Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...the marshland borders of the development in a manner that would not violate applicable state water quality standards for the receiving bodies of water. [3] Estuary appealed this order to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission pursuant to section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1973)....

...See General Development Corporation v. Florida Land and Water Regulatory Commission, 368 So.2d 1323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), in which this court found no error in the hearing officer's requirement that the developer present its case first (in an appeal under Section 380.07, Florida Statutes) since "that would facilitate an orderly presentation of evidence." This procedure is not inconsistent, in our opinion, with the notion that the petitioning property owners, who requested the hearing, also bear a "bur...

...Section 380.05(9). Local orders authorizing or denying development under the regulations may be appealed by affected persons, including state and regional planning agencies, to the Governor and Cabinet acting as the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. Section 380.07....

...lry and selling it back now for the same price." [6] Estuary Properties, 381 So.2d at 1140-41: This cause is remanded to the Adjudicatory Commission for entry, within thirty (30) days from the filing of this opinion, of an order in accordance with F.S. 380.07(5) granting to Petitioner permission to develop, which shall include the use of the black mangrove acreage, and which said order shall be conditioned so as to terminate within said thirty (30) days from its date in the event Lee County shall......

...Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission which dismissed its administrative appeal on the ground that the association, comprised of persons owning property adjoining a development of regional impact (DRI), [1] had no standing, under the provisions of Section 380.07, Florida Statutes, to appeal the order entered by the local governmental entity having jurisdiction over the property affected by the proposed DRI....

...aring regarding *1263 the developers' DRI proposal, approved the DRI, and issued a section 380.06(2) development order. Appellant then filed an administrative appeal with the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission [5] under the provisions of section 380.07(2), stating in relevant part: (2) Whenever any local government issues any development order in any area of critical state concern, or in regard to any development of regional impact, copies of such orders as prescribed by rule by the...

...However, before the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission could consider the merits of the appeal, the developers intervened [6] and moved for dismissal of the appeal, because appellant Caloosa Property Owners Association, Inc., was not a proper party for appellate purposes under section 380.07(2). The case was assigned to a hearing officer, who agreed that appellant was not a proper party to appeal a DRI development order under the provisions of section 380.07(2)....

...The hearing officer recommended dismissal of the appeal with prejudice, and the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission adopted the hearing officer's recommended order. Appellant now asserts that the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission has erred; that it has a right of appeal under section 380.07(2) or, alternatively, under the Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes; or that if it is not a proper party under either section 380.07(2) or Chapter 120, that section 380.07(2) is violative of both its Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as its Florida constitutional rights to equal protection and access to courts....

...Regarding appellant's standing to appeal the development order to the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, we find no less than two reasons for affirming the Commission's determination that appellant is not a proper party to appeal a development order under section 380.07(2)....

...propriate regional planning council — in this case the TCRPC, [8] the developer, [9] or the owner. Each of these terms is defined by statute or administrative rule with the exception of the term "owner." We think it obvious that the term "owner" in section 380.07(2) refers to the owner of the property on which the DRI is to be located....

...Gale Distributors, Inc., 349 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1977); 30 Fla.Jur. Statutes § 16 (Rev. 1974). The first sentence states that copies of the development order are to be sent, inter alia, to " the owner or developer of the property affected by such order." § 380.07(2), Fla....

...f those words, if they are unambiguous. Sachs v. Hoglund, 397 So.2d 447, 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Use of the word "the" to refer to "the" owner or "the" property is sufficiently unambiguous to specify the narrow class of property owner entitled under section 380.07(2) to appeal a development order....

...h existing processes for the guidance of growth and development; and that all the existing rights of private property be preserved in accord with the constitutions of this state and of the United States." Id. at 1374. We consider that merely because section 380.07(2) does not permit adjoining landowners or other affected parties to appeal a development order to the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, the lack of such a remedy does not abrogate the right of such parties to seek redress in court, caused by a taking of their property....

...Thus, the members of the association need only show that their substantial interests are either affected or determined by the proposed action. Again, admittedly, proceedings before the Commission are to be conducted pursuant to procedures set out in Chapter 120, § 380.07(3), Fla....

...However, merely because the APA authorizes that Commission proceedings be conducted pursuant to its tenets does not necessarily control who may appeal to the Commission. To permit any substantially affected party to appeal would contravene the requirements of section 380.07(2). Appellant argues that Chapter 120 supersedes or impliedly repeals § 380.07(2), because the former was enacted later in time than the latter statute....

...[14] However, appellant asks us to overlook the general rule that a repeal by implication is not favored by the courts. DeBolt v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 427 So.2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Enactment of Chapter 120 could not be viewed by us as impliedly repealing section 380.07(2), unless this result was clearly intended by the legislature. Simply because a later statute relates to matters covered in whole or in part by a prior statute does not cause a repeal of the former statute. State v. Dunmann, 427 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1983). We find no legislative intent to repeal impliedly section 380.07(2). In fact, we find that the legislature has declared that section 380.07(2) has a continuing vitality by virtue of Chapter 77-215, section 3, Laws of Florida, wherein section 380.07(2) was amended. The appellant cites Section 120.72(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as authority to bolster its argument that section 380.07(2) has been impliedly repealed....

...to chapters 573 and 601. *1266 (e.s.) Here again, Chapter 77-215, enacted after January 1, 1975, is express authority providing the limited manner in which Chapter 120 does not control Land and Water Adjudicatory proceedings. Therefore, we find that section 380.07(2) has been neither expressly nor impliedly repealed....

...nd that no order exempting the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission has ever been issued. We are unable to say whether an order has ever been issued that would exempt the Commission from the APA, but it would seem superfluous, because by virtue of section 380.07, the legislature has in part exempted the Commission from the requirements of Chapter 120 by specifying who may seek review of and under what conditions he may seek review of a development order by the Commission. Turning now to appellant's constitutional claims, it is first contended that because the appellant has no standing under either section 380.07(2) or the APA, its federal and Florida constitutional rights to equal protection have been violated. Appellant maintains that section 380.07(2) creates two separate classes: (1) landowners applying for DRI approval, and (2) landowners substantially affected by DRI approval....

...r the classification. Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Hospital Corp., 403 So.2d 365, 367 (Fla. 1981). Appellees suggest that while Chapter 380 is intended to facilitate uniform regulation and orderly growth, see section 380.021, limited standing under section 380.07(2) avoids administrative and judicial delay in resolving landowners' development rights, and also represents a factor in the legislative balance between public and private rights....

...results in some inequality." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161-62, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). Thus, there is a reasonable basis for the classifications at bar. Appellant also asserts that the limited standing provisions of section 380.07(2) deny appellant's Florida constitutional right of access to courts....

...by a DRI shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence to the governing board of the regional planning agency. [5] The Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission consists of the Administration Commission or Cabinet. §§ 14.202; 380.07(1), Fla....

...Co., 380 So.2d 489, 491 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), aff'd., 398 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 1981); 30 Fla.Jur. Statutes § 93) (Rev. 1974). [11] § 380.085(2), Fla. Stat. (1981). [12] § 403.412(5), Fla. Stat. (1981). [13] See generally Renard v. Dade County, 261 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1972). [14] Section 380.07(2) was originally enacted in 1972, while Chapter 120 was enacted in 1974....

...We have already noted a few of the alternative methods of review open to appellant. See notes 11-13. Appellant is merely deprived of a right of review of the development order by the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. [16] Appellant also contends that its due process rights have been usurped, and that section 380.07(2) violates Article II, section 3 and Article V, section 1, Florida Constitution....

...not of regional impact. Also, denial of standing to a county was involved in Sarasota County v. General Development Corp., 325 So.2d 45 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976), when the County sought to appeal to the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, pursuant to Section 380.07, Florida Statutes, a development order issued by a city within the county's boundaries....

...AS-156 We find that the proper resolution of this case involves two basic issues: (1) whether Friends and UKCA have standing to appeal a development order to FLWAC after the developer, the property owner, the Department or the SFRPC have declined to do so, and, if not, (2) whether Section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes (1972), [3] limiting standing only to those four groups, should be held unconstitutional? The answer to those issues first requires a review of the legislative purposes behind Chapter 380, Florida's Environmental L...

...Therefore, once local officials have made their determination either to grant or deny an application for a DRI development order, the legislature has expressly limited the right to appeal such a decision to "the owner, the developer, an appropriate regional planning agency ... or the state land planning agency." Section 380.07(2) (e.s.)....

...particular, so that the burden imposed upon the property owner is not increased by needless delay, has led this and other Florida courts to conclude that standing to appeal a development order to FLWAC is limited to those parties expressly stated in section 380.07(2)....

...thin its [sic] boundaries." Beker Phosphate, 322 So.2d at 658. We therefore conclude that there is nothing in Chapter 380 which otherwise overrides the clear legislative intent limiting standing to the four designated groups or individuals listed in section 380.07(2) to appeal DRI orders to FLWAC....

...-378 and Florida Bar, Continuing Legal Education, Environmental Regulation and Litigation in Florida, 20.39 (1981) [ Environmental Regulation ], we do not agree that section 403.412(5) creates a statutory exception to the limited standing granted by section 380.07(2)....

...pense, he is promised expeditious action. Beker Phosphate, 322 So.2d at 658. The right to an expedited review, we believe, is insured by limiting standing to appeal the DRI decision of the local government to the individuals and groups enumerated in section 380.07(2)....

...We conclude, therefore, that intervention at the local DRI review level, whether pursuant to section 403.412(5), or by the grace of the local government authorities, does not create an exception to the express legislative limitation of standing found in section 380.07(2). If such an exception is to be created, then it is for the legislature to so provide — not this court. In the alternative, Friends and UKCA argue that if they are denied standing to appeal a development order to FLWAC, section 380.07(2) operates to deny their constitutional rights of equal protection, access to the courts and due process, thus rendering that section unconstitutional. We have considered and rejected similar equal protection and access to courts challenges to section 380.07(2) in Caloosa and decline to reconsider these issues now....

...As to the issue of due process of law, appellants assert they were entitled to adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard *911 before the Monroe County Zoning Board and County Commission prior to approval by those bodies of a DRI development order. They contend they were denied that right, and that section 380.07(2), which acts to exacerbate such denial by precluding them from appeal, is therefore unconstitutional....

...ffected and, on the other hand, to agencies designated to represent the public's interest in such proceedings violates due process concepts. To summarize our disposition of the issues raised under Case No. AS-156, we do not find that an exception to section 380.07(2) is created by either Friends' or UKCA's standing to challenge local zoning decisions before the circuit court, or their *912 intervention in the local DRI proceedings in this case....

...See Section 380.032(1), Florida Statutes (1981), which provides the Department with the "power and duty" to "[e]xercise general supervision of the administration and enforcement " of Chapter 380 (e.s.). Specifically, Friends sought first to compel the Department to institute an appeal pursuant to section 380.07(2), and second to commence enforcement proceedings pursuant to Section 380.11, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...An appeal of that order was then taken to the Third District Court of Appeal, which court eventually dismissed the appeal as moot. See Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. South Florida Regional Planning Council, 447 So.2d 902 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). [3] Section 380.07(2) provides: Whenever any local government issues any development order in any area of critical state concern, or in regard to any development of regional impact, copies of such orders as prescribed by rule by the state land planning a...

...e latter corporation's failure to follow statutorily mandated procedures. We also hold that this cause was properly dismissed because no appeal from the adverse development order was brought before the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. Section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1975), outlines the procedure for such appeals....

...In addition, a hearing officer is provided for with the power to subpoena witnesses and evidence. The Adjudicatory Commission must issue a decision within 120 days, which decision is subject to judicial review under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Appellant contends that appeals to the Commission are not mandatory, since Section 380.07(2) merely says "may" appeal, rather than "shall" appeal, and is therefore permissive in nature....

...1973), the Supreme *1054 Court of Florida held that a summary judgment had been properly granted for failure to exhaust administrative remedies where a method of appeal to an administrative department was available. The statute involved in that case used the same kind of permissive language found in Section 380.07....

...ich was to allow the fullest possible input by regional and state authorities into areas of development which will have extra-local impact. See Section 380.021, Florida Statutes (1975). Appellant further asserts that even if the review procedures of Section 380.07 are mandatory, it had no standing to pursue such a remedy, since it was not a party to either the rezoning application which was heard by the County Commission or the application for a development of regional impact which was considered by the Regional Planning Council....

...1st DCA 1975), and Sarasota County v. General Development Corp., 325 So.2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). In both cases, Sarasota County sought to directly appeal development orders to the Adjudicatory Commission without having the kind of interest prescribed by Section 380.07(2) as a condition precedent to appeal....

...litan Dade County to the extent that the two conflict. Article VIII, Section 1(g), and Article XI, Section 5, Florida Constitution. See Board of County Commissioners of Dade County v. Boswell, 167 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1964). Therefore, to the extent that Section 380.07, Florida Statutes, provides what we have determined to the uniform statewide procedure for reviewing development orders, it prevails over the zoning review procedures contained within the Dade County Code....

...this chapter," § 380.031(3), Fla. Stat. (1975). Development is specifically defined in § 380.04(2)(b) as including "[a] change in the intensity of use of land, such as an increase in the number of dwelling units in a structure or on land... ." [5] § 380.07, Fla....

...380, and this court, speaking through Judge Boardman, held that the City of North Port, wherein the affected lands were situate, was the only local government with standing to seek to enjoin alleged violations of Ch. 380, and that under the statutory scheme set out in Fla. Stat. § 380.07(2), the county which had neither title to nor zoning authority over the lands lacked standing to enter the controversy. Fla. Stat. § 380.07(2), affords ample protection of the interest of the general public by authorizing the local government and the appropriate regional planning agency and the State Land Planning Agency to appeal matters concerning DRI's directly to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission....

...development is consistent with the local land development regulations; and "(c) The development is consistent with the report and recommendations of the regional planning agency * * *." Local government then issues an order based on its findings. F.S. 380.07(2), provides for review of local government development orders by the Adjudicatory Commission. In conducting such a review, the Adjudicatory Commission, or hearing officer, is not bound by the record before the local government when, as in this case, a de novo review is conducted. (F.S. 380.07(3), (4)) As a result, the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer in this proceeding, which were adopted in their entirety as the final order of the Adjudicatory Commission, supersede the development order entered by Lee County, and...

...Askew v. Cross Key Waterways and Askew v. Postal Colony Co., Inc., 372 So.2d 913, (Fla. 1978). This cause is remanded to the Adjudicatory Commission for entry, within thirty (30) days from the filing of this opinion, of an order in accordance with F.S. 380.07(5) granting to Petitioner permission to develop, which shall include the use of the black mangrove acreage, and which said order *1141 shall be conditioned so as to terminate within thirty (30) days from its date in the event Lee County shall, within said thirty (30) day period, commence condemnation proceedings in the appropriate circuit court for acquisition of the mangrove acreage below the salina. MILLS, C.J., and BOOTH and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See F.S. 380.07, particularly F.S. 380.07(5). [2] Sometimes abbreviated SWFRPC. [3] Environmental Land Management Study Committee, Environmental Land Management: A Final Report and Recommendations, December, 1973. [4] See also F.S. 380.07(5)....

...Pelham of Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, Tallahassee, for amici curiae, Upper Keys Citizens Ass'n, Inc. and Friends of the Everglades, Inc. *878 SHIVERS, Judge. Transgulf Pipeline Co. (Transgulf), and the Department of Community Affairs and Attorney General (State) appeal the order of the circuit court which finds section 380.07(3), Florida Statutes (1981), facially unconstitutional based on principles of unlawful delegation of legislative power and vagueness....

...Willis, 415 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The facts of this case are aptly reported in Smith v. Willis and will not be repeated here. The sole question before the circuit court following the denial of a writ in Smith v. Willis was the facial constitutionality of section 380.07(3), Florida Statutes....

...onduct an appeal on the record made below (the record of the local government proceeding) or to conduct a de novo hearing under section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1981). The circuit court interpreted the word "appeals," used in the second sentence of section 380.07(3), to mean an appeal in the classic judicial sense, i.e., "an examination of the record of a lower tribunal to ascertain if its conclusions of law coincide with applicable principles of law." The court reasoned that the legislature ha...

...ient guidelines to direct the discretion of a hearing officer in making a determination as to whether to conduct a Chapter 120 "de novo" evidentiary hearing or to conduct an "appeal" on the record. The circuit court also found that the provisions of section 380.07(3) are so uncertain that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at their meaning. As noted by counsel for amici curiae, section 380.07(3), Florida Statutes, "is hardly a model of clarity." That fact, however, does not make the statute unconstitutional....

...This is true even where a statute is reasonably susceptible of another interpretation which would render it unconstitutional. Florida State Board of Architecture v. Wasserman, 377 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1979). In the instant case, it is not necessary to interpret the word "appeals," as used in section 380.07(3), in its most narrow, technical sense. To do so would render that section illogical since the first sentence of section 380.07(3) mandates a hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, and Chapter 120 makes no provision for an "appeal" in the technical sense....

...This broader interpretation is implicitly the one taken by this court in the case of General Development Corp. v. Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, 368 So.2d 1323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). In General Development Corp., this court interpreted section 380.07(3): Although the above quoted subsection states that the Commission "shall encourage the submission of appeals on the record", it requires the Commission to hold a hearing pursuant to Chapter 120....

...In other words, the decision to be made by the Commission or its hearing officer is not whether to conduct a de novo evidentiary hearing as opposed to a classic appellate review, but whether certain evidence is to be admitted at the Chapter 120 hearing. Viewed in this way, section 380.07(3) does not grant the Commission or its hearing officer any greater procedural discretion than that possessed by any other agency conducting a Chapter 120 hearing. Under this construction, section 380.07(3) contains sufficient procedural guidelines and is not vague....

...l evidence to support findings of fact made by the Commission or its hearing officer notwithstanding other evidence which might be adduced by the applicant at the section 120.57 hearing. Appellant Transgulf contends that the circuit court also found section 380.07(3) unconstitutional due to lack of substantive standards to guide the Commission or its hearing officer in making determinations pursuant to section 380.07....

...The circuit court order in the instant case makes no mention of section 380.06 or any of the substantive standards contained therein. Furthermore, *880 the decision of this court in Smith v. Willis , leaves no doubt that the only issue before the circuit court was the constitutionality vel non of section 380.07(3), Florida Statutes....

...y of sections 380.06(8) and 380.06(11), Florida Statutes. Appellees denominate as a cross-appeal their argument that the holding of the circuit court can be upheld on an alternative ground rejected by that court. We agree with the circuit court that section 380.07(3) does not violate separation of powers principles by delegating judicial powers to the executive branch in violation of article V, section 1 and article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution....

...Article V, section 1 expressly provides that Commissions and administrative officers may be granted "quasi-judicial" power in matters connected with the functions of their offices. Appellees argue, however, that the power of "appeal" granted to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission under section 380.07(3) is a pure judicial function rather than a quasi-judicial function....

...See generally State, Department of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Under Chapter 120, the final, quasi-judicial decision is made by the agency and is subject to judicial review. Accordingly, the order of the circuit court holding section 380.07(3), Florida Statutes (1981), unconstitutional is REVERSED....

...onal impact by respondent Beker Phosphate Corporation. [2] Sarasota County urges three points in seeking to have the order of Manatee County reviewed by the Adjudicatory Commission, viz: "I. The Adjudicatory Commission's order erroneously interprets Section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes, as preventing an appeal by Sarasota County of the development order issued by Manatee County....

...'s order erroneously prevents application of the provisions of Chapter 74-310, [12] Laws of Florida. This contention is without merit for two reasons. First, as we hereinabove stated, the legislative scheme by the precise language of Florida Statute 380.07(2) excludes Sarasota County as a proper party....

...se or undue burden on water, sewers, solid waste disposal, other public facilities, public transportation, ability of people to find adequate housing, and any other areas which the regional planning agency shall deem appropriate. [9] Florida Statute 380.07(2). [10] Florida Statute 380.07(2). [11] Florida Statutes 380.06(8), 380.08, and 380.07(2)....

...sioners. The complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter for the reason: ... that the Plaintiff, SARASOTA COUNTY, is not a proper party to file an appeal to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, pursuant to Section 380.07 of the Florida Statutes *47 and finds that in any event said plaintiff has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies under Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, since the appeal is still pending... . With respect to the appeal from an order of a local government concerning a development of regional impact, Fla. Stat. § 380.07(2) provides: ......

...Section 163.3215 only permits the Association to challenge a development order on the basis that it is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. In addition, the revival issue has previously been litigated before FLWAC in a separate proceeding. In January 1993, pursuant to section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1991), the Association appealed to FLWAC the Board of County Commissioners' January 1993 decision to revive the 1982 DRI via Resolution 93-2....

...review. See F.M.W. Props., Inc. v. Peoples First Fin. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 606 So.2d 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). [2] The County's determination that the amendments were not substantial deviations is reviewable only by FLWAC. See §§ 380.06(19)(f)6 and 380.07, Fla....

...State, Department of Community Affairs, 567 So.2d 2, 3 (Fla.3d DCA 1990), in which the Third District Court of Appeal certified that it "passed upon a question of great public importance by holding that, in an appeal by the state land planning agency pursuant to section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1987), the burden of persuasion, and the burden of going forward, rested on the applicant for the permit." We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, and quash the decision below....

...Pine Key property. In 1988, Monroe County issued the permits to the Youngs. Because the permits constituted development orders, Monroe County transmitted copies of the *832 permits to the Department of Community Affairs (Department), as required by section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes (1987). [1] Pursuant to section 380.07(2), the Department appealed those orders to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (Commission) and requested that the development orders be reversed as "illegal and violative of the provisions of the Monroe County Land Development Regulations and Comprehensive Plan." As provided in section 380.07(3), Florida Statutes (1987), [2] the matter was scheduled for a hearing before a hearing officer pursuant to chapter 120....

...estion of great public importance. This case presents the issue of which party bears the burden of ultimate persuasion and the burden of going forward with the evidence in an "appeal" to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission pursuant to section 380.07. Section 380.07(1) creates the Commission....

...lanning agency may appeal the order to the Commission within 45 days *833 after the order is rendered. However, as provided in subsection (3), prior to issuing an order the Commission "shall hold a hearing pursuant to the provisions of chapter 120." § 380.07(3), Fla....

...By designating the procedure in subsection (2) an appeal while providing that the hearing in subsection (3) will be pursuant to the provisions of chapter 120, the Legislature has created an internal ambiguity as to what type of proceeding is encompassed by section 380.07, and, consequently, which party bears the burdens of persuasion and going forward in the proceeding....

...overcome. Id. However, a chapter 120 proceeding is a hearing de novo intended "to formulate final agency action, not to review action taken earlier and preliminarily." McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So.2d 569, 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Section 380.07 was enacted by the Legislature in 1972 as part of an act relating to land and water management. See ch. 72-317, § 7, at 1177, Laws of Fla. The legislative history of section 380.07 sheds little light on the statute's ambiguous language....

...By referring to these specific parts of chapter 120, it appears that the Legislature intended that the "appeal" to the commission be a proceeding for formulating agency action, which would then be subject to judicial review. Moreover, we note that the Legislature amended section 380.07 in 1978 in an Administrative Procedure Act conformance bill....

...See ch. 78-95, § 15, at 236, Laws of Fla. The act was intended to place the affected provisions of the Florida Statutes into conformity with chapter 120. Ch. 78-95, § 1, at 147, Laws of Fla. The 1978 amendment evidences a clear legislative intent that section 380.07 be consistent with the administrative procedures of chapter 120....

...640, 70 L.Ed.2d 618 (1981), the Lee County Board of County Commissioners denied a developer's request for approval of a development of regional impact. The developer appealed that order to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission pursuant to section 380.07. This Court characterized the hearing requested by the developer as a "hearing de novo." Id. at 1377. Thus, although section 380.07(2) provides for an "appeal" of a development order in any area of critical state concern or for any development of regional impact, this term must be interpreted in its "broadest, non-technical sense ... to mean merely an application to a higher authority." Transgulf Pipeline Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 438 So.2d 876, 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (interpreting word "appeals" in section 380.07(3)), review denied, 449 So.2d 264 (Fla....

...We agree with the reasoning of the First District Court of Appeal in Transgulf Pipeline that to interpret "appeal" as used in this statute in its most narrow technical sense would render the statute illogical, as chapter 120 makes no provision for an "appeal" in the technical sense and section 380.07(3) specifically requires the Commission to hold a hearing pursuant to the provisions of chapter 120 prior to issuing any order....

...sserting the affirmative of an issue before an administrative tribunal. *834 Balino v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 348 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In Estuary Properties, which involved a hearing before the Commission pursuant to section 380.07, this Court explained that the state had the initial burden of going forward with the evidence by showing "that an adverse impact will result if a permit is granted." 399 So.2d at 1379....

...unconstitutional nor unreasonable to require the developer to prove that the proposed curative measures will be adequate." Id. Although Estuary Properties illustrates the shifting of the burden of going forward with the evidence that may occur in a section 380.07 proceeding, that case did not involve the same underlying statutory framework as the instant case....

...380, the local development regulations, and the local comprehensive plan. However, unlike the statutory framework at issue in Estuary Properties, neither section 380.0552 nor section 380.05 addresses which party carries the burden in a section *835 380.07 proceeding....

...Thus, the development order issued by Monroe County did not constitute proposed agency action or any other type of agency action. The effect of the Department's "appeal" to the Commission was to "stay the effectiveness" of an otherwise valid order. § 380.07(2)....

...ill have the opportunity to present evidence to support their position. We answer the certified question by finding that when the state land planning agency initiates a proceeding before the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission pursuant to section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1987), that agency carries both the ultimate burden of persuasion and the burden of going forward....

...levant statutes in pari materia. See Singleton v. State, 554 So.2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 1990) (requiring courts to harmonize conflicting language in statutes to the greatest extent possible). This issue arises because of the possible conflict created by section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes (1987), which suggests a traditional court-type appeal on the one hand, and by section 380.07(3), Florida Statutes (1987), which requires a hearing pursuant to chapter 120, on the other. Section 380.07(3) provides in relevant part: Prior to issuing an order, the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission shall hold a hearing pursuant to the provisions of chapter 120. (Emphasis supplied.) Florida caselaw generally has interpreted section 120.57, which relates to adjudicatory hearings, as requiring de novo proceedings. McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So.2d 569, 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Because section 380.07(3) refers to chapter 120, the majority concludes that the hearing in section 380.07 appeals must be de novo. Majority op. at 833. This approach reads out any meaning of the legislatively delineated differences between this proceeding and every other section 120.57 proceeding, as well as the plain language of section 380.07(2), which provides: Whenever any local government issues any development order in any area of critical state concern, or in regard to any development of regional impact, copies of such orders as prescribed by rule by the state land pla...

...process. (Emphasis supplied.) This is the language of the traditional appellate process, not state agency administrative proceedings. Had the Legislature intended to require the normal chapter 120-type hearing, it would not have used words of art in section 380.07(2) so clearly contemplating an "appeal." Moreover, chapter 120 itself, when it refers to section 380.07 proceedings, also uses the word "appeal." Section 120.57(1)(b)3., Fla. Stat. (1987) ("When the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission receives a notice of appeal pursuant to s. 380.07, the commission shall notify the division within 60 days of receipt of the notice of appeal if the commission elects to request the assignment of a hearing officer.") (Emphasis supplied). Thus, by specifically discussing section 380.07 "appeals," section 120.57 suggests that those hearings are not the same as the ones generally conducted under the section....

...rings. Id.; see also McDonald, 346 So.2d at 584. Under such circumstances, it is clear that the de novo hearing is designed "not to review action taken earlier and preliminarily," but to formulate agency action. Id. In contrast, in proceedings under section 380.07, a local government has issued a development order....

...or existing judicial decisions. Id., § 120.52(1)(c); see also Booker Creek Preservation, Inc. v. Pinellas Planning Council, 433 So.2d 1306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Amerson v. Jacksonville Electric Auth., 362 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). [5] Although section 380.07(3) clearly provides that review of local government development orders in areas of critical state concern shall be pursuant to chapter 120, nothing in section 380.07 or in the relevant area of critical state concern statutes specifically makes a local government an agency for chapter 120 purposes....

...Nor has my research uncovered any judicial decision making local governments issuing development orders in areas of critical state concern "agencies" for chapter 120 purposes. To the contrary, courts construing the role of local governments in the context of section 380.07 often have emphasized the primary role of local governments....

...It simply shifts the review of those decisions from the circuit court to the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission."), review denied, 412 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1982). Thus, because local governments are not "agencies" but consist of independent elected officials, I believe the Legislature in sections 380.07(3) and 120.57(1)(b)(3) outlined a different type of proceeding than is usual under section 120.57....

...Cross Key Waterways, 372 So.2d 913 *838 (Fla. 1978) (discussing the creation of the areas of critical state concern program). Therefore, I agree with the majority that this statutory framework is relevant. Majority op. at 834-835. However, I also believe that the plain language of sections 380.07 and 120.57 has meaning, is relevant, and can be harmonized in accordance with the requirements of Singleton. I would harmonize the various statutes as follows: By using the word "appeal" in both sections 380.07(2) and 120.57(1)(b)(3), the Legislature indicated that the appellant has the ultimate burden of persuasion and that the decision by the local government is entitled to a presumption of validity....

...for purposes, then, of judicial review. Section 120.68, Fla. Stat. (1987). This approach harmonizes and gives meaning to all of the relevant statutory provisions and is not inconsistent with the case cited by the majority using the word "appeal" in section 380.07 in a broad, nontechnical sense....

...I would approve the decision under review. When one seeks a development permit in an area designated as one of critical state concern, I believe the burden of going forward and the burden of persuasion always rests upon the applicant through all hearings. NOTES [1] Section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes (1987), provides: Whenever any local government issues any development order in any area of critical state concern, or in regard to any development of regional impact, copies of such orders as prescribed by rule by...

...local government which issued the order. The filing of the notice of appeal shall stay the effectiveness of the order and shall stay any judicial proceedings in relation to the development order, until after the completion of the appeal process. [2] Section 380.07(3), Florida Statutes (1987), provides in pertinent part: Prior to issuing an order, the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission shall hold a hearing pursuant to the provisions of chapter 120. [3] Section 380.0552, Florida Statutes (1987), designates the Florida Keys Area as an area of critical state concern. Thus, the permits issued to the Youngs by Monroe County were subject to the procedures of section 380.07....

...d, district, and authority" described in chapter 380 (among other chapters) an agency for purposes of chapter 120. That section does not, however, refer to local governments described in chapter 380. [6] I recognize that many of the cases construing section 380.07 involve orders relating to developments of regional impact rather than to areas of critical state concern. Both types of appeals are governed by sections 380.07(2) and 380.07(3), Florida Statutes....

...den of proof in the chapter 120 hearing. [7] The majority cites Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374, 1377 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083, 102 S.Ct. 640, 70 L.Ed.2d 618 (1981), for the proposition that this Court characterized the 380.07(2) hearing requested by the developer in that case as a "hearing de novo." Majority op....

...The record contains evidence that Moorman's fence is in a location that will adversely affect the Key deer. The Department of Community Affairs ("DOCA") appealed the County's decision pursuant to DOCA's authority over areas of critical state concern. § 380.07(2), Fla....

...environmental concern unique to Big Pine Key. [2] We do note that the Cabinet sitting as the Florida Land & Water Adjudicatory Commission may rescind land-use permits in the Florida Keys or "may attach conditions and restrictions to its decisions." § 380.07, Fla....

...onstituted a substantial deviation. The County made no determination with respect to the question of whether the NOPC was consistent with Bay County's comprehensive plan. After the County's denial, appellant initiated a proceeding before FLWAC under section 380.07, Florida Statutes (2001). Section 380.07(2) vests FLWAC with authority to review "any local government development order ......

...The review procedure conducted by FLWAC in this case did not involve a review of a comprehensive plan, or a comprehensive plan amendment, but rather, a proceeding "to ensure compliance with ... the requirements for developments of regional impact" set forth in chapter 380, Florida Statutes. § 380.07(1), Fla....

...The governing statute provides "the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission shall issue a decision granting or denying permission to develop pursuant to the standards of this chapter and may attach conditions and restrictions to its decisions." § 380.07(5), Fla....

...he record to support the final order of the Commission. We agree and remand the cause to the Commission for further proceedings. [1] In view of the lengthy and confused history of this dispute, however, some guidelines to the remand are appropriate. Section 380.07, Florida Statutes, provides for the creation of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission to hear appeals of development orders issued by local governments for developments classified as having a regional impact ("DRI")....

...with the requirements of Chapter 380. We do not intend by this direction on remand to limit or preclude any other proposals or compromises which the parties may wish to present to the hearing officer. We find without merit appellant's assertion that Section 380.07(4), Florida Statutes, is an unconstitutional delegation of power to the Commission allowing a standardless review of local government DRI development orders....

...By petition for a writ of prohibition or common law certiorari the Attorney General and others question the circuit court's denial of a motion to dismiss and its jurisdiction to proceed upon the amended complaint of the Gadsden County Board of County Commissioners for a declaratory judgment declaring among other things that section 380.07(3), part of the Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, is unconstitutional on its face....

...uestion is not inappropriate in circuit court declaratory judgment proceedings, and that the court did not depart from the essential requirements of law in denying the Attorney General's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust chapter 120 remedies. Section 380.07(3) governs proceedings before the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, which is the Governor and Cabinet, on appeals from development orders issued by local governments in areas of critical state concern or regarding developments of regional impact....

...The commission shall encourage the submission of appeals on the record made below in cases in which the development order was issued after a full and complete hearing before the local government or an agency thereof. The Board of County Commissioners mounted this attack on section 380.07(3) after Transgulf Pipeline Company appealed to the Adjudicatory Commission from the County Commissioners' order denying Transgulf a permit to build a petroleum products terminal, a development of regional impact, in Gadsden County....

...The hearing officer evidently determined that there was no "full and complete hearing before the local government." The scheduled DOAH hearing was postponed when the County Commissioners complained to the circuit court for declaratory relief. The original complaint alleged both that section 380.07(3) is unconstitutional on its face, because it purports to "vest judicial power in the executive department agency contrary to Article V, Section 1, Florida Constitution," and that "Sections 380.06 and 380.07 as attempted to be applied in this case by the hearing officer" are unconstitutional as "a denial of equal protection under the law to Plaintiffs." An amended complaint later elaborated the County Commissioners' attack, first, on the facial constitutionality of section 380.07(3) and, second, on the correctness of the DOAH hearing officer's decision to convene a new evidentiary hearing....

...ose not to be represented by an attorney at the hearing before the Board of County Commissioners and choosing not to cross-examine any witness or to have any witnesses of its own testify under oath, and subsequently, by filing Notice of Appeal under Section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1977), having the matter removed from the local forum of the Board of County Commissioners and to obtain a complete full new hearing by the Hearing Officer in Tallahassee. The amended complaint alleged the facial unconstitutionality of section 380.07(3) in the following terms: 11. Plaintiffs contend that Section 380.07(3) is in violation of Article II, Section 3 and Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Florida in that: (1) Chapter 120 contains no provisions which relate to appellate review proceedings by an administrative agency t...

...1st DCA 1977); and State ex rel. Dept. of General Services v. Willis, 344 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The complaint asserting "doubts" that an evidentiary hearing before the hearing officer is proper in this particular case, and asserting the unconstitutionality of section 380.07(3) as applied by the hearing officer, is transparently a collateral attack on an order which if erroneous was and is remediable by ordinary chapter 120 processes, even by immediate district court review if review of the final order would not be adequate relief, section 120.68(1)....

...409 So.2d at 532. *1335 The facial constitutional issue urged upon the circuit court can be decided only by constitutionally authorizing or deauthorizing the de novo review proceedings scheduled before the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission by authority of section 380.07(3)....

...tions. K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 20.11 at 279-80 (1982 Supp.). The circuit court did not exceed its jurisdiction or depart from the essential requirements of law in denying a motion to dismiss this complaint seeking a declaration that section 380.07(3) is unconstitutional on its face....

...ce they were totally inconsistent with and in derogation of any compensation claim. With the above precepts in mind, upon turning to the relief sought in the complaint below, we find that the complainants request a declaratory judgment (1) declaring Section 380.07(3) unconstitutional, as it permits a hearing officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a de novo hearing on appeal from an order of the local government made upon a development of regional impact application, and (2...

...FDOR’s final budgetary determination to receive an automatic stay pending appeal to the Administration Commission, it would have provided such remedy, as it has done in similar situations, or at the very least set a timeline for the Administration Commission’s action. See, e.g., § 380.07(4), Fla....

...Arline of 1000 Friends of Florida, Inc., Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae in support of Appellees. KAHN, Judge. This is an appeal from a final order of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC). Appellee Edgewater Beach Owners Association (EBOA) sought review by FLWAC, pursuant to section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1995), of an order entered by the Walton County Commission amending a development of regional impact (DRI) development order....

...ding. After review of the case and controlling law, this court entered an order requiring supplemental briefing on the question of EBOA's standing to challenge the DRI development order in a proceeding before FLWAC. In our order, we pointed out that section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes (1995), permits only "the owner, the developer, or the state land planning agency" to appeal a DRI development order to FLWAC, and nothing in the record suggested that EBOA would qualify as one of those designated parties....

...This is not the first DRI development order that EBOA has challenged with regard to appellants' proposed development. Several years ago, EBOA challenged a 1993 Walton County DRI development order concerning the same property. EBOA filed a petition with FLWAC pursuant to section 380.07(2), but FLWAC determined that EBOA did not have standing to appeal the development order and dismissed the administrative appeal....

...reviewing the local government's action and vested with the right to appeal an order entered by such local government." Sarasota County v. Beker Phosphate Corp., 322 So.2d 655, 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). We cannot escape the fact that, in clear terms, section 380.07(2) permits only "the owner, the developer, or the state land planning agency" to appeal a DRI development order to FLWAC. See Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. City of Miami, 485 So.2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Londono v. City of Alachua, 438 So.2d 91, 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)(explaining that section 380.07(2) determines a party's *475 standing to appeal local government development order to FLWAC)....

...he ... purposes of the DRI process in general and the goal of expeditious review in particular ... has led this and other Florida courts to conclude that standing to appeal a development order to FLWAC is limited to those parties expressly stated in section 380.07(2)." Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Monroe County, 456 So.2d 904, 908 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). We have not ignored the parties' attempted stipulation. Nevertheless, the case law and the statute are clear as to the limited standing available in a section 380.07 proceeding....

...cy action in development of regional impact (DRI) proceedings. Fairfield's primary contention, and the issue which we will address in this opinion, is that these rules are nothing more than an attempt to circumvent the limited standing provisions of section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes *1014 (1985), [4] and that giving the intervenors in this proceeding the substantive right to raise new and additional issues is the functional equivalent of giving intervenors the right to appeal a development order under section 380.07(2)....

...Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Professional Engineers v. Florida Society of Professional Land Surveyors, 475 So.2d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). It has been repeatedly recognized by the courts of this state that FLWAC has a policy-making role in resolving a DRI appeal under section 380.07, and is responsible for protecting and balancing state or regional interests in DRI review proceedings. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1981); and Fox v. Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council, 442 So.2d 221, 227 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). As stated by the hearing officer, the term "appeal" as used in section 380.07(3) should be used in its broadest, non-technical sense. Transgulf Pipeline v. Board of County Commissioners, 438 So.2d 876, 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Section 380.07 contemplates that FLWAC will conduct a de novo evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 120.57 in reviewing DRI's. Id. at 879. Further, this statute empowers FLWAC to grant or deny permission to develop pursuant to Chapter 380 standards, and to attach conditions and restrictions to its decisions. § 380.07(4), Fla....

...We find that the rules in question here require FLWAC to define the issues to be litigated in a DRI appeal, before referring the matter to a hearing officer, and that they simply set forth the time and manner of presenting claims. They do not confer standing to appeal contrary to the provisions of section 380.07(2). FLWAC's rule 27G-1.06(2) only allows the intervenors to request FLWAC to consider other issues. Unlike the issues raised by the statutorily designated parties who may initiate appeals under section 380.07(2), FLWAC does not have to consider those issues requested by intervenors....

...Rule 27G-1.08(4) permits FLWAC to exercise its statutorily granted policy-making review authority by adding an issue of statewide or regional importance which was not raised by the parties but which is necessary to a disposition of the appeal under section 380.07....

...ithdraws or settles its appeal in this case, FLWAC's jurisdiction over this appeal should be divested or terminated. Fairfield contends that intervenors cannot continue to maintain their challenge if DCA, the only party with standing to appeal under section 380.07(2), voluntarily dismisses its appeal....

...However, this appeal is limited to a consideration of whether rules 27G-1.06(2) and 27G-1.08(4) are validly enacted rules. The issue of whether intervenors may still maintain their appeal before FLWAC, even though the only party with standing to appeal pursuant to section 380.07(2) has withdrawn or dismissed its challenge, was not briefed nor argued below, and is not an issue before this court....

...days of the filing of a notice of appeal may request the Commission to consider issues raised in the record below but not raised by the parties to the appeal. The specific authority for Rule 27G-1.06 is section 120.53(1) and the laws implemented are section 380.07 and 403.412(5)....

...At this meeting, the Commission may also dispose of procedural motions, including motions to intervene, which have been filed within thirty days of the filing of the notice of appeal. The specific authority for Rule 27G-1.08 is 120.53(1) and the laws implemented are 380.07(3), 380.08(3), and 120.57(1)(b)....

...ny a DRI development order to the owner, the developer, the appropriate regional planning agency or the state land planning agency. Friends of Everglades, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Monroe County, 456 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). [5] Section 380.07(4), Florida Statutes (1985), in its entirety, provides: The Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission shall issue a decision granting or denying permission to develop pursuant to the standards of this chapter and may attach condit...

...ent of Administration, with the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission from an order of the Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners approving with conditions a development of regional impact proposed by appellant/petitioner Fox. Sec. 380.07(2), F.S....

...rds on that day, approving with conditions *58 the development of regional impact proposed by Fox according to the procedures prescribed by The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, as amended. Ch. 380, F.S. 1973 (1974 Supp.). Section 380.07 of the Act created the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, consisting of the Governor and cabinet, and provides in part: "(2) Whenever any local government issues any development order ......

...der to or receipt of them by the specified recipients. The lawyers in this case have given us resourceful arguments concerning the purposes of the Act, the significance of various time limitations thereby imposed and the desirability of interpreting § 380.07(2) in such a way as to promote uniformity and predictability of the period in which appeals may be taken to the Adjudicatory Commission....

...burden them with the encrustment of years of interpretation of "rendered" as applied to judicial judgments. See American Bankers Life Assur. Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So.2d 777 (Fla.App.1st, 1968). The choice and sequence of the verbs employed in § 380.07(2) implicitly but, we think, clearly defines rendition as issuance and transmittal of the development order....

...der. From the Commission's order of dismissal appellants now appeal to this court. Sec. 380.085, Fla. Stat. (1981). A party's standing to appeal from local government's development order to the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission is determined by section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...or the state land planning agency may appeal the order of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission... ." Caloosa Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Palm Beach Board of County Commissioners, 429 So.2d 1260, 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), affirmed the Commission's dismissal of a section 380.07 appeal by an association of persons owning property adjoining a DRI, who complained of Palm Beach County's DRI approval. After reviewing the statutory terms at some length, the court held that section 380.07(2) permits appeals to the Commission only by "the owner of the property on which the DRI is to be located," or by the developer if that is someone else, or by the regional planning council whose public hearing, report and recommendatio...

...per's responsibilities in developing the lands now to be developed. Nor are appellants' properties subject to the conditions of development that govern the DRI properties of Turkey Creek, Inc., which is the sole "owner" and "developer" recognized by section 380.07(2)....

...ot allowed Commission appeals. The owner of lands for which development is sought by DRI application, and the developer, may be different persons, though in this case Turkey Creek, Inc. is both. We thus narrow the class of potential appellants under section 380.07(2), as described in Caloosa, to disqualify "owners" of land included in the DRI for purposes other than for development....

...Laurence Keesey, Tallahassee, Richard L. Smith, Richard E. Nelson and Leslie Telford of Nelson, Hesse, Cyril, Weber & Smith, Sarasota, Robert A. Dickinson, Englewood, Edward John Walsh, Oakland Park, for respondents. MILLS, Acting Chief Judge. Pursuant to Section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1975), the Division of State Planning (Division) and the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council (SW Council) appealed to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (Commission) a development order issued...

...GDC contends that there is no need for a full evidentiary hearing under Section 120.57 since the four-day hearing before the City was neither inadequate nor incomplete. It urges that the appeal before the Commission be determined on the record made below. Section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1977), permits the owner, developer, regional planning agency or state land planning agency to appeal a development order to the Commission. Section 380.07(3) states: "Prior to issuing an order, the ......

...(e) The appropriate local government shall render a decision on the application within 30 days after the hearing, unless an extension is requested by the developer. The development order shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with subsection (11). 380.07 Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission....

...The local government then considers the applications using the required process and issues a development order which, since it is based on an application for a development permit, must deal not only with the DRI request but also with all local zoning matters. Finally, section 380.07 gives an aggrieved party the right to appeal the development order to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission....

...litan Dade County to the extent that the two conflict. Article VIII, Section 1(g), and Article XI, Section 5, Florida Constitution. See Board of County Commissioners of Dade County v. Boswell, 167 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1964). Therefore, to the extent that Section 380.07, Florida Statutes, provides what we have determined to the (sic) uniform statewide procedure for reviewing development orders, it prevails over the zoning review procedures contained within the Dade County Code....

...and Regulation; Florida, the Model Code and Beyond (1979), where he states: [Chapter 380] expressly provides that " any development order ... in regard to any development of regional impact" may be appealed to the Adjudicatory Commission. Fla. Stat. § 380.07(2) (1977) (emphasis added)....

...They contend that the Commission should have affirmed Manatee County's decision as being "fairly debatable." Although we have serious doubts about this argument, we need not consider it because Manatee and Sarasota requested and received a de novo hearing before the hearing officer under section 380.07(3) and, thus, waived the right to depend upon any presumption of validity which might otherwise have attached to the Manatee County order....

...[8] Neither of these cases passed upon the precise procedural issue presented in this case. However, in both cases Sarasota County was found to be without standing to appeal developmental orders of local governments approving applications for developments of regional impact pursuant to § 380.07(2)....

...James and Olivia Young appeal an adverse final order of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. We affirm. The Youngs obtained three land clearing permits from Monroe County, Florida. The subject property is within an area of critical state concern. Pursuant to section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1987), the permits at issue here constitute development orders which may be appealed to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. Under the statute, the state land planning agency — the Department of Community Affairs — is authorized to appeal. [1] Under the statute, the Commission "shall hold a hearing pursuant to the provisions of chapter 120." Id. § 380.07(3)....

...ursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1987). Affirmed. ON SUGGESTION FOR CERTIFICATION We certify that the court has passed upon a question of great public importance by holding that, in an appeal by the state land planning agency pursuant to section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1987), the burden of persuasion, and the burden of going forward, rested on the applicant for the permit. NOTES [1] The statute also grants a right of appeal to the owner, the developer, and an appropriate regional planning agency. Id. § 380.07(2). The Department's appeal automatically stayed the effectiveness of the permits. Id. § 380.07(2)....

...denied, 412 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1982). Following review and a public hearing, the local government may deny or approve the application with conditions, restrictions or limitations. An aggrieved developer may then appeal to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. § 380.07, Fla....

...The FLAWAC's order adopted the identical findings and conclusions contained in the hearing officer's separate recommended order. [1] The FLAWAC's order was entered upon the DCA's appeal from a development order issued by Monroe County approving the appellants' application for a land clearing permit. See § 380.07, Fla....

...atter and parties in this case. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The [DCA] is the state planning agency authorized to appeal local government development orders in any area of critical state concern to the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. Section 380.07, Florida Statutes....

...The Respondents Harbor Course Club, Inc. and Driscoll Properties have the burden of proof *918 in this de novo proceeding since they are seeking a permit to clear land in Monroe County, or in the alternative are seeking an exemption from such permitting requirements. Sections 380.07 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes; Transgulf Pipeline v....

...Transmittal did not occur until June 21, 1984, and this appeal was timely filed on August 3, 1984. Receipt of a copy of Permit No. C-14914 in [the DCA]'s Keys Office on May 14, 1984 does not constitute transmittal of the development order authorizing the issuance of this permit, and Section 380.07(2), as construed in Fox v....

...ished estoppel doctrines precluding relitigation of issues previously adjudicated between the same parties. 32 Fla.Jur.2d, Judgments and Decrees, §§ 102 and 114. In the former appeal, as in this case, appellant has contended that the provisions of § 380.07(2), Florida Statutes, limiting standing for appeals, should not apply if the local proceeding is conducted in a manner which does not afford adequate notice and a fair opportunity for the public to be heard....

...assert they were entitled to adequate notice and an opportunity to be *1128 heard before the Monroe County Zoning Board and County Commission prior to approval by those bodies of a DRI development order. They contend they were denied that right, and section 380.07(2), which acts to exacerbate such denial by precluding them from appeal, is therefore unconstitutional....

...state planning agencies believe that the public's interests will not be served by the local government's approval of a plan for development," and only when those parties initiate an appeal. Friends, supra at 911. Appellant also contends that Chapter 380.07(2) constitutes an improper delegation of legislative authority by failing to provide standards and criteria for the decision as to when an authorized party should appeal to the FLWAC. We find that the provision is not constitutionally infirm. While there are no expressed criteria for the decision to appeal, § 380.07(4) does require that the FLWAC decision be made "pursuant to the standards of this chapter," and the decision to appeal thus would arguably encompass consideration of whether a development order accords with the general standards of Chapter 380....

...including any order of a hearing officer, is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy." [2] The court there held in pertinent part: [S]tanding to appeal a development order to FLWAC is limited to those parties expressly stated in section 380.07(2). Accordingly, we have refused to create any judicial exceptions where none was intended... . [W]e do not agree that section 403.412(5) creates a statutory exception to the limited standing granted by section 380.07(2)... . [I]ntervention at the local DRI review level ... does not create an exception to the express legislative limitation of standing found in section 380.07(2)....

...City of Alachua, 438 So.2d 91 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) answers appellant's argument that, simply because the Edgewater Beach Owners Association (Association) "administers a portion of the property on which the DRI development order is located, it must be considered an owner and granted section 380.07(2) standing in this case." Nor does the result we reach today represent a repudiation of the doctrine of the law of the case....

...The last time the Association appealed an order of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC) dismissing the Association's administrative appeal for lack of standing, we reversed, saying: In conclusion, we find that appellant Edgewater [Beach Owners Association] is an "owner" under the terms of Section 380.07(2), and therefore has standing to appeal the amended development order rendered by the Board of County Commissioners....

...tays the proceedings in the zoning matter: "The filing of the notice of appeal shall stay the effectiveness of the order and shall stay any judicial proceedings in relation to the development order, until after the completion of the appeal process." Section 380.07(4), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Lawrence Keesey, Tallahassee, for appellees. Before HENDRY and KEHOE, JJ., and SCHULZ, GEORGE E., (Ret.), Associate Judge. KEHOE, Judge. Appellant, the South Florida Regional Planning Council [1] (SFRPC), pursuant to the provisions of Sections 120.68(2) and 380.07(5), Florida Statutes (1977), appeals a final order of the State of Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (Fla.WAC) which dismissed its petition to review an alleged development order issued by the Dade County Board of Commissioners (Dade Commissioners)....

...e facts of this cause; that order reads as follows: "1. On April 10, 1978, the Department of Administration received Notice of Appeal and a Petition filed by the South Florida Regional Planning Council (SFRPC) wherein it seeks to appeal, pursuant to Section 380.07, Florida Statutes, a `Development Order' issued by the Dade County Board of County Commissioners (Dade County) on February 9, 1978, relative to proposed development of land on Fisher Island which is located South of Government Cut between Miami Beach and Virginia Key, Dade County, Florida....

...By letter of April 11, 1978, the Secretary of Administration, on behalf of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, referred the Notice of Appeal and Petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the appointment of a Hearing Officer, pursuant to Section 380.07, Florida Statutes, and Rule 22G-1.07, Florida Administrative Code....

...orida Statutes, that a revised proposed project does not constitute a development of regional impact effectively terminates an ongoing DRI process and bars a regional planning agency from pursuing an appeal of favorable local government action under Section 380.07(2), to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory commission....

...nt to Section 380.06(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), by the Division of Land Planning (Division) to appellee Fisher binds SFRPC as to the determination by the Division and bars SFRPC from pursuing an appeal of favorable local government action under Section 380.07(2) to Fla.WAC; and (2) whether SFRPC is barred from collaterally attacking the validity of a binding letter of interpretation issued under Section 380.06(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), where it made an appearance in the proceedings, but failed to take judicial review therefrom....

...to the State planning agency. The regional planning agency has only statutory power and authority to make recommendations to local government consistent with Section 380.06 and to file appeals from development orders by local government pursuant to Section 380.07....

Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (Section 380.07), and is authorized to bring an action for

...he guiding principles. See section 380.0552(1), Fla. Stat. (1985). 2 Next, under Point III, appellants argue that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over that portion of the dock to be constructed seaward of the mean high water line. We agree. Section 380.07 creates the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, which consists of the Administration Commission, and gives it jurisdiction over any designated area of critical state concern....

...rder until January 1, 1999, extended the build-out dates for the remaining four phases of the project, and approved KPM’s proposed design modifications. Edgewater filed a petition with the FLWAC appealing the amended development order. pursuant to Section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes (1991). The FLWAC determined that Edgewater did not have standing to appeal the amended development order and dismissed the administrative appeal. Section 380.07(2) provides that the state land planning agency, regional planning agency, and the “owner or developer of the property affected” may appeal an order concerning a DRI. The full import of this statutory provision as it applies to the question of Edgewater’s standing to appeal the amended development order may be best explained with reference to this court’s prior opinions construing Section 380.07(2)....

...hallenge an approved DRI. In affirming the denial of standing to the homeowners’ association, this court’s decision was grounded on two bases: (1) While an owner of property to be developed has standing under the statute, the term “owner” in Section 380.07(2), Florida Statues, refers to the owner of the property on which the DRI is to be located, as opposed to the owners of adjoining property; and (2) The DRI review process embodied in Chapter 380 is intended primarily for two groups, de...

...evelopment. Londono, 438 So.2d at 91 . In essence, the Londono appellants were nothing more than owners of property adjoining the area of development. We find, under Londono , that the determination of what constitutes an “owner” for purposes of Section 380.07(2) may not be made without reference to the question of what constitutes “development” under Chapter 380....

...onable use” doctrine articulated in Westland Skating Center, Inc. v. Gus Machado Buick, Inc., 542 So.2d 959 (Fla. 1989). The availability of an alternate remedy is not relevant to the question whether Edgewater has standing as an “owner” under section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes. In conclusion, we find that appellant Edge-water is an “owner” under the terms of Section 380.07(2), and therefore has standing to appeal the amended development order rendered by the Board of County Commissioners....

...ished estoppel doctrines precluding relitigation of issues previously adjudicated between the same parties. 32 Fla.Jur.2d, Judgments and Decrees, §§ 102 and 114. In the former appeal, as in this case, appellant has contended that the provisions of § 380.07(2), Florida Statutes, limiting standing for appeals, should not apply if the local proceeding is conducted in a manner which does not afford adequate notice and a fair opportunity for the public to be heard....

...assert they were entitled to adequate notice and an opportunity to be *1128 heard before the Monroe County Zoning Board and County Commission prior to approval by those bodies of a DRI development order. They contend they were denied that right, and section 380.07(2), which acts to exacerbate such denial by precluding them from appeal, is therefore unconstitutional....

...lanning agencies believe that the public’s interests will not be served by the local government’s approval of a plan for development,” and only when those parties initiate an appeal. Friends, supra at 911 . Appellant also contends that Chapter 380.07(2) constitutes an improper delegation of legislative authority by failing to provide standards and criteria for the decision as to when an authorized party should appeal to the FLWAC. We find that the provision is not constitutionally infirm. While there are no expressed criteria for the decision to appeal, § 380.07(4) does require that the FLWAC decision be made “pursuant to the' standards of this chapter,” and the decision to appeal thus would arguably encompass consideration of whether a development order accords with the general standards of Chapter 380....

...including any order of a hearing officer, is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy." . The court there held in pertinent part: [Standing to appeal a development order to FLWAC is limited to those parties expressly stated in section 380.07(2). Accordingly, we have refused to create any judicial exceptions where none was intended.... [W]e do not agree that section 403.412(5) creates a statutory exception to the limited standing granted by section 380.07(2)_ [Ijntervention at the local DRI review level ... does not create an exception to the express legislative limitation of standing found in section 380.07(2)....

authority to issue a ruling in this case. However, section 380.07, Florida Statutes, created the Commission and

...der was received by the DCA. The relevant statute states in pertinent part that “[wjithin 45 days after the order is rendered ... the state land planning agency may appeal the order to [FLA-WAC] by filing a notice of appeal with the commission.” Section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...time to require that such development orders be redone and to do the necessary research to determine whether the orders should be appealed. All future development orders must now be signed. Further statutory solutions are available to FLAWAC. Under section 380.07(2), the state land planning agency (DCA) is authorized to prescribe by rule those orders required to be transmitted by the local government authority issuing the development order....

...(Friends) appeals a final order of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC) dismissing for lack of standing its appeal from the City of Miami’s development order regarding the Terremark Cen-tre, a development of regional impact (DRI). Section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1983) permits only the developer or owner, the Department of Community Affairs, or the regional planning agency to appeal a DRI development order to the FLWAC....

...The circuit court's decision *490 was recently upheld by this court. Izaak Walton League of America v. Monroe County and Windley Key, Ltd., 448 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). In the meantime, the Department, on or about November 15, 1982, filed a petition with FLAWAC, pursuant to section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes (1981), appealing the zoning board's order of January 29, 1982....

...ning board was timely filed. The applicable statute in pertinent part provides that "[w]ithin 45 days after the order is rendered, ... the state land planning agency may appeal the order to [FLAWAC] by filing a notice of appeal with the commission." § 380.07(2), Fla....

...Appellee complains by motion for rehearing, rightfully, that we have not directly decided the critical question in the case: whether the state land planning agency is obligated to take its appeal to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission pursuant to Section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1983) from a zoning board approval order rather than await a final local government development order, in order to avoid being barred by expiration of the *491 forty-five day rule where the appeal by a citizens' grou...

requirements of that chapter. Under the provisions of section 380.-07(2), those with standing to challenge a local

it must be considered an owner and granted section 380.07(2) standing in this case.” Nor does the result

...ent of Administration, with the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission from an order of the Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners approving with conditions a development of regional impact proposed by appellant/petitioner Fox. Sec. 380.07(2), F.S.1973....

...rds on that day, approving with condi *58 tions the development of regional impact proposed by Fox according to the procedures prescribed by The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, as amended. Ch. 380, F.S.1973 (1974 Supp.). Section 380.07 of the Act created the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, consisting of the Governor and cabinet, and provides in part: “(2) Whenever any local government issues any development order ......

...en them with the encrustment of years of interpretation of “rendered” as applied to judicial judgments. See American Bankers Life Assur. Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So.2d 777 (Fla.App.1st, 1968). The choice and sequence of the verbs employed in § 380.07(2) implicitly but, we think, clearly defines rendition as issuance and transmittal of the development order....

...traffic flow; and 2) pay its contribution as established by Rule 9J-2.0255, Florida Administrative Code, or the city’s impact fee, whichever was greater. Babcock appealed the order to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission pursuant to Section 380.07, Florida Statutes....

Commission pursuant to section 380.07 was by de novo hearing. Section 380.07 provides that after certain

PER CURIAM. We do not agree with the Monroe County School Board that its proposed development is not subject to the authority of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission under the provisions of section 380.07, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...substantial deviations” under section 380.06(19), Florida Statutes. 5  On April 20, 2017, SOA petitioned for administrative review with FLWAC, challenging the County’s adoption of Ordinance 2017-12 (“the administrative appeal”). See § 380.07(2), Fla....

...SOA alleged that the “Amended Development Order was approved as a non-substantial deviation without further review, despite containing changes that qualify as substantial deviations . . . .” SOA’s petition suspended rendition of Ordinance 2017-12. See § 380.07(4), Fla....

...(1983) (“The local government shall, at the conclusion of local review, modify the development order to reflect approved changes to the development and shall notify the regional planning agency and the state land planning agency of the changes to the development order, with the findings subject to the appeal provisions of s. 380.07.”); cf....

...1st DCA 1986) (“Despite appellants’ prodigious and successful efforts in obtaining development approval from the county, the Department of Community Affairs (Department) appeared on the scene to challenge the county’s action, wielding its sword of authority afforded by section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes, to appeal to the Commission any development order affecting any area of critical state concern.”). On October 12, 1984, the Sandestin Corporation and DCA entered into an agreement (“the 1984 Agreement”...

...agreed not to seek administrative review of the County’s non- substantial deviation determination; in exchange, the Sandestin Corporation agreed to provide DCA with a complete copy of its files for the Project (“the 1985 Developer Submittals”). See § 380.07, 20 Fla....

...time for Plaintiff to challenge adoption of [Ordinance] 2017-12 was May 26, 2017. By failing to file an appeal to FLAWAC within that time, or with the circuit court within 30 days of approval, Plaintiff is barred from challenging its approval.” See § 380.07(2), Fla....

...challenge that ordinance: “Plaintiff’s motion essentially argues that the implementation of 2017-12 which was finalized on April 11, 2017 did not become ‘final’ as a result of the appeals filed by Intervener which suspended the effective date of the ordinance.” See § 380.07(4), Fla....

...(“The filing of the notice of appeal stays the effectiveness of the order until after the completion of the appeal process.”). Additionally, the court acknowledged that SOA’s petition enjoyed some effect on Ordinance 2017-12, stating: “By operation of § 380.07 (4) Fla....

...challenge the culmination of that process: the County’s adoption of Revised Ordinance 2017-12. B 36  In its order granting summary judgment, the trial court erroneously stated that an administrative appeal under section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes, provides the exclusive means to challenge a DRI: “[Section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes] establishes the exclusive means to challenge DRI’s and any such challenge must be brought within forty-five (45) days of rendition of the local action.” The trial court recognized the statutory authority for filing a “comp plan challenge” under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. However, SDI argued below that “the sole method, for appealing any decision by the county dealing with DRI’s, are found in [section 380.07].” (emphasis supplied)....

...er 380 is the exclusive means dealing with development of regional impact or DRI as opposed to, you know, local that wasn’t part of the DRI.” (emphasis supplied). To the extent the trial court determined that an administrative appeal under section 380.07(2) provides the “exclusive” means for Osborne to challenge the process by which the County amended the Sandestin DRI DO, the trial court erred. See Suwannee River Area Council Boy Scouts of Am., 384 So....

...Walton Cnty., 833 So. 2d 215, 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (“A DRI development order is a ‘final local development order,’ just as a building permit or zoning decision is.”). Additionally, the trial court did not acknowledge the type of action authorized by section 380.07(2)—an administrative 37 challenge to a local government’s decision that denies DRI development approval or fails to adequately address regional impacts....

...fies as substantial (regional impacts) or non-substantial (no regional impacts). See § 380.06(19), Fla. Stat.; see also Bay Point Club, 890 So. 2d at 258. That is a specific determination, with a specific administrative review mechanism under section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes....

...1st DCA 1983)] holds, to the designated governmental bodies whose responsibility it is to protect those regional issues.”). Here, Osborne does not challenge that determination. Rather, he challenges the notification procedures followed by the County prior to that determination. Section 380.07(2) does not preclude an adjoining landowner from challenging “a zoning decision that forms a part of or that is related to a development order.” Caloosa Prop. Owners Ass'n, 429 So. 2d at 1264–65. Nor does the availability of an administrative remedy under section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes, preclude an individual from raising a circuit court challenge to the process by which a local government amends a DRI DO....

...petition for administrative review (to the extent he could do so) did not preclude Osborne from challenging, in circuit court, the process by which the County enacted Revised Ordinance 2017-12. Finally, the trial court did not acknowledge that section 380.07(2) only authorizes a limited class of challengers. See § 380.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2017) (limiting the class of challengers to “the owner, the developer, or the state land planning agency”); see also Grand Dunes, Ltd. v. Walton Cnty., 714 So. 2d 473, 474 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“[I]n clear terms, section 380.07(2) permits only ‘the owner, the developer, or the state land planning agency’ to appeal a DRI development order to FLWAC.”). Under this Court’s precedent, that class of challengers can include a homeowners’ association. See Edgewater Beach Owners Ass’n, Inc., 645 So. 2d at 543 (finding that a homeowners’ association “is an ‘owner’ under the terms of Section 380.07(2), and therefore has standing to appeal the amended development order rendered by the Board of County Commissioners”). However, that class of challengers does not include an individual like Osborne who owns a home in a previously developed portion of a DRI....