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Florida Statute 120.52 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 120.52 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title X
PUBLIC OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND RECORDS
Chapter 120
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 120.52
120.52 Definitions.As used in this act:
(1) “Agency” means the following officers or governmental entities if acting pursuant to powers other than those derived from the constitution:
(a) The Governor; each state officer and state department, and each departmental unit described in s. 20.04; the Board of Governors of the State University System; the Commission on Ethics; the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission; a regional water supply authority; a regional planning agency; a multicounty special district, but only if a majority of its governing board is comprised of nonelected persons; educational units; and each entity described in chapters 163, 373, 380, and 582 and s. 186.504.
(b) Each officer and governmental entity in the state having statewide jurisdiction or jurisdiction in more than one county.
(c) Each officer and governmental entity in the state having jurisdiction in one county or less than one county, to the extent they are expressly made subject to this chapter by general or special law or existing judicial decisions.

This definition does not include a municipality or legal entity created solely by a municipality; a legal entity or agency created in whole or in part pursuant to part II of chapter 361; a metropolitan planning organization created pursuant to s. 339.175; a separate legal or administrative entity created pursuant to s. 339.175 of which a metropolitan planning organization is a member; an expressway authority pursuant to chapter 348 or any transportation authority or commission under chapter 343 or chapter 349; or a legal or administrative entity created by an interlocal agreement pursuant to s. 163.01(7), unless any party to such agreement is otherwise an agency as defined in this subsection.

(2) “Agency action” means the whole or part of a rule or order, or the equivalent, or the denial of a petition to adopt a rule or issue an order. The term also includes any denial of a request made under s. 120.54(7).
(3) “Agency head” means the person or collegial body in a department or other governmental unit statutorily responsible for final agency action. An agency head appointed by and serving at the pleasure of an appointing authority remains subject to the direction and supervision of the appointing authority, but actions taken by the agency head as authorized by statute are official acts.
(4) “Committee” means the Administrative Procedures Committee.
(5) “Division” means the Division of Administrative Hearings. Any document filed with the division by a party represented by an attorney shall be filed by electronic means through the division’s website. Any document filed with the division by a party not represented by an attorney shall, whenever possible, be filed by electronic means through the division’s website.
(6) “Educational unit” means a local school district, a community college district, the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind, or a state university when the university is acting pursuant to statutory authority derived from the Legislature.
(7) “Final order” means a written final decision which results from a proceeding under s. 120.56, s. 120.565, s. 120.569, s. 120.57, s. 120.573, or s. 120.574 which is not a rule, and which is not excepted from the definition of a rule, and which has been filed with the agency clerk, and includes final agency actions which are affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form. A final order includes all materials explicitly adopted in it. The clerk shall indicate the date of filing on the order.
(8) “Invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority” means action that goes beyond the powers, functions, and duties delegated by the Legislature. A proposed or existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority if any one of the following applies:
(a) The agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rulemaking procedures or requirements set forth in this chapter;
(b) The agency has exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(3)(a)1.;
(c) The rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(3)(a)1.;
(d) The rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the agency;
(e) The rule is arbitrary or capricious. A rule is arbitrary if it is not supported by logic or the necessary facts; a rule is capricious if it is adopted without thought or reason or is irrational; or
(f) The rule imposes regulatory costs on the regulated person, county, or city which could be reduced by the adoption of less costly alternatives that substantially accomplish the statutory objectives.

A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not sufficient to allow an agency to adopt a rule; a specific law to be implemented is also required. An agency may adopt only rules that implement or interpret the specific powers and duties granted by the enabling statute. No agency shall have authority to adopt a rule only because it is reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation and is not arbitrary and capricious or is within the agency’s class of powers and duties, nor shall an agency have the authority to implement statutory provisions setting forth general legislative intent or policy. Statutory language granting rulemaking authority or generally describing the powers and functions of an agency shall be construed to extend no further than implementing or interpreting the specific powers and duties conferred by the enabling statute.

(9) “Law implemented” means the language of the enabling statute being carried out or interpreted by an agency through rulemaking.
(10) “License” means a franchise, permit, certification, registration, charter, or similar form of authorization required by law, but it does not include a license required primarily for revenue purposes when issuance of the license is merely a ministerial act.
(11) “Licensing” means the agency process respecting the issuance, denial, renewal, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, or amendment of a license or imposition of terms for the exercise of a license.
(12) “Official reporter” means the publication in which an agency publishes final orders, the index to final orders, and the list of final orders which are listed rather than published.
(13) “Party” means:
(a) Specifically named persons whose substantial interests are being determined in the proceeding.
(b) Any other person who, as a matter of constitutional right, provision of statute, or provision of agency regulation, is entitled to participate in whole or in part in the proceeding, or whose substantial interests will be affected by proposed agency action, and who makes an appearance as a party.
(c) Any other person, including an agency staff member, allowed by the agency to intervene or participate in the proceeding as a party. An agency may by rule authorize limited forms of participation in agency proceedings for persons who are not eligible to become parties.
(d) Any county representative, agency, department, or unit funded and authorized by state statute or county ordinance to represent the interests of the consumers of a county, when the proceeding involves the substantial interests of a significant number of residents of the county and the board of county commissioners has, by resolution, authorized the representative, agency, department, or unit to represent the class of interested persons. The authorizing resolution shall apply to a specific proceeding and to appeals and ancillary proceedings thereto, and it shall not be required to state the names of the persons whose interests are to be represented.

The term “party” does not include a member government of a regional water supply authority or a governmental or quasi-judicial board or commission established by local ordinance or special or general law where the governing membership of such board or commission is shared with, in whole or in part, or appointed by a member government of a regional water supply authority in proceedings under s. 120.569, s. 120.57, or s. 120.68, to the extent that an interlocal agreement under ss. 163.01 and 373.713 exists in which the member government has agreed that its substantial interests are not affected by the proceedings or that it is to be bound by alternative dispute resolution in lieu of participating in the proceedings. This exclusion applies only to those particular types of disputes or controversies, if any, identified in an interlocal agreement.

(14) “Person” means any person described in s. 1.01, any unit of government in or outside the state, and any agency described in subsection (1).
(15) “Recommended order” means the official recommendation of an administrative law judge assigned by the division or of any other duly authorized presiding officer, other than an agency head or member of an agency head, for the final disposition of a proceeding under ss. 120.569 and 120.57.
(16) “Rule” means each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency and includes any form which imposes any requirement or solicits any information not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule. The term also includes the amendment or repeal of a rule. The term does not include:
(a) Internal management memoranda which do not affect either the private interests of any person or any plan or procedure important to the public and which have no application outside the agency issuing the memorandum.
(b) Legal memoranda or opinions issued to an agency by the Attorney General or agency legal opinions prior to their use in connection with an agency action.
(c) The preparation or modification of:
1. Agency budgets.
2. Statements, memoranda, or instructions to state agencies issued by the Chief Financial Officer or Comptroller as chief fiscal officer of the state and relating or pertaining to claims for payment submitted by state agencies to the Chief Financial Officer or Comptroller.
3. Contractual provisions reached as a result of collective bargaining.
4. Memoranda issued by the Executive Office of the Governor relating to information resources management.
(17) “Rulemaking authority” means statutory language that explicitly authorizes or requires an agency to adopt, develop, establish, or otherwise create any statement coming within the definition of the term “rule.”
(18) “Small city” means any municipality that has an unincarcerated population of 10,000 or less according to the most recent decennial census.
(19) “Small county” means any county that has an unincarcerated population of 75,000 or less according to the most recent decennial census.
(20) “Unadopted rule” means an agency statement that meets the definition of the term “rule,” but that has not been adopted pursuant to the requirements of s. 120.54.
(21) “Variance” means a decision by an agency to grant a modification to all or part of the literal requirements of an agency rule to a person who is subject to the rule. Any variance shall conform to the standards for variances outlined in this chapter and in the uniform rules adopted pursuant to s. 120.54(5).
(22) “Waiver” means a decision by an agency not to apply all or part of a rule to a person who is subject to the rule. Any waiver shall conform to the standards for waivers outlined in this chapter and in the uniform rules adopted pursuant to s. 120.54(5).
History.s. 1, ch. 74-310; s. 1, ch. 75-191; s. 1, ch. 76-131; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 12, ch. 77-290; s. 2, ch. 77-453; s. 1, ch. 78-28; s. 1, ch. 78-425; s. 1, ch. 79-20; s. 55, ch. 79-40; s. 1, ch. 79-299; s. 2, ch. 81-119; s. 1, ch. 81-180; s. 7, ch. 82-180; s. 1, ch. 83-78; s. 2, ch. 83-273; s. 10, ch. 84-170; s. 15, ch. 85-80; s. 1, ch. 85-168; s. 2, ch. 87-385; s. 1, ch. 88-367; s. 1, ch. 89-147; s. 1, ch. 91-46; s. 9, ch. 92-166; s. 50, ch. 92-279; s. 55, ch. 92-326; s. 3, ch. 96-159; s. 1, ch. 97-176; s. 2, ch. 97-286; s. 1, ch. 98-402; s. 64, ch. 99-245; s. 2, ch. 99-379; s. 895, ch. 2002-387; s. 1, ch. 2003-94; s. 138, ch. 2003-261; s. 7, ch. 2003-286; s. 3, ch. 2007-196; s. 13, ch. 2007-217; s. 2, ch. 2008-104; s. 1, ch. 2009-85; s. 1, ch. 2009-187; s. 10, ch. 2010-5; s. 2, ch. 2010-205; s. 7, ch. 2011-208; s. 8, ch. 2012-116; s. 14, ch. 2013-173.

F.S. 120.52 on Google Scholar

F.S. 120.52 on Casetext

Amendments to 120.52


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 120.52
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 120.52.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

SOUTHERN BAPTIST HOSPITAL OF FLORIDA d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a v. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a v. v. d b a HCA d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a JFK d b a JFK JFK d b a JFK d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a MHT, LLC, d b a d b a a d b a d b a d b a HCA d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a PPH, LLC, d b a d b a d b a d b a LLC, d b a d b a HCA d b a HCA d b a d b a d b a HCA d b a St. d b a St. TCH, LLC, d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a v. v. d b a HCA d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a JFK d b a JFK JFK d b a JFK d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a MHT, LLC, d b a d b a a d b a d b a d b a HCA d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a PPH, LLC, d b a d b a d b a d b a LLC, d b a d b a HCA d b a HCA d b a d b a d b a HCA d b a St. d b a St. TCH, LLC, d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a HCA d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a JFK d b a JFK JFK d b a JFK d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a MHT, LLC, d b a d b a a d b a d b a d b a HCA d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a PPH, LLC, d b a d b a d b a d b a LLC, d b a d b a HCA d b a HCA d b a d b a d b a HCA d b a St. d b a St. TCH, LLC, d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a v. d b a d b a d b a St. s d b a St. s St. s- St. s d b a St. s St. s d b a St. s v. CGH d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a a d b a d b a St. s d b a St. s d b a v. d b a d b a d b a St. s d b a St. s St. s- St. s d b a St. s St. s d b a St. s v. CGH d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a a d b a d b a St. s d b a St. s d b a v. d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a v. HMA LLC, d b a St. HMA, LLC, d b a d b a HMA, LLC, d b a HMA, LLC, d b a HMA LLC HMA, LLC, d b a HMA, LLC, d b a d b a HMA, LLC, d b a HMA, LLC, d b a HMA, LLC HMA LLC, d b a SC, LLC, d b a St. LLC, d b a HMA, LLC d b a HMA, LLC, d b a HMA, LLC LLC, d b a LLC, d b a HMA, LLC, d b a HMA, LLC, d b a v. v. HMA LLC, d b a St. HMA, LLC, d b a d b a HMA, LLC, d b a HMA, LLC, d b a HMA LLC HMA, LLC, d b a HMA, LLC, d b a d b a HMA, LLC, d b a HMA, LLC, d b a HMA, LLC HMA LLC, d b a SC, LLC, d b a St. LLC, d b a HMA, LLC, d b a HMA, LLC, d b a HMA, LLC LLC, d b a LLC, d b a HMA, LLC, d b a HMA, LLC, d b a v. d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a d b a v. v., 270 So. 3d 488 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . the MTA and unit cost cap methodologies does not constitute an invalid unadopted rule under section 120.52 . . . , modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of ... the language of the enabling statute." §§ 120.52 . . . Regulation , 580 So.2d 267, 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) ; see also § 120.52(2), Fla. Stat. . . . We, therefore, find that both the existing and proposed rules are invalid under section 120.52(8)(c), . . . As such, the unit cost cap is invalid as it was not adopted through rulemaking. § 120.52(8)(a), Fla. . . .

MIAMI DADE COLLEGE, v. ALLEN,, 271 So. 3d 1194 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . ." § 120.52(3), Fla. Stat. (2018). . . .

SNYDER, v. FLORIDA PREPAID COLLEGE BOARD,, 269 So. 3d 586 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . See §§ 120.52(8), 120.536, 1009.971(4)(aa) Fla. Stat. (2018). . . .

ASPHALT PAVING SYSTEMS, INC. v. COLUMBIA, 264 So. 3d 1110 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . State, Dep't of Transp. , 635 So.2d 58, 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ; §§ 120.52(13)(b); 120.57, Fla. . . .

FRS- FAST RELIABLE SEAWAY, LLC. v. BOARD OF PILOT COMMISSIONERS, 261 So. 3d 744 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Section 120.52(13) of the Florida Statutes defines a "party" for the purposes of the APA, and reads in . . . forms of participation in agency proceedings for persons who are not eligible to become parties. §§ 120.52 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH d b a v. SHANDS JACKSONVILLE MEDICAL CENTER, INC. d b a UF JFK d b a JFK d b a d b a d b a HMA LLC, d b a St. St. s d b a St. s JFK d b a JFK d b a d b a v. d b a UF d b a d b a HMA LLC, d b a St St. s d b a St. s, 259 So. 3d 247 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 120.52(8)(c) & (d), Fla. Stat. . . .

GRABBA- LEAF, LLC, v. DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION,, 257 So. 3d 1205 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . ." §§ 120.52(16), 120.56(4)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . , but hasn't been adopted as a rule under chapter 120, then it is considered an "unadopted rule." § 120.52 . . . "rule" because it is a statement of general applicability that implements and interprets the law. § 120.52 . . . requirement or solicits any information not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule." § 120.52 . . .

BLUEFIELD RANCH MITIGATION BANK TRUST, v. SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 263 So. 3d 125 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 120.52(13)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .

CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY,, 253 So. 3d 623 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Acad. of Cosmetic Surgery, Inc. , 808 So.2d 243, 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), superseded by statute , § 120.52 . . .

ORLANDO HEALTH CENTRAL, INC. v. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, d b a LLC,, 252 So. 3d 849 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . 59C-1.012(2)(a) was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, in violation of section 120.52 . . .

ADAMS, a BY AND THROUGH KASPER, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF ST. JOHNS COUNTY, FLORIDA,, 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 120.52(1)(a) and (6) (defining state agency to include local school districts); Fla. Stat. . . .

GOODMAN, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT,, 238 So. 3d 102 (Fla. 2018)

. . . amounted to an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority under various provisions of section 120.52 . . .

DELGADO, D. v. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION,, 237 So. 3d 432 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . ." § 120.52(13)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphasis added). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI- MUTUEL WAGERING, v. DANIA ENTERTAINMENT CENTER, LLC LLC TBDG, LLC d b a TGT, 229 So. 3d 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . .” § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). . . . repeal is required to satisfy independently the remainder of the definition of a ‘rule’ in section 120.52 . . .

SCF, INC. v. FLORIDA THOROUGHBRED BREEDERS ASSOCIATION, INC., 227 So. 3d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . . § 120.52(13)(b), Fla. Stat. . . .

FLORIDA PULP AND PAPER ASSOCIATION ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 223 So. 3d 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . amendments to rule 62-302.530 were invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority under section 120.52 . . .

R. FERNANDEZ J. Sr. PLLC, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE, LLC,, 223 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . was not an “invalid exercise” of the Board’s delegated legislative authority, as defined in section 120.52 . . . delegated legislative authority, or is arbitrary or capricious as those terms are defined by section 120.52 . . .

CITIZENS OF STATE v. GRAHAM,, 213 So. 3d 703 (Fla. 2017)

. . . .” § 120.52(2), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .

MADISON HIGHLANDS, LLC LLC, v. FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, SP LLC, LP LP,, 220 So. 3d 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . determine when a challenger to agency action meets the “substantial interest” element found in section 120.52 . . .

PUTNAM COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER, v. FLORIDA BIRTH- RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, a k a a, 204 So.3d 598 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § 120.52(13)(b), Fla. Stat. . . .

M. RIVERA, v. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA ST. PETERSBURG,, 176 So. 3d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .” § 120.52(l)(a), (6), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . Cfi § 120.52(1). . . .

L. SPRADLEY, v. PAROLE COMMISSION,, 198 So. 3d 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Parole & Probation Comm’n, 289 So.2d 719, 720 (Fla.1974), superseded by section 120.52(10), Fla. . . .

PORT EVERGLADES PILOTS ASSOCIATION, v. FLORIDA- CARIBBEAN CRUISE ASSOCIATION,, 170 So. 3d 952 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . .3d 559, 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citing section 310.151(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2014)); see also § 120.52 . . .

UNITED FACULTY OF FLORIDA, v. FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,, 157 So. 3d 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . that the challenged rule is not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority under section 120.52 . . . A rule is invalid under section 120.52(8)(b) if the agency “exceed[s] its grant of rulemaking authority . . . Section 120.536(1) and the flush-left paragraph in section 120.52(8) require a close examination of the . . . UFF does not challenge the ALJ’s ruling that the challenged rule is not invalid under section 120.52( . . . See §§ 120.52(8), 120.536(1), Fla. Stat. . See, e.g., § 1000.02, Fla. Stat. . . . Section 120.52(8) provides: A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not sufficient to allow . . . In amending section 120.52(8) in 1999, the legislature specifically rejected the notion that rulemaking . . . Section 120.52(8) provides that “an agency may adopt only rules that implement or interpret the specific . . .

Dr. TEJADA- GUIBERT, v. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES,, 159 So. 3d 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . . § 120.52(7), Fla. Stat. (2014). We therefore lack jurisdiction to hear Tejada-Guibert’s appeal. . . .

ROBINSON, v. STEWART,, 161 So. 3d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Section 120.52(8), which in a 1996 statutory rewrite narrowed the administrative power of agencies in . . . the plaintiff-teachers do not claim that the Board has adopted a rule that is invalid under section 120.52 . . . for the constitutionality of a statute is unaffected by the legislatively-adopted change to section 120.52 . . . As revised in 1999, the closing paragraph of section 120.52(8) provides: A grant of rulemaking authority . . . In 1996, the Legislature amended section 120.52(8), defining "invalid exercise of delegated legislative . . . (emphasis supplied) (codified at § 120.52(8), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996)). . . . In apparent response to the decision in Consolidated-Tomoka, the Legislature again amended sections 120.52 . . . cabin agency rulemaking authority, the 1999 Legislature amended the "flush left” paragraph of section 120.52 . . .

AMERISURE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS COMPENSATION,, 156 So. 3d 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . . § 120.52(20), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . .” § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . .” § 120.52(16), (16)(a). See State Bd. of Admin. v. . . .

G. B. Z. L. K. L. J. H. M. R. v. AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES,, 143 So. 3d 454 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .” § 120.52(8)(c), (9), Fla. Stat. . . .

SOUTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT, d b a v. STATE AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION,, 141 So. 3d 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . The Second District reversed and found that, pursuant to section 120.52(10)(b), Florida Statutes, the . . .

M. WINICK, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,, 161 So. 3d 464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .” § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . “Each agency statement defined as a rule by s. 120.52 shall be adopted by the rulemaking procedure provided . . .

SOWELL, v. STATE, 136 So. 3d 1285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . probable cause review” document with the agency clerk as a “final order” in accordance with section 120.52 . . .

FLORIDA QUARTER HORSE TRACK ASSOCIATION, INC. v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARIMUTUEL WAGERING,, 133 So. 3d 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .” § 120.52(20), Fla. Stat.; see also § 120.54(l)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy.” § 120.52 . . .

FLORIDA CARRY, INC. v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA,, 133 So. 3d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . . § 120.52(1), Fla. Stat. . . . This distinction is recognized in section 120.52(1), Florida Statutes, (2011), which defines an agency . . .

FLORIDA VIRTUALSCHOOL, a v. INC. a LLC, a, 735 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 120.52(8) (“An agency may adopt only rules that implement or interpret the specific powers and duties . . .

WESTPHAL, v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG RISK MANAGEMENT,, 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Club, Inc., 733 So.2d 594, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (recognizing that the 1999 amendments to section 120.52 . . . 1st DCA 1998)); Consolidated-Tomoka, 717 So.2d at 79 (recognizing that the 1996 amendments to section 120.52 . . .

SHANDS JACKSONVILLE MEDICAL CENTER, INC. v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, d b a v. HCA d b a HCA Of d b a St. s d b a St. s v., 123 So. 3d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . 395.4025 provides an independent basis for standing by “provision of statute” as contemplated by section 120.52 . . .

SAVE OUR CREEKS v. STATE OF FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION,, 112 So. 3d 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . .” § 120.52(2), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

PRESCRIPTION PARTNERS, LLC, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES,, 109 So. 3d 1218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Further, the Department ruled that Partners does not fit within the definition of a ‘party' under Section 120.52 . . . action, an individual or entity must be a “party” as that term is defined, in relevant part, in section 120.52 . . . challenger to agency action meets the “substantial interest” element of sub-paragraph (b) of section 120.52 . . . In this respect, Partners is a “party” as defined in subsection (a) of section 120.52(18), as being a . . . of Agrico, who needed to demonstrate a ‘substantial interest in the proceeding’ pursuant to section 120.52 . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, v. PETER R. BROWN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 108 So. 3d 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . alleged that the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to section 120.52 . . . 40.103 constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in violation of subsection 120.52 . . . Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2012), defines “invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority . . . Section 120.52(2), Florida Statutes (2012), defines “law implemented,” as “the language of the enabling . . . An administrative rule is invalid under section 120.52(8)(d), Florida Statutes, if it forbids or requires . . .

SUBIRATS, v. FIDELITY NATIONAL PROPERTY,, 106 So. 3d 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . .”); see also § 120.52(8). . . .

IVEY, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 103 So. 3d 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . . § 120.52(7), Florida Statutes; see also Hill v. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, v. BAYFRONT MEDICAL CENTER, INC. d b a St. s d b a St. s HCA d b a HCA d b a, 134 So. 3d 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . centers in the State of Florida brought a rule challenge pursuant to sections 120.56(1) and (3) and 120.52 . . . The term “invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority” is defined in section 120.52(8), Florida . . . than implementing or interpreting the specific powers and duties conferred by the enabling statute. § 120.52 . . . with the Department of Health’s grant of rulemaking authority” and is therefore invalid under section 120.52 . . . section 395.402(4)(a) & (b), Florida Statutes; thus, the rule, by necessity, complies with section 120.52 . . .

J. S. v. C. M. L. C. J. S. L. L. J. F. C. A, s, 135 So. 3d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . ALJ then concluded as follows: APD 04-007 is a statement meeting the definition of a rule in section 120.52 . . . 120.54(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), provides that “each agency statement defined as a rule by s. 120.52 . . . a joint stipulation to the effect that the agency statement met the definition of a rule in section 120.52 . . . which the ALJ properly determined that the agency statement met the definition of a rule in section 120.52 . . .

DECKER, v. UNIVERSITY OF WEST FLORIDA,, 85 So. 3d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . .” § 120.52(1), Fla. Stat. . . .

COUCHMAN, v. UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA,, 84 So. 3d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Section 120.52(1) defines “agency” to mean the following officers or governmental entities if acting . . . university “when the university is acting pursuant to statutory authority derived from the Legislature.” § 120.52 . . .

WASHINGTON COUNTY, v. NORTHWEST FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, L. v., 85 So. 3d 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . See § 120.52(2), Fla. . . .

ELMWOOD TERRACE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, v. FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION,, 73 So. 3d 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Stat. (2009); see also § 120.52(16), Fla. . . .

MOONIER, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, 73 So. 3d 366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . P. 9.020(h); § 120.52(7) Fla. Stat. (2008); Hill v. . . .

WHILEY, v. SCOTT,, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011)

. . . . § 120.52(17), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . . ] the procedure or practice requirements of an agency.” § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . . See §§ 120.54(3)(a)4; 120.52(4), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . . See § 120.52(17), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . . the adoption of less costly alternatives that substantially accomplish the statutory objectives. § 120.52 . . .

ST. JOHNS RIVERKEEPER, INC. v. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT,, 54 So. 3d 1051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Additionally, section 120.52(13)(b) defines “party” as “[a]ny other person who, as a matter of constitutional . . .

FT. MYERS REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC, v. DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI- MUTUEL WAGERING,, 53 So. 3d 1158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See § 120.52(13)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .

FLORIDA ELECTIONS COMMISSION, v. L. BLAIR,, 52 So. 3d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Additionally, the so-called “flush left” paragraph at the end of section 120.52(8) provides: A grant . . . In 2008, the Legislature amended section 120.52 to add a definition of “rulemak-ing authority.” . . . There is nothing in the language of section 120.52(17) or its legislative history suggesting an intent . . . The use of the word “explicitly” in section 120.52(17) is consistent with the settled principle that . . . Absent such, we conclude that the definition of “rule-making authority” in section 120.52(17) was merely . . .

STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION, v. R. HUBERTY, R. v., 46 So. 3d 1144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . .” § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

AMERILOSS PUBLIC ADJUSTING CORP. v. In LIGHTBOURN,, 46 So. 3d 107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . . § 120.52(13), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

COVENTRY FIRST, LLC, v. STATE OFFICE OF INSURANCE REGULATION,, 38 So. 3d 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . ANALYSIS The legislature defines an administrative rule at section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes: “Rule . . . Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes, states that a rule “includes any form which imposes any requirement . . .

OFFICE OF INSURANCE REGULATION, v. LIFE INSURANCE SETTLEMENT ASSOCIATION,, 31 So. 3d 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . found Interrogatory l.d. enlarged the specific provisions of law implemented as contemplated by section 120.52 . . .

STUDENTS FOR ONLINE VOTING, F. A. Jr. v. MACHEN,, 24 So. 3d 1273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 120.52(7), Fla. Stat. (2009); Bank of Port St. Joe v. . . .

W. FRANK WELLS NURSING HOME, v. STATE AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION,, 27 So. 3d 73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . The Second District reversed, finding that, pursuant to section 120.52(10)(b), Florida Statutes, the . . . specifically named party whose substantial interests were determined in the proceeding pursuant to sections 120.52 . . .

L. MORELAND, II L. MORELAND, Sr. Jr. v. AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES,, 19 So. 3d 1009 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . the Proposed Rules on a number of grounds, including that the rules were invalid pursuant to section 120.52 . . . However, pursuant to section 120.52(8), a rule is invalid if it contravenes the statute which it implements . . .

LAMAR OUTDOOR ADVERTISING- LAKELAND, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 17 So. 3d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Under section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2007), a rule by an administrative agency may be challenged . . . contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(3)(a)1.” § 120.52 . . . Also, the last paragraph of section 120.52(8) includes general standards for challenging a rule and provides . . . See § 120.52(8), Fla. . . .

ABBOTT LABORATORIES, v. MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., 15 So. 3d 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Subsection 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2007), defines “invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority . . .

FIRST QUALITY HOME CARE, INC. v. ALLIANCE FOR AGING, INC., 14 So. 3d 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . First, section 120.52(l)(a), which applies to the Governor’s exercise of executive powers other than . . . We, therefore, conclude that Alliance is not an “agency” as defined by section 120.52(1). . . . This conclusion is further supported by subsection 120.52(l)(c)’s reference to “[e]ach other unit of . . . Corp., 448 So.2d 1074, 1082-83 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (stating that subsections of 120.52(1) must be read . . . Therefore, we hold that Alliance is not a “board” as that term is used in section 120.52(1)(b)(3). . . .

PALM BEACH COUNTY ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Co., 14 So. 3d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . .” § 120.52(13)(b), Fla. Stat.; see also AmeriSteel Corp. v. Clark, 691 So.2d 473, 477 (Fla.1997). . . .

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, v. M. HARDEN,, 10 So. 3d 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . which [Harden’s] application was reviewed meets the definition of a ‘rule’ set forth at subsection 120.52 . . . procedure did not fall within one of the exceptions to the requirement of rulemaking set forth in section 120.52 . . . important to the public and which [has] no application outside the agency issuing the memorandum.” § 120.52 . . .

SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, v. SURVIVORS CHARTER SCHOOLS, INC., 3 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2009)

. . . . § 120.52(l)(b)3, Fla. . . .

PEACE RIVER MANASOTA REGIONAL WATER SUPPLY AUTHORITY v. IMC PHOSPHATES COMPANY n k a LLC, 18 So. 3d 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Section 120.52(12)(b) defines a “party” as “[a]ny other person who, as a matter of constitutional right . . . Accordingly, the Authority was properly a “party” under section 120.52(10) and therefore had “standing . . .

COLLIER COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, v. FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, v. v., 993 So. 2d 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 120.52(2) defines agency action as “the whole or part of a rule or order, or the equivalent, . . . Section 120.52(7) defines a final order as a written final decision which results from a proceeding under . . . Section 120.52(3) provides, “ ‘Agency head’ means the person or collegial body in a department or other . . .

AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, v. CUSTOM MOBILITY, INC., 995 So. 2d 984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . .” § 120.52(15), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .

J. NORKUNAS, v. STATE BUILDING COMMISSION, s LLC,, 982 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . However, rather than being a “party” as the term is defined in section 120.52(12), Norkunas is in fact . . .

HAINES, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 983 So. 2d 602 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . However, section 409.175(2)(d) states: “License” means “license” as defined in s. 120.52(9). . . .

ROSENZWEIG, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 979 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 120.52(12)(b), Florida Statutes, provides that a party to an administrative proceeding is “any . . .

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, d b a v. JM AUTO, INC. d b a JM, 977 So. 2d 733 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . agree with the ALJ’s determination that this general grant of authority was insufficient under sections 120.52 . . .

GOLDEN WEST FINANCIAL CORPORATION, SSB, FSB, f k a WLC s v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 975 So. 2d 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Florida SRLY rule is “an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority” prohibited by section 120.52 . . . Section 120.52(8) tells us that [a] grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not sufficient to . . . , or contravenes the specific provisions of law [purportedly] implemented” in violation of- section 120.52 . . . statutes and, therefore, “is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority” prohibited by section 120.52 . . .

MAE VOLEN SENIOR CENTER, INC. v. AREA AGENCY ON AGING PALM BEACH TREASURE COAST, INC., 978 So. 2d 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . . § 120.52(l)(b), Fla. Stat. . . .

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, v. CAPITAL COLLATERAL REGIONAL COUNSEL- MIDDLE REGION W., 969 So. 2d 527 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Department of Financial Services had applied an unadopted and unwritten rule, as defined by section 120.52 . . . requirement or solicits any information not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule. § 120.52 . . . Section 120.52(15)(b) states that the term rule does not include: “Legal memoranda or opinions issued . . .

FLORIDA POWER LIGHT COMPANY, v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,, 970 So. 2d 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . the DEP’s proposed rule was a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to sections 120.52 . . .

COURTS, v. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION,, 965 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . waiver is not “an agency statement of general policy,” and thus not a “rule” as defined in section 120.52 . . .

COASTAL FUELS MARKETING, INC. v. CANAVERAL PORT AUTHORITY,, 962 So. 2d 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Appellant directs our attention to the statutory definition of “agency,” and in particular section 120.52 . . . See § 120.52(1)(c), Fla. . . . 1986), the court considered whether the hospital board was an agency within the definition of section 120.52 . . .

SURVIVORS CHARTER SCHOOLS, INC. v. SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY,, 968 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . . § 120.52(l)(b)7., (6), Fla. Stat. . . . Under section 120.52, the School Board is an agency to which the APA generally applies. . . .

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF JUPITER INLET DISTRICT, v. THIBADEAU, 956 So. 2d 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . See § 120.52(12)(b), Fla. Stat. (defining the term “party”); AmeriSteel Corp. v. . . .

VALE, v. R. McDONOUGH,, 958 So. 2d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . once a rule, or an agency statement or form that constitutes a rule under the definition in section 120.52 . . .

P. J. S. III, a v. SCHOOL BOARD OF CITRUS COUNTY,, 951 So. 2d 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Section 120.52(12)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), defines the term “party” in pertinent part as “[sjpecifically . . .

HANGER PROSTHETICS AND ORTHOTICS, INC. J. v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF ORTHOTISTS AND PROSTHETISTS,, 948 So. 2d 980 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . argue the Board’s proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority under section 120.52 . . . the proposed rule “enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented.” § 120.52 . . .

ASSOCIATION OF FLORIDA COMMUNITY DEVELOPERS v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, St., 943 So. 2d 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . discuss why the proposed rule is not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority under section 120.52 . . . that neither section constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority under section 120.52 . . . legislative authority when it enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provision of law implemented. § 120.52 . . . “Under section 120.52(8)(c), the test is whether a (proposed) rule gives effect to a ‘specific law to . . . rule implements or interprets ‘specific powers and duties.’ ” Day Cruise, 794 So.2d at 704 (citing § 120.52 . . .

MID- CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER USERS, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,, 948 So. 2d 794 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . Section 120.52, Florida Statutes (2005), sets forth in part: (12) “Party” means: (a) Specifically named . . .

VOLUSIA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, v. VOLUSIA HOMES BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, INC., 946 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes (2004), defined a rule as an agency statement of general applicability . . . repeal is required to satisfy independently the remainder of the definition of a ‘rule’ ” in section 120.52 . . .

FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMISSION v. FLORIDA INSURANCE COUNCIL, INC., 938 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . several of their proposed rules invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority pursuant to section 120.52 . . .

FRAZIER, v. ALEXANDRE,, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2006)

. . . . § 120.52(15), or an order, § 120.52(7). . . .

McKENZIE CHECK ADVANCE OF FLORIDA, LLC. v. BETTS,, 928 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 2006)

. . . See § 120.52(8)(c), Fla. . . .

HARTMAN- TYNER, INC. St. v. DIVISION OF PARI- MUTUEL WAGERING, DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION,, 923 So. 2d 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . found, among other things, (1) that Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-11.027(l)(a) violated section 120.52 . . . rulemaking authority, modified the specific law implemented, and was arbitrary, thus violating sections 120.52 . . . ), (c), and (e), Florida Statutes, and (3) that rules 61D-11.027(l)(e) and (2)(b) violated sections 120.52 . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, v. W. MERRITT, D. C. v. W. D. C., 919 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . 1st DCA 2002), addressed the meaning of the term “competent substantial evidence” as used in section 120.52 . . . In the year following the publication of Cosmetic Surgery, the Legislature amended section 120.52(8) . . .

M. FELDMAN, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,, 919 So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . institutionalized spouse, and because the memorandum satisfied the definition of “rule,” as provided in section 120.52 . . .

GALLAGHER, v. C. DUPONT,, 918 So. 2d 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . identified in section 20.13, Florida Statutes (2003), or included within the definitions at section 120.52 . . .

SMITH, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 920 So. 2d 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . .” §§ 120.52(8)(b)-(c), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . . In addition, under the standard set forth in section 120.52(8), the Department’s arguments as to the . . . specific grant of legislative authority for those provisions under the standard set forth in section 120.52 . . . The current version of section 120.52(8) cited here is identical in all material respects to the version . . . Compare § 120.52(8), Fla. Stat. (2004) with § 120.52(8), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .

DILLARD ASSOCIATES CONSULTING ENGINEERS A. Jr. v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,, 893 So. 2d 702 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Section 120.52(12)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), defines “party” as “[a]ny other person who, as a matter . . .

TOTH, v. SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT,, 895 So. 2d 482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . . § 120.52(12)(a) and § 120.57(l)(e)l, Fla. Stat. (2003). . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, v. I. B. D. B., 891 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . adopt a rule only because it is reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation.... ” §§ 120.52 . . . Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2003), lists the circumstances under which a proposed or existing . . . Petitioners have demonstrated the amended rule’s invalidity both under section 120.52(8)(b), and under . . . section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes (2003). . . . Act applies to DCFS, no less than to every other “state department, and each departmental unit.” § 120.52 . . .

KERPER v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,, 894 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes (2003) defines an agency rule, in part, as an “agency statement . . . Each agency statement defined as a rule by s. 120.52 shall be adopted by the rulemaking procedure provided . . .

LENNAR HOMES, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES,, 888 So. 2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . effect of the statement was the issuance of a non-adopted rule, contrary to the provisions of section 120.52 . . . The agency’s statement can, by no stretch of the imagination, be said to be, as required by section 120.52 . . . (15), “one of general applicability that ... prescribes law or policy.” § 120.52(15), Fla. . . . action can hardly be described as “an agency statement of general applicability,” as defined in section 120.52 . . . Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes (2002), defines "Rule,” in pertinent part, as follows: [E]ach agency . . . Florida's Administrative Procedure Act regarding the scope of agency rulemaking authority, see sections 120.52 . . .

BETTS, v. McKENZIE CHECK ADVANCE OF FLORIDA, LLC, d b a A. G., 879 So. 2d 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (1997), states: (8) “Invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority . . .