Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Florida, 368 U.S. 278, 82 S.Ct. 275, 7 L.Ed.2d 285; Locklin v. Pridgeon, 158 Fla. 737, 30 So.2d 102 (1947); State [ex rel. Lee] v. Buchanan, 191 So.2d 33, 336 (Fla. 1966)." See also State v. Dinsmore, 308 So.2d 32 (Fla. 1975), wherein this court determined Section 112.313, Florida Statutes, to be unconstitutionally vague and indefinite....

...Gen., for appellants. Walter M. Meginniss and William F. Crary of Crary, Buchanan & Meginniss, Stuart, for appellee. SUNDBERG, Justice. Appellant has prosecuted an appeal in this Court following a decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, declaring Section 112.313(1), Florida Statutes (1973), unconstitutional....

...A member of the Commission was appointed as hearing examiner, and a fact-finding hearing was held on November 21, 1974. Subsequent to the hearing, the examiner filed his report with the Commission. On December 13, 1974, the full Commission found that appellee violated Section 112.313(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ith the recommendation that no further action be taken. Appellee petitioned the First District Court of Appeal for certiorari review of the Ethics Commission's decision. Certiorari was granted. On June 30, 1976, the court issued an opinion declaring Section 112.313(1), Florida Statutes (1973) as amended by Ch....

...n. Specifically, the District Court's opinion holding the former section unconstitutionally vague was directed at the phrase "that would cause a reasonably prudent person to be influenced in the discharge of official duties." It should be noted that Section 112.313(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974), was amended by Ch. 75-208, § 4, Laws of Florida, and now appears in relevant part as Section 112.313(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...It is not proscribed by the Legislature nor is it delegated to the Ethics Commission accompanied by meaningful standards and guidelines for the Commission to follow. As the Legislature cannot shift its constitutional duties to someone else, neither can we. Consequently, we must exercise our duty and find Section 112.313(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), unconstitutional for the reasons stated herein....

...e statutes which only contain the intent element. That statute also adopts a subjective test of knowledge. The language of Canon 5c of the Code of Judicial Conduct may also provide some guidance. While the proscribed conduct is similar to that under § 112.313(2)(a), Fla....

...d to any such decision, ruling, or act, and a vote shall be recorded or counted for each such member present, except when, with respect to any such member, there is or appears to be a possible conflict of interest under the provisions of § 112.311, § 112.313, § 112.314, § 112.315 or § 112.316. In such cases said member shall comply with the disclosure requirements of § 112.313....

...Gen., for appellant. J. Leonard Fleet, Hollywood, for appellee. CARLTON, Justice: The State of Florida directly appeals from an Order of the Court of Record, Broward County, dismissing an information filed against appellee under authority of Fla. Stat. § 112.313(6), F.S.A., and holding that statute unconstitutional....

...n by B & B Construction Co. of Ohio, Inc., an Ohio Corporation authorized to do business in the State of Florida, and engaged in construction within the said City of Tamarac on said date, against the form of the statute in such case pursuant to Sec. 112.313(6) of the Florida Statutes, made and provided to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida." After pleading "not guilty" to the charge levied against him, appellee moved for a dismissal of the information on the ground that Fla. Stat. § 112.313(6), F.S.A....

...offenders and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained and who could be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the Judicial for the Legislative Department of Government."' "Under the language of F.S. 112.313(6), who is to say what employment will, in fact, impair the independence of judgment of a person described in the statute? What is the barometer, or ascertainable standard of conduct over which reasonable men of common intelligence are not...

...Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1970, at page 537, defines `might' in a variety of terms, among them `possibility' and `probability'. "The foregoing considered, the Defendant having properly raised the sole issue of the constitutionality of Fla. Stat. 112.313(6), the Court finds it has no alternative but to find Section (6) of said statute to be inoperative for reason that it is unconstitutionally vague, thereby violating Florida's Declaration of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." In order that the Legislature should be given as much time as possible to consider a substitute enactment for Fla. Stat. § 112.313(6), F.S.A., the litigants have waived argument and we have expedited our disposition of this cause....

...sual recordings of wire communications in violation of FDCLE general orders and in violation of Section 934.03, Florida Statutes, and (2) West had capitalized upon confidential insider information for his own personal gain or benefit in violation of Section 112.313(8)....

...al Misconduct, outlawed by Section 839.25, Florida Statutes. The indictment charged that the two, while employees of the City of Hollywood, knowingly violated, with corrupt intent to obtain benefit for themselves, a statute relating to their office: Section 112.313(7), Florida Statutes, in that they had employment or held a contractual relationship with a business entity subject to the regulation of or doing business with the City....

...e office of the accused. But, in contrast to DeLeo's alleged official misconduct through conflicting employment or contractual relationships, Johnson's official misconduct was charged to have occurred when he misused his public position, contrary to Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes....

...n any way when he learned that they had aided in the installation of the antenna. This behavior falls far short of the legal and moral standards which our citizens are entitled to expect from their governmental officials and employees. See generally § 112.313(6), Fla....

...Counsel, Com'n on Ethics, Tallahassee, for appellee. KAHN, Judge. We have for review a final order and public report of the Florida Commission on Ethics (Commission). The Commission has determined that appellant Robert G. Goin, former Athletic Director of Florida State University (FSU), violated section 112.313(4), Florida Statutes (1993), and should pay a restitution penalty of $3,000 and a civil penalty of $1,000. In this appeal, Goin argues that section 112.313(4) is unconstitutionally vague....

...Statutes (1993). The Commission accepted the findings of fact contained in the recommended order. Nonetheless, the Commission, on its own motion and over Goin's objection, rejected the hearing officer's conclusion that Goin's conduct did not violate section 112.313(4)....

...Goin issued a personal check for $5,000 to Southeast in payment for the roof. Mr. and Mrs. Goin signed the closing documents for the home on May 27, 1994, but the Goins did not move out of the house until June 20, 1994. II. Goin first challenges the constitutionality of section 112.313(4), Florida Statutes (1993), which provides: UNAUTHORIZED COMPENSATION....

...ils to give adequate notice or the requisite definite warning of what conduct is prohibited. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 1985). Goin also asserts that section 112.313(4) is unconstitutional because it covers cases where the public official does not have actual knowledge that a gift was given to influence the official's vote or other official action....

...Citing State v. Wershow, 343 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1977), Goin argues that a person of common intelligence must not only speculate about the meaning of the statute, but must subject himself to punishment if he guesses wrong. Goin submits that because under section 112.313(4) a person of common understanding intelligence must act at his or her peril, the statute is unconstitutionally vague. In D'Alemberte v. Anderson, 349 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1977), the supreme court considered the language of section 112.313(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), which provided: ACCEPTANCE OF GIFTS PROHIBITED....

...In Barker v. State of Florida, Commission on Ethics, 654 So.2d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), the court relied upon D'Alemberte and struck down the very statute we consider today. The Third District held: [W]hen the Florida Legislature enacted the current section 112.313(4), it used language prohibiting receipt of gifts the official knows, or, "with the exercise of reasonable care, should know," were given to influence....

...n one case but not in another, such exactly replicates the everyday experience of our criminal courts. We see no reason why a public employee should be entitled to a greater degree of protection than a criminal defendant. As the Commission observes, section 112.313(4) is similar to the stolen property statutes in that proof of their transgression, like that of many statutes requiring proof of an element of constructive guilty knowledge, is not dependent upon an express admission, but rather can...

...e authority to initiate change orders and arrange for funding. Nor is there any unfairness in expecting our public officials to ask themselves this single question and to exercise some insight into the motivations of others. We hold, therefore, that section 112.313(4), Florida Statutes (1993), is not unconstitutionally vague and contains a fair test by which to gauge certain conduct of public officials and employees. III. We must now consider whether the Commission on Ethics, by finding Goin guilty of a section 112.313(4) violation, exceeded its lawful authority as a Florida agency subject to the Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 120, Florida Statutes....

...(emphasis in original). The Commission rejected Goin's exceptions, but acknowledged that portions of the challenged paragraphs contained findings of fact. Agreeing "with the hearing officer's findings of fact regarding the issue of whether Petitioner violated section 112.313(4)," the Commission, nonetheless, disagreed with the *1138 "conclusion of law" in paragraph 10, that Goin's conduct did not violate the statute....

...of the words, `necessary to preserve the life of such mother,'" despite requirements in the statutes that the person intend to destroy the child or procure a miscarriage. Id. at 435. In State v. Rou, 366 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1978), the supreme court held section 112.313(3), Florida Statutes (1973), to be unconstitutionally vague. Section 112.313(3) made it improper for state or county employees *1189 to use their official position to secure "special privileges or exemptions." Id....

...Rudser, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant. Allen P. Allweiss of Allweiss & Anderson, St. Petersburg, for appellee. ROBERTS, Justice. This cause is before us on consolidated direct appeals from orders of the County Court of Pinellas County holding Sections 112.313(2), 112.314(1), [1] and 839.07, Florida Statutes, to be unconstitutional for varying reasons....

...his business interest in a business subject to regulation by the municipality of which he was mayor. Separate indictments were handed down charging the appellee with failure to file a sworn statement of disclosure of a business interest contrary to Section 112.313(2), Florida Statutes, which is the subject of the appeal in Case No....

...orida Statutes, which is the subject of appeal in Case No. 45,202. Relative to Case No. 44,802 (failure to file a sworn statement of disclosure), appellee on November 14, 1973, filed a motion to dismiss the indictment against him on the grounds that Section 112.313(2), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutionally vague, indefinite and violates defendant's due process rights; that said statute does not adequately inform the defendant or others with reasonable precision as to what acts are prohibited;...

...ile the sworn statement referred to in the indictment; and that the statute upon which the indictment is based predicates the commission of a crime upon the taking place of some future act. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and held that Section 112.313(2), Florida Statutes, which provides: "(2) If an officer or employee of a state agency, or of a county, city, or other political subdivision of the state, or any legislator or legislative employee is an officer, director, agent, or me...

...e clerk of the circuit court of the county in which he is principally employed." [2] is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite, specifically stating: "However, as our Florida Supreme Court stated in finding sub section 6 of the very same statute (F.S. 112.313) unconstitutional in the case of State v....

...Llopis, 257 So.2d 17, `While we acknowledge a special sympathy for legislation of this nature, which is intended to safeguard the public and insure honesty and integrity in government, our sympathy cannot be allowed to impair our judgment.' This Court is constrained to find that subsection 2 of F.S. 112.313 is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite because it fails to provide when defendant is required to file a sworn statement....

...dvise him within what period of time he must perform it nor can this Court provide such an essential missing element for the Legislature." Appellant-State appeals the order of dismissal to this Court and urges that the trial court erred in declaring Section 112.313(2), Florida Statutes, unconstitutionally vague. Appellant contends that F.S. 112.313(2) is sufficiently explicit that a man of common intelligence would not have to guess at its meaning because it merely requires the filing of a conflict of interest statement....

...om December 6, 1972, until October 12, 1973 (date of indictment) appellee did not file a statement disclosing his controlling interest in a business entity subject to regulation by the City of Pinellas Park. Appellant argues that it is implicit in F.S. 112.313(2) that the public official file a conflict of interest statement in conjunction with his taking office....

...d to any such decision, ruling, or act, and a vote shall be recorded or counted for each such member present, except when, with respect to any such member, there is or appears to be a possible conflict of interest under the provisions of § 112.311, § 112.313, § 112.314, § 112.315 or § 112.316. In such cases said member shall comply with the disclosure requirements of § 112.313." clarifies any doubts as to when a public official should file a statement of business interests. In response to appellant's arguments, appellee relies on State v. Llopis, 257 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1971), to support the order of the trial court. Therein this Court held Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, to be unconstitutionally vague opining, inter alia: "Nor can the Legislature predicate a crime on future acts or contingencies or on the taking place of some future act." The statute involved therein provided tha...

...ive employee shall accept other employment which might impair his independence of judgment in performance of public duties. We agree with the trial court's rationale and reliance on State v. Llopis, supra, as controlling sub judice, and we hold that Section 112.313, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional....

...court dismissing the indictment is approved because of vagueness, without prejudice to file new charges if the exigencies of the situation require or render same appropriate. Therefore, by way of summary, (1) We affirm the trial judge's ruling that Section 112.313(2) is unconstitutional; (2) We find that Section 112.314 is not unconstitutional and to that extent reverse the judgment of the trial court....

...tate to refile charges if it elects to do so under Sections 112.314 and 839.07, Florida Statutes. It is so ordered. ADKINS, C.J., and McCAIN, OVERTON and ERVIN (Retired), JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Although not material sub judice, we note that Sections 112.313 and 112.314 have subsequently been substantially amended by the legislature in its 1974 session, Chapter 74-177, Laws of Florida....

...complaints of violation of the code of ethics as established in this part, including investigation of all facts and parties materially related to the complaint at issue. (emphasis supplied) The "code of ethics as established in this part" refers to Section 112.313, which establishes standards of conduct for public officers and employees of agencies. The operative question then becomes whether violations of Sections 99.012(7) and 116.111 may be determined to be violations of Section 112.313. We hold that they may be. Subsection 112.313(6) provides: MISUSE OF PUBLIC POSITION....

...Smith, 390 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1980), where the complaint involved the corrupt use of a public office to secure a special privilege, benefit or exemption for another by causing the alteration and falsification of copies of public documents in violation of Section 112.313(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974), the predecessor to Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...f the Commission's jurisdiction to hear the complaints. Clearly, both complaints allege the use of a public office to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for the officeholder or another, and, thus, the Commission has jurisdiction under Section 112.313(6)....

...We are not so impressed with the gravity of this charge. Indeed, the inordinate emphasis placed on this "conflict" tends to support McKinney's case rather than that of the Board First, the advisory opinions from the Florida Commission on Ethics clearly illustrate that the Florida statute, § 112.313(7)(a), which the Board claims prohibits McKinney from having his home inspected by members of his own department, is directed at public officials who have business interests which conflict with their public duties....

...t a claimant on the theory that his complaint was frivolous in law and fact and was filed with malicious intent, but Taunton is factually quite distinguishable. The Commission received a sworn complaint from Taunton alleging that Tapper had violated section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), by owning and managing a stevedoring company which was directly regulated by the Port St....

...Joe Port Authority, of which Tapper was the chairman. A preliminary investigation was ordered after the Commission found the complaint to be legally sufficient. Based upon the preliminary investigation, the Commission found that there was no probable cause to believe that Tapper violated section 112.313(7)(a), and dismissed the complaint....

...Petitioner, by its petition for writ of certiorari, has raised as a second point whether THE BOARD MEMBERS OF FGHS ARE "PUBLIC OFFICERS" FOR PURPOSES OF THE VOTING CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROVISIONS OF THE CODE OF ETHICS (SECTION 112.3143, FLORIDA STATUTES) AND THE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT PROVISIONS (SECTION 112.313, FLORIDA STATUTES)....

...Stuart R. Michelson of the Law Office of Stuart R. Michelson, Bay Harbour Islands, for Appellee. GRIMES, Chief Justice. We review Barker v. Florida Commission on Ethics, 654 So.2d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), wherein the district court of appeal declared section 112.313(4), Florida Statutes (1993), facially unconstitutional....

...Coral Gables Country Club and the Coral Gables Executive Club. The State filed a complaint against Barker with the Florida Commission on Ethics (the "Commission"), alleging that Barker had accepted the complimentary *255 memberships in violation of section 112.313(4). Section 112.313(4) provides: No public officer or employee of an agency or his spouse or minor child shall, at any time, accept any compensation, payment, or thing of value when such public officer or employee knows, or, with the exercise of reasonab...

...as given to influence a vote or other action in which the officer or employee was expected to participate in his official capacity. The Commission found probable cause to believe that Barker had accepted the complimentary memberships in violation of section 112.313(4) and ordered a public hearing to ascertain whether Barker knew or should have known that the memberships were given to influence his vote or other official action. The hearing officer concluded that no reasonable person could believe that the complimentary memberships were given to Barker for any reason except to influence him and recommended that the Commission find that Barker had violated section 112.313(4) by accepting the free memberships....

...State, 629 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla.1994); State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141, 1144 (Fla.1985); Zachary v. State, 269 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla.1972); Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670, 678-79, 154 So. 690, 694 (1934). In D'Alemberte, we invalidated an earlier version of section 112.313(4) as unconstitutionally vague....

...or other political subdivision of the state, legislator, or legislative employee shall accept any gift, favor, or service, of value to the recipient, that would cause a reasonably prudent person to be influenced in the discharge of official duties. § 112.313(1), Fla.Stat....

...person on public officials, the statute is unconstitutionally vague and susceptible to the inherent dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Barker, 654 So.2d at 649. The court stated: [W]hen the Florida Legislature enacted the current Section 112.313(4), it used language prohibiting receipt of gifts the official knows, or, "with the exercise of reasonable care, should know," was given to influence....

...See D'Alemberte v. Anderson, 349 So.2d at 166. Barker, 654 So.2d at 648. Coincidentally, the First District Court of Appeal reached a contrary conclusion less than three months later. Goin v. Commission on Ethics, 658 So.2d 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). In upholding section 112.313(4) against an attack for vagueness, the court said: The D'Alemberte court nullified a statute that tested the public official's behavior against the standards of a "reasonably prudent man." We find that the present statute, *256 inclu...

...rate the same evil. Instead, the present statute merely allows proof of an ethical violation by demonstrating the public employee's actual or constructive knowledge of the donor's illegal intent. Goin, 658 So.2d at 1135. We agree that the version of section 112.313(4) at issue focuses upon whether the actual public official against whom the complaint was filed knew or should have known that the gift was given to influence that public official—not whether a hypothetical public official, "a reasonably prudent person," would be influenced by the gift....

...Stated otherwise, this statute asks whether a public official had actual or constructive knowledge of a donor's intent to influence that public official's vote or other official action. Neither the court below nor any of the parties have suggested, nor do we find, that section 112.313(4) would be unconstitutionally vague if it simply prohibited a public official from accepting a gift if that public official knew that the donor had given the gift in order to influence that public official's vote or other official action. Consequently, we need only address the question of whether the constructive knowledge component of section 112.313(4) renders the section unconstitutionally vague....

...ss than are noncriminal statutes. D'Alemberte, 349 So.2d at 168. Therefore, if the constructive knowledge component of section 812.019—a criminal statute—gives adequate notice of the conduct proscribed, then the constructive knowledge component of section 112.313(4) must certainly pass constitutional muster. We conclude, therefore, that section 112.313(4) is facially constitutional. [1] At the same time, however, we note that proof that something of value was given to a public official who might be in a position to help the donor one day, without more, would not establish a violation of section 112.313(4). Having determined that section 112.313(4) is facially constitutional, there remains the question of whether the hearing officer's findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence....

...Anderson, 349 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1977). In an attempt to curb this danger, the majority cautions: "[P]roof that something of value was given to a public official who might be in a position to help the donor one day, without more, would not establish a violation of section 112.313(4)." Majority op....

...No one disputes that is what a "should know" standard means, and considering the difficulties the parties and the courts at all levels have had with the facts in Goin and Barker, no one can dispute that we have been unable to give concrete meaning to the provisions of section 112.313(4)....

...or Appellee. KAHN, Judge. Appellant Gary D. Latham, a former member of the Florida Parole Commission, challenges a final order of the Commission on Ethics (Commission) adopting a hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusion that Latham violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes....

...It also argues that in any event it has no authority to impose any penalty of any sort. Although these arguments are not entirely lacking in logic and lure, they are overcome by the reality of the statutory scheme and its consequences. The statute under which Latham was charged, section 112.313(6), has as its touchstone the requirement that the public officer must not "corruptly use or attempt to use his or her official position ..." The connotation generally given to the word "corrupt" suggests that one who is found guilty of being corrupt could well expect to be penalized....

...A complaint was filed with the State of Florida Commission on Ethics, alleging that DeBusk corruptly used his public office to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for another by causing the alteration and falsification of copies of public documents in violation of section 112.313(4), *328 Florida Statutes (Supp....

...There was no evidence tending to show that DeBusk received any monetary consideration for these actions. On these facts, the Ethics Commission concluded that DeBusk corruptly used his official position to secure a special privilege for Sells in violation of section 112.313(4)....

...No defense may be raised in the civil action to enforce the civil penalty or order of restitution that could have been raised by judicial review of the administrative findings and recommendations of the commission by certiorari to the District Court of Appeal. [2] Section 112.313(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...and to enjoin the Commission from disclosing any of the materials connected with the proceedings. We affirm. Two complaints were filed against Garner, President of Hillsborough Community College, alleging he misused his public position, contrary to Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (1981), by sexually harassing two female college employees. An additional allegation of the complaints charged that the acts of sexual harassment violated Section 112.313(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), which prohibits the solicitation or acceptance of gifts by public officers or employees....

...The trial court did not err in refusing to terminate the Commission's proceedings. First, the conduct alleged in the complaints, misuse of public position to sexually harass and to attempt to obtain sexual favors from subordinate employees, falls within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, prevents a public official or employee from using his or her official position to secure a *69 special benefit, privilege, or exemption for himself or others....

...Garner seeks to transform these complaints into charges of sexual discrimination which would be within the jurisdiction of the Florida Human Relations Commission Act, Section 23.161, et seq. The complaints, however, allege sexual harassment, not sexual discrimination. We find no merit in Garner's contention that Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (1981), is unconstitutionally vague....

...Gleason, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Philip C. Claypool, Staff Atty., Commission on Ethics, Tallahassee, for appellee. HURLEY, Judge. Appellant, a former commissioner and mayor of the City of Margate, challenges the applicability and constitutionality of Section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes (Florida's Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees)....

...Zerweck acknowledged his relationship with DJM Properties and either abstained from voting or voted and filed a voting conflict statement. In November, 1979, a complaint was filed with the State Commission on Ethics charging Mr. Zerweck with a violation of Section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Rather, it turns upon the existence of an adverse opinion, finding, or recommendation. Once articulated, the Commission cannot shield its finding from judicial scrutiny by failing to "formalize" it. Turning to the merits of the appeal, we note Mr. Zerweck's initial suggestion that he is exempt from the strictures of Section 112.313(7)(a) by virtue of subsection (7)(a)(2)....

...ter of all appeals from these boards. Thus, the commission is required to act on a case-by-case basis to discharge this aspect of its regulatory power. Consequently, the Margate City Commission is not an exempt legislative body within the meaning of Section 112.313(7)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1979). Next, Mr. Zerweck argues that Section 112.313(7)(a) is too vague to pass constitutional muster. Specifically, he suggests that the term "conflict," which is used in Section 112.313(7)(a) and which is defined in Section 112.312(6) is too imprecise to satisfy the notice requirements of due process....

...It attempts to prevent honest government agents from succumbing to temptation by making it illegal for them to enter into relationships which are fraught with temptation." (Emphasis supplied). 364 U.S. at 549-550, 81 S.Ct. at 309. As with the federal statute referred to above, Section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), establishes an objective standard which requires an examination of the nature and extent of the public officer's duties together with a review of his private employment to determine whether the two are...

...We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that the Commission's determination that Mr. Zerweck's employment with DJM Properties, Inc., posed a frequently recurring conflict of interest, is supported by substantial, competent evidence. Thus, we affirm the Commission's finding and hold that the language of Section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), is sufficiently definite to provide adequate notice of the conduct which it prohibits....

...." I believe the respondent is entitled to some advice. When the City Commission voted on issues affecting D.J.M. Properties, Inc. did Zerweck's abstentions on voting conflict statements "impede the full and faithful discharge of his public duties?" Section 112.313(7)(a)....

...Gen., Tallahassee and Stephen L. Boyles, State's Atty., Palatka, for appellant. Ben Daniel, Jr., Ocala, for appellee. BOYD, Justice. An information was filed in the County Court of Marion County charging Marion County Commissioner George M. Rou, Jr. with a criminal violation of Section 112.313(3), Florida Statutes (1973)....

...by locating a public road adjacent to Smith's property, contrary to the established Marion County road program, and thereby enhancing the value of Smith's property. The trial judge dismissed the information and held the statute unconstitutionally vague. By direct appeal we are asked to review the order of the Court. [1] Section 112.313(3), Florida Statutes (1973), provided: "No officer or employee of a state agency, or of a county ......

...de by an elected public official where more than one choice is available, so that the statute inadequately identifies the class of benefits which are proscribed as opposed to those which are permitted. As will be seen, Rou's contention suggests that Section 112.313(3) may be ill-suited to achieve the legislative goal....

...(1973). [8] Legislators, for example, quite properly introduce bills of all types to secure privileges or exemptions for others. [9] Contrast the need for external references to fix standards of impropriety, rather than individual intent, which doomed Section 112.313(1), Florida Statutes (1973)....

...Gen., and Craig B. Willis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. REVISED OPINION ZEHMER, Judge. This is an appeal by Louise Blackburn from a final order entered by the Florida Commission on Ethics. The Commission found her guilty of violating section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (1989), by corruptly using her official position as a county commissioner to secure a special benefit for herself, i.e., having an employee of Gadsden County compile information and write a short article in suppor...

...nformation and write the article supporting the garbage ordinance, which she used in her political speeches and in a political ad published in the local newspaper, constituted the misuse of appellant's office as a county commissioner in violation of section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...The Commission accepted the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the hearing officer's recommended order, found appellant guilty of the alleged violation, and recommended that a $250 civil penalty be imposed against appellant. This appeal ensued. Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (1989), provides in pertinent part: (6) MISUSE OF PUBLIC POSITION....

...ining the assistance of a county employee in compiling information and writing a speech or ad that eventually was used in a reelection campaign. They have reached this conclusion without citing to any specific provision by rule or statute other than section 112.313(6), or referring to any published opinion of any Florida court or the Ethics Commission itself, that would give fair and reasonable warning that appellant's obtaining the assistance of the county employee under the circumstances shown in this case would be unlawful or unethical. An essential element of the charged offense under section 112.313(6) is the statutory requirement that appellant acted with wrongful intent, that is, that she acted with reasonable notice that her conduct was inconsistent with the proper performance of her public duties and would be a violation of the law or the code of ethics in part III of chapter 112. We do not believe that section 112.313(6), standing alone, provided a legally sufficient basis for putting appellant on notice that she was committing an unethical practice under these circumstances....

...overnment they are sworn to serve. Section 112.311(5) specifically refers to the code of ethics enacted in this part to implement the policy and intent recited in the preceding subparagraphs (1) through (4), and the standards of conduct set forth in section 112.313 must be construed in the context of these provisions....

...lative intent and policy. It would be difficult, indeed, for this commissioner or anyone else to know when their use of county employees in the performance of their official duties would cross the line of prohibited conduct. If the code of ethics in section 112.313 is to cover the acts charged and proved against appellant in this case, the legislature must evidence that intent in more specific statutory enactments....

...prove appellant acted in these matters with the requisite wrongful intent to violate any law or standard of ethics and that the conduct charged and proven against appellant under the circumstances of this case [2] is not within the proscriptions of section 112.313(6), we reverse the Commission's final order and remand with directions to dismiss the charge against appellant....

...Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Philip C. Claypool, Staff Atty., Commission on Ethics, Tallahassee, for State of Florida Commission on Ethics. GRIMES, Judge. Richard Tenney appeals from an order of the trial court upholding the constitutionality of section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ng of probable cause. Mr. Tenney was an elected public official serving as a city commissioner in Clearwater. On February 18, 1980, a complaint was filed with the Commission on Ethics which charged that Tenney had violated the following provision of section 112.313, Florida Statutes (1979): (6) MISUSE OF PUBLIC POSITION....

...This section shall not be construed to conflict with s. 104.31. After its staff had conducted an investigation into the complaint, the Commission on Ethics met in executive session on June 18, 1980, and determined that there was probable cause to believe that Mr. Tenney had violated the provisions of section 112.313(6)....

...eliminary investigation of this complaint, the Commission on Ethics finds that there is probable cause to believe that Respondent, a member of the Clearwater City Commission, violated Part III of Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, and more specifically, Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by Respondent's use of his position as Clearwater City Commissioner to obtain a meeting with Congressman "Tip" O'Neill and obtain removal of political signs of his electoral opponents and other special privileges and benefits from others. That same day, Tenney filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the constitutionality of section 112.313(6) and seeking to prevent the commission from pursuing its case against him. Subsequently, Mr. Tenney filed a motion for temporary injunction. After a hearing, the court issued an opinion in which it found that section 112.313(6) was constitutional....

...onduct a preliminary hearing on the complaint against Tenney. Both parties filed appeals from the court's order, and we have consolidated them for the purposes of our consideration. In the trial court and here, Mr. Tenney has based his argument that section 112.313(6) is unconstitutional on the fact that the Supreme Court of Florida declared its predecessor statute, section 112.313(3), Florida Statutes (1973), unconstitutional in State v. Rou, 366 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1979) (England, C.J., and Sundberg and Alderman, JJ., dissenting). Section 112.313(3) stated that: No officer or employee of a state agency, or of a county, city or other political subdivision of the state, or any legislator or legislative employee shall use, or attempt to use, his official position to secure specia...

...The terms "special privileges or exemptions" afford one no guidelines, no "ascertainable standard of guilt," Locklin v. Pridgeon, 158 Fla. 737, 30 So.2d 102 (1947), no barometer by which a public official may measure his specific conduct. 366 So.2d at 385. While section 112.313(6) is similar to former section 112.313(3), there have been two notable changes which, when considered together, have removed the taint *1246 of impermissible vagueness found by the supreme court. Accordingly, we hold that section 112.313(6) is constitutional. The first change is not in section 112.313(6) itself but arises from the fact that the legislature has repealed that part of section 112.317, Florida Statutes (1973), which made a violation of section 112.313 a criminal offense punishable as a first-degree misdemeanor....

...1977), "[W]e perceive the test to be much less severe where the maximum penalty is loss of an office or position. Penal statutes must meet a higher test of specificity." This being the case, we can now look at the second change knowing that we need not hold section 112.313(6) to the same standard that the supreme court held its predecessor. The second change comes in the addition of the word "corruptly" to section 112.313(6)....

...ission in rejecting the contention of persons who were the subjects of the commission's investigation that they were entitled to the due process rights available in adjudicatory proceedings. Accordingly, while we affirm the trial court's ruling that section 112.313(6) is constitutional, we reverse that part of the court's order striking the commission's finding of probable cause....

...We do not address the merits of the proposed consent decree. to vote on all matters before them; abstaining from a vote is prohibited unless "there is, or appears to be, a possible conflict of interest under § 112.311, § 112.313, or § 112.3143." Fla.Stat.Ann....

...2 Dist.1983)—a case that has nothing to do with voting. In Garner, the ethics commission considered a complaint alleging that a college president abused his official position by seeking sexual favors from female subordinate personnel. The ethics commission found that this behavior violated Fla.Stat.Ann. § 112.313(6) (West 1994), which provides that "No public officer or employee of an agency ......

...ossible applications of this statute. See Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So.2d 68 (Fla.2000). Accordingly, we AFFIRM the final order revoking appellant's license. WOLF and BROWNING, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] The statute addressed by both Barker and Goin was section 112.313(4), Florida Statutes (1993), which provides: No public officer or employee of an agency or his spouse or minor child shall, at any time, accept any compensation, payment, or thing of value when such public officer or employee knows, o...

...against whom an adverse opinion, finding, or recommendation is made. A similar question was presented in Zerweck v. State Commission on Ethics, 409 So.2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). In that case, a complaint was filed alleging that Mr. Zerweck violated Section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...l not increase regardless of the time, nature, or extent of the services rendered by either. The advisory opinion issued *39 by the Commission on Ethics [4] stated that this dual employment presented a conflict of interest which was prohibited under Section 112.313(3), Florida Statutes (1979). Howard first argues that Section 112.313(3), supra, interferes with the plenary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law under Article V, Section 15 of the Florida Constitution. We find nothing in the legislative policy evinced by Sections 112.311 and 112.316, Florida Statutes (1979), construed in pari materia with Section 112.313(3), which interferes with the constitutional authority of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law....

..., in its broad application, the statute prohibits dual positions without any allegation of impropriety. Affirmed. JORGENSON, Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I agree that we have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. I also agree that Section 112.313(3), Florida Statutes (1979), does not interfere with our Supreme Court's plenary jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. I dissent, however, from the Court's affirmance of the Commission's advisory opinion. The retainer agreement with Mr. Howard and his law firm openly arrived at and in use for a number of years does not, in my view, violate Section 112.313(3), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...tor's place of business. This subsection shall not affect or be construed to prohibit contracts entered into prior to: *41 (a) October 1, 1975. (b) Qualification for elective office. (c) Appointment to public office. (d) Beginning public employment. Section 112.313(3), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...r services. See, for example, CEO 78-39, a copy of which is enclosed. We also have advised that a partner is "acting in a private capacity" when his partnership acts. See CEO 79-83, Question II, a copy of which is enclosed. Thus, we have interpreted Section 112.313(3), Florida Statutes, to apply not only where a public officer or employee is selling his personal services in a private capacity to his agency, but also where the officer or employee is acting in a private capacity to sell the services of another....

...ou share as a partner in the retainer which is paid to the firm by the School Board. These circumstances provide a further indication that you have acted and are acting in a private capacity to sell the services of your law firm to the School Board. Section 112.313(3) does contain a "grandfather" clause, which would exempt contracts entered into prior to October 1, 1975....

...ion participated), when we inquired about our jurisdiction at oral argument. [4] The advisory opinion is reproduced in the appendix to this opinion. [5] There is no suggestion by Howard that the legislature exceeded its authority by the enactment of Section 112.313(3), supra....

...nction. This case began when various individuals filed a complaint with the Ethics Commission charging Lancaster, the Supervisor of Elections of Clay County, with several acts of sexual harassment against some of his female employees in violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Robinson appeals the final order and public report in which the Commission on Ethics recommended a $10,000 civil penalty and a public censure and reprimand for ethical violations committed by Robinson while he was serving as a contracted city attorney. We affirm the portion of the order finding that Robinson violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2014), because competent substantial evidence supports that finding, but we reverse the portion of the order finding that Robinson violated section 112.313(16)(c) because the Commission misconstrued that statute....

...These appointments formed the basis of a complaint filed with the Commission by a city resident. Commission staff investigated the complaint, and based on the investigation, the Commission found probable cause to believe that Robinson violated section 112.313(3), (6), (7), and (16) by “providing counsel and recommendations to the City Commission regarding the adoption of [the ordinance] requiring the appointment of a Zoning Hearing Officer and encouraging the City Commission to amend ....

...2 appoint an administrative law judge (ALJ) to conduct a “public hearing.” See § 112.324(3), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 34- 5.010. After a two-day hearing, the ALJ issued a detailed recommended order finding that Robinson did not violate section 112.313(3) or (7) but that he did violate section 112.313(6) and (16)(c). With respect to section 112.313(6), the ALJ explained: Based upon his years of service to the City and based upon the fact that [Robinson] generally had the majority of the Commissioners on his side when he made recommendations for action to be...

...By offering his services at the 11th hour as the best qualified candidate for the Zoning Hearing Officer position, the obvious conclusion an outsider to the process would make is that [Robinson] created an unfair advantage for himself and his firm. And, with respect to section 112.313(16)(c), the ALJ explained: When [Robinson] continued to represent the City regarding the two ordinances that created new positions with the City, he violated section 112.313(16)(c), because the position he sought was for a “private individual or entity” since both [Robinson] and [his law firm] no longer would be either the City Attorney or the local government attorney ....

.... Based on these violations, the ALJ recommended a $10,000 civil penalty—$5,000 for each violation. Robinson filed exceptions to the recommended order in which he argued, among other things, that (1) the Commission failed to prove that he violated section 112.313(6) because the ALJ did not expressly find, and the evidence did not establish, that he acted “corruptly,” and (2) the Commission failed to prove that he violated section 112.313(16)(c) because other provisions of subsection (16) expressly authorized him to refer business to his law firm. The Commission—with no noted dissent 2—rejected Robinson’s exceptions and adopted the ALJ’s findings that Robinson violated section 112.313(6) and (16)(c), and based on these violations, the Commission recommended that the Governor 3 impose a $10,000 civil penalty and also publicly censure and reprimand Robinson. 2 Commissioner Anchors—the “skeptical...

...The disciplinary official—in this case, the Governor, see § 112.324(8)(d), Fla. Stat.—is then responsible for imposing the penalty. 5  A In his first issue on appeal, Robinson contends that the Commission erred in finding that he violated section 112.313(6) because the evidence does not establish that he acted “corruptly” as required by the statute. We disagree. Section 112.313(6) provides in pertinent part: No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney shall corruptly use or attempt to use his or her official position ....

...failure to make an explicit finding that he acted “corruptly” compels reversal because, as the Commission explained in the final order and public report, that finding is implicit from the other findings in the recommended order and the ALJ’s determination that Robinson violated section 112.313(6). 6 position as city attorney, he persuaded the city commission to create and appoint him to the new positions of Zoning Hearing Officer and Code Enforcement Special Magistrate....

...(stating that “the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on any disputed finding of fact”). In sum, because competent substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that Robinson violated section 112.313(6), we affirm that finding. B In his second issue on appeal, Robinson contends that the Commission erred in finding that he violated section 112.313(16)(c) because the Commission misconstrued that statute. We agree. Section 112.313(16)(c) provides: No local government attorney or law firm in which the local government attorney is a member, partner, or employee shall represent a private individual or entity before the unit of local government to which the local government attorney provides legal services....

...attorney from referring legal work to his firm unless the attorney’s contract with the local government authorizes or mandates that the firm be used to complete the local government’s legal work. Here, Robinson was found to have violated the first sentence of section 112.313(16)(c)....

...First, this broad interpretation is inconsistent with the longstanding interpretation of the statute reflected in the Commission’s advisory opinions issued pursuant to section 112.322(3). In Opinion 17-18, for example, the Commission opined that section 112.313(16)(c) prohibited the contracted attorney for a local value adjustment board from representing “another person or entity” before the board, but that it did not prohibit the attorney from representing “[his] own interests as a property owner” before the board....

...prohibited from appearing before any board in an individual capacity as a private citizen, representing solely his or her own interests.” Id. (citing advisory opinions 78-79 and 93-36). Second, this broad interpretation would result in the first sentence of section 112.313(16)(c) prohibiting conduct that is expressly authorized by the second sentence of the statute. Specifically, if the first sentence of the statute were construed to preclude a local government attorney from representing himself or his...

...‘[w]here possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another’” (quoting Quarantello v. Leroy, 977 So. 2d 648, 651-52 10 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008))). Accordingly, we reject the ALJ’s broad interpretation of section 112.313(16)(c) in this case, and consistent with the longstanding interpretation adopted by the Commission in its advisory opinions, 6 we narrowly construe this statute to only preclude the local government attorney from representing a person...

...t of government to which the attorney provides legal services. This does not mean that there are no ethical limitations on a local government attorney’s referral of legal work to himself or his law firm. Indeed, the second sentence of section 112.313(16)(c) prohibits such referrals unless they are authorized or mandated by the attorney’s contract with the local government, and section 112.313(16)(b) provides that the “the standards of conduct in subsections (2), (4), (5), (6), and (8) [of section 112.313] shall apply to any person who serves as a local government attorney.” Accordingly, as happened in this case, a local government attorney who is found to have misused his position by “corruptly” obtaining legal work or other special benefits or privileges for himself or his firm can be found guilty of violating section 112.313(6). In sum, because the Commission misconstrued section 112.313(16)(c), we reverse the Commission’s determination that Robinson violated that statute. C In his final issue on appeal, Robinson contends that the Commission abused its discretion by increasing the recommended penalty to include a public censure and reprimand. We need not resolve this issue because the Commission will need to reconsider the recommended penalty based on our reversal of the portion of the final order and public report finding that Robinson violated section 112.313(16)(c)....

...“stat[e] with particularity its reasons therefor in the order, by citing to the record in justifying the action.” § 120.57(1)(l), Fla. Stat. III In sum, for the reasons stated above, we affirm the Commission’s finding that Robinson violated section 112.313(6), but reverse its finding that he violated section 112.313(16)(c)....

...-day evidentiary hearing was held and the administrative law judge’s 13 recommended order concluded that two violations were proven and two were not: • Robinson did not violate Florida Statutes section 112.313(3) (2014)—which prohibits doing business with one’s own agency— because section 112.313(16) lawfully permitted him to do so as to the hearing officer/magistrate positions. • Robinson did not violate section 112.313(7)(a)— which prohibits conflicting employment and contractual relationships—because, although he and his law firm had “an inherent conflict” in concurrently representing the...

...on requirements for the two new” hearing officer/magistrate positions, they were permitted to do so by statute such that they could: a) provide “all nature of legal services to the City” under section 112.313(16)(b); and b) were “specifically permitted” to “have an employment or contractual relationship with his law firm that would potentially create a continuing or frequently recurring conflict between his private interests and the performance of his public duties or that would impede the full and faithful discharge of his public duties.” • Robinson violated section 112.313(16)(c)— which prohibits a local government attorney from “represent[ing]” a private individual or entity before the local government that employs him—because he was representing himself and his firm who would both “bec[ome] private citizens as to the City” after their legal services contract came to an end. • Robinson violated section 112.313(6)—which prohibits misuse of public position—because he 14  should have recommended, but didn’t, that the City Commission hire outside counsel to handle the hearing officer/magistrate discussions and negotiations. The Commission’s Final Report unanimously upheld the two violations and this appeal ensued. I agree that Robinson did not violate section 112.313(16)(c) because his actions—assisting the City by offering interim legal and hearing officer/magistrate services—did not amount to representation of a “client” before the City under the circumstances of this case. See § 112.312(22), Fla. Stat. (2014). Neither Robinson nor his firm were representing a “client,” which the definitional statute requires, such that the section 112.313(16)(c) violation must be vacated. But I fail to see how Robinson can be said to have acted “corruptly” in violation of section 112.313(6) as to the hearing officer/magistrate positions under the circumstances presented. As next discussed, (a) he and his law firm were exempt from ethics laws related to “doing business” and having “conflicting employment/contract...

...city attorney at the time the hearing officer/magistrate positions were first discussed, and later proposed and approved. By law, both Robinson and his law firm were statutorily exempt from the prohibition on “doing business with one’s agency,” § 112.313(3), Fla. Stat., and had statutory authority to provide comprehensive legal services and have an employment relationship with the City that conflicted with “his private interests and the performance of his public duties” (or impeded the latter). Section 112.313, subsection (16)(b) states: (b) It shall not constitute a violation of subsection (3) [doing business with agency] or subsection (7) 15  [conflicting employment or contractual relationship...

...This would include the “gap-filling” services Robinson and his law firm provided as well as the limited terminable-at-will services at issue. Nothing in the statutory language gave notice that either of these contracts was other than lawful. Second, and on a similar note, Robinson did not act “corruptly” under section 112.313(6) because he didn’t misuse his position by acting inconsistent with his public duties nor did he act with wrongful intent. Local government attorneys—though shielded from “doing business” and having “conflicting employment/contractual relationships” with their agencies—are subject to the standards of conduct in section 112.313(6), which says that no public official “shall corruptly use or attempt to use his or her official position or any property or resource which may be within his or her trust, or perform his or her official duties, to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, herself, or others.” § 112.313(6), Fla....

...contracting with Robinson directly for his services. Nor is Robinson’s drafting of the ordinances as the City’s attorney alleged to be impermissible under the municipal code; indeed, he fully assisted in the transition in a positive and constructive way. And, as just discussed, section 112.313(16)(b) gave the City much leeway in its procurement of “any or all” of Robinson’s legal services. What’s left is the narrow claim that Robinson was required to suggest that the City hire and pay outside legal counsel to...

...To the contrary, offering his legal services was consistent with the City’s lawful procurement of “any and all” legal services from both him and his law firm; and it was lawful, and not an ethics violation, under the broad legal services contract that was in place. § 112.313(16)(b) & (c), Fla....

...ought to be done generally when legal services are procured, particularly given the statutory protection that attorneys—like Robinson—get from ethics charges that they did business with their own agency or had conflicting employment or contractual relationships. § 112.313(16), Fla....

...proper performance of h[is] public duties and would be a violation of the law or the code of ethics in part III of chapter 112.” Blackburn, 589 So. 2d at 434. Third, it is equally apparent that Robinson did not have the wrongful intent that section 112.313(6) requires....

...assisting the City in proposing and providing the hearing officer/magistrate services under the circumstances presented. *** In summary, the evidence fails to demonstrate that Robinson acted corruptly as statutorily-defined in section 112.313(6)....

...Samuel Bennett ("Appellant") challenges the determination by Appellee, Commission on Ethics ("the Commission") that he corruptly used his position as Chairman of the Council of the Town of Pierson, Florida, to obtain a special benefit in violation of section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes *925 (1999)....

...es affecting Appellant's property were adopted. Throughout this process, Appellant's actions in having marked *926 the original map came under scrutiny, culminating in an investigation and the instant action. The statutory provision at issue here is section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, which provides, in pertinent part as follows: Misuse of public position.—No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney shall [1] corruptly use or attempt to use his or her [2] official position or any property or resource which may be within his or her trust, or perform his or her official duties, [3] to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, herself, or others. § 112.313(6), Fla....

...actions. The Commission argues that Appellant not only acted with a wrongful intent, but that such conduct was inconsistent with the proper performance of his official duties. This, the Commission asserts, meets the "corrupt" standard required under section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes....

...Miller of Bryant, Miller & Olive, Tallahassee, for appellee. PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from an order of the State of Florida Commission on Ethics which assessed attorney's fees against appellant. We reverse. The Commission received a sworn complaint from appellant alleging that appellee had violated Section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), by owning and managing a stevedoring company which was directly regulated by the Port St....

...After the Commission found the complaint to be legally sufficient, a preliminary investigation was ordered. Fla. Admin. Code Rule 34-5-02. Based upon the preliminary investigation, the Commission found that there was no probable cause to believe that appellee violated Section 112.313(7)(a), and accordingly, dismissed the complaint. Fla. Admin. Code Rule 34-5.06. Section 112.313(7)(a) provides: No public officer or employee of an agency shall have or hold any employment or contractual relationship with any business entity or any agency which is subject to the regulation of, or is doing business with, an agency of which he is an officer or employee, ......

...was based upon three grounds. First, although the preliminary investigation revealed that appellee was chairman of the Port St. Joe Port Authority and also sole owner of the St. Joe Stevedoring Company, the Commission found there was no violation of Section 112.313(7)(a) under the exception specified in Section 112.313(7)(b) since the special act creating the Authority permitted two commissioners of the Authority to be primarily engaged in the maritime business....

...cious intent. We find the Commission erroneously concluded the complaint was frivolous and without basis in law or fact. Admittedly, the Commission found after a preliminary investigation that there was no probable cause to believe appellee violated Section 112.313(7)(a)....

...However, such determination was not made until after factual investigations, legal research, and the Commission's statutory interpretation and construction of the pertinent laws and statutes. The Commission's determination that there was no violation of Section 112.313(7)(a) because of the exception set forth in Section 112.313(7)(b) was dependent upon its factual investigation which revealed that no commissioner of the Authority, other than appellee, was primarily engaged in the maritime business....

...The Commission's determination that the complaint was without basis in fact was dependent upon its factual investigation which revealed that no stevedores had been licensed by the Authority. This determination was also based upon the Commission's apparent construction of the "which is subject to the regulation of" phrase in Section 112.313(7)(a) to require present, as opposed to future, regulation....

...PER CURIAM. James K. Gordon appeals from a final order and public report rendered by the State of Florida Commission on Ethics dated December 20, 1990. The order held that appellant, while a member of the Coral Springs City Commission, violated sections 112.313(6) and 112.313(7), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...The order recommended that appellant suffer reprimand by the governor, pay a civil penalty in the amount of $12,200.00, and pay a restitution penalty in the amount of $50.00 to the State of Florida. We affirm the commission's ruling that appellant violated section 112.313(7) by virtue of his employment with two City of Coral Springs franchisees. We reject appellant's argument that his reliance on the city attorney's advice should be construed as a complete defense to these charges. We also affirm the commission's conclusion that appellant violated section 112.313(6) when he used city stationery to promote a symposium for which he received compensation. Appellant contends that the commission failed to apply the correct standard for review of the hearing officer's findings of fact when it concluded that appellant's actions regarding a sign variance and a developer's agreement violated section 112.313(6)....

...er, that the findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply with essential requirements of law. The hearing officer concluded that appellant did not violate section 112.313(6) with reference to the approval of the sign variance....

...the forfeiture retroactively. In that case, the employee did not persuade the county commission to grant him an increased accrued leave benefit while serving as the commission’s chief legal officer. Finally, Mr. Fernandez argues that sec *559 tion 112.313(5), Florida Statutes (2006), 3 relieved him of any fiduciary duty regarding the negotiation of his own salary and severance provisions....

...— Whoever knowingly makes a *557 false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his or her official duty shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.” . Section 112.313 provides: (5) SALARY AND EXPENSES....

...ommission"). Danaher accused Maloy of violating the Florida Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees. See §§ 112.311.326, Fla. Stat. (2000). Danaher's first allegation concerned improper solicitation and acceptance of gifts in violation of section 112.313(2), Florida Statutes: Commissioner Maloy solicited and accepted a sexual "favor or service" from his aide Ms....

...Morris which was based on the understanding that his judgment and official action would be based on the continuance of the sexual "favor or service" from Ms. Morris or her employment would be terminated. Danaher's second allegation accused Maloy of misusing his public position in violation of section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes: Commissioner Maloy allegedly corruptly used his official position to obtain a special privilege from his aide in the form of sexual relations. The complaint also accused Maloy of violating section 112.313(7), Florida Statutes, through an improper conflict with his county commission duties: Commissioner Maloy allegedly held an explicit [sic] employment relationship with his aide which created a frequently occurring conflict between his...

...staff members with the understanding that his official actions or judgment would be influenced; and (2) using his position to engage in sexually or romantically oriented comments, behavior, and/or invitations to female staff members in violation of section 112.313(6)....

PER CURIAM. This cause is an appeal from a final administrative order issued by the Florida Commission on Ethics (“Commission”), concluding that Gary Siplin violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2006), by asserting his position- as a state senator to bully a deputy sheriff into permitting him access to a stadium parking lot through a barricaded roadway....

...Marcus Robinson was one of the Orange County deputy sheriffs who encountered Siplin. In the capacity of a concerned citizen, Robinson filed an ethics complaint against Siplin. The Commission investigated the claim, referred the matter to an administrative law judge, and ultimately concluded that Siplin had violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, which provides standards of conduct for public officers. In order to conclude that Siplin violated section 112.313(6), the Commission was required to find by clear and convincing evidence that Siplin, as a public officer, (1) used or attempted to use his official position (2) “to secure a special privilege, benefit or exemption” for himself or...

...The First District Court of Appeal was asked in Latham v. Florida Commission on Ethics, 694 So.2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), to consider the proper standard of proof in proceedings before the Commission. The district court concluded that the touchstone of section 112.313(6) is its requirement that the public officer acted corruptly, a term that has penal nuances: The statute under which Latham was charged, section 112.313(6), has as its touchstone the requirement that the public officer must not “corruptly use or attempt to use his or her official position ......

...We needed to alleviate the situation in the quickest manner. This opinion should not be read to indicate the approval of Senator Siplin’s conduct. However, his conduct does not rise to the legal definition of acting corruptly for purposes of violating section 112.313(6)....

constituted a prohibited conflict of interest under section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). The Commission

Judiciary Committee, dated April 26, 2006. 11 Section 112.313(2), Fla. Stat. 12 See s. 112.3148, Fla. Stat

predicate for their determination: (1) that Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (1981), is unconstitutionally

that such behavior constituted a violation of section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (1981). After finding

In 1975, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 112.-313(10), Florida Statute, which provides: EMPLOYEES

...ondent. In this instance, pursuant to the statute, the complaints were forwarded by respondent commission to the two districts who were employers of relator on March 4, 1975. On March 18, 1975, relator filed a disclosure statement in compliance with § 112.313(3), Florida Statutes (1974), for the purpose of disclosing the fact of his *139 status as an officer of Coral Ridge Properties, Inc., and Florida National Properties, Inc., and as superintendent of the North Springs and Coral Springs Improvement Districts and the Sunshine Drainage District....

...respects: (1) it gives no notice of what conduct it forbids; and (2) it encourages arbitrary arrests, prosecutions, and convictions. The state filed a response to the defendant’s motion. In the response, the state argued that section 838.016, coupled with sections 112.313(2) and 112.313(4), Florida Statutes (2008), provided adequate notice of 2 proscribed conduct and provided law enforcement with sufficient guidance to avoid arbitrary arrests and prosecutions. Section 112.313(2) provides: No public officer, employee of an agency, local government attorney, or candidate for nomination or election shall solicit or accept anything of value to the recipient, including a gift, loan, reward, promise of future employment, favor, or service, based upon any understanding that the vote, official action, or judgment of the public officer, employee, local government attorney, or candidate would be influenced thereby. § 112.313(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). Further, section 112.313(4) provides: No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney or his or her spouse or minor child shall, at any time, accept any compensation, payment, or thing of value when such public...

...knows, or, with the exercise of reasonable care, should know, that it was given to influence a vote or other action in which the officer, employee, or local government attorney was expected to participate in his or her official capacity. § 112.313(4), Fla....

...phrase “not authorized by law,” but did not define that phrase. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 19.3. To address that issue, the state, consistent with its response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, initially requested a special jury instruction based on sections 112.313(2) and 112.313(4). The state ultimately requested a special jury instruction based on only section 112.313(4). Applying section 112.313(4), the state’s proposed instruction defined the phrase “not authorized by law” as follows: “Not authorized by law” means the following: No public officer or employee of a local government shall, at any time, ac...

...hout waiving his argument that section 838.016’s use of the phrase “not authorized by law” was unconstitutionally vague, he agreed with the state that the court should instruct the jury on the element of “not authorized by law” pursuant to section 112.313(4). 4  Based on the parties’ positions, the trial court instructed the jury on all fifteen counts by using the definition of “not authorized by law” pursuant to section 112.313(4) stated above. During the jury’s deliberations, the jury returned a note to the court asking the following question: “Is there any addition [sic] information regarding clarification of ‘not authorized by law’?” When th...

...ordinary meaning of its words of common usage. We address each below. 1. Other Statutory Provisions Two statutory provisions may be used to define what constitutes a benefit “not authorized by law,” as that phrase is used in section 838.016(1). First, section 112.313(2), Florida Statutes (2008), provides: No public officer, employee of an agency, local government attorney, or candidate for nomination or election shall solicit or accept anything of value to the recipient, includi...

...loan, reward, promise of future employment, favor, or service, based upon any understanding that the vote, official action, or judgment of the public officer, employee, local government attorney, or candidate would be influenced thereby. § 112.313(2), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). Second, section 112.313(4), Florida Statutes (2008), provides: No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney or his or her spouse or minor child shall, at any time, accept any compensation, payment, or thing of val...

...knows, or, with the exercise of reasonable care, should know, that it was given to influence a vote or other action in which the officer, employee, or local government attorney was expected to participate in his or her official capacity. § 112.313(4), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). 7  The common theme running between sections 112.313(2) and 112.313(4) is that a public officer or employee shall not accept anything of value given to influence the public officer’s or employee’s vote or other official action....

...blic duty. . . . Analogous to the supreme court’s conclusion in Brake, we conclude that the dictionary definition of “authorize” illuminates our understanding of the facts here. When combined with the common theme running between sections 112.313(2) and 112.313(4) – that a public officer or employee shall not accept anything of value given to influence the public officer’s or employee’s vote or other official action – a person of common intelligence would understand that providing gifts to i...

....311 et seq., Florida Statutes (2008). Thus, section 838.016(1) was sufficiently definite to inform the defendant that his conduct in providing gifts to influence public employees’ official action – which in turn, caused them to violate sections 112.313(2) and 112.313(4) by accepting things of value given to influence their official action – was “not authorized by law.” 3....

...minal trials, we suggest that the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases consider updating standard jury instruction 19.3 to define the phrase “not authorized by law” using the optional definitions which sections 112.313(2) and 112.313(4) provide. Affirmed. DAMOORGIAN and CONNER, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 12 

...7.021(31) (“public office” defined for purposes of the election code); § 110.107(5) (defining “position” as used in chapter on public officers and employees); § 111.012(1)(b) (defining “elected public officer” for purposes of section); § 112.313(1) (defining “public officer” for purposes of section); § 112.3135(1)(c) (defining “public - 15 -  As was mentioned above, Petitioner finds support for his ambiguity argument in the dissenting views of Judge Altenbernd in LaMorte, who found the phrase �...

...ecific relief sought, we must affirm the challenged order. The proceedings below were initiated upon the filing of a complaint with the Florida Commission on Ethics (“Commission”) alleging that Patchett, a former Florida legislator, had violated § 112.313(4), Florida Statutes (1987), which deals with a public officer’s receiving unauthorized compensation. After entry of a probable-cause order finding a violation of § 112.313(4), the Commission gave notice of intent to take Patehett’s deposition “for the purpose of discovery, for use at public hearing, or for such other purposes as are permitted under the applicable statutes or rules of court.” Patchett immediately sought a protective order to preclude the taking of the deposition....

answered in the affirmative. AS TO QUESTION 2: Section 112.313(2), supra, requires a public officer or employee

...Knecht worked for South Trail as a paramedic. Simultaneously, he was employed by Southern Medical Ambulance Services, Inc., which operates a private ambulance service in the same area as South Trail. Because he deemed Mr. Knecht’s dual employment to be a conflict of interest under section 112.313(7), Florida Statutes (1977), Fire Chief William H....

assessment program." (Emphasis supplied.) Section 112.313(3), id., of the Standards of Conduct Law, prohibits

Commission on Ethics, finding that Barker violated Section 112.313(4), Florida Statutes (1993) (Florida’s Code

...5(a), State Const., and that service by a deputy tax assessor on a county school board would not violate that constitutional provision. There still remains, however, the question of whether such service would violate provisions of the Standards of Conduct Law, ss. 112.311 -112.318, F.S. Section 112.313 (6) of the act formerly prohibited a public official from accepting a position of employment which might impair his independence of judgment in the performance of his public duties....

...Applying this definition, I do not perceive any significant clash between the respective duties of deputy tax assessor and county school board member which would constitute a violation of the common law. The only other provision of the Standards of Conduct Law that might be applicable here is s. 112.313 (4), F.S....

interpret, or make more specific. Cf. AGO 073-489. Section 112.313(1), supra, creates a limitation upon the standards

...contractual relationship with Artel Shows, a business entity subject to the regulation of the Department, to inspect amusement rides at a church carnival.” In determining this violation, the Commission declined to apply the exemption set forth in section 112.313(12)(f), Florida Statutes....

...ch carnival. The Commission does not contend that Artel did business with Mr. Rich's agency. The basis of the alleged violation was that Artel was subject to the regulation of the agency. Given this, the phrase “subject transaction” contained in section 112.313(12)(f) must apply to the single transaction constituting the “contractual relationship” that existed between Mr. Rich and Artel. Accordingly, so much of the final order of the Commission finding Mr. Rich in violation of section 112.313(7)(a) by reason of a church carnival ride inspection and penalizing him therefor is reversed....

...3 The members of the council are appointed by the board and subject to confirmation by the Senate. 4 You state that the council is subject to the open government laws and that its members are subject to the standards of conduct for public officers contained in section 112.313 , Florida Statutes....

...Initially, it must be stated that a member of the governing board of a water management district, a political subdivision of the state, is subject to the provisions of the Standards of Conduct Law. Attorney General Opinion 073-160. The specific provisions of the law which might be applicable in the instant situation are in s. 112.313 (2), (3), and (4), F.S. Also relevant here is s. 286.012 , F.S. Section 112.313 (3), supra, prohibits an officer or employee of a political subdivision of the state from using, or attempting to use, his official position to secure special privileges or exemptions for himself or others. However, there appears to be no present violation of this provision in the situation you describe. Section 112.313 (4), supra, prohibits an officer or employee of a political subdivision from accepting employment or engaging in any business or professional activity which he might reasonably expect would require or induce him to disclose confidential information acquired by him by reason of his official position....

...Although this provision places primary responsibility for determining such expectancy of disclosure upon the officer or employee involved, again there appears to be no likelihood that a violation of this provision will occur in the instant situation. Finally, s. 112.313 (2), supra, requires that an officer or employee of a political subdivision who is an officer, director, agent, or member of, or owns a controlling interest in, any business entity which is subject to the regulation of, or which has substa...

QUESTIONS: 1. Does "subject to regulation by" in s. 112.313 (2), F.S., mean that a legislator-attorney must disclose the name of a client who is regulated by a state agency, when the legal representation has no relation to the official capacity in which the client is regulated by the state? 2. If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative, which professions and occupations are regulated by the state within the purview of s. 112.313 (2), F.S.? 3. If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative, does s. 112.313 (2), F.S., require that there be disclosure of a client who is regulated by the state, but who was represented by the legislator-attorney only prior to the latter's election to office? 4....

...corporation, firm, partnership, or other business entity which is subject to the regulation of any state agency, county, city, or other political subdivision of the state, file with the Department of State a sworn statement disclosing such interest, s. 112.313 (2), F.S....

...nd agent. Griffith v. Investment Co., 110 So. 271 (Fla. 1952); AGO's S.C. 67-12 and S.C. 69-12. Further, it has been ruled by this office, most recently in AGO 074-27, that this agency relationship is within legislative contemplation as expressed in s. 112.313 (2), supra, thus requiring a legislator who is a practicing attorney to file a sworn statement disclosing representation by him of clients who are business entities regulated by a public agency....

...So long as the client is regulated by a public agency, the legislator-attorney should disclose his agency relationship with that client. Attorney General Opinion 074-27. AS TO QUESTION 2: It was ruled in AGO 072-172 that "regulation" within the purview of s. 112.313 (2), supra, means something more than mere issuance of an occupational license. In an earlier opinion of this office, regulation was defined as prescribing the manner in which a thing is to be done. Business entities "subject to the regulation of" a state or local governmental agency, for purposes of s. 112.313 (2), were described therein as those businesses whose operations or modes of doing business are subject to the control or authority of such an agency. Attorney General Opinion S.C. 68-2. Accord: Attorney General Opinions 074-3 and 074-27. Business entities which have been held to be subject to regulation within the meaning of s. 112.313 (2), include law firms, 072-172; motels, 073-114; real estate corporations, letter dated March 24, 1972; and engineering firms, AGO's S.C....

...ities, and any of the professions and occupations regulated in accordance with Chs. 454-486, F.S. Additional examples of regulated business entities would also include pari-mutuel establishments and the alcoholic beverage industry. AS TO QUESTION 3: Section 112.313 (2), supra, applies if a legislator "is an officer, director, agent or member of, or owns a controlling interest in" a regulated business entity....

...ed business entity, is a member of a professional service corporation which has a regulated business entity as a client, the Professional Service Corporation Act may have an effect. As previously indicated, in order for the disclosure requirement of s. 112.313 (2), supra, to apply to a legislator, he must be an officer, director, agent, or member of, or owner of a controlling interest in, a regulated business entity....

...As for the clients of the professional service corporation which are regulated business entities themselves, if the legislator-attorney is not an officer, director, member, or owner of a controlling interest in such clients, he must be their agent in order for the express terms of s. 112.313 (2) to require disclosure. It was previously ruled by this office that all partners in a law firm are the "agents" of the firm's clients within the purview of s. 112.313 (2), supra....

...at matters discussed during such meetings are not to be open to public disclosure. There are other statutes that also may be considered in a situation where a public officer or employee obtains information that is not otherwise public. For instance, section 112.313 (8), Florida Statutes, states: "No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney shall disclose or use information not available to members of the general public and gained by reason of his or her official positi...

...ge of the statute prohibits a public employee or officer from disclosing information that is unavailable to the general public and gained through his or her official position for personal gain or benefit or that of another person or business entity. Section 112.313 , Florida Statutes, is part of the Florida Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees....

...t would arise should a supervisor of elections allow a former employee to use county-owned computer software that was unavailable to the general public when the individual intended to use the program for his personal benefit. The commission cited to section 112.313 (8), Florida Statutes, as a prohibition against the disclosure of the county-owned software if it is unavailable to the general public and gained through the supervisor's official position in order to benefit the former employee....

...e commissioner could not use his official position to gain information unavailable to the general public in order to benefit himself or the newspaper. Ultimately, any question as to whether the situation you have described violates the provisions of section 112.313 , Florida Statutes, would need to be addressed by the Florida Commission on Ethics....

...A few weeks later an agreed order was entered by the circuit court setting the amount of appellate costs and attorney’s fees. This proceeding, as well as the Fanizza matter, came about as a result of complaints filed against appellant by citizens. The commission found separate ethical violations for each case, based on section 112.313(7), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides: No public officer or employee of any agency shall have or hold any employment or contractual relationship with any business entity or any agency which is subject to the regulation of, or is...

...Our standard of review, where the facts are not in dispute and the administrative agency is interpreting the law, is to determine if the agency “has erroneously interpreted a provision of law.” § 120.68(7)(d), Fla. Stat. (2002). We agree with appellant that the commission erroneously interpreted section 112.313(7)....

...Appellant received no attorney’s fees, and she has stated that she never intended to seek fees for herself; she intended to use the possibility of a fee award against the city as only a bargaining tool for settlement. The commission, as we said earlier, found the same violation of section 112.313(7), in the order quoted above....

...We are not so impressed with the gravity of this charge. Indeed, the inordinate emphasis placed on this "conflict" tends to support McKinney’s case rather than that of the Board. First, the advisory opinions from the Florida Commission on Ethics clearly illustrate that the Florida statute, § 112.313(7)(a), which the Board claims prohibits McKinney from having his home inspected by members of his own department, is directed at public officials who have business interests which conflict with their public duties....

PER CURIAM. The Florida Commission on Ethics has found petitioner, a member of the City Commission of Stuart, Florida, to be in violation of F.S. 112.313(1), F.S.1973, as amended by Chapter 74-177, Laws of Florida which provides as follows: “No officer or employee of a state agency, or of a county, city or other political subdivision of the state, or any legislator, or legislative employe...

...gueness is concerned is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.” ( 269 So.2d at page 670 ) In the Llopis decision, the court held subsection 6 of F.S. 112.313 2 unconstitutionally vague, quoting with approval from the order appealed wherein the trial judge rhetorically asked: “Under the language of F.S....

...to guess at its meaning? The imposition of such liability violates the very fundamental precepts of due process.” ( 257 So.2d at page 19 , emphasis added) Judged by the principles of law announced in the Llopis case the standard contained within F.S. 112.313(1) is obviously constitutionally unacceptable....

...The statute here considered employs instead of “will, in fact” the words “would cause”. The meaning is identical. Further, the trial judge (and the Supreme Court) used the descriptive phrase “reasonable men of common intelligence.” The statute (F.S. 112.313(1)) uses the words “reasonably prudent person.” While we too find ourselves, as did the Supreme Court in Llopis , especially sympathetic with legislation aimed at safeguarding the public and insuring honesty and integrity in government...

...the Florida Commission on Ethics is QUASHED. McCORD and MILLS, JJ., concur. BOYER, C. J., specially concurs. . Rossmoor paid for all of the evening meals but not all of the lunches, while petitioner paid for his wife’s and his own breakfasts. . F.S. 112.313(6) provided: “No officer or employee of a state agency, or of a county, city, or other political subdivision of the state, or any legislator or legislative employee shall accept other employment which might impair his independence of judgment in the performance of his public duties.” ....

...es, so there appears to be no "substantial conflict" between the public employee's private interest in this respect and his public duties. Cf. AGO's 073-384 and 074-31. However, one specific standard of conduct prescribed in the law should be noted. Section 112.313 (3), supra, prohibits public officers from using or attempting to use their official positions to secure special privileges or exemptions for themselves or others, except as may be otherwise provided by law....

conflict of interest would be created under Section 112.313(7), Florida Statutes, were a county commissioner

One was based upon an alleged violation of section 112.313, Florida Statutes (1981); Count Two was a common

...at the Commission was refusing to accept the complaint as it was outside the Commission’s jurisdiction. The letter, authored by Virlindia Doss, the Executive Director of the Commission, indicated that the complaint failed to allege, as required by Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, that the public official identified in the complaint acted with the purpose of “securing] a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, herself, or others.” The letter went on to advise the petition...

found that appellant, by his actions, violated § 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by sexually harassing and

agency, as provided by s. 112.313(2), F.S. Section 112.313(2), supra, requires a public officer or employee

such an agency or agencies. AS TO QUESTION 1: Section 112.313(2), supra, requires a public officer or employee

Your question is answered in the negative. Section 112.313(2), supra, requires a public officer or employee

313(2) and (4) and 112.314(1) and (2), F.S. Section 112.313(6), id., prohibiting a public officer or employee

QUESTION: Must an attorney-legislator file a sworn statement, under s. 112.313 (2), F.S., disclosing that he has as clients business entities which he represents in patent, trademark, and antitrust matters? SUMMARY: An attorney-legislator must file a sworn statement pursuant to s. 112.313 (2), F.S., if the clients which he represents are doing substantial business with, or are regulated by, a state or local agency. Section 112.313 (2), supra, requires a public officer or employee to file a sworn statement disclosing an interest as officer, director, agent, or member of, or owner of a controlling interest in, a business entity which is subject to regulation by o...

...s private interest that is presently or potentially a source of conflict with his public duties. The solution to the question you present requires two determinations: Is the attorney-client relationship an "agency" relationship within the purview of s. 112.313 (2), supra, and are the clients you represent subject to regulation by, or do they have substantial business commitments from, a state or local governmental agency? As regards the first determination, it has been long settled in this state that an attorney's relationship to his client is one of principal and agent. Griffith v. Investment Co., 110 So. 271 (Fla. 1926); Beasley v. Girten, 61 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1952); AGO's S.C. 67-12 and S.C. 69-12. Further, this agency relationship has been held to be within legislative contemplation as expressed in s. 112.313 (2), thus requiring a public official who is a practicing attorney to file a sworn statement disclosing representation by him of clients who are "business entities" regulated by, or having substantial business commitments with, a public agency....

...tantial business with a public agency. Therefore, I assume they are not. As to whether these corporations are subject to the regulation of a state or local governmental agency, it has been ruled in AGO 072-172 that "regulation" within the purview of s. 112.313 (2), supra, means something more than mere issuance of an occupational license (presumably including a corporate charter). In an earlier opinion of this office, regulation was defined as prescribing the manner in which a thing is to be done. Business entities "subject to the regulation of" a state or local governmental agency, for purposes of s. 112.313 (2), were described therein as those businesses whose operations or modes of doing business are subject to the control or authority of such an agency. Attorney General Opinion S.C. 68-2. Accord: Attorney General Opinion 074-3. Business entities which have been held to be subject to regulation within the meaning of s. 112.313 (2), include law firms, AGO 072-172; motels, AGO 073-114; real estate corporations, letter dated March 24, 1972; and engineering firms, AGO's S.C....

...Moreover, the mere fact that you represent them in such matters does not in itself require you to file a sworn statement. However, if your clients do come within the definition of regulation as set out above, and the regulating agency is state or local, then your must file a sworn statement in compliance with s. 112.313 (2). (It might be noted that s. 112.313 (2) does not cover business entities regulated by an agency of the federal government.)

...Underhill challenges only two of the five statutory violations. Specifically, he challenges the Commission’s rejection and modification of the findings of fact and conclusions of law by the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) that he violated subsections 112.313(8) and 112.3148(3), Florida Statutes....

...recommended penalties; we set aside the final order and public report. I. Facts The underlying case was consolidated from three separate ethics complaints filed against Underhill. Central to this appeal are two claims: (1) that Underhill violated subsection 112.313(8), by conferring a benefit when he published the transcript of the Board of County Commissioners’ (“Board”) shade meetings that were confidential and closed to the public; and (2) that he created a GoFundMe page for contributio...

...by failing to disclose a gift of legal services. The ALJ recommended a public censure and reprimand and a civil penalty of $5,000. The ALJ determined that the Commission failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Underhill violated subsections 112.313(6) and 112.313(8) by releasing the shade meeting transcripts because he enjoyed no specific benefit from the release of the transcripts; (2) that he “solicited” donations to his legal defense fund in violation of subsection 112.3148(3); and (3) that he...

...order, which the Commission considered at a meeting. The Commission rejected and modified certain factual findings and legal conclusions of the ALJ. The relevant portions of the Commission’s final order are summarized as follows: • As it relates to the violation of subsection 112.313(8), based on Underhill’s undisputed release of the shade transcripts to a private citizen, Kemp Evans, the Commission determined that though competent, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Underh...

...Evans,” and evidence that Underhill was specifically advised against the release of the transcripts by the county attorney and the County Commission, concluding the following: “[G]iven what the ALJ found . . . no further fact finding is needed to show a benefit to Mr. Evans under [sub]section 112.313(8).” The Commission did not alter the ALJ’s findings of fact or conclusions of law that the Commission failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Underhill violated subsection 112.313(6). • As it relates to the violation of subsection 112.3148(3), based on Underhill’s creation of the legal defense fund set up on GoFundMe, the Commission rejected the ALJ’s conclusion that no clear and convincing evidence was introduced to support that Underhill “solicited” donations....

...recommended monetary penalties to $35,000 and, due to the “cumulative severity” of the five statutory violations, the Commission also recommended that Underhill be removed from office. 1 Underhill appeals only the findings of violation of subsection 112.313(8) regarding the release of the shade meeting transcripts, violation of subsection 112.3148(3) regarding the GoFundMe page for legal expenses, and the Commission’s increase in penalties and recommendation that he be removed from office. II....

...with constitutional and statutory text. Shade Meeting Transcripts Disclosure In his first issue on appeal, Underhill contends the Commission impermissibly rejected and modified the ALJ’s findings of fact and legal conclusions to determine he violated subsection 112.313(8), which provides: Disclosure or use of certain information.—A current or former public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney may not disclose or use information not available to members of t...

...Within thirty minutes of the county attorney forwarding the transcripts to the Board, Underhill transmitted the transcripts to Evans in response to a public records request. Sometime thereafter, the transcripts were posted to a Facebook page. The ALJ declined to find Underhill violated subsections 112.313(6) and (8) because no clear and convincing evidence was introduced that Underhill obtained a prohibited benefit through his release of the shade transcripts....

...of the recommended order. Of note, the Commission did not alter the ALJ’s findings of fact or conclusions of law that the 5 Commission failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Underhill violated subsection 112.313(6), concerning misuse of public office, which also requires evidence of a benefit obtained....

...se received a benefit were supported by competent, substantial evidence. The Commission essentially equated “disclose” and “benefit” to fill this fatal gap in the evidence presented as part of the advocate’s attempt to prove a violation of section 112.313(6)....

...disclosure but also that the purpose of the disclosure was for Underhill’s or Evan’s gain. The ALJ found that the advocate failed as to the latter. The Commission did not point to any evidence the ALJ overlooked, and it incorrectly interpreted the statute to get 2 Section 112.313(6), provides: MISUSE OF PUBLIC POSITION.—No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney shall corruptly use or attempt to use his or her official position or any property or resource which ma...

statute addressed by both Barker and Goin was section 112.313(4), Florida Statutes (1993), which provides:

...nificant conversations with any of them. No. The complaint asserted that Appellant was in violation of the moral character rule governing law enforcement officers through violation of sections 914.22(1) (witness tampering), 837.012(1) (perjury), and 112.313(6) (misuse of official position), Florida Statutes, or any lesser included offenses, and that an appropriate penalty should be imposed in accordance with section 943.1395(7)....

...shall corruptly use or attempt to use his or her official position or any property or resource which may be within his or her trust, or perform his or her official duties, to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, herself, or others.” § 112.313(6), Fla....

...Zuilkowski, and Grayden P. Schafer, and Suhail Chhabra, General Counsel, Florida Commission on Ethics, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM.  William Spaude, Mayor of the City of Bushnell, appeals the Final Order of the Florida Commission on Ethics which determined that he violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2022). Spaude argues that the Commission failed to establish by clear and convincing proof that he acted corruptly as defined by sections 112.313 and 112.312(9)....

...deed],” focused on Hadeed’s alleged failure to provide appropriate legal advice to the Board and his conduct in defending a lawsuit against the County. It concluded that the complaint “substantively fails to indicate a possible violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, the only provision of the Code of Ethics even arguably applicable to it.” Specifically, the Commission found that Hadeed’s legal representation and advice 2 to the...

of sealed, competitive biddingpursuant to section 112.313(12)(b), Florida Statutes, and otherwisecomplied

654 So.2d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), we held section 112.313(4) to be unconstitutionally vague, and reversed

presented, a conflict of interest existed under section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), and the

PER CURIAM. We decline to reach the merits of Kristy Johnson’s appeal from an advisory opinion of the Florida Commission on Ethics, because we conclude that her challenge, based upon application of the two-year representation bar of section 112.313(9)(a)4, Florida Statutes (2001), is now moot....

a salary to the commissioner would violate section 112.313, Florida Statutes, of the Code of Ethics for