adopting the policy underlying the Restatement of Judgments as set out above, we believe we are following the lead of the legislature in enacting sections 768.041(1) and 768.31(5)....

...NOTES [1] In Eason v. Lau, 369 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 1365 (Fla. 1979), the court treated a dismissal with prejudice against a joint tortfeasor as if it were a release for purposes of applying sections 768.041(1) and 768.31(5)....

...Additionally, Miss Ludwig sued Commercial Carrier and Mr. Portwood. Commercial Carrier and its driver answered both lawsuits. They raised the defense of joint enterprise and also filed a cross-claim against Miss Ludwig and her grandparents for contribution pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989), seeking a pro rata share of any damages they might ultimately pay to Miss Kane....

...reflect the imputation of Miss Ludwig’s negligence to Miss Kane. Moreover, the posttrial motion requested that the defendants receive the benefit of the $100,000 settlement as a settlement with a joint tortfeasor pursuant to sections 768.-041 and 768.31 of the Florida Statutes (1989)....

...The Function of the Joint Enterprise Doctrine in a Modern Tort Case In a tort system which permits contribution among joint tortfeasors and setoff for their settlements, the functions of joint and several liability and the joint enterprise doctrine are closely related. See §§ 768.-041, 768.31, Fla.Stat....

...er 768, we see no reason to permit these facts to shift the risk of the driver’s collectibility from the joint tortfeasor to the passenger. Accordingly, Commercial Carrier is entitled only to the remedies available to it under sections 768.041 and 768.31 of the Florida Statutes (1989)....

...The plaintiff was 14% at fault, her fiance was 85%, and Disney World was 1%. Under joint and several liability, Disney World was obligated to pay 86% of the damages. The harshness of this result was relieved to the extent that Disney World had a right to seek contribution from the plaintiff's fiance under section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...As part of the risk of collectibility, we include the risks related to an insufficient settlement from a tortfeasor prior to verdict. Under statutory contribution, a good faith settlement by a joint tortfeasor prior to verdict requires the remaining tortfeasor to pay slightly more than its pro rata share of the judgment. § 768.31(5), Fla.Stat....

...This is an appeal from a final judgment for the appellee (third party plaintiff) in an action wherein the third party plaintiff sought indemnity and/or contribution for those funds the third party plaintiff paid to settle a medical malpractice action. There can be no question that § 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989) is applicable to the instant case. See § 768.31(7), Florida Statutes (1989); Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So.2d 386 (Fla.1975). Thus the only question is whether under the facts of this case it meets the criteria set forth in § 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989) to merit contribution....

...intiff has accepted this settlement as a complete satisfaction and has given a complete release. Here a complete release was given for monies received from the various defendants, and the plaintiff accepted the settlement as a complete satisfaction. Section 768.31(3) (1989) contains three provisions on how the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability are to be determined: (a) Their relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability....

...(c) Principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply. (§ 768.-31(3) (1989)) Paragraphs (b) and (c) are the same as when originally enacted. However, as originally enacted in 1975, the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31 provided in Paragraph 3(a), that in determining the pro rata shares of the tortfeasors in the entire liability, relative degrees of fault shall not be considered. § 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975); Lincenberg v....

...Loredo was the only one with any active fault. Class liability requires that the appellant, Findeiss, and Dr. Loredo be treated as a single share 3 since the appellant provided him to the hospital and paid him. Thus, the allocation of liability based on fault pursuant to § 768.31(3)(a) requires that the final judgment be affirmed....

...Government Employees Insurance Company, et al, 371 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); does a family exclusion clause in an automobile liability insurance policy prevent recovery by a joint tort-feasor through the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort-feasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes....

cause will be further considered in light of Section 768.31 Florida Statutes, and Lincenberg v. Issen,

...red by any doctrine of interspousal immunity. See Waite v. Waite, 618 So.2d 1360 (Fla.1993). Likewise, the Defendants could have counterclaimed against Mr. Bland seeking contribution toward the judgment entered against them in favor of his wife. See § 768.31, Fla....

...Moreover, the litigation against the LaGrandes ended in less than a year, and given the difference between the amount of the release and the amount of the Grecos’ claim against the City, we cannot say that the good faith of the release as required by section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1993), and questioned by the City, was a frivolous issue....

...3d DCA 1984); Fenner v. McLowhorn, 424 So.2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Schreier v. Parker, 415 So.2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Quinn v. Millard, 358 So.2d 1378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. Gordon, 328 So.2d 206 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Section 768.31(5) Florida Statutes (1981).

...because the denial of discovery of the settlement amounts wholly eviscerates its affirmative defense of setoff. Under Florida law, setoff is statutorily circumscribed. See § 46.015(2), Fla. Stat. (2020); see also §768.041(2), Fla. Stat. (2020); § 768.31(5)(a), Fla....

...it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the 12  amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater[.]” § 768.31(5)(a), Fla....

...other provision of the Florida Statutes, such other provision shall apply.” Ergo, to the extent section 768.81(3) conflicts with the statutory provisions establishing the substantive right to a setoff (i.e., sections 46.015(2), 768.041(2), and 768.31(5)(a)), the right to such a setoff endures. Because I find Strachan’s suggestion that the Legislature abolished the right to setoff highly dubious, and because Allen cites Strachan as persuasive authority, any future reliance on eit...

...Rather, an agreement to apportion the proceeds of a settlement agreement must he found on the face of the settlement agreement and agreed to by all of the parties involved in the settlement. Id. at 1351 (emphasis added). The court further noted that to hold otherwise would discourage settlement and defeat Florida Statutes section 768.31(5), which provides that a joint tortfeasor who settles in good faith cannot later be sued by the remaining defendants for contribution....

...n June 13, 1975 and applied to all causes of action pending as of that date. Id. at 391-92 . Rather than rely on the newly enacted statute, however, the Supreme Court independently rejected the common law rule. *1348 As adopted by Florida (Fla.Stat. § 768.31), the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfea-sors Act (“UCATA”) provides, in pertinent part: (2)(a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person...

...es of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability. (b) If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share. (c) Principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.31 (West 1997 & Supp....

...determination of pro rata shares. Florida’s statute dictates that, “In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability: their relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability.” *1349 Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.31(3)(a) (West 1997)....

...Florida adopted the remainder of the pro rata share provision verbatim from the model Act: “If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share. Principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply.” Fla.Stat. Ann. § 768.31(3)(b)-(c) (West 1997)....

...he Flight 965 pilots engaged in “willful misconduct” to invoke UCATA’s denial of a right of contribution to “any tortfeasor who has intentionally (willfully or wantonly) caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death.” Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.31(2)(c) (West 1997)....

one-year statute of limitations contained in section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1991), because INA’s action

...lleging the.cross defendants to be joint tort feasors through negligent operation of the Ludwig, Jr. car. Those cross defendants moved to dismiss the crossclaim for failure to state a cause of action. On hearing the motion, prior to the enactment of § 768.31 Fla.Stat., F.S.A....

...be classified as “a tortfeasor who has paid' more than his pro rata share of the common liability”, so as to put him in position to seek contribution from another joint tort feasor “to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share” (§ 768.31 (2) (b), Fla.Stat., F....

...The court below, after hearing and taking the matter under advisement, entered an order dismissing the third party complaint with prejudice. This appeal ensued. The right of appellants to seek contribution from Mel Geist, d/b/a Mel’s Bulldozing, and South Carolina Insurance Company is found in section 768.31(2), Florida Statutes (1977), as construed, in the context of the facts in this case, by Shor v....

to settle, thus frustrating the purpose of section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes 1987.”). It may be the

...A claim for contribution does not accrue until a judgment has been entered against the defendant/third-party plaintiff, or until the defendant has discharged the common liability. Showell Industries, Inc. v. Holmes County, 409 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1981) (Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act), and section 768.31(4)(a, d) thereof....

...Thus, although General Portland clearly had the right to bring a third-party action for contribution against DOT when it did so, see New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Petrik, 343 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fonts, 323 So.2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); section 768.31(4)(a, d), Florida Statutes, the cause of action for contribution had not yet accrued, for purposes of section 768.28(14), at the time the third-party complaint was filed, which was well after the effective date of section 768.28....

...al. Their argument is that this appeal should not be dismissed but stayed pending a decision by the supreme court in Quest and Ard because if it is held that parents are not persons “jointly or severally liable in tort” for the same injury, then Section 768.31 does not apply, the appellants are entitled to contribution, and the settlement is immaterial....

...In opposing the dismissal of the third-party complaint, they now argue that the parents are not persons who can be joint tortfeasors within the meaning of the statute. The two positions are facial contradictions. Appellants cite no authority for the suggestion that parents as joint tortfeasors may be exempt from Section 768.31....

Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31, Florida Statutes, adopted by the Florida legislature

COHEN, J. This appeal arises out of an action brought under Florida’s Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“the Contribution Act”), section 768.31, Florida Statutes....

...st release and original agreement, and that Trapper John’s contribution claim was barred by the statute of limitations. This appeal followed. The Contribution Act gives a settling tortfeasor a right of contribution against other joint tortfeasors. Section 768.31(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), provides: “[Wjhen two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same ......

...t, however, is subject to a caveat: “A tortfea-sor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the ... wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement....” § 768.31(2)(d), Fla. Stat. Additionally, when a release is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same wrongful death, the release does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors unless its terms so provide. § 768.31(5)(a), Fla....

...harged in full or in part the liability of a tortfeasor ... is subrogated to the tortfeasor’s right of contribution to the extent of the amount it has paid in excess *1264 of the tortfeasor’s pro rata share of the common liability.” Fla. Stat. § 768.31 (e)....

...The Act describes the tortfeasor’s right to contribution as follows: “[W]hen two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property ... there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.” Id. § 768.31(a)....

claim for contribution was properly dismissed. § 768.-31(5)(b), Fla.Stat. (1977); Seaboard Coast Line Railroad

...Popovich, supra, ratified the First District Court of Appeal’s decision in Christiani v. Popovich, 363 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and held that the right of one co-defendant to appeal a judgment which exonerates another co-defendant is mandated by Florida’s Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...endant Lindsey’s liability, if any, would be limited to the initial surgery, and that the third party defendant Blaine, would be liable for any other damages to the plaintiff. This, then, states a cause of action for contribution, as authorized by Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors *488 Act....

were improper pursuant to then controlling Section 768.-31(3)(a) & (c), Florida Statutes (1975). Lincenberg

giving Rowe, Jr., a claim against Skolsky. Section 768.-31 Florida Statute (1985), provides that, “when

...That release involved a negotiated settlement for $125,000 which acted to discharge all liability to the plaintiff. In Eller, the agreement expressly contemplated the trial participation of the settling third-party defendant. Subsequently, the non-settling defendant, pursuant to section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes, 1 was given credit against the jury verdict award for the $125,000 paid by the third-party defendant....

...the order denying appellants’ motion to set aside the agreement and covenant not to enforce judgment is affirmed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. SMITH, L. and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . s. 768.31(5), Fla.Stat....

...They contended that Turchin was not entitled to *1180 indemnity, having been found actively negligent, and could not recover contribution because, although a joint tortfeasor under the allegations of the original complaint, he was guilty of a violation of a fiduciary duty. Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Napoleon Steel Contractors, Inc., 385 So.2d 676 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). We reverse the summary judgment as it relates to the contribution count. The violation of a fiduciary duty, if any, would have been to the developer and not to the original plaintiffs and therefore we do not find the provisions of Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983) applicable and we return the matter to the trial court for the purpose of determining the contribution issues. Affirmed in part, reversed in part with directions. . § 768.31, Fla.Stat. (1983) reads in part as follows: "768.31....

...er Florida law there can be no indemnity between tortfeasors. The jury returned a verdict finding negligence of 25% by Richard Skipper, 25% by Cross, 50% by the City, and that the Skippers had suffered damages of $130,000. . *1243 In accordance with section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), the trial court reduced the damages awarded by 25% for the negligence of Richard Skipper, and offset the remainder against the settlement of $225,-000 obtained by the Skippers from Singer and Sargent-Sowell....

...ion, inspection, and maintenance of a table in the McDonald’s restaurant. McDonald’s filed a third party complaint against appellee Buchbinder, the manufacturer of the table, alleging like acts of negligence, and seeking contribution pursuant to Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...osts. Subsequently, Palmetto General moved to limit its liability to $100,000, pursuant to section 768.54(2)(f)l, Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), * and the trial court granted the motion. *437 Relying on the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31 et seq., Florida Statutes (1983) [Contribution Act], Dr....

...As indicated earlier, Lang sued his doctors and a hospital for malpractice arising out of medical care that he received after the boat accident. That claim was settled for $200,000. Upon motion by WIOD, the trial court further reduced Lang’s jury award by $127,500, 4 pursuant to Section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1981). The trial court found that the injuries claimed for the medical malpractice had been included in the claim against WIOD and Coloso and presumably comprised a portion of the jury verdict. Therefore, under Section 768.31(5), the judgment should be reduced by the amount of the medical malpractice settlement....

...In analyzing the effect of an employee's release on an employer, one must start with the applicable state law. Here, the Court must apply the law of Florida. Florida has a statute concerning releases but, unlike Missouri, its language is not limited to joint tortfeasors. Florida Statute § 768.31(5) states: (5) Release or covenant not to sue.— When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death: (a) It d...

...Codotrans has sufficiently stated a claim for indemnity, and Murano’s Motion is denied as to Count II. C. Contribution (Count III) Finally, Murano asserts Count III of the Third-Party Complaint must be dismissed because “Contribution is limited to tort claims.” (Mot. 11 (citing Fla Stat. § 768.31(2)) (alteration added))....

...08-80255-CIV, 2009 WL 1851124 , at *4 (S.D.Fla. June 29, 2009) (quoting Horowitz v. Laske, 855 So.2d 169, 173 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)); see also Fla. Patient’s Comp. Fund v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 559 So.2d 195, 197 (Fla.1990). Florida Statute section 768.31, the statute providing for statutory contribution, limits the availability of contribution as a remedy to tortfeasors who share common tort liability. See Fla. Stat. § 768.31 ; cf. Lapidus v. Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 389 So.2d 1057, 1059 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (noting Fla. Stat. § 768.31 is “expressly restricted to torts” and thus inapplicable to damages on account of a breach of contract)....

...tiffs claim for contribution “with leave to amend, to allege with specificity for which claims it is seeking contribution.” Id., 2009 WL 1851124 , at *4. In light of this clear law, an amendment to Count III is unnecessary. Under Florida Statute section 768.31, Codotrans cannot seek compensation from Murano for any damages Codotrans incurs due to Assa’s breach of contract claim....

supervising the child at the time of the drowning. See § 768.31, Fla.Stat. (1993). The case went to the jury,

...or was jointly and severally liable with Madeira and Publix for Southern’s losses. The trial court further held that Jewel-cor’s intentional acts constituted a tort. Therefore, the court ruled that the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1985), barred Jewelcor from obtaining contribution against Publix and Madeira under its cross-claim....

...Furthermore, this court held that the record did not support a claim of *1302 fraud and the award of punitive damages was error. The district court further held that the judgment was inconsistent in that it held Jewelcor was barred from obtaining contribution from Publix and Madeira under section 768.31(2)(c), because their intentional conduct constituted a tort, whereas it determined Publix and Madeira were entitled to contribution against Jewelcor although it had found them also guilty of consciously and knowingly causing injury to the plaintiff by the breach of their contracts....