Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ppeals for the Eleventh Circuit as determinative of a cause pending before that court and for which there is no controlling precedent. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has certified the following question to this Court: WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION 733.710 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES CONSIDERED SEPARATELY AND/OR TOGETHER OPERATE AS STATUTES OF NON-CLAIM SO THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION EXISTS, CLAIMS NOT FORMALLY PRESENTED WITHIN THE DESIGNATED TIME PERIOD ARE NOT BINDING ON THE ESTATE, OR...

...See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const. As explained below, we determine that section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1991), is a statute of limitations that cannot be waived in a probate proceeding by failure to object to a claim on timeliness grounds, while section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1991), is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in a probate proceeding....

...ot obligated to satisfy the judgment obtained by Mr. Prockup in the wrongful death/personal injury action. INIC in turn had no obligation because the Bradley Estate had no liability. INIC relied on the time limits established in sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes (1991), in making this argument....

...Prockup's counter-petition for administration filed in the Bradley Estate probate proceedings satisfied the requirements of section 733.703, Florida Statutes (1991), and provided sufficient notice of the claim in satisfaction of sections 733.702 and 733.710; (2) the co-personal representatives of the Bradley Estate waived the time limitations established by sections 733.702 and 733.710 by failing to raise Mr....

...a Probate Code. The court specifically concluded that Mr. Prockup's counter-petition for administration did not constitute a valid "Statement of Claim" under the Florida Probate Code or the Florida Probate Rules. The lower court also determined that section 733.710 barred recovery against the Bradley Estate even though the statute was not raised as an affirmative defense. Finally, the court determined that, even assuming the statutory bar of section 733.710 was waived if not raised as an affirmative defense, Mr....

...The court then certified the question now before this Court for consideration, noting that there is a conflict in the case law of Florida regarding the question. See id. at 1207-08. We now analyze the question posed. II. ANALYSIS The Eleventh Circuit has asked us to determine the nature of sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes....

...actions taken by the Florida Legislature in relation to the Florida Probate Code, we determine that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations that cannot be waived in the probate proceedings by failure to assert the statute in an objection, while section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings. A. SECTION 733.702 Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1991), sets forth in pertinent part: (1) If not barred by s. 733.710, no claim or demand against the decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent ......

...tension or be forever barred, the creditor shall be limited to a period of 30 days from the date of service of the notice in which to file a petition for extension. . . . . (5) Nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in s. 733.710....

...the filing of a claim on the grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice. We are not aware of any extension or any post-judgment request for extension pending in any probate court. With this determination in mind, we now turn our attention to section 733.710. B. SECTION 733.710 Section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1991), provides: (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent's estate, the personal representative (if any), nor the beneficiaries shall be liable f...

...(3) This section shall not affect the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or security interest or the lien of any person in possession of personal property *1155 or the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien. In Carter, 658 So.2d at 561, the Third District held that section 733.710 is a statute of limitations and that fraud or misrepresentation may estop an estate from relying on the statute as a defense. Conversely, in Comerica, 673 So.2d at 168, the Fourth District certified conflict with the Third District's decision in Carter, concluding that section 733.710 "states an absolute bar-akin to a statute of repose-that the court lacks power to avoid." Id....

...District in Comerica and certified conflict with the Third District's decision in Carter. [11] See also Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Estate of Johnson, 743 So.2d 83, 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (Nesbitt, J., dissenting and concurring) (concluding that section 733.710 constitutes a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim or a statute of repose). After reading section 733.710 in pari materia with section 733.702, see Pezzi v. Brown, 697 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (stating that "sections 733.702 and 733.710, which relate to the same subject matter, should be read in pari materia"); see generally Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992), we find it clear that section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings. In Comerica, the trial court extended the two-year time period set forth in section 733.710, Florida Statutes, so that the plaintiff could file a statement of claim against the decedent's estate for alleged environmental pollution. See 673 So.2d at 164. On appeal, the Fourth District traced the development of section 733.710, noting that the Legislature amended the statute in 1989 as part of a "package of amendments" in "obvious response" to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pope. See id.; ch. 89-340, Laws of Fla. The Fourth District then compared the terms of section 733.710 with the relevant terms of section 733.702. See Comerica, 673 So.2d at 165. After conducting this comparison, the Fourth District reasoned as follows: The introductory adverbial phrase in section 733.702(1), "[i]f not barred by s. 733.710," means that the 2-year period of section 733.710 is paramount over the limitations period in section 733.702(1). Reading the two sections together, it appears that section 733.702 fixes the basic time frame for filing of claims in decedent's estates being probated in Florida, but section 733.710 sets an absolute deadline beyond which no claim may be entertained. Knowing the effect of the Pope decision, it seems inescapable that the legislative intent for section 733.710 was to create a self-executing period of repose —without significant action by the state itself, it must be noted—for all claims after the lapse of the 2-year period....

...e of action against the decedent. Hence, rather than merely fixing a period of time in which to file claims, as section 733.702 does, in reality it creates an immunity from liability arising from the lapse of the period stated. The only exception to section 733.710's immunity from liability is found within its own subsection (2), which exempts from the bar of subsection (1) claims that were actually filed within the 2 year period but as to which *1156 the [personal representative] has failed to make payment or file an objection....

...The claimant must show fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice to empower the probate court to grant the extension. But the legislature was careful to add in section 733.702(5) that "nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in s. 733.710." There is no extension provision, moreover, in section 733.710. In fact, there is no authority anywhere in the probate code to extend the 2-year period of section 733.710. Reading the limited grant of extension authority in section 733.702(3) to enlarge the section 733.710 period of repose would be contrary to the structure and text of part VII of the probate code. Enlarging the repose period would also frustrate the obvious purpose underlying section 733.710 to provide an absolute bar date on the estate's liability for claims in decedent's estates being probated in Florida. Paradoxically, it would tend to make section 733.710 all but indistinguishable from section 733.702. . . . . Clearly, section 733.710 creates a self-executing, absolute immunity to claims filed for the first time, as here, more than 2 years after the death of the person whose estate is undergoing probate....

...It obviously represents a decision by the legislature that 2 years from the date of death is the outside time limit to which a decedent's estate in Florida should be exposed by claims on the decedent's assets. Comerica, 673 So.2d at 165-67 (footnotes omitted). In reaching its conclusion that section 733.710 operates to automatically bar claims and is not subject to waiver or extension, the Comerica court disagreed with the reasoning employed by the Third District in Carter. In Carter, to support its holding that section 733.710 is a statute of limitations, the Third District noted that (1) section 733.710 is entitled, "Limitations on claims against estates"; (2) the legislative history of section 733.710 repeatedly refers to the statute as one of limitations; and (3) the statute does not contain any of the "magic words of finality" evidencing the Legislature's intention to foreclose equitable claims that would be precluded by a "true statute of repose." 658 So.2d at 563-64. The Comerica court disagreed with the Carter court's reliance on the legislative history of section 733.710, noting that legislative history is irrelevant when the wording of a statute is clear. See Comerica, 673 So.2d at 167-68. Further, the Comerica court essentially concluded that the interrelation of sections *1157 733.702 and 733.710 provided the "magic words of finality" found lacking by the Carter court, relying on the fact that section 733.702(5) expressly disclaims any power to extend the two-year time period set forth in section 733.710. Comerica, 673 So.2d at 168. Judge Nesbitt recently reached a similar conclusion, determining that section 733.710 operates as a statute of nonclaim or statute of repose because "section 733.702(5) expressly prohibits any court from granting an extension of the time to file a claim against the decedent's estate on any grounds including fraud, esto...

...ent notice of the claim beyond two years following the death of the decedent." See Estate of Johnson, 743 So.2d at 88 (Nesbitt, J., dissenting and concurring); cf. In re Estate of Bartkowiak, 645 So.2d 1082, 1083 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (determining that section 733.710 barred Sun Bank from filing a claim outside the two-year time period despite the fact that the personal representative of the estate failed to ascertain that Sun Bank was a creditor and failed to serve the bank with the notice of administration). After considering the plain language of section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1991), and its interplay with section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1991), we hold that section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that automatically bars untimely claims and is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings. [12] As stated by the Fourth District in Comerica, section 733.710 "obviously represents a decision by the legislature that 2 years from the date of death is the outside time limit to which a decedent's estate in Florida should be exposed by claims on the decedent's assets." 673 So.2d at 167. Accordingly, we now consider the facts of this case in light of our determinations regarding sections 733.702 and 733.710....

...e months after first publication of the notice of administration and more than two years after Mr. Bradley's death. Thus, if such document constitutes Mr. Prockup's sole and exclusive claim filed in the probate proceedings, then sections 733.702 and 733.710 would both bar recovery from the Bradley Estate in excess of Mr....

...Further, it is well settled that the total failure to file a timely claim against an estate does not prevent a creditor from recovering up to the policy limits of a decedent's casualty insurance. See § 733.702(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991); Pezzi, 697 So.2d at 885-86 (determining that sections 733.702 and 733.710 did not bar plaintiffs from stating a cause of action to recover up to policy limits from decedent's casualty insurance even though the plaintiffs did not file a timely claim in the probate proceedings); Kent Ins....

...ortance so long as it furnishes sufficient information of the extent and character of the claim"). In light of our analysis regarding the petition and counter-petition, it is clear that Mr. Prockup satisfied the two-year nonclaim period set forth in section 733.710....

...atutes (1991), is a statute of limitations that bars untimely claims even if the issue of timeliness is not asserted in an objection in the probate proceedings, but that such limitation may be extended by the probate court. Further we determine that section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1991), is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings. Finally, while we would conclude that Mr. Prockup satisfied the nonclaim period set forth in section 733.710, he did not satisfy the limitation period established in section 733.702(1), and we are not aware of any extension or pending request for extension in any probate court....

...ad been violated, citing In re Estate of Danese, 641 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). The federal district court also stated that Mr. Prockup had "actual notice of the administration" of the Bradley Estate. [7] The 1991 version of sections 733.702 and 733.710 are applicable in this case because Mr....

...lature amended section 733.702 only once since 1991, and that amendment did not effect a substantive change, see chapter 97-102, section 1016, at 1360, Laws of Florida (making language in the statute gender-inclusive); and (2) the current version of section 733.710 is identical to the 1991 version. Compare § 733.710, Fla. Stat. (1999), with § 733.710, Fla....

...02, Florida Statutes (1983), which barred claims against an estate unless filed "[w]ithin 3 years after the decedent's death, if notice of administration has not been published." That subsection of section 733.702 dovetailed with the 1983 version of section 733.710, Florida Statutes, which provided, "Three years after the death of a person, his estate shall not be liable in any cause of action if no letters have been issued in Florida within the 3-year period." Thus, although we held in Barnett...

...lemental pleading."). [11] No party petitioned this Court for review in either Comerica or Estate of Petz, despite the presence of a certified conflict. [12] As with section 733.702, we determine that an estate may waive the time period set forth in section 733.710 in a separate action outside of the probate proceedings....

...arate action cannot recover against the estate unless the creditor has filed a claim in the probate proceedings within two years of the decedent's death. This is so because the probate court lacks the authority to extend the time period set forth in section 733.710. [13] Sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes, do not bar a creditor from stating a cause of action to recover up to policy limits from decedent's casualty insurance even though the creditor has not filed a timely claim in the probate proceedings....

...of estates. See In re Estate of Brown, 117 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1960). If claims based upon agreements to make a will are not required to be filed in three months, a lawsuit could be filed at any time until three years [1] after the decedent's death, see section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1985), and the payment of claims and the distribution to the beneficiaries could be substantially delayed or disrupted....

...recovery of the disputed expenses. The trial court dismissed Albritton's complaint, accepting the arguments raised by Ferrera in her motion to dismiss, finding Albritton's complaint was not filed within two years of the date of death, as required by section 733.710(1), Florida Statutes (1995), which the court found to be a statute of limitation....

...After this ruling, Ferrera sought attorney's fees against Albritton and his two attorneys, Langford and Regan, pursuant to the 1997 version of section 57.105, Florida Statutes. As grounds, Ferrera argued Albritton's complaint was frivolous because: (1) It was untimely, and thus barred by section 733.710, which was a statute of repose Albritton was unable to toll as a matter of law; and (2) Even if it was possible to toll section 733.710, Albritton failed to present a justiciable issue which would defeat the limitations defense. In defense, Albritton and his counsel argued the following three grounds as to why their complaint was not frivolous: (1) The expenses for which Albritton sought reimbursement were post-death expenses which were not subject to section 733.710; (2) Ferrera's arguments of estoppel, waiver or lack of notice were not applicable, because the claim was filed within the three month period allowed by the NOA; and that (3) At the time of the initial claim, there was a justiciable issue of law based on a conflict of authority as to whether section 733.710 was a statute of repose or limitation....

...See Langford, 823 So.2d at 797. Specifically, this court: (1) cited well established principles of law regarding the elements required to plead estoppel; (2) noted that, pursuant to specific probate code provisions, post-death expenses are not subject to section 733.710; and (3) reiterated the standard required to award fees under the pre-1999 version of section 57.105....

...Jay R. Dingledy of Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., Columbus, Ohio, for appellant. Jose O. Diaz and Carla L. Brown of Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn, West Palm Beach, for appellee. FARMER, Judge. The issue emerging from this appeal is whether section 733.710, Florida Statutes *164 (1991), is a statute of repose, thus barring the claim in suit, or an ordinary statute of limitations empowering the probate judge to extend the time for filing the claim....

...years from decedent's death barred it from any claim against the estate, the beneficiaries or the PR. On September 27, 1994, SDI filed a petition to enlarge the time for filing its claim, which the probate court granted over the PR's objection that section 733.710 unavoidably barred the claim as untimely. Thence this appeal. Section 733.710 was part of a package of amendments to the Probate Code that the legislature adopted in 1989 in obvious response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Tulsa Professional Collection Services Inc....

...n providing repose for potential defendants and in avoiding stale claims. The State has no role to play *165 beyond enactment of the limitations period." 485 U.S. at 486, 108 S.Ct. at 1345. The pertinent provisions of the statute in question state: "733.710 Limitations on claims against estates.— (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent's estate, the personal representative (if any), nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for...

...of pursuant to s. 733.705. (3) This section shall not affect the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or security interest or the lien of any person in possession of personal property or the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien." [e.s.] Section 733.710 is found in part VII of chapter 733, entitled "Creditors' Claims." Also found in part VII is section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1991). Section 733.702(1) states in part: "(1) If not barred by s. 733.710, no claim or demand against the decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any of its subdivisions, whether due or not, direct or contingent, or liquidated or unliquidated; no claim for...

...such copy of the notice on the creditor, even though the personal representative has recognized the claim or demand by paying a part of it or interest on it or otherwise." The introductory adverbial phrase in section 733.702(1), "[i]f not barred by s. 733.710," means that the 2-year period of section 733.710 is paramount over the limitations period in section 733.702(1). Reading the two sections together, it appears that section 733.702 fixes the basic time frame for filing of claims in decedent's estates being probated in Florida, but section 733.710 sets an absolute deadline beyond which no claim may be entertained. Knowing the effect of the Pope decision, it seems inescapable that the legislative intent for section 733.710 was to create a self-executing period of repose—without significant action by the state itself, it must be noted— for all claims after the lapse of the 2-year period....

...e of action against the decedent. Hence, rather than merely fixing a period of time in which to file claims, as section 733.702 does, in reality it creates an immunity from liability arising from the lapse of the period stated. The only exception to section 733.710's immunity from liability is found within its own subsection (2), which exempts from the bar of subsection (1) claims that were actually filed within the 2 year period but as to which the PR has failed to make payment or file an objection....

...[4] The claimant must show fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice to empower the probate court to grant the extension. But the legislature was careful to add in section 733.702(5) that "nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in s. 733.710." There is no extension provision, moreover, in section 733.710. In fact, there is no authority anywhere in the probate code to extend the 2-year period of section 733.710. Reading the limited grant of extension authority in section 733.702(3) to enlarge the section 733.710 period of repose would be contrary to the structure and text of part VII of the probate code. Enlarging the repose period would also frustrate the obvious purpose underlying section 733.710 to provide an absolute bar date on the estate's liability for claims in decedent's estates being probated in Florida. Paradoxically, it would tend to make section 733.710 all but indistinguishable from section 733.702....

...Jackson, 598 So.2d 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). [5] This is true even though the claims filing period of section 733.702 may be enlarged by the court when the required factual basis for doing so has been established. In contrast, as we have already seen, section 733.710 unequivocally erases any liability on claims filed after the repose period....

...Bogorff, 583 So.2d 1000 (Fla.1991), a statute barred stale claims based on medical malpractice. [6] They are apparently chosen by the legislature to operate in contexts in which an absolute bar date is deemed important and which cannot be avoided by pleading and evidence. Clearly, section 733.710 creates a self-executing, absolute immunity to claims filed for the first time, as here, more than 2 years after the death of the person whose estate is undergoing probate....

...h is the outside time limit to which a decedent's estate in Florida should be exposed by claims on the decedent's assets. SDI relies on Baptist Hospital of Miami v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), in which the third district concluded that section 733.710 is an ordinary statute of limitations, rather than of repose, and that fraud or misrepresentation of the type alleged there could serve to estop the estate from raising the section 733.710 defense....

...true" statute of limitations as to which estoppel or fraud could prevent the opponent of the claim from asserting the statute. The court also distinguished Parson, saying that there is no "language indicating the existence of an absolute cut off [in section 733.710], and thus a statute of repose." Carter, 658 So.2d at 563-64....

...We are required to indulge the assumption that the legislature knows the meaning of words and has expressed its intent in the words used in the statute. S.R.G. Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 365 So.2d 687 (Fla.1978). To repeat ourselves, there is no ambiguity in the words used in section 733.710....

...There is no indication anywhere in the committee reports that the term limitations was intended to be used as a term of art, referring to the ordinary statutes that must for effect be asserted by adverse parties or be deemed waived, and thus to suggest that—despite its text—the proposed new section 733.710 would not be one of repose but of ordinary limitation....

...amendment and before the Pope decision. The pre-1984 version of section 733.702 was a statute of limitations according to Read that could be waived by conduct of the opponent of the claim. But that hardly has any meaning as to the intent of the 1991 section 733.710, which itself contains no provision for enlargement and as to which section 733.702(5) expressly disclaims any power to enlarge. Most importantly, as we have just seen, section 733.710 does indeed contain an absolute "cutoff" of liability on claims or causes of action against the decedent....

...SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge. Baptist Hospital appeals from a final order striking its claim against the decedent's estate for the expenses of his last illness on the ground that it was filed more than two years after his death and was therefore barred by section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1989): 733.710....

...estate would be opened because there were no probatable assets owned by the decedent; and (c) notwithstanding these statements, the estate was indeed opened, but more than two years after the death. We hold that (a) while, under the 1989 version of section 733.710, the caveats did not toll the two-year limitation provided by that statute; (b) because 733.710 is a statute of limitations, rather than of repose, fraud or misrepresentation of the type alleged here may serve to estop the estate from raising the limitations defense....

...Although Baptist, notified because of the caveats, immediately filed a claim for its bill, it was stricken as untimely in the order now before us. II. One of Baptist's primary contentions is that the caveats in effect tolled the two-year statute of limitations for the filing of a claim provided by section 733.710....

...Jackson Memorial Hospital, *562 309 So.2d 564 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), which, following Lord v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 296 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), indeed so held. We agree, however, with the trial judge that the now-effective 1989 amendment to 733.710 overruled the Gomez case in this respect. Prior to 1989, section 733.710 provided as follows: 733.710 Limitations against unadministered estates....

...d in Florida within the 3-year period. This section shall not affect the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or security interest or the lien of any person in possession of personal property or the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien. § 733.710, Fla....

...licability "notwithstanding any other provision of the code" — obviously including the caveat provision, section 731.110. The clarity and specificity of those changes leave us with no doubt that their effect was to render a caveat irrelevant to the 733.710 limitations period and thus to negate the holdings in Gomez and Lord....

...Clearly, the legislature intended to provide a point of closure for estates, even if the personal representative or beneficiaries did not comply with the procedures set out in the probate code. ("Notwithstanding any other provision of the code ..."). Thus, by operation of 733.710, Sun Bank's right to file its claim was extinguished on September 14, 1991, two years after the death of Bartkowiak, regardless of whether Sun Bank knew or should have known of its right to file a claim against his estate and regardless of whether Ms....

...ition, absolutely bars a claim or action after the passage of a particular period of time regardless of the underlying circumstances. See University of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 1991). There is no basis, however, for the conclusion that section 733.710 is such a statute: 1. Everything in the statute itself and in the legislative history mandates the conclusion that 733.710 is a statute of limitations rather than repose....

...* * * Second, the free standing statute of limitations barring claims after the expiration of three years of a decedent's death, would be reduced to two years whether or not a petition for administration has been filed. * * * * * * Section 9 amends section 733.710, F.S., relating to limitations on claims against unadministered estates....

...indicate the legislature's intent to create a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim which, under the circumstances specified in the statutes, automatically bars untimely claims. In re Estate of Parson, 570 So.2d at 1126 (footnote omitted). It is obvious that the language of 733.710 invokes Barnett rather *564 than Parson....

...cient administration of the decedent's probatable assets will itself provide ample impetus for the prompt opening of estates well within the two-year period. If this is not done, however, any creditor — faced with the known obstacle of the two-year-733.710 period — is, of course, free to provide self-protection by opening the estate itself as an "interested person" under sections 733.202(1) and 731.201(21)....

...ort for the proposition that the statutes are not "true" statutes of repose or jurisdictional non-claim statutes. Cf. Comerica Bank & Trust, F.S.B. v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So.2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (construing the two-year period in section 733.710 as a statute of repose because the period cannot be enlarged by the court); Hirsh v....

...Appellants, John and Dorothy Pezzi (plaintiffs), appeal a final summary judgment in favor of appellee, Mary Jane Brown, personal representative of the estate of Leroy Simmons, Jr. (appellee Brown). The final summary judgment was based on plaintiffs' failure to comply with sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes (1995), which place limitations on recovery against a probate estate and the estate's personal representative....

...It is undisputed that this cause of action was not barred by the general four-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence cases. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). However, the trial court in effect determined that the cause of action was otherwise barred by sections 733.702 and 733.710 because plaintiffs did not file a timely claim with the decedent's estate and did not bring the action within two years after Simmons' death....

...after the tortfeasor's death, where the plaintiff seeks to recover damages only from the tortfeasor's liability insurance policy and not from the assets of the estate. The resolution of this issue depends on an interpretation of sections 733.702 and 733.710, which place limitations on creditors' claims against probate assets, and the relationship of these sections to section 95.011, which places general time limitations on bringing causes of actions. Sections 733.702 and 733.710 are part of Chapter 733, Florida's probate code....

...he personal representative was still the proper nominal party in a lawsuit to establish liability of the decedent tortfeasor. Because plaintiffs' complaint was filed more than two years after the date of Simmons' death, we must also consider whether section 733.710 erects a bar to plaintiffs' cause of action, although section 733.702 does not. Section 733.710, entitled "Limitations on claims against estates," states in relevant part: Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent's estate, the personal representative (if any), nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied). Appellee Brown urges us to read section 733.710 as extinguishing a cause of action based on the tortious conduct of a tortfeasor where the lawsuit was not brought within two years of the decedent's death, thereby extinguishing the ability of plaintiffs to recover under decedent's liability policy. In determining the legislative intent of a statute, we look primarily to the language of the statute. Arthur Young & Co. v. Mariner Corp., 630 So.2d 1199, 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Section 733.710, by its own terms, does not bar a cause of action against a decedent; it merely states that neither the decedent's estate, the personal representative nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action filed more than two years from the decedent's death. The limitation on liability pursuant to section 733.710 is specific to the decedent's estate, the personal representative, and the beneficiaries; the limitation does not extend to the decedent's insurance policy....

..."Courts always presume that the legislature — a body advised and informed by lawyers — adopted the particular wording of a statute advisedly and for a purpose." Sirmons v. State, 634 So.2d 153 (Fla.1994) (Kogan, J., concurring) (citing Lee v. Gulf Oil Corp., 148 Fla. 612, 4 So.2d 868 (1941)). The language in section 733.710 limiting the liability of specific parties should be contrasted with the language in section 733.702, providing that no cause of action shall survive unless a claim is timely filed or the claim comes within one of the exceptions set forth in subsection 702(4). The language limiting liability in section 733.710 should also be contrasted with the language in section 95.11 governing general limitations on bringing causes of action, providing that a cause of action shall be barred unless brought within a specified period of time. *886 Defendants correctly note that section 733.710 does not contain the exception provided in section 733.702 for proceedings to establish liability to the extent of a decedent's insurance coverage. However, sections 733.702 and 733.710, which relate to the same subject matter, should be read in pari materia. See Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 454-55 (Fla.1992). "[S]ection 733.702 fixes the basic time frame for filing of claims in decedent's estates being probated in Florida, but section 733.710 sets an absolute deadline beyond which no claim may be entertained." Comerica Bank & Trust F.S.B....

...v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So.2d 163, 165 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). [2] The exception in section 733.702 is an exception to the general statement that disallows causes of action where no claim has been filed within the specified time periods. Section 733.710, on the other hand, does not disallow causes of action but rather provides an absolute limitation on liability of specified entities (or individuals). In this case, where the decedent's estate, the personal representative, and the beneficiaries could not be held personally liable as a result of the application of section 733.702, section 733.710 has no additional impact on plaintiffs' cause of action....

...In deciding this case, we are further guided by the principle that statutes restricting access to the courts must be narrowly construed in a manner favoring access. See Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993); Silva v. Southwest Fla. Blood Bank, Inc., 601 So.2d 1184, 1186 (Fla.1992). Section 733.710 "represents a decision by the legislature that 2 years from the date of death is the outside time limit to which a decedent's estate in Florida should be exposed by claims on the decedent's assets." Comerica, 673 So.2d at 167 (emphasis supplied). There is no indication that section 733.710 represented a legislative decision to undermine the rights of plaintiffs to recover under tortfeasors' insurance policies. Our interpretation here is consonant with the purpose of the time limitations in sections 733.710 and 733.702, which are designed to promote "the public policy of providing for the speedy settlement of estates" in order that "the payment of claims and the distribution to the beneficiaries [not] be substantially delayed or disrupted." Spohr, 589 So.2d at 228; In re Brown's Estate, 117 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla.1960). Applying section 733.710 in a manner that would prevent a claimant from recovering up to the limits of a tortfeasor's insurance coverage would not foster the goals of Chapter 733. Plaintiffs seek recovery only to the extent of Simmons' liability insurance coverage and not from his estate's assets, the personal representative individually, or the beneficiaries. [3] Neither section 733.702 nor section 733.710 precludes plaintiffs from bringing this cause of action and recovering to the extent that Simmons was covered by liability insurance....

...See generally Florida Wrongful Death Act, §§ 768.16-.27, Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] In Comerica Bank & Trust F.S.B. v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So.2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), we certified conflict with Baptist Hospital of Miami v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), on the issue of whether section 733.710 is a statute of limitations or a statute of repose....

...ree months of the date of the publication of the notice or have their claims forever barred pursuant to section 733.702. Specifically, this statute provides in relevant part that: 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims.— (1) If not barred by § 733.710, no claim or demand against the decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any of its subdivisions, whether due or not, direct or contingent, or liquidated or unliquidated; no claim for...

...this probate proceeding and remand for further proceedings. Reversed. GODERICH, J., concurs. NESBITT, J. (dissenting and concurring): I agree with the result but not the reasoning of the court. I cannot subscribe to the view that section 732.102 or section 733.710 may be harmonized with and construed pari materia with section 409.910, Fla. Stat., so as to afford notice to the personal representative. There are really two parts to this analysis. First, section 709.910 creates and establishes AHCA's right to a lien upon a Medicaid recipient's property. Section 733.710 is generally designed to limit, reduce, extinguish or nullify all claims so as to hasten the closing of a decedent's estate....

...Nonetheless, Florida Probate Rule 5.490(e) makes it perfectly plain that the claim must be filed with the clerk of the division of the court responsible for administering probate. Under the test announced in Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 (Fla.1992), section 733.710 constitutes a non-claim statute or a "statute of repose." This is because section 733.702(5) expressly prohibits any court from granting an extension of the time to file a claim against the decedent's estate on any grounds including fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice of the claim beyond two years following the death of the decedent. § 733.710(1), Fla....

...Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30, at 168 (5th ed. 1984)). Section 733.702 contains other provisions which, if complied with, reduce the time period for the filing of the creditor's claim, but any extended discussion as to whether section 733.710 is a Statute of Limitations or a Statute of Non-claim is entirely irrelevant to a proper resolution of this case. In a word, that is because sections 733.702(4)(a) and 733.710(3) exclude a "security interest, or other lien" on the property of a decedent....

...NOTES [1] The summary judgment in this case only concerned the issue of priority as between Mr. Rice and Mr. Greene. Mr. Rice's breach of contract claim against Mrs. Schwartz was not affected by this judgment. [2] At this point, creditors' claims are likely barred by section 733.710, Florida Statutes (2004), a two-year jurisdictional statute of non-claim that automatically bars claims that are not asserted within two years following the date of death....

...f appellant's petition, and it was error to strike the claim and deny the petition without an evidentiary hearing on the factual issues presented. Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings. WIGGINTON and KAHN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1987), provided in pertinent part as follows: Limitations against unadministered estates....

...cept as provided in this section. (2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702 within 2 years after the person's death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s. 733.705. Section 733.710, as amended, does not apply in this case as the amended version became effective after the decedents death. The earlier version of section 733.710, quoted above, cannot operate as a bar to appellant's claim because, by its terms, it applied to unadministered estates....

...1964); In re Estate of Bierman, 587 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Therefore, the order is now ripe for appeal. Turning to the merits of the appeal, we reverse the probate court's order upon a finding that Sun Bank's claim was barred by the limitation provision of Florida Statutes Section 733.710....

...Clearly, the legislature intended to provide a point of closure for estates, even if *1084 the personal representative or beneficiaries did not comply with the procedures set out in the probate code. ("Notwithstanding any other provision of the code ..."). Thus, by operation of 733.710, Sun Bank's right to file its claim was extinguished on September 14, 1991, two years after the death of Bartkowiak, regardless of whether Sun Bank knew or should have known of its right to file a claim against his estate and regardless of whether Ms....

...CASANUEVA, Judge. Lutheran Brotherhood Legal Reserve Fraternal Benefit Society appeals an order dismissing with prejudice its petition to reopen the estate of Robert F. Petz. We affirm the trial court's determination that the petition was barred by operation of section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...tion seeking to reopen Robert F. Petz's estate and to set aside the personal representative's discharge. The personal representative countered by filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting that Lutheran Brotherhood's claim was barred by section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1997). In dismissing the petition with prejudice, the trial court found that the claim was filed more than two years after Mr. Petz's death and was barred because section 733.710 functions as a statute of repose. Section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1997), is entitled "Limitations on claims against estates" and provides in subsection (1): Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent's estate, the per...

...aid nor has had the claim resolved, nor will it affect the lien or fore-closure *598 rights of holders of mortgages or security interests or personal property. Presently, the courts have arrived at two divergent views of the proper interpretation of section 733.710....

...ed claim. See Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla.1986) (explaining the distinction between jurisdictional statutes of non-claim (repose) and statutes of limitations, which are subject to waiver). We conclude that section 733.710 is a statute of repose that bars Lutheran Brotherhood's untimely filed claim....

...nt-client George Albritton (Albritton) (collectively "Appellants"), under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1997). Appellee-personal representative Martha Ferrera (Ferrera) argues that Albritton's claim as a creditor of the estate was time-barred by section 733.710, Florida Statutes, the statute of repose, and even if the claim was not time-barred, Albritton was not entitled to reimbursement because the sums for which he sought reimbursement were expended without Ferrera's authority....

...the expenses for which Albritton initially sought reimbursement were post-death obligations of the estate, which included mortgage payments, taxes, insurance, maintenance, and repairs and are not subject to the provisions of sections 733.702(1) and 733.710; and (3) at the time of the initial claim, there was a conflict of authority as to whether section 733.710 is a statute of repose or a statute of limitation....

...nst Ferrera's assertion that his claim is time-barred. Appellant's estoppel defense cannot be deemed non-justiciable because May v. Illinois National Insurance Company, 771 So.2d 1143 (Fla.2000), was decided after Appellant filed his claim. May held section 733.710 "is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that automatically bars untimely claims, and is not subject to waiver or extension in probate proceedings." See id. at 1157. However, when Appellant filed his complaint, there was a split of authority among our sister courts as to whether section 733.710 was a statute of limitation or a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim as was subsequently determined by May. See Comerica Bank & Trust, F.S.B. v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So.2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that the court lacks the power to avoid); Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (section 733.710 is a statute of limitation, and estate could be estopped from asserting limitation as a defense to untimely claim)....

...ppellant's claim. Appellant also stated a justiciable claim for post-death expenditures, because such claims are not subject to the probate code's statutes of nonclaim. See Swenszkowski v. Compton, 662 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); §§ 733.702 and 733.710, Fla....

...(Emphasis added.) *422 The appellees did not file their objection to venue [2] until four months and twenty-one days after the statutory deadline had expired. Their objection was thus "forever barred." Cf. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560, 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (section 733.710, Florida Statutes, which mandates that creditors' claims against estate be filed within two years of decedent's death, is a statute of limitations)....

...The daughter moved for summary judgment, arguing that debtors had waited too long to assert recoupment. She argued that they should have asserted the recoupment by filing a claim against decedent's estate and that, having failed to do so, they are barred from asserting recoupment by section 733.710, the nonclaim statute....

...transformed to a claim against his estate. And the holder of the mortgage is equally correct that such an independent claim against the estate expired when the debtors failed to file such a claim with the personal representative before the lapse of section 733.710....

...d). The theory is that the defense should be viable as long as the claim to which it responds is viable. See Beekner v. L.P. Kaufman Inc., 145 Fla. 152, 157, 198 So. 794, 796 (1940) (generally defense should be as long-lived as cause of action). [6] Section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim and not an ordinary statute of limitations....

...ment is nonetheless still available defensively to lessen the amount owed on the mortgage debt. [7] The daughter argues that the more recent decision in Beach v. Great Western Bank, 692 So.2d 146 (Fla.1997), bars the recoupment theory, again because section 733.710 operates like a statute of repose....

...NOTES [1] For purposes of deciding the legal issue, we take as presumptive fact those factual assertions as to which the losing party on summary judgment has offered evidence. Whether a trier of fact will so find is beyond our competence to say. [2] In turn she assigned it to her own living trust. [3] See n. 7, below. [4] § 733.710, Fla....

...eal estate); and Admiral Sec. & Inv. Co. v. Curtis, ___ So.2d ___, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D2094, 2001 WL 984793 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug.29, 2001) (defensive use of recoupment not available against non money damages claim to quiet title). [7] Debtors argue that section 733.710 applies only to claims for money or property against the decedent's estate and carries over to probate estate assets distributed to estate beneficiaries. See § 733.710(1), Fla....

...(2000) ("[two years after death] neither the decedent's estate, the personal representative (if any), nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent"); and May v. Illinois Nat. Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143, 1157 (Fla.2000) (section 733.710 is jurisdictional statute of nonclaim automatically barring untimely claims and not subject to waiver or extension in probate)....

...They contend that in this case they seek no money or property from the probate estate or its beneficiaries. They also argue that the mortgage is not an asset traceable to the probate estate, that it passed outside of probate through decedent's inter vivos trust and therefore section 733.710 does not control the outcome of debtors' attempt to assert recoupment to lessen the amount they owe on the mortgage. We are unable to resolve these contentions on the basis of the record before us and therefore are unable to decide the section 733.710 issue on this basis....

...f v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 942 So.2d 425, 427 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). The circuit court concluded that Crescenze's request to intervene was barred because it was not filed prior to the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 733.710(1), Florida Statutes (2005). However, it is clear from the language of the statute and its place in chapter 733 of the Probate Code that section 733.710(1) applies exclusively to claims against an estate in a probate proceeding and has no application in a civil action to terminate a trust. See also Henry P. Trawick, Jr., Trawick's Redfearn Wills and Administration in Florida § 2:11 (2008-09 ed.) (recognizing that "[s]everal statutes of limitation apply only to probate matters" and discussing section 733.710)....

...We adopt the trial court's reasoning as explained in its order and summarize it below. First, the trial court found that the Arencibias' claims against the estate were barred by the jurisdictional statute of non-claim because they were filed more than two years after the decedent's death. § 733.710, Fla. Stat. (1991); May v. Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143, 1157 *80 (Fla.2000)("[S]ection 733.710, Florida Statutes (1991), is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that automatically bars untimely claims and is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceeding.")....

...Next, the trial court concluded that although the Arencibias claimed that the delay in filing their claims was due to the "lulling promises" of a third party, these allegations were immaterial and irrelevant. May, 771 So.2d at 1156 ("[T]he claimant cannot avoid [§ 733.710] by showing ......

...The trial court noted that, in the instant case, although the parties were each seeking a one-third interest in the property, the interests were entirely different and effectively doubled the amount claimed against the estate. Lastly, the trial court rejected the Arencibias' claim that section 733.710 was inapplicable to a claim of trust or joint venture because the property never became a part of the estate....

...hip interest of the estate and must be governed by the Probate Code. Moreover, the trial court properly denied the motion to realign Gulf Seafood and Santiago Arencibia as party-plaintiffs because the new claims are barred by the non-claims statute. § 733.710, Fla....

...In ruling upon appellant's motion, the trial judge determined that appellant's claim was time barred by appellant's failure to file its claim within three months of the first publication of notice of administration and by not being filed within two years of the death of the decedent "as required by Section 733.710, Florida Statutes or any applicable Statute of Limitation." Section 733.710 does not apply to this case as that section was enacted by chapter 89-340, Laws of Florida, and specifically made applicable only to the estates of decedents dying after July 1, 1989....

...The court thus had no evidentiary basis from which to conclude that the estate of the former husband had proven laches. Moreover, the estate did not contend until oral argument that the former wife's action was barred by the two-year statute of non-claim under section 733.710, Florida Statutes....

...creditor of Harry’s estate and sought a determination to that effect. The personal representative of Harry’s estate filed a response to appellant’s petition, asserting in relevant part that the claim was time-barred under sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes....

...The personal representative later filed an amended motion to strike the statement of claim. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court entered its Order Striking Untimely Filed Claim, ruling that the statement of claim was untimely under sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes, and established case law....

...On appeal, appellant argues that if the notice to creditors is not served on a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor, then the applicable limitations period of section 733.702(1) never begins to run and the known or reasonably ascertainable creditor is bound only by section 733.710’s two-year statute of repose....

...and shall promptly serve a copy of the notice on those creditors.” To preserve a claim against a decedent’s estate in Florida, a creditor must file a written statement of the claim within the statutorily prescribed time periods. See §§ 733.702, 733.710, Fla. Stat. (2006). Section 733.702 is a statute of limitations that cannot be waived in a probate proceeding by failure to object to a claim on timeliness grounds, while section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in a probate proceeding. See May v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143, 1145 (Fla.2000). Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (2006), 1 provides in relevant part: (1) If not barred by s. 733.710, no claim or demand against the decedent’s estate that arose before the death of the decedent ......

...s the time in which the claim may be filed. An extension may be granted only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period.... [[Image here]] (6) Nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in s. 733.710. (emphasis added). Section 733.710, Florida Statutes (2006), provides in relevant part: (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent’s estate, the personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiaries...

...(2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702 within 2 years after the person’s death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s. 733.705. This court has held that under sections 733.702 and 733.710, any claims of known or reasonably ascertainable creditors, though filed after the three-month period following publication of notice of administration, should not be stricken as untimely if filed prior to the earlier of 30 days after service of notice of administration or two years after the decedent’s death....

...aims has commenced. However, regardless of whether or not the claimants had actual notice, section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes, does not bar the claim of a creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice of administration, unless barred by section 733.710, until the later of the 3-month period following publication or 30 days after seiuice of notice on the creditor....

...timely if filed prior to the earlier of 30 days after service of notice of administration or 2 years after the decedent’s death. Id. at 27 (citation omitted). Our decision in Puzzo is consistent with the plain language of sections 733.702 and *393 733.710....

...reditor who was not served with a notice to creditors is required to file a claim within the publication period of three months unless the creditor files a motion for an extension of time under section 733.702(3) within the two-year repose period of section 733.710. See Lubee, 77 So.3d at 884 ; Morgenthau, 26 So.3d at 632-33 . For example, in Lubee , the creditor, Mr. Lubee, filed a claim outside the three-month publication period, but prior to the expiration of the two-year statute of repose provided in section 733.710....

...Lubee was required to file his claim in the probate proceeding within the three-month window following publication. Alternatively, Mr. Lubee could seek an extension from the probate court pursuant to section 733.702(3) within the two-year window of section 733.710....

...2 years after the decedent’s death.” Puzzo, 637 So.2d at 27 . We certify conflict with Lubee and Morgenthau . Reversed and Remanded; conflict certified. DAMOORGIAN, C.J., and KLINGENSMITH, J., concur. . The 2006 versions of sections 733.702 and 733.710 are applicable in this case because they were in effect at the time of Harry’s death on February 16, 2007....

...1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). However, regardless of whether or not the claimants had actual notice, section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes, does not bar the claim of a creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice of administration, unless barred by section 733.710, until the later of the 3-month period following publication or 30 days after service of notice on the creditor....

...judgment. We reverse the order. After the estate objected to this claim, Ms. Howard filed an independent action, which was dismissed for failure to prosecute. When she refiled her claim several years later, it was untimely under sections 733.705 and 733.710, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that a claim or demand against an estate that arose before the death of the decedent is not binding on the estate unless filed within the relevant statutory period. This statute makes no exception for a claim based on a judgment. Section 733.710 provides that the estate is not liable for claims filed two years from the date of the decedent's death. Although section 733.710(3) states that the section does not affect "the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or security interest or the lien of any person in possession of personal property or the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien," no similar protection is provided for a judgment lien....

...3.702(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and the Macks filed petitions seeking to strike the Estate's objections to their claims. We agree with the trial court that the Macks' claims against the estate are barred by sections 733.702(1)(3), [1] and *698 733.710(1), [2] Florida Statutes (2005)....

...The Macks' claims were filed more than three months from the date the notice to creditors was first published. See § 733.702(1). Further, the Macks did not file a request for an extension of time under section 733.702(3) until after the running of the two-year non-claim period in section 733.710(1). As the Supreme Court held in May v. Illinois National Insurance Company, 771 So.2d 1143, 1157 (Fla.2000), "section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that automatically bars untimely claims and is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceeding." The May court explained that this statute "represents a decision by the legislature...

...ecessary surplusage" which has no "affect [on] the validity or effectiveness of the first notice published." AFFIRMED. WOLF and ROBERTS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (2005) provides in pertinent part: (1) If not barred by s. 733.710, no claim or demand against the decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent, ....

...* * * (3) Any claim not timely filed as provided in this section is barred even though no objection to the claim is filed unless the court extends the time in which the claim may be filed. An extension may be granted only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period. . . . [2] Section 733.710 provides in pertinent part: 733.710 Limitations on claims against estates....

...claim by failing to file a legally sufficient statement of claim against the Bradley estate. To preserve a claim against a decedent's estate in Florida, a claimant must file a written statement of the claim within statutorily prescribed time periods. See §§ 733.702, 733.703, 733.710, Fla....

...May concedes that the formal statement of claim filed by Prockup was untimely because it was filed more than three months after first publication, as required by section 733.702 and more than two years after Oscar Bradley's death, as required by section 733.710....

...No such extenuating circumstances are present in this case. Waiver of Defense by Estate May contends the personal representatives of the estate waived any objections to the sufficiency or timeliness requirements specified in sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes, (1) by failing to object to Prockup's claims in either the probate proceeding or the wrongful death/personal injury action; (2) by acknowledging the validity of the claims by filing a proof of claim and making partial pay...

...tt Bank 9 of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla.1986). Read was decided in 1986, prior to the most recent changes in the Florida Probate Code, including the addition of section 733.710. The characterization of section 733.710 is no more settled.1 The two state appellate courts that have looked at the statute have come out differently on the matter....

...ath, the widow commenced administration of the estate. The hospital was notified of the administration by the court because of the caveat, and promptly filed its claim. The personal representative/widow moved to strike the claim as being barred by section 733.710, and the trial court struck the claim. The hospital appealed, arguing that "733.710 is a statute of limitations, rather than of repose, [and therefore] fraud or misrepresentation of the type alleged here may serve to estop the estate from raising the limitations defense." Baptist Hospital, 658 So.2d at 561. The Third District Court of Appeal agreed and reversed and remanded for a factual determination of the misrepresentation estoppel issue. 1 Section 733.710 provides in pertinent part: (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent's estate, the personal representative (if any), nor the bene...

...(3) This section shall not affect the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or security interest or the lien of any person in possession of personal property or the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien. § 733.710, Fla....

... In direct conflict is the holding of Comerica Bank. In that case, the probate court granted upon motion an extension of time, beyond two years following decedent's death for the bank to file its claim. The personal representative appealed, arguing that section 733.710 was a statute of repose that erased any liability on claims filed after the repose period. The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed and reversed. The court reasoned in part that section 733.702 by its terms is subordinate to section 733.710, and that if section 733.702 was a statute of repose, section 733.710, which was "paramount," must also be a statute of repose rather than a statute of limitations....

...precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida. Therefore, we certify the following question of law, based on the facts and procedural history recited above, to the Supreme Court of Florida for instructions: WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION 733.710 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES CONSIDERED SEPARATELY AND/OR TOGETHER OPERATE AS STATUTES OF NONCLAIM SO THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION EXISTS, CLAIMS NOT FORMALLY PRESENTED WITHIN THE DESIGNATED TIME PERIOD ARE NOT BI...

...his death. The Trustee was appointed as the personal representative of the Decedent's estate. The Creditor's claim on the note, filed in the probate proceedings more than two years after the expiration of the two-year statute of nonclaim imposed by section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1993), was ultimately held to be barred....

...2d DCA 2000); Williams v. Sebring Hous. & Dev., 723 So.2d 359, 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). The Applicable Law The Creditor's claim against the Decedent's estate was barred by her failure to file her claim against the estate within the two-year period established by section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...barred. See Charles E. Early, Notices Under the New Trust Law, 70 Fla. B.J. 12, 14 (Jan.1996). Unless the creditor timely served a claim on the trustee within two years after the settlor's death, section 737.3057(3) (the trust claims counterpart of section 733.710 in the Probate Code) barred claims against the trust, the trustee, and the beneficiaries....

...ly impractical. Wolf, 69 Fla. B.J. at 61. [4] An estate was ultimately opened for the Decedent, and the Trustee was appointed as his personal representative. The estate was not opened, however, until after the two-year nonclaim period established in section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1993), had already expired....

...der section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (2006), if not filed within three months after the first publication of the notice to creditors absent an extension, or whether the claim is timely if filed within two years of the decedent’s death under section 733.710, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...notice to creditors is required to file a claim within three months after the first publication of the notice, unless the creditor files a motion for an extension of time under section 733.702(3) within the two-year period of repose set forth in section 733.710....

...on 733.702(1) are not applicable to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors who are never served with a copy of the notice to creditors and that the claims of such creditors are timely if filed within two years of the decedent’s death under section 733.710, we approve the decision of the Fourth District in Golden and disapprove the decisions of the First and Second Districts in Morgenthau and Lubee. I....

...Carol Jones, the personal representative of Harry’s estate and the Petitioner before this Court, filed a response to Golden’s petition asserting that Katherine was not a reasonably ascertainable creditor of Harry’s estate and that her guardian’s claim was time-barred under sections 733.702 and 733.710....

...After a hearing on the petition, the probate court entered an order striking the guardian’s 1. In 2008, a guardian was court appointed for Katherine Jones because she was adjudicated to lack capacity. -3- 2009 claim as untimely under sections 733.702, 733.710, on the authority of the decisions of the First and Second District Courts in Morgenthau and Lubee. On appeal, Golden argued that because the notice to creditors was not properly served on Katherine, a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor, the three-month limitations period set forth in section 733.702(1) never began to run, and the claims of Katherine’s guardianship could only be barred by the two-year statute of repose in section 733.710....

...representative to publish a notice to creditors of the pending administration of an estate and to serve a copy of the notice to creditors on known or reasonably ascertainable creditors. It provides, in relevant part: (1) Unless creditors’ claims are otherwise barred by s. 733.710, the personal representative shall promptly publish a notice to creditors....

...Service is not required on any creditor who has filed a claim as provided in this part, whose claim has been paid in full, or whose claim is listed in a personal representative’s timely filed proof of claim. .... (4) Claims are barred as provided in ss. 733.702 and 733.710. § 733.2121, Fla....

...An extension may be granted only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period. .... -6-  (6) Nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in s. 733.710. § 733.702, Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis added). Section 733.710 provides, in relevant part: (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent’s estate, the personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiarie...

...(2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702 within 2 years after the person’s death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s. 733.705. § 733.710, Fla. Stat. (2006). We have held that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations and that section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim, which cannot be waived or extended....

...Lubee was required to file his claim in the probate proceeding within the three- month window following publication. Alternatively, Mr. Lubee could seek an extension from the probate court pursuant to section 733.702(3) within the two-year window of section 733.710....

...2d 448, 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (affirming order enforcing claim against estate where creditor failed to file claim within three-month window of section 733.702(1) but did file motion for extension of time within two-year window of section 733.710)....

...However, regardless of whether or not the claimants had actual notice, section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes, does not bar the claim of a creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice of administration, unless barred by section 733.710, until the later of the 3-month period following publication or 30 days after service of notice on the creditor....

...with a copy of the notice, section 733.702(1) does not govern the timeliness of that creditor’s claims. Instead, the claims of such a creditor are only barred if not filed - 12 - within the two-year period of repose set forth in section 733.710....

...ainst the rights of those creditors to have their intangible interests in property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 485. The Supreme Court determined that where a time bar is self-executing—such as the two-year statute of repose in section 733.710—there is insufficient state action to implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment....

...791, 800 (1983)). A personal representative is therefore constitutionally obligated to provide actual notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors and if the personal representative fails to provide that notice, the creditors’ claims cannot be barred except under section 733.710....

...uired. See Fla. Prob. R. 5.241(a) (“[T]he personal representative shall promptly publish a notice to creditors and serve a copy of the notice on all creditors of the decedent who are reasonably ascertainable.”). Notwithstanding these provisions, section 733.710, Florida Statutes, is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim, which cannot be extended and limits claims against an estate to two years after the death of a decedent. See § 733.710(1), Fla....

...Code’s two-year statute of repose 1 functioned as an adjudication on the merits such that the “exoneration rule” forbade liability of the employer. Tsuji, 366 So. 3d at 1031–33. In a careful and thoughtful textual analysis of the Code’s language, the Florida Supreme 1 Section 733.710(1), Florida Statutes (2013), the applicable statute in Tsuji, provided, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent’s estate, the personal representative, if any,...

...been issued, except as provided in this section.” 5 Court determined that it did, noting that the Code’s statute of repose “automatically barred” the plaintiff’s untimely suit. See id. at 1026, 1032. “Section 733.710(1) is in that sense ‘a self-executing, absolute immunity to claims filed for the first time ....

...Probate Code. See also Crescenze v. Bothe, 4 So.3d 31, 33 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (addressing a different section of the Probate Code but finding that “[i]t is clear from the language of the statute and its place in Chapter 733 of the Probate Code that section 733.710(1) applies exclusively to claims against an estate in a probate proceeding and has no application in a civil action to terminate a trust.”) (emphasis added)....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. April 23, 2008. Lionel Barnet, Miami, for appellant. Holland & Knight and Christopher W. Boyett and Eduardo A. Ramos and Kevin E. Packman, Miami, for appellee. Before RAMIREZ, CORTIÑAS, and ROTHENBERG, JJ. PER CURIAM. We affirm on the basis of section 733.710, Florida Statutes (2002), which provides that "[two] years after the death of a person, neither the decedent's estate, the personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent....

...Notice of administration; filing of objections. § 733.2121, Fla. Stat. Notice to creditors; filing of claims. § 733.701, Fla. Stat. Notifying creditors. § 733.702, Fla. Stat. Limitations on presentation of claims. § 733.705, Fla. Stat. Payment of and objection to claims. § 733.710, Fla....

...ient statement of claim against the Bradley estate. To preserve a claim against a decedent’s estate in Florida, a claimant must file a written statement of the claim within statutorily prescribed time periods. See §§ 733.702, 733.703, 733.710, Fla....

...May concedes that the formal statement of claim filed by Prockup was untimely because it was filed more than three months after first publication, as required by section 733.702 and more than two years after Oscar Bradley’s death, as required by section 733.710....

...No such extenuating circumstances are present in this case. Waiver of Defense by Estate May contends the personal representatives of the estate waived any objections to the sufficiency or timeliness requirements specified in sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes, (1) by failing to object to Prockup’s claims in either the probate proceeding or the wrongful death/personal injury action; (2) by 11 acknowledging the validity of the claims...

...is nevertheless a statute of limitations,” citing Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1986). Read was decided in 1986, prior to the most recent changes in the Florida Probate Code, including the addition of section 733.710. The characterization of section 733.710 is no more settled....

...1 The two state appellate courts that have looked at the statute have come out differently on the matter. Compare Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (statute of limitations) with Comerica Bank & Trust, F.S.B. v. SDI Operating 1 Section 733.710 provides in pertinent part: (1)Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent’s estate, the personal representative (if any), nor the beneficiaries shall...

...disposed of pursuant to s.733.705. (3) This section shall not affect the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or security interest or the lien of any person in possession of personal property or the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien. § 733.710, Fla....

...period following the decedent’s death, the widow commenced administration of the estate. The hospital was notified of the administration by the court because of the caveat, and promptly filed its claim. The personal representative/widow moved to strike the claim as being barred by section 733.710, and the trial court struck the claim. The hospital appealed, arguing that “733.710 is a statute of limitations, rather than of repose, [and therefore] fraud or misrepresentation of the type alleged here may serve to estop the estate from raising the limitations defense.” Baptist Hospital, 658 So.2d at 561....

...In direct conflict is the holding of Comerica Bank. In that case, the probate court granted upon motion an extension of time, beyond two years following decedent’s death for the bank to file its claim. The personal representative appealed, arguing that section 733.710 was a statute of repose that erased any liability on claims filed after the repose period. The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed and reversed. The court reasoned in part that section 733.702 by its terms is subordinate 16 to secti9on 733.710, and that if section 733.702 was a statute of repose, section 733.710, which was “paramount,” must also be a statute of repose rather than a statute of limitations....

...nt in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida. Therefore, we certify the following question of law, based on the facts and procedural history recited above, to the Supreme Court of Florida for instructions: WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION 733.710 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES CONSIDERED SEPARATELY AND/OR TOGETHER OPERATE AS STATUTES OF NONCLAIM SO THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION EXISTS, CLAIMS NOT 17  FORMALLY PRESENT...

...filing a written statement of a claim in a state probate proceeding within statutorily prescribed time periods. See May v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co.,190 F.3d 1200(11th Cir. 1999). The questions were as follows: WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION 733.710 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES CONSIDERED SEPARATELY AND/OR TOGETHER OPERATE AS STATUTES OF NONCLAIM SO THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION EXISTS, CLAIMS NOT PRESENTED WITHIN THE DESIGNATED TIME PERIOD ARE NOT...

...limitations that bars untimely claims even if the issue of timeliness is not asserted in an objection in the probate proceedings, but that such limitation may be extended by the probate court based on fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice; (2) section 733.710 Florida Statutes (1991), is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings; and (3) that a petition for the appointment of an administrator ad litem and a counter-petition...

...2 with the essential requirements of section 733.703 and Fla. Prob. R. 5.490(e). See May v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143, (2000). In light of these conclusions, the Court held that the filing of the petition and counter-petition “satisfied the nonclaim period set forth in section 733.710,” but “did not satisfy the limitation period set forth in section 733.702(1), and we are not aware of any extension or pending request for extension in any probate court.” Thus the Supreme Court’s decision effectively bars the claim made against the estate. The motion of appellant David R....

...for filing a written statement of a claim in a state probate proceeding within statutorily prescribed time periods. See May v. Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co., 190 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir.1999). The questions were as follows: WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION 733.710 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES CONSIDERED SEPARATELY AND/OR TOGETHER OPERATE AS STATUTES OF NONCLAIM SO THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION EXISTS, CLAIMS NOT PRESENTED WITHIN THE DESIGNATED TIME PERIOD ARE NOT BINDING ON...

...is a statute of limitations that bars untimely claims even if the issue of timeliness is not asserted in an objection in the probate proceedings, but that such limitation may be extended by the probate court based on fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice; (2) section 733.710 Florida Statutes (1991), is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings; and (3) that a petition for the appointment of an administrator ad litem and a counter-petition...

...section 733.703 and Fla. Prob. R. 5.490(e). See May v. Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143, (2000). In light of these conclusions, the Court held that the filing of the petition and counter-petition "satisfied the nonclaim period set forth in section 733.710," but "did * Honorable Julian Abele Cook, Jr., U.S....

...The Estate can show no prejudice caused by the erroneous procedures employed by the Paynes’ Michigan counsel. Nevertheless, the Paynes are seeking an extension not only beyond the period authorized in section 733.702, but also beyond the two-year period established in section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...733.212 Notice of administration; filing of objections and claims. F.S. 733.508 Accounting upon removal. F.S. 733.604 Inventory. F.S. 733.701 Notifying creditors. F.S. 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims. F.S. 733.705 Payment of and objection to claims. F.S. 733.710 Limitations against unad-ministered estates....

...733.212 Notice of administration; filing of objections and claims. F.S. 733.508 Accounting upon removal. F.S. 733.604 Inventory. F.S. 733.701 Notifying creditors. F.S. 733.702 Limitations on presentation of claims. F.S. 733.705 Payment of and objection to claims. F.S. 733.710 Limitations against unad-ministered estates....

...we add the following observations concerning other arguments presented to us. Contrary to the argument of appellant, we do not conclude that the claim, which arose during the administration of the estate, is time barred by either section 733.702 or section 733.710. Section 733.702, in its terms, applies to claims that arose before the death of the decedent and does not apply to claims against casualty insurance. Section 733.710, the 1987 version of which is applicable to the claim in this case which allegedly arose December 28, 1988, applies to unadministered estates....

...Accounting upon removal. 1⅜£⅛ 733.604, Fla.Stat. Inventory. ⅞⅛⅛ 733.701, Fla.Stat. Notifying creditors. ⅜§⅛ 733.702, Fla.Stat. Limitations on presentation of claims. Fr§4 733.705, Fla.Stat. Payment of and objection to claims. ⅞⅛⅛ 733.710, Fla.Stat....

...ministration; filing of claims. Notice of ad-objections and 733.702, Fla.Stat. presentation of claims. Limitations on RS4 733.703, Fla.Stat. ner of presenting claim. Form and man- ⅜&⅞ 733.704, Fla.Stat. claims. Amendment of 733.708, Fla.Stat. Compromise. § 733.710, Fla.Stat....

...issued payments from the estate’s bank account to creditors to satisfy fifteen, alleged personal debts of the decedent; none of these creditors had filed a statement of claim against the estate within two years of the decedent’s date of death. See § 733.710(1), Fla....

...r the death of a person, neither the decedent’s estate, the personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued.” § 733.710, Fla....

...The decedent died on December 30, 2011. On February 7, 2012, the personal representative (the decedent’s son) filed a petition for formal administration of the decedent’s estate in the probate division of the Monroe County Circuit Court. Pursuant to section 733.710(1), any creditor with a claim against the decedent’s estate had until December 30, 2013, to file the claim....

...from the breach of this duty.”); In re Estate of Pearce, 507 So. 2d 729, 731 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (recognizing that section 733.609 permits surcharging a personal representative for making unauthorized payments from an estate’s bank account); see also §733.710(1), Fla. Stat. (2011); May v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co., 771 So. 2d 1143, 1157 (Fla. 2000) (“[S]ection 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that automatically bars untimely claims and is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings.”). 5  On December 10, 2020, the benefici...

...sonal representative shall serve all interested persons with a copy of the claim and notice of the right to object to the claim.” 6 to satisfy “a claim . . . against the decedent” within the meaning of section 733.710....

...beneficiaries’ summary judgment motion, which explained as follows: 9. The $1,500,000 payment [the beneficiaries] refer to as being paid to me . . . was not paid to me in satisfaction of a claim I made against [the decedent] within the meaning of § 733.710....

...As to the remaining fourteen payments to other creditors discussed herein, the personal representative’s memorandum of law argued that the payments were also not made to satisfy “a claim . . . against the decedent” within the meaning of section 733.710, because, somehow, they were “in rem claims against corporate interests organized and operated outside the State of Florida.” With respect to these disbursements, the personal representative’s affidavit avowed that “each of...

...esentative’s affidavit, establishes that these disbursements were made to satisfy personal debts of the decedent, and the personal representative’s affidavit provides no rational explanation to the contrary. See § 733.609(1), Fla. Stat. (2011); § 733.710(1), Fla....

...10 and estate assets were used to repay the loan, then the surcharge was proper because the personal representative failed both to (i) file a timely, written statement of claim against the estate, see § 733.703(1), Fla. Stat. (2011); § 733.710(1), Fla....

...it Court, General Jurisdiction Division. 1 Therefore, Robert preserved any claim on the property by properly asserting same within the time frame in 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1987), when Richard Coba instituted these probate proceedings in 1992. Section 733.710, Florida *734 Statutes (1987) does not bar Robert Coba’s claim....

...That order became final 30 days after May 22nd. On July 22, 2002— more than 30 days after the order striking the claim — Interim filed a motion for rehearing but took no action to schedule a hearing on its motion. All claims became jurisdictionally barred on March 22, 2003. See § 733.710(1), Fla. Stat. (2001) (2 years after the death neither the estate, the personal representative, nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim against the decedent); see also May v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143, 1157 (Fla.2000) (“section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of non-claim that automatically bars untimely claims and is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings.”)....

except as provided in this section.” Fla. Stat. § 733.710(1). The statute provides an exception for creditors

...s after the decedent’s death, for three reasons: (1) pursuant to section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (2015), the petition was an untimely claim against the estate; (2) the petition was further barred by the two-year statute of repose contained in section 733.710(1), Florida Statutes (2015); and (3) no exception to those statutory deadlines allowed the wife to file the petition more than two years after the decedent’s death. The wife argues that her petition to determine her community pr...

...F THE FIRST PUBLICATION OF THIS NOTICE. ALL CLAIMS NOT FILED WITHIN THE TIME PERIODS SET FORTH IN FLORIDA STATUTES SECTION 733.702 WILL BE FOREVER BARRED. See § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2015) (“If not barred by s. 733.710, no claim or demand against the decedent’s estate that arose before the death of the decedent ....

...or, as to any creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice to creditors, 30 days after the date of service on the creditor . . . .”) (emphasis added). 2  The notice further stated, pursuant to section 733.710(1)’s two-year repose deadline: NOTWITHSTANDING THE TIME PERIOD SET FORTH ABOVE, ANY CLAIM FILED TWO (2) YEARS OR MORE AFTER THE DECEDENT’S DATE OF DEATH IS BARRED. See § 733.710(1), Fla....

...On June 30, 2015, the three-month claims period under section 733.702(1) expired. By that time, the wife had not filed a claim or other pleading against the estate to determine her alleged community property interest. On January 21, 2017, the two-year repose period under section 733.710(1) expired....

...distribution under the laws of succession of this state.”). The decedent’s daughters filed a motion to strike the wife’s petition. The daughters’ motion and supplemental memorandum argued that the wife’s petition was untimely under sections 733.702(1), 733.710(1), and 732.223. Section 732.223 states: If the title to any property to which ss....

...aim” under section 731.201(4). Third, the wife argued that if her petition was a claim, then her community property interest fell within the common law “trust exception” and the statutory “lien exception” to section 733.702(1)’s and section 733.710(1)’s deadlines....

...the community property interest was exempt from the statutory deadlines. b. The Statutory “Lien Exception” As a second exception to the statutory deadlines, the wife relied upon the lien exceptions contained in sections 733.702(4)(a) and 733.710(3), Florida Statutes (2015). Section 733.702(4)(a) states: “Nothing in this section affects or prevents . . . [a] proceeding to enforce any mortgage, security interest, or other lien on property of the decedent.” Section 733.710(3) states: “This section shall not affect the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or security interest or the lien of any person in possession of personal property or the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien.” The wife, applying sections 733.702(4)(a) and 733.710(3), argued that even if her community property interest was considered as a claim, then the vesting of community property interest gave rise to an equitable lien which should be excepted from sections 733.702(1) and 733.710(1). 3....

...Stat., as it is a claim or demand against Decedent’s estate for personal property in the possession of the personal representative, which claim was filed more than 3 months after the notice to creditors was first published. The Petition is further barred by section 733.710(1), Fla....

...’s death. (paragraph numerals omitted). 6  4. This Appeal and Our Review This appeal followed. To the extent our review involves interpretation of sections 733.702’s and 733.710’s deadlines, or an examination of whether the wife qualifies for an exception to those deadlines, our review is de novo. See Headley v....

...subject to any statutory deadlines. The wife further argues that if her petition was a claim, then her community property interest fell within the common law “trust exception” and the statutory “lien exception” to section 733.702(1)’s and section 733.710(1)’s deadlines. The daughters argue that the circuit court properly struck the wife’s petition as untimely pursuant to both section 733.702(1) and section 733.710(1) because the wife’s petition is a claim....

...name at the time of his death, the wife’s failure to make a claim upon her community property interest within section 733.702(1)’s three-month claim period barred her later-filed untimely claim (in the form of her petition). See § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2015) (“If not barred by s. 733.710, no claim or demand against the decedent’s estate that arose before the death of the decedent ....

...the date of service on the creditor . . . .”) (emphasis added). Third, to the extent the wife’s petition is not only a “claim” under section 731.201(4) but also a cause of action, the wife’s failure to make a claim upon her community property interest within section 733.710(1)’s two-year claim period barred her later-filed untimely claim (in the form of the petition). See § 733.710(1), Fla....

...Similarly here, the wife did not allege the existence of an express trust or any other clearly defined means by which the decedent held the community property interest on her behalf. 8  Fifth, the wife’s reliance upon the lien exceptions contained in sections 733.702(4)(a) and 733.710(3) is similarly unavailing....

...2(4)(a)’s exception (“Nothing in this section affects or prevents . . . [a] proceeding to enforce any mortgage, security interest, or other lien on property of the decedent.”), we could not reach the same conclusion under the plain language of section 733.710(3)’s narrower exclusion. Section 733.710(3) states: “This section shall not affect the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or security interest or the lien of any person in possession of personal property or the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien.” The wi...

...disagree with the wife’s argument that sections 732.216–.228’s failure to establish a deadline when a surviving spouse must file a petition to perfect a community property interest means no such deadline exists. Rather, as the daughters argue, a two-year deadline exists based on section 733.710(1)’s plain language: “Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent’s estate, the personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim...

...Because the wife’s community property interest was a “claim” as defined in section 731.201(4), the wife had three months after the time she published the notice to creditors to file her claim according to section 733.702(1), and in any event had two years after the decedent’s death to file her claim according to section 733.710(1)....

...As a result, the circuit court properly found that the wife’s untimely claim (in the form of her petition) was barred, and that no exception to the statutory deadlines existed. Ruling otherwise would have left no deadline by which the wife had to file a petition to perfect her community property interest, contrary to section 733.710(1). Affirmed. 9 LEVINE and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing....

...cedent’s funeral expenses. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in ordering her to pay the expenses because appellees’ funeral expense claims were filed more than two years after the decedent’s death and were, thus, untimely pursuant to section 733.710(1), Florida Statutes....

...soon after [her] death as may be practical.... ” More than two years after the decedent’s death, appellees, the decedent’s children, filed claims against the estate for the payment of her funeral expenses. 1 Appellant objected on the basis of section 733.710(1). The trial court ordered appellant to pay the expenses, which totaled $3,521.40. This appeal followed. Section 733.710 Florida Statutes (2001), entitled “Limitations on claims against estates,” provides: (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent’s estate, the personal represent...

...r lien. (Emphasis added). A “claim” is defined in part as a “liability of the decedent, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, and funeral expense.” § 731.201(4), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added). The supreme court has held that section 733.710 is a “jurisdictional statute of non-claim that automatically bars untimely claims and is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings.” May v. Ill. Nat’l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143, 1157 (Fla.2000). The supreme court explained that section 733.710 “ ‘obviously represents a decision by the legislature that 2 years from the date of death is the outside time limit to which a decedent’s estate in Florida should be exposed by claims on the decedent’s assets.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). It is undisputed in this case that appel-lees filed their claims against the decedent’s estate more than two years after her death. Pursuant to section 733.710(1), the claims were barred....

...Were that not the case, each of the decedent’s creditors could have simply relied on the will and filed claims against the estate long after her death, thereby forever subjecting the estate to uncertainty. Such a situation would conflict with the purpose behind section 733.710(1)....

...On the same day, the trial court entered its Order Denying Authorization of Sale of Real Property. The court adjudged that the Personal Representative was not authorized to sell because “no cause of action was timely filed by the purchaser in accordance with F.S. 733.702(1), F.S. 733.702(6) and F.S. 733.710.” We agree with the Personal Representative’s assertion on appeal that Mr....

...as it furnishes sufficient information of the extent and character of the claim”). 771 So.2d at 1160-61 (second alteration in the original). We further conclude that a claim by Mr. Zilewicz was timely filed in accordance with sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...n. Ch. 2002-82, § 6, Laws of Fla. (eff. April 23, 2002). The amendment is pertinent to the instant case and renders the claim timely under section 733.702. Also, Mr. Zilewiez’s claim would not be time barred by the two-year statute of nonclaim in section 733.710, which bars claims not filed within two years after a person’s death....

...is but one consideration in determining the propriety of an injunction, here, Barbara contends the trial court was required to grant injunctive relief because the painting constitutes an estate asset, and any claim to the contrary is time-barred by section 733.710, Florida Statutes (2021)....

...in the possession of the personal representative. § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. The statutory time frame is, however, subject to extension and waiver. See Fla. Prob. R. 5.042(b). 6  The second provision, codified in section 733.710, Florida Statutes, reads, in relevant part: (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, [two] years after the death of a person, neither the decedent’s estate, the personal representative, if any, nor th...

...as provided in this section. (2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702 within [two] years after the person’s death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s. 733.705. § 733.710(1)–(2), Fla....

...either alone or in conjunction with any other person, is liable for the expenses of the administration and other obligations of the decedent’s estate to the extent the decedent’s estate is insufficient to pay them as provided in s. 733.607(2). . Section 733.710(1), Florida Statutes (1999), provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of the' code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent’s estate, the personal representative (if any), nor the beneficiaries shall be liable...

...extension of time. See §§ 733.2121(3)(a), .702(3). If reasonably ascertainable creditors are not served with notice of the administration of the estate, they must be given an extension of time to file their claims up to the two-year statute of limitations in section 733.710....

...4th DCA 1977) ("For efficiency in administration, the Circuit Court is frequently divided into divisions, with each division handling certain types of cases. Judges and cases can both be transferred from one division to another . . . ."). 4 Section 733.710 states in relevant part: (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent's estate, the personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent ....

...quirements for filing a written statement of a claim in a state probate proceeding within statutorily prescribed time periods. See May v. Illinois Nat'l Ins. Co., 190 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir.1999). The question is as follows: WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION 733.710 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES CONSIDERED SEPARATELY AND/OR TOGETHER OPERATE AS STATUTES OF NON-CLAIM SO THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION EXISTS, CLAIMS NOT PRESENTED WITHIN THE DESIGNATED TIME PERIOD ARE NOT BINDING ON THE ESTATE, OR DO THEY...

...of limitations that bars untimely claims even if the issue of timeliness is not asserted in an objection in the probate proceedings, but that such limitation may be extended by the probate court based on fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice; (2) section 733.710 Florida Statutes (1991), is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings; and (3) that a petition for the appointment of an administrator ad litem and a counter-petition fo...

...3 and Fla. Prob. R. 5.490(e). See May v. Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143 (2000). In light of these conclusions, the Court held that the filing of the petition and counter-petition “satisfied the nonclaim period set forth in section *1283 733.710,” but “did not satisfy the limitation period set forth in section 733.702(1), and we are not aware of any extension or pending request for extension in any probate court.” Thus the Supreme Court’s decision effectively bars the claim made against the estate....

...Golden, 176 So. 3d 242, 243 (Fla. 2015), the Florida Supreme Court held that claims of known or reasonably ascertainable creditors of an estate who were not served with a copy of the notice to creditors under section 733.702(1) are timely filed under section 733.710, Florida Statutes, if filed within two years of the decedent’s death....

...BART FLEET, etc., et al., Respondents. June 29, 2023 COURIEL, J. In the end—often a good place to start—this is a negligence case against a man that was filed more than three years after he died. Section 733.710(1), Florida Statutes (2013), tells us that is too late by over a year....

...h. Tsuji v. Fleet, 326 So. 3d 143, 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). It did so notwithstanding a contrary decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal that had found in another law, section 733.702(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), a reason to disregard section 733.710(1)’s prohibition where, as here, a plaintiff in a negligence action sought money damages from the decedent’s insurer rather than from the decedent himself (or from his estate, his personal representative, or his beneficiaries). Pezzi v. Brown, 697 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). 1 The First District is correct. Section 733.710(1) extinguishes the claim at issue in this case....

...While the petitioners’ claims against LBC were not limited in the amended complaint, the petitioners now state that their claims against LBC are also capped by the limits of LBC’s casualty insurance coverage. -3-  LBC moved for summary judgment. It argued that section 733.710(1) barred the petitioners’ claims against the estate because the statute required the petitioners to bring claims within two years of the decedent’s death—something the petitioners failed to do. Additionally, LBC, citing Buettner v. Cellular One, Inc., 700 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), asserted that because section 733.710(1) exonerated the estate from liability, so too was LBC exonerated from vicarious liability for Morton’s negligence. In response, the petitioners cited Pezzi, 697 So....

...2d at 886, and this Court’s statements approving that decision in May v. Illinois National Insurance Co., 771 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2000). 3 The 3. In May, we answered a fairly technical certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit: whether sections 733.702 and 733.710, alone or together, function as statutes of nonclaim (such that, absent an exception, claims not presented within the periods they designate would not be binding on an estate) or as statutes of limitation (such that a party seeking to invoke them would have to plead and prove its applicability as affirmative defenses to avoid waiver). 771 So. 2d at 1145. We said section 733.702 is a statute of limitations that cannot be waived in a probate proceeding by failure to object to a claim on timeliness grounds, and section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in a probate case....

...ection 733.702(4)(b)— can bring claims against a decedent’s estate over two years after the decedent’s death if the plaintiff seeks recovery from only the decedent’s casualty insurance. The trial court agreed with LBC and ruled that section 733.710(1) barred the petitioners’ action against the estate because the petitioners failed to file the claims within two years of Morton’s death....

...Biscayne Kennel Club v. Bd. of Bus. Regul., 276 So. 2d 823, 826 (Fla. 1973). They are therefore “without force as precedent” though we do of course note them. Id. -5-  On appeal, the First District affirmed, holding that section 733.710(1) bars the petitioners from bringing claims based on Morton’s negligence against the estate beyond the two-year time limit, and because of this, the petitioners also could not hold LBC vicariously liable for Morton’s negligence. Tsuji, 326 So. 3d at 147- 49.4 The petitioners then sought review from this Court. II We first address whether section 733.710, Florida Statutes, bars the petitioners’ claims against Fleet, the personal representative of Morton’s estate.5 It does. In reaching that conclusion, we consider the petitioners’ arguments about how section 733.702 informs our reading of section 733.710. 4....

...1992). -7-  B Part VII of chapter 733 of the Florida Probate Code has two sets of limits that, together, bring order to creditors’ claims against estates: one resides in section 733.702 and the other in section 733.710. Section 733.702 “fixes the basic time frame for filing of claims in decedent’s estates being probated in Florida.” May, 771 So. 2d at 1155 (quoting Comerica Bank & Tr., F.S.B. v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So. 2d 163, 165 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). It says, at subsection (1): If not barred by s. 733.710, no claim or demand against the decedent’s estate that arose before the death of the decedent ....

...§ 733.702(2), Fla. Stat. This provision sweeps more broadly than subsections (1) and (3), as it incorporates not only the periods outlined in section 733.702, but also those elsewhere in part VII of chapter 733 of the Florida Statutes, such as section 733.710(1). Subsection (4) then enumerates three exceptions to the limitations found in subsections (1), (2), and (3)....

...The other two exceptions are: section 733.702(4)(a), Florida Statutes (“A proceeding to enforce any mortgage, security interest, -9- Importantly, however, subsection (5) makes clear that: “Nothing in [section 733.702] shall extend the limitations period set forth in s. 733.710.” § 733.702(5), Fla. Stat. So we come to subsection (1) of section 733.710, which provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent’s estate, the personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as provided in this section. § 733.710(1), Fla. Stat. There are only two exceptions to this statute of repose or nonclaim. Subsection (2) provides that section 733.710(1) “shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702 within 2 years after the person’s death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s. 733.705.” § 733.710(2), Fla....

...iling of a cross-claim or counterclaim against the estate in an action instituted by the estate; however, no recovery on a cross-claim or counterclaim shall exceed the estate’s recovery in that action.”). - 10 - 733.710(1) “shall not affect the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or security interest or the lien of any person in possession of personal property or the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien.” § 733.710(3), Fla. Stat. Neither of these exceptions addresses casualty insurance. When no exception applies, an untimely claim is “automatically barred.” Barnett Bank of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Estate of Read, 493 So. 2d 447, 448 (Fla. 1986). Section 733.710(1) is in that sense “a self-executing, absolute immunity to claims filed for the first time ....

...2d at 167). C The petitioners filed their claims more than two years after Morton’s death. If the petitioners’ claims seek to hold Fleet “liable” for claims against Morton, then they are barred under section 733.710(1). So we have to decide: is Fleet “liable” under section 733.710(1) given that the petitioners seek only payment from a casualty insurance provider? We decide he is, and that therefore petitioners’ claims are untimely. - 11 -  The petitioners assert that �...

...He may have been responsible for the decedent’s breach of a duty, but he does not have to pay; an insurer does. This, they say, means their claims are not barred even though they were filed more than two years after Morton’s death. In support of their reading, the petitioners rely on the context of section 733.710(1), the canon against surplusage, and the - 12 - Legislature’s inaction following the Fourth District’s decision in Pezzi and our approval of that decision in dicta in May. None of those arguments pan out. 1 The petitioners argue that their proposed reading of “liable” makes sense in the context of section 733.710(1). After all, section 733.710(1) concerns claims against the decedent, not the estate, personal representative, or any beneficiary....

...n of a person after he has breached his contract or violated any obligation resting upon him.” Liability, Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 751 (2d ed. 1948). We do not read the context as the petitioners do. The word “liable” appears in section 733.710(1), which, as a statute of repose or nonclaim, “automatically bars untimely claims.” May, 771 So. 2d at 1157....

...2009). Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “liable,” in part, as “bound or obligated according to law or equity.” Liable, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1302 (1986). The sixth edition of Black’s, published only a year after section 733.710(1) was first enacted, defines “liable” as: “[b]ound or obliged in law or equity; responsible; chargeable; answerable; compellable to make 7. The Legislature has provided such instruction in both section 733.710(2) and section 733.710(3), but neither applies here. - 14 - satisfaction, compensation, or restitution.” Liable, Black’s Law Dictionary 915 (6th ed. 1990). 8 And The American Heritage Dictionary defines the term, in part, as “[l]egally obligated; responsible.” Liable, The American Heritage Dictionary 1036 (3d ed. 1992). The neighboring language in section 733.710 refers to liability “for any claim or cause of action against the decedent,” and not, for example, a money judgment, charge, or amount due—all of which would square more naturally with what the petitioners call the “pay-money” understanding of the word. All this makes clear that Fleet can be held “liable” under the meaning of the term in section 733.710(1) without a finding that he breached a duty owed to the petitioners....

...915 (6th ed. 1990). - 15 - 1955)—responsible, accountable, answerable, and chargeable for a claim that they have against Morton, they effectively seek to hold Fleet “liable” for a claim they have against Morton under section 733.710(1). There is also the fact that the Legislature uses “liable” and “liability” throughout the code in a way that is hard to square with the petitioners’ proposed understanding of the term....

...And yet, the Legislature still used the term “liability.” We see no reason to read “liable” and “liability” to mean different things across part VII of chapter 733. Other uses of “liability” and “liable” in the Florida Statutes also refute the petitioners’ proposed reading of section 733.710(1)....

...(2022) (“Upon adverse adjudication at trial or upon appeal, the authorized insurer shall be liable for damages, together with court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the plaintiff.”). Here, however, the Legislature did not use “liable” in this narrow way: it did not provide in section 733.710(1) that the decedent’s estate, the personal representative, or the beneficiaries shall not be liable “for damages” for any claim or cause of action against the decedent brought more than two years after the decedent’s death. This absence suggests that we should not read “liable” in section 733.710(1) narrowly to refer only to the obligation to pay. Given the context in which we find “liable,” the commonly understood meaning of the term, and the Legislature’s usage of “liable” and “liability” both in part VII of chapter 733 and elsewhere in the code, we conclude that section 733.710(1) bars the petitioners’ claims against Fleet. - 18 -  2 The petitioners also invoke the canon against surplusage, “an elementary principle of statutory...

...tion that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible.” Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of New York, 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003). They say that the First District’s reading of section 733.710(1) renders duplicative section 733.702(2), which extinguishes any cause of action not filed within the periods set forth in part VII of chapter 733, including section 733.710(1)’s two-year time bar. If, according to the petitioners, section 733.710(1) bars their claims, then the Legislature would have had no reason to extend the reach of section 733.702(2) to also extinguish a cause of action filed beyond section 733.710(1)’s two-year time bar. 9 The petitioners also argue that the First 9. The petitioners further argue that we should not read section 733.710(1) to protect unenumerated parties, as that would also result in overlap with section 733.702(2), which protects any defendant facing an untimely claim. But we do not read section 733.710(1) to bar a proceeding against either LBC or a casualty insurer, both unenumerated parties. Instead, as a consequence of our conclusion that section 733.710(1) bars the petitioners’ claims against Fleet, the exoneration rule operates to bar the petitioners’ claims against LBC....

...And it would be Florida’s - 19 - District renders inoperative part of section 733.702(4)—the one that says nothing in section 733.702(2), including its extinguishment of causes of action filed outside the period provided in subsection 733.710(1), affects or prevents exceptions listed in subsection (4). The canon against surplusage, which is in any event not “an absolute rule,” Marx v....

...371, 385 (2013), is also not “a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature,” United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985). Section 733.702(4)(b) provides an exception to the limits provided elsewhere in section 733.702, and section 733.710(1) stands as the ultimate backstop that “automatically bars untimely claims” filed against the estate, its personal representative, or any beneficiaries more than two years after the decedent’s death absent the applicability of one of the exceptions outlined elsewhere in section 733.710. May, 771 So. 2d at 1157. nonjoinder insurance statute, not section 733.710(1), that then prevents the petitioners from reaching insurers absent a settlement. See § 627.4136(1), Fla....

...(providing that before a plaintiff can maintain a cause of action against a liability insurer they must “first obtain a settlement or verdict against a person who is an insured”). - 20 - Even informed by our consideration of the canon against surplusage, we read section 733.710 as an insurmountable obstacle to the petitioners’ claims against Fleet....

...a competing interpretation gives effect ‘to every clause and word of a statute.’ ”) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). Under the petitioners’ proposed reading, the other two exceptions found in section 733.702(4) would also be exceptions to section 733.710(1). One of these exceptions provides “[n]othing in this section affects or prevents . . . [a] proceeding to enforce any mortgage, security interest, or other lien on property of the decedent.” § 733.702(4)(a), Fla. Stat. An exception found in section 733.710, however, already provides that section 733.710(1) does not “affect the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or security interest or the lien of any person in possession of personal property - 21 - or the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien.” § 733.710(3), Fla. Stat. While the scope of the two exceptions is not identical, the petitioners’ proposed reading creates significant overlap, meaning it fails to give independent effect to every provision in both section 733.702 and section 733.710. In the end, the canon against surplusage does not tip the scales in the petitioners’ favor—especially since some degree of surplusage would result under either party’s reading. 3...

...11 D Given the clarity with which the Legislature spoke, this is a case in which our analysis begins and ends with the statutory language. See Comerica, 673 So. 2d at 168 (“[T]here is no ambiguity in the words used in section 733.710.”). Section 733.710(1) “sets an absolute deadline beyond which no claim may be entertained” absent the applicability of one of the exceptions outlined in sections 733.710(2) and 733.710(3)....

...We are also told that approving the First District’s opinion would upset settled expectations in probate law, place a heavy burden on trial lawyers, and cause increased expenses in probate court, with more parties filing claims in probate court to avoid section 733.710(1)’s two-year bar....

...This case, however, does “not turn on our view of the ‘better’ policy, but turns solely on statutory interpretation.” Survivors Charter Schs., Inc., 3 So. 3d at 1228. And because our interpretation of the statutory provisions at issue leads us to conclude section 733.710(1) bars the petitioners’ claims, we have no license to say otherwise. - 24 - insurance policy, seek to hold Fleet “liable” for claims against Morton. Because the petitioners’ claims against Morton’s estate, through Fleet, were filed beyond section 733.710(1)’s two-year deadline and do not qualify under either exception, they are barred. III What about Morton’s employer, LBC? Again, the First District was right....

...e “exoneration rule”—for vicarious liability claims against an employer has turned on whether the underlying claims against the employee have been “adjudicated on the merits.”12 Consequently, the pertinent question before us is whether section 733.710(1), a “jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that automatically bars untimely claims,” May, 771 So. 2d at 1157, constitutes such an adjudication where the provision bars the petitioners’ claims against Morton’s estate. 12....

...circumvent the statute. See Carr v. Broward Cnty., 541 So. 2d 92, 95 (Fla. 1989) (“[S]tatutes of repose are a valid legislative means to restrict or limit causes of action in order to achieve certain public interests.”). Concluding that section 733.710(1)’s time bar on the petitioners’ claims against LBC constitutes an “adjudication on the merits” finds support in our case law....

...There, the district court reviewed a final summary judgment dismissing as untimely the plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claim against an employer filed more than two years after the death of the deceased employee. Id. “[B]ased on the two-year statute of limitations . . . in sections 733.702(5) and 733.710,” the trial court had entered judgments for both the employee and the employer. Id. - 29 - at 48, 48 n.1. On appeal, the First District affirmed. After holding that the dismissal of the untimely liability action against the employee under sections 733.702(5) and 733.710(1) exonerated the employee, the district court concluded that the vicarious liability action against the employer was barred under the exoneration rule. Id. (citing Farish, 464 So. 2d at 532). In the end, claims based on vicarious liability are unavailable against LBC because section 733.710(1)’s bar on untimely claims against Morton through his estate amounts to an “adjudication on the merits.” Accordingly, the First District correctly held that section 733.710(1)’s statute of nonclaim exonerates LBC from vicarious liability for Morton’s negligence. IV For the reasons stated above, we approve the First District’s decision and disapprove the Fourth District’s decision on the applicability of section 733.710(1)....

...AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. LABARGA, J., dissenting. I agree with the majority that if the claims against the decedent’s estate are barred by the statute, then LBC cannot be vicariously liable. However, because I would hold that sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes, do not bar the claim against Morton’s estate, I dissent. To conclude that sections 733.702 and 733.710 bar suit, the majority pleads for exacting specificity where none is needed....

...what it indeed already says. However, the context of the statute alone makes it apparent: the estate and its proxies can only be liable for claims against the decedent in a pay-money sense, and so in protecting those entities, the term “liable” in 733.710 can only refer to pay-money liability. See § 733.710, Fla....

...See majority op. at 17. But again, such precise language is unnecessary when the context commands a certain interpretation. Nor does looking to the term “liability” in section 733.702(4)(b) refute the pay-money interpretation of liable in 733.710....

...Correctly, the majority interprets “liability” in section 733.702(4)(b) as meaning something different than pay-money liability but finds “no reason” why “liable” should be read differently between the statutes. Again, context is key. Section 733.710 focuses on liability of the estate and its proxies for claims against the decedent, implicating only pay-money liability. See § 733.710, Fla....

...A cause of action, of course, may implicate both breach-of-duty and pay-money liability; the term “liable” in section 733.702(4)(b) reflects that context. The terms’ contexts provide the “reason” for the different meanings of the term “liable.” Where the majority does look specifically to section 733.710, the argument is unpersuasive....

...It is true that there are numerous ways the statute could better say what it says. But that notion should not be used to cloud the clear and logical conclusions of a word’s context. The estate and its proxies can only be liable for claims against the decedent in a pay-money sense, and so “liable” in section 733.710 can only refer to one thing....

...See majority op. at 22-24. When the words of the statute so obviate any need for clarification, it is easy to imagine that the Legislature felt that extra explanation was unnecessary. For these reasons, I would hold that the term “liable” in section 733.710 refers to pay-money liability, that sections 733.702 and 733.710 do not bar suit against Morton’s estate, and accordingly that suit may be brought against LBC under a theory of vicarious liability. Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Certified Conflict of Decisions/Direct Conflict of Decisions First District – Case No....

...§ 733.508, — Flat-Stat. Accounting upon removal. § 733.604,-Fla. Stat. Inventory. § 733.701, Fla. Stat. Notifying creditors. § 733.702, Fla. Stat. Limitations on presentation of claims. § 733.705, Fla. Stat. Payment of and objection to claims. § 733.710, Fla....

...la. Stat. Notice to creditors; filing of claims. § 733.702, Fla. Stat. Limitations on presentation of claims. § 733.703, Fla. Stat. Form and manner of presenting claim. § 733.704, Fla. Stat. Amendment of claims. § 733.708, Fla. Stat. Compromise. § 733.710, Fla....

...The issue on appeal is whether the decedent’s former wife, who is a creditor, can bring an action against the estate after the running of the statutory two year period of non-claim, if the person who became personal representative fraudulently induced her to delay filing her claim. Section 733.710 provides in part: (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent’s estate, the personal representative (if any), nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or...

...im that is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings.” May v. Ill. Nat’l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143, 1150 (Fla.2000). See also Comerica Bank & Trust F.S.B. v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So.2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (section 733.710 is “an absolute bar-akin to a statute of repose-that the court lacks the power to avoid”)....

...Estate of Durant, 650 So.2d 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Although it is true that, in Durant, this court remanded for further proceedings which might have resulted in a claim being filed against an estate more than two years after the death of the decedent, this court did not address section 733.710, and it may not have been raised....

...Notice of administration; filing of objections. § 733.2121, Fla. Stat. Notice to creditors; filing of claims. § 733.701, Fla. Stat. Notifying creditors. § 733.702, Fla. Stat. Limitations on presentation of claims. § 733.705, Fla. Stat. Payment of and objection to claims. § 733.710, Fla....

...ding within thirty days after service of the notice on him or, at a maximum, within two years of the decedent’s death. He argues that because he was never served with the notice to creditors, he timely filed his claim within the two-year window of section 733.710....

...Lubee was required to file his claim in the probate proceeding within the three-month -window following publication. Alternatively, Mr. Lubee could seek an extension from the probate court pursuant to section 733.702(3) within the two-year window of section 733.710....

...Estate of Baer, 837 So.2d 448, 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (affirming order enforcing claim against estate where creditor failed to file claim within three-month window of section 733.702(1) but did file motion for extension of time within two-year window of section 733.710)....

Fla. Stat. (2011), and the statute of repose, § 733.710, Fla. Stat. (2011), set forth in the probate code

Fla. Stat. (2011), and the statute of repose, § 733.710, Fla. Stat. (2011), set forth in the probate code

...the probate case a Motion to Prohibit Disbursement of Estate Proceeds. Two days after filing that motion, it filed a statement of claim for $193,176.11. The Estate moved to strike the statement of claim as untimely, citing the two- year statute of nonclaim in section 733.710, Florida Statutes (2016) (automatically barring claims not filed within two years of the decedent’s death), and the three- month filing deadline set out in section 733.702, Florida Statutes (2016) (a statute of limitations barrin...

...Demps’s death and is based solely on the actions of the Estate, not for any acts or omissions on Mr. Demps’s part during his lifetime. Accordingly, it argues that its claim was not subject to the statute of limitations of section 733.702 or the statute of nonclaim, section 733.710. We turn first to section 733.702(1), Fla....

...den when the Estate lost. Accordingly, Palm Garden was not required to file a statement of claim under section 733.702. 5  Having determined that section 733.702 is inapplicable, we turn next to section 733.710(1), which provides that “2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent’s estate, the personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent . . . .” Because Palm Garden’s entitlement to its arbitration costs did not stem from any liability on the decedent’s part, we hold, too, that section 733.710(1) does not bar its claim. The Estate triggered the cost provision of the arbitration agreement by filing suit....

claim is barred” as untimely, pursuant to section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1989).1 Relying upon Tulsa

...the decedent’s New York domiciliary estate. The nursing home argues that the court erred in dismissing the petition based on the court’s findings that: (1) the nursing home’s claim against the decedent’s estate *110 was untimely pursuant to section 733.710(1), Florida Statutes (2011); and (2) the nursing home was not an “interested person” pursuant to section 731.201(23), Florida Statutes (2011)....

...The personal representative argued that because the nursing home filed its claims against both the New York domiciliary estate and the Broward County ancillary estate more than two years after the decedent’s death, the claims were untimely under Section 733.710(1), Florida Statutes (2011). Section 733.710(1) states: Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent’s estate, the personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as provided in this section. § 733.710(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). The nursing home’s response to the motion argued that section 733.710(1) did not apply because its petition was not requesting the court to adjudicate the nursing home’s claim against the ancillary estate....

...is not an interested person pursuant to 731.201(23). This appeal followed. The nursing home argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing the petition based on the court’s findings that: (1) the nursing home’s claim was untimely pursuant to section 733.710(1); and (2) the nursing home was not an “interested person” pursuant to section 731.201(23)....

...home’s claim against the Broward County ancillary estate was untimely. See § 734.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2011) (imposing notice and publication requirements on ancillary personal representative “[u]nless creditors’ claims are otherwise barred by s. 733.710”)....

...I mean, I don't -- I'm going to, you know unless you don't want me to take judicial notice of the records of my own court -- [APPELLANTS’ COUNSEL]: I would never do that. Appellants also argue that Appellees’ petition to reopen summary administration was time-barred by section 733.710(1), Florida Statutes (2016), commonly referred to as the nonclaim statute.1 That statute provides: Limitations on claims against estates. (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years...

...sentative failed to serve him with a copy of the notice to creditors, the creditors’ claim period never began to run. Therefore, according to Souder, his claims were timely because they were filed within the two-year limitation period set forth in section 733.710....

...Creditors who are not served a copy of the notice to creditors are required to file their claims within the three-month window following publication or, alternatively, may seek an extension from the probate court pursuant to section 733.702(3) within the two-year window set forth in section 733.710. Lubee, 77 So.3d at 884 . AFFIRMED. TORPY, C.J. and COHEN, J., concur. . Subsections (1) and (2) of section 733.2121 state: (1) Unless creditors’ claims are otherwise barred by s.733.710, the personal representative shall promptly publish a notice to creditors....

...(2) Publication shall be once a week for 2 consecutive weeks, in a newspaper published in the county where the estate is administered or, if there is no newspaper published in the county, in a newspaper of general circulation in that county. . See § 733.710, Fla....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 733.710(3), Fla....