Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...After the "mini-trial" on standing, the substantive portion of the hearing became a veritable maze of conflicting technical evidence which the hearing officer was required to resolve within the framework of nonexistent LRACT criteria for sulphur-handling facilities. [4] The petitioners did not seek to intervene under section 403.412(5) nor comply with its requirements, so we need not consider its applicability to this case.

...c., Florida Agricultural Research Institute, Florida Farm Bureau Federation and Indian River Citrus League, Inc., amici curiae. McDONALD, Justice. This is a direct appeal from a circuit court order dismissing the federation's complaint and declaring section 403.412(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), [1] an impermissible incursion into this Court's power to adopt rules of practice and procedure. We have jurisdiction [2] and reverse. In May 1979, the Florida Wildlife Federation (federation) filed suit against the Department of Environmental Regulation *66 (DER) and the South Florida Water Management District (district) pursuant to section 403.412, the Environmental Protection Act (EPA)....

...The federation duly filed an amended complaint which DER answered. The district, however, filed another motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that because the federation failed to allege special injury it did not have standing to bring suit. Agreeing with the district that section 403.412(2)(a) is an impermissible invasion of this Court's prerogative to adopt rules of practice and procedure, the trial court dismissed the complaint....

...nserve and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty." Section 7 further provides that "[a]dequate provision shall be made by law for the abatement of air and water pollution." To help effectuate that policy, the legislature enacted the EPA as section 403.412 in 1971. While providing that state citizens as well as state agencies may institute suit to compel governmental agencies to perform their duties and to enjoin the violation of laws, rules, and regulations, section 403.412(2) sets out numerous conditions precedent to the bringing of such actions....

...he waters surrounding the spillway for recreational purposes, and that the federation's members have been irreparably damaged by the spillway's operation. The federation contends that its complaint adequately sets forth a cause of action pursuant to 403.412(2)(a) which should not be disallowed because the legislature saw fit to create a new cause of action by creating capacity in private citizens to enjoin pollution of the state's natural resources. The district, on the other hand, claims that the legislature has tried to abrogate this Court's special injury rule of standing to sue. Thus, the district sees 403.412(2)(a) as a rule of procedure, passage of which was not within the legislature's power. Although the trial court agreed with the district, we do not. We hold that by enacting section 403.412 the legislature created a new cause of action, giving the citizens of Florida new substantive rights not previously possessed....

...As a new cause of action, the statute is substantive law. Substantive law has been defined as "that part of the law which creates, defines, and regulates rights, or that part of the law which courts are established to administer." State v. Garcia, 229 So.2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1969). By the enactment *67 of section 403.412(2)(a) the citizens of Florida have been given the capacity to protect their rights to a clean environment-a right not previously afforded them directly....

...c. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1977), wherein this Court found that the statute under attack there sought to define proper parties rather than to set out substantive rights. The instant statute, however, does not suffer from the same defect. Section 403.412(2)(a) is not an impermissible incursion into this Court's power over practice and procedure in the state's courts....

...or not the moving party has stated a case sufficient to motivate granting the requested relief. See North Shore Bank v. Town of Surfside, 72 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1954); Ready v. Safeway Rock Co., 157 Fla. 27, 24 So.2d 808 (1946). We hold, therefore, that section 403.412 creates a new cause of action and that private citizens of Florida may institute suit under that statute without a showing of special injury....

...Under these guidelines, the federation's complaint has stated a cause of action. [3] As a final comment, we address the question of whether the federation is a proper plaintiff. During oral argument, the Court questioned whether the federation, a nonprofit corporation, was a "citizen" within the meaning of section 403.412(2)(a)....

...for the purpose of pursuing rights granted to citizens. See In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 243 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1971) (discussing the holdings from numerous jurisdictions). We agree with the Fourth District Court of Appeal [4] that, by enacting section 403.412, the legislature has declared the protection of the environment to be a collective responsibility and that to treat corporations as citizens is consistent with that declaration. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. SUNDBERG, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ENGLAND and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The portion of § 403.412 with which this appeal is concerned reads as follows: (2)(a) The Department of Legal Affairs, any political subdivision or municipality of the state, or a citizen of the state may maintain an action for injunctive relief against: 1....

...Any person, natural or corporate, governmental agency or authority to enjoin such persons, agencies, or authorities from violating any laws, rules or regulations for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources of the state. [2] Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. (1972). [3] We note, however, that § 403.412 does not authorize money damages....

...hat the permitted use is inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan. We note from other statutes that when the Legislature means to place restrictions on third party challenges to agency decisions granting permits, it says so in specific text. Compare § 403.412(2)(c), Fla....

...[10] Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976); Kokay v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 380 So.2d 489, 491 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), aff'd., 398 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 1981); 30 Fla.Jur. Statutes § 93) (Rev. 1974). [11] § 380.085(2), Fla. Stat. (1981). [12] § 403.412(5), Fla....

...d the Florida Department of Community Affairs (Department) declined to so appeal (Case No. AS-156). Friends also appeals orders of dismissal entered by the Leon *906 County Circuit Court in a suit for injunctive relief brought by Friends pursuant to Section 403.412(2), Florida Statutes (1971), seeking to compel the Department to take an appeal to FLWAC or to commence an alternative equitable action to halt the development of Port Bougainville on North Key Largo (Case No....

...C, challenging the validity of the tentative agreements reached by the parties. [2] When the public hearings were not delayed, Friends intervened *907 in the proceedings before both the local zoning board and the Monroe County Commission pursuant to Section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (1971), and appeared before them, voicing its opposition to the granting of an amended development order and to what it considered were procedural due process violations. Despite its opposition, an amended development order was adopted by the county commission on October 24, 1982. Friends' next move was to file a complaint, pursuant to section 403.412(2), with the Department, requesting that an appeal of the amended development order be taken to FLWAC....

...Second, appellants urge that they acquired standing to appeal the development order to FLWAC due to their being permitted to intervene in the local DRI process, thus making them parties for all purposes, including appeal. Intervention was accomplished with reference to Section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (1971) which provides: In any administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruct...

...onduct, or product to be licensed or permitted has or will have the effect of impairing, polluting, or otherwise injuring the air, water, or other natural resources of the state. (e.s.) Although the authorities have suggested that intervention under section 403.412(5) may carry with it the right to appeal DRI orders to FLWAC notwithstanding the *910 lack of standing otherwise, [4] see Finnell, supra at 377-378 and Florida Bar, Continuing Legal Education, Environmental Regulation and Litigation in Florida, 20.39 (1981) [ Environmental Regulation ], we do not agree that section 403.412(5) creates a statutory exception to the limited standing granted by section 380.07(2)....

...the right to appeal from a final decision. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 721, 727 (1968). We conclude, therefore, that intervention at the local DRI review level, whether pursuant to section 403.412(5), or by the grace of the local government authorities, does not create an exception to the express legislative limitation of standing found in section 380.07(2)....

...We therefore affirm the final order of FLWAC dismissing for lack of standing the appeals taken from the Monroe County development order by Friends and UKCA. CASE NO. AS-423 In addition to filing a notice of appeal with FLWAC on December 9, 1982, Friends also filed a complaint in the circuit court of Leon County pursuant to section 403.412(2), [5] seeking to compel the Department to take an appeal from the Monroe County development order....

...the consent of the parties, and an order purporting to do so is ineffectual. 3 Fla.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 121 (1978); Salinger v. Salinger, 100 So.2d 393, 394 (Fla. 1958). Friends then filed an amended complaint, again seeking relief pursuant to section 403.412(2), requesting, among other things, that the Department be compelled to institute appropriate legal action to enjoin development of Port Bougainville, restrain Monroe County from issuing permits for the development, and to compel the...

...Although we agree that the amended complaint, as it now stands, fails to state a cause of action against the Department, we are of the opinion that, for the following reasons, the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint without leave to amend. Section 403.412, Florida Statutes (1971), Florida's Environmental Protection Act, was enacted as a means of carrying out Florida's constitutional mandate to abate *913 air and water pollution within this state....

...See also Comment, Environmental Law: The Inapplicability of the Special Injury Rule to the Florida Environmental Protection Act, 33 U.Fla.L.Rev. 425, 433 (1981). In lieu of the special injury requirement, however, individuals seeking to invoke the remedies provided by section 403.412(2) must satisfy the following conditions precedent to the bringing of such actions: An interested party must first file a complaint with the appropriate agency....

...Florida Wildlife Federation, 390 So.2d at 66. See also Wetzel v. A. Duda & Sons, 306 So.2d 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Furnans v. Santa Rosa Island Authority, 315 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). In this case, which is one of first impression, Friends seek to invoke section 403.412(2) to compel the Department to carry out its enforcement duties under Chapter 380....

...60, 62 (1935), "fraud, corruption, [or] gross abuse of discretion", Senior Citizens Protective League, 132 So.2d at 239, or other "arbitrary or unlawful conduct." State v. Lee, 157 Fla. 62, 24 So.2d 798, 801 (Fla. 1946). See generally 1 Fla.Jur.2d Administrative Law §§ 142, 154 (1977). We consider that section 403.412(2)(a), in authorizing a suit for injunctive relief against any governmental agency to compel it to enforce laws relating to the protection of the natural resources of the state, and to enjoin any person from violating such laws, at th...

...f the appeal process. (e.s.) [4] The statute has in fact been cited as authority for "intervention and participation in the DRI hearing of a local government having jurisdiction over a proposed DRI", see Environmental Regulation, supra at 20.38. [5] Section 403.412(2) provides, in part: (2)(a) The Department of Legal Affairs, any political subdivision or municipality of the state, or a citizen of the state may maintain an action for injunctive relief against: 1....

...[7] In most cases coming within this exception, the rule is that the complaining party must plead and prove "special damages peculiar to himself and differing in kind rather than in degree from the damages suffered by the people as a whole." Boucher v. Novotny, 102 So.2d 132, 135 (Fla. 1958). Section 403.412 has, of course, abrogated the "special injury" rule in cases such as this where the enforcement or violation of "laws, rules, and regulations for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources" is concerned, section 403.412(2)(a)1....

...organized to protect southwest Florida's natural resources. Each group has a substantial membership in the southwest part of the state, but neither has a sufficient number of members in Hardee County to meet the group standing requirement imposed by section 403.412(6), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...Certainly, we could not say that a litigant who files a petition that is dismissed for lack of standing cannot appeal the dismissal because he lacks standing. That is the very question presented in the appeal. The central issue in the dispute over standing in the lower tribunal is the constitutionality of section 403.412(6), Florida Statutes (2002), which places new restrictions on the right of an organization to challenge an environmental permit....

...n the county where the activity is proposed, and which was formed for the purpose of the protection of the environment, fish and wildlife resources, and protection of air and water quality, may initiate a hearing pursuant to s. 120.569 or s. 120.57. § 403.412(6), Fla....

...The new statute contains another feature that is relevant to the arguments made on the motion to dismiss the appeal. It provides that an organization failing to qualify for standing to initiate an administrative proceeding may nevertheless participate as an intervenor. Subsection 403.412(5) states in pertinent part: In any administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction, ......

...a citizen of the state shall have standing to intervene as a party on the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the activity, conduct, or product to be licensed or permitted has or will have the effect of impairing, polluting, or otherwise injuring the air, water, or other natural resources of the state. § 403.412(5), Fla....

...rative proceeding, then I could agree that would be a sufficient demonstration of injury. The majority, however, assumes as a matter of law, without requiring appellants to make any further showing, that because their standing has been restricted by section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (2002), they have necessarily been injured....

...a de novo constitutional challenge in the absence of any display by them of present harm. It appears to me that appellants' primary interest is not in contesting the issuance of a mining permit, but rather in asserting a constitutional challenge to section 403.412(5), based on the constitution's single-subject provision....

...its initial motion to dismiss. Appellee points out that subsequent to this court's decision, another panel of this court dismissed the appeal of the same appellants in a companion case, because appellants' single-subject constitutional challenge to section 403.412(6), Florida Statutes, had become moot due to the legislature's readoption of the Florida Statutes on July 1, 2003....

...State, 853 So.2d 551 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The pertinent facts in both cases are hereafter summarized. In Environmental Confederation II, appellants, on August 14, 2002, filed their declaratory-judgment suit, asserting the constitutional invalidity of section 403.412(6), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...On March 4, 2003, the court entered summary judgment for DEP and dismissed appellants' complaint with prejudice, holding that they had failed to allege an injury in fact that would state a case or controversy sufficient to bring an action for declaratory judgment, and that section 403.412(6) did not violate the single-subject requirement....

...ppeal from the complaint's dismissal, DEP, on April 22, 2003, entered the order at issue in this appeal, dismissing appellants' challenge to the mining permit due to their lack of standing as a result of the more restrictive standing requirements of section 403.412(6)....

...d by legislative acts pertaining to remedy or procedure, and dismissed the appeal. I acknowledge, as the majority observes, that appellees have not raised any specific contention in their motion to dismiss that the appeal has now become moot because section 403.412(6) should be applied retroactively....

...was not final agency action was in error and the dismissal must therefore be reversed. Appellees finally contend that Friends is not entitled to a formal administrative hearing, because an adequate judicial remedy otherwise exists for Friends under Section 403.412(2)(a)1, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Any governmental agency or authority charged by law with the duty of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources of the state to compel such governmental authority to enforce such laws, rules, and regulations... . Section 403.412 was intended to make enforcement of environmental laws and to make restraint of violations thereof a responsibility of both the government and the citizenry....

...1st DCA 1984), review denied, 488 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1986). Certainly appellant could submit information to enable DER to investigate whether the driveway actually qualified for the exemption. If DER declined to agree with appellant, appellant could then commence a suit pursuant to section 403.412 to compel DER to enforce its laws. The fact, however, that two forms of relief may be available to an affected party, i.e., a section 120.57 hearing or a section 403.412 enforcement proceeding, does not foreclose appellant from using either avenue....

...e County. As one of the bases for dismissing plaintiff's amended complaint the trial court concluded: "The Plaintiff, Orange County Audobon [sic] Society, Inc., a Florida corporation is not `a citizen of the state' within the intent and meaning of F.S. 403.412 [F.S.A.] and as a result has no standing to maintain this action....

...ural and corporate persons, yet fails to broaden or supplement the term `citizen' to include a corporation." In 1971 the legislature enacted Chapter 71-343, Laws of Florida, known as the "Environmental Protection Act of 1971" and renumbered as F.S., Section 403.412, F.S.A....

...A reading of this act reflects a legislative purpose to provide a procedure whereby governmental bodies could be compelled to enforce applicable environmental laws and individuals, corporations and governmental bodies could be restrained from violating any of the applicable environmental laws. In particular, subsection 2 of Section 403.412 provides: "(2)(a) The department of legal affairs, any political subdivision or municipality of the state, or a citizen of the state may maintain an action for injunctive relief against: 1....

...e evinces a legislative intent to make enforcement of environmental laws and to make restraint of violations thereof a responsibility of the government as well as the citizenry. It is urged, however, that the meaning of the word "citizen" as used in Section 403.412, supra, be restricted to a "natural person" only, thereby precluding any entity such as a corporation, association or club from invoking the provisions of Section 403.412....

...582: "The test generally of whether a corporation is to be treated as a citizen `depends upon the intent to be gathered from the context and the general purpose of the whole legislation in which it occurs.' (citation omitted)" With the enactment of Section 403.412 the legislature has declared that the protection of the environment is a collective responsibility....

...gathered from the context and the general purpose of the whole legislation". See Oneida County Forest Preserve Council v. Wehle, 1955, 309 N.Y. 152, 128 N.E.2d 282. Accordingly, the Orange County Audubon Society is a "citizen" within the meaning of Section 403.412 and has standing to *544 maintain suit; that portion of the final judgment inconsistent herewith is reversed and the cause remanded for such other proceedings as may be deemed appropriate....

...overnment outlining facts on which petition is based and reason regulation believed inconsistent prior to filing suit, justified dismissal); Furnans v. Santa Rosa Island Auth., 315 So.2d 481, 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (finding a failure to comply with section 403.412(2)(c), which required plaintiff to file verified complaint with governmental agency charged with regulating environmental act, setting forth facts on which based and manner complaining party has been affected, prior to instituting cla...

...ER along with a letter which stated he was suing on behalf of the state because of DER's inactivity, refusal to institute suit, and lack of cooperation with his office. The letter actually requested that DER treat the suit as one brought pursuant to section 403.412, Florida Statutes (1981). [7] However, during the hearing on GDC's motions, appellant admitted that he was not proceeding under either section 403.412 with respect to the complaint for civil damages and penalties or section 120.69(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), [8] with respect to the administrative action....

...[19] Additionally, we again note that a state attorney is not precluded from filing a public nuisance action against GDC. § 60.05(1), Fla. Stat. (1981); State ex rel. Shevin. We do not express any opinion as to whether a state attorney has standing under section 403.412....

...Suwannee American Cement Company, Inc., 802 So.2d 520, 521 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). In Suwannee American, the Sierra Club and Save Our *653 Suwannee, Inc. (SOS), two environmental advocacy organizations, possessed standing at the administrative level by virtue of their compliance with section 403.412(5)....

...Section 373.016(3), Fla. Stat. By rule 17-101.040(12)(a)3, the department has authorized the District to administer and enforce certain laws and rules, including section 373.042. Citizens has standing to maintain the action against the District pursuant to section 403.412(2), Florida Statutes: (a) The Department of Legal Affairs, any political subdivision or municipality of the state, or a citizen of the state may maintain an action for injunctive relief against: 1....

...The purpose of this statute was discussed in Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Board of County Com'rs of Monroe County, 456 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), review denied sub nom. Upper Keys Citizens Ass'n v. Board of County Com'rs of Monroe County, 462 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 1985): Section 403.412, Florida Statutes (1971), Florida's Environmental Protection Act, was enacted as a means of carrying out Florida's constitutional mandate to abate air and water pollution within this state....

...The trial court dismissed the four injunctive counts without leave to amend, on the grounds that primary jurisdiction for abatement of the alleged pollution is lodged with the Florida Air, Water, and Pollution Control Commission and that appellants had failed to exhaust their administrative remedy provided in § 403.412(2)(a), (c), F.S....

...t an opportunity to take action thereon. Thus, if appellants were suing to enjoin the violation of some specific rule or regulation of the Department of Pollution Control they would be required to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by § 403.412(2)(c), F.S....

...and challenging in the other case the decision of the DEP to issue a phosphate mining permit to IMC Phosphates, Inc. (IMC). The DEP dismissed both petitions on the ground that appellants could not establish standing under the requirements of revised section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes. The issues in this case are (1) whether an amendment to section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes, relating to standing to challenge decisions of DEP, is violative of the single subject requirement found in article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution, and (2) whether the alleged single subject violation is rendered moot by the subsequent readoption of the revised section 403.412, Florida Statutes. We hold that while the dispute was not rendered moot by the subsequent reenactment of the statute, no single subject violation occurred. Mootness Section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes, was amended by chapter 2002-261, Laws of Florida, effective July 2002....

...[1] Chapter *1016 2002-261 covers a variety of subjects relating to environmental protection, including Everglades restoration funding and modification of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission's review authority over certain water management district rules and final orders, in addition to amending section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes. Prior to the amendment, section 403.412 allowed any citizen to intervene as a party in an administrative proceeding by filing a verified pleading stating that the contested project or permit had or would have "the effect of impairing, polluting, or otherwise injuring the air, water, or other natural resources of the state." § 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (2000). In Manasota-88, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 441 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), this court held that a citizen has standing to "intervene" as described in section 403.412(5), when the department issues a notice of proposed action, not when the matter is later referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. This construction of the term "intervene" essentially affords any citizen the right to not just intervene in ongoing proceedings, but to initiate a challenge to a proposed permit as well. The revisions to section 403.412(5) substantially limited participation in the permitting process in two ways....

...They also argue that the legislative history indicates that the original bill was used as a "cloak" to pass unpopular legislation. *1017 DEP and IMC argue that appellants' single subject challenge is no longer a live controversy because the amendments to section 403.412(5) were reenacted as part of the legislature's biennial readoption of the Florida Statutes and that the reenacted statute should be retroactively applied to the time that the petition was filed, regardless of whether it was filed during a window period....

...The legislature did not expressly state in chapter 2002-261 that the amendment was to apply retroactively. This court must, therefore, determine whether the legislatively created right to initiate an administrative proceeding is substantive or procedural. The original enactment of section 403.412, Florida Statutes, gave citizens of the state substantive rights to challenge certain environmental permits....

...Determination of who has standing is encompassed within these substantive rights. See Caloosa Property Owners Ass'n v. Palm Beach County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 429 So.2d 1260, 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) ("Part of the process of designing a new cause of action includes delineation of who has standing."). The changes to section 403.412(5) made by chapter 2002-261 eliminate the appellants' previous right to initiate a proceeding upon notice of DEP's intent to issue a permit....

...[4] In Rothermel, the appellant had an opportunity to be heard before the Parole Commission. He still maintained the right to raise all issues, albeit in a different forum. Here, appellants' right to be heard concerning the issuance of permits by DEP was removed by the amendment to section 403.412....

...The issues of when and how the bill was amended are within the province of the legislature. Because we find no single subject violation, the decisions of the DEP are affirmed. KAHN and LEWIS, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Chapter 2002-261 made the following changes to section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes: (5) In any administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction, the Departmen...

...activity is to take place. Corporations falling in this category are not required to show a substantial interest. In both of the cases before us, the appellants did not qualify for automatic standing, and claimed standing under the old standards of section 403.412(5)....

...2d DCA 2000). The county also petitioned the circuit court to temporarily enjoin SFWMD from discharging Lake Okeechobee's water into the Caloosahatchee at a rate greater than 800 cfs. This action was filed pursuant to the Environmental Protection Act of 1971, section 403.412, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...ile its lawsuit. However, *896 the statute provides that failure to comply with this condition precedent does not bar an action for a temporary restraining order "to prevent immediate and irreparable harm from the conduct or activity complained of." § 403.412(2)(c), Fla....

...ense or imposition of terms for the exercise of a license. Appellants interpret the quoted statutes as providing that licensing proceedings commence when an application for permitting is filed. Appellants then assume such is the case and assert that § 403.412(5) is a provision bestowing party status upon them by the definition found in § 120.52(10)(b). [1] Section 403.412(5) provides: (5) In any administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction, the Department of Lega...

...While we affirm the denial of the request for *1111 party status at this stage of the activity between DER and Gardinier, we find DER's interpretation of Greene to be unnecessarily broad as discussed more fully below. We affirm the denial of the petition because we discern no legislative intent in § 403.412(5) to permit intervention during the free-form, informal process between the time an application is filed and the notice of proposed agency action is issued....

...ceedings under Chapter 120, there will be no activity "to be licensed or permitted." Conversely, until an agency proposes to issue a license or permit, it cannot be said that the objectionable activity is "to be licensed or permitted" as required by § 403.412(5). Thus, licensing proceedings do not commence for purposes of § 403.412(5) until DER issues its notice of proposed action. In the event that the Department does propose to issue the permits to Gardinier, § 403.412(5) would appear to be a statutory provision entitling appellants to participate as a party in the proceedings under § 120.52(10)(b), including initiationof a § 120.57 hearing. Greene holds only that a citizen may not in reliance on § 403.412(5) initiate a § 120.57 hearing when there is no licensing or permitting proceeding involved, or when there is an absence of the statutorily required allegations with respect to injury to the environment. It does not follow that a citizen is precluded from initiating § 120.57 proceedings when the department does propose to proceed with the granting of licenses or permits. When an entity meets the standing requirements of § 403.412 and achieves party status, the statutory scheme would generally if not always permit a determination that the substantial interests of the parties will be affected by the proceedings....

...action which allegedly has or will have an effect of impairing, polluting, or otherwise injuring the natural resources of the state a party may intervene and initiate further proceedings by filing the appropriate verified petition in accordance with § 403.412(5)....

...This is an appeal from a Department of Natural Resources order denying appellant's petition for an administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1979). We affirm. On February 5, 1981, appellant, as a State citizen, filed a "Verified Petition and Complaint Pursuant to Section 403.412(5), Fla. Stat., For Formal Administrative Hearing Pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Fla. Stat., and Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Section 403.412(2), Fla....

...In summary the Department denies your petition for a 120.57(1), F.S., hearing and denies the complaint and petition for injunctive relief on the grounds that there is no license or permit involved which would properly serve as final agency action for a 403.412 verified complaint challenge and there is no action, either already taken or pending which affects the petitioner's substantial interests....

...Appellant is neither the owner, nor adjacent owner, of any land in the Westlake parcel nor the owner of any land on the CARL Committee's acquisition list with lower priority than Westlake, or the owner of land not on the list but which allegedly should be on the list. Appellant's attempt to use Section 403.412 as a springboard into a Section 120.57 proceeding is misplaced. Section 403.412 has not obviated the requirement that a citizen allege a special injury or allege the agency decision affects a substantial interest. Although Section 403.412(2) has done away with the requirement of showing a special injury required by the traditional rule of standing provided express conditions precedent are met, this statute only applies to suits to maintain an action for injunctive relief in circuit court. Florida Wildlife Federation v. State Department of Environmental Regulation, 390 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1980). There is no provision in Section 403.412(2) authorizing a citizen to initiate and maintain a Section 120.57 proceeding without meeting the substantial interest test. Contrary to appellant's argument, Section 403.412(5) also does not authorize or allow a citizen to initiate a Section 120.57 proceeding without first meeting the substantial interest standing test. Section 403.412(5) provides: In any administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction, the Department of Legal Af...

...rty on the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the activity, conduct, or product to be licensed or permitted has or will have the effect of impairing, polluting, or otherwise injuring the air, water, or other natural resources of the state. Section 403.412(5) does allow a citizen of the state to intervene as a party without meeting standing requirements in any "administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction." However, appellant is not an intervenor but is attempting to maintain or initiate an administrative proceeding. Even assuming Section 403.412(5) could be interpreted as authorizing appellant to initiate an administrative action, his petition still fails to meet the conditions precedent to bringing such an action. Section 403.412(5) applies to administrative, licensing, or other proceedings involving those agencies with power and authority over environmental permitting and licensing....

...ular human conduct, and does not even constitute final agency action. Appellees' conduct only approved a proposed list of EEL acquisitions authorizing DNR to commence negotiations for the voluntary acquisition of the lands on the list. Even assuming Section 403.412(5) can further be interpreted to include appellees' approval of the proposed EEL acquisition list as a licensing or permitting proceeding, appellant's verified petition is still deficient. Section 403.412(5) provides a citizen with standing to intervene as a party on the filing of a verified pleading "asserting that the activity, conduct, or product to be licensed or permitted has or will have the effect of impairing, polluting, or oth...

...8 in connection with a water pollution permitting proceeding. First, as to the "agency action" issue, in the prior appearance of this case, Manasota-88, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 441 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), we held that Section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (1983), does not permit intervention "during the free-form, informal process between the time an application is filed and the notice of proposed agency action is issued." [1] Id. at 1111. We further explained that, until an agency proposes to issue a license or permit, it cannot be said that the objectionable activity is to be "licensed or permitted," as required for Section 403.412(5) to apply. "Thus, licensing proceedings do not commence for purposes of § 403.412(5) until DER issues its notice of proposed action." Id. at 1111. This decision, in my view, indicates that the agency's determination not to require a permitting or licensing application does not authorize intervention by objecting third persons under Section 403.412(5)....

...water pollution, cannot confer upon intervenors the right to a hearing to seek reversal of DER's decision unless a licensing or permitting proceeding covering the same installation is then pending or later instituted. This is so because the statute, Section 403.412(5), confers no rights whatever to intervenors under such circumstances....

...sota-88's right to intervention and to challenge DER's failure to deal properly with the air pollution issue ripened under the statute, and it was error for DER to dismiss the petition. Without unduly belaboring the matter further, I would hold that Section 403.412(5), read in pari materia with other pertinent provisions, provides not only for the "standing" of intervenors such as Manasota-88, but also delineates the scope of the relief available to the intervenors....

...to be produced by the activity sought to be constructed and operated. The sole statutory criterion for intervention is that the proceeding must be one for the "protection" of the air, water, or other natural resources of the state from "pollution." Section 403.412(5)....

...tion, an order that Gardinier be required to apply for an air pollution permit [7] which, if granted, must contain provisions to prohibit or control the projected air pollution to the extent required by applicable laws and regulations. [8] NOTES [1] Section 403.412(5) provides: (5) In any administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction, the Department of Lega...

...roduct to be licensed or permitted has or will have the effect of impairing, polluting, or otherwise injuring the air, water, or other natural resources of the state. Although appellees urge that appellant has abandoned its claim of "standing" under Section 403.412(5), I would disagree....

...fect was intended. In re Seven Barrels of Wine, 79 Fla. 1, 83 So. 627 (1920). In addition, the Environmental Control Act clearly provides for its prospective enforcement by injunction only in order to prevent immediate and irreparable harm. See F.S. § 403.412(2)(c)....

...t to achieve by acting on its own behalf. See Section 380.06(3), Florida Statutes. Second, petitioner may initiate legal proceedings under the Florida Environmental Protection Act of 1971 to require Manatee County to comply with the DRI process. See Section 403.412, Florida Statutes....

...(1981). As I understand the district court's decision being approved by this Court, it neither held nor said anything about the possibility of a state attorney bringing an enforcement proceeding in an official capacity pursuant to the provisions of section 403.412, Florida Statutes (1981), or a proceeding to establish criminal liability under section 403.161.

...hich it concurs in the position taken by Manasota. [2] See § 120.57, Fla. Stat. (1987). [3] See § 120.57(1)(b)3, Fla. Stat. (1987). D.E.R. appears to accept Manasota's claim of standing, based on the provisions of the Environmental Protection Act, § 403.412(5), Fla....

...ion, appellee's use and value of the subject property was being interfered with. Thus, these points of appellant are without merit. Surfside next urges as reversible error the failure of appellee to exhaust its administrative remedies as required by Section 403.412(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), which is a condition precedent to the institution of these proceedings by appellee....

...ver a period of 15 years, and continue to occur, according to the petition, in the absence of any lease from the Board. It is apparent, moreover, that appellant seeks relief in the nature of an injunction, for which an action may be maintained under section 403.412, Florida Statutes....

...t court proceeding, he is not without a remedy. Should any of the several agencies now involved in the regulation of the Lab's monkey-breeding operations fail to carry out their regulatory responsibilities, appellant may seek injunctive relief under section 403.412(2)(a)1, Florida Statutes....

...n pertinent part: [S]tanding to appeal a development order to FLWAC is limited to those parties expressly stated in section 380.07(2). Accordingly, we have refused to create any judicial exceptions where none was intended... . [W]e do not agree that section 403.412(5) creates a statutory exception to the limited standing granted by section 380.07(2)......

...Kerrigan, Pensacola, for appellants. W. Spencer Mitchem of Beggs, Lane, Daniel, Gaines & Davis, and Thurston A. Shell of Shell, Fleming, Davis & Menge, Pensacola, for appellee. MILLS, Judge. Appellants-plaintiffs filed suit against appellee-defendant under Section 403.412, Florida Statutes, known as the Environmental Protection Act of 1971, seeking to enjoin defendant from violating Section 5 of Chapter 70-680, Special Acts of Florida, 1970, which prohibited defendant from entering into a lease agreeme...

...nd dismissed the amended complaint without leave to amend. The sole issue here is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the complaints. We affirm. As the complaints did not seek a temporary injunction to prevent immediate and irreparable harm, Section 403.412(2)(c), Florida Statutes, requires that three conditions must be met before a complaint can be filed....

...We affirm the final judgment denying attorney's fees due to appellants' failure to comply with the notice requirement of section 284.30, Florida Statutes (1999). Appellants were the prevailing parties in an action brought against the Martin County Health Department [1] under the Environmental Protection Act of 1971, section 403.412, Florida Statutes (1999). The amended complaint included a request for attorney's fees pursuant to section 403.412(2)(f), which entitles prevailing parties to costs and attorney's fees....

...The Department of Health's June, 1999, answer also sought attorney's fees under the same subsection. Other than that reference to attorney's fees, the answer set forth no reason why such fees should not be awarded to appellant. An August, 1999, pre-trial stipulation left the issue of section 403.412 fees as one to be determined at trial. After the trial court issued its final judgment in February, 2000, appellants moved for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 403.412(2)(f) as the prevailing parties....

...a/k/a Indian River-keeper, appeal the Florida Department of Environmental Protection’s (“FDEP”) final order dismissing their petition for a formal administrative proceeding. We affirm because Appellants do not have stand *624 ing to initiate an administrative proceeding pursuant to section 403.412(6), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...ntamination at a bleach-manufacturing and chlorine-repackaging facility owned by Allied and Chem-Tex. Dissatisfied with its terms, Appellants petitioned for an administrative hearing to challenge the settlement agreement. They claimed standing under section 403.412(6), Florida Statutes, which grants automatic standing to certain Florida corporations to initiate an administrative proceeding....

...120.569 or s. 120.57, provided that the Florida corporation not for profit was formed at least 1 year prior to the date of the filing of the application for a permit, license, or authorization that is the subject of the notice of proposed agency action. § 403.412(6), Fla....

...to the agency’s interpretation of a statute it is given the power and duty to administer when that interpretation is reasonable. Capo v. Fla. Pub. Emps. Council 79, 82 So.3d 1116, 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Because we hold that FDEP’s reading of section 403.412(6) is reasonable, we affirm the order dismissing Appellants’ administrative petition for lack of standing....

...effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.” Hecht-man v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So.2d 993, 996 (Fla.2003). The language of section 403.412(6) is not ambiguous....

...This case does not concern an application for a permit, license, or authorization. Rather, *625 it involves a third-party challenge to a settlement agreement. Accordingly, we hold that Appellants do not have standing to challenge the settlement agreement under section 403.412(6), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...(Booker) then filed a petition and an amended petition seeking a formal hearing pursuant to § 120.57(1), Fla. Stat. for the purpose of contesting DER's proposed issuance of the permits. Booker sought to intervene in this licensing proceeding pursuant to § 403.412(5), Fla....

...beyond the applicable zone of discharge. The DER's adoption of the hearing officer's conclusion in this regard was erroneous, and is reversed. We affirm the order of the hearing officer that Booker had standing to intervene in the proceedings below. Section 403.412(5), Fla....

...See, e.g., § 403.088(4), 403.121, 403.131, 403.135, 403.141, 403.161, Fla. Stat. (1995). Under part I of chapter 403, a private citizen may seek an injunction against any entity or person who violated any air or water pollution laws of the state, but only after first seeking relief from a governmental agency. See § 403.412(2)(a)....

...The actions of the attorneys demonstrate a purpose that is improper in the context of the goal of administrative proceedings. Administrative proceedings are designed to allow a third party who has standing either as a substantially affected party or as a citizen pursuant to the provision of Section 403.412, Florida Statutes, [including domestic corporations not for profit, see Florida Wildlife Fed....

Sehlusemeyer for injunctive relief and damages under section 403.412, Florida Statutes (1995), Florida’s Environmental

...f Environmental Protection (DEP) finding that LEAF had no standing to intervene in the underlying administrative proceeding under either the substantial interest test of section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1995), or under the liberalized provisions of section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes. LEAF is a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of Alabama, has a certificate of authority to conduct business in Florida, and has Floridians among its members. Because DEP correctly construed section 403.412(5), and because LEAF does not contend that it is entitled to participate in these proceedings by virtue of a substantial interest, we affirm the order on appeal....

...the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the activity, conduct, or product to be licensed or permitted has or will have the effect of impairing, polluting, *1353 or otherwise injuring the air, water, or other natural resources of the state. § 403.412(5), Fla....

...Florida Statutes (1995). By virtue of such certificate, and the provisions of section 617.1505(2), Florida Statutes (1995), LEAF argues that it has the same status as any domestic corporation not-for-profit when it comes to intervention rights under section 403.412(5)....

...3d DCA 1991) (concluding that under section 607.1505, a foreign corporation's certificate of authority does not make the corporation a resident of Florida for forum non conveniens purposes). Moreover, the generalized provisions of chapter 617 do not override the specific constraints of section 403.412(5)....

...e general terms."). In Florida law, a more specific statute is considered an exception to, or qualification of, the general terms of the more comprehensive statute. See Floyd v. Bentley, 496 So.2d 862, 864 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). The Legislature enacted section 403.412 to extend standing to private and corporate citizens of Florida without any showing of special injury as required by the traditional rule of standing....

...(2) Sue and be sued and appear and defend in all actions and proceedings in its *1354 corporate name to the same extent as a natural person. § 617.0302, Fla. Stat. (1995). A Florida not for profit corporation's right to "appear" includes the rights conferred by section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...merely by filing a verified pleading alleging that the underground waste disposal for which Pinellas County sought permits from the Department of Environmental Protection would impair or pollute groundwater "or other natural resources of the state." § 403.412(5), Fla. Stat. (1995). Section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: (5) In any administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or destructi...

...rty on the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the activity, conduct, or product to be licensed or permitted has or will have the effect of impairing, polluting, or otherwise injuring the air, water, or other natural resources of the state. Section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (1995), is the only basis for intervention which LEAF has asserted on appeal....

...izens for the purpose of pursuing rights granted to citizens. See In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 243 So.2d 573 (Fla.1971) (discussing the holdings from numerous jurisdictions). We agree with the Fourth District Court of Appeal that, by enacting section 403.412, the legislature has declared the protection of the environment to be a collective responsibility and that to treat corporations as citizens is consistent with that declaration....

...Instead, invoking the familiar rule of statutory construction that "a specific statute covering a particular subject area always controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms," McKendry v. State, 641 So.2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994), the majority seems to suggest that section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (1995), deals specifically (unlike section 617.1505(2), Florida Statutes (1995), which deals only generally) with foreign corporations authorized to do business in Florida. The fallacy in this implied argument is apparent: The word "corporation" does not appear in section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...domestic corporation of like character. As a foreign corporation not for profit holding a valid certificate of authority to do business in Florida, [2] LEAF has the same rights as a domestic corporation not for profit to *1355 assert standing under section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...See, e.g., Holmes County Sch. Bd. v. Duffell, 651 So.2d 1176 (Fla.1995). By the time section 617.1505(2), Florida Statutes, was enacted, Ch. 90-179, § 95, Laws of Fla., a domestic corporation's entitlement to participate in administrative proceedings on the authority of section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes, had been established for a decade, under Florida Wildlife Federation . Even if a conflict between sections 403.412(5) and 617.1505(2) could be said to exist, the pertinent rule of statutory construction is that if "two statutes are in conflict, the later promulgated statute should prevail as the last expression of legislative intent." McKendry, 641 So.2d at 46....

...tial treatment of foreign corporations can give rise to. The major legal premise that should control today's decision is Florida Wildlife Federation's holding that, along with natural persons, domestic corporations not for profit have standing under section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The state legislature enacted the Environmental Protection Act of 1971 to give citizens of the state substantive rights to challenge certain environmental permits. See Envtl. Confed. of Sw. Fla., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 886 So.2d 1013, 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (2010), authorizes a citizen of the state to intervene as a party without meeting standing requirements in any “administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized by law for the protection of the air, wa...

...The statute further states that a citizen will have standing to intervene upon filing a verified pleading that asserts the activity, conduct, or product to be licensed or permitted has or will have the effect of impairing, polluting, or otherwise injuring the air, water, or other natural resources of the state. § 403.412(5), Fla....

..., the court is bound to apply the statutory language and cannot “depart from the plain meaning of the language which is free from ambiguity.” L.A.P. v. State, 62 So.3d 693, 695 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). It is thus evident that the legislature intended section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (2010), to allow citizens of the state to intervene in permit and license proceedings only....

...and challenging in the other case the decision of the DEP to issue a phosphate mining permit to IMC Phosphates, Inc. (IMC). The DEP dismissed both petitions on the ground that appellants could not establish standing under the requirements of revised section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes. The issues in this case are (1) whether an amendment to section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes, relating to standing to challenge decisions of DEP, is violative of the single subject requirement found in article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution, and (2) whether the alleged single subject violation is rendered moot by the subsequent readoption of the revised section 403.412, Florida Statutes. We hold that while the dispute was not rendered moot by the subsequent reenactment of the statute, no single subject violation occurred. Mootness- Section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes, was amended by chapter 2002-261, Laws of Florida, effective July 2002....

...1 Chapter *1016 2002-261 covers a variety of subjects relating to environmental protection, including Everglades restoration funding and modification of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission’s review authority over certain water management district rules and final orders, in addition to amending section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes. Prior to the amendment, section 403.412 allowed any citizen to intervene as a party in an administrative proceeding by filing a verified pleading stating that the contested project or permit had or would have “the effect of impairing, polluting, or otherwise injuring the air, water, or other natural resources of the state.” § 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (2000). In Manasota-88, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 441 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), this court held that a citizen has standing to “intervene” as described in section 403.412(5), when the department issues a notice of proposed action, not when the matter is later referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. This construction of the term “intervene” essentially affords any citizen the right to not just intervene in ongoing proceedings, but to initiate a challenge to a proposed permit as well. The revisions to section 403.412(5) substantially limited participation in the permitting process in two ways....

...They also argue that the legislative history indicates that the original bill was used as a “cloak” to pass unpopular legislation. *1017 DEP and IMC argue that appellants’ single subject challenge is no longer a live controversy because the amendments to section 403.412(5) were reenacted as part of the legislature’s biennial readoption of the Florida Statutes and that the reenacted statute should be retroactively applied to the time that the petition was filed, regardless of whether it was filed during a window period....

...The legislature did not expressly state in chapter 2002-261 that the amendment was to apply retroactively. This court must, therefore, determine whether the legislatively created right to initiate an administrative proceeding is substantive or procedural. The original enactment of section 403.412, Florida Statutes, gave citizens of the state substantive rights to challenge certain environmental permits....

...Determination of who has standing is encompassed within these substantive rights. See Caloosa Property Owners Ass’n v. Palm Beach County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 429 So.2d 1260, 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (“Part of the process of designing a new cause of action includes delineation of who has standing.”). The changes to section 403.412(5) made by chapter 2002-261 eliminate the appellants’ previous right to initiate a proceeding upon notice of DEP’s intent to issue a permit....

...4 In Rothermel , the appellant had an opportunity to be heard before the Parole Commission. He still maintained the right to raise all issues, albeit in a different forum. Here, appellants’ right to be heard concerning the issuance of permits by DEP was removed by the amendment to section 403.412....

...The issues of when and how the bill was amended are within the province of the legislature. Because we find no single subject violation, the decisions of the DEP are affirmed. KAHN and LEWIS, JJ., Concur. . Chapter 2002-261 made the following changes to section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes: (5) In any administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction, the Departmen...

...activity is to take place. Corporations falling in this category are not required to show a substantial interest. In both of the cases before us, the appellants did not qualify for automatic standing, and claimed standing under the old standards of section 403.412(5)....

...f counsel, we conclude that the amended complaint does state a cause of action as is required by Rule 1.110(b), RCP, 30 F.S.A. The amended complaint alleges in pertinent part as follows: 1. This action is brought pursuant to the authority of Chapter 403.412 of the Florida Statutes, known as the Florida Environmental Protection Act....

...To do so at this stage of the proceedings would not only be premature but plain error. For the reasons stated, the order appealed is, therefore, reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. HOBSON, A.C.J., and McNULTY, J., concur. NOTES [1] Florida Statutes, Section 403.412(2) (a), provides: "The department of legal affairs, any political subdivision or municipality of the state, or a citizen of the state may maintain an action for injunctive relief against: 1....

...Any person, natural or corporate, governmental agency or authority to enjoin such persons, agencies, or authorities from violating any laws, rules or regulations for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources of the state." [2] Florida Statutes, Section 403.412(2) (c), provides in pertinent part: "......

...of that system. We affirm on all issues on appeal and on cross-appeal by the appellee, ECOSWF (Environmental Confederation of Southwest Florida), intervenor below. Cape Cave contends 1) that ECOSWF was not a “citizen” entitled to intervene under section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes; 1 2) that Chapter 381, Florida Statutes, 2 precludes DER’s consideration of septic tank impact on water quality in this proceeding; 3) that DER’s policy of considering such impact was invalid as a rule not ad...

...ction of a 2800-lot residential project, Rotonda Villas. On July 22, 1983, DER issued its intent to issue the permit with eighteen proposed conditions. Both ECOSWF and the state Department of Community Affairs then filed petitions to intervene under section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes, and section 120.57(l)(b), Florida Statutes....

...The final order entered by the DER assistant secretary granted the permits with conditions above noted, and agreed with the hearing officer that ECOSWF did not establish “substantial interest” standing under section 120.57, Florida Statutes. 5 The order resolves capacity and standing issues under section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes, by holding: (1) that ECOSWF was a citizen under the cited statute; (2) that ECOSWF’s petition, verified by its attorney (who was not a member), met the procedural requirements for intervention because there was no evidence that any form of authorization was necessary other than the finding of counsel’s authorization “to take all actions necessary” to obtain a hearing on the proposed permit; (3)that section 403.412(5) does not require ECOSWF, as a citizen intervenor, to establish that its substantial interests are affected....

...NIMMONS, J., and GARY, Associate Judge, concur. . "In any administrative ... proceedings authorized by law for the protection of the ... natural resources of the state ... a citizen of the state shall have standing to intervene as a party on the filing of a verified pleading...." Section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes....

...The court there held in pertinent part: [Standing to appeal a development order to FLWAC is limited to those parties expressly stated in section 380.07(2). Accordingly, we have refused to create any judicial exceptions where none was intended.... [W]e do not agree that section 403.412(5) creates a statutory exception to the limited standing granted by section 380.07(2)_ [Ijntervention at the local DRI review level ......

...direct or collateral. Florida law provides numerous opportunities for affected persons to obtain review of agency determinations. See, e.g., § 120.68, Fla. Stat. (1987) (judicial review); § 120.69, Fla. Stat. (1987) (enforcement of agency action); § 403.412(2), Fla.Stat....

...This is an appeal from a Department of Natural Resources order denying appellant’s petition for an administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1979). We affirm. On February 5,1981, appellant, as a State citizen, filed a “Verified Petition and Complaint Pursuant to Section 403.412(5), Fla....

...In summary the Department denies your petition for a 120.57(1), F.S., hearing and denies the complaint and petition for in-junctive relief on the grounds that there is no license or permit involved which would properly serve as final agency action for a 403.412 verified complaint challenge and there is no action, either already taken or pending which affects the petitioner’s substantial interests....

...ttee’s acquisition list with lower priority than Westlake, or the owner of land not on the list but which allegedly should be on the list. Appellant’s attempt to use Section 403-412 as a springboard into a Section 120.57 proceeding is misplaced. Section 403.412 has not obviated the requirement that a citizen allege a special injury or allege the agency decision affects a substantial interest. Although Section 403.412(2) has done away with the requirement of showing a special injury required by the traditional rule of standing provided express conditions precedent are met, this statute only applies to suits to maintain an action for injunctive relief in circuit court....

...State Department of Environmental Regulation, 390 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1980). There is no provision in Section 403.-412(2) authorizing a citizen to initiate and maintain a Section 120.57 proceeding without meeting the substantial interest test. Contrary to appellant’s argument, Section 403.412(5) also does not authorize or allow a citizen to initiate a Section 120.57 proceeding without first meeting the substantial interest standing test. Section 403.412(5) provides: In any administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction, the Department of Legal Af...

...rty on the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the activity, conduct, or product to be licensed or permitted has or will have the effect of impairing, polluting, or otherwise injuring the air, water, or other natural resources of the state. Section 403.412(5) does allow a citizen of the state to intervene as a party without meeting standing requirements in any “administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction.” However, appellant is not an intervenor but is attempting to maintain or initiate an administrative proceeding. Even assuming Section 403.412(5) could be interpreted as authorizing appellant to initiate an administrative action, his petition still fails to meet the conditions precedent to bringing such an action. Section 403.412(5) applies to administrative, licensing, or other proceedings involving those agencies with power and authority over environmental permitting and licensing....

...ar human conduct, and does not even constitute final agency action. Appellees’ conduct only approved a proposed list of EEL acquisitions authorizing DNR to commence negotiations for the voluntary acquisition of the lands on the list. Even assuming Section 403.412(5) can further be interpreted to include appellees’ approval of the proposed EEL acquisition list as a licensing or permitting proceeding, appellant’s verified petition is still deficient. Section 403.412(5) provides a citizen with standing to intervene as a party on the filing of a verified pleading “asserting that the activity, conduct, or product to be licensed or permitted has or will have the effect of impairing, polluting, or o...

...along with a letter which stated he was suing on behalf of the state because of DER’s inactivity, refusal to institute suit, and lack of cooperation with his office. The letter actually requested that DER treat the suit as one brought pursuant to section 403.412, Florida Statutes (1981). 7 However, during the hearing on GDC’s motions, appellant admitted that he was not proceeding under either section 403.412 with respect to the complaint for civil damages and penalties or section 120.69(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), 8 with respect to the administrative action....

....Additionally, we again note that a state attorney is not precluded from filing a public nuisance action against GDC. § 60.05(1), Fla.Stat. (1981); State ex rel. Shevin . We do not express any opinion as to whether a state attorney has standing under section 403.412....

...Protection. 2 Appellants make several arguments for reversal of the trial court’s order. We find no merit in the issues raised and affirm, but write to address Appellants’ contention that the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that section 403.412(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2020), is constitutional and preempts Orange County Charter section 704.1. Because section 403.412(9)(a), Florida Statutes, precludes a “local government regulation, ordinance, code, rule, comprehensive plan, charter, or any other provision of law” from “recogniz[ing] or grant[ing] any legal rights to a plant, an animal, a...

...from decisions by the South Florida Water management District granting conceptual approval of a surface water man *1118 agement system and denying the appellant’s request to intervene. We affirm. Friends was properly denied intervention based upon Section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...provision of statute, or provision of agency regulation, is entitled to participate in whole or in part in the proceeding, or whose substantial interests will be affected by proposed agency action, and who makes an appearance as a party.” Finally, section 403.412(5) speaks to the issue of standing under sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, providing: (5) In any administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural res...

...1 AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part. ORFINGER, J., and ROBERTS, C., Associate Judge, concur. . Seminole asserts that "Riverkeeper’s argument is at best a moot point” because ‘‘River-keeper was determined to have standing in this proceeding pursuant to Section 403.412(6), Florida Statutes, and fully participated in the proceeding below.”

...uth Florida Water Management District denying the City of St. Cloud’s request for a formal administrative hearing (case number 88-557). In case number 88-468, the City of St. Cloud filed, with this court, a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 403.412 of the Environmental Protection Act. Section 403.412 provides: 403.412 Environmental Protection Act.— ¡¡c s}: sfc ⅜: ⅜ ⅝ (f) In any action instituted pursuant to this section, the prevailing party or parties shall be entitled to costs and attorney fees....

...If the court has reasonable ground to doubt the solvency of the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s ability to pay any cost or judgment which might be rendered against him in an action brought under this section, the court may order the plaintiff to post a good and sufficient surety bond or cash. § 403.412(2)(f), Fla.Stat....

...See City of Hollywood v. Mulligan, 934 So. 2d 1238, 1241 (Fla. 2006) (holding whether municipal ordinance is preempted by state law “is a question of law subject to de novo review”). The City argues that the charter amendment is expressly preempted by section 403.412(9), Florida Statutes....

...3d at 495 (quoting Barragan v City of Miami, 545 So. 2d 252, 254 (Fla. 1989)). Therefore, our determination of whether the charter amendment is expressly preempted begins with an analysis of the specific language used in both the proposed amendment and in section 403.412(9)(a)....

... appropriate jurisdiction to enjoin violations of the right to clean water. Remedies shall include injunctive relief to enjoin the violation and monetary damages to restore the waters to their pre-damaged state. In contrast, section 403.412(9)(a) states as follows: A local government regulation, ordinance, code, rule, comprehensive plan, charter, or any other provision of law may not recognize or grant any legal rights to a plant, an animal, a bo...

...1.01(8) or grant such person or political subdivision any specific rights relating to the natural environment not otherwise authorized in general law or specifically granted in the State Constitution. In determining whether the charter amendment is expressly preempted by section 403.412(9)(a), the issue here is whether granting residents of Titusville the “right to clean water,” and allowing them to bring an action in the name of the Waters for injunctive relief and for monetary damages is “authorized in general law or specifically granted in the State Constitution.” The City relies on Wilde Cypress Branch v. Hamilton, 386 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024), to support its argument that the charter amendment is expressly preempted by section 403.412(9)(a)....

...ounty, provided injunctive relief as a remedy for any violation of those rights, and conferred standing on certain persons to enforce the charter amendment’s provisions. The trial court first found that the charter amendment could not coexist with section 403.412(9)(a) because it granted rights to bodies of water in Orange County, which was expressly prohibited under the statute. It also found that the charter amendment impermissibly granted specific rights to citizens of Orange County not otherwise 4 authorized in general law or specifically granted in the Florida Constitution. The Sixth District affirmed on appeal, finding that section 403.412(9)(a) preempted the charter amendment....

...The Sixth District determined that because the county charter recognized a right held by water bodies “to exist, Flow, to be protected against Pollution and to maintain a healthy ecosystem,” the charter was indeed in conflict with and preempted by section 403.412(9)(a) based on the statute’s language that precludes a charter from recognizing any legal rights to a plant, animal, or body of water. Wilde Cypress, 386 So....

...as the Orange County charter in Wilde Cypress did—the right to exist, flow, and be protected from pollution. It does, however, implicitly grant rights to bodies of water by granting residents the ability to bring an action “in the name of the Waters of Titusville,” and section 403.412(9)(a) expressly precludes a charter from recognizing a legal right to a body of water....

...pollution control, neither the Florida Constitution nor other general law explicitly provides this right to clean water as defined in the charter amendment, which is a right “relating to the natural environment” and thus, expressly preempted by section 403.412(9)(a). Speak Up cites to section 403.412(2)(a) to argue that because a citizen may maintain an action for injunctive relief to enforce laws and regulations for the protection of the water, the right given to Titusville residents in the charter amendment to enjoin violations of the right to clean water is thus a right authorized in general law. Indeed, pursuant to section 403.412, a citizen may seek, and a court may grant, injunctive relief and impose conditions on a defendant consistent with “any rules or regulations adopted by any state or local governmental agency which is charged to protect the air, water, and other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction.” § 403.412(3), Fla....

...However, while this allows citizens to maintain actions for violations of laws pertaining to the protection of air, water, and natural resources, it does not confer a specific right to clean water or waters free from pollution. Additionally, it is noted that under section 403.412, a citizen is only authorized to bring an action for injunctive relief (and prevailing party attorney’s fees), while the charter amendment also provides for monetary damages to restore the waters to their pre-damaged state....

...These types of monetary damages are not authorized in either general law or specifically granted in the State Constitution. We recognize the overwhelming support of this charter amendment by the residents of the City of Titusville and the admirable policies of the amendment. However, the Legislature in drafting section 403.412(9)(a) of the Environmental Protection Act has not authorized the types of rights provided for in the charter amendment....

...to residents relating to the natural environment that are not authorized in general law. Therefore, consistent with the holding of our sister court in Wilde Cypress, we conclude that the charter amendment is in conflict with, and thus preempted by, section 403.412(9)(a)....

...a/k/a Indian Riverkeeper, appeal the Florida Department of Environmental Protection’s (“FDEP”) final order dismissing their petition for a formal administrative proceeding. We affirm because Appellants do not have standing to initiate an administrative proceeding pursuant to section 403.412(6), Florida Statutes (2010). In 2010, Allied Universal Corporation (“Allied”) and Chem-Tex Supply Corporation (“Chem-Tex”) negotiated a settlement agreement with FDEP to remediate soil and groundwater contamination at a bleach- manufacturing and chlorine-repackaging facility owned by Allied and Chem-Tex. Dissatisfied with its terms, Appellants petitioned for an administrative hearing to challenge the settlement agreement. They claimed standing under section 403.412(6), Florida Statutes, which grants automatic standing to certain Florida corporations to initiate an administrative proceeding....

...120.57, provided that the Florida corporation not for profit was formed at least 1 year prior to the date of the filing of the application for a permit, license, or authorization that is the subject of the notice of proposed agency action. § 403.412(6), Fla....

...statutory interpretation, we defer to the agency’s interpretation of a statute it is given the power and duty to administer when that interpretation is reasonable. Capo v. Fla. Pub. Emps. Council 79, 82 So. 3d 1116, 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Because we hold that FDEP’s reading of section 403.412(6) is reasonable, we affirm the order dismissing Appellants’ administrative petition for lack of standing. “As with the interpretation of any statute, the starting point of analysis is the actual language of the statute.” Brown v....

...effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.” Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003). The language of section 403.412(6) is not ambiguous....

...This case does not concern an application for a permit, license, or authorization. Rather, it involves a third-party challenge to a settlement agreement. Accordingly, we hold that Appellants do not have standing to challenge the settlement agreement under section 403.412(6), Florida Statutes (2010). Affirmed. FORST, J., and HANZMAN, MICHAEL, Associate Judge, concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed on authority of Section 403.412 (2) (f), Florida Statutes....