Cases from cite.case.law:

MDXQ, LLC, v. MIAMI- DADE COUNTY,, 271 So. 3d 68 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . consistency determination, MDXQ was entitled to a de novo review of that determination pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . complaint and its attachments, as well as the plain language of the County's Master Plan and section 163.3215 . . . also properly concluded that, in the absence of a development order, a cause of action under section 163.3215 . . .

LITTLE CLUB CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, a a a v. MARTIN COUNTY, a LLC RG LLC,, 259 So. 3d 864 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . At the same time, they brought a section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2016) action in the trial court . . . Section 163.3215(3) permits only a challenge to a county board action, "which materially alters the use . . . Section 163.3215(3) provides the right to a de novo "action" before the trial court. . . .

MINTO PBLH, LLC, v. FRIENDS OF FLORIDA, INC. PBC,, 228 So. 3d 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . , now appeals an order denying its motion for attorney’s fees under both section 57.105 and section 163.3215 . . . Moreover, the trial court properly denied sanctions against 1000 Friends under section 163.3215(6), Florida . . .

HEINE v. LEE COUNTY, a LLC, a, 221 So. 3d 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . entered in favor of Alico West Fund,' LLC, and -Lee County, in the Heines’ lawsuit brought under section 163.3215 . . . action ... to challenge any decision of such local government granting ... a development order.” § 163.3215 . . . Shidel, 795 So.2d 191, 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“[W]e observed that section 163.3215 had liberalized . . . There, the Fourth District recognized that “[sjection 163.3215 enlarged the class of persons with standing . . . Martin County, 134 So.3d 966, 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“Section 163.3215 is a remedial statute designed . . .

HERBITS, v. CITY OF MIAMI,, 207 So.3d 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . relating to the project are governed by the Growth Management Act of 1985 and a separate statute, section 163.3215 . . .

REALTY ASSOCIATES FUND IX, L. P. v. TOWN OF CUTLER BAY,, 208 So. 3d 735 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . final order dismissing RAF’s complaint, which included a consistency challenge pursuant to section 163.3215 . . .

CITY OF MIAMI, v. VILLAGE OF KEY BISCAYNE, 197 So. 3d 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Among other things, the Village’s lawsuit alleged, pursuant to - section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes . . .

AHEARN, v. MAYO CLINIC, A A, 180 So. 3d 165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . standing to enforce local comprehensive plans through development orders,” which is contained in section 163.3215 . . . Willis, 41 So.3d 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010j, we found standing under section 163.3215(2) where a party’s . . .

J. HOWELL, v. PASCO COUNTY, 165 So. 3d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . favor of Outlaw Ridge, Inc., in the Howell parties’ consistency action brought pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . Statutes (2012), and, therefore, that the Howell parties could not bring an action pursuant to section 163.3215 . . .

O NEIL, O v. WALTON COUNTY, a a A. E. Jr., 149 So. 3d 699 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 163.3215(3), Fla. Stat. . . . But because § 163.3215 is predicated upon showing a material alteration of property inconsistent with . . . If the PUD materially altered the primary dune and CPZ on the property for purposes of § 163.3215, then . . . See § 163.3215(3), Fla. . . . Rather, both the 2010 and 2013 Orders were susceptible to de novo challenge under § 163.3215. . . .

SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA, v. HENDRY COUNTY, a Co. LLC, a, 114 So. 3d 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . This case involves the interplay of section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2011), and sections 403.501-.518 . . . The Tribe filed a complaint for declaratory relief pursuant to section 163.3215(3) to challenge the County . . . opined that in cases such as this one, involving power plants, the procedures set forth in section 163.3215 . . . third amended complaint in the declaratory action, arguing that the PPSA completely preempted section 163.3215 . . . case, the trial court was incorrect in its assessment that preemption could therefore bar a section 163.3215 . . .

SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA, v. HENDRY COUNTY, a CO. LLC, a, 106 So. 3d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . The circuit court properly found that section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2011), would preclude the Seminole . . . methods for a party to challenge the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan. § 163.3215 . . . party may maintain a de novo action for declaratory or other relief to challenge a development order. § 163.3215 . . . Though section 163.3215(4) provides that an adversely affected party may challenge a development order . . .

W. A. R. INC. v. LEVY COUNTY LLC,, 93 So. 3d 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . appeals a final order denying declaratory and injunctive relief in appellant’s action pursuant to section 163.3215 . . .

L. PRUITT v. G. SANDS,, 84 So. 3d 1267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . See § 163.3215(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .

GRAVES, v. CITY OF POMPANO BEACH, CITY COMMISSION, a PPI, INC., 74 So. 3d 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . concluded that the City’s plat approval is not a “development order” subject to challenge under section 163.3215 . . . Thus, the plat approval may not be challenged as a development order under section 163.3215. . . . Section 163.3215 specifically provides that a “development order” is “as defined in s. 163.3164”: Any . . . The appellants’ motion for rehearing ignores section 163.3215’s use of the phrase “as defined in s. 163.3164 . . . Section 163.3215 creates a cause of action limited to a development order “as defined in section 163.3164 . . . Under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2009), an aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain . . . motion to dismiss and concluded that the City’s plat approval was not subject to challenge under section 163.3215 . . . Appellants alleged in their complaint that the plat approval was a development order under section 163.3215 . . . In reviewing dismissal of a complaint seeking relief under section 163.3215, the standard of review is . . . attendant development consequences, constitutes a development order subject to challenge under section 163.3215 . . .

MARTIN COUNTY CONSERVATION ALLIANCE v. MARTIN COUNTY, LLC, LC,, 73 So. 3d 856 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Willis, 41 So.3d 270, 276-78 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (explaining section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, created . . . the test for standing under section 120.68 is similar to the statutory test established in section 163.3215 . . . Appellants concede that standing is “liberalized” under section 163.3215, but argue that the statutes . . . As noted in Nassau County, standing under section 163.3215 is broadly granted, but even under that test . . .

A. BUSH A. v. CITY OF MEXICO BEACH,, 71 So. 3d 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . , as the City argues, that consistency issues must be raised in an action filed pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . Cook was entitled to seek certiorari review in circuit court rather than an injunction under section 163.3215 . . .

D. REHMAN, v. LAKE COUNTY,, 56 So. 3d 852 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . The proceeding below was an action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . Comprehensive Plan, the trial court properly entered summary judgment on Rehman’s claim brought under section 163.3215 . . .

PAYNE a a v. CITY OF MIAMI, a LLC,, 52 So. 3d 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . standing two of four petitioners (Payne and the Marine Group) who had filed a challenge under Section 163.3215 . . .

ARBOR PROPERTIES, INC. PUD, LLC, PUD II, LLC. v. LAKE JACKSON PROTECTION ALLIANCE, INC. S. E. C. C., 51 So. 3d 502 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Appellees filed a complaint against the County under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, seeking to invalidate . . .

MARTIN COUNTY CONSERVATION ALLIANCE v. MARTIN COUNTY, LLC, LC,, 134 So. 3d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . inapposite as it addresses the standing requirements for a circuit court proceeding pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . Section 163.3215 is a remedial statute designed to enlarge the class of persons with standing to challenge . . .

NASSAU COUNTY, v. G. WILLIS T. H. Jr. D. Co- G. T. u d o G. LLC, a LLC, a v., 41 So. 3d 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . . § 163.3215 Whether a party has standing to enforce a local comprehensive plan is a pure question of . . . Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, (2006) provides: 163.3215 Standing to enforce local comprehensive . . . Pursuant to section 163.3215, a party’s standing to enforce a comprehensive plan depends on it being . . . District held that a party must demonstrate a specific injury to have standing pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . Appellee’s established themselves as “aggrieved and adversely affected” parties pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . As Plaintiffs assert, the standard of review for statutory standing under section 163.3215 to challenge . . . The 1985 adoption of section 163.3215, however, liberalized the standing requirements by providing a . . . Section 163.3215 is a remedial statute which must be liberally construed in order to protect the public . . . Prior to the enactment of section 163.3215, limitations on standing resulted in “a failure to conform . . . Rather, section 163.3215 requires only that the adverse interest exceed in degree that of the public’ . . .

PRESIDENTS COUNCIL OF SD, INC. v. WALTON COUNTY, II, LLC,, 36 So. 3d 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . properly determined that the action for declaratory and injunctive relief was untimely under section 163.3215 . . . Section 163.3215(3) provides that an action for declaratory or injunctive relief to contest a development . . . The appellants’ circuit court action was filed long after the thirty-day time limit under section 163.3215 . . . The appellants’ failure to bring their circuit court action within the time allowed under section 163.3215 . . . claim because it was not brought within the jurisdictional time limits provided in section 163.3215( . . .

M. JOHNSON, v. GULF COUNTY, a Jr. D K LLC, a GROUP, LLC, a, 26 So. 3d 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . The neighbors alleged standing under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2006). . . . complaint ruling that Johnson and the other neighbors did not possess standing to seek relief under section 163.3215 . . . activities materially altered the use, density, or intensity of the use of the land pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . entitled to a de novo hearing to challenge the decision of Gulf County to permit Rish’s development. § 163.3215 . . . Section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2006), provides in pertinent part: (3) Any aggrieved or adversely . . .

D. KEENE, v. ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT,, 22 So. 3d 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . does not help that the issue in this case is whether Keene is entitled to a judgment under section 163.3215 . . . Keene promptly filed suit pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, challenging the Wilsons’ Special . . . Remember, section 163.3215 only does one thing. . . . Keene does not have a cause of action under section 163.3215. . . . Section 163.3215 is not designed to cover every land use dispute in Florida. . . . . The dissent questions whether the SUP issued to the Wilsons is a development order under section 163.3215 . . . Section 163.3215(6) defines “development" as having the meaning in section 380.04, Florida Statutes, . . .

BAY COUNTY LLC, v. HARRISON, 13 So. 3d 115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . . § 163.3215(3), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . Section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2007), permits “[a]ny aggrieved or adversely affected party” to . . . adverse effect to an interest protected or furthered by the local government comprehensive plan....” § 163.3215 . . . Because section 163.3215 is a remedial statute affording aggrieved parties the right to enforce comprehensive . . . Palm Beach County, 751 So.2d 621, 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (explaining that “[sjection 163.3215 enlarged . . .

SAVE HOMOSASSA RIVER ALLIANCE, INC. v. CITRUS COUNTY, FLORIDA,, 2 So. 3d 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . On August 10, 2006, Plaintiffs filed this suit against the County, pursuant to section 163.3215, challenging . . . Palm Beach County, 751 So.2d 621, 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (section 163.3215 is a remedial statute in . . . As a remedial statute, section 163.3215 is to “be liberally construed to advance the intended remedy. . . . See § 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (2007); see also Fla. Rock Props. v. . . . The action underlying this appeal was brought pursuant to section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes. . . . . majority opinion eviscerates the “adverse effect” element of the standing requirement in subsection 163.3215 . . . Subsection 163.3215(2) defines an “aggrieved or adversely affected party” as “any person or local government . . .

CITY OF FORT MYERS, a v. SPLITT, a a a a, 988 So. 2d 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . The Applicable Law of Standing The section 163.3215 standard for standing applied by the trial court . . . The term includes the owner, developer, or applicant for a development order. § 163.3215(2) (emphasis . . . It has repeatedly been acknowledged that the standing provisions of section 163.3215 were adopted to . . . The difference between the section 163.3215 standard and the Renard special damages test is immediately . . . In determining the standing issue on the basis of section 163.3215, the circuit court failed to apply . . .

DUNLAP, v. ORANGE COUNTY,, 971 So. 2d 171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Section 163.3215(2) of the Florida Statutes (2004) authorizes an “aggrieved or adversely affected” party . . . The statute reads, in relevant part, as follows: 163.3215. . . . The term includes the owner, developer, or applicant for a development order. § 163.3215(2), Fla. . . . The homeowners further argue that the trial court erred in concluding that section 163.3215, Florida . . . Section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes (2004) reads, in pertinent part: 163.3215. . . .

STRANAHAN HOUSE, INC. a a v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, a L. P. a, 967 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . for review of the alternative site plan, it filed a declaratory judgment action pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . Such claims must be filed as a declaratory judgment action pursuant to section 163.3215(3) and are not . . .

STRANAHAN HOUSE, INC. v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, a L. P. a, 967 So. 2d 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . months later for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City and Coolidge pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . Section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (2006), provides that “subsections (3) and (4) provide the exclusive . . . alternative site plan because they are not “aggrieved or adversely affected parties” under section 163.3215 . . . adverse effect to an interest protected or furthered by the local government comprehensive plan.... ” § 163.3215 . . . The adoption of section 163.3215 liberalized the standing requirements for enforcing a comprehensive . . .

PALAZZO LAS OLAS GROUP LLC, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, a a, 966 So. 2d 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Count V sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, which . . .

M. JOHNSON, P. E. R. W. v. GULF COUNTY, a Jr., 965 So. 2d 298 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . initial complaint against Gulf County and William Joseph Rish, Jr. for injunctive relief under section 163.3215 . . . Section 163.3215(3) allows “[a]ny aggrieved or adversely affected party” to bring suit to challenge “ . . . Appellants assert that, in addition to the claim under section 163.3215(3), they also seek to file a . . .

McNAMARA, P. A. K. v. CITY OF LAKE WORTH, a, 956 So. 2d 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . and Anabeth Karson filed a complaint against the City of Lake Worth under Florida Statutes section 163.3215 . . . granted final summary judgment in favor of Lake Worth because the complaint did not comply with section 163.3215 . . .

BISCAYNE BOULEVARD, LLC v. STEBBINS,, 937 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . prohibition to prevent the circuit court from proceeding with a de novo action filed pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . Stebbins filed a complaint pursuant to section 163.3215, challenging the City’s development order that . . . In 2002, the Florida Legislature substantially amended section 163.3215 to address issues of standing . . . The 2002 amendment to section 163.3215 was intended to simplify the time limit for bringing the de novo . . . , Florida Statute, would be deleted and the time schedule in s. 163.3215(4), Florida Statute, would be . . .

PAYNE, v. CITY OF MIAMI,, 927 So. 2d 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . River Marine Group’s (“Marine Group”) amended complaint, on their face, satisfy the requirements of § 163.3215 . . . Payne and the Marine Group both claim standing under section 163.3215. . . . However, the amended complaint fails to adequately allege, pursuant to the requirements of section 163.3215 . . . To have standing under section 163.3215 to challenge rezoning on the grounds that it is inconsistent . . . Looking first at section 163.3215, it is important to note that, as the Majority states, the statute . . . Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2004), sets forth the standing requirements for enforcing a local . . . The term includes the owner, developer, or applicant for a development order. § 163.3215(2), Fla. . . . Prior to the adoption of section 163.3215, common law rules for standing applied, requiring that the . . . City of West Palm Beach, 450 So.2d 204, 208 (Fla.1984)). ■ However, after section 163.3215 was adopted . . . See § 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . .

LAKE ROSA v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,, 911 So. 2d 206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . ) appeal the final order rendered in their suit for injunctive and declaratory relief under section 163.3215 . . . phase two began on May 6, 2002, when the Coalition took the initial steps to file suit under section 163.3215 . . . We look first to section 163.3215, which governs when an action for injunctive or other relief may be . . . We believe that no earlier date can be assigned to the government action because section 163.3215(4), . . . Adverting to the provisions of section 163.3215(1), a challenge to a development may arise under any . . .

BRITT, v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE,, 874 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . complaint with the clerk’s office within the required 30 day period for actions brought under section 163.3215 . . . Appellant states that she may not now refile her complaint because the 30-day period provided in section 163.3215 . . .

CITY OF COCONUT CREEK, a v. CITY OF DEERFIELD BEACH, a LLC,, 840 So. 2d 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Coconut Creek’s amended complaint sought to enjoin issuance of the site plan approval, under section 163.3215 . . . See § 163.3215(3)(b) (“Suit under this section shall be the sole action available to challenge the consistency . . . Section 163.3215(4) provides that: As a condition precedent to the institution of an action pursuant . . . Section 163.3215(4) is clear. . . . Where the presuit notice requirement of section 163.3215(4) has not been met, case law is clear in this . . .

ST. JOHNS COUNTY, v. DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, G., 836 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Although Friends conceded that they lacked standing under section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes, they . . . This court, while agreeing with Friends that they lacked standing based on section 163.3215, further . . . preventing the construction of the lines by asserting a challenge to a development order under section 163.3215 . . . only argument that Friends used because they conceded that they did not possess standing under section 163.3215 . . .

EDGEWATER BEACH OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. WALTON COUNTY, KPM, A. v. KPM, LTD., 833 So. 2d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . The 1985 adoption of section 163.3215, however, liberalized the standing requirements by providing a . . . As a remedial statute, section 163.3215 should be liberally construed to ensure standing for a party . . . Under the liberalized standing requirements of section 163.3215, the Association, a group of property . . . Section 163.3215 only permits the Association to challenge a development order on the basis that it is . . . Section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (1991), requires that the Association file a verified complaint . . .

S. COMBS, K. v. CITY OF NAPLES, a, 834 So. 2d 194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . trial court dismissed count 1 for failure to comply with the condition precedent provision in section 163.3215 . . . However, count 1 of the complaint before us is not an action filed pursuant to section 163.3215. . . . Thus, we conclude the trial court erred by applying the condition precedent provision of section 163.3215 . . . lacked standing because he was not an “aggrieved or adversely affected person” as defined in section 163.3215 . . . They also qualify as an “aggrieved or adversely affected party” as defined in section 163.3215(2). . . .

PINECREST LAKES, INC. v. SHIDEL,, 795 So. 2d 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . (2) and therefore had no standing to seek relief under section 163.3215. . . . That would render section 163.3215 meaningless and ineffectual. . . . See § 163.3215(4), Fla. . . . There is no similar provision in section 163.3215. . . . Stat. (2000), with § 163.3215(4), Fla. . . .

COASTAL DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH FLORIDA, INC. v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE BEACH,, 788 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2001)

. . . See § 163.3215, Fla. Stat. (1995). . . .

H. LEE, v. ST. JOHNS COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,, 776 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . Johns County Board of County Commissioners, filed pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, challenging . . . court ruled that Lee failed to file her complaint within the thirty day time limit required by section 163.3215 . . . Appellees argue that Lee failed to timely comply with section 163.3215, which provides strict time limits . . . The time limit specified in section 163.3215(4) is jurisdictional. Bal Harbour Village v. . . . Section 163.3215(1) permits parties to challenge development orders, which are inconsistent with local . . .

VEAL M. v. ESCAMBIA COUNTY,, 773 So. 2d 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Palm Beach County, 751 So.2d 621, 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (construing section 163.3215, Florida Statutes . . . A similar provision in section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes, has been construed as a jurisdictional . . .

DIXON, Jr. III, v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a a, 774 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . order was inconsistent with the comprehensive plan and sought injunc-tive relief pursuant to section 163.3215 . . .

In SECTION LAND GROUP, LTD. S. W. Co. C. C. V. V. V. I, LLC, L. v. I,, 252 B.R. 812 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000)

. . . Stat. § 163.3215. . . . Stat. § 163.3215? . . . Stat. § 163.3215. . . . Stat. § 163.3215(b)? . . . Stat. § 163.3215. . . .

In SECTION LAND GROUP, LTD. S. W. Co. C. C. V. V. V. I, LLC, L. v. I,, 252 B.R. 819 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000)

. . . . § 163.3215, which authorizes adversely affected persons to file suit in the Circuit Court challenging . . . Stat. § 163.3215; and that neither the site plan or the plat is inconsistent with the Collier County . . .

BAKER, v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, a k a a Of BMS, 774 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . as being inconsistent with the land use plan, the sole method available is that provided by section 163.3215 . . .

FRIENDS OF FLORIDA, INC. v. ST. JOHNS COUNTY,, 765 So. 2d 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . The appellants concede that they do not have standing under section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes. . . . See §§ 163.3215(1), 163.3164, 380.04(3)(b). . . .

BRADY, v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a, 764 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Because Elyse Brady and Valerie Britt failed to comply with a condition precedent under section 163.3215 . . .

LUTZ LAKE FERN ROAD NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS, INC. v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY,, 779 So. 2d 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Count IV was an action pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1997), in which the Neighbors . . . asserted that, as to count IV, the Neighbors failed to timely file their action pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . writ of mandamus on the basis that “[a] cause of action brought by third parties pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . finds that [the Neighbors] have failed to comply with the condition precedent set forth in section 163.3215 . . . Section 163.3215 provides, in relevant part: (1) Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain . . .

BUCK LAKE ALLIANCE, INC. v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF LEON COUNTY,, 765 So. 2d 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . review of a summary final judgment entered against it on its action challenging, pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . Appellant’s complaint was premised on section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1997), a part of the Local . . . To the extent pertinent, section 163.3215 reads: (1) Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain . . . an effort to comply with the condition precedent to the right to file an action set out in section 163.3215 . . . It first determined that, for purposes of section 163.3215, consistency with the comprehensive plan was . . .

PUTNAM COUNTY ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL, INC. v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PUTNAM COUNTY,, 757 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . court dismissed the action, ruling PCEC did not possess standing to challenge the order under section 163.3215 . . . Section 163.3215 sets forth the standing requirements for parties seeking to enforce a local comprehensive . . . The statute provides: 163.3215. . . . Prior to the enactment of section 163.3215 in 1985, the common law rule for standing applied. . . . Testing PCEC’s allegations against the liberalized standing test of section 163.3215, we conclude that . . . In my view, those are distinctions without great import, and both should have standing under section 163.3215 . . . development is surrounded only by the developer’s own land, free from challenge pursuant to section 163.3215 . . .

VILLAGE OF KEY BISCAYNE, v. TESAURUS HOLDINGS, INC., 761 So. 2d 397 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . The appellate division also held that the Council’s sole remedy was found in section 163.3215, Florida . . . development was in compliance with the Village’s master plan, was to bring an action pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . particular piece of property that is not consistent with the comprehensive plan adopted under this part.” § 163.3215 . . .

EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC. d b a My L. v. PALM BEACH COUNTY, d b a, 751 So. 2d 621 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . Preservation, Inc., and SAC Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint with Palm Beach County pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . Section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes allows an adversely affected third party to maintain an action . . . verified complaint with the local government within thirty days of the local government’s action. § 163.3215 . . . As a remedial statute, section 163.3215 should be liberally construed to advance the intended remedy, . . . Given this, a verified complaint is sufficient under section 163.3215(4) so long as it places the governmental . . .

CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, v. KOVACH, 733 So. 2d 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . property owners, to afford them the opportunity to utilize the 80-day procedure set forth in section 163.3215 . . .

THOMAS, E. T. H. v. SUWANNEE COUNTY, a a S. P. Jr., 734 So. 2d 492 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . In their pleading, the objecting neighbors sought relief under, inter alia, section 163.3215(1), Florida . . . the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan.” § 163.3215(3)(b), Fla Stat. (1993 . . . Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1993), lays down conditions precedent to filing in circuit court. . . . Relying on section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes. (1993), the court below concluded that the objecting . . . Thereafter they pleaded their constitutional claims as somehow falling under section 163.3215. . . . .

COOK, v. CITY OF LYNN HAVEN,, 729 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . the court stated that Cook’s cause of action was limited to the injunctive remedy provided in section 163.3215 . . . he was entitled to seek certiorari review in circuit court, rather than an injunction under section 163.3215 . . .

FRIENDS OF MATANZAS, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,, 729 So. 2d 437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . road right-of-way is outside the purview of “development orders” subject to challenge under section 163.3215 . . .

EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC. d b a My L. d b a W. v. PALM BEACH COUNTY,, 721 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . court denied their amended petition solely on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . was contrary to local comprehensive development plan, claimant should have pursued case under section 163.3215 . . . complaint asserting inconsistency with comprehensive plan should have been by action under section 163.3215 . . . those issues raised by Petitioners which are not exclusively reviewable by an action under section 163.3215 . . .

C. DAS, v. OSCEOLA COUNTY,, 715 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . appellants should be given a reasonable notice so that they can utilize the procedure set forth in section 163.3215 . . . If so, you must proceed pursuant to the provisions of section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, within 30 days . . . Section 163.3215 allows an “aggrieved party” to bring suit against a local government to prevent the . . . property owners, to afford them the opportunity to utilize the 30-day procedure set forth in section 163.3215 . . . Neither due process, section 163.3215, nor this court in Das I, required more. . . .

FLORIDA ROCK PROPERTIES, v. KEYSER,, 709 So. 2d 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . who filed the lawsuit seeking the declaratory judgment, is not an aggrieved party pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . decision, Keyser alleged that he was an “aggrieved or adversely affected person” as defined in section 163.3215 . . . Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, (1995) reads: 163.3215 Standing to enforce local comprehensive plans . . . See § 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). . . . Section 163.3215 does not specify or explain the degree to which the protected interest must be affected . . . Section 163.3215 was enacted in 1985 as part of the Growth Management Act. . . . This section addresses standing as follows: 163.3215. . . .

A. SHAHAN, v. LISTLE, 703 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . Pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1995), Jeff and Laura Johnson (the Johnsons) filed a . . . Section 163.3215 provides, in pertinent part: As a condition precedent to the institution of an action . . . court determined that the Johnsons had standing to challenge the City’s ordinance pursuant to section 163.3215 . . .

POULOS, v. MARTIN COUNTY, 700 So. 2d 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . This action was brought in the trial court pursuant to, section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1995). . . . We conclude that section 163.3215 provides for a de novo, trial. . . . Appellants, in accord with section 163.3215, filed a verified complaint with the county alleging the . . . is consistent with our determination that section 163.3215 provides for a de novo trial. . . . This court has referred to the scope of the proceedings under section 163.3215. . . .

C. DAS, v. OSCEOLA COUNTY,, 685 So. 2d 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . County alleged, among other things, that the crossclaim was time-barred because, pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . Section 163.3215, “Standing to enforce local comprehensive plans through development orders,” provides . . . it must can the Trustees, as “adversely affected parties,” proceed under the provisions of section 163.3215 . . . Until Osceola County issues its determination, Trustees are not within the purview of section 163.3215 . . . Because Trustees failed to timely file a verified complaint pursuant to section 163.3215, the trial court . . .

Y. CHUNG, U A D v. SARASOTA COUNTY, a L. L. R. A. O., 686 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . . § 163.3215(1). . . . .” § 163.3215(7). . . .

BEACH G. v. VILLAGE NORTH PALM BEACH CITY COUNCIL,, 682 So. 2d 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . On June 9, 1995, as required by section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (1993), as a condition precedent . . . Section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (1993), reads: (4) As a condition precedent to the institution . . . action as being inconsistent with the comprehensive plan of the Village in accordance with section 163.3215 . . . that case, the court concluded that the 30-day period for filing a verified complaint under section 163.3215 . . .

BAL HARBOUR VILLAGE, a v. CITY OF NORTH MIAMI, a, 678 So. 2d 356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . Id. § 163.3215(1), (3)(b). . . . Id. § 163.3215(4). . . . Id. § 163.3215(4). . . . The claim under Section 163.3215 is time-barred. . . . Id. § 163.3215(4). . . .

ROBBINS, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH,, 664 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . Kent Harrison Robbins appeals the dismissal with prejudice of his complaint filed pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . that the trial court properly determined that Robbins did not have a cause of action under section 163.3215 . . . subject resolution cannot properly be deemed a development order subject to challenge under section 163.3215 . . . Although we conclude that an action to challenge the resolution as a development order under section 163.3215 . . .

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a v. M. WYNN, D. W., 650 So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . This action does not purport to seek review of a development order, see sections 163.3194(3)(a), 163.3215 . . .

R. TURNER, v. SUMTER COUNTY, BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,, 649 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . We agree with Sumter County that Turner’s remedy for this claim was an action under section 163.3215, . . . do not mean to suggest that a county’s noneompliance with its own ordinances is limited to a section 163.3215 . . . Appellant filed a section 163.3215 proceeding but elected not to pursue it. . . . As formulated, this is not a section 163.3215 issue and it does not appear the claim should have been . . .

FLORIDA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC. a v. MARTIN COUNTY,, 641 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . FIT filed a complaint pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. . . . Under Parker, section 163.3215 applies not to property owners whose applications have been denied, but . . . ’s common law right to petition for certiorari review in the circuit court is unaffected by section 163.3215 . . .

R. MOORE F. v. CITY OF PUNTA GORDA, A, 627 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . against the City of Punta Gorda for failure to comply with a condition precedent contained in section 163.3215 . . . Leon County, 627 So.2d 476 (Fla.1993), where the court held that section 163.3215 applied only to third . . . Under Parker, section 163.3215 does not apply to property owners, such as the Moores, whose application . . . The dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply with section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1991) is . . . Section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (1991), states: (4) As a condition precedent to the institution . . .

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BREVARD COUNTY, v. R. SNYDER,, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993)

. . . briefs suggests that Snyder’s remedy was to bring a de novo action in circuit court pursuant to section 163.3215 . . .

J. PARKER, v. LEON COUNTY, EMERALD ACRES INVESTMENTS, INC. v. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF LEON COUNTY,, 627 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1993)

. . . Leon County filed motions to dismiss the actions for failure to comply with section 163.3215, Florida . . . The court reasoned that suit had to be brought under section 163.3215. . . . . § 163.3215(4), Fla.Stat. (1989); Leon County v. . . . Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1989), provides in pertinent part: 163.3215 Standing to enforce local . . . The following year as part of the Growth Management Act the legislature enacted section 163.3215 to ensure . . .

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, v. SEMINOLE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,, 623 So. 2d 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . The court noted that section 163.3215(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1991) provides that suit under that section . . . of trustees had failed to comply with the statutory condition precedent to filing suit under section 163.3215 . . . issue in this case is whether the 30-day period for filing a verified complaint, set forth in section 163.3215 . . . Sections 163.3215(3)(b) and (4), Florida Statutes (1991) provide the following: 163.3215 Standing to . . . Finally, section 163.3215(3)(b) provides that suit for injunctive or other relief under that section . . .

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF LEON COUNTY, v. MONTICELLO DRUG COMPANY O, 619 So. 2d 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . In response to the decision in Parker, Monticello asserted that section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, was . . . Monticello also asserted that it had substantially complied with section 163.3215(4) because: 1) no relief . . . , and that Monticello failed to satisfy the condition precedent to bringing an action under section 163.3215 . . . Florida Statute section 163.3215 does not preclude certiorari relief. . . . As noted in Emerald Acres, section 163.3215 contains no requirement that the "alleged inconsistent action . . .

LEE COUNTY, a v. SUNBELT EQUITIES, II, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a, 619 So. 2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . Sunbelt filed an original action pursuant to § 163.3215, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

JENSEN BEACH LAND COMPANY, INC. v. CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE GROWTH OF THE TREASURE COAST, INC. a, 608 So. 2d 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . The issue of jurisdiction and the provisions of section 163.3215 were not raised in the trial court and . . . We understand Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1991), to require that a court challenge to the consistency . . .

B H TRAVEL CORPORATION, a d b a v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, 602 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, sections 163.3161-163.3215 . . .

EMERALD ACRES INVESTMENTS, INC. v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF LEON COUNTY a a, 601 So. 2d 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . The trial court found that appellant did not comply with the provisions of section 163.3215, Florida . . . Section 163.3215 provides, in pertinent part: (1) Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain . . . Section 163.3215 contains no requirement that the “alleged inconsistent action” be reduced to writing . . . We also reject appellant’s argument that section 163.3215 unconstitutionally infringes on the rule-making . . . Section 163.3215(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989). AFFIRMED. BARFIELD and ALLEN, JJ., concur. . . . I agree that appellant has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating compliance with section 163.3215 . . . Fla. 1st DCA 1990), that no judicial review is available to appellant absent compliance with section 163.3215 . . . Turning now to the statute in question, it would be my view, but for Parker, supra, that section 163.3215 . . . Returning to the statute in question, I note that the very title of section 163.3215 reads, “Standing . . . In 1985 the Florida Legislature created the statute, section 163.3215, applied today by this court. . . .

R. SNYDER, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BREVARD COUNTY,, 595 So. 2d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . Moreover, section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (1987) now authorizes rezoning orders which are challenged . . . See section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes. . §§ 163.3161 — 163.3215, Fla.Stat. (1989). . . . .

GILMORE, v. HERNANDO COUNTY,, 584 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . This kind of suit is not only authorized by the new statute, section 163.3215(1)) but it appears to be . . . in by the circuit court when a zoning decision (or “development order”) is challenged under section 163.3215 . . . See, e.g., § 163.3215(4), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . . . . § 163.3215(1), Fla.Stat. (1987). . § 163.3215(3)(b), Fla.Stat. (1987); Leon County v. . . . ascertainable standards which can be followed concerning density and intensity of use. §§ 163.3161-163.3215 . . . raised by the record before the trial court as to whether the challenged rezoning pursuant to section 163.3215 . . .

LEON COUNTY, v. J. PARKER P. P. LEON COUNTY, v. EMERALD ACRES INVESTMENTS, INC., 566 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . In my view, as the trial court also concluded, the lawsuit referred to in Section 163.3215(1), Florida . . . If that is so, then the condition precedent provided for in Section 163.3215(4) clearly has no application . . . dismiss filed in each case for failure of the respondents to comply with the provisions of Section 163.3215 . . . Also, subsection (3)(a) of Section 163.3215 refers to suits “under this section challenging the approval . . . Section 163.3215(4) provides that a verified complaint must be filed with the local government as a condition . . . The requirement of Section 163.3215(4) that a verified complaint be filed with the local government prior . . . Because the respondent’s complaints failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes . . .

WHITE, Dr. O Dr. Dr. A. Dr. B. J. O Dr. J. J. Dr. O Jr. v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY,, 563 So. 2d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . City of West Palm Beach, Inc., 450 So.2d 204, 208 (Fla.1984); see also, § 163.3215(1), Fla.Stat. (1989 . . .

B. B. McCORMICK SONS, INC. a J. T. M. Jr. F. R. J. T. St. v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE,, 559 So. 2d 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . Section 163.3215 provides for injunctive and other relief for parties aggrieved by land use changes that . . .

F. GREGORY v. CITY OF ALACHUA, A. Jr. H., 553 So. 2d 206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . Count I, seeking injunc-tive and declaratory relief, was brought under Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes . . . Count II, also seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, was, as Count I, brought under section 163.3215 . . . This is an action under § 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1986) [sic] to have the City of Alachua zoning . . . Although we find that only consistency challenges may be brought under section 163.3215, and that the . . . This is so because, while the complaint states that it is brought under section 163.3215, the pleadings . . . evidentiary hearing in an action brought by the appellants Peter and Mary Gregory pursuant to section 163.3215 . . . Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, provides for suits challenging the approval of zoning and other “ . . . development orders” granted by any local government after October 1, 1985, and states: 163.3215 Standing . . .

PALM BEACH COUNTY, a v. ALLEN MORRIS COMPANY,, 547 So. 2d 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . Morris and Realty brought this action pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1985) and challenged . . .

BATTAGLIA FRUIT CO. v. CITY OF MAITLAND,, 530 So. 2d 940 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1985), which authorizes an action for injunctive or other relief . . . See § 163.3215(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985). . . . . This language is similar to the provisions in section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (1985). . . . See Chapter 63-1716, Laws of Florida, Special Acts 1963. . § 163.3215(2), Fla.Stat. (1985), effective . . . It is further, the intent of the Legislature to reconfirm that sections 163.3161 through 163.3215 have . . .

VENTURE, d b a v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SARASOTA COUNTY, a, 529 So. 2d 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . As to count II of the same complaint, see section 163.3215(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987). . . .

SOUTHWEST RANCHES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. a v. COUNTY OF BROWARD, a, 502 So. 2d 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . here is in accord with the intent of the legislature as manifested by the recent addition of Section 163.3215 . . .