Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...opinion. It is so ordered. BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. SHAW, J., dissents. NOTES [1] One or more of the amicus briefs suggests that Snyder's remedy was to bring a de novo action in circuit court pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...pollution, flooding, and deterioration of potable water supply. Therefore, we believe *935 that the Association meets the general standing criteria of Citizens Growth Management. Moreover, a finding of standing here is in accord with the intent of the legislature as manifested by the recent addition of Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1985) to the statutory scheme....

...s and not subject to review by certiorari, many rezoning decisions have been held to be reviewable by certiorari because a zoning ordinance, charter or special act so provides. [39] Some decisions omit any basis for certiorari review. [40] Moreover, section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (1987) now authorizes rezoning orders which are challenged on the basis of consistency with the local comprehensive plan, to be subject to injunctive relief in circuit court and disagreement exists over the appropriate standard of review....

...might not withstand the test of constitutionality." 47 S.Ct. at 121. [32] See Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410, 414 (5th Cir.1950) (Hutcheson dissenting). [33] See section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes. [34] §§ 163.3161 — 163.3215, Fla....

...therwise applied the correct principle of law. That is, we would not reweigh the circuit court's determination whether or not adequate evidence was presented. [3] In addition to a petition for certiorari, Sunbelt filed an original action pursuant to § 163.3215, Fla....

...jectives, policies, land uses, etc., as provided in its comprehensive plan. See § 163.3194(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). Appellants claimed that the development order was inconsistent with the comprehensive plan and sought injunctive relief pursuant to section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...Appellate review did not produce the outcome for which the developer had hoped. In 1997 we reversed the trial court's decision that the County's consistency determination complied with the Comprehensive Plan. Poulos v. Martin County, 700 So.2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Specifically, we concluded that section 163.3215 required de novo consideration in the trial court on the consistency issue. Our opinion explained: "if section 163.3215 was intended to provide for the circuit court to conduct an appellate review by certiorari, then the statutory language permitting the filing of the action up to 90 days after the granting of the development order is in conflict with the 30 day deadline outlined under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure." 700 So.2d at 165. We further adopted an analysis by Judge Wentworth as to the meaning of section 163.3215: "the ......

...As regards the remedy, the Final Judgment found no evidence indicating that either Brooks or the Homeowners Association were damaged by any diminution in value. The court found that the Homeowners Association was not a person within the meaning of section 163.3215(2) and therefore had no standing to seek relief under section 163.3215. Accordingly, only plaintiff Shidel was entitled to seek injunctive relief under section 163.3215....

...al government to prevent such local government from taking any action on a development order ... which materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property that is not consistent with the comprehensive plan...." § 163.3215(1), Fla....

...elief under this provision. Moreover there is but one basis for issuing the injunction: that the development order is not consistent with the Comprehensive Plan to the detriment of adjoining property owners. Hence the issuance of an injunction under section 163.3215(1) necessarily requires the judge to determine in the first instance whether a development order is consistent with the Comprehensive Plan....

...k notice of it. The result was the Growth Management Act of 1985. Chap. 85-55, Laws of Fla. This is essentially the statute we have today, parts of which have been cited in preceding paragraphs. [12] Its most important provision for our purposes was section 163.3215, the provision used by Shidel to bring this action into court. In Southwest Ranches, we observed that section 163.3215 had liberalized standing requirements and demonstrated "a clear legislative policy in favor of the enforcement of comprehensive plans by persons adversely affected by local action." 502 So.2d at 935. In Parker v. Leon County, 627 So.2d 476, 480 (Fla.1993), the court held that "the legislature enacted section 163.3215 to ensure the standing for any person who `will suffer an adverse effect to an interest protected ......

...The Parker court quoted with approval the above passage from Southwest Ranches. 627 So.2d at 479. See also Putnam County Envt'l Council, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Putnam County, 757 So.2d 590, 593 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) ("That standard changed, however, with the 1985 adoption of section 163.3215, which liberalized the standing requirements and `demonstrat[ed] a clear legislative policy in favor of the enforcement of comprehensive plans by persons adversely affected by local action.'")....

...th the Comprehensive Plan. In discussing the difference between a developer aggrieved by a land use decision of local government and an affected property owner in the vicinity aggrieved by a proposed new development, the Snyder court emphasized that section 163.3215 "provides a remedy for third parties to challenge the consistency of development orders." 627 So.2d at 475....

...Scherker, Rights, Remedies, and Ratiocination: Toward a Cohesive Approach to Appellate Review of Land Use Orders After Board of County Commissioners v. Snyder, 24 STET. L.REV. 311, 312 (1995). In light of this history, deferential review of the kind advocated by developer here is no longer the rule after Snyder. Under section 163.3215 citizen enforcement is the primary tool for insuring consistency of development decisions with the Comprehensive Plan....

...o a development order, a cause of action—as it were—for compliance with the Comprehensive Plan is presented to the court, in which the judge is required to pay deference only to the facts in the case and the applicable law. In light of the text of section 163.3215 and the foregoing history, we reject the developer's contention that the trial court erred in failing to defer to the County's interpretation of its own Comprehensive Plan....

...enactment, regardless of whether the traditional judicial restrictions on that remedy in other, non-statutory contexts would limit its usage. As the author of the primary duty, the Legislature alone shapes the form of its effectuating mechanism. In section 163.3215, we think the Legislature has constructed such a statute....

...roperty owners in the vicinity is not any diminution in the value of their homes, but instead is merely "knowing that there is an upscale apartment building approximately a football field away, partially visible through some trees behind the house." Section 163.3215 says nothing about weighing these specific equities before granting an injunction....

...Shidel let the developer know when it was just beginning construction of the first building that she would seek demolition if the court found the project inconsistent. When developer decided to proceed with construction in spite of the absence of a final decision as to the merits of the challenge under section 163.3215, the developer was quite able to foresee that it might lose the action in court....

...ompliance would make the standards of growth management of little real consequence. It would allow developers such as this one to build in defiance of the limits and then escape compliance by making the cost of correction too high. That would render section 163.3215 meaningless and ineffectual....

...l whose financial loss is an inconsequential item." 70 F.2d at 382-83. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that respect for law, in this case the Comprehensive Plan, trumps any "inequity" of financial loss arising from demolition. Our understanding of section 163.3215 is thus different from equity's traditional use of its remedies....

...ance, or any other official action of local government having the effect of permitting the development of land.... `Development order' means any order granting, denying, or granting with conditions an application for a development permit."). [4] See § 163.3215(4), Fla....

...Thereafter, the complaining party may institute the action authorized in this section. However, the action shall be instituted no later than 30 days after the expiration of the 30-day period which the local government has to take appropriate action."). [5] See § 163.3215(1), Fla....

...in this appeal by Karen Shidel. [10] To illustrate the point, we draw an analogy. The action by a county approving a development order could fairly and logically be compared to the actions of administrative agencies generally. Thus we might contrast section 163.3215(1) with comparable provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act. Section 120.68 generally grants parties in agency proceedings access to a court after the agency has finally acted. Section 120.68(4), however, limits review to the record in agency. There is no similar provision in section 163.3215....

...otherwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision; but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on an issue of discretion. " [e.s.] § 120.68(7), Fla. Stat. (2000). There is nothing even remotely comparable in section 163.3215....

...the Comprehensive Plan. We note from other statutes that when the Legislature means to place restrictions on third party challenges to agency decisions granting permits, it says so in specific text. Compare § 403.412(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2000), with § 163.3215(4), Fla. Stat. (2000), as to preconditions for suit; see also § 163.3215(6), Fla....

...STANDING: CITY OF MAITLAND Pursuant to the Orange County Zoning Act, "Any person aggrieved by the board of county commissioner's decision ... may file a petition for writ of certiorari ... in the circuit court of Orange County... ." (Ch. 71-795 sec. 16). This language is similar to the provisions in section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...procedure in all courts, including the time for seeking appellate review), there is nothing in the record to disclose that Maitland Association ever applied for or that the circuit court ever granted an extension of time for filing the petition. [4] Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1985), which authorizes an action for injunctive or other relief to enforce a local comprehensive plan is not applicable as Battaglia filed its application before July 1, 1985. See § 163.3215(3)(a), Fla....

...the traffic impact of the planned development would be less than if the property were fully developed for residential purposes. [1] Established by a special act of the Florida Legislature. See Chapter 63-1716, Laws of Florida, Special Acts 1963. [2] § 163.3215(2), Fla....

...ipal or county officials, but shall be interpreted as a recognition of their broad statutory and constitutional powers to plan for and regulate the use of land. It is further, the intent of the Legislature to reconfirm that sections 163.3161 through 163.3215 have provided and do provide the necessary statutory direction and basis for municipal and county officials to carry out their comprehensive planning and land development regulation powers, duties, and responsibilities....

...RIGHT TO PETITION FOR COMMON LAW CERTIORARI IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE STATE IS STILL AVAILABLE TO A LANDOWNER/PETITIONER WHO SEEKS APPELLATE REVIEW OF A LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT ORDER FINDING COMPREHENSIVE PLAN INCONSISTENCY, NOTWITHSTANDING SECTION 163.3215, FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)? Emerald Acres, 601 So.2d at 584; Parker, 601 So.2d at 1223....

...Each developer then sought certiorari review in the Leon County Circuit Court. Although they had traveled through the administrative process separately, the cases were consolidated at the trial level. Leon County filed motions to dismiss the actions for failure to comply with section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1989); these motions were denied....

...m the essential requirements of law. Leon County then sought appellate review. In a split decision, the district court of appeal held that the county's motions to dismiss should have been granted. The court reasoned that suit had to be brought under section 163.3215. Therefore, as a condition precedent, it was necessary that a verified complaint first be filed with the local government within thirty days after the applications were denied. § 163.3215(4), Fla....

...with the statutory condition precedent. Id. at 1318. On remand, the developers filed amended complaints, again raising the issue of whether the proposed developments were consistent with the comprehensive plan. Emerald Acres alleged compliance with section 163.3215 or waiver of the requirements. Parker alleged substantial compliance with the statute. The trial court dismissed both actions, finding that the developers had failed to file verified complaints with the county within thirty days of the county's denials as required by section 163.3215(4)....

...ept for the court's prior opinion in Parker I. The dismissal of Parker's action was summarily affirmed with citation to the Emerald Acres decision. Parker, 601 So.2d at 1223. On rehearing in both cases, the court certified the question quoted above. Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1989), provides in pertinent part: 163.3215 Standing to enforce local comprehensive plans through development orders....

...urred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The developers argue that as landowner applicants their common law right to petition for certiorari review in circuit court was unaffected by section 163.3215 because that statute only applies to actions by third-party intervenors....

...g which required that a legally recognized right be adversely affected. Citizens Growth Management Coalition, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach, 450 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1984). The following year as part of the Growth Management Act the legislature enacted section 163.3215 to ensure the standing for any person who "will suffer an adverse effect to an interest protected ... by the ... comprehensive plan." § 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (1985). See Southwest Ranches Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Broward, 502 So.2d 931, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA) ([Section 163.3215] "liberalizes standing requirements and demonstrates a clear legislative policy in favor of the enforcement of comprehensive plans by persons adversely affected by local action."), review denied, 511 So.2d 999 (Fla....

...We acknowledge that subsection (2) defines the term "aggrieved or adversely affected party" to include " any person ... which will suffer an adverse effect to an interest protected or furthered by the local governmental comprehensive plan." (Emphasis added.) Further, the term "development order," referred to in section 163.3215(1), is defined as "any order granting, denying, or granting with conditions an application for a development permit," § 163.3164(6), Fla. Stat. (1989) (emphasis added), and section 163.3215(3)(a) *480 refers to suits maintained under the statute which challenge approvals or denials....

...standing to challenge a land use decision on the ground that it fails to conform with the comprehensive plan." Citizens Growth Management Coalition of West Palm Beach, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach, Inc., 450 So.2d 204, 208 (Fla. 1984); see also, § 163.3215(1), Fla....

...sion) affirmance of the Board of Adjustment's order approving an application for a special exception to the county's comprehensive land use plan. The trial court dismissed the action, ruling PCEC did not possess standing to challenge the order under section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes (1999)....

...berts' property. Following the County Commission's ratification of the Board of Adjustment's approval of the application for the special exception, PCEC filed a complaint seeking to enforce Putnam County's comprehensive plan pursuant to chapter 163. Section 163.3215 sets forth the standing requirements for parties seeking to enforce a local comprehensive plan. The statute provides: 163.3215....

...equipment or services, or environmental or natural resources. The alleged adverse interest may be shared in common with other members of the community at large, but shall exceed in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons. § 163.3215, Fla. Stat. (1999)(emphasis added). The County Commission moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that PCEC lacked standing under section 163.3215....

...A hearing was held on the motion to dismiss, after which the trial court, in a thorough and thoughtful written order, dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice based upon the conclusion that PCEC lacked standing to challenge the order. The trial court narrowly construed the standing requirement of section 163.3215, rejecting PCEC's claim that the statute was designed to expand the group of persons possessing standing to enforce local comprehensive plans....

...interests that were any greater than those of the community at large. "Any other conclusion," wrote the court, "would in essence allow any citizen to bring an action without being `aggrieved or adversely affected.'" The trial court's conclusion that section 163.3215 was not to be liberally construed was incorrect. Prior to the enactment of section 163.3215 in 1985, the common law rule for standing applied....

...recognized right that would be adversely affected by the decision. See Citizens Growth Management Coalition of West Palm Beach, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach, 450 So.2d 204, 208 (Fla.1984). That standard changed, however, with the 1985 adoption of section 163.3215, which liberalized the standing requirements and "demonstrat[ed] a clear legislative policy in favor of the enforcement of comprehensive plans by persons adversely affected by local action." Southwest Ranches Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Broward, 502 So.2d 931, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 511 So.2d 999 (Fla.1987); see also Education Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 751 So.2d 621 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (noting that section 163.3215 is a remedial statute and as such is to be liberally construed to ensure standing to any party with a protected interest under the comprehensive plan). Testing PCEC's allegations against the liberalized standing test of section 163.3215, we conclude that PCEC's assertions, taken as a whole, are sufficient to give PCEC standing to seek enforcement of Putnam County's Comprehensive Plan....

...nt to distinguish PCEC's situation from that in Florida Rock Properties. In Florida Rock Properties, this court rejected Keyser's assertion that his lifelong interest in environmental protection and his activism in that field gave him standing under section 163.3215, noting, "Keyser never demonstrated any specific injury, only that the county would not be as bucolic as it once was....

...In conducting this review, we must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true. See Cintron v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 681 So.2d 859 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Having done so, we conclude that the averments set forth in PCEC's amended complaint satisfied the standing requirement of section 163.3215....

...citizen. And, in this case, PCEC is a non-profit corporation primarily interested in a specific forest, which would be affected by the planned development. In my view, those are distinctions without great import, and both should have standing under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. As pointed out in my dissent in Keyser, the majority opinion in that case as well as this one, leaves the very large acreage owner whose proposed development is surrounded only by the developer's own land, free from challenge pursuant to section 163.3215.

...equired hearings. As a final note, we point out an interesting provision in chapter 163, Florida Statutes (1995). Aggrieved parties are entitled to bring suit to prevent local government action that would be inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. § 163.3215(1). "In any action under this section, no settlement shall be entered into by the local government unless the terms of the settlement have been the subject of a public hearing after notice as required by this part." § 163.3215(7)....

...t as true. See Fox, 801 So.2d at 178; see also Wexler v. Lepore, 878 So.2d 1276, 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Hospice, 876 So.2d at 7; Putnam County Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Bd. Of County Comm'rs of Putnam County, 757 So.2d 590, 594 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2004), sets forth the standing requirements for enforcing a local comprehensive plan, and provides, in relevant part: Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain a de novo action for declaratory, injunct...

...ve plan adopted under this part. The de novo action must be filed no later than 30 days following rendition of a development order or other written decision, or when all local administrative appeals, if any, are exhausted, whichever occurs later. ß 163.3215(3), Fla....

...The alleged adverse interest may be shared in common with other members of the community at large but must exceed in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons. The term includes the owner, developer, or applicant for a development order. ß 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added). Prior to the adoption of section 163.3215, common law rules for standing applied, requiring that the party possess a legally recognized right that would be adversely affected by a land use decision. Putnam *907 County, 757 So.2d at 593 ( citing Citizens Growth Mgmt. Coal. of West Palm Beach, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach, 450 So.2d 204, 208 (Fla.1984)). However, after section 163.3215 was adopted, the standing requirements for enforcing a comprehensive plan were liberalized. Putnam County, 757 So.2d at 593; Educ. Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 751 So.2d 621, 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Southwest Ranches Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Broward, 502 So.2d 931, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). As a remedial statute, section 163.3215 "allows an adversely affected third party to maintain an action to determine whether a development order is consistent with the [local] comprehensive plan." Educ....

...mpatible with marine industrial use and will further erode the limited areas zoned for marine industrial use. Appellants have alleged an adverse interest that "exceed[s] in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons." See ß 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). Taking all of appellants' allegations as true, as we must on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, we find that they have sufficiently alleged facts to meet the liberalized standing requirements of section 163.3215....

...5th DCA 2000). Therefore, the only issue *910 presently before this Court is whether the allegations contained in Herbert Payne's ("Payne") and the Miami River Marine Group's ("Marine Group") amended complaint, on their face, satisfy the requirements of ß 163.3215, Fla....

...e Group have standing to challenge the City's rezoning and issuance of a MUSP on the grounds that these acts are inconsistent with the Miami Comprehensive Neighborhood Plan ("Comprehensive Plan"). Payne and the Marine Group both claim standing under section 163.3215. However, the amended complaint fails to adequately allege, pursuant to the requirements of section 163.3215, that Payne and the Marine Group are "aggrieved" parties whose interests are specifically "protected or furthered" by the Comprehensive Plan, and that they will suffer a harm greater than the general public if Hurricane Cove's construction proceeds....

...tory guarantee. Peregood v. Cosmides, 663 So.2d 665, 668 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982)). To have standing under section 163.3215 to challenge rezoning on the grounds that it is inconsistent with a comprehensive plan, a party must be one that is "aggrieved," that is, one whose interest is specifically protected or furthered by the comprehensive plan in question....

...Furthermore, the alleged violation of the party's interest must cause harm greater than that suffered by the community as a whole. Southwest Ranches Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Broward, 502 So.2d 931, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Looking first at section 163.3215, it is important to note that, as the Majority states, the statute was designed to liberalize the standing requirement. Even though it has been liberalized, the statute still requires a party to allege certain facts in order for that party to have standing. 163.3215 Standing to enforce local comprehensive plans through development orders.— (1) Subsections (3) and (4) provide the exclusive methods for an aggrieved or adversely affected party to appeal and challenge the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan adopted under this part....

...rthered by the local government comprehensive plan.... The alleged adverse interest may be shared in common with other members of the community at large but must exceed in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons. . . . ß 163.3215, Fla....

...I agree with the Majority that we must confine our review to the four corners of the complaint. Within the four corners of the amended complaint, neither Payne nor the Marine Group makes any such allegation. Therefore, the amended complaint is facially insufficient under section 163.3215 and neither Payne nor the Marine Group has standing to challenge the City's rezoning as being inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan....

...een privately owned companies which comprise the Port of Miami River, neither Payne nor the Marine Group has to allege that it is one of the fourteen entities in order to have standing. With all respect, that flies in the face of the requirements of section 163.3215 and the plain language of the Comprehensive Plan. Additionally, this analysis departs from the only issue before this court, that is, whether the amended complaint is facially sufficient under section 163.3215....

...It could be argued that such analysis confers standing on any Miami-Dade citizen to challenge the City's rezoning on the Miami River as inconsistent with the Port of Miami River element of the Comprehensive Plan. Such, obviously, was not the intent of the legislature in drafting section 163.3215 or of the drafters of the Comprehensive Plan....

...First, must a person challenging a development order based on an alleged conflict *272 with a county's comprehensive plan show more than demonstrated recreational interests in the natural resources of the affected area in order to establish standing, pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes? We answer this question in the negative, and hold that such interests are sufficient under the plain text of the statute, especially in light of liberalizing amendments to the standing requirements....

...rdinance 2006-08 approving the densities requested in the Planned Unit Development application. C. Consistency Challenge and Trial Proceedings Plaintiffs reside in Nassau County and oppose the development. They filed an amended complaint pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, challenging the development's consistency with the Comprehensive Plan....

...development at the higher density. The case proceeded to non-jury trial and was bifurcated into two phases, consistency and standing. In order to establish standing, Plaintiffs claimed to be "aggrieved or adversely affected" parties, as required by section 163.3215, asserting that (1) they are environmentalists and members of an environmental organization; and (2) they enjoy recreational activities in the surrounding environment of Crane Island which will be negatively impacted by the proposed development....

...2] by insuring the consistency of development orders with the city's or county's comprehensive plan. Adopting the County's position here would mean that no citizen in this case would have standing to seek enforcement of the Comprehensive Plan. Under section 163.3215, "an aggrieved or adversely affected party" has standing to challenge the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan....

...The alleged adverse interest may be shared in common with other members of the community at large but must exceed in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons. (Emphasis added.) As Plaintiffs assert, the standard of review for statutory standing under section 163.3215 to challenge consistency with the Comprehensive Plan is set forth in Edgewater Beach Owners Association, Inc....

...Prior to 1985, the common law rule for standing applied to actions challenging a land use decision. Under the common law rule, a party had to possess a legally recognized right that would be adversely affected by the land use decision in order to have standing to challenge that decision. The 1985 adoption of section 163.3215, however, liberalized the standing requirements by providing a right to enforce a comprehensive plan to parties having more than a general interest....

...Inc. v. Bay County, 890 So.2d 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (noting the statute "gives citizens with adversely affected interests a significantly enhanced standing to challenge the consistency of development decisions with the local comprehensive plan"). Section 163.3215 is a remedial statute which must be liberally construed in order to protect the public interests identified in the statute....

...Rather, the statute simply requires a citizen/plaintiff to have a particularized interest of the kind contemplated by the statute. . . . Save Homosassa River Alliance, Inc. v. Citrus County, 2 So.3d 329, 340 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), review denied, 16 So.3d 132 (Fla.2009). Prior to the enactment of section 163.3215, limitations on standing resulted in "a failure to conform development decisions to the plan based upon the fact that citizens lacked standing to challenge development orders for lack of consistency with the comprehensive plan." James C....

...nary/ degree [1] (last accessed April 1, 2010). In comparison, "kind" is defined as "fundamental nature or quality: essence." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http:// www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/kind [1] (last accessed April 1, 2010). Thus, section 163.3215 does not require an adverse interest different in kind, such as an adverse effect on property ownership or commercial interest, from that of the public's interest in the community. Rather, section 163.3215 requires only that the adverse interest exceed in degree that of the public's "interest in the community good shared by all persons." By its use of the measure "in degree," the Legislature demonstrated that only the intensity of the...

...Crane Island for fishing, boating, observing, and photographing habitat and wildlife, the plaintiffs have demonstrated a connection with Crane Island that "exceed[s] in degree" the general public's interest in the "community good" in Nassau County. Section 163.3215 establishes a broad legislative grant of standing which we are not at liberty to reject....

...property can be developed at the least intense adjacent density. Thus, Policy 1.09.03 is self-executing, reasonable, and not invalid under any state law. Conclusion We AFFIRM the trial court's holding that Appellees established standing pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, but disagree with the trial court's ruling on consistency....

...HAWKES, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part, with opinion. I concur in reversing the trial court and reinstating the Nassau County development order. I dissent, however, from the portion of the opinion concluding the Appellees had standing to challenge the development order in the first place. § 163.3215 Whether a party has standing to enforce a local comprehensive plan is a pure question of law subject to de novo review. See Bay Point Club, Inc. v. Bay County, 890 So.2d 256 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, (2006) provides: 163.3215 Standing to enforce local comprehensive plans through development orders.— (1) Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain an action for injunctive or other relief against any local government to prevent such local government from taking any action on a development order, as defined in s....

...ronmental or natural resources. The alleged adverse interest may be shared in common with other members of the community at large, but shall exceed in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons. (Emphasis added). Pursuant to section 163.3215, a party's standing to enforce a comprehensive plan depends on it being "aggrieved or adversely affected." A party is "aggrieved or adversely affected" if: (1) the comprehensive plan protects or furthers the party's personal and prof...

...The Appellees' interests are far less substantial than the interests of parties that are generally considered to have standing to enforce a comprehensive plan. For example: In Keyser, the Fifth District held that a party must demonstrate a specific injury to have standing pursuant to section 163.3215....

...City of Fort Lauderdale, 967 So.2d 427, (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). In Payne v. City of Miami, the Third District found that a local marine group, whose members owned and operated a marine industry business on the Miami River, had sufficient interests to attain standing under section 163.3215....

...[3] Because (1) the Appellees' interests do not exceed that of the general public; and (2) the Appellees failed to prove any adverse effects to their asserted interests, I do not believe the Appellee's established themselves as "aggrieved and adversely affected" parties pursuant to section 163.3215....

...ty in Palm Beach County. Within thirty days, Plaintiffs Education Development Center, Margie L. Bellamy, David Spring, the Association for Neighborhood Preservation, Inc., and SAC Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint with Palm Beach County pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, alleging that the development order issued to the Salvation Army was inconsistent with the comprehensive plan....

...The plaintiffs then filed their complaint in circuit court. The Salvation Army intervened, filing a motion to strike all plaintiffs except SAC Mercantile for failing to verify the complaint. The trial court granted the motion. Those plaintiffs who were stricken from the complaint now appeal. Section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes allows an adversely affected third party to maintain an action to determine whether a development order is consistent with the comprehensive plan. Before an adversely affected third party can file suit in court, however, the party must first file a verified complaint with the local government within thirty days of the local government's action. § 163.3215(4). The issue here is whether, in a case involving multiple plaintiffs, the condition precedent of first filing *623 a verified complaint with the local government is satisfied upon verification by only one plaintiff. Section 163.3215 enlarged the class of persons with standing to challenge a development order as inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. See Southwest Ranches Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Broward, 502 So.2d 931, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). As a remedial statute, section 163.3215 should be liberally construed to advance the intended remedy, i.e., to ensure standing for any party with a protected interest under the comprehensive plan who will be adversely affected by the governmental entity's actions....

...he local government before filing a complaint in court places the governmental entity on notice of the third party's position and intent to pursue that position in court. Parker, 627 So.2d at 479. Given this, a verified complaint is sufficient under section 163.3215(4) so long as it places the governmental entity on notice of all parties involved and the basis for their claim, regardless of how many parties verify the complaint....

...rd") to rezone a 509-acre parcel of Florida Rock's land from agriculture to mining. Although several issues are raised, one is dispositive: Timothy Keyser, who filed the lawsuit seeking the declaratory judgment, is not an aggrieved party pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes....

...The Board approved the rezoning without requiring a 25 percent set-aside to preserve native vegetation as mandated by the county's comprehensive plan. [1] In his verified complaint for declaratory relief to quash the Board's decision, Keyser alleged that he was an "aggrieved or adversely affected person" as defined in section 163.3215, Florida Statutes....

...The court found that Keyser had standing because his "exceptional personal and professional interests, efforts, and activities in conservation, wildlife and environmental protection matters were proven" and would be adversely affected by the Board's decision "to a greater degree than... other members of the community." Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, (1995) reads: 163.3215 Standing to enforce local comprehensive plans through development orders....

...Each time a legislative body changes a statute or ordinance, a lawyer is in doubt as to the advice to give his client. That is the nature of a lawyer's practice. Moreover, professional interests are not among the interests the comprehensive plan protects. See § 163.3215(2), Fla....

...ons and habitats in Putnam County. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that judicial review must "be sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome." Section 163.3215 does not specify or explain the degree to which the protected interest must be affected, but, case law is helpful....

...I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion's conclusion that Keyser lacks standing to challenge the rezoning decision rendered by Putnam County. Based on the trial court's findings and this record, I conclude that Keyser established sufficient facts to give him standing pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes....

...Thus I would affirm the trial court's determination that Florida Rock's proposed mining operation is "new development," on which a 25% reservation of land to protect native vegetation is required pursuant to the Putnam County Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Act. Section 163.3215 was enacted in 1985 as part of the Growth Management Act. This section addresses standing as follows: 163.3215....

...Keyser then proceeded to petition the Board of County Commissioners for remand or denial of the rezoning. This evidence appears sufficient to me to support the trial court's determination that Keyser was an aggrieved or adversely affected party under section 163.3215....

...June 18, 2001, Deerfield Beach's Development Review Committee, nonetheless, granted site plan approval for Energy Center to build a power plant. Count I of Coconut Creek's amended complaint sought to enjoin issuance of the site plan approval, under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...hensive plan under section 163.3194(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001); and that Coconut Creek is an "aggrieved or adversely affected party" entitled to bring suit to challenge the consistency of the site plan approval with the comprehensive plan, under section 163.3215(1). Consequently, Coconut Creek's contention that the site plan approval is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan is controlled by section 163.3215. See § 163.3215(3)(b) ("Suit under this section shall be the sole action available to challenge the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan adopted under this part."). Section 163.3215(4) provides that: As a condition precedent to the institution of an action pursuant to this section, the complaining party shall first file a verified complaint with the local government whose actions are complained of setting forth...

...After a September 13, 2001, hearing, on September 19, 2001, the trial judge entered an order dismissing the complaint. On September 28, 2001, Coconut Creek filed the amended complaint under review. Though Coconut Creek alleges it complied with all conditions precedent under section 163.3215, it acknowledges that it never filed a separate verified complaint with Deerfield Beach. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice following a February 22, 2002, hearing, and this appeal followed. Section 163.3215(4) is clear....

...aining party. The verified complaint shall be filed no later than 30 days after the alleged inconsistent action has been taken. It is undisputed that Coconut Creek never complied with this condition precedent. Where the presuit notice requirement of section 163.3215(4) has not been met, case law is clear in this and every other district that has considered the issue that the action should be dismissed. See Jensen Beach Land Co. v. Citizens for Responsible Growth of the Treasure Coast, Inc., 608 So.2d 509, 510 (Fla. 4th DCA *392 1992) ("We understand Section 163.3215......

...acked jurisdiction to hear this matter."); Lee v. St. Johns County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 776 So.2d 1110, 1112 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) ("Legislative intent is clear that a challenge to a development order must be brought within the narrow time limits of section 163.3215 or not at all."); Brady v. City of Jacksonville, 764 So.2d 715, 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ("Because [appellants] failed to comply with a condition precedent under section 163.3215(4) ......

...Count III was directed against the County and School Board and asked the court to declare that the interlocal agreement contained an unconstitutional delegation of quasi-judicial authority and to enjoin the County and School Board from developing the Lutz Lake Fern Road site. Count IV was an action pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1997), [1] in which the Neighbors asked the court to *383 declare the Lutz Lake Fern Road site inconsistent with the comprehensive plan and to enjoin the County and School Board from taking any further action toward development of the site....

...They argued that neither section 235.193 nor the interlocal agreement allowed the Neighbors to bring a viable cause of action. The County and School Board also asserted that, as to count IV, the Neighbors failed to timely file their action pursuant to section 163.3215....

...under chapter 86. As to count IV, the trial court dismissed the action as time-barred. The trial court dismissed the petition for writ of certiorari or for writ of mandamus on the basis that "[a] cause of action brought by third parties pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, provides for a de novo trial only." We first address the dismissal of counts I, II and III....

...In its order dismissing count IV, the trial court made the following findings: [T]he actions taken by the County and the School Board gave [the Neighbors] adequate notice of the alleged inconsistent action to afford [the Neighbors] the opportunity to utilize the thirty (30) day procedure set forth in section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes....

...In addition, the Court finds that the actions taken by the County and the School Board constitute a "Development Order" as defined in section 163.3164(7), Florida Statutes. The Court finds that [the Neighbors] have failed to comply with the condition precedent set forth in section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes....

...ituted a development order. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order of dismissal with prejudice and remand with directions that the second amended complaint be reinstated. Reversed and remanded. CASANUEVA and SALCINES, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Section 163.3215 provides, in relevant part: (1) Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain an action for injunctive or other relief against any local government to prevent such local government from taking any action on a development order, as defined in s....

...1st DCA 1998). The Court vacated FLWAC's order and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the petition for lack of standing. Id. at 475. On March 7, 1996, the Association filed a complaint against Walton County, Grand Dunes and KPM, pursuant to section 163.3215 seeking to enjoin any development under Resolution 95-82....

...After the Association rested, the developers orally moved to dismiss, stating that the motion was a bench trial equivalent to a motion for directed verdict. The trial court dismissed the action finding that the appellants failed to establish that they were "an aggrieved or adversely affected party" as defined in section 163.3215(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...adversely affected by the land use decision in order to have standing to challenge that decision. Id.; see also Citizens Growth Mgmt. Coalition of West Palm Beach, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach, 450 So.2d 204, 208 (Fla.1984). The 1985 adoption of section 163.3215, however, liberalized the standing requirements by providing a right to enforce a comprehensive plan to parties having more than a general interest....

...4th DCA 1987) (stating that "this section liberalizes standing requirements and demonstrates a clear legislative *220 policy in favor of the enforcement of comprehensive plans by persons adversely affected by local action"). To establish standing under section 163.3215(2), a party must demonstrate that it is an "aggrieved or adversely affected party" who will "suffer an adverse effect to an interest protected or furthered by the local government comprehensive plan." As a remedial statute, section 163.3215 should be liberally construed to ensure standing for a party with a protected interest under the comprehensive plan who will be adversely affected by the local government's actions....

...She further stated that the proposed development would place some of the Association's recreational facilities in the shade until noon. As an adjacent landowner, the Association has a more direct stake in the impact of the development than the general community. Under the liberalized standing requirements of section 163.3215, the Association, a group of property owners whose land adjoins the proposed development and stands to be directly affected by the alleged aspects of the development, has, therefore, shown standing to contest Resolution 95-82....

...NOTES [1] The Association's complaint filed in this proceeding only challenged Resolution 95-82. Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the Association could not and did not challenge the County's decision in Resolution 93-2 to revive the 1982 DRI. The Association filed the instant proceeding under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1995), asserting only that Resolution 95-82 was inconsistent with the County's comprehensive plan. Section 163.3215 only permits the Association to challenge a development order on the basis that it is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan....

...This Court affirmed FLWAC's final order on appeal. Edgewater Beach Owners Ass'n v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Walton County, 694 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). As the Association elected to pursue litigation of Resolution 93-2 before FLWAC, they could not seek a remedy under section 163.3215 upon FLWAC's finding of lack of standing. Section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (1991), requires that the Association file a verified complaint with the County within 30 days of the alleged inconsistent action by the County....

...[25] Section 163.3187(3)(a) confers standing in these administrative hearings to any "affected person" as broadly defined by section 161.3184(1)(a), without the need to allege an injury. Conversely, when challenging a zoning decision, an affected person must allege an injury. See § 163.3215, Fla....

...ive plan, were erroneous. We do not reach the merits of this determination because we find that the trial court should have granted the petitioners' motion to dismiss filed in each case for failure of the respondents to comply with the provisions of Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...The term "development order," as used in subsection 1, is a statutorily defined term which means "any order granting, denying, or granting with conditions an application for a development permit." (e.s.) Section 163.3164(6), Florida Statutes (1989). Also, subsection (3)(a) of Section 163.3215 refers to suits "under this section challenging the approval or denial ... ." (e.s.) The issue presented by the respondents' complaints was whether the proposed developments were consistent with the comprehensive plan. Section 163.3215(4) provides that a verified complaint must be filed with the local government as a condition precedent to the institution of a suit raising such issues....

...The action of the Leon County Commission in these cases does not appear to be an exception. Rather than simply deny the respondent's requests in the cases below, the Leon County Commission suggested that the respondents meet further with the Planning Commission in an effort to work out differences. The requirement of Section 163.3215(4) that a verified complaint be filed with the local government prior to instituting suit has the salutary effect of putting such governmental body on notice that it should be prepared to defend its action and will need to create a record to support that action. Indeed, if such procedure had been followed in the instant cases, the disputed matters might well have been resolved without the necessity of court proceedings. Because the respondent's complaints failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted in each of these cases and the final judgment in each case is quashed....

...On remand, the trial *1318 court is instructed to dismiss both complaints. WENTWORTH and ALLEN, JJ., concur. NIMMONS, J., dissents with written opinion. NIMMONS, Judge, dissenting. In my view, as the trial court also concluded, the lawsuit referred to in Section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes, contemplates one instituted by an aggrieved or adversely affected party in those situations where the local governmental agency has granted the applicant's proposal. If that is so, then the condition precedent provided for in Section 163.3215(4) clearly has no application to those situations where, as in the instant case, the application has been denied....

...The trial court, therefore, properly denied Leon County's motion to dismiss. ON REHEARING PER CURIAM. The respondents have moved for rehearing. We deny rehearing, but we make one observation. Emerald Acres Investments, Inc., has asserted in its motion that although it failed to allege compliance with Section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes, in its complaint, it nevertheless did comply with the requirements of the subsection....

...As the petitioners acknowledge in their response to the motion for rehearing, our opinion merely requires the trial court to dismiss the complaints in these cases because the respondent's complaints failed to allege satisfaction of the requirements of Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes....

...In addition, the objecting neighbors invoked both state and federal constitutional provisions, alleging due process violations and unconstitutional takings in counts two through five. In their pleading, the objecting neighbors sought relief under, inter alia, section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...d to dismiss. This time the trial court dismissed with prejudice on the following grounds: 1. Counts I through V of the Second Amended Complaint are all based on paragraphs 15 and 16 which seek to establish [the objecting neighbors'] compliance with Section 163.3215(4) of the Florida Statutes....

...Count VI of the Second Amended Complaint is defective in that it does not comply with the standards required for a petition for certiorari. The objecting neighbors now appeal dismissal with prejudice of their second amended verified "complaint and/or appeal." II. For the objecting neighbors, [4] an action under section 163.3215 was "the sole action available to challenge the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan." § 163.3215(3)(b), Fla Stat. (1993). Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1993), lays down conditions precedent to filing in circuit court....

...they also attacked the special exception on constitutional grounds. [5] See Turner v. Sumter County, Bd. of County Comm'rs, 649 So.2d 276, 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (remanding for consideration of a due process claim in a complaint held untimely under section 163.3215)....

...[7] *497 The circuit court apparently concluded— some years after the fact—that the failure to wait until on or after December 31, 1994, to file in circuit court was fatal, not only to so much of count one as alleged inconsistency with the comprehensive plan, but also to the second amended complaint, as a whole. Relying on section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (1993), the court below concluded that the objecting neighbors failed to meet a statutory condition precedent before filing in circuit court....

...Thereafter, the complaining party may institute the action authorized in this section. However, the action shall be instituted no later than 30 days after the expiration of the 30-day period which the local government has to take appropriate action. § 163.3215(4), Fla Stat....

...1st DCA 1995), with W.B.D., Inc., 382 So.2d at 1323. In the present case, the passage of time had cured the problem before the trial court acted. Premature filing did not, therefore, justify dismissal even of so much of count one as alleged inconsistency with the comprehensive plan. The purpose of section 163.3215(4) is to alert local government to an impending court challenge, allowing local government a last chance to respond before the case is filed in circuit court....

...cy with comprehensive plans no longer existed. VI. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment dismissing the second amended verified "complaint and/or appeal" and remand with directions that the trial court reinstate count one insofar as it alleges (under section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes) that the special exception is inconsistent with Suwannee County's comprehensive plan....

...2d DCA 1993) (same). See generally City of Jacksonville Beach v. Marisol Land Dev., Inc., 706 So.2d 354, 355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). [5] In their initial verified "complaint and/or appeal," the objecting neighbors stated their constitutional claims without reference to section 163.3215. Thereafter they pleaded their constitutional claims as somehow falling under section 163.3215....

...conceded that the Renard standard was applicable but contended that the allegations of their petition were sufficient to establish their standing under Renard. The circuit court concluded, however, that the question of standing was governed not by the Renard standard but by the provisions of section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2006), regarding challenges to the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan. Based on the application of section 163.3215, the circuit court determined that—according to the allegations of their petition in the circuit court—Mrs....

...sideration nor to direct the [entry of] any particular order or judgment.'" G.B.V. Int'l, Ltd., 787 So.2d at 844 (quoting Tamiami Trail Tours v. R.R. Comm'n, 128 Fla. 25, 174 So. 451, 454 (1937) (on rehearing)). B. The Applicable Law of Standing The section 163.3215 standard for standing applied by the trial court governs de novo challenges to "the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan." § 163.3215(1)....

...novo action for declaratory, injunctive, or other relief" with regard to "a development order ... which materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property which is not consistent with the comprehensive plan." § 163.3215(3)....

...The alleged adverse interest may be shared in common with other members of the community at large but must exceed in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons. The term includes the owner, developer, or applicant for a development order. § 163.3215(2) (emphasis added)....

...to himself differing in kind as distinguished from damages differing in degree suffered by the community as a whole.'" Renard, 261 So.2d at 835 (quoting Boucher, 102 So.2d at 135). It has repeatedly been acknowledged that the standing provisions of section 163.3215 were adopted to liberalize the standing requirements that would otherwise be applicable....

...Shidel, 795 So.2d 191, 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Putnam County Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 757 So.2d 590, 593 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Sw. Ranches Homeowners Ass'n v. Broward County, 502 So.2d 931, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). The difference between the section 163.3215 standard and the Renard special damages test is immediately apparent. Under section 163.3215(2), standing may be based on the showing of an adverse effect on an interest that " exceed[s] in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons." (Emphasis added.) The more restrictive Renard standard requires a...

...Here, Mrs. Splitt et al. voluntarily abandoned any comprehensive plan consistency challenge to the ordinance. Once they did so, Mrs. Splitt et al. were foreclosed from obtaining the advantage of the more liberal standing provisions applicable under section 163.3215. In determining the standing issue on the basis of section 163.3215, the circuit court failed to apply the correct law....

...A county planning staff report with the land use recommendations was presented to the board at a hearing. FIT presented expert testimony at the hearing in favor of the staff's analysis. The board decided not to adopt the land use amendment recommended by the staff. FIT filed a complaint pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes....

...lative and that FIT's sole remedy was an original action, de novo, in the trial court. The trial court did not have the benefit of the Florida Supreme Court's decisions in Snyder and in Parker v. Leon County, 627 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1993). Under Parker, section 163.3215 applies not to property owners whose applications have been denied, but only to third party intervenors who challenge the consistency of development orders. Hence, the property owner's common law right to petition for certiorari review in the circuit court is unaffected by section 163.3215....

...Miller Enterprises and the county moved to dismiss the complaint filed in the circuit court by DNR and the board of trustees. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. The court noted that section 163.3215(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1991) provides that suit under that section is "the sole action available to challenge the consistency of a development order." It found that DNR and the board of trustees had failed to comply with the statutory condition precedent to filing suit under section 163.3215(1) by failing to file its verified complaint with the county no later than 30 days after its alleged inconsistent action on December 10, 1991, the date Miller Enterprises' rezoning application was approved....

...It found that the petition was filed on April 23, 1992, 76 days after the development order was issued and therefore rendered on February 7, 1992. We affirm. The issue in this case is whether the 30-day period for filing a verified complaint, set forth in section 163.3215(4) above, begins to run from the date of the county's approval of Miller Enterprises' rezoning application or from the date of its execution of the development order....

...Miller Enterprises and the county contend that the alleged inconsistent action occurred on December 10, 1991 when the county approved Miller Enterprises' rezoning application whereas DNR and the board of trustees contend that it occurred on February 7, 1992 when the county executed the development order. Sections 163.3215(3)(b) and (4), Florida Statutes (1991) provide the following: 163.3215 Standing to enforce local comprehensive plans through development orders....

...to the county's action of approving or denying a rezoning application. Thus, we conclude that the trial court correctly found that DNR and the board of trustees did not comply with the statutory condition precedent to invoking its jurisdiction under section 163.3215(4) by filing a verified complaint within 30 days of the county's alleged inconsistent action. Finally, section 163.3215(3)(b) provides that suit for injunctive or other relief under that section is the sole action available to challenge the consistency of a development order....

...The Ordinance was nonetheless adopted. II. On January 7, 1993, Bal Harbour filed a statutory "verified complaint" with North Miami, contending that Ordinance 888 was inconsistent with North Miami's Comprehensive Plan. See generally §§ 163.3161-.3215, Fla.Stat. (1993). Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, authorizes certain litigants to challenge the consistency of a development order [2] with a city's duly adopted comprehensive plan. Id. § 163.3215(1), (3)(b)....

...Prior to instituting any lawsuit, "the complaining party shall first file a verified complaint with the local government whose actions are complained of setting forth the facts upon which the complaint is based and the relief sought by the complaining party." Id. § 163.3215(4)....

...f the above referenced Noise Study Work or the issuance by the City of North Miami of a building permit for the construction of the Amphitheater Facility...." In return, North Miami recognized that Bal Harbour could file a "verified complaint" under section 163.3215 when North Miami issued a building permit for the amphitheater, and if the "verified complaint" was not resolved, then Bal Harbour could proceed with a lawsuit in accordance with section 163.3215....

...would constitute a nuisance; and that Bal Harbour was fraudulently induced to enter into the settlement agreement. The trial court granted motions to dismiss all claims. Bal Harbour has appealed. III. We affirm dismissal of Bal Harbour's claim under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. In that claim (Count II of the amended complaint) Bal Harbour asserted that Ordinance 888 was inconsistent with the North Miami Comprehensive Plan. Section 163.3215 specifies that in order to challenge the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan, the litigant must first file a "verified complaint" with the appropriate local government. Id. § 163.3215(4)....

...However, the action shall be instituted no later than 30 days after the expiration of the 30-day period which the local government has to take appropriate action. " Id. (emphasis added). We agree with the Fifth District Court of Appeal that the time limit specified in Section 163.3215 is jurisdictional....

...See Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Seminole County Board of County Commissioners, 623 So.2d 593, 595-96 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), review denied, 634 So.2d 622 (Fla.1994). The legislative intent is very clear that a challenge to a development order under Section 163.3215 must be brought within the narrow time limits *361 specified by the statute, or else must not be brought at all....

...Assuming that North Miami responded on the thirtieth day (February 6, 1993) and Bal Harbour filed a lawsuit on the thirtieth day thereafter, the deadline for filing would have been sixty days after January 7, 1993, or March 8, 1993. The instant lawsuit was not filed until January 11, 1994. The claim under Section 163.3215 is time-barred....

...§ 163.3164(7), (8). [3] Because we do not reach the merits of Bal Harbour's claims related to the North Miami Comprehensive Plan, we express no view on whether the matters set forth in Bal Harbour's "verified complaint" set forth a viable cause of action under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. [4] Section 163.3215 also states, "Failure to comply with this subsection shall not bar an action for a temporary restraining order to prevent immediate and irreparable harm from the actions complained of." Id. § 163.3215(4)....

...to serve the "verified complaint" on the governmental unit and wait thirty days for a response. See id. This sentence does not allow a claim for injunctive relief to be brought after the expiration of the jurisdictional time periods set forth in subsection 163.3215(4)....

...The City Commission approved the alternative site plan on December 6, 2005, in a resolution that granted site plan approval and development of the Hyde Park Market site. Stranahan filed its complaint several months later for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City and Coolidge pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...plan is consistent with the City's comprehensive plan has never been adjudicated in any court. Stranahan maintains that the only way to determine the consistency of the alternative site plan with the comprehensive plan is by a complaint pursuant to section 163.3215 and this is the first such action it has brought....

..."The test of the sufficiency of a complaint in a declaratory judgment proceeding is not whether the complaint shows that the plaintiff will succeed in getting a declaration of rights in accordance with his theory and contention, but whether he is entitled to a declaration of rights at all." Id. (citations omitted). Section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (2006), provides that "subsections (3) and (4) provide the exclusive methods for an aggrieved or adversely affected party to appeal and challenge the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan a...

...Thus, the Agreement and Consent Final Judgment do not operate to prevent Stranahan's complaint. Finally, Coolidge asserts that both Stranahan and Friends lack standing to challenge the City's approval of the alternative site plan because they are not "aggrieved or adversely affected parties" under section 163.3215. An aggrieved or adversely affected party is defined as "any person or local government that will suffer an adverse effect to an interest protected or furthered by the local government comprehensive plan. . . ." § 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). Coolidge's standing argument is without merit. The adoption of section 163.3215 liberalized the standing requirements for enforcing a comprehensive plan....

...and the wildlife in and around the Homosassa River and in Old Homosassa, Florida." Plaintiffs Bitter, Rendueles, and Watkins are individuals who own property in the area. On August 10, 2006, Plaintiffs filed this suit against the County, pursuant to section 163.3215, challenging the County's approval of Resort's application on the ground that it is inconsistent with the County's Comprehensive Land Use Plan, Citrus County Ordinance No....

...County and Resort's joint motion. At the hearing, Resort and the County essentially reiterated the points they had raised in their written motion and urged that the dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint be with prejudice. Plaintiffs argued that section 163.3215 gave affected citizens significantly enhanced standing to challenge the consistency of development decisions and that their allegations were sufficient to establish standing under this liberalized standard....

...5th DCA 2000); Citizens Growth Mgmt. Coal., Inc., 450 So.2d at 206. In 1985, the Florida Legislature reacted to the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Citizens Growth Management that the common law rules of standing applied to the Growth Management Act by enacting section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. [6] Its stated purpose was "to ensure the standing for any person who `will suffer an adverse effect to an interest protected ... by the ... comprehensive plan.'" Parker, 627 So.2d at 479 ( citing § 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (1985)); see also Edu. Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 751 So.2d 621, 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (section 163.3215 is a remedial statute in that it "enlarged the class of persons with standing to challenge a development order as inconsistent with the comprehensive plan"). As a remedial statute, section 163.3215 is to "be liberally construed to advance the intended remedy...." Edu. Dev. Ctr., Inc., 751 So.2d at 623; see also Dunlap v. Orange County, 971 So.2d 171, 174 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). There is no doubt that the purpose of the adoption of section 163.3215 was to liberalize standing in this context. See City of Ft. Myers v. Splitt, 988 So.2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). In part, section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2007), provides: Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain a de novo action for declaratory, injunctive, or other relief against any local government to challenge any decision of such local governme...

...ny action on, a development order, as defined in s. 163.3164, which materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property which is not consistent with the comprehensive plan adopted under this part. *337 Further, section 163.3215(2), Florida Statutes (2007), provides: As used in this section, the term "aggrieved or adversely affected party" means any person [ [7] ] or local government that will suffer an adverse effect to an interest protected or furthered by...

...ity at large but must exceed in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons. The term includes the owner, developer, or applicant for a development order. (Emphasis added). Thus, a person's standing to bring a challenge under section 163.3215(3) depends on (1) whether the interests the person alleges are "protected or furthered by the local government comprehensive plan"; if so, (2) whether those interests "exceed in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons"; and (3) whether the interests will be adversely affected by the challenged decision. See § 163.3215(2), Fla....

...including interests related to health and safety, police and fire protection service systems, densities or intensities of development, transportation facilities, health care facilities, equipment or services, and environmental or natural resources. § 163.3215(2), Fla....

...The application was approved, and the Putnam County Environmental Council ["PCEC"] subsequently filed a complaint, seeking to enforce Putnam County's comprehensive plan pursuant to chapter 163. The trial court concluded that PCEC lacked standing to challenge the order under section 163.3215 and dismissed the action on that basis....

...nterest greater than that which all persons share in the community good. Id. at 593-94. On appeal, Plaintiffs begin with the premise that the trial court's dismissal order was based on the trial court's view that in order to have standing to mount a section 163.3215 challenge, the plaintiff must own real property adjacent to or very near the parcel at issue....

...e to them. Without it being unique to them, their interest cannot exceed in degree the general interest in the community good shared by all persons. The majority opinion eviscerates the "adverse *341 effect" element of the standing requirement in subsection 163.3215(2), Florida Statutes, and stands in direct conflict with the case law interpreting that statute. Subsection 163.3215(2) defines an "aggrieved or adversely affected party" as "any person or local government which will suffer an adverse effect to an interest furthered by the local government comprehensive plan...." (Emphasis added)....

...er it will be able to supply because of [Resort's] project demands." [5] The Old Homosassa Redevelopment Area Plan is incorporated into the County's Land Development Code as section 4680. [6] The action underlying this appeal was brought pursuant to section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes....

...urther the objectives, policies, land uses, and densities or intensities in the comprehensive plan and if it meets all other criteria enumerated by the local government. Once adopted, a comprehensive plan may be amended. Sections 163.3184, 163.3187. Section 163.3215 provides for injunctive and other relief for parties aggrieved by land use changes that are inconsistent with the comprehensive plan....

...David La Croix, Pennington, Wilkinson, Dunlap, Bateman & Camp, Tallahassee, for appellees. PER CURIAM. Appellant seeks review of an order denying its petition for writ of certiorari and mandamus. The trial court found that appellant did not comply with the provisions of section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...On appeal, this Court found that the issue presented by the complaint was whether the proposed development was consistent with the comprehensive plan and that the trial court should have granted the motion of the Board and the planning commission to dismiss for failure of the appellant to comply with the provisions of section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...[1] After dismissal of the complaint on remand, appellant filed an amended complaint again raising the issue of whether the proposed development was consistent with the comprehensive plan. Appellant also asserted that all conditions precedent to the institution and maintenance of the action, including the requirements of section 163.3215, had occurred, been satisfied or waived....

...The trial court noted that the Board affirmed the planning commission's conclusion, that denial of the plat was consistent with the comprehensive plan, at its June 27, 1989 meeting. The trial court found that the verified complaint was filed 58 days after the decision of the Board, in violation of section 163.3215. Section 163.3215 provides, in pertinent part: (1) Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain an action for injunctive or other relief against any local government to prevent such local government from taking any action on a development order, as defined in s....

...The trial court correctly determined that appellant failed to timely file a verified complaint with the local government. Appellant argues that the 30-day period for filing the verified complaint does not commence until the County's decision is reduced to writing and sent to the applicant. We reject this argument. Section 163.3215 contains no requirement that the "alleged inconsistent action" be reduced to writing....

...The legislative requirement of filing a verified complaint with the local government within 30 days of the local government's alleged inconsistent action does not require the assistance of court rules designed to determine time periods for seeking review of court rulings. We also reject appellant's argument that section 163.3215 unconstitutionally infringes on the rule-making authority of the Florida Supreme Court....

...The action of the Leon County Commission in these cases does not appear to be an exception. Rather than simply deny the respondent's requests in the cases below, the Leon County Commission suggested that the respondents meet further with the Planning Commission in an effort to work out differences. The requirement of Section 163.3215(4) that a verified complaint be filed with the local government prior to instituting suit has the salutary effect of putting such governmental body on notice that it should be prepared to defend its action and will need to create a record to support that action....

...invasion of the court's rule-making authority). Appellant's argument that the remedy of common law certiorari is still available is without merit. This argument is controlled by the decision in Parker, where the trial court's initial construction of section 163.3215 was rejected: The trial court stated, in the final judgment, "......

...The remedy of common law certiorari is not available because the legislature has designated the statutory *581 remedy the sole action available to challenge the consistency of a development order [3] with a comprehensive plan adopted under the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act. Section 163.3215(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). AFFIRMED. BARFIELD and ALLEN, JJ., concur. KAHN, J., concurs, with written opinion. KAHN, Judge, concurring. I agree that appellant has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating compliance with section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1989). Since this court has already held in Leon County v. Parker, 566 So.2d 1315 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), that no judicial review is available to appellant absent compliance with section 163.3215(4), we must affirm the circuit court....

...After fairly extensive discussion and comments by various members of the public, and with advice of the county attorney, the Commission upheld the denial of the preliminary plat. [1] Appellant then filed an action in the circuit court. Turning now to the statute in question, it would be my view, but for Parker, supra, that section 163.3215 could be construed so *582 as not to bar Emerald Acres' right to certiorari review....

...f the 30-day period which the local government has to take appropriate action. Failure to comply with this subsection shall not bar an action for a temporary restraining order to prevent immediate and irreparable harm from the actions complained of. § 163.3215(1), (2), (4), Fla....

...rought by the landowner to a county commission order denying approval of a subdivision. In cases where the "aggrieved or adversely affected party" is a person or entity who was legally a stranger to the local government proceeding, the provisions of 163.3215(4) requiring presuit notice to the local government make perfect sense....

...ly of an appellate nature, in the circuit court. Appellant, in arguing its right to certiorari review, concedes that such review is necessarily of a limited nature, and would not afford the latitude that is now provided by a de novo proceeding under section 163.3215....

...act and ordinance, petitioner also (has) a right to common law certiorari review of the board decision, to which the ten-day notice deadline would not apply." 596 So.2d at 493. [3] Returning to the statute in question, I note that the very title of section 163.3215 reads, "Standing to enforce local comprehensive plans through development orders." There can exist no serious dispute that the landowner whose application has been denied has, under any traditional notion, all the standing in the world to pursue review by way of common law certiorari....

...ffected." Citizens Growth Management Coalition of West Palm Beach, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach, 450 So.2d 204, 208 (Fla. 1984) (construing sections 163.3161-163.3211, Florida Statutes (1981)). In 1985 the Florida Legislature created the statute, section 163.3215, applied today by this court....

...RIGHT TO PETITION FOR COMMON LAW CERTIORARI IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE STATE IS STILL AVAILABLE TO A LANDOWNER/PETITIONER WHO SEEKS APPELLATE REVIEW OF A LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT ORDER FINDING COMPREHENSIVE PLAN INCONSISTENCY, NOTWITHSTANDING SECTION 163.3215, FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)? The motion is otherwise denied....

...." "Development permit" is defined to include any subdivision approval. Section 163.3164(6) and (7), Florida Statutes (1989). [1] Query: Whether this procedural chronology fits the "informal, free-form" model assumed by the majority? Op. at 580. [2] Section 163.3215(3)(b) provides "suit under this section shall be the sole action available to challenge the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan adopted under this part." This subsection does not on its face bar certiorari review....

...ny appellant its constitutional right to due process. Rinker's second argument is that the assessments are inconsistent with the Town's *1126 Comprehensive Land Use Plan. The Town Council replies that such a challenge can only be brought pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1985); that Rinker waived any right to raise this issue by failing to plead it in his answer or counterclaim; and that there is no proof that the assessments are indeed inconsistent with the Town's Comprehensive Land Use Plan....

...the alleged adverse 6 Henry L. Doherty & Co., 200 So. at 240. 7 The Appellants’ standing to challenge the City’s land use and zoning decisions relating to the project are governed by the Growth Management Act of 1985 and a separate statute, section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2014); see Pinecrest Lakes, Inc....

...That action was filed in connection with a development order issued by the Director of the Department of Planning and Zoning for the appellee Walton County. Among other grounds for summary judgment, the circuit court properly determined that the action for declaratory and injunctive relief was untimely under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes. Section 163.3215(3) provides that an action for declaratory or injunctive relief to contest a development order's consistency with a local comprehensive plan must be filed no later than thirty days following rendition of the order, or when all local administrative appeals are exhausted, whichever occurs later. In the present case there were no administrative appeals. The appellants' circuit court action was filed long after the thirty-day time limit under section 163.3215(3) had expired, as the order was rendered when it was filed with the clerk for the Department of Planning and Zoning....

...duties, the record establishes that she was the person in charge of such filings and that being the records clerk was a major part of her job responsibilities. The appellants' failure to bring their circuit court action within the time allowed under section 163.3215(3) is a jurisdictional defect, upon which summary judgment was properly entered as to the section 163.3215 action....

...he person specifically designated as such, or who most closely resembles a clerk in the functions performed. In the present case, the Department's clerk was the clerk of the lower tribunal and summary judgment was properly entered on the appellants' section 163.3215 claim because it was not brought within the jurisdictional time limits provided in section 163.3215(3)....

...Appellant Valerie Britt appeals the trial court's order dismissing her action against appellee City of Jacksonville without prejudice for failure to comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j). Appellant initially filed her complaint with the clerk's office within the required 30 day period for actions brought under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2002), but served appellee 124 days after she filed her complaint, just outside the 120-day period of Rule 1.070(j). Appellant states that she may not now refile her complaint because the 30-day period provided in section 163.3215(3) has long passed....

...ght review of the rezoning decision by filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the Palm Beach County circuit court, appellate division. The circuit court denied their amended petition solely on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1995), citing Poulos v. Martin County, 700 So.2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (holding that section 163.3215 provides for de novo trial, not certiorari review, where adversely affected party seeks injunctive or other relief to prevent a local government from acting on a development order that alters the use of property in a way that is not consistent with the comprehensive plan)....

...5th DCA 1995) (affirming in part and reversing in part circuit court's dismissal of petition for certiorari from county's decision to award mining license; to extent claimant's challenge was that issuance was contrary to local comprehensive development plan, claimant should have pursued case under section 163.3215; but to extent claimant raised other issues, claimants were limited to certiorari review); Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Seminole County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 623 So.2d 593 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (affirming dismissal of appellant's complaint, where portion of complaint asserting inconsistency with comprehensive plan should have been by action under section 163.3215 and appellants failed to comply with requirement of filing verified complaint within thirty days, and where challenge that rezoning violated Wekiva River Protection Act was limited to certiorari review, for which complaint was untimely filed), rev....

...denied them procedural due process. Accordingly, we grant the petition, quash the order on review, and direct the circuit court to exercise jurisdiction over those issues raised by Petitioners which are not exclusively reviewable by an action under section 163.3215....

...id tract, and there is no genuine issue raised by this record that they would be affected by noise, traffic impact, land value diminution, or in any other respect by the subject zoning ordinance, Renard v. Dade County, 261 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1972); see § 163.3215(2), Fla....

...Before GERSTEN, RAMIREZ, and WELLS, JJ. RAMIREZ, J. Petitioners 5220 Biscayne Boulevard, LLC and the City of Miami (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the City") seek a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from proceeding with a de novo action filed pursuant to section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2005), challenging the approval of a construction project at 5220 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida....

...Stebbins challenged the City's issuance of a major use special permit which was approved by the City Commission on December 15, 2005 in a Development Order which the Mayor signed on December 20, 2005. The City Clerk entered the Development Order on December 21, 2005. Stebbins filed a complaint pursuant to section 163.3215, challenging the City's development order that permits the developer to build a high rise, high density condominium building at 5200-5220 Biscayne Boulevard....

...After the circuit court denied the motion, the City sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from exercising its subject matter jurisdiction over the Stebbins' claims and to require the circuit court to dismiss the Stebbins' claims with prejudice. Section 163.3215(3) provides that the de novo action "must be filed no later than 30 days following rendition of a development order." We conclude, in this case of first impression, that the triggering event for "rendition" is when the City Clerk entered the development order, not when the mayor signed the order....

...ion to dismiss this case as untimely filed. Miami-Dade County v. Peart, 843 So.2d 363, 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). Furthermore, we held in Bal Harbour Village v. City of North Miami, 678 So.2d 356, 360-61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), "the time limit specified in Section 163.3215 is jurisdictional." Even though Bal Harbour involved an earlier version of the statute with slightly different requirements, we see no reason to recede from the holding that the issue is jurisdictional. In 2002, the Florida Legislature substantially amended section 163.3215 to address *1191 issues of standing, the standard of review, and the procedure for challenging a development order, to correct perceived problems with the prior version of the law. For example, to measure the appropriate thirty day period within which to file the action under the 2001 version of section 163.3215, an aggrieved or adversely affected person was required to determine the date that "the alleged inconsistent action was taken." The 2002 amendment to section 163.3215 was intended to simplify the time limit for bringing the de novo action to challenge a development order by requiring that the action be filed within thirty days of rendition of the development order. No reported case interprets how an aggrieved or adversely affected party should determine the date of rendition of a development order in the context of section 163.3215....

...o City Charter to be either ten days after passage by the City Commission without the Mayor's signature "or (if earlier) the date on which the Mayor signs the ordinance." Id. at 1261. Thus, the Payne case is inapplicable because the trigger date for section 163.3215 is the date of rendition of a development order. The Senate Staff Analysis of the proposed 2002 amendment of section 163.3215 indicates that the date of rendition should be calculated in accordance with the Florida Rules of Court....

...ort entitled "A Liveable Florida for Today and Tomorrow." Recommendation 38 of the Growth Management Study Commission specifically stated: Regardless of whether a local government used the special master process, the verified complaint provisions of section 163.3215, Florida Statute, would be deleted and the time schedule in s. 163.3215(4), Florida Statute, would be revised to make clear that a challenger has a certain amount of time from the date of the rendition of the local decision, in accordance with the Florida rules of court to file an action in circuit court for the appropriate review, as provided by statute....

...The Florida Rules of Court provide that the date of rendition of an order is the date when a signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.020(h). This legislative history supports the argument that the word "rendition" was used in the 2002 amendment to section 163.3215 to eliminate the confusion in filing deadlines, because the "date of rendition" has a specific, uniform meaning and is determined in accordance with the Florida Rules of Court....

...See Das v. Osceola County, 685 So.2d 990 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (wherein the court held that a local government "should, at the least, issue an order or permit of public record before the rights of the public to file a consistency challenge [pursuant to section 163.3215] are foreclosed by the expiration of time.")....

...The City granted the Spencers' petition and entered two developmental orders rezoning the property accordingly on June 16, 1986. Within 30 days after the two development orders were entered, the Gregorys filed a three-count complaint against the City. Count I, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, was brought under Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1985), [1] and alleged that the development orders were invalid under Section 163.3194, Florida Statutes (1985), [2] because the city commission and planning commission failed to make the required factual findings regarding consistency with the comprehensive plan adopted by the City of Alachua in *207 February 1981 when the orders were enacted. Count II, also seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, was, as Count I, brought under section 163.3215 and alleged that the development orders were contrary to the provisions of section 163.3194, because the subject properties' revised zoning designations were inconsistent with the comprehensive plan, which had designated the properties as agricultural....

...Count III was a common law challenge seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the theory that the two revised zoning designations were arbitrary, unreasonable and had no substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or general welfare. The City filed a motion to dismiss Counts I and II on the ground that section 163.3215 only grants relief from development orders which are not consistent with comprehensive plans adopted under chapter 163 and that no relief was available under section 163.3215, because the City's comprehensive plan was not adopted pursuant to chapter 163....

...considerations and an expert who testified that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to support a finding of consistency with the City's comprehensive plan. The trial judge thereafter made the following findings: 1. This is an action under § 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1986) [sic] to have the City of Alachua zoning ordinances numbers 0-86-13 and 0-86-16 declared invalid as being inconsistent with the City's Comprehensive Plan....

...Based upon the foregoing findings, judgment was rendered on September 24, 1987, in the defendants' favor. Although the Gregorys timely petitioned for clarification of the judgment, their motion was denied and this appeal was instituted. Although we find that only consistency challenges may be brought under section 163.3215, and that the Gregorys failed to show that the orders were not consistent with the comprehensive plan adopted by the City, we do not believe that such conclusions mandate affirmance of the trial court's order. [4] This is so because, while the complaint states that it is brought under section 163.3215, the pleadings were *209 impliedly amended to seek relief in the form of appellate review, and such issue was in effect tried by consent....

...t the outset of the circuit court proceeding, the trial court rendered a final order which appears to relate back to the issues as framed in the initial complaint; that is, whether the Gregorys were entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief under section 163.3215 pursuant to a consistency theory....

...This is an appeal from a final judgment of the circuit court for Alachua County denying injunctive and declaratory relief against the appellee City of Alachua after evidentiary hearing in an action brought by the appellants Peter and Mary Gregory pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act. I would affirm the denial of relief under the Act for reasons set out below, without determining that the city zoning ordinances in question were or were not consistent with its comprehensive plan under the Act. Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, provides for suits challenging the approval of zoning and other "development orders" granted by any local government after October 1, 1985, and states: 163.3215 Standing to enforce local comprehensive plans through development orders....

...Because I conclude the judgment does not make that determination, I would affirm without any inference that a determination of consistency could be affirmed on the record here. I would note instead that there exist serious questions as to proof of a comprehensive plan by which consistency could be measured. [7] NOTES [1] Section 163.3215(1) provides: Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain an action for injunctive or other relief against any local government to prevent such local government from taking any action on a development order, as defined in s....

...They're saying that the City's record, the record itself does not show that it was consistent. We're saying that is not the case. If she is going to attack the City's action, the burden is upon her to show that it was not consistent. (Emphasis added.) [4] Unlike the dissent, we do not read section 163.3215 as abrogating remedies previously available to parties seeking to challenge zoning orders on grounds such as procedural due process violations....

...Fernandez, Sarasota, for Amicus Curiae Florida Association of County Attorneys. Robert M. Rhodes and Donna E. Blanton of Steel Hector & Davis, LLP, Tallahassee, for Amici Curiae Florida Home Builders Association and Florida Association of Realtors. PER CURIAM. This action was brought in the trial court pursuant to, section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1995). We conclude that section 163.3215 provides for a de novo trial....

...eeding, we reverse and remand with direction to proceed in accordance herewith. Appellants' action for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the above statute challenged a development order issued by Martin County. Appellants, in accord with section 163.3215, filed a verified complaint with the county alleging the development decision was inconsistent with the county's comprehensive plan....

...In its motion, appellee sought to have the circuit court review the decision of the county commission in its appellate capacity rather than conducting a trial de novo as requested in appellant's complaint. The trial court granted appellee's motion, stating that the proper scope of review of a case brought under section 163.3215 is certiorari, by a review of the record before the board of county commissioners, and not as a trial de novo. After conducting a review of the record as established at the county commission hearing, the court held that the commission had not erred in finding the development was consistent with the comprehensive plan. Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1995) states in part: (1) Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain an action for injunctive or other relief against any local government to prevent such local government from taking any action on a de...

...ch the local government has to take appropriate action. * * * * * * (5) Venue in any cases brought under this section shall lie in the county or counties where the actions or inactions giving rise to the cause of action are alleged to have occurred. § 163.3215, Fla....

...elopment order, the proper procedure was for the party to petition the circuit court for common law certiorari. When a non-party, such as a neighbor, seeks to challenge a development order, the action should be filed in the circuit court pursuant to section 163.3215. Although the action in Snyder involved a landowner and was thus not pursuant to section 163.3215, the court did mention the statute: One or more of the amicus briefs suggests that Snyder's remedy was to bring a de novo action in circuit court pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Leon County, 627 So.2d 476 (Fla.1993), we explained that this statute only provides a remedy for third parties to challenge the consistency of development orders. 627 So.2d at 475 n. 1 (emphasis added). Although the court was not addressing the issue of the scope of a section 163.3215 action, its language is consistent with our determination that section 163.3215 provides for a de novo trial. [1] *165 Appellant convincingly argues that section 163.3215 must provide for a de novo proceeding because the time frame for filing the action is "at complete odds with that set forth in the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure." Appellants point out that the pre-suit requirement, requiring t...

...entially be filed up to 90 days after the issuance of the development order. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure, 9.100(c)(1) provides that a petition for certiorari must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. [2] Here, if section 163.3215 was intended to provide for the circuit court to conduct an appellate review by certiorari, then the statutory language permitting the filing of the action up to 90 days after the granting of the development order is in conflict with the 30 day deadline outlined under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure....

...rity of the supreme court may not be exercised by the Legislature. In re Adoption of a Minor Child, 570 So.2d 340, 342 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), approved in part on unrelated certified question, 593 So.2d 185 (Fla.1991) (citations omitted). Thus, reading section 163.3215 to authorize the invocation of the circuit court's certiorari jurisdiction more than 30 days after the agency action being challenged would make the section unconstitutional. Whenever possible, a statute should be construed so as not to conflict with the constitution. State v. Stalder, 630 So.2d 1072 (Fla.1994). Accordingly, we hold that section 163.3215 does not provide for appellate review by the circuit court, but rather provides for an original de *166 novo action....

...In one of those two cases, Judge Kahn wrote a concurring opinion in which he stated: Appellant, in arguing its right to certiorari review, concedes that such review is necessarily of a limited nature, and would not afford the latitude that is now provided by a de novo proceeding under section 163.3215....

...Emerald Acres Inv. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 601 So.2d 577, 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (Kahn, J., concurring)(citing Gregory v. City of Alachua, 553 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)), quashed, 627 So.2d 476 (Fla.1993). In Gregory, the First District indicated that section 163.3215 provides for a de novo trial. Given Judge Kahn's concurrence in Emerald Acres, it seems even more unlikely that the supreme court would have carelessly labeled a section 163.3215 action as a de novo proceeding. This court has referred to the scope of the proceedings under section 163.3215. Jensen Beach Land Co. v. Citizens for Responsible Growth of the Treasure Coast, Inc., 608 So.2d 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). The circuit court in Jensen Beach, in an action brought pursuant to section 163.3215, found a development order inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. Id. This court reversed because the challenger had not complied with the statutory requirement that the challenger file a verified complaint with the entity that entered the order before bringing suit under section 163.3215. Id. This court began the opinion by stating: The developer/intervenor below seeks review by certiorari of the circuit court's order, entered in its appellate capacity. Id. at 510 (emphasis added). The dissent clarifies that the provisions of section 163.3215 were not raised in the trial court or relied upon by the petitioner on appeal, and the failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirement was pointed out by amicus curiae....

...Actually, the court in Splash explicitly declined to reach the issue of whether a statutory remedy allowing for the filing of a petition of certiorari in circuit court later than allowed by the rules of appellate procedure was constitutional. Id. at 492 n. 2. [3] Appellants argue that the language used in section 163.3215, i.e., "maintain an action," "suit under this section," "institution of an action under this section," clearly indicates that the legislature intended an action brought under that section to be a de novo trial rather than an appellate review....

...Appellees point out that even when the Legislature has specifically provided for review by certiorari, it has referred to the review as an "action" in the very same section. § 171.081, Fla. Stat. (1995). Nevertheless, Judge Wentworth found the statutory language in section 163.3215 significant, stating: I find the above quoted language in the statute, upon which the complaint was expressly based, provides only for a suit or action clearly contemplating an evidentiary hearing before the court to determine the co...

...1996) (explaining courts should avoid reading a statute in a manner which renders part of the statute meaningless). We are guided by the definition of “aggrieved” in the context of “standing to enforce local comprehensive plans through development orders,” which is contained in section 163.3215(2), Florida Statutes....

...claratory and injunctive relief both individually and as putative class representative. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under Chapter 86 7 In Nassau County v. Willis, 41 So. 3d 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), we found standing under section 163.3215(2) where a party's interest exceeded the interest of the general public. 14  Without specifically reciting statutory authority, count four asserted a claim for a declaratory judgment and also sought injunctive relief to enforce the anticipated declaratory judgment....

...llants predict come to pass regarding future development orders, Appellants and other parties can challenge such actions under chapter 163 in circuit court. See, e.g, Nassau County v. Willis, 41 So.3d 270, 276-78 *864 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (explaining section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, created broad and liberal standing threshold for persons with environmental interests to show they are aggrieved or adversely affected to challenge development). Appellants argue that the test for standing under section 120.68 is similar to the statutory test established in section 163.3215, which confers standing to challenge development orders as inconsistent with comprehensive plans. Appellants concede that standing is “liberalized” under section 163.3215, but argue that the statutes are similar enough to make their appeal sufficiently credible so as to avoid sanctions. We reject Appellants’ argument. As noted in Nassau County , standing under section 163.3215 is broadly granted, but even under that test, a party must show an adverse effect on their interests, as defined by that statute....

...After the circuit court denied rehearing, Stranahan timely petitioned this court for second-tier certiorari review. At the same time that Stranahan House filed its petition for review of the alternative site plan, it filed a declaratory judgment action pursuant to section 163.3215(3), seeking a declaration that the plan was inconsistent with the City's comprehensive plan and an injunction to prevent further action on the site plan....

...In its second petition to the circuit court, Stranahan House included allegations of the alternative site plan's inconsistency *1126 with the historical preservation provisions and neighborhood compatibility provisions of the comprehensive plan. Such claims must be filed as a declaratory judgment action pursuant to section 163.3215(3) and are not properly part of the petition for review....

...Osceola County, 715 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ("This court did take the reasonable approach that adequate notice of the decision administratively made should be given to the affected property owners, to afford them the opportunity to utilize the 30-day procedure set forth in section 163.3215.")....

...nless CFP receives a valid development order [2] from Osceola, CFP's taking of Trustees' property would be unlawful." (Footnote added). Finally, Trustees contended that they had no other adequate remedy against Osceola County in that an action under section 163.3215 "is the only proceeding for challenging a development order or permit, but Osceola's refusal to apply its comprehensive plan has resulted in there being no order to challenge." On August 22, 1995, the trial court entered an order of taking in favor of CFP....

...CFP deposited a good faith estimate of value and took possession of a perpetual pipeline easement. [3] That same date, Osceola County filed its motion to dismiss Trustees' crossclaim. Osceola County alleged, among other things, that the crossclaim was time-barred because, pursuant to section 163.3215, the sole mechanism for challenging the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan is the filing of a verified complaint no later than thirty days after the alleged inconsistent action has taken place....

...The court found that it was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, stating, "The sole method to contest [an] alleged inconsistency of Petitioner's Pipeline Project with the Osceola County Comprehensive Plan is through the filing of a verified complaint pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 163.3215." Section 163.3215, "Standing to enforce local comprehensive plans through development orders," provides in pertinent part: (1) Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain an action for injunctive or other relief against any local government...

...Trustees' petition for mandamus was an attempt to force Osceola County to conduct such a review, complete with public notice and hearings, and issue a formal order upon reaching a conclusion. Only after Osceola County has performed as it must can the Trustees, as "adversely affected parties," proceed under the provisions of section 163.3215 to bring a consistency challenge. Until Osceola County issues its determination, Trustees are not within the purview of section 163.3215....

...t interests via eminent domain. The forum for objecting to CFP's acquisition of an easement was the eminent domain proceeding, of which Trustees were given the requisite notice. Because Trustees failed to timely file a verified complaint pursuant to section 163.3215, the trial court correctly ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction....

...Count 4 is a taxpayer's action, brought solely by Kessler, challenging the City's obligation in the agreement to expend City funds as an unconstitutional exercise of the City's taxing and spending powers. The trial court dismissed count 1 for failure to comply with the condition precedent provision in section 163.3215(4) of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act (Comprehensive Planning Act), [1] which applies to actions challenging the consistency of a development order with a local government's comprehensive plan. However, count 1 of the complaint before us is not an action filed pursuant to section 163.3215....

..., [2] but we find no provision in the Development *197 Agreement Act that also incorporates the condition precedent provision of the Comprehensive Planning Act. Thus, we conclude the trial court erred by applying the condition precedent provision of section 163.3215 to a section 163.3243 action. In its order dismissing count 1, the trial court also found that Kessler lacked standing because he was not an "aggrieved or adversely affected person" as defined in section 163.3215(2)....

...The Combses own property adjacent to the Club and are within the class of property owners the City determined should be provided notice of the public hearings pertaining to approval of the development agreement. They also qualify as an "aggrieved or adversely affected party" as defined in section 163.3215(2)....

...ent with this opinion. ALTENBERND and SILBERMAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §§ 163.3161 to 163.3217, Fla. Stat. (1999). [2] Section 163.3243 of the Development Agreement Act provides: Any party, any aggrieved or adversely affected person as defined in s. 163.3215(2), or the state land planning agency may file an action for injunctive relief in the circuit court where the local government is located to enforce the terms of a development agreement or to challenge compliance of the agreement with the provisions of ss....

...rder, entered in its appellate capacity, wherein the court held that the Development of Regional Impact (DRI) development order and the Planned Unit Development (PUD) agreement were inconsistent with Martin County's comprehensive plan. We understand Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1991), to require that a court challenge to the consistency of a zoning order with the comprehensive plan which does not merely seek a temporary restraining order to prevent immediate and irreparable harm be preceded by timely filing of a complaint with the entity that entered the order....

...oner's seeking relief from the County Board of Commissioners or other appropriate authority. LETTS, J., and WALDEN, Senior Judge, concur. ANSTEAD, J., dissents with opinion. ANSTEAD, Judge, dissenting. The issue of jurisdiction and the provisions of section 163.3215 were not raised in the trial court and are not relied upon by petitioner here....

...and Karen Schutzer, unsuccessfully brought this case to challenge the consistency of certain Development Orders with the County’s Comprehensive Plan. The intervenor-defendant, Minto PBLH, LLC, now appeals an order denying its motion for attorney’s fees under both section 57.105 and section 163.3215(6), Florida Statutes, as to one of the plaintiffs, 1000 Friends....

...cross-appeal. MAY and KUNTZ, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 1Moreover, the trial court properly denied sanctions against 1000 Friends under section 163.3215(6), Florida Statutes, as Minto did not make a showing that the plaintiffs’ claims were brought for an improper purpose. 3 

...Counts III and IV, asserting equitable and promissory estoppel, respectively, alleged justifiable reliance on the City's actions and agreements and sought to estop the City from denying Palazzo site plan approval and damages. Count V sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, which precludes local governments from acting in a manner contrary to their Comprehensive Plan....

...The court granted review and quashed the Council's decision, holding that the Council had denied the developer due process of law in denying the application in 1999 after provisionally approving it in 1998. The appellate division also held that the Council's sole remedy was found in section 163.3215, Florida Statutes....

...The appellate division also applied the wrong law when it ruled that the Village's sole remedy, if it chose to contest the Council's original determination that the proposed development was in compliance with the Village's master plan, was to bring an action pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes....

...ent such local government from taking any action on a development order ... which materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property that is not consistent with the comprehensive plan adopted under this part." § 163.3215(1), Fla....

...Shepherd, Miami, for Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation; Terrell K. Arline, Legal Director, Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae 1000 Friends of Florida, Inc., and Florida Wildlife Federation. WEBSTER, J. Appellant seeks review of a summary final judgment entered against it on its action challenging, pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1997), a development order as inconsistent with the Tallahassee-Leon County Comprehensive Plan....

...nt Pursuant to Section 161[sic].3215, Florida Statutes." On July 29, 1997, the County Commission rejected appellant's complaint. Appellant filed the action which is the subject of this appeal on August 27, 1997. Appellant's complaint was premised on section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1997), a part of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act. Ch. 163, pt. II, Fla. Stat. (1997). To the extent pertinent, section 163.3215 reads: (1) Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain an action for injunctive or other relief against any local government to prevent such local government from taking any action on a development order, as defined in s....

...ent on the pleadings. Among other arguments, they maintained that the action was barred because the complaint filed by appellant with the County Commission in an effort to comply with the condition precedent to the right to file an action set out in section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (1997), had not been "verified" as required, and by collateral estoppel because of the previous proceedings before the Planning Commission....

...previously determined in a quasi-judicial proceeding *127 that the proposed development was in compliance with all applicable land use and development ordinances, collateral estoppel barred appellant from relitigating the issue. This appeal follows. Section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (1997), authorizes "an action ......

...sive plan alleged in appellant's complaint appear to involve matters in addition to "use or density or intensity of use." However, nobody has argued, either in the trial court or here, that the claims made by appellant are not cognizable pursuant to section 163.3215....

...um" was sufficient to place appellant on notice that collateral estoppel would be relied on by appellees. The trial court reached its decision to grant the motion for summary judgment by a two-step analysis. It first determined that, for purposes of section 163.3215, consistency with the comprehensive plan was to be determined by reference to whether the implementing ordinances adopted by the county had been complied with, rather than to whether the policies, goals and objectives of the comprehensive plan, itself, had been met....

...Appellees argue that, even if the trial court's ruling regarding collateral estoppel *128 was error, affirmance is appropriate because the complaint filed by appellant with the County Commission in an effort to comply with the condition precedent to the right to file an action set out in section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (1997), had not been "verified" as required by that statute....

...After the trial court entered its order of January 20, 1987, it heard and entered an order in a companion case filed by Morris and Realty Leasing which also sought injunctive relief and certiorari review of the action taken by Palm Beach County. Morris and Realty brought this action pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1985) and challenged the rezoning of the Fearnley property based upon its alleged inconsistency with the County's Comprehensive Land Use Plan....

...RIGHT TO PETITION FOR COMMON LAW CERTIORARI IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE STATE IS STILL AVAILABLE TO A LANDOWNER/PETITIONER WHO SEEKS APPELLATE REVIEW OF A LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT ORDER FINDING COMPREHENSIVE PLAN INCONSISTENCY, NOTWITHSTANDING SECTION 163.3215, FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)? The motion is otherwise denied....

...[2] In the main, Turner seeks to challenge an earlier determination by the county that third parties had vested rights, which was the predicate for issuance of the permit. We agree with Sumter County that Turner's remedy for this claim was an action under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1991), Board of County Comm'rs of Brevard County v....

...of County Comm'rs, 623 So.2d 593, 595-596 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), review denied, 634 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1994), not certiorari review of the issuance of the permit. In so doing, we do not mean to suggest that a county's noncompliance with its own ordinances is limited to a section 163.3215 remedy simply because the ordinance is *277 made part of the comprehensive plan. After studying the complaint, however, it is clear that the gravamen of this action is the county's decision to enter into a settlement of the vesting issue with the third parties. Appellant filed a section 163.3215 proceeding but elected not to pursue it. Appellant does marginally raise one other issue, however — whether the county complied with the requirements of due process in the permit issuance procedure followed in June 1993. As formulated, this is not a section 163.3215 issue and it does not appear the claim should have been dismissed for untimeliness under the cases interpreting that statute....

Marine Group) who had filed a challenge under Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, alleging that the City’s

...mplaint with prejudice. This appeal timely followed. In challenging the instant dismissal order, the homeowners first argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint on the basis that they lack standing to prosecute this lawsuit under section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes (2004). We agree. Section 163.3215(2) of the Florida Statutes (2004) authorizes an "aggrieved or adversely affected" party to maintain an *174 action to determine whether development orders (in this case, M/I Homes' construction permits) are consistent with a County's comprehensive plan. The statute reads, in relevant part, as follows: 163.3215....

...The alleged adverse interest may be shared in common with other members of the community at large but must exceed in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons. The term includes the owner, developer, or applicant for a development order. § 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). In Education Development Center, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 751 So.2d 621, 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), the court explained: As a remedial statute, section 163.3215 should be liberally construed to advance the intended remedy, i.e., to ensure standing for any party with a protected interest under the comprehensive plan who will be adversely affected by the governmental entity's actions....

...City of Fort Lauderdale, 967 So.2d 427 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), Stranahan House, Inc., and Friends of the Park at Stranahan House appealed the trial court's dismissal order entered in favor of the City of Fort Lauderdale and Coolidge-South Markets Equities, L.P., in a section 163.3215 action....

...In reversing the dismissal order, the Fourth District held, among other things, that Stranahan and Friends possessed standing to maintain the lawsuit. In that case, Stranahan filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City and Coolidge pursuant to section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes (2006), challenging the City Commission's approval of a building site plan....

...The City filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and the motion was granted. On appeal, Coolidge asserted, inter alia, that both Stranahan and Friends lacked standing to challenge the City's approval of the site plan because they were not "aggrieved or adversely affected parties" as required under section 163.3215....

...wn such lake-front property. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling that the homeowners lack standing to challenge the issuance of M/I Homes' construction permits is reversed. The homeowners further argue that the trial court erred in concluding that section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, only authorizes a de novo appeal (not a de novo trial), to parties seeking to challenge a development order pursuant to the terms of the statute. We again agree. "The interpretation of a statute is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to the de novo standard of review." Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Fla. 2006). Section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes (2004) reads, in pertinent part: 163.3215....

...nsive plan adopted under this part. The de novo action must be filed no later than 30 days following rendition of a development order or other written decision, or when all local administrative appeals, if any, are exhausted, whichever occurs later. § 163.3215(1), (3) Fla....

...he County's Comprehensive Plan and BCC's approval of M/I Homes' permit applications by failing to raise the issue during BCC's public hearing. However, our reading of the statutory language leads us to the conclusion that an action filed pursuant to section 163.3215(3) of the Florida Statutes is in the nature of a de novo trial, not a de novo appeal....

...llate action. As such, the trial court's ruling dismissing the homeowners' amended complaint on the basis of waiver is reversed. See 5220 Biscayne Blvd., LLC v. Stebbins, 937 So.2d 1189, 1191 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)(explaining that the "2002 amendment to section 163.3215 was intended to simplify the time limit for bringing the de novo action to challenge a development order by requiring that the action be filed within thirty days of rendition of the development order")....

...Michael W. Pettit, Naples, FL, for Collier Co. ORDER ON DEFENDANTS, COLLIER COUNTY, FLORIDA, TWINEAGLES LAND GROUP I, LLC, TWINEAGLES MANAGEMENT, LTD., TWINEAGLES DEVELOPMENT, INC. AND TEXTRON FINANCIAL CORPORATION, MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES PURSUANT TO SECTION 163.3215(6), FLORIDA STATUTES (DOC. NO. 106) ALEXANDER L. PASKAY, Bankruptcy Judge. THIS CAUSE came on for hearing upon the Motion for Costs and Fees Pursuant to Section 163.3215(6), Florida Statutes filed by Defendant, Collier County, Florida (Collier County), TwinEagles Land Group I, LLC (Land Group), TwinEagles Management, Ltd., TwinEagles Development, Inc....

...Circuit Court), Case No. 98-3694-CA, against Defendant, Collier County (State Court Action), seeking to vacate and void the final plat of the Property approved by the County on August 4, 1998. The Complaint alleged a cause of action under Fla. Stat. § 163.3215, which authorizes adversely affected persons to file suit in the Circuit Court challenging local government development orders which are inconsistent with comprehensive land use plans adopted pursuant to Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes....

...98-17 and the approval of the site plan; that Swigert failed to present any evidence that the development of the Property according to the final plat would negatively impact his property value; that the Complaint was untimely filed under Fla. Stat. § 163.3215; and that neither the site plan or the plat is inconsistent with the Collier County Comprehensive Land Use Plan. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Final Judgment are presently on appeal to the District Court. TwinEagles and Textron contend that Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel violated Section 163.3215 by signing the Complaint, thus certifying that they performed a reasonable inquiry into the facts underlying the allegations and that the case was not interposed for any improper purpose....

...s issues different from those before the appellate court. See In re Allen-Main Associates, *817 Ltd. Partnership, 243 B.R. 606, 608 (D.Conn.1998). The issues presented by the Motion relate to the propriety of awarding fees and costs under Fla. Stat. § 163.3215....

...See Allen-Main Associates, Id. (Bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to consider alleged debtor's motion for costs and fees although order dismissing involuntary petition was appealed). Whether TwinEagles Waived Its Right To Sanctions Under Fla. Stat. § 163.3215? In return for obtaining the Plaintiffs' consent to TwinEagles intervening in the State Court Action, TwinEagles agreed that it would bear its own attorney's fees and costs. Since the litigation in which TwinEagles sought to intervene was based upon Fla. Stat. § 163.3215, it may be inferred that TwinEagles, represented by counsel, was aware that the Statute contained the provision for Defendants to seek and obtain sanctions. It is clear to this Court that TwinEagles intentionally and voluntarily relinquished its right to claim attorney's fees under Fla. Stat. § 163.3215....

...rule. The instant Motion was not filed until May 22, 2000, five months after the Final Judgment was entered. This Court is satisfied that the Motion is untimely and should be denied. Whether Sanctions Would Otherwise Be Appropriate Under Fla. Stat. § 163.3215(b)? Although this Court finds that the Motion is untimely, the Court finds it appropriate to address the merits of the Motion. Section 163.3215(6), Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part, The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that he or she has read the pleading, motion, or other paper and that, to the best of his or her knowledge, information,...

...an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The language of Section 163.3215(b), Florida Statutes, is substantially similar to former Section 120.57(1)(b)(5), Florida Statutes, and to Rule 11 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Thus, the case law construing Section 120.57(1)(b)(5) and Rule 11 are useful in applying Section 163.3215(b)....

...never quite articulated. Textron argues that the Plaintiffs failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry regarding the pertinent facts and applicable law prior to signing the Complaint. Although this Court found that the Complaint was barred by Fla. Stat. § 163.3215, the suit was not devoid of merit....

...2nd DCA 1997). The Plaintiffs also presented reasonable legal arguments and facts in support of their positions that the site plan and plat were inconsistent with the Collier County Comprehensive Land Use Plan and that they had standing under Fla. Stat. § 163.3215....

...The fact that this Court chose to adopt the Defendants' position over that of the Plaintiffs should not be the basis for sanctions. See Mercedes, supra at 279. Accordingly, it is *819 ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion for Costs and Fees Pursuant to Section 163.3215(6), Florida Statutes, be, and the same is hereby denied.

...tion for writ of certiorari directed to the city of Lynn Haven's issuance of a development order to a property owner to replat his property. In its denial, the court stated that Cook's cause of action was limited to the injunctive remedy provided in section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, to any person aggrieved or adversely affected by a local government's issuance of a development order, when the resulting use "is not consistent with the comprehensive plan." We grant the petition and quash the circuit court's order....

...Instead, Cook challenged the City's development order on the basis that it violated a zoning provision and not because it was in conflict with the comprehensive plan. Accordingly, he was entitled to seek certiorari review in circuit court, rather than an injunction under section 163.3215....

...Fred M. Johnson, Gwen P. Johnson, Michele E. Eddy, Harry R. Mills, and Twila W. Mills, plaintiffs below, appeal a final order dismissing with prejudice their initial complaint against Gulf County and William Joseph Rish, Jr. for injunctive relief under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2006). Because the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing this case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend, we reverse. Section 163.3215(3) allows "[a]ny aggrieved or adversely affected party" to bring suit to challenge "any decision of [a] local government granting or denying an application for, or to prevent [the] local government from taking any action on, a development order, ....

...ion of Gulf County's comprehensive plan and allege that the County allows development in wetlands such as Rish's without issuing a development order contrary to Florida law. See § 380.04(f)(g). Appellants assert that, in addition to the claim under section 163.3215(3), they also seek to file a count for common law nuisance....

...on in its place. Appellants challenge the dismissal of their complaint for declaratory relief filed against appellees, the City of Pompano Beach and PPI, Inc., to declare a revised plat approval inconsistent with the City's comprehensive plan. Under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2009), an aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain an action for declaratory or injunctive relief against a local government to challenge a "development order" that is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. The trial court granted the appellees' motion to dismiss and concluded that the City's plat approval was not subject to challenge under section 163.3215(3) because it was not a "development order." Upon further review and consideration of the development rights consequent to a plat approval under the City Land Development Code, we find that the plat approval in the instant case is a "development *597 order" under the statutory scheme and reverse....

...ity's comprehensive plan because it violates various traffic policies and public-facility standards, and threatens surrounding properties and infrastructures. Appellants alleged in their complaint that the plat approval was a development order under section 163.3215 and had to comply with the City's comprehensive plan....

...The City and PPI filed a motion to dismiss and maintained that a plat approval was not the equivalent of a development order. The trial court agreed with the City and PPI, and granted the motion to dismiss. In reviewing dismissal of a complaint seeking relief under section 163.3215, the standard of review is de novo....

...ct property in accordance with the increased uses or "restrictions" listed in the plat notes. Accordingly, we find that the City's plat approval, with its attendant development consequences, constitutes a development order subject to challenge under section 163.3215(3)....

...The appellants' motion for rehearing is based upon inapplicable authorities. Our original opinion affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the appellants' complaint. We concluded that the City's plat approval is not a "development order" subject to challenge under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...See City of Pompano Beach, Fla.Code Ordinances §§ 157.03, .45 (2009) (listing requirements for site plan approval that must be met prior to issuance of building permits). Thus, the plat approval may not be challenged as a development order under section 163.3215....

...eed to wait until later in the process, if the plans continue, to challenge the proposed facilities and uses. Id. at D779. The appellants' motion for rehearing nevertheless argues that the City's plat approval constitutes a "development order" under section 163.3215....

...Coconut Creek pre-dates by two years the legislature's creation of section 163.3125, the statute under which the appellants brought this action. Thus, Coconut Creek can have no bearing upon an interpretation of section 163.3125. Second, the City's definition of "development permit" also is inapplicable. Section 163.3215 specifically provides that a "development order" is "as defined in s....

...elopment of land." § 163.3164(8). A "plat approval" is not included in that definition and, as we noted in our original opinion, the plat approval here, by itself, did not permit the development of land. The appellants' motion for rehearing ignores section 163.3215's use of the phrase "as defined in s....

..."[A] conflict exists when two legislative enactments cannot co-exist." Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections, Inc. v. Browning, 28 So.3d 880, 888 (Fla.2010) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Here, the two legislative enactments cannot co-exist. Section 163.3215 creates a cause of action limited to a development order "as defined in section 163.3164." Adding the City's definition of "development permit" to section 163.3164's definition broadens the cause of action beyond that which the legislature intended by its own words....

...By statute, a local government may not authorize any development that would be inconsistent with the applicable comprehensive plan. § 163.3194(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). An aggrieved party may challenge a DO as inconsistent with a comprehensive plan by filing a consistency challenge in circuit court. § 163.3215(3), Fla....

...Courts construe a plan's silence as to a particular land use as indicative of planners' intent not to authorize that particular use. See Dixon, 774 So.2d at 766. As a preliminary matter, we note that appellants have challenged the Fund's standing to join as a plaintiff in the action below. Section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2007), permits "[a]ny aggrieved or adversely affected party" to bring a consistency challenge. "[T]he term `aggrieved *119 or adversely affected party' means any person ... that will suffer an adverse effect to an interest protected or furthered by the local government comprehensive plan...." § 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). Because section 163.3215 is a remedial statute affording aggrieved parties the right to enforce comprehensive plans, courts liberally construe the statute to grant standing to a broad class of plaintiffs. See S.W. Ranches Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Broward County, 502 So.2d 931, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); see also Educ. Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 751 So.2d 621, 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (explaining that "[s]ection 163.3215 enlarged the class of persons with standing to challenge a development order as inconsistent with the comprehensive plan," and holding statute must be construed liberally)....

...If certiorari relief was denied, Monticello requested that the circuit court declare that continuance of the agricultural zoning is confiscatory and that Monticello is entitled to a zoning classification that will allow reasonable commercial development. In response to the decision in Parker, Monticello asserted that section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, was not applicable or that it would have been futile to request further administrative proceedings. Monticello also asserted that it had substantially complied with section 163.3215(4) because: 1) no relief was sought to prevent local government from taking action that materially alters land use; 2) compliance was futile because the Board had already been informed of the objections to the Commission's report and...

...The Board contended that the agricultural zoning was not confiscatory and its reasonableness was at least fairly debatable. The Board also argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action because Monticello failed to comply with the mandatory condition precedent specified in section 163.3215....

...sive Plan. After acknowledging that the denial of a rezoning application is a "development order," that a comprehensive plan consistency determination as to any development order is subject to review only pursuant to the statutory remedy provided in section 163.3215, Florida, Statutes, and that Monticello failed to satisfy the condition precedent to bringing an action under section 163.3215, the trial judge found: In the opinion of the Court, the Petitioners would be deprived of due process if the thirty-day time period, by which the Petitioners are bound for satisfaction of the statutory condition precedent, begins to...

...The cause was remanded to the Board to set forth with specificity the reasons for its determination that the rezoning application was determined to be inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. Monticello was given 30 days afterward to comply with the condition precedent set out in section 163.3215(4)....

...ticed hearing. The action therefore was quasi-judicial in nature and reviewable by certiorari. It is not part of the legislative function to deal with particular cases, and no challenge was made here to the validity of any ordinance. Florida Statute section 163.3215 does not preclude certiorari relief....

...We REMAND to the trial judge with instructions to reinstate the order of the Board denying Monticello's application for rezoning. [3] BOOTH and MINER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The trial judge incorrectly determined that the thirty-day period for filing a verified complaint pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, did not commence until the County's decision was reduced to writing. Emerald Acres Investments, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Leon County, 601 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). As noted in Emerald Acres, section 163.3215 contains no requirement that the "alleged inconsistent action" be reduced to writing and no ordinance requiring the Board to reduce its action to writing has been cited....

MORRIS, Judge. Robert J. Howell, Terry Hoppenjans, and Myles Friedland (Howell parties) appeal a final summary judgment entered in favor of Outlaw Ridge, Inc., in the Howell parties’ consistency action brought pursuant to section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...ALTENBERND and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur. . Outlaw asserted that the limerock mining was expressly excluded from the definition of "development” in section 380.04, Florida Statutes (2012), and, therefore, that the Howell parties could not bring an action pursuant to section 163.3215(3)....

...PER CURIAM. Appellants (landowners bordering or near rezoned property) appeal from a final summary judgment which held there was no material fact question raised by the record before the trial court as to whether the challenged rezoning pursuant to section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (1989) was inconsistent with Hernando County's Comprehensive Plan....

...Carefully following all of the procedural steps required by Chapter 163, [1] appellants then filed a suit for injunctive relief in the circuit court to challenge the rezoning as not being consistent with the County's Comprehensive Plan. This kind of suit is not only authorized by the new statute, section 163.3215(1)) but it appears to be the sole or exclusive way to challenge a zoning decision (called a development order by the statute), [2] "which materially alters the use or density or intensity [3] of use of certain property" as not being consistent with a County's required Comprehensive Zoning Plan....

...deferential to the zoning authority's decision. [9] While it may be properly applied in some zoning cases, [10] a stricter review standard should be engaged in by the circuit court when a zoning decision (or "development order") is challenged under section 163.3215(3)(b) as being inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan adopted by the County....

...stimony of witnesses proffered by the parties. [19] Summary judgment in appellees' favor, based on this record, was erroneous. NOTES [1] See City of Cape Canaveral v. Mosher, 467 So.2d 468 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (Cowart, J., concurring). [1] See, e.g., § 163.3215(4), Fla. Stat. (1987). [2] See § 163.3164(6) & (7), Fla. Stat. (1987). [3] § 163.3215(1), Fla. Stat. (1987). [4] § 163.3215(3)(b), Fla....

...prehensive plan and if it meets all other criteria enumerated by the local government. [18] The 1985 law requires that future use plans must contain ascertainable standards which can be followed concerning density and intensity of use. §§ 163.3161-163.3215, Atty Gen.Op....

...The appellants unsuccessfully sought injunctive and declaratory relief below, contending that the project could not go forward because the county's comprehensive plan does not contemplate the project. The appellants concede that they do not have standing under section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes....

...Under this subsection, an adversely affected person may maintain an action for injunctive and other relief in connection with a development order, but appellants concede that construction of water and sewer lines on existing rights-of-way is excluded from the definition of development. See §§ 163.3215(1), 163.3164, 380.04(3)(b)....

of County Commissioners, filed pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, challenging a “development

...r of Lake County, Florida, [“Lake County”], Mid-Lake Holdings, LLC, Ashish Karve, Chaitrali Karve, and Albert E. Harthman [“collectively Harthman”]. The proceeding below was an action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes....

...The trial court accordingly entered an order granting Harthman’s motion for summary judgment. Because the use approved by Lake County is not inconsistent with the land uses contained in the Comprehensive Plan, the trial court properly entered summary judgment on Rehman’s claim brought under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes....

...conditions an application for a development permit." § 163.3164(7), Fla. Stat. Development orders must be consistent with the local government's comprehensive plan. § 163.3194(3)(a), Fla. Stat. Appellees filed a complaint against the County under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, seeking to invalidate the development order on the basis of inconsistency with the Plan....

...ef against the County and DOT arising out of this same matter. In St. Johns, this court affirmed the dismissal of the action on the basis that Friends lacked standing to prosecute the action. Although Friends conceded that they lacked standing under section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes, they asserted that they nonetheless possessed standing to contest the project because the project was a "public facility." They reasoned that the County should have amended its comprehensive plan because a *1037 public facility should be included in the comprehensive plan. This court, while agreeing with Friends that they lacked standing based on section 163.3215, further noted that the Florida supreme court, in Rinker Materials Corp....

...Johns, Friends conceded, as they have in this appeal, that the sewer and water lines fall outside of the definition of development and that they thus have no means of preventing the construction of the lines by asserting a challenge to a development order under section 163.3215(1) of the Florida Statutes....

...to the requirements of part two of Chapter 163." This court was aware of the fiscal implications argument in St. Johns. In St. Johns, it was in fact, the only argument that Friends used because they conceded that they did not possess standing under section 163.3215(1)....

...On August 21, 2006, these parties filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief alleging that the clearing violated Gulf County's comprehensive plan because it failed to maintain a 50-foot buffer for the wetlands. The neighbors alleged standing under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2006). [2] The trial court dismissed the complaint ruling that Johnson and the other neighbors did not possess standing to seek relief under section 163.3215....

...y have been determined to be non-jurisdictional by DEP and the Corps, the trial court found that Johnson failed to prove that Rish's clearing and filling activities materially altered the use, density, or intensity of the use of the land pursuant to section 163.3215(3)....

...order. Moreover, because Johnson asserts that the development proposed and accomplished by Rish violates the County's comprehensive plan, Johnson is entitled to a de novo hearing to challenge the decision of Gulf County to permit Rish's development. § 163.3215(3), Fla....

...62-312.030-.050 (explaining when DEP takes jurisdiction and requires a permit for dredging and filling). The County takes the position that all other wetlands are "nonjurisdictional" wetlands over which it has no control. See section IV, infra. [2] Section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2006), provides in pertinent part: (3) Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain a de novo action for declaratory, injunctive, or other relief against any local government to challenge any decision...

...*1151 Kent Harrison Robbins, in pro. per. John C. Dellagloria, Chief Deputy City Attorney; John G. Fletcher, South Miami, for appellee. Before LEVY, GERSTEN and GREEN, JJ. GREEN, Judge. Kent Harrison Robbins appeals the dismissal with prejudice of his complaint filed pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1993) wherein he challenges a City of Miami Beach resolution as inconsistent with the City's comprehensive land use plan....

...He alleges that he will be adversely affected by this proposed project because access to his property will be restricted by the proposed narrowing of the street. We find that the trial court properly determined that Robbins did not have a cause of action under section 163.3215....

...if the work is carried out on land within the boundaries of the right-of-way." § 380.04(3)(a). Without question, the streetscape project involves work within the boundaries of the City's right-of-way. Hence, the subject resolution cannot properly be deemed a development order subject to challenge under section 163.3215....

...3d DCA 1990). The trial court therefore correctly dismissed the complaint below as pled. We must, however, reverse the trial court's dismissal with prejudice. Although we conclude that an action to challenge the resolution as a development order under section 163.3215 does not properly lie, there is nothing to preclude Robbins from otherwise attempting to seek redress in an action for declaratory relief, injunctive relief and/or petition for statutory writ of certiorari provided he can demonstrate his standing [1] to institute or maintain such an action....

...98-3694-CA (State Court Action), seeking to vacate and void the final plat of a portion of the real property owned by the Debtors that was approved by the Board of County Commissioners of Collier County on August 4, 1998. The Complaint alleged a cause of action under Fla. Stat. § 163.3215, which authorizes adversely affected persons to file suit in the Circuit Court challenging local government development orders which are inconsistent with comprehensive land use plans adopted pursuant to Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes....

...and Conclusions of Law and, on December 23, 1999, entered its Final Judgment. The Court found that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge Ordinance 98-17 and the approval of the site plan; that the Complaint was untimely filed under Fla. Stat. § 163.3215; and that neither the site plan or the plat is inconsistent with the Collier County Comprehensive Land Use Plan....

...ipeline was exempt from the plan and sought mandamus to compel the county to follow its comprehensive plan. The county claimed that the cross-claim was time barred and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the cross-claim because section 163.3215 of the Growth Management Act, was the sole mechanism for challenging a development order because of inconsistency with a comprehensive plan....

...Granted, the opinion does not preclude a public hearing, but neither does it preclude a process less encompassing. The opinion does provide that in order to comply with the statutory purpose, that once a decision is made, the appellants should be given a reasonable notice so that they can utilize the procedure set forth in section 163.3215 to challenge the decision....

...unty's Comprehensive Plan. The last paragraph of this letter states: Please be further advised that you may have a right to challenge this determination pursuant to Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. If so, you must proceed pursuant to the provisions of section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, within 30 days. Section 163.3215 allows an "aggrieved party" to bring suit against a local government to prevent the latter from taking action on a development order....

...unty's determination. This court did take the reasonable approach that adequate notice of the decision administratively made should be given to the affected property owners, to afford them the opportunity to utilize the 30-day procedure set forth in section 163.3215. The appellants, by having received *1108 Osceola County's letter in April of 1997, were specifically informed that they had 30 days to challenge the county's decision. Neither due process, section 163.3215, nor this court in Das I, required more....

...t of the Christian and Missionary Alliance. SAWAYA, J. Lake Rosa and Lake Swan Coalition, Inc. and intervening plaintiff John King (collectively the Coalition) appeal the final order rendered in their suit for injunctive and declaratory relief under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, challenging the issuance of a building permit as being inconsistent with the Putnam County Comprehensive Plan (the Comprehensive Plan)....

...the new construction would violate certain zoning ordinances. As the zoning contest wound its way to an unsuccessful conclusion—for the Coalition that is—phase two began on May 6, 2002, when the Coalition took the initial steps to file suit under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2001), by filing a verified complaint with the County. The County responded on *208 May 28 that it would not grant the relief requested in the complaint. Compliance with these conditions precedent set the stage for the Coalition, on June 5, 2002, to file the section 163.3215 complaint in the circuit court seeking a determination that the building permit was inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan and thus invalid; a permanent injunction preventing the County from acting upon the permit or implementing it; and an injunction requiring the County to rescind the permit....

...ication was made on November 1, 2001. Significantly, however, the trial court noted that "[u]nder the current designation of rural residential, the Court accepts that no further construction of dormitories would be permitted without running afoul of Section 163.3215." Advocating for the notation rather than the ruling, the Coalition contends that issuance of the permit, which was well after the change in the land use designation, controls because it is government action that triggers application of the provisions of section 163.3215....

...he Agricultural II classification under the Comprehensive Plan when determining whether the building permit applied for by the Alliance should have been issued. The answer lies in various statutory provisions, which we next examine. We look first to section 163.3215, which governs when an action for injunctive or other relief may be taken against a local government to prevent action on a development order....

...nt from taking any action on a development order, as defined in s. 163.3164, which materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property that is not consistent with the comprehensive plan adopted under this part. § 163.3215(1), Fla....

...element shall be consistent with such plan or element as adopted." These statutory provisions reveal that the Coalition is correct: It is government action on a development order rather than application for such an order that triggers application of section 163.3215(1)....

...By this date, the Comprehensive Plan had already been amended to change the land use classification of the camp property from Agriculture II to Rural Residential, in which a camp is not permitted. We believe that no earlier date can be assigned to the government action because section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (2001), requires that a verified complaint be filed with the governing body within 30 days of issuance of the challenged development order and the challenged development order in this case, the building permit, issued April 12, 2002....

...tion failed to establish that the new development would cause a material alteration of the land use inconsistent with the amended plan. Therefore, the Alliance urges that issuance of the permit was proper. We disagree. Adverting to the provisions of section 163.3215(1), a challenge to a development may arise under any one of the following three instances: 1) where it materially alters the use of a property; 2) where it materially alters the density of property; or 3) where the intensity of the use of the property is materially altered....

...ensive Plan's designation of the property as Rural Residential. For this reason alone, issuance of the building permit was improper. Nevertheless, we will briefly explain why issuance of the permit was improper for the second and third reasons under section 163.3215(1)....

...We are not much impressed with the Alliance's arguments that it had a vested right to have the permit issued under the Agricultural II designation of the Comprehensive Plan prior to its amendment and that the Coalition lacked standing to pursue the consistency challenge under section 163.3215. We are equally unimpressed with the arguments advanced by the Alliance in support of the issues it raises in its cross appeal—that the trial court erred in refusing to find the section 163.3215 action barred by the Coalition's alleged failure to exhaust its administrative remedies applicable to the zoning challenges; that the trial court erred in ruling that the Coalition was not bound by application of administrative res j...

...Vorbeck of Theriaque Vorbeck & Spain, Destin for Appellee. OSTERHAUS, J. Appellants have challenged an order approving a 20-unit planned unit development (PUD) immediately seaward of their beach-view property at Inlet Beach in Walton County. Citing § 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2013), they assert that the order conflicts with Walton County’s comprehensive plan (Comp Plan) by approving new lots seaward of the coastal construction control line (CCCL); approving other construction (dwellings...

...including its site plan and the location of development relative to the CCCL and CPZ. The Board of County Commissioners (“County”) further found this earlier application “in compliance and consistent with” the Comp Plan. And nobody challenged it. See § 163.3215(3), Fla. Stat. (requiring consistency challenges to be filed “no later than 30 days following rendition”). Instead, Appellants filed this action after the County approved the follow-up, detailed plan in 2013. But because § 163.3215 is predicated upon showing a material alteration of property inconsistent with a Comp Plan, and here the County’s 2010 order had already 2 approved the placement and relative location of the things that Appellants challenge, this challenge to the 2013 order fails to meet the requirements of § 163.3215. I. A....

...CPZ’s upland boundary line (as marked by the primary dune) remained seaward of the proposed construction of dwellings, roads, driveways, and other infrastructure. B. The Litigation After the Detailed Plan was approved in 2013, Appellants challenged the PUD under § 163.3215.2 The Complaint alleged that the 2013 Order conflicted with three of the Comp Plan’s environmental protection provisions: [1.] Defendants propose to destroy significant primary dunes through grading, the construction o...

...Comp Plan and LDC] prohibit construction of dwellings within the [CPZ]. . . . The CPZ, if properly located, would allow only very limited development on the lots proposed to be created . . . and [preclude] the proposed 2 Section 163.3215(3) specifically provides: Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain a de novo action ....

...In Developer’s view, the 2013 Order approving the Detailed Plan merely implemented development rights that had already been granted. After a hearing, the trial court entered summary judgment for Appellees, concluding that the 2013 Order did not materially alter the property as required to bring a § 163.3215-based challenge....

...7 these parcels were sited in the same location relative to the CCCL as addressed in Developer’s County-approved and recorded 2010 application, the 2013 Order cannot be considered to have “altered” the property per § 163.3215(3)....

...And here the Concept Plan specifically addressed the location of development relative to the CCCL. Moreover, at this point, it is well beyond the 30-day statutory deadline for challenging the 2010 Order, a jurisdictional impediment for the court to consider changes wrought by the 2010 Order. § 163.3215(3), Fla....

...But, as with the issue above, the 2010 Order—not the 2013 Order—specifically addressed the location of the primary dune and CPZ relative to the residential development. If the PUD materially altered the primary dune and CPZ on the property for purposes of § 163.3215, then the alteration occurred with the 2010 Order. The Complaint’s assumption about where the primary dune and CPZ were located circa 2013 is wrong....

...ady established the relative location of the CPZ (and primary dune) elsewhere, in a place separate from the upland development. As discussed earlier, to the extent that Appellants dispute the 2010 placement of these things, they are too late. See § 163.3215(3), Fla....

...11  B. Finally, we reject Appellants’ contention that the 2013 Order presented the first opportunity to challenge the County’s approvals because the 2010 Order wasn’t a “development order.” Section 163.3215(3) only authorizes challenges to local decisions involving applications for “a development order, as defined in § 163.3164.” Under § 163.3164(15), “development order” refers to “any order granting, denying, or granting with conditions an application for a development permit.” (Emphasis added)....

...quality as a “development order.” See, e.g., Arbor Properties, Inc., 51 So. 3d at 503 (treating an order approving a concept plan with conditions as a development order). Rather, both the 2010 and 2013 Orders were susceptible to de novo challenge under § 163.3215....

...Quick, for appellee Town of Cutler Bay. Before ROTHENBERG, LAGOA, and LOGUE, JJ. ROTHENBERG, J. The Realty Associates Fund IX, L.P. (“RAF”) appeals the trial court’s final order dismissing RAF’s complaint, which included a consistency challenge pursuant to section 163.3215(3) of the Florida Statutes....

...cate of appropriateness” for construction of a “Target” store. On May 10, 1995, pursuant to section 6-56 and section 6-58, 2 the Planning Commission issued a final certificate of appropriateness for the project. On June 9, 1995, as required by section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (1993), as a condition precedent to institution of an action *165 under that section, appellants filed a “verified complaint” with the Village challenging the Planning Commission’s approval of the project as being contrary to the Village’s comprehensive development plan....

...g permit and begin construction of the Target Store.” In addition, the Amended Verified Complaint farther alleged that “The certificate of appropriateness is a development order as such term is defined by Florida Statutes Section 163.3164(7).” Section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (1993), reads: (4) As a condition precedent to the institution of an action pursuant to this section, the complaining party shall first file a verified complaint with the local government whose actions are compla...

...In addition, the May 10, 1995 final approval was a development order which materially altered the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property enabling appellants to challenge such action as being inconsistent with the comprehensive plan of the Village in accordance with section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...On appeal from the Circuit Court for Walton County. David W. Green, Judge. September 15, 2021 TANENBAUM, J. The primary question here concerns the scope of a trial court’s de novo review in an action, brought pursuant to section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2018), challenging whether a development order is consistent with a local comprehensive plan. As we will explain in detail, we agree with the appellants, based on our reading of the statutory text, that the tri...

...There are two ancillary issues we also must address. First, we agree with South Walton Community Council, Inc. (“SWCC”) that it has standing to participate in the appellants’ consistency action as an “aggrieved or adversely affected party,” as that term is defined in section 163.3215(2)....

...Before us are four appellants. Two are individual landowners. Two are non-profit corporations concerned with environmental 2 conservation and sustainable development within Walton County. All of them sued the county and Ashwood pursuant to section 163.3215(3)....

...(22). 3  5) violation of the requirement that streets in the proposed development have sidewalks along both sides. The county and Ashwood asserted that none but the first of these claims is cognizable under the statute. By their reading, section 163.3215(3) limits the type of inconsistency claims that can be brought....

...claims in an action under the subsection are those addressing inconsistency with the aspects of the comprehensive plan dealing with land use, density, and intensity of use. They also argued that the appellants were not “aggrieved or adversely affected” parties under section 163.3215(2), so the appellants did not have standing to sue in any event....

...order for the Cypress Lake PUD was entirely consistent with the comprehensive plan. Relying on the Second District’s decision in Heine, the trial court agreed with the county and Ashwood about the scope of claims that could be asserted in a suit under section 163.3215(3). As a result, the court held a multi-day evidentiary hearing but engaged in a de novo review of the county’s grant of the Cypress Lake development order only with respect to the inconsistency claims relating to density and intensity (i.e., the first category described by the trial court). The court found that the proposed Cypress Lake PUD, in this respect at least, was consistent with the county’s comprehensive plan. The court also concluded that SWCC could not sue under section 163.3215(2), finding that it lacked an interest in the development beyond that shared by all persons....

...assertion that the trial court erred by refusing to include all of their claims as part of its de novo review, and that it erred by dropping SWCC as a plaintiff. 2 II. A. Let us first put section 163.3215(3) in context....

...es a detailed examination of the development order for exact compliance with, or adherence to, the comprehensive plan” (emphasis supplied)). B. With this in mind, we turn to the text of the statute at issue. Section 163.3215 from the start echoes the main point of the Act. It provides the “exclusive methods” by which “to appeal and challenge the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan adopted under [the Act].” Id....

...And there certainly would be no reason to apply the limitation in a case where an application for a development order is denied. Cf. Parker v. Leon County, 627 So. 2d 476, 479 (Fla. 1993) (explaining that under a prior, but similar, version of this provision in section 163.3215, “the denial of an application does not alter the use or density of property [but] simply preserves the status quo [such that] no further action is possible”). Working our way backward, the next noun in line is the same “...

...yields a similar result. Consider the following two parallel infinitive phrases in subsection three: “to challenge any decision of such local government granting or denying an application for,” and “to prevent such local government from taking any action on.” § 163.3215(3), Fla....

...taking any action on a development order, as defined in s. 163.3164, which materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property that is not consistent with the comprehensive plan adopted under this part. § 163.3215(1), Fla....

...is part”) looks past the noun series “use or density or intensity of use” and modifies either “development order” or the local government action taken regarding such an order. We can find no reasonable, grammatically supportable reading of section 163.3215(3) that yields the limitation on the scope of a de novo consistency review that the trial court relied on in this case. A trial court in turn must conduct a de novo review of a development order challenged under section 163.3215(3)—provided the order alters the use, density, or intensity of use on a property—and determine whether there is complete consistency between the local government’s action on that order and the local comprehensive plan....

...density, and intensity of use. C. As a check on our interpretative work, we look at surrounding provisions in the same statute, and at related statutes that are part of the same Act, to determine whether our reading of section 163.3215(3) is consistent and compatible with those provisions and the Act as a whole....

...aning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” (internal citations omitted)). Initially, we see that requiring a comprehensive consistency review under section 163.3215(3)—beyond just use, density, and intensity of use—satisfies at least one of the broader purposes of the Community Planning Act, of which the provision is a part....

...Any review of a development order for consistency must consider whether there is complete consistency. 9 9 In fact, the scope of a consistency review is broader yet. Such a review also puts on the table the reasonableness of the plan or 14  So, while section 163.3215 limits a cognizable challenge to a development order that, at a minimum, alters use, density, or intensity of use, the Act as a whole (and section 163.3194(3)(a) in particular) essentially precludes the trial court from completing it...

...de novo review for consistency without considering all of what is permitted by the order and determining whether the local government acted with respect to the order in a manner that is entirely consistent with the plan. Our refusal to read a carve-out into section 163.3215(3) for what the trial court must consider in its de novo consistency review comports with the holistic approach to consistency dictated by the Act. Moreover, when we consider the variegated and intersecting elements required to...

...be considered in the de novo review. any of its elements, to the extent it relates to the government action at issue. See § 163.3194(4)(a), Fla. Stat. 15  We also find validation for our interpretation of section 163.3215(3) in the text of the subsections that come before and after....

...density, and intensity—viz. “interests related to health and safety, police and fire protection service systems, densities or intensities of development, transportation facilities, health care facilities, equipment or services, and environmental or natural resources.” § 163.3215(2), Fla....

...10 The definition in 10 Notably, a precursor to the current act was a response to public dissatisfaction with landowners’ inability to challenge many types of inconsistent development. See Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So. 2d 191, 199–200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); id. at 202 (“Under [the earlier version of] section 163.3215 citizen enforcement is the primary tool for insuring consistency of development decisions with the Comprehensive Plan.”); see also Parker v. Leon County, 627 So. 2d 476, 479 (Fla. 1993) (noting that the Legislature enacted section 163.3215 in response to the supreme court’s earlier ruling limiting third-party standing, “to ensure the standing [to challenge the consistency of a development order] for any person who will suffer an adverse effect to an...

...Then there is subsection four, which complements subsection three. Subsection four applies to those development orders that a local government designates through the process it adopts under that provision; subsection three applies to all other development orders. § 163.3215(1), Fla. Stat. Within section 163.3215, the two subsections provide the “exclusive methods for an aggrieved or adversely affected party to appeal and challenge” consistency between a development order and a comprehensive plan. § 163.3215(1), Fla....

...written decision of the local government, or when all local interest protected by the comprehensive plan” (internal quotation and marks omitted)). 17  administrative appeals, if any, are exhausted, whichever occurs later. . . . § 163.3215(4), Fla....

...supported by substantial competent evidence”). Still, in the quasi-judicial hearing, the special master must “determin[e] whether a proposed development order is consistent with the comprehensive plan” under a strict scrutiny standard of review. § 163.3215(4)(f), Fla....

...lan. Nowhere else in the Act is consistency treated as being limited in scope, and there is nothing in subsection three that expressly limits that scope. D. Let us now sum this up. There is no textual basis in section 163.3215 to limit the trial court’s scope of review as to whether a challenged development order is entirely consistent with the comprehensive plan....

...phrase does not modify that clause. 19 the trial court’s inquiry when considering whether there is consistency with the comprehensive plan is not limited at all. We hold that once an action is filed pursuant to section 163.3215(3) regarding the appropriate type of development order, the trial court must conduct a plenary review that considers all properly pleaded claims of inconsistency between the local government action regarding a development order and the comprehensive plan. Consequently, the trial court erred in its reliance on the Second District’s decision in Heine v. Lee County, 221 So. 3d 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)—which, in our view, runs counter to the text of section 163.3215—even though that was the most on-point decision the trial court had available to it at the time....

...The trial court’s determination of consistency on the density and intensity claim was not challenged on appeal, so that determination has preclusive effect. III. We turn now to SWCC’s appeal of the trial court’s determination that it lacked standing to sue under section 163.3215(2)....

...to comply with the established comprehensive plan,” not “to redress damage to particular plaintiffs.” Nassau County v. Willis, 41 So. 3d 270, 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting Save the Homosassa River All., Inc. v. Citrus County, 2 So. 3d 329, 340 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)). Section 163.3215 grants a cause of action to “any aggrieved or adversely affected party.” Id....

...The alleged interest may be shared in common with other members of the community at large but must exceed in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons. The term includes the owner, developer, or applicant for a development order. § 163.3215(2), Fla....

...statute significantly “liberalizes standing requirements” for actions under it. Parker v. Leon County, 627 So. 2d 476, 479 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Sw. Ranches Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. County of Broward, 502 So. 2d 931, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)); see also Willis, 41 So. 3d at 278 (“Section 163.3215 establishes a broad legislative grant of standing which we are not at liberty to reject.”)....

...rea surrounding the proposed Cypress Lake PUD with the degree of interest that the Willis Court found sufficient to support standing 22 leaves little doubt that SWCC satisfies the minimal standing requirements of section 163.3215(2)....

...In a case such as this, where the majority opinion is as long as this one and contains *674 so much extraneous material, the worry is whether the reader will even find the dissent, much less have the energy to read it. It does not help that the issue in this case is whether Keene is entitled to a judgment under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, that Putnam County's issuance of a special use permit to the Wilsons is inconsistent with the County's Comprehensive Plan—a topic not likely to rivet the attention of most readers....

...d site visits by staff and several County commissioners were made. The Special Use Permit was approved with conditions that limited the number of annual rides to two and the number of riding students to six. Mr. Keene promptly filed suit pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, challenging the Wilsons' Special Use Permit as a "Development Order" [5] that is inconsistent *675 with the County's Comprehensive Plan....

...It is a place where the owner can sell as many riding lessons to as many people as they can get through the door. It is a place where horses can be rented to ride and where equestrian goods and supplies are sold. That is not what the Wilsons are doing. Remember, section 163.3215 only does one thing....

...tible with the surrounding areas and that there was no material or undue impact on the neighbors. [9] Finally, there is a certain irony in the outcome of this appeal. Environmentalists and other organized opponents of large-scale developments, which section 163.3215 was actually intended to address, probably never imagined, in their wildest dreams, that a proposed Development Order, consistent on its face with a County's Comprehensive Plan, could be attacked as inconsistent by matching it with an example listed somewhere else in a county's development code. I would affirm. NOTES [1] The dissent questions whether the SUP issued to the Wilsons is a development order under section 163.3215....

...Section 163.3164(7), Florida Statutes, specifically defines "development order" as "any order granting, denying, or granting with conditions an application for a development permit." Section 163.3164(8) defines "development permit" as an official action having the effect of permitting the development. Section 163.3215(6) defines "development" as having the meaning in section 380.04, Florida Statutes, which defines "development" as "making any material change in the use or appearance of any structure or land....

...Allowing a total of four nights of camping connected to trail rides into the adjacent State Forest and riding lessons for up to six children is not "development" and the challenged permit is not a development order. If it is not a development order, Mr. Keene does not have a cause of action under section 163.3215. Section 163.3215 is not designed to cover every land use dispute in Florida....

...the attorney’s fees awarded to Jay Listle and the City of Tarpon Springs (the City) pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1995). We reverse because the complaint filed in the underlying action was not entirely devoid of merit. Pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1995), Jeff and Laura Johnson (the Johnsons) filed a complaint with the City to challenge local ordinance 94-29. Section 163.3215 provides, in pertinent part: *1091 As a condition precedent to the institution of an action pursuant to this section, the complaining party shall first file a verified complaint with the local government whose actions are complained of.......

...requirements are subject to waiver and estoppel. Solimando, 594 So.2d at 852 . The facts presented in the instant ease are not distinguishable. The trial court determined that the Johnsons had standing to challenge the City’s ordinance pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1995); however, the court entered summary judgment against the Johnsons based on expiration of the limitations period....

...in its place. Appellants challenge the dismissal of their complaint for declaratory relief filed against appellees, the City of Pompano Beach and PPI, Inc., to declare a revised plat approval inconsistent with the City’s comprehensive plan. Under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2009), an aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain an action for declaratory or in-junctive relief against a local government to challenge a “development order” that is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. The trial court granted the appellees’ motion to dismiss and concluded that the City’s plat approval was not subject to challenge under section 163.3215(3) because it was not a “development order.” Upon further review and consideration of the development rights consequent to a plat approval under the City Land Development Code, we find that the plat approval in the instant case is a “development *597 order” under the statutory scheme and reverse....

...y’s comprehensive plan because it violates various traffic policies and public-facility standards, and threatens surrounding properties and infrastructures. Appellants alleged in their complaint that the plat approval was a development order under section 163.3215 and had to comply with the City’s comprehensive plan....

...The City and PPI filed a motion to dismiss and maintained that a plat approval was not the equivalent of a development order. The trial court agreed with the City and PPI, and granted the motion to dismiss. In reviewing dismissal of a complaint seeking relief under section 163.3215, the standard of review is de novo....

...perty in accordance with the increased uses or “restrictions” listed in the plat notes. Accordingly, we find that the City’s plat approval, with its attendant development consequences, constitutes a development order subject to challenge under section 163.3215(3)....

...ird party is considered a beneficiary of the contract only if the contracting parties intended to primarily and directly benefit the third party.”). Relying on the definition of “aggrieved and adversely affected party” contained in section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes,2 Manny Seafood 1 Paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement reads as follows: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be deemed to affect the rights of any person not a party to this Agreement. This Agreement is not intended to benefit any third party.” 2 In relevant part, section 163.3215 reads as follows: [T]he term “aggrieved or adversely affected party” means any person ....

...exceed 3 argues that, notwithstanding its status as a non-party to the Settlement Agreement, it is an “adversely affected party” by virtue of the City’s alleged violation of the Settlement Agreement. Section 163.3215, though, provides the exclusive mechanism for an aggrieved party to challenge a development order for an alleged inconsistency with a municipality’s comprehensive plan. See § 163.3215(1), Fla....

...opment permit.” § 163.3164(15), Fla. Stat. (2023). Manny Seafood’s complaint does not suggest, much less allege, that the City’s proposed use of the subject property as a public park constitutes a “development order” so as to implicate section 163.3215; therefore, this statute provides no basis for Manny Seafood to assert standing to seek a declaration that the City’s intended use of its property as a park violates the Settlement Agreement. Affirmed. in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons. The term includes the owner, developer, or applicant for a development order. § 163.3215(2), Fla....

...The Martin County Board of County Commissioners ("the Board") approved the tower. Appellants filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Appellate Division, arguing the Board's "stealth" determination was not based on competent substantial evidence. At the same time, they brought a section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2016) action in the trial court below....

...4th DCA 2009) ("Abatement has been utilized to terminate one of two actions pending simultaneously which involve the same parties and the same issues."). This is not to say that Appellants could have challenged the Board's stealth determination in the trial court had they not filed the petition. Section 163.3215(3) permits only a challenge to a county board action, "which materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property which is not consistent with the comprehensive plan." Land development regulations are not part of comprehensive plans....

...ust further removed from residential property. The circuit appellate division would have reviewed the Board's decision under the competent substantial evidence standard. See Town of Manalapan v. Gyongyosi , 828 So.2d 1029 , 1032 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Section 163.3215(3) provides the right to a de novo "action" before the trial court.

...tower. Appellants filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Appellate Division, arguing the Board’s “stealth” determination was not based on competent substantial evidence. At the same time, they brought a section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2016) action in the trial court below....

...zone, just further removed from residential property. 2 The circuit appellate division would have reviewed the Board’s decision under the competent substantial evidence standard. See Town of Manalapan v. Gyongyosi, 828 So. 2d 1029, 1032 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Section 163.3215(3) provides the right to a de novo “action” before the trial court. 4 v....

...4th DCA 2009) (“Abatement has been utilized to terminate one of two actions pending simultaneously which involve the same parties and the same issues.”). This is not to say that Appellants could have challenged the Board’s stealth determination in the trial court had they not filed the petition. Section 163.3215(3) permits only a challenge to a county board action, “which materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property which is not consistent with the comprehensive plan.” Land development regulations are not part of comprehensive plans....

the Village’s lawsuit alleged, pursuant to - section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes, that *582

...Matanzas points out the extension of the sewer and water lines in their direction makes future alterations to the Plan and future development more likely. Because the installation of water and sewer lines along an existing road right-of-way is outside the purview of “development orders” subject to challenge under section 163.3215, Matan-zas argues it has no effective remedy....

...The order on discovery compels CTG to disclose the identity, contact information, and property address of all its members and supporters who would be adversely affected by the development order. The respondents contend that the information is necessary for them to investigate the plaintiff’s standing to sue pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2019)....

County, in the Heines’ lawsuit brought under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2015) (the Consistency

PER CURIAM. Appellants (landowners bordering or near rezoned property) appeal from a final summary judgment which held there was no material fact question raised by the record before the trial court as to whether the challenged rezoning pursuant to section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (1989) was inconsistent with Hernando County’s Comprehensive Plan....

PER CURIAM. Because Elyse Brady and Valerie Britt failed to comply with a condition precedent under section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (1997), before filing their verified complaint in circuit court, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief....

...While appellants cite Save the Homosassa River Alliance v. Citrus County, 2 So.3d 329 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), in support of their claim of standing, this case is inapposite as it addresses the standing requirements for a circuit court proceeding pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. Section 163.3215 is a remedial statute designed to enlarge the class of persons with standing to challenge a local development order....

...cluded that the action was preempted by the Florida Electrical Power Plant Siting Act (the PPSA), sections 403.501-518, Florida Statutes (2011). Because we find no preemption on the facts of this case, we reverse. This case involves the interplay of section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2011), and sections 403.501-.518....

...The sole purpose of the rezoning ordinance was to allow construction of an electric power plant on the land. McDaniel subsequently sold the land to Florida Power & Light Company, which could then build a power plant. 1 The Tribe filed a complaint for declaratory relief pursuant to section 163.3215(3) to challenge the County’s enactment of the ordinance....

...er plant fell under the PPSA and that the PPSA was intended to be a centrally coordinated, one-stop licensing process for power plant projects. The court then opined that in cases such as this one, involving power plants, the procedures set forth in section 163.3215 were thereby preempted or superseded by the PPSA. Armed with the trial court’s order in the certiorari petition, the County and Florida Power filed a motion to dismiss the Tribe’s third amended complaint in the declaratory action, arguing that the PPSA completely preempted section 163.3215 as a method for challenging the County’s decision to rezone the site to allow the construction of a power plant....

...tent with applicable local government comprehensive plans and land development regulations.” § 403.509(3)(c). Based on all of the above-quoted statutory language, the County and Florida Power argued below, as they do here, that the PPSA preempted section 163.3215(3) and that the Tribe was asking the trial court to undergo the same analysis that would have to be done by a different state agency under the PPSA....

...In conclusion, based on the statutory language discussed above, there is no question that the PPSA procedures would have applied in this case if Florida Power had requested rezoning of the land after filing a PPSA application — in that case, the PPSA would have preempted a challenge under section 163.3215....

...Hence, even though the trial court correctly noted that the PPSA is a “centrally coordinated, one-stop licensing process,” in the factual context of this case, the trial court was incorrect in its assessment that preemption could therefore bar a section 163.3215 challenge....

...to stop the power plant siting process to go get that approval.” On these facts, therefore, there can be no preemption at this stage of the proceedings. The appellees elected to obtain rezoning outside of the PPSA context, thereby subjecting the County’s decision to challenge under the provisions of section 163.3215(3)....

...2d at 1064. Plaintiffs also have standing under section 163.3243, Florida Statutes, with respect to their claims against DEC and city, except for the constitutional challenge to section 550.155(2). Section 163.3243, Florida Statutes, provides: Any party or aggrieved or adversely affected person as defined in s. 163.3215(2) may file an action for injunctive relief . . . to enforce the terms of a development agreement or to challenge compliance of the agreement with ss. 163.3220-163.3243. Section 163.3215(2), Florida Statutes, in turn, defines “aggrieved or adversely affected party” as follows: [A]ny person or local government that will suffer an adverse effect to an interest protected or furthered by the local...

...�� not ‘to redress damage to particular plaintiffs.’” Imhof v. Walton Cnty., 328 So. 3d 32, 46 (Fla. 1st 9 DCA 2021) (quoting Nassau Cnty. v. Willis, 41 So. 3d 270, 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “Under section 163.3215 citizen enforcement is the primary tool for insuring consistency of development decisions with the Comprehensive Plan.” Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So. 2d 191, 202 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). “[S]ection 163.3215 ha[s] liberalized standing requirements and demonstrate[s] ‘a clear legislative policy in favor of the enforcement of comprehensive plans by persons adversely affected by local action.’” Id. at 200 (quoting Southwest Ranches Homeowners Ass’n v. Broward Cnty., 502 So. 2d 931, 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)). “[T]he legislature enacted section 163.3215 to ensure the standing for any person who ‘will suffer an adverse effect to an interest protected . . . by the . . . comprehensive plan.’” Parker v. Leon Cnty., 627 So. 2d 476, 479 (Fla. 1993) (quoting § 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (1985)). Standing under section 163.3215 differs from standing under the Renard class of cases requiring special damage. See City of Ft. Myers v. Splitt, 988 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Splitt explained the difference as follows: Under section 163.3215(2), standing may be based on the showing of an adverse effect on an interest that “exceed[s] in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons.” (Emphasis added.) The more restrictive Renard...

...The trial court dismissed the non-profit corporation for lack of standing because it failed to show that it possessed any interest in the development project beyond that shared by all persons. Id. On appeal, the court explained the broad standing of section 163.3215(2), stating: The particular breadth of standing authorized by the statute reflects its primary purpose—“to remedy the governmental entity’s failure to comply with the established comprehensive plan,” not “to redress damage to particular plaintiffs.” Nassau County v....

...standing, pursuant to section 163.3243, Florida Statutes (2011). This provision provides no better standing for the plaintiffs than the general standing rules. Section 163.3243 provides: Any party or aggrieved or adversely affected person as defined in s. 163.3215(2) may file an action for injunctive relief in the circuit court where the local government is located to enforce the terms of a development agreement ....

...adverse effect to an interest protected or furthered by the local government comprehensive plan . . . [that] may be shared in common with other members of the community at large but must exceed in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons.” § 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphasis added). Section 163.3215(2) also requires a showing of an injury different in degree from that suffered by 16 the community in general. Coastal Dev. of N. Fla., Inc. v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 788 So. 2d 204, 209 n.25 (Fla. 2001). The majority claims that standing under section 163.3215 differs from Renard’s standing requirements....

...For while the statute does not use the term “special injury,” it does expressly state that the adverse effect “must exceed in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons.” It simply must be “more” than any injury suffered by the community as a whole. In analyzing section 163.3215, our supreme court stated that “when challenging a zoning decision, an affected person must allege an injury.” Coastal Dev. of N. Fla., Inc., 788 So. 2d at 209 n.25; see also § 163.3215, Fla....

...enience would give to any resident or property holder of an urban area the right to override the decisions of boards of zoning appeals any time such property owner or resident disagreed with such decision”). 6 The plaintiffs have no standing under section 163.3215. • Broward County The County adopts the positions of the City and the DEC but has its own unique position with regard to the litigation....

a citizen who sued the county pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, and prevailed? According

...stent with the comprehensive plan, in violation of LDC section 1-53-5.4(1) (2010). That section provides as follows: “Only uses which are consistent with the comprehensive plan ... may be approved as a PUD.” The circuit court properly found that section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2011), would preclude the Seminole Tribe from raising this issue in a petition for writ of certiora-ri. That section states that it provides the exclusive methods for a party to challenge the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan. § 163.3215(1). It provides that an adversely affected party may maintain a de novo action for declaratory or other relief to challenge a development order. § 163.3215(3). The Seminole Tribe filed a separate action under this subsection along with its certiorari petition. Though section 163.3215(4) provides that an adversely affected party may challenge a development order solely by *23 filing a petition for writ of certiorari if the local government has adopted an ordinance establishing various requirements, the parties hav...

review of that determination pursuant to section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2017). We affirm

PER CURIAM. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied. As to count I of petitioner’s complaint filed in the circuit court, see Grady v. Lee County, 458 So.2d 1211 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). As to count II of the same complaint, see section 163.3215(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...process.”). SDI then intervened in the administrative appeal and moved to dismiss SOA’s Petition. The County filed a notice of joinder as to that motion. On May 9, 2017, SOA sued in circuit court, alleging that the amended Sandestin DRI DO violates section 163.3215, Florida Statutes....

...hes the exclusive means to challenge DRI’s and any such challenge must be brought within forty-five (45) days of rendition of the local action.” The trial court recognized the statutory authority for filing a “comp plan challenge” under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. However, SDI argued below that “the sole method, for appealing any decision by the county dealing with DRI’s, are found in [section 380.07].” (emphasis supplied)....

...ining the facts on which the petition is based and the reasons the person considers the regulation to be inconsistent; the statute expressly makes such filing a condition precedent to the institution of subsequent proceedings. A similar provision in section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes, has been construed as a jurisdictional condition precedent which precludes the designated party from further legal challenge under the statute....

RYDER, Acting Chief Judge. Mr. and Mrs. Moore seek review of the trial court’s order dismissing their complaint against the City of Punta Gorda for failure to comply with a condition precedent contained in section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Count one sought declaratory relief; count two was a petition for writ of certiorari, and count three a petition for writ of mandamus. The City moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the Moores had failed to comply with the statutory condition precedent to filing suit in circuit court stated in section 163.3215. 1 The lower court dismissed the Moores’ complaint on this basis. At the time of its decision, the lower court did not have the benefit of the supreme court’s ruling in Parker v. Leon County, 627 So.2d 476 (Fla.1993), where the court held that section 163.3215 applied only to third parties who wished to intervene in order to challenge the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan. Under Parker , section 163.3215 does not apply to property owners, such as the Moores, whose application has been denied. They are, therefore, not required to comply with section 163.3215’s condition precedent and their complaint was improperly dismissed on this basis. The dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply with section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1991) is reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate the Moores’ suit. CAMPBELL and THREADGILL, JJ., concur. . Section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (1991), states: (4) As a condition precedent to the institution of an action pursuant to this section, the complaining party shall first file a verified complaint with the local government whose actions are compl...

...se and would not affect the underlying validity of the City Council’s Final Order denying the Lot Split Application.” We cannot agree. While it is correct, as the City argues, that consistency issues must be raised in an action filed pursuant to section 163.3215 and cannot be brought in a petition for writ of certiorari, see Stranahan House, Inc....

...City of Lynn Haven, 729 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (granting petition for writ of certiorari and quashing the circuit court’s order, ruling that Cook was entitled to seek certiorari review in circuit court rather than an injunction under section 163.3215 because Cook was challenging the City’s development order on the basis that it violated a zoning provision and not because it was in conflict with the comprehensive plan)....

...he plan's inconsistency by certiorari review. Ordinarily, it is true, if an aggrieved or adversely affected party undertakes to challenge a development order as being inconsistent with the land use plan, the sole method available is that provided by section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1999)....

PER CURIAM. W.A.R., Inc., appeals a final order denying declaratory and injunctive relief in appellant’s action pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2010), which challenged the development order of the Levy County Board of County Commissioners (County) that approved the application of Tarmac America, LLC (Tarmac), appellee, to mine lime rock on a site in Levy County containing environmentally-sensitive lands....

...Crescenzo of Casey Ciklin Lubitz Martens McBane & O'Connell, West Palm Beach, for appellee City of Lake Worth. STEVENSON, C.J. Lawrence McNamara, Drew Martin and Anabeth Karson filed a complaint against the City of Lake Worth under Florida Statutes section 163.3215, challenging the adoption of ordinance 2004-12. The trial court granted final summary judgment in favor of Lake Worth because the complaint did not comply with section 163.3215, in that it was not timely filed....

...le” standard, the statute would have expressly addressed that deferential standard in the statute. The statute instead permitted an aggrieved party to file suit to contest the consistency between a development order and the comprehensive plan. See § 163.3215(1), Fla....