Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...In addition, Nathan Hall, the owner of the parked car, testified that Combs admitted to backing into his truck. Combs objected to the admission of these statements on the grounds that they were made to fulfill his statutory duty to make an accident report under sections 316.063 and 316.066, Florida Statutes (1981), and were therefore privileged under section 316.066(4). The trial court overruled the objections. On appeal the circuit court affirmed, finding that the privilege conferred by Florida Statute 316.066 prohibits only the introduction of the written report prepared by the officer investigating an accident and does not protect statements made by the Appellant to the officer....

...e spontaneous and voluntary. The Appellant was not obligated to tell either the officer or Mr. Hall that he was the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident. Under these facts the admissions, therefore, are not privileged under Florida Statute 316.066....

...ew, it did not err in denying the petition for common-law certiorari. The petitioner asserted that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law by affirming a judgment based upon statements admitted into evidence in violation of section 316.066. Petitioner correctly points out that the circuit judge was wrong in stating that the privilege conferred by section 316.066 only applies to the introduction of the written report of the investigating officer....

...The trial court also erred by concluding that petitioner was not obligated to tell either the officer or Mr. Hall that he was the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident. However, the trial court did not err by concluding that the statements were not privileged under section 316.066....

...A motorcycle was lying in the roadway, and the body of the motorcyclist was lying near the truck. Heaton was advised at the scene that Calvin Burks, standing outside the truck, had been the driver of the truck. Heaton conducted a traffic investigation in order to complete an accident report as required by section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Rooney, Inc., 654 So.2d 911, 914 (Fla.1995) ("When the legislature has used a term... in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, we will not imply it where it has been excluded.")). Tellingly, in section *447 316.066(4) of the Florida Statutes (2001), located in the same chapter as the statutory provision at issue in this case, the Legislature enacted a provision that mandates that neither a crash report nor a statement made in connection with such a report "shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal. " § 316.066(4), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied). The Legislature's use of the language "civil or criminal" in section 316.066(4) to modify the phrase "any trial," and the exclusion of those same modifiers in the statutory provision under review here, compels us to conclude that the Legislature intended different meanings of the term "any trial" in each statute. If the Legislature had intended section 316.650(9) to include "any trial, civil or criminal, " then the Legislature would have included that language within its enactment, as it did in section 316.066(4)....

...0(9) must have been intended to exclude citations only in traffic-related trials. This reasoning, however, is undermined by the crash report provision, contained in the same Uniform Traffic Control Law and furthering the same legislative intent. See § 316.066(4), Fla....

...During the proffer of the officer's testimony the officer said that he asked a lab technician for a sample of Boles' blood. A chemist proffered that the blood alcohol content of the sample was .083 per cent. The trial court ruled that this evidence was inadmissible under section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...evidence of Boles' blood alcohol content was properly excluded. We disagree. With respect to the admissibility of Boles' blood alcohol content, both the trial court and the district court of appeal concluded that this evidence was inadmissible under section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1981), because the chemical analysis of Boles' blood was performed for the purpose of completing an accident report....

...ase of the investigation had ended and the blood test was taken as a result of the criminal investigation of the incident. This so-called distinction between an accident report investigation and a criminal investigation is based on a construction of section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides: 316.066 Written reports of accidents....

...We clearly and emphatically hold that the purpose of the statute is to clothe with statutory immunity only such statements and communications as the driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in order to comply with his or her statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2)....

...ustody, had done nothing illegal, and the trooper did not command him to stop. The State contends the evidence presented at trial established the trooper was engaged in the lawful exercise of a legal duty (i.e., investigating an accident pursuant to section 316.066(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)), and appellant, knowing the officer wanted to detain him for questioning, fled to impede that duty....

...tain the defendant. "[T]he officer must articulate in particular and objective terms his reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Harris v. State, 647 So.2d at 208 (quoting Daniels v. State, 543 So.2d 363, 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)). Under sections 316.066(3)(a) and *1248 316.061, Florida Statutes (1993), the trooper is obligated to file an accident report for all accidents which result in damage to a vehicle. Nevertheless, neither statute requires witnesses to the accident to stay at the scene or report to investigating officers. §§ 316.061, 316.062, 316.066(3)(a), Fla....

...gress in 1975, thereby predating the Florida Code. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (U.S. 1972); 88 Stat. 1947 (1975). [7] The homicide accident report constitutes an example of inadmissible evidence. See § 316.066(4), Fla....

...ficer had concluded his investigation of the accident in question, "had nothing more to gain" and was just "standing there as an ... interested bystander watching the emergency room procedures." We conclude that the trial court erred in relying upon Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1973), formerly Section 317.171 in excluding this evidence....

...The record fully supports the trial court's ruling excluding Garchar's statement. The majority has ruled in essence that it was uncontradicted that the statement was volunteered to the physician attending Garchar and that the investigating police officer had concluded his investigation. Hence it is concluded that Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1973) does not apply to protect the statement....

...The jury returned a verdict finding Schreier eighty percent negligent and Rufus Parker twenty percent negligent. We affirm in part and reverse in part. The first point on this appeal concerns the testimony of the investigating officer regarding his conversations with Mr. Schreier, alleged to be privileged under Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Though the opinion is not clear, apparently he was not allowed to contact his attorney and was given the breath test. The second district held that suppression of the results of the breath test was not required, but its decision was based on the fact that results of such tests are not privileged under section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1981), the privileged accident report statute....

...is case because of conflicting opinions as to the location of the carrier at the time of the accident. . Evenflo also cites Florida’s statutory privilege concerning statements made for the purpose of preparing a traffic accident report, Fla. Stat. § 316.066 (7), for the astonishing proposition that an accident report may not be used in a trial....

...n direct examination, whether there were any traffic citations issued. The officer answered affirmatively, though no mention of Cassidy was made in the jury's presence. Cassidy's statements to the officer were properly excluded after a proffer under section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...4th DCA 1991), in which the district court held that statements made by Norstrom, after he was informed of his Miranda [1] rights and signed a waiver form, were not admissible because the statements were made during the accident investigation phase of the incident and were, therefore, privileged under section 316.066, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988). The district court certified the following to be a question of great public importance: WHETHER STATEMENTS MADE IN THE COURSE OF A POST ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BY AN INDIVIDUAL IN POLICE CUSTODY ARE PRIVILEGED UNDER § 316.066, FLORIDA STATUTES, WHERE MIRANDA WARNINGS HAVE BEEN GIVEN AND THE INDIVIDUAL IS NOT TOLD THAT HE OR SHE IS REQUIRED TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS....

...some alcohol during the evening. The taped statements were played to the jury and included his acknowledgment that he understood his Miranda rights. The issue presented by the certified question is whether Norstrom's statements were privileged under section 316.066 in circumstances where: (1) the statements were made after Norstrom had been read his Miranda warnings and had signed a waiver form; (2) Norstrom had not been advised that, pursuant to section 316.066, he must answer questions pertaining to the accident; and (3) Norstrom's statements were made while the investigating officer was proceeding in the accident investigation phase of the incident, as distinguished from the criminal investigation of the incident....

...of Norstrom's statements. Id., 587 So.2d at 1151. More importantly, the district court held that another warning, in addition to the standard Miranda warning, is required before a voluntary statement by a defendant can be admitted without violating section 316.066. The district court stated that, "`unless a defendant has been apprised by police that the questions being asked are part of a criminal investigation, the statements made in response to those questions will be deemed privileged pursuant to § 316.066(4).'" Id....

...The district court concluded that the "statements [Norstrom] made while at the police station prior to the point at which Officer Lavoie `changed hats,' even though informed of his Miranda rights, fell within the accident investigation privilege." Id. 587 So.2d at 1151. The pertinent part of section 316.066, which sets forth the statutory privilege, reads as follows: *440 (4) Each accident report made by a person involved in an accident shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the...

...We clearly and emphatically hold that the purpose of the statute is to clothe with statutory immunity only such statements and communications as the driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in order to comply with his or her statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2)....

...The purpose of the United States Supreme court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), was to establish an effective means to inform accused persons of their rights, including their right to remain silent. The purpose of section 316.066(1) was to obtain information on accidents. The legislature established a statutory privilege under section 316.066(4) to ensure that accident information could be compelled without Fifth Amendment violations....

...The record establishes that Norstrom expressly waived his right to remain silent. Given the factual circumstances of this case, we find that the statements made by Norstrom were voluntary and that there was no Fifth Amendment violation. We hold that the privilege granted by section 316.066 is not applicable in this case where Norstrom was not told that he had to respond to the questions asked by the officers and where Norstrom was given his Miranda rights. Accordingly, we quash the decision of the district court on this issue. Furthermore, we also disapprove its prior decision in West v. State, 553 So.2d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). To clarify our decision, we emphasize that the privilege granted under section 316.066 is applicable if no Miranda warnings are given....

...Thus, we find that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel access to the personal notes and records of Officer James for the purposes of cross-examination. Plaintiff cross-appellee argues that the trial court was correct in prohibiting counsel from inspecting these documents because they are privileged pursuant to § 316.066, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., which bars the admission thereof into evidence. We disagree under the circumstances. Fla. Stat. § 316.066, F.S.A....

...along with it. So let's come back in about ten minutes. (Recess) THE COURT: Back on the record. Let me just make sure that I understand what we're addressing. We have had Mr. Halbach's statement that he made in opening read back, and Florida Statute 316.066 says that no accident report or statements made by any persons at an accident shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal....

...In reviewing such discretionary act, the appellate court should apply the Canakaris [2] reasonableness test. See Baptist Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bell, 384 So.2d 145, 146 (Fla.1980). Here, the argument in support of mistrial concerned opening statements which violated the provisions of section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Perry, 702 So.2d 294 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). The purpose of the statute is to clothe with statutory immunity the statements and communications that a driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in compliance with the statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2)....

...I mean, I think the Court has indicated our options; if we have a mistrial, we're looking at a year from now. I assume there's not another jury panel we can try to impanel this week. We're ready and here. I have one expert already in town, ready to go. [2] Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980). [3] Section 316.066(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: 316.066 Written reports of accidents.___ (1) The driver of a vehicle which is in any manner involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle or other property in an apparent amount of at least $500...

...v. Brassell, 347 So.2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). *752 The only explanation offered to rebut the presumption of negligence was the suggestion of the involvement of a "phantom vehicle;" this was based on an accident report, which was inadmissible under section 316.066, Florida Statutes, and on a police officer's opinion based on hearsay, which was likewise inadmissible....

...McClain, 508 So.2d 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), aff'd. 525 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1988). West correctly asserts that the admission into evidence of his prejudicial statements and admissions were violative of the accident investigation privilege set forth in § 316.066, Fla. Stat. (1987). § 316.066(4) provides in pertinent part: Each accident report made by a person involved in an accident shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the department or other state agencies having use of the records for accident prevention purposes ......

...vestigation has begun, courts have held that unless a defendant has been apprised by police that the questions being asked are part of a criminal investigation, the statements made in response to those questions will be deemed privileged pursuant to § 316.066(4)....

...ey). Because the police never apprised West of the distinction between the accident and criminal phases of the investigation, we hold that the statements at issue fall within the accident investigation privilege and are thus inadmissible pursuant to § 316.066(4)....

...Zyla, 486 F.2d 473 (1st Cir.1973). [4] Section 318.14, Florida Statutes. [5] See Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 803.18a, p. 520 note 7 (2d Ed. 1989). [6] See Boshnack v. Worldwide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 195 So.2d 216 (Fla. 1967); Stevens v. Duke, 42 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1949). [7] Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, constitutes a limitation on reports and statements made to law enforcement officers for the purpose of completing accident reports....

...He related that the second automobile was traveling approximately 50 miles per hour at the time, and that there were no skid marks or any other indications revealing that the vehicle's occupant had applied the brakes before striking his car. Given this testimony, and the fact that Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, precludes the use of accident reports "as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident ...", the court may well have considered the evidence was insufficient on the question of whether Brown was at fault....

...Subsequently, appellee filed two motions to suppress the statements she made to Trooper LaForte on August 27th at the American Legion Hall. The trial court suppressed appellee's statements on two grounds. First, the lower court determined that appellee's statements are privileged under Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982). Second, the court determined that the state's evidence is insufficient to establish the corpus delicti of the offenses charged in this case and therefore appellee's confession is not admissible against her. Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...As in this case, the state, in Ferguson, appealed a trial court order suppressing certain statements the appellee made during the investigation of a hit and run automobile accident which resulted in injury. In Ferguson, The sole question on appeal is whether Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1979) prohibits introduction in a criminal trial of statements made by an alleged hit and run driver to investigating police officers....

...case, appellee, reported a different alleged accident than the hit and run out of which the instant charges arise. Under the circumstances here, the statements appellee made regarding an accident which she was not reporting are not privileged under Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...The purpose of this statute is to promote candor in the making of accident reports. This purpose is not achieved where a person, rather than candidly reporting one accident, reports another in an attempt to conceal her involvement in the one. It was error to determine that Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...the tractor owner, W.E. Schlechter and Sons, Inc., was liable for negligently entrusting the vehicle to him. The case was tried twice. At the first trial, the court excluded evidence of the blood alcohol test results, considering it privileged under section 316.066, Florida Statutes, as part of the accident report....

...The jury returned a verdict in favor of the appellees. Appellants first contend that the final rest diagram and reconstruction diagram were part of a traffic homicide report and thus were inadmissible pursuant to the accident report privilege contained in § 316.066. Section 316.066(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), provides in part that: Every law enforcement officer who in the regular course of duty investigates a motor vehicle accident: 1....

...." See also White v. Kiser, 368 So.2d 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Tangible evidence of an automobile accident, such as location of accident, vehicle locations, skid marks and damage to vehicle observed by the investigating officer, are not confidential pursuant to § 316.066 and may be admitted into evidence by the investigating officer in an action arising from the accident....

...Brown, the driver of the Mustang. Because some of the information used to construct the diagrams was not based on first-hand knowledge and was based in part on the testimony of a driver of one of the vehicles involved in the accident, the diagrams were privileged under § 316.066 and it was error to admit them into evidence....

...ts' witnesses and being consistent with appellees' version of the accident. For this reason, we cannot agree that the error should be treated as harmless. See Dinowitz v. Weinrub, 493 So.2d 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), in which it was held a violation of § 316.066 to admit an officer's testimony that a map he had drawn, which was based on the statement of the driver, indicated that the vehicle struck the pedestrian on the road rather than on the grass....

...The appellee cross-appeals from the trial court's refusal to suppress the results of a breathalyzer test given to her during the investigation. The appellee was charged by information with vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injuries. The sole question on appeal is whether Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1979) prohibits introduction in a criminal trial of statements made by an alleged hit and run driver to investigating police officers....

...In support of suppression she asserted that the police *296 never advised the appellee of the fact that the police investigation was related to a criminal charge, but rather they informed her that their questioning related only to an accident investigation. The appellee therefore contended that Section 316.066(4) mandated suppression of her statements. Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1979) reads: (4) All accident reports made by persons involved in accidents shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the department or other state agencie...

...tection than is constitutionally required for other criminal suspects. Section 316.065, Florida Statutes, (1979) provides that the drivers of all vehicles involved in traffic accidents shall make immediate reports of these accidents to local police. Section 316.066(4) allows persons making such reports to enjoy the privilege of confidentiality in their reports....

...The appellee was a suspect for the crime of leaving the scene of an accident rather than an accident participant who merely was performing her statutory duty of reporting. As the Supreme Court stated in State v. Coffey, 212 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1968), [while interpreting the substantially identical statutory predecessor of Section 316.066, Section 317.171, Florida Statutes (1967)]: And we think that these circumstances are ample to take the evidence of the results of the blood test out from under the protective cloak of Sec....

...nnocence is concerned. In our opinion, he is entitled to the same constitutional safeguards as any other person suspected of or charged with a crime — no more and no less. See also, State v. Mitchell, 245 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1971). Because we find that Section 316.066(4) does not operate to confer its privilege of confidentiality on those who have abandoned their duties after involvement in an accident, and who choose instead to leave the scene of an accident, we hold that the trial court erred in suppressing the statements of the defendant....

...A court’s erroneous interpretation of these authorities is subject to de novo review.” Id. (quoting McCray v. State, 919 So.2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)). Here, the trial court’s ruling on *508 the accident report privilege was an incorrect interpretation of the law. Section 316.066(5), Florida Statutes (2010) 1 , provides: Except as specified in this subsection, each crash report made by a person involved in a crash and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing...

...However, the statutes requiring an accident report and the case law interpreting those statutes demonstrate that the privilege only applies to a driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle because those are the only people compelled to make a report under the statutes. See § 316.066(1) (requiring a driver to make a report when involved in a crash where there is bodily injury, death, or damage to a vehicle); § 316.062(1) (requiring a driver to give his or her information to a police officer upon request when a crash r...

...Boles, 452 So.2d 540, 544 (Fla.1984) (“We clearly and emphatically hold that the purpose of the statute is to clothe with statutory immunity only such statements and communications as the driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in order to comply with his or her statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2).”); S.G.K. v. State, 657 So.2d 1246, 1247-48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (concluding that section 316.066(3)(a) does not require “witnesses to the accident to stay at the scene or report to investigating officers” (citing §§ 316.061, 316.062, 316.066(3)(a), Fla....

...Edge, 397 So.2d 939 , 942 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); and Lobree v. Caporossi, 139 So.2d 510, 512-13 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962))). The Estate argues that the accident report privilege applies to the witnesses in this case because they were “involved in the crash” as required by section 316.066(5)....

...licable statute. See Benyard v. Wainwright, 322 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1975) ("Substantive law prescribes the duties and rights.... Procedural law concerns the means and method to apply and enforce those duties and rights.”). The legislature amended section 316.066 in 2011 and subsection (5) was renumbered and is now subsection (4)....

...Defendant was charged with driving under the influence in violation of section 316.193, Florida Statutes ("DUI"). At trial, the county court excluded from evidence all statements made by the defendant during the accident investigation, holding that such statements were inadmissible under the accident report privilege. See § 316.066(4), Fla....

...The state has petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The crux of the state's argument is that the legislature's 1991 amendments to chapter 316, Florida Statutes, [3] had the effect of eliminating any requirement for a citizen to make an accident report under section 316.066, Florida Statutes....

...Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435-42, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3147-51, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 331-36 (1984), the state urges that the defendant's admission about drinking should not have been suppressed. We do not agree with the state's analysis. Subsections 316.066(1) and (2), Florida Statutes require the driver of a vehicle which has been involved in any manner in an accident to make an accident report if the accident resulted in bodily injury or death, or damage in an apparent amount of at least $500....

...[4] Because the driver is required to report, the statute excludes from evidence "each accident report made by a person involved in an accident and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing an accident report required by this section ..." Id. § 316.066(4)....

...Boles, 452 So.2d 540, 544 (Fla.1984). "[T]he purpose of the statute is to clothe with statutory immunity only such statements and communications as the driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in order to comply with his or her statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2)." Id. Once the accident investigation ends and the criminal investigation begins, the accident report privilege is not applicable. However, because subsections 316.066(1) and (2) create a statutory duty to make statements during the accident investigation, it is necessary for there to be clear advice to the reporting person at roadside that the criminal investigation has begun and that the reporting person now has a right to remain silent....

...[5] The state acknowledges that the foregoing was the customary procedure prior to the 1991 amendments to chapter 316. The state argues, however, that the rules have changed as a result of two 1991 amendments to chapter 316. First, in 1991 the legislature inserted an exception into the part of section 316.066 which creates the accident report privilege. Immediately after the portion of the statute which states that "no such report or statement shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal," id. § 316.066(4), the legislature added the following: "However, subject to the applicable rules of evidence, a law enforcement officer at a criminal trial may testify as to any statement made to the officer by the person involved in the accident if that person's privilege against self-incrimination is not violated." Id. § 316.066(4) (Supp....

...Before questioning Norstrom the police officers advised him of his Miranda rights. Norstrom then waived his rights and made statements. Prior to trial Norstrom argued that his statements should be excluded from evidence under the accident report privilege of subsection 316.066(4)....

...make the statement for the purpose of complying with the duty to furnish an accident report and the statement is not privileged." Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 501.2, at 239 (1996 ed.) (footnote omitted). In sum, the 1991 amendment to subsection 316.066(4) created a limited exception to the accident privilege for criminal cases. The 1991 amendment did not change the fact that subsections 316.066(1) and (2) still require drivers to make accident reports. Subsection 316.066(4) carries forward the accident report privilege which remains fully operative, unless the statement made by the reporting person during the accident investigation is made after a waiver of Miranda rights or is otherwise not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. § 316.066(4). The state's second argument is based on another part of the 1991 legislative amendments to chapter 316. In addition to amending section 316.066, which covers accident reports, the 1991 legislature also *723 amended section 316.062, which imposes a duty to give information and render aid after an accident....

...to information which would violate the privilege of such person against self-incrimination." Id. § 316.062(3); ch. 91-255, § 13, Laws of Florida. [8] The state argues that this amendment to section 316.062 should be interpreted as also applying to section 316.066. The state urges that upon reading subsection 316.062(3) into section 316.066, it follows that a driver is no longer required to make a report or say anything to the investigating officer....

...[9] We do not think that the state's analysis is a plausible interpretation of the 1991 statutory amendments. The 1991 amendments to chapter 316 were enacted in chapter 91-255, Laws of Florida. That piece of legislation added provisions regarding self-incrimination to both section 316.062 and section 316.066, Florida Statutes—and used different language in each case....

...mation and render aid, the legislature added the limitation that there would be no duty to make a report or give information which would violate the privilege against self-incrimination. § 316.062(3), Fla.Stat. However, when the legislature amended section 316.066, it also addressed the subject of self-incrimination, but used different and far *724 more restrained language. The legislature amended the very subsection which creates the accident report privilege—subsection 316.066(4)—and in so doing stated that the law enforcement officer at a criminal trial "may testify as to any statement made to the officer by the person involved in the accident if that person's privilege against self-incrimination is not violated." Tellingly, the legislature chose not to amend subsections 316.066(1) and (2), both of which compel drivers to make accident reports. Furthermore, the 1991 exception to the accident report privilege set forth in subsection 316.066(4) only applies to criminal cases, not civil cases. Plainly if the 1991 legislature wanted to eliminate, or limit, the duty to report set forth in subsections 316.066(1) and (2), the legislature knew very well how to revise or amend those sections. The legislature did not do so. Instead, it left intact the longstanding duty to report, and created a very limited exception relating to the privilege against self-incrimination. We conclude that the accident report privilege of section 316.066 remains intact, but has been modified by the 1991 exception contained in subsection 316.066(4)....

...[5] We reach this conclusion as a matter of Florida law. Of course, if at the end of the accident investigation the investigating officer places the defendant under custodial arrest, then Miranda warnings would be required in any event. [6] As amended, subsection 316.066(4) provides in full: (4) Except as specified in this subsection, each accident report made by a person involved in an accident and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing an acciden...

...It should be noted, however, that if, among the witnesses' statements referred to, there were the statement of the deputy driver given in compliance with the statute requiring an accident report, such statement is immune from discovery (except as to its existence). See, Fla. Stat. § 316.066 (formerly § 317.131, 317.171)....

...Shortly after the accident Deputy Sheriff Jon McDonough arrived on the scene and proceeded with a traffic accident investigation. Immediately thereafter Detective Walsh arrived and proceeded to assist McDonough with the investigation. McDonough interrogated Ackerman to obtain information for his accident report, required by Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...f Walsh's testimony is the judicial error assigned for review. The parties don't agree on the point involved in this appeal. However, the issue as we see it is whether the proffered testimony was admissible in evidence or whether it was protected by Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1975). Appellant contends that McDonough was at the scene to investigate the accident and to make the Section 316.066 report but that Walsh was there to conduct the criminal investigation, if such an investigation were called for....

...nal investigation — in fact, his conduct there was in part assisting McDonough with the accident investigation. However, that is not decisive of the real point in the case. Ackerman was required by law to make a report of the accident §§ 316.062; 316.066; 316.068 (1975). As a consequence of that statutory mandate he was entitled to the protection of § 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1975), which makes such report inadmissible as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of the accident....

...Duke, 42 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1949). That protection does not apply with regard to a voluntary statement made during the course of an investigation of the criminal aspects of an accident. The same officer may conduct both the accident investigation for the § 316.066 report and the criminal investigation or different officers may be involved....

...The solution to the problem presented in these cases is relatively simple. Law enforcement officers investigating accidents must be aware of the ramifications associated with taking statements from drivers in accident cases. When the investigation conducted to make the 316.066 report is concluded and the investigation into possible criminal aspects of the accident commences the driver should be advised of that fact....

...Johnson dealt with the statutory precursor to subsection 395.041(4) and held that, to insure the reliability and efficacy of the required reports, they should not be used in litigation. TMRMC further argues that subsection 395.041(4) is analogous to subsection 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1985), involving accident reports, which states that "[n]o such report shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident." This Court has previously held that statements contained in accident reports compiled under section 316.066 may not be used for impeachment....

...DUI traffic citation, intoxilyzer print card, and the probable cause affidavit. Silva sought administrative review of the suspension. At the review hearing, Silva objected to the Department's use of the crash report, alleging it was privileged under section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...Favino, 667 So.2d at 308. Accordingly, we grant the Department's petition and quash the circuit court's order reinstating Silva's driving privilege. FULMER and WHATLEY, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (2000) provides: Except as specified in this subsection, each crash report made by a person involved in a crash and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing a cr...

...A motorcycle was lying in the roadway, and the body of the motorcyclist was lying near the truck. Heaton was advised at the scene that Calvin Burks, standing outside the truck, had been the driver of the truck. Heaton conducted a traffic investigation in order to complete an accident report as required by section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...We have an appeal and cross-appeal from a final judgment entered after jury trial in a tort action arising from a motor vehicle accident. As to the issues raised on appeal, we affirm. Specifically, the record supports the trial court's decision finding section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1993), inapplicable to statements made by defendant Ronald Perry at the accident scene....

...If it has been made in preparation for trial, the statement's substance would be protected per Cotton States and cases cited therein. As for the written statement, those statements made to investigating police officers are privileged by operation of Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1983): (4) Each accident report made by a person involved in an accident shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the department or other state agencies h...

...Marshall, 695 So.2d 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), in which the court certified direct conflict with State v. Riley, 617 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, sections 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. In construing section 316.066, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), this Court has stated: To clarify our decision, we emphasize that the privilege granted under section 316.066 is applicable if no Miranda warnings are given....

...The driver was later given a breathalyzer test on an intoximeter. The intoximeter reading was .13% and this was admitted into evidence. Plaintiff was precluded by the trial court from introducing in evidence the results of the field sobriety test on the ground that same was privileged pursuant to section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1975). The district court held that this was error. We disagree and quash the decision of the District Court of Appeal. Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1975), requires that the driver of a vehicle which is involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury forward a written report of such accident within 5 days thereafter to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, but excuses that requirement when the investigating officer has made a written report of the accident. As to such report, section 316.066(4) provides that "All accident reports made by persons involved in accidents shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting......

...Coffey and Mitchell also dealt with a physical test, namely, a chemical test to determine the amount of alcohol in the blood, as a means of determining intoxication. The results of the blood alcohol tests in those cases were held by this Court to be admissible in evidence, not because the statutory exclusion afforded by section 316.066(4) did not extend to a non-testimonial communication, but because the blood tests were not given in connection with the accident report phase of the investigation....

...The field sobriety test is also a physical test to determine facts bearing on sobriety and intoxication. The results of a field sobriety test by the investigating officer during the accident report phase of the investigation are within the protective mantle of section 316.066(4) and were properly excluded by the trial judge....

...ed was taken by the investigating officer for the purpose of making his accident report and formed a basis for that report. 245 So.2d at 623. The field sobriety test in question meets that test and accordingly, we hold that the privilege provided by section 316.066 attaches to the information given by Sobolewski in response to the request by the investigating officer to perform the field sobriety test and was properly excluded by the trial judge....

...of agility, be clothed with the protective mantle of statutory immunity, notwithstanding that those observations may later be reduced to writing and become part of the accident report." 391 So.2d at 702. I would not extend the protective immunity of section 316.066(4) to any nontestimonial communication other than chemical tests for alcohol which, as pointed out by the district court, are now governed by section 322.261....

...ur suspension of Steven A. Corbin, a state highway patrol trooper, and awarding him a reasonable attorney's fee and costs. In this case we are asked to determine whether the hearing officer and PERC correctly applied the "accident report privilege," section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), to bar use of the trooper's report of his own accident against him in disciplinary proceedings by the agency....

...According to Sexton's proffered testimony, Corbin had told him that it was very foggy in patches on Highway 90 and throughout the county that morning. Corbin prevailed before both the hearing officer and PERC. On appeal, the agency asserts that it was error to permit Corbin to invoke the accident report privilege. Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), requires the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury, death, or property damage totalling $100 or more to forward within five days a written report of the accident to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. This requirement is excused when the investigating officer himself makes a written report of the accident. As to such report, section 316.066(4) provides in pertinent part: Each accident report made by a person involved in an accident shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the department or other state agencies *871 having use of the records for accident prevention purposes, ......

...plicable in the present case and that PERC's contrary statement was made gratuitously and merely in passing, in light of its determination that the case was controlled by Model Rule 28-5.304. The purpose of the accident report privilege contained in section 316.066(4) is to encourage people to make a true report of the accident in order to facilitate the ascertainment of the cause of accidents, thus furthering the state's ultimate goal of making the highways safer for all of society....

...against himself unless he has been granted immunity from federal and state use of the compelled testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution against him. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 20 L.Ed.2d 1082, 88 S.Ct. 1913 (1968). Section 316.066 compels the driver of an automobile involved in an accident *872 to provide potentially self-incriminating testimony as to the circumstances surrounding the accident, but it also immunizes the testimony from subsequent use in a criminal prosecution against the driver. If the protection provided in section 316.066(4) was no broader than the privilege against self-incrimination, we would be persuaded by appellant's argument....

...Jorandby, Public Defender, and Paul E. Petillo, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee/cross-appellant. WARNER, Judge. We affirm the trial court's order granting suppression of appellee's statements made at the scene of an automobile accident. Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1993), as amended in 1989, provides for a privilege to individuals who are questioned by officers conducting an accident investigation....

...ies. We affirm the dismissal of the subject complaint. In our view, Dade County owed no underlying common law or statutory duty of due care to the plaintiffs to fill out the subject accident report accurately. Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1985) [1] , which authorizes the preparation of accident reports, was enacted to benefit the public as a whole, not, as urged, to benefit the victims of accidents so that said victims can pursue civil suits. Indeed, such reports are generally for the confidential use of responsible state agencies in accident prevention planning. See § 316.066(4), Fla....

...But see Fischer v. Travelers Insurance Co., 429 So.2d 538 (La. Ct. App.), cert. not considered, untimely, 433 So.2d 159 (La. 1983) (liability found for negligent report preparation). Beyond that, we are dubious as to whether the county's employee violated Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1985), by not securing the name and address of the driver, owner and insurer of the ice cream truck....

...o statement was made to him by other witnesses at the scene which would contradict Mrs. Maliszewski's statement that her lights were on. Appellant contends that statements made by Brian Tucker to the investigating police officer are privileged under section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1981), which says, in pertinent part: All accident reports made by persons involved in accidents shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the department o...

...ecall him saying was that one second he didn't see the car or the lights and the next second he saw the lights and the car. He told me it seemed to suddenly appear." On appeal plaintiff alleges, because of the evidence exclusionary rule contained in section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1981), it was reversible error to permit defense counsel to cross-examine Brian as to his statement to the police officer and to cross-examine the police officer as to Brian's statement to the officer....

...achieved, without permitting an exclusion to thwart truth-seeking at trials by preventing cross-examination as to, and admissibility of, prior inconsistent statements offered to impeach false testimony. In summary, the violation of the exclusion in section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1981), to the extent that it did not contradict or impeach Brian but produced testimony more favorable to the plaintiff, was harmless error; on the other hand, to the extent the violation did contradict and impea...

...t-witness requirement “was unique” because "[s]ince its inception, the Committee believed its jurisdiction was limited to provisions of the Evidence Code” and noting that, for example, “the many amendments to the accident report privilege in section 316.066 and the rape shield statute in section 794,022 were never within scope of the [C]ommittee’s recommendations”)....

...At his trial in county court, Officer Randall of the Ocala Police Department testified as to Edwards' physical condition and appearance at the scene of the accident. Edwards objected to this testimony claiming it was privileged and therefore inadmissible pursuant to section 316.066, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982). This section provides in relevant part as follows: 316.066 Written reports of accidents....

...basis for that report. Finally, in Duval Motor Co. v. Woodward, 419 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1982), the court held that the results of a field sobriety test by the investigating officer during the accident report phase of the investigation were protected by section 316.066(4)....

...We clearly and emphatically hold that the purpose of the statute is to clothe with statutory immunity only such statements and communications as the driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in order to comply with his or her statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2)....

...is no longer viable. Rather the only question is whether the disputed testimony involves "statements and communications *554 as the driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in order to comply with his or her statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2)." According to the order of the circuit court, Officer Randall's testimony was as follows: 1....

...Likewise, the field sobriety test is not a communication protected by the statute. Since the disputed testimony does not involve "statements" or "communications" that Edwards was compelled to make in order to comply with his statutory duty, its use was not prohibited by section 316.066(4)....

...See State v. Allen, 335 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1976); County of Dade v. Pedigo, 181 So.2d 720 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). Petition for writ of certiorari GRANTED and the order of the circuit court is QUASHED. DAUKSCH and COWART, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Brackin construed section 316.066 in effect in 1981. The statute in effect in the present case was amended to specifically provide that the results of breath, urine and blood tests administered as provided in chapter 316 do not fall within the confidentiality privilege. § 316.066(4), Fla....

...de the state from introducing testimony regarding his drinking on the night of the accident. He maintained that any testimony about drinking would not be relevant. The court denied the motion. Appellant argues that his statement was privileged under section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1988) because it was made for purposes of an accident investigation. Section 316.066 (1988) provides, in part: Each accident report made by a person involved in an accident shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the department or other state agencies having use of the records for accident prevention purposes......

...We clearly and emphatically hold that the purpose of the statute is to clothe with statutory immunity only such statements and communications as the driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in order to comply with his or her statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2)....

...4th DCA 1989), this court, citing to Brackin, held it to be reversible error for the trial court to allow testimony of the investigating officer that appellant advised him at the scene that he had consumed six or seven beers. Admitting such testimony violated section 316.066(4)....

...vestigation has begun, courts have held that unless a defendant has been apprised by police that the questions being asked are part of a criminal investigation, the statements made in response to those questions will be deemed privileged pursuant to § 316.066(4)....

...* * * * * * Because the police never apprised West of the distinction between the accident and criminal phases of the investigation, we hold that the statements at issue fall within the accident investigation privilege and are thus inadmissible pursuant to § 316.066(4)....

...The judgment and sentence are reversed. We remand for a new trial. We certify the following question to the supreme court: WHETHER STATEMENTS MADE IN THE COURSE OF A POST ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BY AN INDIVIDUAL IN POLICE CUSTODY ARE PRIVILEGED UNDER § 316.066, FLORIDA STATUTES, WHERE MIRANDA WARNINGS HAVE BEEN GIVEN AND THE INDIVIDUAL IS NOT TOLD THAT HE OR SHE IS REQUIRED TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS....

...LETTS, J., concurring specially with opinion. LETTS, Judge, concurring specially. This is a case of some notoriety and I concur specially to reiterate that this is not a drunk-driving case. The appellant's blood alcohol content was zero. As to the statute, section 316.066, unequivocally commands that an accident report by an involved person cannot be used as evidence in any trial arising out of that accident, I question the value of such legislation....

...Roselli of Law Offices of Krupnick and Campbell, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants. Mary Anne Philips of Dickman, Green and Murphy, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. GLICKSTEIN, Judge. This is an appeal by the plaintiff from an adverse jury verdict. We reverse. The bases for our reversal are that there was a failure to adhere to section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1983); and that the error occasioned thereby was harmful. Section 316.066(4) provides: Each accident report made by a person involved in an accident shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the department or other state agencies having use of the rec...

...ently of Mr. Walton's statements. For this reason, we do not address whether the State could establish the corpus delicti of the offense of driving while license suspended or revoked. The applicability of the accident report privilege established in section 316.066(7) to Mr....

...the test. An analysis of the blood sample taken at the hospital revealed a content of alcohol by weight at .30 percent. [2] The order granting appellee's motion to suppress was based on what the trial judge perceived to be the privilege accorded by section 316.066, Florida Statutes, and the application to the facts of this case of the following cases: Cooper v....

...So long as there is not an affirmative refusal to take the test. Sambrine v. State, 386 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1980). Even the failure to advise the driver of his right to refuse is no impediment to the lawful administration of the test. Id. With certain very limited exceptions, the privilege accorded by section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1979), and its predecessors applies only to "statements" the driver is compelled to make in order to comply with his statutory duty and the statute, being in derogation of common law, must be strictly construed "in...

...ion of the following question as one of great public importance: WHETHER STATEMENTS MADE IN THE COURSE OF A POST ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BY AN INDIVIDUAL NOT IN POLICE CUSTODY AND NOT GIVEN WARNINGS PURSUANT TO MIRANDA V. ARIZONA ARE PRIVILEGED UNDER SECTION 316.066, FLORIDA STATUTES (1991)....

...Riley filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test and a motion to suppress the statements made under the accident report privilege. The court denied the motion to suppress the results of the blood test but granted the motion to suppress the statements. The county court reasoned that the 1991 amendment to section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, did not change the pre-amendment case law requirement that a law enforcement officer must apprise a defendant when the officer's questions are part of a criminal investigation, so that a defendant may understand that his answers to the officer's questions are no longer privileged. The county court also certified the aforementioned question as one of great public importance. We accepted jurisdiction. Prior to July 1, 1991, section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, commonly known as the accident report privilege, provided in part: [E]ach accident report made by a person involved in an accident and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpos...

...We clearly and emphatically hold that the purpose of the statute is to clothe with statutory immunity only such statements and communications as the driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in order to comply with his or her statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2)....

...1st DCA 1988). But see Alley v. State, 553 So.2d 354 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), rev. denied, 563 So.2d 634 (Fla. 1990), and West v. State, 553 So.2d 254, 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), disapproved, State v. Norstrom, 613 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1993). The legislature amended section 316.066(4) in 1991 by adding the underlined language: [E]ach accident report made by a person involved in an accident and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing an accident report required by this section shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting....

...that Riley's statements must be suppressed. We note that the supreme court has now disapproved West and overruled the Fourth District's decision in Norstrom. State v. Norstrom, supra. In Norstrom, the supreme court dealt with the pre-1991 version of section 316.066(4), but found nonetheless that the proper inquiry should be upon whether the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were violated. 613 So.2d at 439. According to the Norstrom court, the purpose of the statutory privilege under section 316.066(4) is "to ensure that accident information could be compelled without Fifth Amendment violations." Id....

...ase Riley was not. This distinction is of questionable significance, however, because Riley was not in custody. We hold that pursuant to the supreme court's decision in Norstrom, and certainly by virtue of the 1991 amendments to sections 316.062 and 316.066, the court must focus upon the question of whether the defendant's constitutional right to be free from self incrimination has been violated....

...rights. The case of Brackin v. Boles, 452 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1984) dealt with the admissibility of blood alcohol tests in a civil proceeding. The trial court and district court of appeal held that the results were inadmissable as being privileged under section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...However, if the motorist is subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody," then he is entitled to the protection provided by Miranda. Moreover, any statements made by petitioner to a police officer for purposes of completing an accident report would be privileged and, thus, inadmissible. Brackin. See § 316.066(4), Fla....

...Although Johnson states in dictum that it is against the legislative intent to use incident reports in litigation, the case does not discuss the use of reports for impeachment purposes, and thus is not helpful as to the point raised. Appellants also argue that Section 395.041, Florida Statutes, is analogous to Section 316.066, Florida Statutes, involving automobile accident reports, which states that "[n]o such report shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident... ." Although Section 316.066, Florida Statutes, provides for very limited disclosure of some information, it does not say that an automobile accident report is discoverable; thus, the plain language of this statute is essentially different from section 395.041....

...Similarly, we hold that the trial court's allowing Trooper See to testify regarding appellant's statements made to him at the scene was error, though harmless error. Appellant correctly argues that the statement made to Trooper See was privileged under section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, and that the supreme court's decision in Brackin v....

...The rule against disclosing "who got the ticket" cannot be extended to prohibit the offering of otherwise proper expert testimony by a law enforcement officer in a traffic accident case. The estate next argues that the expert testimony should have been excluded under the accident report privilege of subsection 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...We distinguish that case because the Florida Supreme Court's later pronouncements in Marshall and State v. Norstrom, 613 So.2d 437, 440-41 (Fla.1993), are controlling and supersede Hammond to the extent of any inconsistency. In Marshall the court said: To clarify our decision, we emphasize that the privilege granted under section 316.066 is applicable if no Miranda warnings are given....

...Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Company, 404 So.2d 802 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Second, there is an exception to the privilege and confidentiality of an accident report, filed pursuant to Chapter 316 of the Florida Statutes (1981), when the identity of the driver is an issue. See Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Next, we consider it to be reversible error for the trial court to allow, over objection, the testimony of the investigating officer that appellant advised him at the scene that he had consumed six or seven beers but was not impaired nor at fault. Such testimony violates section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, making such statement privileged....

...ficer at the accident scene. It is true that in Duval Motor Co. v. Woodward, 419 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1982), the Supreme Court found that the results of field sobriety tests were not admissible when obtained for use in an accident report made pursuant to Section 316.066(1), Florida Statutes (1983). Section 316.066(4) provides that no such report "shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident......

...1984), the Court reversed previous holdings and found that "the results of a blood alcohol test are admissible in a civil trial regardless of whether the test was made for purposes of an accident report investigation... ." It found that the test was not a communication protected by Section 316.066(4)....

...During the interview, Cino admitted to driving the vehicle, and admitted that he had just left a bar at which he had consumed four or five beers. Cino moved to suppress these post-Mi randa statements on the legal theory that the accident report privilege set forth in section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (2002), prohibited Sergeant Buster from legally sharing any information derived during his traffic investigation with Officer Munn....

...Sergeant Buster, in effect, illegally telling Officer Munn everything he knew as a result of his accident investigation.” The county judge then dismissed the information. On appeal, the circuit court upheld the trial judge’s ruling, holding inter alia, that section 316.066(4) barred the State (including any investigating officer) from relying upon Sergeant Buster’s observation that Cino exhibited slurred speech and smelled of alcohol, or upon the other driver’s statements to Sergeant Buster placing Cino behind the wheel of a vehicle. Contrary to the circuit court’s decision, section 316.066(4) only prohibits the State from using as evidence at trial either the crash report or statements made to law enforcement during a traffic investigation by persons involved in the crash....

...Therefore, an observation of a defendant’s speech patterns does not implicate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege, nor does an observation as to any other physical trait of the accident scene or person. Id. The second mistake of law made by the circuit court was in holding that section 316.066(4) barred the State from using statements made to law enforcement during the traffic investigation by persons other than Cino in its prosecution of Cino. In 1991, the Legislature added the following language to section 316.066(4): “However, subject to the applicable rules of evidence, a law enforcement officer at a criminal trial may testify as to any statement made to the officer by the person involved in the crash if that person’s privilege against self-incrimination is not violated.” Chapter 91-255, § 14, Laws of Florida....

...rsion of the statute which allowed anyone to object to the state’s attempt to use at trial any person’s statements to an officer investigating a traffic accident. Under the newer version of the statute, a law enforcement officer is not barred by section 316.066(4) from testifying at a criminal trial regarding statements made to him during his traffic investigation by anyone other than the defendant on trial (because doing so would in no way violate the non-defendant declarant’s privilege against self-incrimination). 4 The State also argues that the circuit court erred in holding that section 316.066(4) bars the State from using Cino’s compelled statements against him during its investigation, or at any pre-trial proceeding....

...However, the Constitution prohibits the State from making any use of Cino’s compelled statements against him, either directly or derivatively. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). The purpose of the section 316.066(4) accident report privilege is to ensure that the state does not violate an individual’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination when he or she is compelled to truthfully report to law enforcement the facts surrounding an automobile accident....

...Consequently, our Supreme Court has held that the statute “clothe[s] with statutory immunity only such statements and communications as the driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in order to comply with his or her statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2).” Id....

...not Deveau was negligent. Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of no liability as to all appellees. Rierson sought a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. This appeal ensued. ANALYSIS 1 Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (2018) provides: “Except as specified in this subsection, each crash report made by a person involved in a crash and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing a...

...IV. Defendant contends that the result should be otherwise on account of State v. Marshall, 695 So.2d 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), opinion adopted, 695 So.2d 686, 687 (Fla.1997). That case interpreted the accident report privilege and stated: Subsections 316.066(1) and (2), Florida Statutes require the driver of a vehicle which has been involved in any manner in an accident to make an accident report if the accident resulted in bodily injury or death, or damage in an apparent amount of at least $500....

...Because the driver is required to report, the statute excludes from evidence “each accident report made by a person involved in an accident and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing an accident report required by this section ...” Id. § 316.066(4)....

...Boles, 452 So.2d 540, 544 (Fla.1984). “[Tjhe purpose of the statute is to clothe with statutory immunity only such statements and communications as the driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in order to comply with his or her statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2).” Id. Once the accident investigation ends and the criminal investigation begins, the accident report privilege is not applicable. However, because subsections 316.066(1) and (2) create a statutory duty to make statements during the accident investigation, it is necessary for there to be clear advice to the reporting person at roadside that the criminal investigation has begun and that the reporting person now has a right to remain silent....

...While a number of arguments were advanced by the defense, one in particular deserves consideration. Mr. Vedner argued below that since Officer Thomson was in charge of the accident investigation and Officer Drummond was in charge of the homicide investigation, section. 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1999), would prohibit the use of statements made in the course of an accident investigation, and the interviews should be suppressed....

...redacted), were admitted into evidence. The jury found Mr. Vedner guilty as charged. Mr. Ved-ner was not sentenced for the vehicular homicide, but received a lengthy prison term for the other charges. This appeal followed. LEGAL ANALYSIS Subsections 316.066(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1999), require the driver of a vehicle that has been involved in an accident to make a written report of the crash, if the accident involves bodily injury or death of any person or property damage of at least $500....

...Norstrom, 613 So.2d 437, 440 (Fla.1993); Brackin v. Boles, 452 So.2d 540, 544 (Fla.1984). The application of these principles has generated a significant number of appellate opinions. Norstrom is of particular interest because it summarizes the interplay between section 316.066 and the Fifth Amendment....

...His statements were made, however, while the police officer was involved in the accident investigation phase, as opposed to the criminal investigation phase. The supreme court held that the statements were voluntary and that there was no Fifth Amendment violation, saying that: [W]e emphasize that the privilege granted under section 316.066 is applicable if no Miranda warnings are given....

...Norstrom, 613 So.2d at 440-41 ; see also State v. Marshall, 695 So.2d 686 (Fla.1997). From these cases a number of general propositions can be extracted. First, it is clear that statements made pursuant to the requirement to give information for a crash report required by section 316.066 may not be used as evidence in civil, criminal or administrative proceedings....

...none. What is troubling, of course, is that the interview was conducted, at least in part, in connection with the accident investigation. This fact alone, however, does not under Nor-strom and Marshall vitiate the admissibility of his statements. Subsection 316.066(4) provides that no crash report or statement made to a law enforcement officer for completing a crash report shall be used as evidence in any trial....

...t and issuing a citation prior to the invitation to accompany her upstairs. In addition to the foregoing, we note that the officer investigating a traffic accident has a duty to expeditiously complete and file written accident reports in many cases, Section 316.066(3)(a) Florida Statutes....

...*355 We affirm as to all issues [2] but one. We address whether appellant's statements at the scene and later at a medical clinic were given during the accident report phase of the investigation and, therefore, privileged and statutorily inadmissible. § 316.066(4), Fla.Stats....

...nder the influence. The only basis of the officer's conclusion that Perry was driving the second car was Perry's admission made during the accident investigation. In overturning the license suspension, the three judge circuit court panel relied upon section 316.066(4)....

...Thus, the findings of the hearing officer suspending Perry's license were not supported by competent substantial evidence. The Department contends the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law in applying the accident report privilege in section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, to an administrative license suspension hearing....

...The District Court of Appeal held that PERC properly applied the model rules (28-5.304) under the provisions of section 120.54(1), Florida Statutes, in finding the statements privileged. The court in Corbin stressed the legislative intent in passing section 316.066(4) was to encourage true and uninhibited reporting of accidents, with the ultimate goal of making highways safer for all users of them....

...Weinbaum, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jonathan Tanoos, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before SHEPHERD, ROTHENBERG and SCALES, JJ. SHEPHERD, J.  The issue in this case is whether section 316.066(4) of the Florida Statutes (2012), which excludes from evidence in any civil or criminal trial statements made by a “person involved in an [automobile] crash ....

...For the reasons discussed in State v. Ferguson, 405 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) and Cummings v. State, 780 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), which we acknowledge treated earlier versions of the same statutory scheme, we hold that the accident privilege in section 316.066(4) does not confer any benefit or privilege on a person who abandons her duty to remain at the scene of any automobile accident which results in death, and who chooses instead to leave the scene of an accident, contrary to section...

...ed the first impact (which he did subsequently testify to). Thus, Durse did not have to move for a mistrial in order to preserve; the issue was preserved because part of Durse's objection was overruled. Regarding Florida's accident report privilege, section 316.066(7), Florida Statutes (2007), provides in pertinent part: Except as specified in this subsection, each crash report made by a person involved in a crash and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose...

..."Because some of the information used to construct the diagrams was not based on first-hand knowledge and was based in part on the testimony of a driver of one of the vehicles involved in the accident," the First District held that "the diagrams were privileged under § 316.066 and it was error to admit them into evidence." Id....

...n the meaning of Nationwide, the lowered final amount of his medical bills. The trial court erred by excluding the medical bills showing the full amount of the charges. Reversed and Remanded for a New Trial. WARNER and CONNER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 316.066(7), Fla....

4th DCA 1984). The privilege derives from section 316.066, Florida Statutes (2006), which under certain

...However, the right to discovery is not absolute. Rule 1.280(b)(1) precludes discovery regarding any matter that is privileged. Florida law recognizes privileges created by the Florida Evidence Code, statutes, and the Florida and United States Constitutions. See § 90.501, Fla. Stat. (2005); cf. § 316.066(4), Fla....

...ent resulting in death. There are no photographs of the accident in the record. There are no photographs of the mower tractor or other vehicles. Although law enforcement was required to complete a Florida Traffic Crash Report, Long Form, pursuant to section 316.066, Florida Statutes (2006), no such report is contained in our record....

...ollision Johnson told trooper Raker, inquiring for purposes of preparing a traffic accident report, that he, Johnson, was on his way to work at White's nursery at the time of the collision. The testimony was excluded as a communication privileged by § 316.066(4), F.S....

...Mitchell, 245 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1971). Notwithstanding the appeal of appellants' argument on the seeming inequity of the result, we hold that the trial court properly admitted the homicide investigator's testimony and excluded that of the traffic accident investigator. Sec. 316.066(4), F.S....

...r vehicle. Cummings was charged at a later time. Cummings argues that the trial court erred in allowing in evidence the statements he made to Lieutenant Hill because those statements were inadmissible under the accident report privilege contained in section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1997). 1 We disagree. Cummings was a suspected hit-and-run driver and as such was not entitled to the confidentiality privilege of section 316.066(4)....

...nd Cummings’ statements to Lieutenant Hill were admissible. Cummings has raised other issues on appeal which we find have no merit. We, therefore, affirm Cummings’ conviction and sentence. Affirmed. PATTERSON, C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., concur. . Section 316.066(4) provides in pertinent part: [E]ach accident report made by a person involved in an accident and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing an accident report required by this section shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting....

...mmediately objected based on the lack of foundation regarding the source of this information during the investigation. After extensive argument of counsel, the county court sustained the objection based on the "accident or crash report" privilege in section 316.066(7), Florida Statutes (2007), and instructed the prosecutor to proceed to the next question....

...NOTES [1] § 316.193, Fla.Stat. (1993). [2] State v. Perez, 587 So.2d 630 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). [3] State v. Durden, 655 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). [4] State v. Jensen, 765 P.2d 1028 (Colo.1988). [5] See Henninger v. State, 667 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). [6] § 316.066(4), Fla.Stat....

...State, 636 So.2d 1327 (Fla.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 972, 115 S.Ct. 444, 130 L.Ed.2d 354 (1994); Charles v. State, 683 So.2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Dobson v. State, 566 So.2d 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), rev. denied, 577 So.2d 1326 (Fla. 1991). [10] Section 316.066(4) provides: Except as specified in this subsection, each accident report made by a person involved in an accident and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing an accident report required by this section shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting....

...im that the driver of the other vehicle had expired. Detective Dorn then took over to begin a homicide investigation. Appellant moved to suppress the results of the blood test as being inadmissible as evidence in the criminal prosecution, relying on Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1981). The trial court denied the motion to *1203 suppress. As the motion was well-founded, we reverse. Section 316.066(4) deals with accident reports made by persons involved in accidents, and provides in pertinent part: "No such report shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident......

...erson to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing a crash report required by this section shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting. Such report or statement may not be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal. § 316.066(4), Fla. Stat. (2012); 1 see Vedner v. State, 849 So.2d 1207, 1212 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“[Statements made pursuant to the requirement to give information for a crash report required by section 316.066 may not be used as evidence in civil, criminal or administrative proceedings.”)....

...on to make the highways safer. The legislature has made the decision that in both criminal and civil actions, it is better that statements made by a defendant not be introduced before the jury than to restrict the goal of safer highways for society. Section 316.066 compels a report when there is total apparent damage of at least five hundred dollars or if a person dies or suffers bodily injury or death....

...d and maintained by the police department. We find that such accident reports are public records subject to public inspection and copying pursuant to section 119.07(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), subject however to the confidentiality provisions of section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...of the actual cost of duplication of the record. Appellant argues that although accident reports are public records as defined by chapter 119, they are exempt from personal inspection and copying because of the provisions of section 119.07(3)(a) and section 316.066(4). Section 119.07(3)(a) provides that all public records which are presently provided by law to be confidential are exempt from personal inspection and copying. Section 316.066(4) provides that “each accident report made by a person involved in an accident ... shall be for the confidential use of the department or other state agencies having use of the records for accident prevention purposes This court considered the intent of section 316.066(4) in Lobree v....

...The record reflects that at least some of the accident reports affected by the trial court’s writ of mandamus contain statements made to the investigating officer by someone involved in the reported accident. To the extent that these statements were made pursuant to the requirements of section 316.066, they are both confidential and privileged. § 316.066(4), Fla.Stat....

...nature of an accident report”); Wise v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 177 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965) (accident report privilege extends to verbal statements). The reporting person’s privilege and the confidential nature of his statements under section 316.066(4), therefore, attaches to that part of an officer’s written accident report which reflects those statements....

...We, therefore, remand this matter to the trial court. On remand the trial judge is instructed to strike that portion of its writ which would require an entire accident report to be produced for public inspection even if such report contains a statement which section 316.066(4) describes as confidential or contains other portions which are otherwise exempt from public disclosure pursuant to section 119.07(3)....

...pitated the accident, the subject matter of this suit. We hold that it was error to allow the officer to testify to this, as statements made to an investigating police officer by a participant in the accident are confidential and not admissible. See § 316.066, Fla.Stat....

...The appellants contend it was error to allow the investigating police officer to testify concerning what plaintiff, Terry Hill, told him, in that such statements made by Hill at the scene of the accident fall within the “accident report” privilege afforded by Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1977), which provides that “No such report shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident.” See, generally, Wise v....

...The appellees contend there was no error in allowing the investigating police officer *157 to testify concerning what plaintiff, Hill, told him, where the statement was made at the scene of the accident during the course of the officer’s investigation, because the privilege under Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1977) was waived....

...Therefore, respondent does not meet his burden as a matter of law simply by raising a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Additionally, the trial court erred in determining that appellee’s statements to the police at the scene of arrest could not be considered because they were privileged as an accident report pursuant to section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, which provides: Each accident report made by a person involved in an accident shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the department or other state agenc...

accident investigation and inadmissible under Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1979); (4) a motion to suppress

Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. See § 316.066, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1990). There was no obvious mechanical

...After trial, the jury returned a verdict for the Hamiltons, finding no negligence. During the trial and over the Ev-anses’ objection, the Hamiltons cross-examined Mr. Evans as to his refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test. He contends that this violated the accident report privilege provided in section 316.066, Florida Statutes (2000). We hold that the privilege does not apply to a refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test. Section 316.066(4) provides that statements made by a person involved in an accident in order to complete a crash report as required by the statute, as well as the actual crash report, are not admissible as evidence in any civil or criminal trial....

...Boles, 452 So.2d 540, 544 (Fla.1984), the court held that this statute provides immunity only to “such statements and communications as the driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in order to comply with his or her statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2) [to report an accident]” so as to avoid a Fifth Amendment violation....

...Id.; see also State v. Sowers, 442 So.2d 239, 240 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Because a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test is not compelled, and admission of such refusal does not violate the Fifth Amendment, the trial court did not err in finding that section 316.066 does not prevent the admission into evidence of Mr....

was subject to the statutory exclusion under section 316.066(4), F.S. Upon review of the factual circumstances

...for Petitioner. Philip Averbuck of Highland City, for Respondent. SALARIO, Judge. Ruben Allen Jones has been charged in the county court with driving on a suspended license. Relying on Florida's statutory accident-report privilege, section 316.066(4), Fla....

...identity made pursuant to this statutory duty to give information relevant to an accident in an otherwise unrelated criminal prosecution of the driver, who appears to have had no valid driver's license when the accident happened. The answer derives in part from section 316.066(4), which creates the accident-report privilege....

...However, subject to the applicable rules of evidence, a law enforcement officer at a criminal trial may testify as to any statement made to the officer by the person involved in the crash if that person's privilege against self-incrimination is not violated. § 316.066(4) (emphasis added)....

...Jones moved to suppress his statements of identity arguing, among other things, that their admission would violate his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the accident-report privilege under section 316.066(4).2 The State opposed the motion, arguing that under the Supreme Court's decision in California v....

...424 (1971), statements of identification made pursuant to a statutory duty to provide such information after an automobile accident are not subject to the privilege against self-incrimination. It also argued that the statutory accident-report privilege did not apply because section 316.066(4) authorizes law enforcement officers to testify to any statement during a crash investigation so long as the privilege against self-incrimination is not violated. At a hearing on the motion, Mr....

...identity is not an incriminating statement and therefore should not be protected under the Accident Report Privilege. This court disagrees. The Accident Report Privilege is created by statute. Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, provides a privilege to individuals who are questioned by officers conducting an accident investigation, and the statute (after an amendment in 1989) does n...

...2d 305, 306 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). This passage seems to recognize that there is no constitutional self-incrimination problem with the admission of Mr. Jones's statement of identity under Byers and to hold that the statutory privilege under section 316.066(4) for statements made in connection with an accident investigation barred its admission....

...-5-  C. The State appealed to the circuit court. As it did in the county court, the State argued that under Byers, there is no self-incrimination issue in this case, and that section 316.066(4) authorizes law enforcement officers to testify as to statements made at the scene. Mr. Jones argued that Byers was irrelevant because his argument was based on section 316.066(4), which contains no exception for statements of identity. The circuit court affirmed. In a written opinion, the circuit court first quoted in full the text of section 316.066(4) and then stated that the statute "prohibits a statement obtained during an accident investigation from being used as evidence in any trial." It concluded by stating that "the trial court properly relied on State v....

...did not explicitly address any issue concerning the privilege against self-incrimination. Because the Fourth District's decision in Evans was central to the circuit court's decision, it is important to understand what Evans says. Evans held that section 316.066(4) precluded the State from having a driver's statements of identity during an accident investigation admitted at trial. 692 So. 2d at 306. Its analysis of the question reads as follows: We affirm the trial court's order granting suppression of appellee's statements made at the scene of an automobile accident. Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1993), as amended in 1989, provides for a privilege to individuals who are questioned by officers conducting an accident investigation....

...te constitutions. As far as this case is concerned, then, Fifth Amendment precedents are dispositive. - 10 - that a driver's disclosure of her identity for purposes of completing an accident report under section 316.066 did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination). We recognize, as Mr....

...accident or criminal investigation); Marshall, 695 So. 2d at 720-21 (denying the State's second-tier certiorari petition where an officer began conducting a criminal investigation but failed to read Miranda warnings). The concept appears to be rooted in the notion that section 316.066(4) creates a privilege for statements a person is compelled by statute to make during the accident investigation but not for statements made after the accident investigation is over and the criminal investigation begins, such that a...

... B. We turn now to the more explicit basis for the circuit court's holding—that statutory accident-report privilege categorically precludes admission of statements of identity because section 316.066(4) contains no exception for statements of identity.4 As quoted earlier, section 316.066(4) generally makes statements made by a person involved in a crash inadmissible in a civil or criminal trial, except that "a law enforcement officer at a criminal trial may testify as to any statement made to the officer by the per...

...by a law enforcement officer, (3) about a statement made to the law enforcement officer by a person involved in the crash, (4) if that person's privilege against self-incrimination is not violated. See also Vedner, 849 So. 2d at 1213 (noting that section 316.066(4) "specifically permits a law enforcement officer to testify in a criminal trial about statements made to the officer by a person involved in a crash, provided the person's privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated"); Marshall, 695 So....

...permits exclusion of anything other than a driver's statements at a crash scene. Neither question is in play in this proceeding, however, and we express no opinion about them. - 13 - that the privilege against self-incrimination in section 316.066(4) is "co-extensive with the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination." State v....

...The trial is criminal; the testimony would be provided by a law enforcement officer; the testimony would be about a statement made to the officer by a person involved in the crash; and, as we have shown, there is no violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. That the privilege section 316.066(4) creates contains no exception for statements of identity, as the circuit court reasoned, is beside the point. Granted, section 316.066(4) does not exclude statements of identity from its general ban on admitting privileged statements at trial....

...3d 767, 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (finding a departure permitting second-tier certiorari relief where the circuit court relied on Fourth Amendment precedent from another district that "misapplied" the law and "should be rejected"). To the extent Evans held that section 316.066(4) bars the admission of statements of identity merely because it contains no exception for such - 15 - statements, it too failed to follow the unambiguous language of the statute and departed from the essential requirements of law.5 See Nader, 87 So....

...rcuit court decision is "isolated in its effect," in which there may not be a miscarriage of 5Evans might have reached the result it did by relying on a superseded version of the statute. Although Evans cites the 1993 version of section 316.066(4), it also explicitly states that it was looking specifically at the 1989 amendments to the statute. Evans, 692 So. 2d at 306 ("Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1993), as amended in 1989, provides for a privilege to individuals who are questioned by officers conducting an accident investigation." (emphasis added))....

...Before 1989, the statute did not contain the exception present in the current version (and in 1993) for testimony by law enforcement officers in criminal trials; it did, however, contain an exception for statements of identity when identity was at issue. See § 316.066(4), Fla. Stat. (1988). The legislature removed the exception for statements of identity in 1989. See § 316.066(4), Fla. Stat. (1989). But it did not add the exception for testimony by law enforcement officers in criminal trials until 1991. See § 316.066(4), Fla....

...There is more than enough here to justify us exercising our discretion and granting the writ on these bases. And in that regard, we note that this is not the first time a district court of appeal has granted the State's petition for second-tier certiorari when a trial court has misinterpreted section 316.066(4)'s accident-report privilege....

Florida’s accident report privilege is codified at section 316.066 of the Florida Statutes: Except as specified

...The agency’s consideration of the report or statements made at the accident scene, for the purpose of completing the required crash report, during its proceedings against Nelson was error. The statements of persons involved in the crash made to investigators at the accident scene are inadmissible pursuant to section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1999)....

the police officer investigating the same. Section 316.066(1), F. S., requires the driver of a vehicle

contained in crash reports prepared pursuant to section 316.066, Florida Statutes, prior to the expiration

...ant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Blanco claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a pretrial motion to suppress and for failing to make timely objections at trial based upon the accident report privilege pursuant to section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1996)....

...way. Until that point, Blanco’s counsel was unaware of the need to file a pretrial motion to suppress, and he did not object to any testimony that may have been privileged. See State v. Marshall, 695 So.2d 719, 721 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (stating that section 316.066 excludes from evidence “each accident report made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing an accident report”)....

...Our review of the record in the light of this argument shows that no prejudice resulted to the appellant. See Johnson v. State, 355 So.2d 143 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); and Ballard v. State, 323 So.2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Appellant’s point directed to the introduction of the accident report was not error inasmuch as Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1977), is not applicable to a *819 staged collision which was not, under any consideration, an accident....

investigator’s report, which is protected by Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1977). Said statute provides

the accident report privilege contained in section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (2021), which provides

accident report which was published to the jury. Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1977), prohibits the introduction

of Maitland Fire Department authorized by section 316.066, Florida Statutes, to receive a copy of a written

a statement was a report privileged under Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1981). Initially, the

...or as to whether or not Deveau was negligent. Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of no liability as to all appellees. Rierson sought a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. This appeal ensued. ANALYSIS 1 Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (2018) provides: “Except as specified in this subsection, each crash report made by a person involved in a crash and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing a...

...Although Johnson states in dictum that it is against the legislative intent to use incident reports in litigation, the case does not discuss the use of reports for impeachment purposes, and thus is not helpful as to the point raised. Appellants also argue that Section 395.-041, Florida Statutes, is analogous to Section 316.066, Florida Statutes, involving automobile accident reports, which states that “[n]o such report shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident_” Although Section 316.066, Florida Statutes, provides for very limited disclosure of some information, it does not say that an automobile accident report is discoverable; thus, the plain language of this statute is essentially different from section 395.041....

...Petitioner contends that an accident report may be admitted into evidence at trial, to support a conviction for careless driving. Petitioner argues that the apparent conflict between Fla.R.Traf.Ct. 6.460, allowing for the admittance of accident reports into evidence, and Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1975), which in pertinent part provides that “....

...Therefore, petitioner concludes, accident reports are admissible in a hearing based upon a traffic offense such as careless driving and in reversing respondent’s conviction and holding otherwise, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law. Respondent, on the other hand, states that Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1975), being substantive law, abrogates and is superior to a procedural rule, such as Fla.R.Traf.Ct....

...In addition, respondent argues that the penalties involved in traffic violations are sufficiently serious so as to classify “infractions” as being criminal in nature, thus precluding the introduction of an accident report into evidence based upon Section 316.066(4). The question, then, raised by the parties is whether Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1975), as substantive law, abrogates Fla.R.Traf.Ct....

...eads to the arrest and conviction of another). The trial court, in pronouncing the reasoning behind its decision to grant E.M.’s motion in limine, likened the language in section 1006.09(2)(a) to Florida’s accident report privilege, contained in section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (2014). Section 316.066(4) states in pertinent part: *686 Except as specified in this subsection, each crash report made by a person involved in a crash and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing a crash report required by this section shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting. Such report or statement may not be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal. § 316.066(4), Fla. Stat. (2014). Within section 316.066(4), the legislature specifically set forth two items which shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting: (1) the crash report, and (2) any statement made to law enforcement officers. However, unlike section 1006.09(2)(a), when further describing which items become inadmissible at a trial under section 316.066(4), the legislature specifically stated that the inadmissibility applied to both “[s]ueh report or statement.” In contrast, in section 1006.09(2)(a), the legislature stated two methods by which a student could potentially qualify...

that Florida's Accident Report Privilege, section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (2016), does not prohibit

that Florida's Accident Report Privilege, section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (2016), does not prohibit

...violation. "[E]ach crash report made by a person involved in a crash and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose of completing a crash report ... shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting." *738 § 316.066(7), Fla....

such evidence, notwithstanding the terms of Section 316.-066, Florida Statutes (1977), must ordinarily

...In cross-examination, when JEB’s counsel attempted to mark a diagram contained in a police officer’s report referred to by Moss in direct examination, counsel for the plaintiffs objected on the basis that the report and diagram were protected by the accident report privilege. See § 316.066(7), Fla....

...The officer did not read Bender her Miranda rights but did ask Bender to submit to a breath test and read implied consent to her. ii. Bender’s Motion to Suppress Bender moved to suppress the incriminating statements she made to the officer because of Florida’s accident report privilege, section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (2019), and because the officer had not read Bender her Miranda rights after the officer had concluded the crash investigation. At a hearing on the motion, the State asked Bender to clarify the scope of her motion because the motion did not specify any particular statements to suppress....

...Bender responds that the officer had an affirmative legal duty to read Bender her Miranda rights as soon as the crash investigation ended and the criminal investigation began. The accident reporting privilege Bender relies on is designed to protect the right against self-incrimination. Sections 316.066(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (2019), require the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident to report the accident. To avoid violating the Fifth Amendment, section 316.066(4) “prohibits the use of communications ‘made by persons involved in accidents.’” Brackin v....

...the accident reporting privilege and the Fifth Amendment can result in three solutions. Vedner v. State, 849 So. 2d 1207, 1212 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). First, statements made “pursuant to the requirement to give information for a crash report required by section 316.066 may not be used as evidence in civil, criminal or administrative proceedings.” Id. (citation omitted)....

...and precepts associated with Miranda seem to apply.” Id. (citations omitted). The officer had announced the criminal DUI investigation was underway when Bender made the statements at issue. So this was no longer a crash investigation required by section 316.066 and was an investigation to which “the usual rules and precepts associated with Miranda seem to apply.” Id....

...basis of this legal dispute. Since the driver of the vehicle was not a party to the legal action, his out-of-court statements constituted hearsay. In addition, we held in Dinowitz that the admission of such a statement is barred by the provisions of section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1985) barring the admission into evidence of reports made to police officers by persons involved in automobile accidents....

...Perez, a deputy with the Hillsbor-ough County Sheriffs Office, had been drinking that night and upon exiting his car simply stated to the officer who had arrived at the scene, “I’m a deputy sheriff and I fucked up.” He was convicted and sentenced for violating section 316.193(3), 1 Florida Statutes. In reliance upon section 316.066(4), 2 Florida Statutes (1991), which provides for the confidentiality of certain statements made to an officer during the course of an accident investigation, Perez sought to suppress his spontaneous utterance....

...Every driver of an automobile in Florida who is involved in a motor vehicle accident is required to report the event to law enforcement. See § 316.062, Fla.Stat. (1991). The information providéd in the report is privileged and may not be used *1232 against the driver in any trial arising out of the occurrence. Section 316.066(4), Fla.Stat. (1991). The functional purpose of section 316.066(4) is to achieve in the public interest an accurate truthful relation of the facts surrounding the accident and to relieve persons involved in it from incrimination when the circumstances are described....

...xpressed view that “the purpose of the statute is to clothe with statutory immunity only such statements and communications as the driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in order to comply with his or her statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2).” Brackin, 452 So.2d at 544 ....

...That section, in relevant part, reads: (3) Any person: (a) Who is [under the influence of alcoholic beverages]; (b) Who operates a vehicle; and (c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes: 2. Serious bodily injury to another ... is guilty of a felony of the third degree. . Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part: Except as specified in this subsection, each accident report made by a person involved in an accident and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the purpose...

which was admitted without objection. Although Section 316.066, Florida Statutes, protects the confidentiality

...cement officer for the purpose of completing a crash report required by this section shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting. No such report or statement shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal.... Florida Statute § 316.066(5) (2010). “The purpose of the statute is to clothe with statutory immunity the statements and communications that a driver, owner, or occupant of a vehicle is compelled to make in compliance with the statutory duty under section 316.066(1) and (2).” White v....

...Failing to timely provide changes to a defense radiologist’s report to appellant’s counsel (the doctor had been provided additional materials since his report was prepared); e. Attempting to interject information from the police report of the accident, in violation of section 316.066, Florida Statutes (2009); 4 f.Unnecessarily interrupting appellant’s counsel during final argument in the presence of the jury in an effort to suggest that counsel was taking too much time, even though there was a specific determination by the trial judge governing time already in place 5 ....

...ng to personal injuries he had checked code 1, used by him to indicate no apparent injuries. Up to this point there was no impropriety, since observations made by the investigating police officer at the accident scene are not within the privilege of section 316.066(4) Florida Statutes....

...Defendant’s name; and Defendant had signs of impairment. 1 Under the totality of the circumstances, this established the existence of probable cause to arrest Defendant for DUI. Accident Report Privilege Turning to the accident report privilege, section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (2023), provides: Except as specified in this subsection, each crash report made by a person involved in a crash and any statement made by 1 We note that in Wagner v....

...However, subject to the applicable rules of evidence, a law enforcement officer at a criminal trial may testify as to any statement made to the officer by the person involved in the crash if that person’s privilege against self-incrimination is not violated. § 316.066(4), Fla....

...ffs Office. Counsel advised Trooper Brock that Sylvester asserted her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Counsel also advised that Sylvester would comply with the accident reporting requirements of section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1987), under the compulsion of that statute....

...ing to remain at the scene of the accident involving an injury in violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1987). Sylvester moved to suppress her statements to Trooper Brock, contending that they were protected by the statutory immunity of subsection 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Ferguson, 405 So.2d 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), which holds that any privilege is lost where a driver has left the scene of an accident. Id. at 297 . We affirm the trial court ruling, but on different grounds. Because the present case can be resolved within the terms of section 316.066, we do not reach the potentially more troublesome fifth amendment issues posed by Ferguson’s broad concept of waiver....

...Subsequently, neither the State nor Sylvester succeeded in locating the witness for deposition. By the time the motion to suppress was heard, it was uncertain whether the witness would be located and if so, whether he could in fact identify Sylvester. Subsection 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1987) provides in part: Each accident report made by a person involved in an accident ......

...t the department shall disclose the final judicial disposition of the case, indicating which, if any, of the parties were found guilty. (Emphasis added). At trial, had the witness not been located or had he been unable to identify Sylvester, then subsection 316.066(4) would have allowed the disclosure of Sylvester’s identity as the driver, based on the traffic report....

...�s testimony by means of a prior inconsistent statement Bohannon had given to the police during the homicide investigation after the accident. Appellant objected to the admissibility of the statement on the ground that it was privileged by virtue of § 316.066(4), F.S.1973....

...After the jury returned a verdict for appellant the appellees moved for a new trial, contending among other things, that the court erred in refusing to allow the statement *49 into evidence. The court granted the ap-pellees a new trial because it had erred in holding the statement was privileged under § 316.066(4). Both parties agree that the statement in question was not privileged since it was not given as part of the accident report required by § 316.066(4), F.S.1973....

amendments to the accident report privilege in section 316.066 and the rape shield statute in section 794

...r touch his nose, failed the test. At trial, the court held that since the test’s results were obtained prior to an arrest, they were privileged information because part of an accident investigation, and therefore inadmissible. Those provisions of Section 316.066(4), making confidential accident reports “by persons involved in accidents,” were enacted by Chapter 20578, § 17, Laws of Fla....

...s] blood for alcohol’ ” as well as a compliance with the requirements of Section 322.261, Florida Statutes. 245 So.2d at 622 . Finally, the accident report need not be filed or completed prior to the time the blood test is administered. However, Section 316.066 may still bar the use of blood alcohol analyses as evidence if “the information sought to be excluded was taken by the investigating officer for the purpose of making his accident report and formed a basis for that report.” Id. at 623 . Whatever construction was placed upon Section 316.066 by the courts as to tests for alcohol, the statute has never been interpreted as either sanctioning or disapproving field sobriety tests....

...The same repugnance does not attend the results of a field physical sobriety test, which obviously are not obtained-as is a blood sample-by extracting a defendant’s body fluids for the purpose of prosecuting him. Since we are required to place a strict interpretation upon the statute, we decline to extend Section 316.066(4)’s protective immunity to any nontestimonial communication other than a chemical test for alcohol, which, as we have previously observed, fn....

...bly in seeking it. We have considered Woodward’s remaining points and find them unavailing. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and remanded for new trial. ROBERT P, SMITH, Jr., J., concurs. WENTWORTH, J., dissents with opinion. .The provisions of Section 316.066(4), insofar as they have been construed as permitting the admissibility of chemical tests for intoxication, notwithstanding the absence of consent, have apparently been superseded by those provisions of Section 322.261, first enacted by Section 1, Ch....

accident when such identity is not otherwise known.” § 316.066(4), Fla.Stat. (1987). See Sylvester v. State,

...In that case, we held that motor vehicle accident reports prepared and maintained by law enforcement or traffic regulating agencies are public records subject to public inspection and copying pursuant to section 119.-07(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), subject, however, to the confidentiality provisions of section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Accordingly, we remanded that case to the trial court with instructions that such accident reports must be furnished for inspection and copying pursuant to section 119.07(1)(a), but that the custodian of such records should delete or otherwise excise from any such records furnished information made confidential by reason of section 316.066(4)....

...destrians and witnesses. We conclude that the deletion of such information concerning names and addresses of parties and witnesses was error and not in compliance with the intent of our previous opinion or that of the confidentiality restrictions of section 316.066(4)....

this personal injury action unless barred by section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1971) (formerly section

...t Lynch. Lynch’s counsel objected to Deputy Metz’ testimony concerning Lynch’s statement that he suggested that the driver leave the scene of the accident. The objection was predicated on his contention that such statement was privileged under Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1977), as made during the course of the deputy’s investigation of the accident....

JOANOS, Judge. C.A. Meyer Paving and Construction (Meyer) and The Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers) appeal the deputy commissioner’s determination that the results of a blood alcohol test were privileged under section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, therefore, there was no lawful evidence that Billy Lee McFalls, the deceased employee, had a blood alcohol level of .10% or greater, and that had there been evidence of blood alcohol level in excess of .10%, ther...

..., 1982 when Meyer and Travelers controverted the claim based upon excessive blood alcohol content under section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1979). The deputy commissioner accepted McFalls’s widow’s argument that the accident report privilege of section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, applied....

...iance from his employer’s instructions; the absence of alcoholic beverage containers or receipts in the vehicle; and the insufficient amount of time McFalls would have had to have consumed sufficient alcohol to achieve .196% blood alcohol content. Section 316.066, Florida Statutes (1979), requires that the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in bodily harm forward a written report of the accident to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. The requirement is excused when an investigating officer makes a written report of the accident. Section 316.066(4) provides that “[a]ll accident reports made by persons involved in accidents shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting_ No such report shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident ....” As recently held in Brackin v. Boles, 452 So.2d 540 (Fla.1984), the purpose of section 316.066(4) is to clothe with statutory immunity only such statements as the driver is compelled to make under section 316.066(1) and (2)....

following question: Do the recent amendments to section 316.066, Florida Statutes, by Chapter 01-163, Laws

punishable as provided by ss. 775.082 and 775.083. Section 316.066(4), F. S., allows confidential accident reports

unattended vehicle or other property. *2288 Section 316.066, F.S., addresses the question of whether a

...Steven Paul Anderson seeks certiorari review of an order overruling his objections to deposition questions and compelling additional depositions in this automobile negligence action. Anderson asserts that the "accident report privilege" set forth in section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (2017), precludes the discovery of statements made by individuals involved in the accident for the purpose of completing a crash report....

...During the depositions of Anderson, his wife, and the investigating officers, defense counsel objected to questions about statements the Andersons made to the officers at the scene. Counsel asserted that the statements were protected from discovery under the accident report privilege in section 316.066(4), and the witnesses refused to answer those questions. The trial court entered an order compelling the witnesses to submit to additional depositions and answer questions regarding statements the Andersons made to law enforcement at the scene. This is the order that prompted Anderson's petition for certiorari in this court. Anderson argues that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by ruling that the accident report privilege in section 316.066(4) does not preclude the discovery of these statements. "[R]eview by certiorari is appropriate when a discovery order departs from the essential requirements of law, causing material injury to a petitioner throughout...

...to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id. Thus, information that is merely "inadmissible" is discoverable while information that is "privileged" is not. The question before this court is whether the information protected under section 316.066(4) is privileged or merely inadmissible. Section 316.066(4) provides: Except as specified in this subsection, each crash report made by a person involved in a crash and any statement made by such person to a law enforcement officer for the...

...(2017) (emphasis added); see also §§ 90.503(2) (using the same key terms to establish the psychotherapist-patient privilege), .504(1) (using analogous key terms to create the spousal privilege). In comparison, the legislature has enacted several statutes like section 316.066(4) that make information inadmissible in court but do not otherwise prohibit its disclosure....

...2d DCA 1984) ("[T]he rule protecting offers of compromise [section 90.408] appears to be one more of admissibility than privilege."). Anderson argues that this plain language interpretation of the statute conflicts with the body of law that has developed over time interpreting section 316.066(4). See, e.g., Brackin v. Boles, 452 So. 2d 540, 544 (Fla. 1984) (holding that the purpose of section 316.066(4) "is to clothe with statutory immunity" the statements and communications a driver, owner, or vehicle occupant is legally required to make for the purpose of completing an accident report); Pastori v....

...2d DCA 1984) ("[A]ny statements made by petitioner to a police officer for purposes of completing an accident report would be privileged and, thus, inadmissible."); Nationwide Ins. v. Monroe, 276 So. 2d 547, 548 n.4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973) (providing that statements given in compliance with section 316.066 are "immune from discovery"). However, the statute has changed substantially over time. The version of section 316.066(4) in effect until 1982 provided as follows: All accident reports made by persons involved in accidents shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall be for the confi...

...ndicating which if any of the parties were found guilty. No such report shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident . . . . -5- § 316.066(4), Fla. Stat. (1971) (emphasis added). In addition to providing that the accident reports shall not be used as evidence at trial, this version of section 316.066 expressly made the information confidential and prohibited its disclosure. In 1982, the legislature added a sentence providing an exception to "the confidential privilege afforded by this subsection" for breath, urine, and blood tests....

...an officer by a person involved in an accident shall not be admissible in court but shall otherwise be public record." Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., PCB GO 89-4 (1989) Staff Analysis 4 (Mar. 31, 1989). Thus, the cases applying the pre-1989 version of section 316.066(4) are inapposite. Unfortunately, courts have continued to refer to the statute as creating an "accident report privilege" despite the 1989 amendment....

...2d 1231, 1232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Wetherington v. State, 135 So. 3d 584, 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Alexander v. Penske Logistics, Inc., 867 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). Some courts have also used language describing the post-1989 version of section 316.066(4) as making the statements both inadmissible and privileged....

...2d at 1232; Nelson v. State Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 757 So. 2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). However, these statements are dicta and are therefore not binding on this court. In conclusion, the current version of section 316.066(4) does not create a true privilege precluding the disclosure of statements of individuals involved in an accident for the purpose of completing a crash report....

...nt that the roadside encounter had moved to a new phase. It was not necessary for him to say he was “switching hats” because he never wore the hat of an accident investigator. The defendant relies on the accident report privilege set forth in section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (2020), which provides in pertinent part: (4) Except as specified in this subsection, each crash report made by a person involved in a crash and any statement made by such person to a law enforc...

...le applies.” Id. at *3. Because the officer in Bender “had announced the criminal DUI investigation was underway when [the defendant] made the statements at issue,” we concluded that “this was no longer a crash investigation required by section 316.066 and was an investigation to which ‘the usual rules and precepts associated with Miranda seem to apply.’” Id....

...Deputy Sapp informed the defendant that he was conducting a DUI investigation before the challenged statements were made. He reminded the defendant multiple times that he did not have to answer any questions. Deputy Sapp’s questioning was therefore not “a crash investigation required by section 316.066,” but rather “an investigation to which ‘the usual rules and precepts associated with Miranda seem to apply.’” Id. Accordingly, Deputy Sapp’s failure to immediately advise the defendant of his Miranda rights when he be...