Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...The commission is an investigatory body and located in the legislative branch of government. Commission on Ethics v. Sullivan, 489 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1986). Therefore, proceedings before the commission cannot be "civil" actions. This is further evidenced by the fact that § 112.317(2), Fla....

...Even though a less stringent examination as to vagueness is utilized in scrutinizing non-criminal statutes, a statute of this nature must nevertheless satisfy minimal constitutional standards for definiteness. Further, there are sanctions in the current Section 112.317, Florida Statutes (1975), which provide for such inexorable penalties as impeachment, suspension, removal from office, or a $5,000 civil fine....

...vote of the city commission, so long as Galbut's city commissioner relative abstains from voting and in no way advocates the reappointment. It is so ordered. BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 112.317, Fla....

...loyees of counties, cities and other political subdivisions of the State as well as officers and employees of a state agency who were encompassed within the original legislation. Also relevant to the issue here presented was the amendment in 1970 to Section 112.317, Florida Statutes (1969), dealing with violations of any provision of Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes....

...Therefore, in Florida, any reporter's privilege is based on the protections of the first amendment to the United States Constitution and the corresponding protections offered by the Florida Constitution in article I, section 4. [2] The implicated commissioners filed a complaint alleging violation of § 112.317(6), Fla....

...This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. The issue is whether a reporter, subpoenaed in a state attorney's investigation, has a qualified privilege against revealing the identity of a source whose information violated section 112.317(6), Florida Statutes (1981)....

..., but the commission ultimately dismissed the complaint for failure to state a legally sufficient charge. After this dismissal, the county commissioners named in the article filed a complaint with the state attorney's office, alleging a violation of section 112.317(6)....

...337 So.2d at 955 (citations omitted). Utilizing the balancing test adopted in Morgan, we find that the societal interests underpinning most criminal statutes are not present in the instant statute. Much like the situation in Morgan, the principal interest which section 112.317(6) furthers amounts to a private interest in reputation. [2] When balancing section 112.317(6) against Tunstall's first amendment rights, Morgan mandates that the first amendment prevail. Accordingly, Tunstall's contempt citation must fall. Tunstall also challenges the constitutionality of section 112.317(6)....

...sonally claim those rights justifies this rule of judicial restraint. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); Deerfield Medical Center, 661 F.2d at 333. Tunstall's source would clearly be the proper party to challenge section 112.317(6) should that source ever be charged under the statute....

...this civil contempt proceeding was separate from the underlying investigation. Tunstall stood in no different position after the entry of the contempt order than he did as a witness. Id. at 11. Accordingly, any challenge to the constitutionality of section 112.317(6) must be left for another day....

...reporter from compelled questioning not about the identity of a source of information, but about the identity of a person known to the reporter to have committed a criminal act. We should not allow the perceived triviality of the offense defined by section 112.317(6), Florida Statutes (1981), to be a factor in our decision....

...essful defense of a charge before the Florida Ethics Commission that was initiated by Appellants. All claims against the mayor were dismissed by the state and an attorney's fee claim was filed against Appellants in the name of the mayor, pursuant to section 112.317, Florida Statutes, alleging that the ethics commission charges were frivolous and brought with malicious intent....

...rust in which officials and employees of the government hold their office and employment. The function of the commission is to receive and investigate complaints of unethical conduct; after investigating, it reports its findings and recommendations. Section 112.317, dealing with procedure if the commission finds against a respondent, itself contemplates that the commission's own proceedings do not constitute civil actions: Subsection 2 of this section provides that upon a finding of a violation...

...NOTES [1] Although not material sub judice, we note that Sections 112.313 and 112.314 have subsequently been substantially amended by the legislature in its 1974 session, Chapter 74-177, Laws of Florida. See Article X, Section 9, Florida Constitution. [2] Section 112.317, Florida Statutes, provided that violation of this statute would constitute a misdemeanor....

...Green, West Palm Beach, Fla., for plaintiff. Shirley A. Walker, George L. Waas, Asst. Attys. Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants. FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ROETTGER, District Judge. The legal issue for determination by the Court in the instant case is whether Section 112.317(6), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Plaintiff. Section 112.317(6) of the Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part: Any person who willfully discloses, or permits to be disclosed, his intention to file a complaint, the existence or contents of a complaint which has been filed with the Commissio...

...ry investigation of the Commission, before such complaint, document, action, or proceeding becomes a public record as provided herein is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. Florida Statute § 112.317(6)....

...cs against elected and public officials who failed to file financial disclosure statements for the years 1984 and 1985. Plaintiff desires to speak and publish articles about those complaints, but cannot do so out of fear of prosecution for violating Section 112.317(6) of the Florida Statutes. Defendant, DAVID BLUDWORTH, through one of his assistants, has publicly announced that his office may prosecute individuals who violate Section 112.317(6) of the Florida Statutes....

...e accepted as appropriate plaintiffs." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42, 91 S.Ct. 746, 749, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). With respect to the case at bar, defendant has publicly announced that it may prosecute individuals who violate Florida *692 Statute § 112.317(6)....

..., the court concludes that these are the principal interests which the statute at issue is designed to serve. As was noted by the Supreme Court of Florida in Tribune Co. v. Huffs- *694 tetler, 489 So.2d 722 (Fla.1986), "the principal interests which Section 112.317 § 6) furthers amounts to a private interest in reputation." Id....

...emedies for the abuse of process or defamation or criminal penalties for false report or perjury. *695 In sum, the truth in the case of a frivolous complaint or a complaint filed for political purposes is that the complainant is abusing the process. Section 112.317(6) prevents the public from knowing about such abuses as well as preventing the public from knowing about meritorious complaints in a timely manner....

...terests are insufficient to justify the restrictions on First Amendment freedoms interposed by the legislation. The interests asserted by defendants herein are no more compelling than those asserted in Landmark, and the criminal sanctions imposed by Section 112.317(6) are not justified thereby....

...Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 1371-72, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962)). This society's foundation of self-governance requires that the speech prohibited by the Florida statute be not only tolerated, but encouraged. Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Section 112.317(6), Florida Statutes, is hereby declared unconstitutional on its face as a matter of law and unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is, therefore, GRANTED. FURTHER ORDERED that defendants are hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing Section 112.317(6), Florida Statutes....

...[4] The Supreme Court of Florida found the challenging party in Huffstetler to be without standing to contest the statute's constitutionality. However, in State v. Collins, 3 Fla.Supp.2d 15 (2d Jud.Cir.1983), the circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity ruled § 112.317(6), Florida Statutes, is constitutional as applied to participants to the proceedings and does not violate the First Amendment....

...Carlton, Jr., Staff Attorney, Tallahassee, for Appellee Commission on Ethics; Joseph L. Hammons of Hammons Longoria & Whittaker, Pensacola, for Appellees Robert Burgess and Hilton Kelly. PADOVANO, J. This is an appeal by a public official from a final order denying costs and attorney fees under section 112.317(8) Florida Statutes (2004)....

...Once the house was destroyed, the property was worth much less and Brown had no alternative but to reduce the assessment. The Florida Commission on Ethics dismissed the complaints, and Brown subsequently made a claim for costs and attorney fees under section 112.317(8)....

...thics complaint" and that he had "recklessly disregarded whether the complaint contained false allegations." Based on these findings, Judge Dean concluded in his recommended orders that Brown was entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees under section 112.317(8)....

...They described the complaints as "blatantly political" and "shameful." Nevertheless, the Commission denied Brown's request for costs and attorney fees. This decision was based on a concern that the findings of fact in Judge Dean's order were insufficient. The Commission construed the language of section 112.317(8) to require a finding of "actual malice," as defined by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times Co....

...ndard, as expressed in section 120.68(7)(d). Because the order is based on a conclusion of law that did not require any particular expertise, we need not defer to the Commission. Brown contends that the phrase, "reckless disregard for the truth," in section 112.317(8) should be interpreted by its plain meaning....

...To meet this standard, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing *558 evidence that the "defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968). If the Florida Legislature meant to incorporate these concepts into section 112.317(8), Burgess and Kelly will prevail on appeal. On this record, we could not say that they acted with "actual malice," as that phrase is used in Sullivan. To resolve the controversy, we first consider the text of the statute. Section 112.317(8) states in full: In any case in which the commission determines that a person has filed a complaint against a public officer or employee with a malicious intent to injure the reputation of such officer or employee by filing the comp...

...inding by the commission, the commission shall forward such information to the Department of Legal Affairs, which shall bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of such costs and fees awarded by the commission. § 112.317(8), Fla....

...The Legislature plainly understood when it enacted section 104.271(2) that a statute regulating pure speech or expression would require proof of actual malice to meet First Amendment standards. By contrast, the absence of this well known phrase in section 112.317(8) is an indication that the Legislature did not intend to engraft the Sullivan standard into the statutory requirements for recovery of costs and attorney fees. Another indication leading to the same conclusion is that section 112.317(8) does not explicitly require evidence of a high awareness of probable falsity, or proof that the complainant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the allegations in the complaint....

...It is also significant that the statute does not address the evidentiary standard that applies to a claim for costs and attorney fees. A public official who files a civil action for defamation must prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, yet there is nothing in section 112.317(8) to suggest that the Commission should also apply this high burden of proof to a claim for costs and fees....

...Florida courts interpret statutes according to their plain meaning. There are certain accepted principles of statutory construction that can be applied if a statute is ambiguous, but the courts have no reason to speculate as to the meaning of a statute if it is clear on its face. Section 112.317(8) is not confusing or ambiguous. It lays out in plain English the requirements for recovering costs and attorney fees. It is not for us to add to these requirements by reading unstated terms into the statute. We reject the argument that section 112.317(8) incorporates the actual malice standard in Sullivan based on the text of the statute alone....

...[2] As the courts have recognized, these are very different issues. A person who files a lawsuit based on a false allegation is not entitled to the same protection that is afforded to a person who merely publishes false information. That proof of actual malice is not required to recover attorney's fees under section 112.317(8) will not discourage citizens from filing ethics complaints against a public officials....

...We have stated our view that the actual malice standard is not necessary as a matter of constitutional law, but the Florida Legislature is certainly free to incorporate this standard in the statute if it wishes. For these reasons, we conclude that the phrase, "reckless disregard for the truth," in section 112.317(8) was not used as a shorthand reference to the exacting requirements in New York Times Co....

...*561 The Commission need only enter a final order adopting Judge Dean's original recommendations. Reversed and remanded. ROBERTS, J., concurs. WOLF, J., concurs with opinion. WOLF, J., Concurring. I concur fully in the majority's determination that the text of section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes, does not incorporate the actual malice standard....

...ive complainants to the Commission on Ethics as much protection as provided in Sullivan. [5] I, therefore, would not engage in a *562 discussion of the relative importance of these rights. NOTES [1] The statute was subsequently renumbered. It is now section 112.317(7). [2] We recognize that section 112.317(8) involves policy considerations that are not present in other forms of civil litigation....

...On July 22, 1992, the Commission issued its final order awarding attorney's fees. The Commission granted in part appellee Chapin's exception to finding of fact No. 39. The order finds that appellee Chapin was entitled to the attorney's fee award under section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes....

...The Commission's final order adopts the findings of fact set forth in the recommended order, which finds that Couch's actions evidenced a malicious intent to injure appellee Chapin's reputation, and that his complaint was "frivolous and without basis in law or fact." Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes, provides: In any case in which the commission [on ethics] determines that a person has filed a complaint against a public officer or employee with malicious intent to injure the reputation of such officer or empl...

...ent. Based upon the preliminary investigation, the Commission found that there was no probable cause to believe that Tapper violated section 112.313(7)(a), and dismissed the complaint. Tapper then petitioned for costs and attorney's fees pursuant to section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes....

...was frivolous and without basis in law or fact, and whether the petition was filed with a malicious intent to injure appellee Chapin's reputation. Couch next argues that appellee Chapin did not actually "incur" attorney's fees within the meaning of section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes, because appellee Chapin had no obligation to pay her attorney anything. In one portion of the recommended order, the hearing officer concluded: Construing Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes, strictly, it must be concluded that it was Orange County and not Ms....

...The same justification for imposing an award of attorney's fees in Wright [1] applies in this case: Mr. Couch's allegations against Ms. Chapin were frivolous and maliciously made in an effort to discredit Ms. Chapin. It cannot be ignored, however, that Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes, unlike the statutory provision dealt with in Wright, specifically requires that the award of fees and costs be limited to amounts "incurred by the person complaint against." The recommended order, however, did co...

...re was no longer a possibility at the time of the attorney fee hearing that appellee Chapin would be required to reimburse Orange County, then there was no entitlement to recovery. The Commission disagreed with the hearing officer and concluded that Section 112.317(8) does provide for an award of attorney's fees against a complainant when the respondent was represented by counsel of her public agency, as was [Chapin] and is not limited to situations in which a respondent contracts personally and directly with a private attorney for representation or pays fees from her own pocket. *1127 The Legislature intended, in enacting Chapter 75-208, Laws of Florida, which is codified at Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes (the costs and attorney's fee provision at issue here), to punish persons who make malicious and baseless ethics complaints, such as that found by the Hearing Officer and this Commission to have been made by Mr....

...Dade County Police Benevolent Ass'n, 467 So.2d 987 (Fla. 1985). The Commission properly allowed recovery of attorney's fees by Chapin, represented by county attorneys, for the hours expended in obtaining dismissal of Couch's complaint, because the award effectuates the legislative intent of section 112.317(8) to penalize frivolous and malicious Commission complaints....

...980, cutting off her claim to recover fees for attorney time expended after the September 18, 1991, the date the Commission dismissed the complaint. Couch argues that the award was "clearly unnecessarily excessive to satisfy the statutory purpose of section 112.317(8)." He seizes upon language from a Federal case, Eastway Const....

...lity to produce press releases. [2] Finally, the Eastway court's concern of "chilling the particular kind of *1128 litigation involved" cannot be of any concern here, given the hearing officer's findings of malice and frivolousness and the fact that section 112.317(8) has as its very purpose the chilling by way of a penalty of malicious, frivolous complaints such as Mr....

...5th DCA 1980), this court held that an award of fees under section 57.105 was proper when the trial court found an action to be frivolous, i.e., so clearly devoid of merit both on the law and the facts as to be completely untenable. Section 57.105 appears to be the statute most analogous to section 112.317(8)....

...lection to the Florida Senate, District 12." [4] On this basis, the circuit court rendered Mr. Norman's primary victory a nullity, declared him "disqualified" as a candidate in the general election, and ordered him "removed from said ballot," citing section 112.317(1)(c)1., Florida Statutes (2010)....

...[1] According to the Commission's Final Order and Public Report, Latham violated that section of the Code of Ethics, chapter 112, Part III, Florida Statutes, "by engaging in unwanted sexually or romantically oriented behavior toward a subordinate female employee." The Commission, pursuant to section 112.317(1)(a) [2] , Florida Statutes, *84 recommended that the Governor impose a civil penalty of $2,500 and give Latham a public censure and reprimand. We reverse because, as Latham argues, the Commission must require proof by clear and convincing evidence before recommending the penalties available for a public officer under section 112.317(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...3d DCA 1995) (reversing a final order of the Florida Commission on Ethics which recommended imposition of a civil penalty under the antinepotism law and holding the anti-nepotism law is a civil statute of a penal nature). Under the controlling standard of Ferris and Osborne Stern, we find that the penalties authorized by section 112.317, Florida Statutes implicate a loss of livelihood and more. Next the Commission argues that it has no authority to penalize. Of course, the Ethics Code does contain a very explicit section on penalties, section 112.317....

...uch official or body shall have the power to invoke the penalty provisions of the Ethics Code. § 112.324(7), Fla. Stat. We find two statutory provisions that counter the Commission's claim that it lacks authority. Under the enforcement provision of section 112.317(2) a civil penalty is enforced by the attorney general who brings a civil action....

...Recognizing that the burden of proof we have adopted will impact a potentially large number of Commission cases, we pose the following question of great public importance to the supreme court: In Commission on Ethics proceedings against a public officer that may result in recommended penalties pursuant to section 112.317(1)(a), Florida Statutes, must the Commission require proof by clear and convincing evidence? REVERSED and REMANDED....

...tly use or attempt to use his or her official position or any property or resource which may be within his or her trust, or perform his or her official duties, to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, herself, or others. [2] Section 112.317(1)(a), Florida Statutes provides: 112.317 Penalties.— (1) Violation of any provision of this part, including, but not limited to, any failure to file any disclosures required by this part or violation of any standard of conduct imposed by this part, or violation of any provision of s....

...Forfeiture of no more than one-third salary per month for no more than 12 months. 6. A civil penalty not to exceed $10,000. 7. Restitution of any pecuniary benefits received because of the violation committed. [3] The holding in this case is limited to section 112.317(1)(a), penalties as to public officials....

...Career Service Comm'n, 289 So.2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). A career service employee's dismissal or other discipline is essentially an employment action, and does not warrant the same protection as a public proceeding against an official subject to the penalties found in section 112.317(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Waldense D. Malouf, Clearwater, for appellant. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Frank A. Vickory, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. ALDERMAN, Justice. DeBusk appeals an order of the county court awarding a $2,500 judgment to the State and declaring section 112.317(2), Florida Statutes (1977), [1] constitutional. We affirm the judgment and hold that section 112.317(2) is constitutional....

...On these facts, the Ethics Commission concluded that DeBusk corruptly used his official position to secure a special privilege for Sells in violation of section 112.313(4). The Commission recommended that DeBusk be penalized $2,500 in accordance with section 112.317(1)(a)6, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...[3] DeBusk petitioned the District Court of Appeal, Second District, to review the Commission's final action. The district court, after receiving briefs and hearing oral arguments, denied the petition. Thereafter, DeBusk sought no further review of the Commission's action. Subsequently, pursuant to section 112.317(2), the attorney general brought an action in the Citrus County Court to recover the penalty assessed by the Commission....

...DeBusk moved to dismiss, alleging that chapter 112 is unconstitutional because it is a bill of attainder and that the charges and documentary evidence before the State of Florida Commission on Ethics were based on hearsay. Concluding that it had jurisdiction over the action, the court denied the motion to dismiss, held section 112.317(2) constitutional, and awarded the State a judgment of $2,500 against DeBusk....

...This appeal is from that order. DeBusk attempts to collaterally attack the validity of the proceedings before the Ethics Commission. We need not consider the collateral issues that could have been raised before the district court. The sole issue properly before us is whether section 112.317(2) is constitutional....

...n a District Court of Appeal upon the petition of the party against whom an adverse opinion, finding, or recommendation *329 is made." That section gives one right of review where all judicially reviewable issues should be raised. The prohibition in section 112.317(2) against raising defenses in a subsequent proceeding which could have been raised and considered by the district court at the time it reviewed the final action of the Ethics Commission is merely a codification of the estoppel rule. We conclude that the section is constitutional. Accordingly, the trial court is affirmed. It is so ordered. SUNDBERG, C.J., and OVERTON, ENGLAND and McDONALD, JJ., concur. ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., dissent. NOTES [1] Section 112.317(2), Florida Statutes (1977), provides: In any case in which the commission finds a violation of this part and recommends a civil penalty or restitution penalty, the Attorney General shall bring a civil action to recover such penalty....

...[2] Section 112.313(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974), provides: No public officer or employee of an agency shall corruptly use, or attempt to use, his official position, or perform his official duties, to secure special privileges, benefits, or exemptions for himself or others. [3] Section 112.317(1)(a)6, Florida Statutes (1975), provides: (1) Violation of any provision of this part, including, but not limited to, any failure to file any disclosures required by this part or violation of any standard of conduct imposed by this p...

...1977), in which no common meaning could be found to sustain the term "malpractice in office." [3] State v. Lindsay, 284 So.2d 377, 379 (Fla. 1973). [4] Contrast State v. Llopis, 257 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1971). [5] Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2186 (1968). [6] Black's Law Dictionary 1359 (4th ed. 1968). [7] § 112.317, Fla....

...*1246 of impermissible vagueness found by the supreme court. Accordingly, we hold that section 112.313(6) is constitutional. The first change is not in section 112.313(6) itself but arises from the fact that the legislature has repealed that part of section 112.317, Florida Statutes (1973), which made a violation of section 112.313 a criminal offense punishable as a first-degree misdemeanor....

...Shuler Bros., Inc., 590 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). 6. Dep’t of Law Enf. v. Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991). -7- the revocation of a professional license,7 penalties for public officers under section 112.317(1)(a), Florida Statutes,8 and campaign finance violations under chapter 106, Florida Statutes.9 In Osborne, this Court held that the clear and convincing evidence standard is the requisite burden of proof in administrative p...

...ing reappointed, so long as Commissioner Eisenberg recuses himself, and so long as Commissioner Eisenberg does not in any way advocate Galbut for appointment. That is the plain meaning of the statute. Because this statute is penal in nature, see id. § 112.317, any doubt must be resolved in favor of a narrow construction so that the public official (and the official's relatives) are clearly on notice of what conduct is proscribed....

...s. While it is true that the anti-nepotism law does not impose criminal penalties, the law does impose a series of noncriminal penalties, which include civil penalties of up to $5,000 and removal from public office or employment, among other things. § 112.317, Fla....

...He contends that the partial repeal requires that he be exonerated of the charge that he violated the anti-nepotism statute. We agree. The anti-nepotism law is a civil statute of a penal nature. See City of Miami Beach v. Galbut, 626 So.2d at 194. Under section 112.317, Florida Statutes (1989), there are civil penalties for the violation of the anti-nepotism law, but no criminal penalties....

...on appeal. Fleming v. Fleming, 710 So.2d 601, 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). The same discretion is vested in the ALJ. Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.210. Finding the ALJ did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the denial of Milanick's motion for continuance. Section 112.317(7), Florida Statutes (2007), entitles Osborne to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against the ethics complaint....

...unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Harrington & Company, Inc. v. Tampa Port Authority, 358 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1978). Following the Commission's dismissal of the complaint, appellee petitioned for costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Section *845 112.317(8), Florida Statutes (1979). The Commission, in a 5 to 3 vote, found that the complaint was maliciously filed and was frivolous, and accordingly entered its order finding appellant liable for the attorney's fees incurred by appellee. Section 112.317(8) provides: In any case in which the commission determines that a person has filed a complaint against a public officer or employee with a malicious intent to injure the reputation of such officer or employee and in which such compla...

...It is thus apparent *846 that though appellant was wrong, the complaint can not be characterized as "completely untenable" or clearly frivolous, as that term is defined in Treat v. State ex rel. Mitton, supra . Because the Commission erroneously interpreted Section 112.317(8) and a proper interpretation does not support the finding that appellant's complaint was frivolous, we vacate the Commission's order assessing attorney's fees against appellant....

...Alexander Milanick appeals a non-final order denying his motion to quash and dismiss the proceeding. He argues that the case should have been dismissed based on the State’s failure to personally serve him. We agree and reverse. The instant action was brought by the State pursuant to section 112.317(7), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the State to bring a civil action to recover costs and fees awarded by the Florida Commission on Ethics....

...Ultimately, the commission dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause to believe that Lieberman committed any ethics violation. This appeal concerns Lieberman's subsequent petition for an award of attorney's fees and costs against Kaminsky for allegedly filing a frivolous and malicious ethics complaint. See § 112.317(8), Fla.Stat....

...Milanick did not contain the requisite false allegations. Because we conclude that the Commission's view of the complaint was too restricted, we reverse. An award of attorneys' fees in favor of the person complained against in a complaint filed with the Commission on Ethics is governed by section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes (2005), which reads in pertinent part: In any case in which the commission determines that a person has filed a complaint against a public officer or employee with a malicious intent to injure the reputation of su...

...Milanick was fully aware that Mayor Osborne did not live on property adjacent to the land to be annexed. *27 While the Commission rejected virtually all of the factual exceptions made by Dr. Milanick to the ALJ's recommended order, it agreed with one legal exception to the effect that the ALJ's construction of section 112.317(8) was not correct....

...Given that virtually all of the factual findings made by the ALJ, including the finding concerning the falsity of the allegations and the finding that Dr. Milanick and his attorney either knew or should have known that his claim was false, were accepted and adopted by the Commission, we conclude that pursuant to section 112.317(8), Mayor Osborne was entitled to the award of attorney's fees and costs contained in the recommended order concerning fees....

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from an order of the State of Florida Commission on Ethics denying appellant’s motion to tax attorney’s fees and costs. Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes (1979) provides: In any case in which the commission determines that a person had filed a complaint against a public officer or employee with a malicious intent to injure the reputation of such officer or employee...

...We find this position to be without merit due to the specific finding of the commission that the complaint was not frivolous in law or fact even though it found summarily that there was no probable cause to constitute a violation of the code of ethics. The wording of Section 112.317(8) precludes recovery of fees and costs even if there was a determination of malicious intent of the corporation, without the accompanying finding of frivolity....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. § 112.317(8), Fla.Stat....

...ly sought a protective order to preclude the taking of the deposition. In support of his motion, Patchett argued that 1) prosecutions for violation of Chapter 112, Part III (Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees), are penal in nature, see § 112.317 (penalties), and 2) his right to assert a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was justified under State ex rel....

...ives the Commission of the authority to investigate the complaint. The legislature has provided a criminal penalty for willfully disclosing an intention to file a complaint or for disclosing any of the confidential proceedings before the Commission. Section 112.317(6), Florida Statutes....

meaning of s. 7(a), Art. IV, State Const. Section 112.317, among other things, stipulates that a violation

and employees are prohibited from performing. § 112.317, F.S.1974 Supplement, specifies the penalties

...action to recover any civil penalty or restitution awarded, and in that proceeding, “[n]o defense may be raised . . . that could have been raised by judicial review of the administrative findings and recommendation by the commission . . . .” § 112.317(2), Fla. Stat.; see also DeBusk v. Smith, 390 So. 2d 327, 328 (Fla. 1980) (explaining that section 5 112.317(2) is “a codification of the estoppel rule”); Latham v. Fla. Comm’n on Ethics, 694 So. 2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (noting that, under section 112.317(2), “all defenses to [the Commission’s] orders must be raised before the Commission or the district court or they will be lost when the attorney general moves to enforce a penalty”)....

...constitutionality of the agency’s action on direct appeal did not preclude the petitioner from bringing the challenge in circuit court where the constitutional challenge is separate and distinct from the issue determined on appeal). Indeed, under the plain language of section 112.317(2), a challenge to the disciplinary official’s action (or the constitutionality of the statute authorizing that action) would not be foreclosed in a subsequent proceeding where, as here, the disciplinary action had not been taken...

...ising his constitutional challenge to section 112.324(8)(e) in a declaratory action in the circuit court if the Speaker takes action on the Commission’s recommendation or in defense of an enforcement action brought by the Attorney General under section 112.317(2). AFFIRMED. WOLF, WETHERELL, and JAY, JJ., CONCUR. 9 

official subject to part III, Ch. 112, F. S. Section 112.317(6), by its terms, and in pertinent part, only

...The Ethics Commission did receive such a com *1171 plaint, but ultimately voted to dismiss it for failure to assert a legally sufficient charge. Thereafter, the two county commissioners filed a complaint with the state attorney’s office regarding a violation of section 112.317(6), Florida Statutes, which criminally proscribes disclosure of the intent to file an ethics complaint or of the existence of a complaint that has been filed with the Ethics Commission....

...The crime, revelation of the ethics complaint, was witnessed by the reporter. A witness to a crime, simply because he happens also to be a news reporter and intends to write about what was told to him, has no greater right to refuse testimony than any other witness. Appellants contend that section 112.317(6) is unconstitutional in that it does not simply purport to regulate time, place, or manner of expression but rather seeks to prohibit expression itself, when the expression deals with a particular subject, i.e., allegations of official misconduct....

...o the administrative law judge to order production of the discovery sought by Petitioner, with the amount of fees paid and the retainer amount redacted. The amount of fees may be relevant to the potential penalty phase of this proceeding pursuant to section 112.317, Florida Statutes....

...Albert “Al” Hadeed, a county attorney, and Nathan “Nate” McLaughlin, a county commissioner, who were the targets of unsuccessful ethics complaints, appeal the Commission on Ethics’s denial of their requests for costs and attorney’s fees sought under section 112.317(7), Florida Statutes....

...d not end the matter. Florida law provides for an award of costs and attorney’s fees against persons who file knowingly false ethics complaints against public officials and employees, provided certain parameters are met. The applicable statute, section 112.317(7), states in relevant part: In any case in which the commission determines that a person has filed a complaint against a public officer or employee with a malicious intent to injure the reputation of such officer or employ...

...reckless disregard for whether the complaint contains false allegations of fact material to a violation of this part, the complainant shall be liable for costs plus reasonable attorney fees incurred in the defense of the person complained against[.] § 112.317, Fla....

...McLaughlin, they were not “material” to any purported ethics violation. Hadeed and McLaughlin appeal the orders denying their fee requests. II. The central point we address in this consolidated appeal is the language of section 112.317(7), which requires that a complaint contain false statements that are “material to a violation” of the Ethics Code....

...ndard from First Amendment jurisprudence, id., but it also requires that the false allegations be “material” to an ethics violation to be actionable for costs and fees. Falsely calling someone a terrorist or child abuser is of no moment under section 112.317(7) unless the false allegation is “material” to a violation of Florida’s Code of Ethics. Amidst the hundreds of pages of inflammatory, disparaging, and conclusory allegations in the complaints, the Commission found just...

...and not ethical breaches. Accordingly, there are no false allegations of fact in the complaints that are material to a violation of the Code to support a request for costs and fees. Though we need not defer to the Commission’s interpretation of section 112.317(7), Brown, 969 So....

...2d at 557, we nonetheless find it supportable as applied in this case. The statutory analysis stops here. Whether the disparaging language and desultory legal conclusions interspersed through the two tome-like complaints were maliciously intentional or knowingly false doesn’t matter legally under section 112.317(7); so long as the allegations are true and material, costs and fees 5 are not recoverable....

Commission. You refer to the provisions of section 112.317(6), Florida Statutes, making it a misdemeanor