Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...4)(a)(3), eleven counts of Official Misconduct in violation of Florida Statute § 838.022, one count of Grand Theft in violation of Florida Statute § 812.014, and one count of False and Fraudulent Insurance Claims in violation of Florida Statute § 817.234....

...We recognize, of course, that this State strongly discourages insurance fraud. See, e.g, § 626.989, Fla. Stat. (1997) (recognizing and empowering the Division of Insurance Fraud); § 626.9891, Fla. Stat. (1997) (mandating that insurers create anti-fraud investigative units); § 817.234, Fla....

...Glazier, Miami, for Amicus Curiae The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers. KOGAN, Justice. We have for review State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 654 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), in which the district court certified the following question to be of great public importance: WHETHER SECTION 817.234(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1987), IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED TO ATTORNEYS IN THE REPRESENTATION OF THEIR CLIENTS SINCE IT DOES NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF WHEN AN OMISSION WILL RESULT IN AN "INCOMPLETE" CLAIM UNDER THE STATUTE? Id. at 1194. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), of the Florida Constitution. We find that by using the term "incomplete," section 817.234(1), Florida Statutes (1987), does not provide sufficient notice of the conduct by attorneys that it proscribes and that it is subject to arbitrary enforcement when applied to attorneys in the representation of their clients....

...h informations were based on the attorneys' actions in representing various clients in insurance claims during pre-suit settlement negotiations. The State alleged that the attorneys' actions violated the false and fraudulent insurance claim statute, section 817.234(1) [9] *536 and (3), [10] Florida Statutes (1987). We are concerned here with the counts charging violations of section 817.234, along with the grand theft counts based upon the alleged violations of section 817.234. Early in the proceedings, the defendants filed a number of motions challenging section 817.234 and the counts in the first information that were based upon that statute....

...Following the disqualification of the judge who ruled on these motions, the defendants filed several motions to reconsider the prior judge's rulings. In two orders dated October 14, 1993, the trial court reconsidered the defendants' claims regarding section 817.234. The first order addressed the counts raised in the first information. The trial court determined that the structure of section 817.234 as well as the insurance code, particularly section 627.4136, Florida Statutes (1993), [11] indicated that section 817.234 did not apply to third-party insureds or their attorneys....

...The counts dismissed from the second information were counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. Prior to the trial court's orders dismissing these counts, the defendants filed several motions to dismiss various counts in the first information in which the defendants were charged with violating section 817.234(1) by submitting incomplete demand letters to insurers....

...[15] The trial court did not directly address the remaining counts the defendants challenged in these motions because they pertained to third-party claims and thus already had been dismissed by the court's prior order. In this third order, the trial court first addressed and rejected the defendants' claim that section 817.234 was unconstitutionally vague because it conflicted with section 627.736(7)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), the personal injury protection benefits statute. *537 The trial court thereafter addressed the defendants' claim that section 817.234 was unconstitutionally vague because, in using the term "incomplete," it failed to warn attorneys filing insurance claims on behalf of their clients that omitting unfavorable medical reports in a pre-suit demand statement could violate the statute....

...tutional vagueness. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed counts 20 and 21, as well as the corresponding predicate acts. On appeal, the district court consolidated the cases arising from the three orders as they all involved the question of whether section 817.234(1) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to attorneys in the representation of their clients. Marks, 654 So.2d at 1185. The district court answered that question affirmatively because it concluded section 817.234(1) did not provide adequate notice as to when omissions by the attorney would result in an "incomplete" claim. Id. at 1190. The district court further held that the legislature intended both subsection (1) and subsection (3) of section 817.234 to apply to third-party claims....

...On the State's motion for rehearing/certification the district court certified the question above as one of great public importance. Id. at 1193-94. I. Vagueness We first address the question certified by the district court. While the issue of whether the term "incomplete" renders section 817.234(1) unconstitutionally vague is only expressly addressed in the trial court's third order, the issue is also relevant to a number of counts which the trial court dismissed in its first two orders....

...rmation, were based on the attorneys' alleged conduct of filing incomplete claims. Our resolution of the certified question therefore will impact certain counts dismissed in all three of the trial court's orders. In order for a criminal statute like section 817.234(1) to withstand a void-for-vagueness challenge the language of the statute must provide adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits when measured by common understanding and practice....

...Rou, 366 So.2d 385 (Fla.1978). Additionally, the statute must define the offense in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Brown, 629 So.2d at 842; State ex rel. Lee v. Buchanan, 191 So.2d 33 (Fla.1966). The State alleges that section 817.234(1) meets these requirements. Respondents, however, maintain that in using the term "incomplete," section 817.234(1) fails to inform attorneys of the conduct it proscribes and this imprecision may invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Section 817.234 does not define the term "incomplete," but the absence of a definition is not dispositive of vagueness....

...able. We cannot conclude that practicing attorneys would reach a different conclusion. Because less than complete disclosure by an attorney in the representation of his or her client is considered acceptable practice in certain instances and because section 817.234(1), does not indicate, in terms that a person of common intelligence would understand, in what instances less than complete disclosure by an attorney becomes a criminal offense, we conclude that the statute does not provide adequate notice of the conduct by attorneys that it proscribes. Cf. Hermanson v. State, 604 So.2d 775, 776 (Fla.1992). The State's argument to the contrary is without merit. According to the State, section 817.234(1) is constitutional because it criminalizes nondisclosure of material information only when the nondisclosure is coupled with an intent to defraud, deceive, or injure the insurer. Moreover, the State contends the statute's specific intent requirement brings the statute into conformity with the rules, case law, and statutes that govern an attorney's conduct because these sources, like section 817.234(1), do not allow an attorney to perpetuate fraud....

...m. Mark Marks, 654 So.2d at 1189 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1108, 63 L.Ed.2d 348 (1980)); see also Gutter v. Wunker, 631 So.2d 1117, 1118 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Because an attorney's duty to disclose is uncertain under section 817.234(1), the intent element in that statute does nothing to clarify the conduct the statute proscribes. We are still left to wonder in what situations an attorney's nondisclosure will be subject to criminal prosecution. Furthermore, the intent element is not an acceptable source on which to rely in defining the conduct proscribed by section 817.234(1), because intent is an after-the-fact determination made by the courts....

...See Wershow, 343 So.2d at 607-08; Lee, 191 So.2d at 37. If the proscribed act is not made clear by the statute or some source outside the statute, such as the custom of a particular profession or trade, then those enforcing the statute may do so arbitrarily. That is exactly what could occur with section 817.234(1)....

...cting in accord with the rules and statutes concerning the confidentiality of medical records. Cf. Lee, 191 So.2d at 37. The risk of arbitrary enforcement was, in fact, demonstrated in this case by the State's decision to alter its interpretation of section 817.234(1), with regard to the degree of disclosure the statute required, three times during the course of the proceedings. Based on the foregoing, we find that the term "incomplete" renders section 817.234(1) vague as applied to attorneys in the representation of their clients....

...See Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 137 So.2d 828, 830 (Fla.1962). Our holding on this matter therefore does not preclude the State from prosecuting attorneys for insurance fraud. On the contrary, the State may still prosecute an attorney pursuant to section 817.234(1) for filing "false" or "misleading" information concerning any fact or thing material to an insurance claim. It is *540 our opinion that the conduct at which the statute is aimed is amply encompassed by these two terms. If the legislature concludes otherwise, it may amend section 817.234(1) to clarify the meaning of the term "incomplete." [17] II. Third-Party Claims Although we conclude that the State may prosecute an attorney pursuant to section 817.234(1) for filing false or misleading information, the question remains as to whether this holds true for attorneys representing injured third parties to insurance claims, as opposed to attorneys representing insured first parties. The remaining counts that the trial court dismissed were based either on a violation of section 817.234(1) for submitting false or misleading information or a violation of section 817.234(3). [18] The trial court dismissed these counts in its first and second orders because it found that section 817.234 was not applicable to third-party claims. If, as the State contends, section 817.234 applies to both first and third-party claims, then the trial court erroneously dismissed these counts. The trial court offered section 627.4136, Florida Statutes (1993), the nonjoinder statute, as the primary reason for its conclusion that section 817.234 did not apply to third-party claims. After examining the history of section 817.234, the trial court looked to the insurance code for guidance on how to define the terms "any person" and "claimant" as those terms were used in section 817.234(1) and (3), respectively....

...Accordingly, the term "any person" in subsection 1 and "claimant" in subsection 3 can and should be construed as "any insured" as only the insured possess an interest so only the insured can make a claim. We do not believe it was necessary for the trial court to look beyond the language of section 817.234 in interpreting subsections (1) and (3) of the statute....

...Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984). The fact that we are dealing with a penal statute does not alter our analysis, because penal statutes, as a fundamental rule, must be strictly construed. Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310, 1312-13 (Fla.1991). A. Section 817.234(1) Section 817.234(1), contains the phrase "any person." In arguing that this term means "any insured" the respondents attempt to limit the express terms of an unambiguous statute....

...By using this language, the *541 legislature intended to prevent all persons, not just those with a contract with the insurer, from committing insurance fraud. Our conclusion garners additional support from the fact that the legislature expressly used the term "insured party" in other subsections of section 817.234. See § 817.234(2), (4)....

...Bureau of Crimes Compensation, 408 So.2d 751, 753 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1982); accord Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995). The statute's use of the language "a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy" does not alter our conclusion that section 817.234(1) applies to both first and third-party claims. This language does not indicate that a party must have a legal interest in an insurance policy in order to make a claim pursuant to the policy and thus become subject to the provisions of section 817.234(1). Cf. Kiddie v. State, 574 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Okla.Crim.App.1977)(finding privity of contract between accused and insurer unnecessary to pursue charges under a statute similar to section 817.234(1)); [20] but see People v....

...On the contrary, this language when considered in conjunction with the term "any person" indicates that the statute applies to any claim made pursuant to an insurance policy with the intent to defraud. Cf. People v. Benson, 206 Cal. App.2d 519, 23 Cal.Rptr. 908, 916-17 (1962)(finding statute similar to section 817.234(1) applied to every person who had intent to defraud), cert....

...If we were to interpret the statute so as to treat the demands that arise out of these settlement negotiations differently than first-party claims, we would not be fully serving the purpose of this legislation—to deter insurance fraud. Consequently, we find section 817.234(1) applicable to both first-party and third-party claims. Even if we were to look to the legislative history to discern the legislature's intent with regard to section 817.234(1) we would reach the same conclusion. As the district court noted, section 817.234 was originally enacted as part of the insurance chapter....

...The district court correctly recognized that this transfer of the statute indicates that the statute has more to do with fraud than insurance. Marks, 654 So.2d at 1190. Consequently, we do not find, as did the trial court, that the legislative history of section 817.234 leads us to the insurance code and consequently the nonjoinder statute for guidance in interpreting the statute. The legislative history, however, does lead us to conclude that the legislature intended section 817.234(1) to apply to "any person" and not just "any insured party." The original version of section 817.234(1) reads: (1) Any insured party or insurer or insurance adjuster who, with intent, knowingly and willfully conspires to fraudulently violate any of the provisions of this part.......

...t accorded it before the amendment. See Capella v. City of Gainesville, 377 So.2d 658 (Fla.1979); Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362, 364 (Fla.1977). Accordingly, we find that the legislative history, like the plain language of section 817.234(1), supports a conclusion that the statute applies to both first-party and third-party claims. We therefore approve the district court's decision reversing the trial court's orders and remanding with the direction that the trial court reinstate all counts based on section 817.234(1) which were not totally and exclusively dependent on alleged incomplete statements. B. Section 817.234(3) As mentioned previously, the trial court dismissed several counts against the attorney defendants brought pursuant to section 817.234(3) because it concluded, as it did with section 817.234(1), that this provision did not apply to third-party claims. [21] We find our analysis regarding the application of section 817.234(1) to third-party claims is also dispositive with regard to section 817.234(3). Since a third party can make a claim pursuant to section 817.234(1), it follows that a third party may also be classified as a claimant. Consequently, we conclude that the reference to "claimant" in 817.234(3) does not limit that provision's application to first-party claims. While our analysis regarding third-party claims is equally applicable to section 817.234(1) and (3), the same does not hold true for our vagueness analysis. We do not find that section 817.234(3) suffers the same infirmities as section 817.234(1). [22] Consequently, we approve the district court's decision finding erroneous the trial court's dismissal of the counts brought pursuant to section 817.234(3) and ordering the reinstatement of those counts....

...e basis for a number of the remaining counts. [7] Count 21 was not listed in the style of the information but was included in the body of the information. [8] The four defendants are Mark Marks, P.A., Mark Marks, Gary Marks, and Ronald Centrone. [9] Section 817.234(1), Florida Statutes (1987), provides in part: (1)(a) Any person who, with the intent to injure, defraud or deceive any insurance company, including, but not limited to, any statutorily created underwriting association or pool of insu...

...owing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. [10] Section 817.234(3), Florida Statutes (1987), provides: (3) Any attorney who knowingly and willfully assists, conspires with, or urges any claimant to fraudulently violate any of the provisions of this section or part XI of chapter 627, or any person...

...a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. [11] Section 627.4136 is Florida's nonjoinder statute. [12] In dismissing these counts the trial court dismissed all counts based on alleged violations of section 817.234(3)....

...lent claim, or any proof in support of any such claim, upon any contract of insurance for the payment of any loss ... shall be punishable by imprisonment... or by fine.... Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1662 (1971)(emphasis added). [21] The counts based on section 817.234(3) were all contained in the first information. They were counts 15, 22, 23, and the corresponding predicate acts in count 1. [22] We do not address any challenges to the constitutionality of section 817.234(3) other than the challenges made by the parties with respect to section 817.234(1). The parties did not present any independent basis for finding section 817.234(3) unconstitutionally vague.

...Essentially, State Farm argues that it “owed absolutely nothing for Defendants’ services,” Opp. at 1329-30, because such services are “the product of an arrangement prohibited by Florida Statutes §§ 395.0185, 456.054, 817.505, 502.201 et. seq., and 817.234,” Am....

...f this litigation for services rendered pursuant to the Unlawful Referral Agreement, as alleged herein, are not owed because they are the product of an arrangement prohibited by Florida Statutes §§ 395.0185, 456.054, 817.505, 502.201 et. seq., and 817.234.” Id....

...Fla. 2009) (discussing Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.736 (12), which similarly provides an insurer a “cause of action against any person convicted of, or who, regardless of adjudication of guilt, pleads guilty or nolo contendere to insurance fraud under s. 817.234”)....

...63), and (2) as Calhoun Defendants note, “the two claims are essentially identical,” Calhoun Motion at 8 n.2. . Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ conduct violates Florida Statutes §§ 817.505 (Patient Brokering Statute), 456.054 (Anti-Kickback Statute), 395.0185 (Anti-Rebate Statute) and 817.234 (Insurance Fraud)....

...§ 627.736 (5)(b)(l)(c) ("An insurer or insured is not required to pay a claim or charges.. .To any person who knowingly submits a false or misleading statement relating to the claim or charges;”). In fact, in another subsection of one of the statutes Plaintiff cites (Fla Stat. 817.234) the legislature determined that "[c]harges for any services rendered by any person who violates this subsection in regard to the person for whom such services were rendered are noncompensable and unenforceable as a matter of law.” See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 817.234 (8)(d) (pertaining to soliciting business from a person involved in a motor vehicle accident)....

...Oswald, Amici Curiae. Robert A. Ader and Elizabeth B. Hitt of the Law Offices of Robert Ader, Miami, FL, for Dr. Randolph Hansbrough, Amicus Curiae. LEWIS, J. We have for review Bradford v. State, 740 So.2d 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), which expressly declares valid section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes (1997), a statute criminalizing certain conduct related to solicitation when insurance benefits are available....

...protections afforded commercial speech by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. [1] FACTS This case is one in a long line of cases in which the State charged several chiropractors with unlawful insurance solicitation in violation of section 817.234(8). [2] The specific facts relating to Mr. Bradford's prosecution are as follows. Charles Bradford, a licensed chiropractor, was charged by information with two counts of unlawful insurance solicitation in violation of section 817.234(8)....

...s & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), held: [T]he first prong of the Central Hudson test is satisfied, as the solicitation made by Edelson and Barr was unlawful only because it violated section 817.234(8), and not for any other reason....

...Morales, 990 F.2d 217, 222 (5th Cir.1993), as support for their argument that the statute is not narrowly tailored, is misplaced. The statutes in those cases placed total bans on the professional solicitation at issue which were not sufficiently tailored in scope or purpose. In contrast, section 817.234(8), by limiting its purpose to the filing of motor vehicle tort or PIP benefits claims, is reasonably tailored to fit the state's interests in preventing insurance fraud and rising premiums....

...This reasoning was based on (1) the district court's decision to read subsection (1)(a), which criminalizes certain acts performed with the intent to defraud, in pari materia with subsection (8), which was totally void of any language as to intent to defraud; and (2) the Fourth District's focus on the title of section 817.234: "False and fraudulent insurance claims." Thus, the Fourth District's reasoning essentially inserted an element into the statute that did not otherwise exist. In late 1999, the Third District was presented with yet another of these cases challenging the validity of section 817.234(8) on, inter alia, First Amendment grounds....

...did not create a constitutionally impermissible burden on the right to commercial speech. See Hershkowitz, 744 So.2d at 1270. Approximately one year after announcing the Bradford decision, the Fourth District again addressed the constitutionality of section 817.234(8)....

...State, 757 So.2d at 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA), review granted, 779 So.2d 271 (Fla.2000). In that case, however, the court wrote: [T]his court, in Bradford [], followed Barr, but, in order to satisfy the third-prong of the Central Hudson four-prong test, interpreted section 817.234(8) as applying only where the defendant intends to defraud an insurance carrier. However, in Barr, we had previously ruled that section 817.234(8) satisfied the state's interest in preventing fraud. Accordingly, language in Bradford, interpreting section 817.234(8) as requiring an intent to defraud in order to satisfy the third prong of the Central Hudson test, was dicta and not controlling.[ [3] ] Id....

...equired by the Central Hudson test. See id. at 876. With that background in mind, we consider two issues. First, we must determine whether intent to defraud is an element of the offense of unlawful insurance solicitation, as specifically codified in section 817.234(8). Second, if fraud is not an element, we must then decide whether section 817.234(8) violates the protections afforded by the First Amendment to commercial speech. We address each issue in turn. 1. Whether Intent to Defraud Is an Element of Section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes (1997). A. Plain Meaning This Court has repeatedly held that "the plain meaning of statutory language is the first consideration of statutory construction." Capers v. State, 678 So.2d 330, 332 (Fla.1996). Section 817.234(8) states in pertinent part: It is unlawful for any person ......

...In fact, as noted by Judge Stone in Hansbrough: The statute in question, distilled to its most essential terms, provides that it is unlawful for any "person ... to solicit any business ... for the purpose of making ... claims for personal injury protection benefits...." § 817.234(8), Fla.Stat....

...was intentional. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984). 757 So.2d at 1283 (Stone, J., concurring specially). The same reasoning was echoed by the First District Court of Appeal in its recent decision in Cronin where the court noted that "section 817.234(8) clearly and unambiguously does not include the requirement that the solicitation occur with the intent to defraud." See 774 So.2d at 874....

...threshold amount, [4] the Legislature enacted section *818 627.7375, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976). See ch. 76-266, § 7, Laws of Fla. [5] Section 627.7375, when enacted, contained essentially that which is now found in subsections (1) through (4) of section 817.234, all of which then included, and still include, fraud as an element of the crime....

...injury protection benefits. See ch. 78-258, § 3, Laws of Fla. The Legislature, again having the opportunity to include intent to defraud as an element, did not do so. The following year, the entire section (then-section 627.7375) was renumbered as section 817.234....

...While revising then-section 627.7375, the Legislature permitted subsections (8) and (9) to remain untouched. See ch. 79-400, § 240, Laws of Fla. Subsections (8) and (9) have remained, essentially, unchanged since 1979. In our view, it is clear from the preceding analysis that the legislative history accompanying section 817.234(8) also supports the conclusion that the Legislature, having had ample opportunity to do so, did not include fraudulent intent as an element of the offense of unlawful insurance solicitation. C. Statutory Construction Respondent Bradford initially asserts that section 817.234 is codified within a chapter entitled "Fraudulent Practices" and is itself entitled "False and Fraudulent Insurance Claims." Thus, Bradford presents the position that the title of section *819 817.234 evinces a strong indication that the Legislature intended fraud to be an element of subsection (8)....

...in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.")). In the present case, while intent to defraud is not mentioned in subsection (8), it is specifically included as an element in subsections (1), (2), (3), (4), and (7) of section 817.234....

...sections (1), (2), (3), (4) and (7)), yet it declined to do so as related to subsection (8). As a result, we conclude that the Legislature has not included fraudulent intent as an element of the offense of unlawful insurance solicitation. 2. Whether Section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes (1997), Constitutes an Impermissible Restriction on Commercial Speech in Violation of the First Amendment....

...precise interests put forward by the State with other suppositions." Went for It, 515 U.S. at 624, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at *821 768, 113 S.Ct. 1792). In the instant case, the State asserts the following interests in support of section 817.234(8): (1) The State has a substantial interest in protecting the public from unnecessarily inflated insurance rates for personal injury protection and liability insurance....

...2371, the Court found that the Bar's restriction targeted a concrete, nonspeculative harm. See id. at 629, 115 S.Ct. 2371. As to this second prong of the Central Hudson test, the State correctly contends that it is not required to establish that each of its asserted interests is or will be directly advanced by section 817.234(8)....

...See Went For It, 515 U.S. at 625 n. 1, 115 S.Ct. 2371. The interest which the State focused on throughout its briefs to this Court and its presentation during oral argument was the prevention of insurance fraud. As such, it relied on the 1975 Report forming part of section 817.234's legislative history....

...The 2000 Report makes similar observations to those made by the 1975 Report; its import, however, is in the documentation that these unscrupulous practices continue to take place. While these reports certainly indicate that the evil which the State seeks to correct is unacceptable to all professions, real, and pervasive, section 817.234(8) does not directly and materially advance the State's goal of preventing insurance fraud....

...However, United States Supreme Court precedent requires that the restriction on commercial speech directly and materially alleviate the evil (i.e., insurance fraud), see Went For It, 515 U.S. at 626, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71, 113 S.Ct. 1792); that this subsection does not accomplish. Section 817.234(8) does not directly and materially prohibit solicitation which results in fraudulent tort and PIP benefits claims....

...Thus, we conclude that the statute does not directly and materially alleviate the problem of insurance fraud and actually condemns totally lawful conduct. C. Narrowly Tailored Even if we were to conclude that the statute does directly and materially alleviate the problem, section 817.234(8) would still violate First Amendment parameters because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve the State's articulated interest —prevention of insurance fraud....

...2371 (quotation marks omitted)(emphasis supplied); see also Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989); Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476, 108 S.Ct. 1916. In this case, the State, relying on language from Barr, seeks to meet its burden by maintaining that section 817.234(8): [I]s not a blanket ban on all solicitation of business by a chiropractor, but rather, targets only those persons who solicit business for the sole purpose of making motor vehicle tort or PIP benefits claims....

...Thus, the Edenfield Court concluded that Ohralik made it clear that "a preventative rule was justified only in situations `inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct.'" Id. (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464, 98 S.Ct. 1912). Additionally, Ohralik only banned face-to-face solicitation, whereas section 817.234(8) does not make that distinction....

...ead to prosecution under this section simply because payment under such circumstances would usually flow from PIP benefits. When we consider that pursuant to this statute "any person" who contacts another, by any means, may be charged with violating 817.234(8) if they do so intending to recover payment, to which they are legitimately and lawfully entitled, from a PIP carrier or through a tort claim, it is apparent that this statute is not narrowly tailored and casts a net far beyond constitutional boundaries....

...ce fraud. See, e.g., Went For It, 515 U.S. at 632, 115 S.Ct. 2371; Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476, 108 S.Ct. 1916. One *828 very obvious less restrictive manner with which to prevent insurance fraud would be to include "intent to defraud" as an element of 817.234(8)....

...was released, we had already accepted jurisdiction in Bradford. Noting that we had accepted review, the Fourth District certified the questions at issue in this case as being of great public importance. The specific questions certified were: WHETHER SECTION 817.234(8), FLORIDA STATUTES, INCLUDES A REQUIREMENT OF SPECIFIC INTENT TO DEFRAUD THE INSURER....

...ien. Reversed with directions. NOTES [1] Our holding makes it unnecessary for us to rule on the appellant's other points on appeal. [2] Because Mr. Speiller was killed in a motor vehicle accident, an additional statute is arguably applicable here — Section 817.234(9), Florida Statutes (1981): "It is unlawful for an attorney to solicit any business relating to the representation of persons injured in a motor vehicle accident for the purpose of filing a motor vehicle tort claim or a claim for personal injury protection benefits required by s....

...islative history underlying those statutory subsections supports our conclusion regarding their relationship."); State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So.2d 533, 542 (Fla.1997) ("Accordingly, we find that the legislative history, like the plain language of section 817.234(1), supports a conclusion that the statute applies to both first-party and third-party claims."); Streeter v....

...keys in the vehicle at 1:30 a.m. on Thursday, April 25, and discovered the vehicle missing at about 6:15 that same morning. On May 28, 2002, the state filed an information against the defendant charging him with insurance fraud in violation of *1178 section 817.234(1); [1] tampering with physical evidence in violation of section 918.13(1)(a) [2] and official misconduct in violation of section 839.25, [3] Florida Statutes....

...ny fact or thing material to such claim, to wit: THAT HIS POLICE ISSUED VEHICLE WAS ALLEGEDLY STOLEN and/or THE LOCATION OF THE POLICE VEHICLE WHEN IT WAS ALLEGEDLY STOLEN and/or THE TIME THAT THE POLICE VEHICLE WAS ALLEGEDLY STOLEN, in violation of s. 817.234(1) Florida Statutes, contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida....

...We remind the court that it has other alternative sanctions, in lieu of dismissal, available to address the prosecutor's response, or lack thereof, other than dismissal to enforce compliance with its order. Accordingly, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. NOTES [1] Section 817.234 provides: (1)(a) A person who, with the intent to injure, defraud, or deceive any insurer: 1....

...Edward Shohat, Miami, for appellee-Carl Borgan. PER CURIAM. Following oral argument, we sua sponte consolidated all three of the subject cases arising out of the trial court's three orders of dismissal being appealed, as there is a common constitutional issue among all three; namely, whether section 817.234(1), Florida Statutes (1987), is unconstitutionally vague as applied to attorneys in the representation of their clients....

...the RICO count in the 1992 amended information. The second order dismissed counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the second information in this case. The underlined counts and predicate acts were dismissed because of the trial court's view that section 817.234(1) was unconstitutional, or did not apply in a third party context [1] ; the remaining counts and predicate acts, apparently because of its view that section 817.234(3) was also unconstitutional or did not apply in a third party context....

...It was unnecessary to dismiss all of the counts, given the trial court's limited, but justified constitutional concern for the word "incomplete" as it applies to attorneys in their representation of clients. Specifically, there was no legitimate reason to invalidate section 817.234(3), constitutionally or otherwise, to impair the prosecution based on that section....

...orneys in representation of their clients. Only to this extent do we affirm the trial court's actions, since we find that its application of "vagueness" beyond that to be erroneous. I VAGUENESS In the instant case, appellees were charged pursuant to section 817.234(1) with submitting "incomplete" insurance claims to insurers. Appellees allegedly sent demand letters to insurance companies which omitted medical records or statements that would not be favorable to their claim. The trial court found the term "incomplete" made the statute vague as applied to attorneys. Section 817.234 does not define "incomplete." The uniqueness of an attorney's obligations in an adversarial context makes the lack of guidance as to what constitutes an incomplete claim problematic....

...In an adversarial context, an attorney would rightfully be confused as to what conduct would subject him or her to punishment for filing an "incomplete" claim under Florida's insurance fraud statute. The state repeatedly argues, as it did below, that the specific intent required under section 817.234(1) saves the statute from being vague....

...fully detained and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government. Wershow, 343 So.2d at 608, quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 23 L.Ed. 563 (1876). In sum, section 817.234(1) is unconstitutionally vague in its application to attorneys in the representation of their clients, as it does not provide adequate notice when omissions will result in an "incomplete" claim under the statute....

...A finding that the statute is vague does not mean that the legislature may not prescribe punishment for attorneys who commit insurance fraud. It simply means that the current legislation is inadequate to do so in a constitutional manner. II THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS A. Section 817.234(1), Florida Statutes (1987) Even though we find section 817.234(1) to be unconstitutionally vague as it applies to attorneys in the representation of their clients, we are compelled to address the statute's applicability to situations involving third party claims. The trial court extensively reviewed the legislative history of section 817.234 and its relationship to the nonjoinder statute, section 627.7262, Florida Statutes (1987). It also looked at the language in the current nonjoinder statute, section 627.4136, Florida Statutes (1993). After doing the same, we respectfully disagree with the trial court's finding on this issue, and hold that section 817.234(1) applies in the third party context....

...At the same time, the insurance fraud statute addresses improper behavior by individuals in the claims process. This statute has remained in substantially the same form since 1977, except that it was renumbered and moved to chapter 817, which addresses all types of fraudulent practices. This suggests that section 817.234 has more to do with fraud than insurance per se....

...89), since it was passed in the same act as sections 627.7264 and 624.155. Id. at 1128. In the instant case, the nonjoinder statute does not relate to the insurance fraud section in such a way as to assist a court in determining the applicability of section 817.234(1) to attorneys in third party claim situations....

...Based on these circumstances, the nonjoinder statute and the insurance fraud statute need not be read in light of each other. The trial court relied upon the current nonjoinder statute, section 627.4136, Florida Statutes (1993), to support its holding that section 817.234 applies only to first party claims....

...file a claim pursuant to the policy. Therefore, since the insurance fraud statute is couched in terms of filing a claim, it necessarily follows that only first party claims, those of the insured under the policy, are susceptible to the provisions of section 817.234. Section 817.234 does not define the term "claim." The trial court seems to hold that section 817.234(1) defines a claim as "a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy." Using a term to define itself is circular....

...1994). Even so, the Conquest court found that a third party suit was improper since section 624.155 defines bad faith refusal in terms of acting in the "insured's" best interest. § 624.155(1)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. (1991). There is no such "back-up" in section 817.234(1) precluding its application to third party claims....

...a contract of insurance," related to a "situation when an insured or someone having a right to be paid for a loss under the terms of a policy makes a claim against the insurance company based upon the contract of insurance." Id. 121 N.Y.S.2d at 391. Section 817.234(1)(a)(1) uses language similar to the New York law....

...App.3d 70, 262 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1 Dist. 1989). The court held that the facts of that case supported a finding of probable cause that Petsas had violated the insurance fraud statute in a third party context. Id. 262 Cal. Rptr. at 472. [7] In conclusion, we find that section 817.234(1) applies to anyone who would file a fraudulent claim, including attorneys of injured third parties....

...ured" and "claimant." This suggests that the legislature intended different applications of each section of the statute. Other perceived problems with the language in the statute, such as the meaning of the term "incomplete," could, and does, render section 817.234 vague as applied to attorneys, but not necessarily inapplicable to them....

...ld have a cause of action and/or an interest in a policy upon obtaining a settlement. It is axiomatic that settlements are negotiated. Fraud committed in this context should be punishable, assuming a valid statute proscribing punishment for such. B. Section 817.234(3), Florida Statutes (1987) In its October 14, 1993 order in trial court case no. 90-6433, the trial court dismissed charges against the attorney defendants brought under section 817.234(3). In count 15 (and predicate act M) of the Information, the state alleged that appellees conspired with a claimant, Howard Drinks, to make a false and fraudulent insurance claim in violation of section 817.234(1)(a). Specifically, appellees allegedly urged Drinks to falsely testify in a deposition in violation of section 817.234(3)....

...dly urged Phillip Gummage to undergo unnecessary surgery. [8] The trial court apparently dismissed these charges because they involved third party claims. In its October 14, 1993 order the trial court found that the meaning of the word "claimant" in 817.234(3) was governed by the language in the current nonjoinder statute, section 627.4136, Florida Statutes (1993). The trial court found that "claimant" meant "any insured" and, thus, section 817.234(3) would not apply in third party contexts. Since the trial court's analysis fails as to whether section 817.234(1) applies to third party actions, then its analysis as to 817.234(3) must also fail. Section 817.234(3) specifically applies to attorneys who conspire with claimants to violate any of the provisions of section 817.234....

..."Claimant" is defined as "[o]ne who claims or asserts a right, demand or claim." Black's Law Dictionary 225 (5th Ed. (1979)). A third party injured by another and seeking damages from an insurance company is asserting a demand for compensation. Attorneys are on notice, and section 817.234(3) is not vague in and of itself. Further, section 817.234(1) is vague only as it applies to attorneys. If Mills, Drinks, or Gummage filed a false or misleading report under section 817.234(1), and appellees conspired with them to fraudulently do so, then charges could be brought against appellees under section 817.234(3) without the same constitutional problems as under section 817.234(1). A cursory review of the information shows that the allegations are adequate to support the charges. Because we conclude that the statute does apply to third party claims, and section 817.234(3) does not suffer the same vagueness shortfall as section 817.234(1), the dismissal of the counts brought pursuant to section 817.234(3) was erroneous. HERSEY, GLICKSTEIN and POLEN, JJ., concur. ON MOTION FOR REHEARING/CERTIFICATION We deny the state's motion for rehearing, but grant the motion for certification as to *1194 the following question of great public importance: WHETHER SECTION 817.234(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1987), IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED TO ATTORNEYS IN THE REPRESENTATION OF THEIR CLIENTS SINCE IT DOES NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF WHEN AN OMISSION WILL RESULT IN AN "INCOMPLETE" CLAIM UNDER THE STATUTE. HERSEY, GLICKSTEIN and POLEN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 817.234(1), Florida Statutes (1987), provides: (1)(a) Any person who, with the intent to injure, defraud, or deceive any insurance company, including, but not limited to, any statutorily created underwriting association or pool of insurers or...

...ance the following: "Any person who knowingly and with intent to injure, defraud, or deceive any insurance company files a statement of claim containing any false, incomplete, or misleading information is guilty of a felony of the third degree." [2] Section 817.234(3), Florida Statutes (1987), provides: (3) Any attorney who knowingly and willfully assists, conspires with, or urges any claimant to fraudulently violate any of the provisions of this section or part XI of chapter 627, or any person...

...Oklahoma's statute, as cited in the opinion, is very similar to Florida's, and premises the fraudulent behavior on a claim "upon any contract of insurance." Id. at 1046, quoting Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1662 (1971). [8] None of the parties on appeal discuss whether the charges brought under section 817.234(3) could stand despite a finding that section 817.234(1) is unconstitutionally vague. They seem to take an "all-or-nothing" approach to section 817.234, which is incorrect.

...And I don't—have not seen, in my opinion any evidence of any fraud whatsoever. MS. CURRAN: Okay. Okay. Can you give me the parameters, guidelines, or whatever it is that an Insurance Fraud Adjuster uses in order to make a determination of whether or not there is insurance fraud? THE WITNESS: Well, Florida Statute 817.234 gives us a good place to start, I guess, and that is that any person who, with criminal intent, submits to an insurance carrier information in support of a claim for loss which is a false, misleading, or incomplete statement, they would have...

...The basis of the dismissal was that the Affidavit of Vehicle Theft was a claim form and that because the affidavit did not include the required statutory warning and had not been approved by the Department of Insurance, it failed to meet the statutory prerequisites to prosecution under Section 817.234(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985). We disagree for two reasons. First, we find that the Affidavit of Vehicle Theft does not constitute a claim form within the meaning of Section 817.234(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...As conceded by the defendant, the claim herein was initiated by a recorded telephone call. Thereafter, pursuant to the terms of his policy, Book was required to submit additional documentation of the claim. Not all documentation submitted in support of a claim needs to contain the statutory warning. Section 817.234(6), Florida Statutes (1985), recognizes several documents that can be filed in support of a claim and that reasonably will not contain the statutory warning....

...For example, the insurer in the case sub judice does not utilize a formal claim form, but relies upon telephonic notification; therefore, we hold that the Affidavit of Vehicle Theft filed in this case does not constitute a claim form within the meaning of Section 817.234(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985). We also find that the warning provision of Section 817.234(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), is not a prerequisite to a charge of filing a false and fraudulent insurance claim because we conclude that the provision in Section 817.234(1)(b) is directory rather than mandatory....

...on the context in which it is found and the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the statute. See S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 1977); White v. Means, 280 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). Clearly, the intent of the Legislature in enacting Section 817.234 was to make the *639 filing of a false or fraudulent insurance claim a crime....

...Carney, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. POLEN, J. Renny Edelson and Daniel Barr, both chiropractors, timely appeal from the denial of their motions to dismiss the state's information charging them with unlawful insurance solicitation in violation of section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Edelson and Barr examined such person, determined treatment was necessary, and later billed that person's PIP benefits for the services they rendered. The state then charged Edelson and Barr separately with unlawful insurance solicitation in violation of section 817.234(8)....

...The court denied both motions. They then pled no contest to the lesser offense of conspiracy to commit unlawful insurance solicitation, reserving their right to appeal the above issue. The overbreadth doctrine does not apply Edelson and Barr first argue that section 817.234(8) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it unduly restricts their commercial speech. Section 817.234(8) provides, It is unlawful for any person, in his or her individual capacity or in his or her capacity as a public or private employee, or for any firm, corporation, partnership, or association, to solicit any business in or about ci...

...le tort claims or claims for personal injury protection benefits required by s. 627.736. Any person who violates the provisions of this subsection commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 817.234(8), Fla....

...the ends. Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995). Here, the first prong of the Central Hudson test is satisfied, as the solicitation made by Edelson and Barr was unlawful only because it violated section 817.234(8), and not for any other reason....

...Morales, 990 F.2d 217, 222 (5th Cir.1993), as support for their argument that the statute is not narrowly tailored, is misplaced. The statutes in those cases placed total bans on the professional solicitation at issue which were not sufficiently tailored in scope or purpose. In contrast, section 817.234(8), by limiting its purpose to the filing of motor vehicle tort or PIP benefits claims, is reasonably tailored to fit the state's interests in preventing insurance fraud and rising premiums. The statute is not void for vagueness Edelson and Barr next argue that section 817.234(8) is vague because it does not define "solicitation." We disagree and hold the term may be readily understood by reference to commonly accepted dictionary definitions....

...actors, and differently from lawyers who file PIP claims on behalf of the victims. Since it is undisputed that a chiropractor's right to solicit patients for whatever reason is not a fundamental right, and that chiropractors are not a suspect class, section 817.234(8) may be held unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection only if the challenged classification bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest....

...vehicle tort claim or a claim for personal injury protection benefits." As the trial court noted, subsection (9) does nothing to lessen the prohibition on solicitation, but merely imposes further restrictions on attorneys. In addition to abiding by section 817.234, attorneys must also follow the dictates of the Florida Bar rules when dealing with potential clients....

...2371 (holding Rule 4.7-4(b)(1) of the Florida Bar Rules prohibiting a lawyer's direct mail solicitation of a personal injury or wrongful death client within thirty days of accident narrowly drawn to pass Central Hudson test). Therefore, we conclude that section 817.234(8), as applied to Edelson and Barr, does not violate the equal protection clause of the constitution. AFFIRMED. GUNTHER and FARMER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 817.234(9), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, It is unlawful for any attorney to solicit any business relating to the representation of persons injured in a motor vehicle accident for the purpose of filing a motor vehicle tort claim or a claim for personal injury protection benefits required by s....

...This section shall not be interpreted to prohibit advertising by attorneys which does not entail a solicitation as described in this subsection and which is permitted by the rules regulating The Florida Bar as promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court. § 817.234(9), Fla....

...ble patients. Absent an element of fraud, they argue such conduct is constitutionally protected under the First Amendment. In support, the defendants cite State v. Bradford, 787 So.2d 811 (Fla.2001). In that case, the Florida Supreme Court held that section 817.234(8), which made it unlawful for any person to solicit business for the purpose of making motor vehicle tort claims or claims for PIP benefits, violated the First Amendment because it prohibited solicitation regardless of whether fraudulent intent was involved....

...felt it lacked. On that date, the Florida Department of Financial Services, Division of Insurance Fraud, informed Mercury that Cooper was arrested for providing false claims information to Mercury concerning the accident in question in violation of section 817.234(1), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...Wheeler, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. POLEN, J. Charles Bradford, a chiropractor, timely appeals from the denial of his motion to dismiss the state's information charging him with unlawful insurance solicitation in violation of section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...eatment if necessary. Bradford examined such person, determined treatment was necessary, and later billed that person's PIP benefits for the services they rendered. The state then charged Bradford with unlawful insurance solicitation in violation of section 817.234(8)....

...With respect to the second prong of the Central Hudson test, Bradford notes that subsection (8) does not speak directly to the state's interest in preventing insurance fraud. Nevertheless, subsection (1) does. In fact, subsection (1) begins, "Any person who, with the intent to injure, defraud, or deceive any insurer...." § 817.234(1)(a), Fla....

...When reading subsection (8) in pari materia with subsection (1)(a), it becomes obvious that the legislature in enacting subsection (8) intended to punish only solicitations made for the sole purpose of defrauding that patient's PIP insurer. Moreover, the statute's title supports this interpretation. The heading of section 817.234 reads, "False and fraudulent insurance claims." § 817.234, Fla....

...While the location of a law in a particular title or chapter of Florida Statutes does not necessarily determine the issue of legislative intent, it may be persuasive in certain circumstances. State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141, 1143 (Fla.1985). We hold that this principle is especially applicable to subsection 817.234(8)....

...In other words, a chiropractor may solicit any prospective patient even if that chiropractor happens to get paid for his services by the patient's PIP insurance, as long as he does not solicit with the intent to defraud the insurer. Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED. DELL and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 817.234(8) provides, It is unlawful for any person, in his or her individual capacity or in his or her capacity as a public or private employee, or for any firm, corporation, partnership, or association, to solicit any business in or about ci...

...ehicle tort claims or claims for personal injury protection benefits required by § 627.736. Any person who violates the provisions of this subsection commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in §§ 775.082, 775.083, or 775.084. § 817.234(8), Fla....

...Ingrassia (Ft.Lauderdale), Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and GREEN, JJ. NESBITT, J. Jerome M. Hershkowitz was convicted below of unlawful solicitation of motor vehicle tort or personal injury protection (PIP) claims, a violation of section 817.234(8) Florida Statutes (1995) [1] ....

...We reject that argument and adopt the reasoning and analysis outlined by the Fourth District in Barr v. State, 731 So.2d 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and reiterated and further supported in Bradford v. State, 740 So.2d 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). We conclude that section 817.234(8) is not an impermissible burden on the right to commercial free speech, nor is that section unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, or violative of equal protection....

...Bradford, 740 So.2d at 571 (quoting Barr, 731 So.2d at 129.) Accordingly, the statute creates no impermissible burden on the right to commercial free speech. Likewise, the statute is neither void for vagueness, nor violative of the right to equal protection. In order for a statute like section 817.234 to withstand a void-for-vagueness challenge, the language of the statute must provide adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits when measured by common understanding and practice....

...As Black's Law Dictionary notes, "[t]he term implies personal petition and importunity addressed to a particular individual to do some particular thing." Barr, 731 So.2d at 130 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1248-49 (5th ed.1979)). Thus, the void for vagueness claim fails. Section 817.234(8) may be held unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection only if the challenged classification bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest....

...sonal injury claims is "rationally related" to the law's objective of deterring insurance fraud. See State v. Falk, 724 So.2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). Thus, we find no violation of the right to equal protection under the law. In sum, we conclude that section 817.234(8) is neither unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, violative of equal protection, nor is the section an impermissible burden on the right to commercial free speech. Furthermore, we find the remaining points raised by appellant to be without merit. Accordingly, the order under review is affirmed. NOTES [1] Section 817.234(8) provides: It is unlawful for any person, in his or her individual capacity or in his or her capacity as a public or private employee, or for any firm, corporation, partnership, or association, to solicit any business in or about ci...

...f); D.R. 3-102 (dividing legal fees with a nonlawyer); D.R. 1-102(A)(1) (violating a disciplinary rule); and D.R. 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law). The referee also noted that Stafford had violated section 817.234, subsections (8) and *1322 (9), Florida Statutes (1985), which prohibit the solicitation of personal injury protection claims and motor vehicle tort claims....

...any split-fee arrangement, in any form whatsoever, with any physician, surgeon, organization, or person, either directly or indirectly, for patients referred to a licensed facility." Fla. Stat. § 395.0185 (1). D. Insurance Fraud Statute, Fla. Stat. § 817.234 (a)(1) - (2), (6), (12) (2012) Under Florida Law a person commits insurance fraud if that person, with the intent to injure, defraud, or deceive any insurer presents or causes to be presented any written statement as part of, or in support of, a claim for payment pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim. Fla. Stat. § 817.234 (1)(a)(1)....

...that is intended to be presented to any insurer in connection with, or support of, any claim for payment pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning the claim. Id. § 817.234(1)(a)(2). A statement includes but is not limited to, any notice, statement, proof of loss, invoice, account, bill for services or other *1300 evidence of loss, injury or expense. Id. § 817.234(6)....

..., 698 So.2d 533 , 539 (Fla. 1997). Defendants' reliance upon Mark Marks is misplaced. The Supreme Court of Florida in Mark Marks only addressed an attorney's duty to disclose. Specifically, the Court held that "an attorney's duty to disclose is uncertain under section 817.234(1)" because "it is an attorney's unique obligations when viewed in conjunction with the term 'incomplete' that renders [the] statute vague as applied to attorneys." Id....

...Indeed, in Sammy Sterling Holdings, LLC v. United States Aircraft Ins. Grp. , this Court distinguished between an attorney's duty to disclose and an insurer's duty to disclose stating that "an insurer has no such countervailing duties that might blur the extent of its obligations under section 817.234(7)." No....

...16-cv-21230, 2016 WL 8679130 , at *6 (S.D. Fla. Jun. 23, 2016). Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Florida's holding in Mark Marks about an attorney's duty to disclose has no bearing on whether Defendants, health care providers, had a duty to disclose. Section 817.234 imposes a duty of disclosure as it explicitly prohibits preparing or making any written statement that is intended to be presented to any insurer in connection with any claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact material to that claim. Fla. Stat. § 817.234 (1)(a)(2)....

...KJ Chiropractic Ctr. LLC , No. 12-cv-1138, 2013 WL 12155947 , at *6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2013), report and recommendation adopted , No. 12-cv-1138, 2014 WL 12617566 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2014) (Discussing various statutes, including Florida's Insurance Fraud Statute, Section 817.234, the court stated "[p]laintiffs are not seeking relief under these statutes; they are citing the alleged violation of these statutes as support for their claim under FDUPTA [ sic ]....

...of the victim is by definition factored into the offense level. See § 921.0024, Fla. Stat. (2001). In contrast, insurance fraud where the property value is $100,000 or more is also a first degree felony, but no victim injury points are imposed. See § 817.234(11)(c), Fla....

...able. We cannot conclude that practicing attorneys would reach a different conclusion. Because less than complete disclosure by an attorney in the representation of his or her client is considered acceptable practice in certain instances and because section 817.234(1), does not indicate, in terms that a person of common intelligence would understand, in what instances less than complete disclosure by an attorney becomes a criminal offense, we conclude that the statute does not provide adequate notice of the conduct by attorneys that it proscribes." State v....

...Appellant raises three issues, one of which warrants reversal. Citing Thompson v. State, 585 So.2d 492 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), approved and adopted by, State v. Thompson, 607 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1992), appellant argues that he should not have been convicted of filing a false insurance claim in violation of section 817.234(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and burning with the intent to defraud in violation of section 817.233, Florida Statutes, where he was also convicted of grand theft, because all three crimes are in the nature of theft offenses....

...st non-chiropractors engaging chiropractors as independent contractors and interfering with the chiropractors’ clinical judgment, Fla. Stat. § 460.4167 , as well as the prohibition against waiver of patient co-payments and deductibles, Fla. Stat. § 817.234 (7)(a), and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla....

...of reducing the billed charges by an amount equal to the waived deductible, co-payment or co-insurance requirement, a device which effectively misrepresented and overstated the applicable charges submitted to the insurance companies, in violation of § 817.234(7)(a) and § 817.234(11), Fla....

...Additionally and in the alternative, defendants contend that United’s common law fraud claim (Count 1) based on false claim submissions fails to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements under Rule 9(b); that the common law fraud claim (Count 2) based on violation of Florida’s waiver of patient responsibility statute, § 817.234(7), Fla....

...the claim.... (b) A claim for overpayment shall not be permitted beyond 30 months after the health insurer’s payment of a claim, except that claims for overpayment may be sought beyond that time from *1364 providers convicted of fraud pursuant to s. 817.234....

...§ 627.6131(6), Fla. Stat. Defendants argue that § 627.6131(6)(b) precludes all of United’s fraud-based claims in this action as time-barred because it has not and cannot allege that any of the provider-defendants to this cause have been convicted of fraud under § 817.234....

...of Willis & Ferebee, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellees. WOLF, J. This is an appeal from a final order dismissing criminal charges against appellees. The state asserts that the trial court erroneously concluded that in order to pursue a violation of section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes, the state must allege and prove that the solicitation covered by the statute was made with an intent to defraud....

...First Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 4 of the Florida Constitution. The order dismissing the charges is therefore affirmed. Appellees were charged with one violation of Florida's RICO Act and several violations of section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes, otherwise known as Florida's anti-solicitation statute, with the predicate conduct for the RICO charge being the several counts of unlawful insurance solicitation. The counts charging appellees with violations of section 817.234(8) alleged only that appellees had unlawfully solicited business from the victims for the purpose of making motor vehicle tort claims or claims for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits....

...The trial court dismissed the charges based on the fourth district's decision in Bradford v. State, 740 So.2d 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), which the trial court interpreted as requiring an allegation that the solicitation occurred with the intent to defraud. Under the express terms of section 817.234(8), any person who solicits business, through any medium, with the intent of receiving payment by making a motor vehicle tort claim or a claim for PIP benefits commits a third degree felony. See Barr v. State, 731 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that "to solicit" as used in the statute means to contact or communicate with either orally or in writing). In Barr, the defendant chiropractors had been charged with violating section 817.234(8) and filed motions to dismiss the charges arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, overly broad, and violative of equal protection....

...at 2351; Fox, 492 U.S. at 476-81, 109 S.Ct. at 3032-35. The fourth district in Barr reasoned that the first prong of the Central Hudson test had been satisfied because the solicitations made by the defendants in that case were unlawful only because they violated section 817.234(8)....

...substantial interest in combating insurance fraud and the resulting increase in insurance premiums borne ultimately by the public. See id. The court in Barr further reasoned that the third prong of the Central Hudson test had been satisfied because section 817.234(8) does, in fact, directly advance the state's interest in preventing insurance fraud....

...s reasonably tailored to the state's interest in preventing insurance fraud and raised premiums. Id. [1] A little over two months after the issuance of the decision in Barr, the fourth district again had occasion to write on the constitutionality of section 817.234(8) in Bradford v. State, 740 So.2d 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). In Bradford, the defendant chiropractor had been charged with violating section 817.234(8) and had, like the defendants in Barr, filed a motion to dismiss the charges arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, over broad, and violative of equal protection....

...See State v. Bradford, 761 So.2d 331 (Fla.2000). After the fourth district issued its opinion in Bradford, but before the supreme court granted review in that case, the third district in Hershkowitz v. State, 744 So.2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), also held that section 817.234(8) does not constitute an impermissible burden on the right to commercial *874 speech, nor was it unconstitutionally vague, over broad, or violative of equal protection....

...he fourth district in [ Barr ], and reiterated and further supported in [ Bradford ]," without specifically adopting the language in the Bradford opinion which had indicated that an intent to defraud was a necessary element of the offense defined in section 817.234(8). See Hershkowitz, 744 So.2d at 1269. Subsequently, the fourth district in Hansbrough v. State, 757 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), receded from its statement in Bradford that an intent to defraud was a necessary element of the offense defined in section 817.234(8)....

...See Hansbrough v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly 47, ___ So.2d ___ (Fla. Nov. 13, 2000). Consequently, at the present time, there is no court in Florida which has specifically indicated that an intent to defraud is an essential element of the offense defined in section 817.234(8)....

...State, 622 So.2d 536, 537-38 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). "It is fundamental that judges do not have the power to edit statutes so as to add requirements that the legislature did not include." Meyer v. Caruso, 731 So.2d 118, 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Sections 817.234(1)(a),(2), and (3), Florida Statutes, specifically indicate that an intent to defraud is an element of the offenses defined in those subsections....

...s required by s. 627.736. Any person who violates the provisions of this subsection commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. As Judge Stone wrote in his special concurrence in Hansbrough, section 817.234(8) clearly and unambiguously does not include the requirement that the solicitation occur with the intent to defraud....

...so in light of other sections in chapter 817 which independently criminalize general schemes to defraud. See § 817.034(4), Fla. Stat. (1997). We thus find no legislative intent to include an intent to defraud as an element of the offense defined in section 817.234(8)....

...r of regulation may best be employed. *876 Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479-80, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 3034-35, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989). We disagree with the fourth district's holding in Barr that the prohibition in section 817.234(8) is narrowly tailored because it only relates to solicitations made for the purpose of making motor vehicle tort claims or claims for PIP benefits....

...the third district's decision in Hershkowitz. BOOTH and JOANOS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The fourth district in Barr had not been called upon to address, nor had it specifically addressed in its opinion, whether the elements of the offense defined in section 817.234(8) included an intent to defraud on the part of the defendant....

...She found that there had been no phone or electrical service in the house. In addition, Murphy-Perez also discovered fraudulent receipts in the claims file which, in her opinion, presented evidence of fraud. Murphy-Perez issued a complaint/arrest warrant charging Saenz with violations of sections 817.234 3 and 812.014 4 , Florida Statutes....

...Section 626.989(6) provides in pertinent part that: any insurer, agent, or other person licensed under the code, or an employee thereof, having knowledge or who believes that a fraudulent insurance act or any other act or practice which, upon conviction, constitutes a felony or a misdemeanor under the code, or under s. 817.234, is being or has been committed shall send to the Division of Insurance Fraud a report or information pertinent to such knowledge or belief and such additional information relative thereto as the department may require....

...cy, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, ors. 775.084. § 817.234(l)(a), Fla....

...nd engaging in a scheme to defraud. Brasner ultimately entered an Alford 2 plea of guilty in his best interest to three crimes, two of which have direct relevance to this case. Brasner pled guilty to Count 13, which charged a violation of Fla. Stat. § 817.234 (l)(a)3....

...at 148-49; Franklin, 576 So.2d at 1372; Scutti, 220 So.2d at 630 (holding that there can be no duress unless the act of the party compelling obedience of another is unlawful or wrongful). The legal consequences of filing a statement of claim with misleading information are set forth in Section 817.234 of the Florida Statutes Annotated. [11] Section 817.234, therefore, prohibits the filing of any statement of a claim with an insurance company which contains false or misleading information, and also requires that each claim form bear the following warning: "Any person who knowingly and wi...

...r years of benefits, that you would be waiving any further rights that you had under the policy and that you would be asked to give the policy back? A: I understand that I would not be getting $1,400 a month from that point on." [11] Florida Statute 817.234 provides in relevant part: "Any person who, with the intent to injure, defraud, or deceive any insurer: 1....

...*1306 Hershoff & Levy and Jay Levy, Robert Kanzinger, Miami, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Mark S. Dunn, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and JORGENSON, JJ. REVISED OPINION BARKDULL, Judge. The appellant was informed [1] against for a violation of Section 817.234(8), of the Florida Statutes (1985)....

...uestion of violation of his first amendment rights and it will not be considered by this court. Therefore, the adjudication and sentence under review be and they are hereby affirmed. Affirmed. NOTES [1] INFORMATION FOR INSURANCE FRAUD (SOLICITATION) 817.234(8) IN THE NAME AND BY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA: 1, Chet Zerlin, Assistant State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, on the authority of JANET RENO, State Attorney, prosecuting for the State of Florida, in the County...

...and State aforesaid, did knowingly solicit business upon a public street or highway for the purpose of making a motor vehicle tort claims or claims for personal injury protection benefits required by Section 627.736 Florida Statutes, in violation of 817.234(8) Florida Statutes. [2] Florida Statute 817.234(8), (1985) False and fraudulent insurance claims (8) It is unlawful for any person, in his individual capacity or in his capacity as a public or private employee, or for any firm, corporation, partnership, or association, to solicit any busin...

...Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Thomas Leonard Sheppard appeals his judgment and sentence for filing a fraudulent insurance claim, a violation of section 817.234, Florida Statutes (1997), and for grand theft, a violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...'s complaint." Id. The Court thus rejects Health & Wellness's contention otherwise. E. Dr. Lorites's arguments directed at Florida's criminal statute regarding insurance fraud are misplaced. State Farm alleges that violations of Florida Statutes section 817.234(1) -a criminal statute dealing with insurance fraud-serve as predicates supporting its FDUTPA claims, including the FDUTPA claim against Dr. Coll. Section 817.234 "explicitly prohibits preparing ......

...pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact material to that claim." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Performance Orthapaedics & Neurosurgery, LLC , 315 F. Supp. 3d 1291 , 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (Moore, J.) (citing Fla. Stat. § 817.234 (1)(a)(2) ). Dr. Lorites does not dispute that a violation of section 817.234 is a per se violation of FDUTPA....

...UTPA.") State Farm, in its complaint, pointedly alleges Dr. Lorites was an integral part of the complained of fraud, including his involvement, as a medical director, in the submission of false and misleading bills and records-in direct violation of section 817.234....

...Rule 4-8.4(b) provides that a lawyer shall not commit a criminal act [1] that "reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." The Bar argues that Varner's submission of the fictitious notice violated section 817.234(1)(a)1-2, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

...claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim... commits a felony of the third degree.... § 817.234(1)(a)1-2, Fla. Stat. (Supp 1998). Although it is arguable whether Varner violated subsection one, in that at the time the fictitious notice was sent the "claim" had already been paid, see § 817.234(1)(a)1 (prohibiting presenting any false statement " as part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy") (emphasis added), we find it unnecessary to resolve this question because we agree with the Bar that a violation of subsection two of the statute is clear. Section 817.234(1)(a)2 provides that any person who, with the intent to deceive an insurer, "[p]repares or makes any written......

...is guilty of violating the statute. Under the facts as found by the referee, it is clear that the fictitious notice was sent with an intent to deceive an insurer "in connection with" a claim for payment, and that such act constitutes a violation of section 817.234(1)(a)2....

...riminal offense). [2] This is the version of the statute in effect on January 27, 1999, when Varner submitted the fictitious notice. A violation of this statute is classified as a third-degree felony. [3] In concluding that Varner's actions violated section 817.234(1)(a)2 for the purposes of this attorney discipline proceeding we expressly make no comment as to Varner's criminal culpability, if any, because in the attorney discipline process proof must only be clear and convincing, whereas in the criminal context such proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt....

...In October of 1996, attorney Steven Falk ("the defendant") was charged by Information with unlawfully "solicit[ing] business relating to the representation of persons injured in a motor vehicle accident for the purpose of filing a motor vehicle tort claim or a claim for personal injury protection benefits... in violation of s.817.234(9)." The language of the Information parallels that found in the statutory subsection....

...stion, thereby making it impossible for any court implementing an "as applied" test in connection with the State's efforts to apply the statutory language in question to the defendant herein. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court found that section 817.234(9), Florida Statutes (1995), violated the defendant's right to free speech....

...to the extent that the said motion was predicated on an alleged violation of the freedom of speech protections afforded to the defendant by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. II. EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE On the issue of whether section 817.234(9) violates the Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S....

...In the instant dispute, the legislature differentiates between those who engage in solicitation relating to a motor vehicle accident from all other personal injury solicitation. Such a distinction is rational under the Equal Protection clause. We note that section 817.234 is titled "False and fraudulent insurance claims." The legislature may have concluded that the likelihood of insurance fraud is greater with motor vehicles accidents. *149 This might be particularly true where the State requires all motor vehicle owners to carry personal injury protection insurance and many motor vehicle owners also carry liability and uninsured motorist coverage. To summarize, we hold that section 817.234(9) is constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under Article I, Section 2 of the Florida Constitution, since a rational basis exists for the disparate treatment of those who solicit motor vehicle claims. Accordingly, the Order of Dismissal relating to the Equal Protection challenge is reversed. We further hold that the trial court was in error in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss predicated upon a finding that section 817.234(9) is unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds, since the record, including the Information filed by the State, is insufficient to support such a finding....

...are alleged to have violated the statute in question. Thereafter, the defendant should be allowed to either renew or amend his motion to dismiss relating to the free speech argument. Reversed and remanded with directions. NOTES [1] In relevant part, section 817.234(9), Florida Statutes (1995) provides: "It is unlawful for any attorney to solicit any business relating to the representation of persons injured in a motor vehicle accident for the purpose of filing a motor vehicle tort claim or a claim for personal injury protection benefits.......

...Paul cites Fla. Stat. 772.185 entitled "Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices." This Statute ostensibly authorizes an award of attorney's fees and costs for a multiple criminal practices and, among others, submitting a false insurance claim, Fla.Stat. 817.234....

...or misleading statement relating to the claim or charges.” § 627.736(5)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2014). Moreover, medical care providers are prohibited from rendering any bill for services that is false or fraudulent, and those that do may suffer severe criminal and civil penalties. See § 817.234(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). Section 817.234 also prohibits a medical care provider from rendering a bill it does not intend to collect from the insured in order to meet the deductible amount and trigger coverage under the policy. § 817.234(7)(a), Fla....

...Therefore, Bell was properly convicted of both second degree arson and burning to defraud an insurance company. REVERSED and REMANDED. W. SHARP and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 806.01(2), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] § 817.233, Fla. Stat. (1991). [3] § 817.234, Fla....

...Should we find nothing which would indicate that such a limiting construction was intended by the legislature, however, we are precluded from rewriting the statute to preserve its constitutionality. State v. Cronin, 774 So.2d 871, 874-75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). In Cronin, we held that an anti-solicitation statute, section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes (1997), which prohibited a person from soliciting business for the purpose of making motor vehicle tort claims or claims for PIP benefits, was violative of the First Amendment....

...Lamos, Fort Pierce, and Juan F. Torres III, Fort Pierce, for appellee. FORST, J. The State appeals the trial court’s order granting Appellee Michael Delprete’s amended motion to dismiss. The State argues that the trial court erred in: (1) misinterpreting section 817.234, Florida Statutes (2016), by reading a justifiable reliance element into the statute, and (2) finding the State’s traverse insufficient to establish a prima facie case of insurance fraud....

...claim as a theft, the insurer elected to pay out under Appellee’s collision coverage. 2 The claims manager had further testified that Insurer would have handled the claim as a collision loss even if Appellee’s uncle had been the driver. Appellee thus argued that, because under section 817.234, Florida Statutes (2016), any alleged misrepresentation “must be material and it 1 Background information is taken from the trial court order’s “Established and Undisputed Facts” section....

...other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy or a health maintenance organization subscriber or provider contract, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim[.] § 817.234(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphases added). Noticeably absent from the statute is any “reliance” element—whether justifiable or otherwise. Indeed, the statute’s plain language supports the State’s position that reliance is not an element of a section 817.234 violation. Florida case law further supports this contention....

...een stolen. Id. at 1014. The defendant later called his insurer and requested 4 to withdraw the claim. Id. Despite his insurer never paying any money on the claim, the State charged the defendant with violating section 817.234(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...ted making of a false and fraudulent insurance claim is a nonexistent crime in Florida, since attempt is encompassed in the substantive offense itself.” Id. at 1015. As further noted by the court, “the substantive crime [of insurance fraud under section 817.234(1)(a)] clearly encompasses acts which are prepa[ra]tory or preliminary to presenting a false claim to an insurance company.” Id. at 1014. Thus, the court remanded for the defendant to be “retried for the offense set forth in section 817.234.” Id....

...e statute has since been amended multiple times, the only material changes to the statute have been clarifications or updates addressing the degree of punishment, with the statute’s elements remaining nearly identical. Compare id. at 1014 (quoting § 817.234(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1981)), with § 817.234(1)(a), Fla....

.... 443 So. 2d at 1015. Consequently, we hold the trial court erred in dismissing Appellee’s insurance fraud charge based upon a non-existent reliance element. B. The Traverse’s Sufficiency Having determined reliance is not an element of a section 817.234(1)(a) violation, we next examine whether the State’s traverse was legally sufficient. 5  Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(d), “[a] motion to dismiss under subdivision (c)(4) ....

...Although the trial court took issue with several portions of the State’s traverse, the trial court did so in the context of a non-existent statutory element of justifiable reliance, notwithstanding its acknowledgment that the State’s traverse at least in part asserted relevant disputed facts. Because section 817.234(1)(a) does not contain a reliance element (justifiable or otherwise), we necessarily hold that the trial court erred in finding the traverse insufficient based on its erroneous interpretation of this statute. Reversing the dismiss...

...of mind is not an issue to be decided on a motion to dismiss under Rule 3.190(c)(4),” State v. Book, 523 So. 2d 636, 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); (2) the parties do not dispute that Appellee presented an oral statement in connection with his insurance policy under section 817.234(1)(a); and (3) the parties’ disagreement as to any alleged misstatement’s materiality constituted a dispute concerning material facts....

...determine if Appellee’s alleged misstatements were “information concerning any fact or thing material to [Appellee’s insurance] claim.” Conclusion The trial court erred in reading a non-existent justifiable reliance element into section 817.234, and therefore erroneously found the State’s traverse legally insufficient....

...OWINGLY AND WITH INTENT TO INJURE, DEFRAUD OR DECEIVE ANY EMPLOYER, OR EMPLOYEE, INSURANCE COMPANY OR SELF-INSURED PROGRAM, FILES A STATEMENT OF CLAIM CONTAINING ANY FALSE OR MISLEADING INFORMATION, COMMITS INSURANCE FRAUD, PUNISHABLE AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 817.234, FLORIDA STATUTES....

of unlawful insurance solicitation under section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes (1997), despite the fact

...Likewise, QBE's ninth affirmative defense is that the policy's conditions provide "remedies in the event of concealment, misrepresentation, or fraud." After describing its own defense, QBE then quotes the "concealment, misrepresentation or fraud" section and then refers to section 817.234, Florida Statutes, which it summarizes as a statute concerning insurance fraud....

...OWINGLY AND WITH INTENT TO INJURE, DEFRAUD OR DECEIVE ANY EMPLOYER, OR EMPLOYEE, INSURANCE COMPANY OR SELF-INSURED PROGRAM, FILES A STATEMENT OF CLAIM CONTAINING ANY FALSE OR MISLEADING INFORMATION, COMMITS INSURANCE FRAUD, PUNISHABLE AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 817.234, FLORIDA STATUTES....

...The trial court also requested that the parties address what evidence Coral Reef relied upon to' demonstrate a prima facie case, the admissibility of that evidence, and the crime-fraud which would support application of the exception, with particular attention paid to sections 817.234(7) and 817.234(l)(a)3.a., Florida Statutes, relating to false and fraudulent insurance claims....

...See Florida Mining, 556 So.2d at 519 ; First Union Nat’l Bank v. Whitener, 715 So.2d 979, 982 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)(stating that “[t]he party seeking to invoke the fraud exception must present prima facie evidence that the client sought the advice of counsel to procure a fraud.”). Under section 817.234(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), a person commits insurance fraud when that person, “with the intent to injure, defraud, or deceive any insurer,” does the following: 1....

...See American Tobacco, 697 So.2d at 1256 . *343 The Prima Facie Case Coral Reef in this case must have alleged that the communications between Lloyd’s and the Butler Firm were made as part of Lloyd’s effort to perpetrate what they knew to be a crime or fraud as defined in sections 817.234(l)(a) or 817.234(7), Florida Statutes (2003)....

2d 871 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), which declared section 817.234(8) of the Florida Statutes invalid. The court

...or misleading statement relating to the claim or charges.” § 627.736(5)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2014). Moreover, medical care providers are prohibited from rendering any bill for services that is false or fraudulent, and those that do may suffer severe criminal and civil penalties. See § 817.234(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). Section 817.234 also prohibits a medical care provider from rendering a bill it does not intend to collect from the insured in order to meet the deductible amount and trigger coverage under the policy. § 817.234(7)(a), Fla....

...ry with a deadly weapon). Therefore, Sinclair is not being subjected to double punishment for the same criminal act. We affirm his conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. W. SHARP and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur. . § 812.014(1), (2)(c) 1, Fla.Stat. (1991). . § 817.234(l)(a)l, Fla.Stat....

...Hansbrough pled no contest to a lesser offense of conspiracy to commit insurance solicitation, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his dispositive motion to dismiss the information charging him with unlawful solicitation for the purpose of filing a PIP claim in violation of section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes. We affirm. Hansbrough, a chiropractor, was one of twelve chiropractors charged by the state-wide prosecutor with violating section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes....

...ot in question. Furthermore, there is no *1283 claim that Hansbrough personally solicited the patients or knew in advance that the persons who were solicited for examinations would be filing PIP claims. Hansbrough challenges the constitutionality of section 817.234(8) as impermissibly restricting rights of commercial speech....

...Subsequently, this court, in Bradford v. State, 740 So.2d 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), rev. granted, No. SC96910, ___ So.2d ___ (Fla. Feb.25, 2000), followed Barr, but, in order to satisfy the third-prong of the Central Hudson four-prong test, interpreted section 817.234(8) as applying only where the defendant intends to defraud an insurance carrier. However, in Barr, we had previously ruled that section 817.234(8) satisfied the state's interest in preventing fraud. Accordingly, language in Bradford, interpreting section 817.234(8) as requiring an intent to defraud in order to satisfy the third prong of the Central Hudson test, was dicta and not controlling....

...Bradford does not require reversal in this case. We note, however, that the supreme court has accepted the state's petition for review in Bradford and, accordingly, in this case, we certify the following questions of great public importance: WHETHER SECTION 817.234(8), FLORIDA STATUTES, INCLUDES A REQUIREMENT OF SPECIFIC INTENT TO DEFRAUD THE INSURER....

...NCE FRAUD AND IS NOT MORE EXTENSIVE THAN IS NECESSARY TO SERVE THAT INTEREST. DELL and POLEN, JJ., concur. STONE, J., concurs specially with opinion. STONE, J., concurring specially. I agree with the majority that dicta in Bradford, which interprets section 817.234(8), as requiring an intent to defraud is not controlling, but I disagree with Bradford's statutory interpretation and would, therefore, recede from that language....

...State, 721 So.2d 1170 (Fla.1998). The statute in question, distilled to its most essential terms, provides that it is unlawful for any "person ... to solicit any business ... for the purpose of making ... claims for personal injury protection benefits...." § 817.234(8), Fla....

...nstrument pursuant to section 831.02, Florida Statutes (Count 2); one count of first degree grand theft pursuant to section 812.014(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Count 3); one count of false or fraudulent insurance claims/$100,000 or more pursuant to section 817.234(1), Florida Statutes (Count 4); and one count of organized fraud/scheme to defraud/$50,000 or more pursuant to section 817.034(4)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (Count 5). In May 2015, Mr....

unlawful insurance solicitation in violation of section 817.234(8), Florida Statutes (1997). He argued the

LEWIS, J. We have for review Hansbrough v. State, 757 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), wherein the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified the following questions as being of great public importance: WHETHER SECTION 817.234(8), FLORIDA STATUTES, INCLUDES A REQUIREMENT OF SPECIFIC INTENT TO DEFRAUD THE INSURER....

...4)(a)(3), eleven counts of Official Misconduct in violation of Florida Statute § 838.022, one count of Grand Theft in violation of Florida Statute § 812.014, and one count of False and Fraudulent Insurance Claims in violation of Florida Statute § 817.234....

...real property and appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft. . Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.190(c)(4). . The second count, which was not dismissed and remains pending, charges insurance fraud under Section 817.234, Florida Statutes.

filing a fraudulent insurance claim, under section 817.234(l)(a), Florida Statutes, violate principles

...Cox appeals from convictions for making a false report of a crime to a police officer 1 and attempting to make a false insurance claim to an insurer. 2 He raises many points. The only one we find has merit is that there is no such crime in Florida as an attempt to make a false insurance claim. Cox was charged with violating section 817.234, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides in part: (l)(a) Any person who, with the intent to injure, defraud, or deceive any insurance company, including, but not limited to, any motor vehicle, life, disability, credit life, credit, ca...

...tains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim, is guilty of a felony of the third degree. ... In this case the evidence was sufficient to sustain a jury’s determination that Cox violated section 817.234 by making telephone calls to two agents for Nationwide Insurance Company and reporting the theft of a trailer he knew had not been stolen....

...tablished.” Id. at 327 . In this case, the substantive crime clearly encompasses acts which logically are prepatory or preliminary to presenting a false claim to an insurance company. Even more clearly than section 817.49, Florida Statutes (1981), section 817.234 encompasses attempts....

...Accordingly, we reverse Cox’s judgment based on Count II. Attempted making of a false and fraudulent insurance claim is a nonexistent crime in Florida, since attempt is encompassed in the substantive offense itself. On remand Cox can be retried for the offense set forth in section 817.234....

...Double jeopardy will not bar a new trial. Sykes; Achin; Jordan v. State, 416 So.2d 1161 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). 3 We affirm Cox’s conviction under Count I. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. ORFINGER, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur. . § 817.49, Fla.Stat. (1981). . § 817.234, Fla.Stat....

...appendix to Figone's motion/petition. It is not entirely clear from the record who would have presided over the proceedings that, with this opinion, we are constrained to prohibit. Other, more recent orders have been entered by Judge Lynn Tepper. . § 817.234, Fla....

...ling or its contents” which were the property of Charlie Berry, contrary to Section 806.01, Florida Statutes. 1 The state also charged appellant with presenting a false and fraudulent insurance claim to Nationwide Insurance Company in violation of section 817.234, Florida Statutes, and with obtaining or endeavoring to obtain $20,000 or more from Nationwide in violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes....

...However, no other docu-mente in the record of that case, Case No. 13-cv-24393-UU, have been entered -into evidence by Defendants. . Defendants also argue that State Farm alleges in its Complaint that Defendants committed insurance fraud as defined by Florida Statute § 817.234, and that this claim should be dismissed because State Farm lacks any standing to sue for a violation of this statute. The Court finds that State Farm has not alleged a direct cause, of action or violation of § 817.234....