CopyCited 106 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 30 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 143, 2005 Fla. LEXIS 400, 2005 WL 549896
...Consequently, an order was entered on July 3, 2002, closing the Department's file, canceling the scheduled final hearing, and closing the DOAH file. On August 5, 2002, Daniels filed a petition for attorney's fees under the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act (FEAJA), section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2002), seeking an award of attorney's fees and costs....
...er. See Daniels,
868 So.2d at 551-52. We granted review based on certified conflict of decisions. ANALYSIS The key issue in this case is whether Daniels, the sole owner of a subchapter-S corporation, qualifies as a small business party as defined in section
57.111, Florida Statutes (2002), when suit is brought against her individually and not against the corporation....
...Baker,
668 So.2d 989, 990-91 (Fla.1996). Because statutes providing for attorney's fees are in abrogation of the common law, such statutes are to be strictly construed. See Sarkis v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
863 So.2d 210, 223 (Fla.2003). The statute at issue in this case, section
57.111, Florida Statutes (2002), is clear and unambiguous. It provides in relevant part:
57.111 Civil actions and administrative proceedings initiated by state agencies; attorneys' fees and costs....
...The final order of an administrative law judge is reviewable in accordance with the provisions of s.
120.68. If the court affirms the award of attorney's fees and costs in whole or in part, it may, in its *66 discretion, award additional attorney's fees and costs for the appeal. §
57.111, Fla....
...son fits the statutory criteria of a small business party. The Department's complaint was filed against Daniels individually. Thus the question before this Court is whether she is included within the statutory definition of a "small business party"? Section 57.111(3)(d)(1)(a) defines a small business party as an entity that is a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business. Daniels does not fit this definition because she practices under South Beach Maternity, a subchapter-S corporation, and not as a sole proprietor. Additionally, she is not included within section 57.111(3)(d)(1)(b) because the agency filed a complaint against her as an individual and not against her corporation, South Beach Maternity....
...for a corporation wholly owned by him and his wife. Shealy prevailed in an administrative proceeding, obtained the license, and sought attorney's fees from the Commission under FEAJA. In reversing the attorney's fees award, the First District said: Section 57.111 authorizes an attorney's fee for a qualifying small business party, which must be a corporation, a partnership, or a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business. See § 57.111(3)(d)1.a and b, Fla.Stat....
...Although the appellee and the corporation were found to be "one and the same entity" based on the appellee's control of the business, the statute does not permit such disregard of the corporate form. The appellee was not a small business party as defined by the statute, and he thus should not have been awarded a section 57.111 attorney's fee....
...nd Ramiro Alfert. After this dismissal, Toledo Realty was awarded attorney's fees under FEAJA, but Alfert was not. In affirming the denial of attorney's fees for Alfert, the First District found that he was not a "small business party" as defined by section 57.111(3)(d), since he was an employee of Toledo Realty....
...d and pardoned for his prior conviction. The Department then reinstated him, and he thereafter filed a petition for attorney's fees under FEAJA. The hearing officer denied the petition, finding Thompson was not a "small business party" as defined by section 57.111(3)(d), because the action was brought against him as an individual....
...cords to a patient.
763 So.2d at 1131. The suit was dismissed, and Albert sought attorney's fees under FEAJA. The administrative law judge denied the motion for fees and found that Albert was not a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business under section
57.111(3)(d)(1)(a), Florida Statutes, because he practiced as a professional association. The administrative law judge also found that Albert could not qualify as a corporation or partnership under section
57.111(3)(d)(1)(b), Florida Statutes, because the complaint was filed against him individually, not his professional association....
...quest for attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the Fourth District reversed, finding that Ann & Jan, the entity that brought the appeal, and Sophie DeRuiter were "one and the same entity" and thus qualified as a "small business party" as defined by section 57.111(3)(d) a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business....
...employee of the corporation and not against the corporation itself. Although Daniels and South Beach Maternity are one and the same entity in that Daniels controls South Beach Maternity and owns 100% of its stock, strict adherence to the language of section 57.111(3)(d) compels us to reach the conclusion that Daniels is not a small business party, because she is not a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business and because South Beach Maternity was not a party to any of these proceedings....
...ary adjudication was initiated.... *69 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Thus, the federal act specifically provides for the award of fees to qualifying individuals. After its federal counterpart was created, the Florida Legislature enacted section 57.111, Florida Statutes, in 1984. [3] The portion of FEAJA which is at issue here, section 57.111(3)(d), was included in the original 1984 act and remains unchanged....
...We decline to look beyond the plain language of the statute, and leave expansion of the rights conferred under the statute to the Legislature. CONCLUSION Because the Department's complaint was filed against Daniels individually, she does not fall within either definition of a "small business party" contained in section 57.111(3)(d)1....
CopyCited 15 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Braxton, P.A., Miami, for appellees/cross appellants. ERVIN, Judge. The Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) appeals a final order of a Division of Administrative Hearings officer, awarding attorney's fees against it pursuant to the provisions of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1987), the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act (FEAJA)....
...lty, Inc. (TRI), and Alfert. The basis of the hearing officer's denial of fees to Alfert in the present action was that, because Alfert was an employee of TRI, he therefore did not fall within the definition of a small business party, as provided in section 57.111(3)(d)....
...g the administrative complaint. We approve of the hearing officer's interpretation of the statute, insofar as it relates to the parties' respective burdens. We consider that his construction is consistent with the legislative purpose, as provided in section 57.111(2), which is "to diminish the deterrent effect of ......
...s such construction is harmonious with the spirit and policy of Florida legislation on the subject. Gentele v. Department of Professional Regulation, Bd. of Optometry,
513 So.2d 672, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Section 504(a)(1) of the EAJA, similar to Section
57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes, provides: (a)(1) An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a prevailing party other than the United States, fees and other expenses incurred by that party in connection with that proceed...
...NLRB,
710 F.2d 748, 750 (11th Cir.1983). The above portion of the comments, establishing the standard of reasonableness, i.e., that the government show that its "case had a reasonable basis in both law and fact," has been explicitly adopted by the Florida Legislature. See section
57.111(3)(e), providing: "A proceeding is `substantially justified' if it had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated by a state agency." Although we agree with the hearing officer's preliminary determination that the...
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 3176, 1991 WL 46857
...Fingar, of Huey, Guilday, Kuersteiner & Tucker, P.A., Tallahassee, for appellee. ERVIN, Judge. The Department of Environmental Regulation (DER or department) appeals from a summary final order entered by the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH or division), assessing against it attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1989), in favor of Puckett Oil Company, Inc....
...om the very statutes that rule 22I-6.035 referenced as authorizing its adoption: Section
120.57, Florida Statutes (1989), specifically subsection (1)(b)4, authorizing parties "to respond, to present evidence and argument on all issues," and sections
57.111(4)(c) and (d), allowing a state agency against which a small business party has prevailed to oppose an application for attorney's fees and costs by affidavit, and requiring the hearing officer to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the application....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 182035
...§ 501 to provide that relief for infringement is available against "`anyone' includ[ing] any State." See Unix System Laboratories, Inc. v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc.,
832 F. Supp. 790 (D.N.J. 1993). [3] The Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, section
57.111, Florida Statutes (1993), confers final order authority on hearing officers to award attorney's fees and costs in certain circumstances. §
57.111(4)(d), Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9214, 1995 WL 389309
...t and written findings of fact and law by the hearing officer. Fla.Stat. §
120.57. Moreover, a dentist may appeal decisions of the DPR to Florida's District Courts of Appeal. See id. Brown,
602 So.2d at 1338-39. Finally, pursuant to Florida Statute §
57.111, a plaintiff may seek attorneys fees for actions filed against them by the DPR or Board without substantial justification....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 76514
...of Health and Rehabilitative Services, West Palm Beach, for appellee. DELL, Judge. Ann and Jan Retirement Villa, Inc., appeals from an order of the Department of Administrative Hearings which denied its claim for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1990), also known as the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act....
...denial of the license renewal. Although the hearing on the motion was scheduled for September 8, 1989, on September 7, HRS filed a notice of dismissal. In February, 1990, DOAH conducted a hearing solely on the issue of appellant's entitlement under section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1990) to attorney's fees and costs incurred in the appeal of HRS's denial of the license....
...eRuiter. Under these facts, we hold that the record shows substantial compliance with Rule 22I-6.035. Next, the hearing officer found that HRS's denial of Sophie DeRuiter's license renewal (through its OLC agency) was "substantially justified" under section 57.111(4)(a). Section 57.111(3)(e) provides that such action is "substantially justified" *280 where there exists a reasonable basis in law and fact for the agency action at the time the agency initiates the action....
...The record shows that if Aging and Adult Services had conducted a reasonable investigation, the unsubstantiated report against Sophie DeRuiter would not have made its way into the abuse registry. The legislature, to protect small businesses from such action, enacted section
57.111 "to provide alternative, and in some cases, additional means for a small business to recover costs and attorney fees when a state agency initiates action against it ..." City of Naples Airport Authority v. Collier Development Corp.,
515 So.2d 1058 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1987). The term "initiated by a state agency" means, in pertinent part, that the state agency, under section
57.111(3)(b)(3), "[w]as required by law or rule to advise a small business party of a clear point of entry after some recognizable event in the investigatory or other free-form proceeding of the agency." Moreover, section 400.414(2)(e), Flori...
...Here, the report of abuse, as entered in the abuse registry, was never substantiated, was not upheld following a chapter 120 hearing and, in fact, was abandoned when appellee dropped its objections to the license renewal. Accordingly, we hold that HRS failed to prove substantial justification for its actions under section 57.111(3)(e). Finally, we disagree with the hearing officer's finding that appellant did not qualify as a small business party as defined by section 57.111. The record shows that Sophie DeRuiter and Ann and Jan Retirement Villa are one and the same entity. We note that the hearing officer at one point acknowledged that fact. Section 57.111(3)(d) states that "[t]he term "small business party" means: 1.a....
...that she owned and operated Ann and Jan Retirement Villa, she never employed more than 25 full-time employees. The record also shows that the combined net worth of Ms. DeRuiter and the Ann and Jan Retirement Villa was less than two million dollars. Section 57.111(3)(c) provides: (c) A small business party is a "prevailing small business party" when: *281 1......
...HRS voluntarily dismissed its stated objections to Sophie DeRuiter's license renewal. Further, HRS's wrongful refusal to renew appellant's licence caused appellant to incur attorney's fees and costs in order to defend its right to continue to operate the business. Section 57.111(2) states: The purpose of this section is to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action by providing in certain situations an award of attorney's fees and costs against the state. Accordingly, we hold that the Division of Administrative Hearings erred when it denied appellant's claim for attorney's fees and costs as contemplated by section 57.111. We reverse the order on appeal and we remand this cause with instructions to enter an order awarding Ann and Jan Retirement Villa, Inc., reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1990)....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 2361
...We find no merit to appellant's second point contending the trial court erred in not allowing sufficient time for rebuttal evidence. Appellant's remaining point concerning assessment of the maximum amount of costs which can be assessed against appellant under section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1985), is premature in this case and is the subject of a companion appeal now pending before this court in case number 87-1057....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 107406
...Witte of Patterson and Traynham, Tallahassee, for appellant. John R. Perry, Asst. Dist. Legal Counsel, Tallahassee, for appellee. ZEHMER, Judge. Ira W. Thompson appeals a final order of the Division of Administrative Hearings denying his petition for attorney's fees filed pursuant to § 57.111, Florida Statutes (1987), the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act....
...It was determined that Thompson's position of director was not a "care-taker" position within the meaning of section
393.0655, so the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services was ordered to reinstate Thompson. Thompson then filed a petition for attorney's fees pursuant to section
57.111....
...substantially unjustified in law and in fact, and [that] no circumstances exist[ed] that would make the requested award unjust." The hearing officer denied the petition for attorney's fees, finding that Thompson did not meet the criteria outlined in § 57.111(3)(d) to be considered a "small business party." Section 57.111, Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 264612
...The Department's reward for its laudable conduct was an order requiring that it pay fees to Salter for his prosecution of an uncontested matter. The circuit court order under review suggests no other bases to justify its award of fees. We reject Salter's supposition that fees were awarded pursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1997), which governs fee awards in administrative proceedings initiated by state agencies. He has made no attempt to bring himself, a motorist arrested for driving under the influence, within the definition of a "small business party," the only beneficiary of that statute. See § 57.111(3)(d)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 82454
...Co., Inc.,
396 So.2d at 788; General Development Corp. v. Florida Land & Water Adjudicatory Comm'n,
368 So.2d 1323, 1326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Our disposition on the merits necessarily forecloses the Youngs' second point on appeal, a claim for attorney's fees pursuant to section
57.111, Florida Statutes (1987)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1987 WL 1807
...[1] CDC's subsequent motion to tax costs pursuant to section
57.041, Florida Statutes (1985), was granted, and a cost judgment in the amount of $39,497.96 was entered. This timely appeal followed. The airport authority does not contest the individual cost assessments but contends that section
57.111(4)(d)(2), Florida Statutes (1985), controls the disposition of this matter so that $15,000 is the maximum amount of costs that could be awarded to CDC. CDC, on the other hand, contends that the airport authority is not a state agency and, therefore, section
57.111(4)(d)(2) does not apply. CDC also contends that section
57.111 provides an additional or alternative remedy to small businesses but does not limit a cost award entered pursuant to section
57.041. Since we agree with CDC's second contention, it is not necessary for us to decide whether the airport authority is a state agency or whether CDC qualifies as a small business party according to the provisions of section
57.111. CDC, as the prevailing party in the trial court, sought to recover its costs pursuant to section
57.041. Prior to the enactment of section
57.111 in 1984, costs clearly could be taxed in favor of the party recovering a judgment against the state or one of its agencies....
...CDC, accordingly, would have had the statutory right pursuant to section
57.041 to recover its costs without being subject to a statutory maximum even if the airport authority is a "state agency." We disagree with the airport authority's contention that because the legislature enacted section
57.111 after the Simpson decision, the legislature was aware that the effect of the section would be to limit the award of costs when a state agency initiates an action. We conclude that rather than being intended to effect a limitation on cost awards, section
57.111 was designed to provide costs and/or attorney's fees in some situations where there were then no provisions for these awards. For instance, section
57.111 provides for costs and attorney's fees in actions that are purely administrative, whereas section
57.041 provides for costs in judicial actions only. See Allen United Enterprises v. Special Disability Fund,
288 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1974). Furthermore, although here CDC would have been entitled to recover costs against the airport authority prior to the enactment of section
57.111, it would have been able to recover attorney's fees only if it could have established that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the airport authority. See §
57.105, Fla. Stat. (1985). On the other hand, if CDC qualified as a small business party under section
57.111, it would be entitled to limited attorney's fees and costs as the prevailing party unless the actions of the agency were substantially justified or special circumstances existed which would make the award unjust. See §
57.111(4)(a)....
...Rather than establishing a limitation, we believe that the legislature intended to provide an alternative, and in some cases, an additional means for a small business to recover costs and attorney's fees when a state agency initiates an action against it. This construction of section
57.111 gives both statutory sections a field of operation and does not repeal or render section
57.041 ineffective. See Oldham v. Rooks,
361 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1978). This construction, furthermore, does not place section
57.111 in conflict with section
57.041 or section
57.105, or with other statutes covering the same general field. See Howarth v. City of De Land,
117 Fla. 692,
158 So. 294 (1934). Finally, our interpretation of section
57.111 is supported by the legislative intent as expressed within the statute itself. [2] Section
57.111(1) provides that the section may be cited as the "Florida Equal Access to Justice Act." The title of a section is a *1060 direct statement by the legislature of its intent. State v. Webb,
398 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1981). This title, along with the legislature's statement of its findings and the expressed purpose of the enactment set forth in section
57.111(2), [3] together with the act's limited application, evidences the legislature's intention to provide at least a partial remedy for those too frequent situations where small businesses find opposing state agency action too expensive even when the state agency action may appear to be totally unjustified. There is no language in section
57.111 which directly indicates that the legislature intended for the section to operate to limit costs and attorney's fees to $15,000 in every case where the prevailing party is a "small business party." Neither do we find that intention imp...
...ion could have the effect of placing small business parties in a less advantageous position, not a more equal position, when it comes to defending themselves against state agency action. In this case, CDC's costs exceeded $15,000. Since we hold that section
57.111 does not take away any rights a party has under section
57.041, CDC had the right to proceed as it did, and the court was correct in awarding the costs under section
57.041 without determining whether CDC qualified as a small business party or whether the airport authority was a state agency....
...warding costs, was appealed separately, and our decision affirming that judgment is reported in City of Naples Airport Authority v. Collier Development Corp.,
513 So.2d 247 (Fla. 2d DCA Sept. 30, 1987). [2] While we believe the legislative intent of section
57.111 is clear on the face of the statute, its legislative history confirms our interpretation of the appropriate purpose and scope of section
57.111. See Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statements for Senate Bill No. 438 (Apr. 5, 1984, and May 2, 1984). [3] Section
57.111(2), Florida Statutes (1985), provides: The Legislature finds that certain persons may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against, unreasonable governmental action because of the expense of civil actions and administrative proceedings....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1992 WL 170980
...licensee is entitled to a section
120.57 evidentiary hearing to accord him an opportunity to prove that probable cause was improvidently found. Toledo Realty addressed only whether, when ruling on a motion for attorney's fees against an agency under section
57.111 (the Florida Equal Access To Justice Act) on the ground that the agency was not substantially justified in initiating the disciplinary complaint, a hearing officer is required to consider evidence contained in the Department's investigative file that supported the Department's probable cause determination....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1673
...of Professional Regulation, Tallahassee, for appellee/cross-appellant. ERVIN, Judge. Dr. Anthony Gentele, O.D. (Gentele), appeals the final order issued by the DOAH hearing officer denying his application for attorney's fees and costs under the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act (FEAJA), Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) cross-appeals, contending that the hearing officer erred in his conclusion that Gentele was a small business party under section 57.111(3)(c). We hold that the hearing officer correctly denied an award of attorney's fees in determining that the actions of the DPR were "substantially justified" within the meaning of section 57.111(3)(e), and therefore decline to address the issue raised in the cross-appeal. Section 57.111 provides that attorney's fees and costs shall be made to a prevailing small business party in any adjudicatory proceeding or administrative proceeding under chapter 120 initiated by a state agency, unless the actions of the agency were substantially justified, or special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust. A proceeding is "substantially justified" if it had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated by the agency. Section 57.111(3)(e)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1993 WL 40477
...of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Pensacola, for appellant. William Eddins, Pensacola, for appellee. WIGGINTON, Judge. These consolidated appeals are brought from separate orders entered by the hearing officer awarding attorney's fees pursuant to sections
120.57(1)(b)5., and
57.111, Florida Statutes. For the following reasons, we approve the award under section
57.111, but reverse the award under section
120.57....
...f particulars [filed by HRS prior to the final administrative hearing] evinced a `frivolous purpose' within the meaning of the statute." Additionally, the hearing officer found that this award of fees "shall be without prejudice to proceedings under section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1989), and Rule 22I.6.035, Florida Administrative Code, for recovery of costs and fees incurred before the filing of the bill of particulars or for other non-duplicative costs." The recommendation of the hearing offi...
...The hearing officer went on to find that during this same period, appellee also incurred costs in the amount of $1,015.50. Accordingly, the hearing officer ordered HRS to pay appellee $6,415.50. The hearing officer also considered appellee's timely petition filed under section 57.111 seeking fees pursuant to Florida's Equal Access to Justice Act, section 57.111(4)(b)1....
...HRS' argument that the question of substantial justification was res judicata in light of the earlier agency final order wherein the agency concluded that the bill of particulars was not frivolous. In that regard, the hearing officer concluded that section 57.111, "which authorizes hearing officers to award attorney's fees and costs against agencies in appropriate cases, confers no authority on the agency litigant to insulate itself from an award by self-serving conclusions in the final order i...
...[2] That the hearing officer chose to adopt appellee's position over that of HRS should not be the basis "for harsh punitive action." Id. at 278-79. Accordingly, we are compelled to reverse the order awarding fees pursuant to section
120.57(1)(b)5. [3] CASE NO. 92-679:
57.111 FEES AND COSTS Section
57.111 is known as the "Florida Equal Access to Justice Act." See section
57.111(1), Florida Statutes....
...ordingly, the statute's stated purpose "is to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, the governmental action by providing in certain situations an award of attorney's fees and costs against the state." To that end, section 57.111(4)(a) provides for an award of attorney's fees to be made to a prevailing small business party "unless the actions of the agency were substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust." (Emphasis...
...Thus, as *1386 HRS urged in the preceding case, appellee's failure to appeal the initial agency final order renders the agency's conclusion of law on this point res judicata. Again, we disagree with HRS' position. By virtue of the clear authorization given a hearing officer under section 57.111(4)(d) to award attorney's fees against a governmental entity, no real issue exists as to an agency's prerogative to countermand such an award....
...Thus, HRS' position that the agency's final order was res judicata on this point is completely without merit. However, equally as erroneous is HRS' equating a finding of "no frivolous purpose" with a finding of "substantial justification," as that phrase is defined in subsection
57.111(3)(e). In Gentele v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Optometry,
513 So.2d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), this court addressed the issue of whether fees were properly awarded pursuant to section
57.111, and concluded that it must follow persuasive federal authority in defining the scope of the statutory definition of "substantially justified." In that respect, McDonald v....
...at 316. Thus, the clear implication is that while governmental action may not be so unfounded as to be frivolous, it may nonetheless be based on such an unsteady foundation factually and legally as not to be substantially justified. Similarly, under section 57.111(3)(e), a proceeding is considered to have been "substantially justified" if "it had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated by a state agency." Consequently, HRS' first point urging that the agency's final order rejecting the finding of frivolous purpose also established that HRS' action was substantially justified, and was therefore res judicata for purposes of section 57.111, is equally without merit. Next, under Point II, HRS questions whether appellee's act of pleading entitlement to attorney's fees under section 57.111 after final judgment in the main case waived her right to attorney's fees under the recent supreme court decision in Stockman v....
...s part, in spite of the fact that HRS possessed knowledge that there may have been a misunderstanding between appellee and Dr. Campbell. Knowing that "substantially justified" may not be equated with the term "non-frivolous," and given the fact that section 57.111 is clearly a rule of inclusion mandating the award of fees to a prevailing small business unless the agency was substantially justified, we hold that the award of fees below was appropriate....
...at the time it was initiated and therefore was not "substantially justified." Cf. Ann & Jan Retirement Villa, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services,
580 So.2d 278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Accordingly, we affirm the fees awarded under section
57.111. However, in light of the fact that we have reversed the fees awarded under section
120.57(1)(b)5., and because section
57.111, being more pervasive than
120.57(1)(b)5., authorizes an award of fees for the entire cost of the proceedings, we remand the cause to the hearing officer to consider appellee's right to seek additional fees under section
57.111, since he expressly did not award duplicative fees. AFFIRMED, in part, REVERSED, in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. KAHN and MICKLE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, section
57.111, Florida Statutes, at issue in case no. 92-679, clearly authorizes a hearing officer, and not the agency, to enter a final order on an application for award of attorney's fees. See section
57.111(4)(d). Since section
57.111 is more pervasive in that it allows an award of fees for the entire cost of the proceedings, and not simply an award as a sanction for opposing a particular pleading, we believe the legislative grant of authority to the hearing officer in section
57.111 proceedings is persuasive authority that the hearing officer possesses a similar prerogative under section
120.57(1)(b)5....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 4958, 19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 1149
...Atty. Gen., Orlando, for appellant. Joel Hirschhorn and Robert M. Einhorn of Joel Hirschhorn, P.A., Coral Gables, for appellee. ALLEN, Judge. The Florida Real Estate Commission appeals an order by which the appellee was awarded an attorney's fee under section 57.111, Florida Statutes....
...reversed. *152 The Commission initially denied the appellee's application for a real estate sales license. The appellee challenged this action and prevailed in an administrative proceeding, eventually obtaining licensure. The appellee then sought a section 57.111 attorney's fee, which may be recovered by a prevailing small business party....
...The appellee indicated that he desired the license for work which he intended to perform on behalf of a corporation wholly owned by himself and his spouse. However, the corporation was not a party to any of the proceedings below, and the appellee appeared in his individual capacity. Section 57.111 authorizes an attorney's fee for a qualifying small business party, which must be a corporation, a partnership, or a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business. See § 57.111(3)(d)1.a and b, Fla....
...Although the appellee and the corporation were found to be "one and the same entity" based on the appellee's control of the business, the statute does not permit such disregard of the corporate form. [*] The appellee was not a small business party as defined by the statute, and he thus should not have been awarded a section 57.111 attorney's fee....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 8541, 2002 WL 1332037
...Price of Solms & Price, P.A., Miami, and Dennis Grossman, Fort Lauderdale, not admitted in Florida, for appellant. Pamela H. Page of The Agency for Health Care Administration, Tallahassee, for appellee. SHAHOOD, J. We affirm the denial of appellant's petition for attorney's fees under section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2000), the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act (FEAJA), on the grounds that the Department of Health, Board of Dentistry (Department), was substantially justified in bringing the underlying disciplinary action against appellant....
...Thereafter, appellant petitioned the court for attorney's fees under the FEAJA as a result of having to defend the action brought against him by the Department. He claimed that the underlying action against him was not substantially justified within the meaning of section 57.111, [1] *423 where his due process rights were violated when the Department failed to provide his response to the Probable Cause Panel prior to voting to go forward with the administrative complaint....
...ey's fees, the Department established that it was substantially justified in proceeding against him. We agree. A proceeding is "substantially justified" if it had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time it was initiated by a state agency. See § 57.111(3)(e), Fla....
...Appellant's response to the investigative file disputed the allegations against him, but did not disprove or conclusively rebut those allegations. In fact, appellant's response highlighted the fact that there were disputed issues of fact as to the charges against him. AFFIRMED. GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2000) provides that: Unless otherwise provided by law, an award of attorney's fees and costs shall be made to a prevailing small business party in any adjudicatory proceeding or administrative proceeding pursua...
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 179, 2004 WL 57308
...Before COPE, GODERICH and SHEPHERD, JJ. PER CURIAM. The petitioner, Shari Daniels, appeals from a final order of the Division of Administrative Hearings denying her amended petition for attorney's fees, pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. § 57.111, Fla. Stat. (2002), based on the Administrative Law Judge's [ALJ] finding that she is not a "small business party" as defined by section 57.111(3)(d)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 19197, 2011 WL 6004353
...Saliba, Assistant General Counsels, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Jay Adams of Broad and Cassel, Tallahassee, for Appellee. HAWKES, J. This appeal concerns whether the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) properly found that MVP Health, Inc. (MVP) was entitled to attorney's fees and costs under section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2010)....
...In actuality the [] application was complete, and [MVP] met all the requirements for licensure at the time the application was submitted. Thus, the Agency should have approved [MVP's] licensure application. After receiving this favorable order, MVP moved for attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2010)....
...ubstantial justification" for issuing the Notice of Withdrawal. DOAH disagreed with AHCA. Following another evidentiary hearing focusing exclusively upon the fees issue, DOAH issued the order on appeal awarding attorney's fees and costs to MVP under section 57.111(4)(a). We reverse. The "Substantial Justification" Standard Section 57.111(4)(a) states fees may be awarded in the following circumstances: Unless otherwise provided by law, an award of attorney's fees and costs shall be made to a prevailing small business party in any adjudicatory proceeding or administrative proceeding pursuant to chapter 120 initiated by a state agency, unless the actions of the agency were substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust. (emphasis added). Section 57.111(4)(a) states that a state agency may avoid fees if its action was "substantially justified." It is the burden of the state agency to show that this exception applies....
...Here, AHCA claims two facts "substantially justified" its decision to issue the Notice of Withdrawal: (1) the ongoing litigation over MVP's ownership; and (2) its concern over MVP's accreditation. We agree. An action is "substantially justified" if the state agency had a "reasonable basis in law and fact" to initiate it. § 57.111(3)(e), Fla....
...'" then that action should be considered "substantially justified." Helmy,
707 So.2d at 368, quoting Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 565,
108 S.Ct. 2541,
101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988). An additional consideration when evaluating an agency's action under section
57.111 is that the inquiry is limited only to whether the agency had a "reasonable basis in law and fact at the time" it took the action. §
57.111(3)(e), Fla....
...Conclusion AHCA's Notice of Withdrawal was reasonably based on the uncertainty concerning MVP's ownership and accreditation. This uncertainty "substantially justified" its decision. We therefore find that attorney's fees and costs should not have been awarded pursuant to section 57.111(4)(a)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
where a licensee seeks attorneys’ fees under section
57.111(3)(e), Florida Statutes (2020). See, e.g.,
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
(2) section
57.105(5), Florida Statutes; (3) section
57.111, Florida Statutes; and (4) equitable considerations
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
(2) section
57.105(5), Florida Statutes; (3) section
57.111, Florida Statutes; and (4) equitable considerations
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1988).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
subject to the provisions contained therein. Section
57.111, F.S., the Florida Equal Access to Justice
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 628005
...No award of attorney's fees as provided by this subsection shall exceed $15,000. (Emphasis added.) This court, interpreting a similar agency fee statute, tells us: Once the party seeking fees under the statute proves it is a small business, as defined by section 57.111, and is the prevailing party, the burden shifts to the government agency to show that its action in initiating the proceeding was "substantially justified." "[I]t is the agency which must affirmatively raise and prove the exception." "...
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 2280, 34 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 618
...of Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellant. Wings S. Benton, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellee. WHATLEY, Judge. Stephen W. Thompson, M.D., appeals the final administrative order denying his application for attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2007) (Florida Equal Access to Justice Act)....
...The Board of Medicine adopted the judge's recommended order in favor of Thompson as its own. Thompson then *1151 filed an application for attorney's fees, which was denied by the administrative law judge based on her finding that the actions taken by the Department were substantially justified. See § 57.111(4)(a). Section 57.111(4)(a) provides: Unless otherwise provided by law, an award of attorney's fees and costs shall be made to a prevailing small business party in any adjudicatory proceeding or administrative proceeding pursuant to chapter 120 initiated by...
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 68506
...10.00 Cost of taking Deposition of Linda Galloway ...................... ...
106.33 Cost of taking Deposition of Brian Harrison ...................... ... 155.00 Cost of Transcript of Trial on June 4, 1987 ........................ ... 100.00 __________ TOTAL COSTS .................... .. $583.58 HRS argued that section
57.111, Florida Statutes (The Florida Equal Access to Justice Act of 1984) precludes an award of costs in this case....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 6519
exempts the receiver from the provisions of section 57.-111, Florida Statutes,2 Chapter 631, Part I, is
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1999 WL 1259990
...Appellant, a dentist, was the subject of a disciplinary proceeding involving a dispute as to whether he had improperly refused to furnish copies of dental records to a patient. After the case was dismissed, he filed a petition for attorney's fees under section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1997), which the administrative law judge denied. We reverse. Section 57.111 authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees against the state, in some cases, by a "prevailing small business party" in administrative proceedings initiated by a state agency....
...Toledo Realty, Inc.,
549 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), but that case is distinguishable. In that case, the Department of Professional Regulation had brought proceedings against Toledo Realty, Inc. and Ramiro Alfert, which were dismissed. The judge awarded fees under section
57.111 to Toledo Realty, Inc., but denied them to Alfert on the ground that he was an employee of Toledo Realty, Inc....
...opinion does not reflect whether Alfert owned the stock in Toledo Realty, Inc. Accordingly, we interpret that case as standing for the proposition that an individual who is merely an employee cannot be a "small business party" within the meaning of section 57.111. We reverse and remand for an award of attorney's fees to appellant. FARMER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. ON MOTION FOR REHEARING KLEIN, J. The Department points out in its motion for rehearing that an award of attorney's fees under section 57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1997) shall be made "unless the actions of the agency were substantially justified." Because that issue was not reached we should have remanded for reconsideration in light of that provision rather than simply remanding for an award of attorney's fees....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 5958, 35 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 985
...After a final hearing, the ALJ recommended that the Department find Boetzel not guilty of the charged violations. The Department entered a final order adopting the ALJ's recommendations. Boetzel then filed a petition for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2008)....
...timely request." The ALJ thus erred in denying Boetzel's petition while Boetzel still had time to make a timely request for a hearing. In addition, the statute under which Boetzel sought attorney's fees and costs provides for an evidentiary hearing. Section
57.111(4)(d) states in pertinent part that the ALJ "in the case of a proceeding under chapter 120[] shall promptly conduct an evidentiary hearing on the application for an award of attorney's fees and shall issue ... a final order." Thus, section
57.111(4)(d) clearly provides for an evidentiary hearing to be held on a petition for attorney's fees and costs. The Department argues that an evidentiary hearing is not required, relying on federal case law interpreting the federal statute after which section
57.111 was modeled. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Lehman,
736 F.2d 550, 559 n. 12 (9th Cir.1984). Section
57.111 "will take the same construction in the Florida courts as its prototype has been given in the federal courts, insofar as such construction is harmonious with the spirit and policy of Florida legislation on the subject." Dep't of Prof'l Reg., Div....
...Unlike Florida's version, the federal statute does not specifically provide for an evidentiary hearing but states that an award of fees should be based on the record in the underlying proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (2006). Therefore, we need not construe section 57.111(4)(d) consistently with federal cases on this issue. Because Boetzel should have been given the full opportunity to request an evidentiary hearing as provided for in both the ALJ's initial order and section 57.111(4)(d), we reverse the order denying its petition for fees and costs and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion....
