Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Miami, for Elton J. Gissendanner, amicus curiae. ADKINS, Justice. This is an appeal from a final judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Leon County, Florida, directly passing upon the validity of Ch. 70-80, Laws of Florida, amending § 99.012, Fla....

...perty Appraiser and to the Board, pursuant to the Hillsborough County Civil Service Rules ("the local law"). 2 Prior to the election, Baker took an oath stating that he "had resigned from any office from which he [was] required to resign pursuant to Section 99.012 Florida Statutes" ("the statute")....

...As to the award under § 1988, the district court found that Baker failed to establish a prima facie case, the defendant did not offer to settle, the district court granted summary judgment, and Baker "could have attacked the constitutionality of Florida Statutes 99.012(7) at the time" of the state court action....

...52 As to the award under Rule 11, the district court found that "after a reasonable inquiry Plaintiff should have believed that the pleadings he filed were not well-grounded in facts and law." 53 It noted that, after Baker was made aware that he had acknowledged that he had read Fla. Stat. § 99.012 , he "should have known ignorance of the law is no excuse," and "would have been well advised to move for voluntary dismissal of the action." 54 Reviewing the situation under the "warning" standard, it noted that Baker's counsel was provide...

...it is clear that after a reasonable inquiry Plaintiff should have believed that the pleadings he filed were not well-grounded in facts and law. Plaintiff had also read Defendants' response which informed Plaintiff that he had sworn to the "Resign to Run" Law, Florida Statutes § 99.012 which discharged him from his employment at the Hillsborough Property Appraiser's Office by "Operation of Law." The Second District Court of Appeals ruled on this....

...pay to the Property Appraiser and to the Board, pursuant to the Hillsborough County Civil Service Rules (“the local law).2 Prior to the election, Baker took an oath stating that he “had resigned from any office from which he [was] required to resign pursuant to Section 99.012 Florida Statutes” (“the statute”).3 The statute required that “subordinate personnel” resign when qualifying “for a public office which is currently held by an individual who has the authority to appoint, employ, promote or...

...694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). 14 prima facie case, the defendant did not offer to settle, the district court granted summary judgment, and Baker "could have attacked the constitutionality of Florida Statutes 99.012(7) at the time" of the state court action.52 As to the award under Rule 11, the district court found that "after a reasonable inquiry Plaintiff should have believed that the pleadings he filed were not well-grounded in facts and law."53 It noted that, after Baker was made aware that he had acknowledged that he had read Fla. Stat. § 99.012, he "should have known ignorance of the law is no excuse," and "would have been well advised to move for voluntary dismissal of the action."54 Reviewing the situation under the "warning" standard, it noted that Baker's counsel was provided...

...he pleadings he filed were not well-grounded in facts and law. Plaintiff had also read Defendants’ response which informed Plaintiff that he had sworn to the “Resign to Run” Law, Florida Statutes § 99.012 which discharged him from his employment at the Hillsborough Property Appraiser’s Office by “Operation of Law.” The Second District Court of Appeals ruled on this. The Fl...

...The legislative role in the appointment of judges has been completed with the enactment of Fla. Stat. § 43.29, F.S.A., which authorizes the commissions in accordance with the requirements of Fla. Const., art. V, § 11(b), F.S.A. Of course, resignations under Fla. Stat. § 99.012, F.S.A....

...[4] See Weeks v. Gamble, 13 Fla. 9 (1870); Klein v. Schulz, 87 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1956); State ex rel. Ayres v. Gray, 69 So.2d 187 (Fla. 1953); State ex rel. West v. Gray, 70 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1954); Ervin v. Collins, 85 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1956). [5] F.S. § 99.012; In re Advisory Opinion, 239 So.2d 247 (Fla....

...tute — that a candidate who withdraws from one race can legally become a candidate for a newly designated office for which such candidate may duly qualify. *520 The trial court properly rejected Bob Crawford's argument that the plain language of subsection 99.012(2), Florida Statutes (1993), prohibits any person who has qualified to run for political office from later withdrawing from that race and qualifying to run for any other office during the same election year. Mr. Crawford's argument was predicated on the language of subsection 99.012(2), which provides: No person may qualify as a candidate for more than one public office, whether federal, state, district, county, or municipal, if the terms of any part thereof run concurrently with each other. The trial court correctly construed that subsection as follows: A more reasonable interpretation of Section 99.012(2) is that it prohibits a candidate from qualifying for more than one public office at a time....

...However, as a condition precedent to such action he should be required to withdraw or abandon his original or prior qualification for candidacy in the primary election. This passage of the opinion in Adams gives some indication of the meaning of the statute at issue in this case. Section 99.012(2) was enacted in its original form shortly after the Adams decision apparently to prevent the situation that gave rise to that case. It has become a closely related part of what is now known as the "Resign-to-Run" law, Section 99.012(3), Florida Statutes. There can be no question about the fact that the "Resign-to-Run" law was intended to prevent a candidate from seeking one public office at the time that candidate holds another. The Division of Elections has interpreted Section 99.012(2) to prohibit simultaneous qualifications for more than one office but not sequential qualifications for more than one office....

...However, the interpretation by the Division of Elections in 1978 is consistent with the advice given by to [sic] the Republican Party and the earlier opinion was rendered by unrelated parties. Although there is at least some doubt about the meaning of Section 99.012(2), that doubt should be resolved in favor of holding a free and competitive election....

...s charter required Martinez to resign effective no later than September 11, 1981, the last day upon which one could qualify to run for the office of Mayor, Martinez sued in the Dade County Circuit Court for a *603 judgment declaring that pursuant to Section 99.012(2), Florida Statutes (1981), [1] he could run for the office of Mayor without first resigning his councilman's position or, alternatively, if resignation were required, it could be made effective "not later than the date upon which he...

...sume office, if elected to the office to which he seeks to qualify, the expiration date of the term of the office which he presently holds, or the general election day at which his successor is elected, whichever occurs earliest," [2] as provided in Section 99.012(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...[5] However, we disagree with the trial court's holding that Martinez was required to resign at all. We therefore reverse the trial court's order and remand the cause for the entry of an order, in accordance with this opinion, which provides that Martinez need not resign his office to run for the office of Mayor. Section 99.012(2) provides, in pertinent part: "No individual may qualify as a candidate for public office who holds another elective or appointive office, whether state, county or municipal, the term of which or any part thereof runs concurrently *6...

...he may run. [6] Attempting to harmonize the Charter with the statute, the trial court seized upon the fact that since the Charter provides only for resignation and is silent on the effective date of the resignation, the effective date provisions of Section 99.012(2), Florida Statutes (1981), can be read into the Charter....

...hall supersede any provision of any ordinance enacted pursuant to said charter and in conflict therewith, and shall supersede any provision of any charter of any municipality in Dade County in conflict therewith." Since the general law of the state, Section 99.012, Florida Statutes (1981), permits Martinez, whose term as a councilman is not concurrent with the term of the Mayor's office he seeks, to run without resigning, the City's Charter provision which places a greater restriction on Martine...

...Because Martinez must qualify for the office of Mayor on or before September 11, 1981, no petition for rehearing will be entertained, and our mandate will issue simultaneously with this opinion. Reversed and remanded with directions. NOTES [1] Identical to Section 99.012(2), Florida Statutes (1979), the statute applicable when the suit was originally brought....

...be in doubt as to whether the City's appeal from the non-final order granting summary judgment effectively stayed the trial court's ruling. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.310(b)(2). [4] The trial court's ruling rejected, sub silentio, Martinez's contention that Section 99.012(2), Florida Statutes (1981), required no resignation whatsoever....

...Stephen Marc Slepin of Slepin, Slepin, Lambert & Waas, Tallahassee, for appellees. REVISED OPINION [*] PER CURIAM. This case presents the primary issues of whether the Commission on Ethics has authority to receive and investigate sworn complaints of violations of Sections 99.012(7) and 116.111, Florida Statutes, by public officers or employees, and of whether this Court's earlier per curiam affirmance (PCA) of a Commission order denying appellees' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was res judicata, so as to preclude a contrary ruling by the trial court....

...tution. Wilma was alleged to have violated the antinepotism law, Section 116.111, Florida Statutes (1977), by appointing, employing, promoting or advancing son John in his position as Deputy Supervisor of Elections. John was alleged to have violated Section 99.012(7), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...loyee and was not so when the complaint was filed; that the Commission did not have jurisdiction under either Article II, Section 8(f), Florida Constitution, or Chapter 112, part III, Florida Statutes, to hear complaints of violations under Sections 99.012(7) and 116.111, Florida Statutes; that the Commission did not have authority to define "breach of public trust" on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis; and that the Commission did not have the authority under subsection 8(f) to adopt rules expanding its authority beyond that specifically provided by Chapter 112, part III....

...ion over a former public official or public officer. John posed five issues for declaratory judgment: the first four were the same as those presented by Wilma; his fifth issue was whether the Commission had jurisdiction to hear alleged violations of Section 99.012(7)....

...The Sullivans presented four issues to this Court: (1) whether they were entitled to and received a probable cause hearing before the Commission, (2) whether the Commission had subject matter jurisdiction over complaints of violations of Sections 116.111 and 99.012(7), (3) whether Commission Rule 34-5.015 was valid, and (4) whether the Commission had [personal] jurisdiction of a non-officer, Wilma Sullivan....

...rida Statutes, and Article II, Section 8, Florida Constitution; that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaints alleging conduct by John Sullivan in violation of Section 116.111 [sic], and by Wilma Sullivan in violation of Section 99.012(7) [sic], and that the foregoing being dispositive of the matters before the court, no ruling was made with respect to other issues posed in the petitions....

...In arguing their case on this appeal, and apparently in the circuit court below, the Commission appears to have avoided taking the position that Chapter 112, part III, provides Commission jurisdiction for an investigation of complaints of Sections 99.012(7) and 116.111, and instead has focused its arguments on Article II, Section 8, Florida Constitution, as the basis for Commission authority....

...(emphasis supplied) The "code of ethics as established in this part" refers to Section 112.313, which establishes standards of conduct for public officers and employees of agencies. The operative question then becomes whether violations of Sections 99.012(7) and 116.111 may be determined to be violations of Section 112.313....

...The complaints here allege that Wilma breached a public trust by violating the Anti-nepotism law (Section 116.111) in appointing, employing, promoting, or advancing son John in his position as Deputy Supervisor and that John breached a public trust by violating the resign-to-run law (Section 99.012(7)) in failing to take a leave of absence from his position as Deputy Supervisor after filing for the office of Supervisor of Elections....

...Thus, the extent of the Commission's power is challenged and it is the responsibility of this Court to so determine within the issues posed. John Sullivan has been charged with the violation of Section 116.111, Florida Statutes. Wilma Sullivan has been charged with the violation of Section 99.012(7), Florida Statutes....

...atutes and Article II, Section 8, Florida Constitution. 2. The Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the complaints alleging conduct by John Sullivan in violation of Section 116.111, Florida Statutes and by Wilma Sullivan in violation of Section 99.012(7), Florida Statutes....

...trust beyond those enumerated in subsections 8(a)-(e). (3) whether the adopted Commission rules were constitutional, both facially and as applied to the Sullivans. (4) whether subsection 8(f) authorized the Commission to treat violations of sections 99.012 and 116.111, Florida Statutes, as breaches of the public trust....

...The suit seeks to establish that defendant, who in 1984 while employed by the predecessor to the current property appraiser qualified to run against his superior for that elective office, was thereby obligated to resign, and in effect resigned pursuant to section 99.012(7), Florida Statutes (1984)....

...The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of defendant on the basis that, pursuant to section 25 of the Hillsborough County Civil Service Law, chapter 82-301, Laws of Florida, (hereinafter "the local law") which was enacted after the enactment of section 99.012(7) (hereinafter "the statute"), defendant was required only to take a leave of absence upon running for that office....

...using Authority of the City of Sanford v. Billingslea, 464 So.2d 1221, 1222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), "special statute will prevail over general statute in absence of a clear legislative intent to contrary." The statute and the local law read as follows. SECTION 99.012(7), FLORIDA STATUTES (Supp....

...objection which is insufficient. Snead urges that the assistant state attorney who signed the indictment was without authority to sign the indictment because he had become a city commissioner at the same time he was an assistant state attorney. See Section 99.012(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....

instituted. See 21 Fla.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 99; 12 Fla.Jur., Estoppel and Waiver, § 63. The final

...Relator Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General, and co-relators seek to have Respondent Stone withdraw his certification of qualification of the candidacies of the co-respondents [2] on the ground of failure to comply with the requirements of Fla. Stat. § 99.012, F.S.A., the so-called "resign to run" law....

...of Representatives and should remain on the ballot. Respondent Richard Stone, as Secretary of State, is charged under Fla. Stat. § 15.13, [3] F.S.A., with "general supervision and administration of the election laws," which laws include Fla. Stat. § 99.012(2), F.S.A., providing as follows: "(2) No individual may qualify as a candidate for public office who holds another elective or appointive office, whether state, county or municipal, the term of which or any part thereof runs concurrent wit...

...manner as provided in the municipal or county charter. This does not apply to political party offices." By way of caveat we note that the 1971 session of the Legislature in "An act relating to transportation, " Ch. 71-373, tacked on a § 10 amending § 99.012, effective October 1, 1971, to provide as follows: "No person who serves as a member of any appointive board or authority without salary shall be in violation of this section by reason of holding any such office." None of respondents is in this category....

...heard during a post-termination hearing; 3. Violation of procedural due process in that Plaintiff was denied a penalty hearing; 4. Violation of procedural due process due to Defendant's failure to notify Plaintiff of the existence and application of section 99.012(7); 5....

...Wrongful discharge based on improper motivation; 10. Discrimination on the basis of political party affiliation in violation of *1114 the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and 11. Unconstitutionality of section 99.012(7) of the Florida Statutes....

...s; that he has qualified for no other public office in the state, the term of which office or any part thereof runs concurrent with that of the office he seeks; and that he has resigned from any office from which he is required to resign pursuant to Section 99.012 Florida Statutes....

...Property Appraiser defeating Plaintiff. On November 7, 1984, Plaintiff attempted to resume his duties at the Property Appraiser's office at which time he was informed that he was no longer an employee at the Property Appraiser's Office, pursuant to section 99.012(7) of the Florida Statutes, which provides as follows: For the purpose of this section, no individual who is a subordinate personnel, deputy sheriff or police officer need resign pursuant to subsection (2) or subsection (3) unless such...

...However, any such personnel, deputy sheriff or police officer shall take a leave of absence without pay from his employment during the period which he is seeking election to public office. Property Appraiser Daniel sought a declaratory judgment seeking a declaration of the rights of the parties under section 99.012(7). The circuit court held that section 99.012(7) did not apply; instead, section 25 of the Hillsborough County Civil Service Law Chapter 82-301 applied and Plaintiff was not required to resign in order to run against Daniel. The Second District Court of Appeal, reversing the circuit court's decision, held that section 99.012(7) applied to Plaintiff and Plaintiff was required to resign his position at the Property Appraiser's Office before running against his supervisor....

...ate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which *1115 that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. EFFECT OF SECTION 99.012(7) The resign-to-run requirement in section 99.012(7) of the Florida Statutes is enforced by section 99.021 which provides that "[e]ach candidate ......

...for nomination or election to any office other than a judicial office as defined in chapter 105, shall take and subscribe to an oath or affirmation in writing." Plaintiff swore, under the Oath of Candidate, "that he has resigned from any office from which he is required to resign pursuant to Section 99.012 Florida Statutes." Hence, when Plaintiff signed the Oath of Candidate, he made a sworn affirmation of resignation. This Court finds that Plaintiff resigned by operation of law, pursuant to section 99.012(7) of the Florida Statutes....

...cordance with the standard set forth in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett . JURISDICTION In light of the prior state court judgment, this Court must first determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim attacking the constitutionality of section 99.012(7) of the Florida Statutes....

...By failing to raise his claims in state court a plaintiff may forfeit his right to obtain review of the state-court decision in any federal court. Id. at 482, n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 1316, n. 16. Since the prior state court proceeding addressed the issue of whether section 99.012(7) of the Florida Statutes or the local law applied to Plaintiff, this Court finds that the claim regarding constitutionality of the same statute is inextricably intertwined with the state court proceeding....

...Appellees Michelle Rehwinkel Vasilinda and Freddy Moore Todd filed separate actions, later consolidated, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on claims that Appellant Fred Varn, a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives, District 9, had violated section 99.012(3), Florida Statutes (2008), a provision of Florida's "resign to run" law, and seeking to have Varn's name removed from the August 2008 primary ballot. There were no disputed issues of material fact, and after a hearing on the merits of the request for declaratory judgment, the circuit court entered a Final Declaratory Judgment which found that Varn "failed to comply with F.S. § 99.012(3)(c) and (g) by not timely submitting his written resignation of his office with the Leon County School [B]oard in accordance with the requirements of those statutory provisions" and that "[t]he only legal remedy available to the Court is...

...These are consolidated appeals from mandatory injunctions declaring Sandra Ruiz, a term-limited member of the Doral City Council, ineligible to run for the Democratic nomination to the Florida House of Representatives on the ground that she failed to satisfy the requirements of Florida's "resign-to-run" law, section 99.012, Florida Statutes (2010)....

...Florida's "resign-to-run" law states, "No officer may qualify as a candidate for another state, district, county, or municipal public office if the terms or any part thereof run concurrently with each other without resigning from the office he or she presently holds." See § 99.012(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). It is uncontested that this law applies to city council members, such as Ms. Ruiz, and that she did not resign from her council position before seeking to qualify for the upcoming primary. See § 99.012(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2010). The issue before us, therefore, is whether, if Ms. Ruiz were to win the Democratic primary election next week and the general election on November 2, 2010, the terms will run concurrently for any period of time within the meaning of section 99.012(3)(a)....

...directing the supervisors of election in the affected counties to post notices at polling places and with absentee ballots that votes for Chalifoux would be disregarded (ballots had already been printed). Chalifoux failed to meet the requirements of section 99.012(3), Florida Statutes (2007), Florida's Resign-to-Run Law....

...Chalifoux challenged the standing of Neri Sanchez, appellee, to bring this action contending that Sanchez, an elector as defined in section 97.021(13), was not registered as a republican, and, therefore, was not qualified to contest the candidacy in the republican primary. *433 Section 99.012(5) places the responsibility for enforcing the Resign-to-Run Law on an elector or the Department of State without requiring either to have a party affiliation....

...It could have done so, if it chose to place limitations on the elector, as it did elsewhere in the election laws. See §§ 100.361, 101.021, and 102.168, Fla. Stat. (2007). Appellant argues that since appellee cannot vote in the primary under section 101.021, he is not a qualified elector under section 99.012(5)....

...pervisor of elections, among others. The thrust of Parker's complaint was that McKane was not qualified to run for or hold the office of Town Commissioner of Lauderdale-By-The-Sea because, as a police officer of the City of Sunrise, he was barred by section 99.012(7), Florida Statutes (1989), from running for another municipal office without taking a leave of absence without pay from the Sunrise Police Department pending the election....

...overnment of the state, county, or municipalities therein. The case was tried and resulted in the entry of final judgment eight days after the election, holding in favor of Parker. The trial court reviewed, at some length, the legislative history of section 99.012, Florida Statutes, and concluded that McKane was unqualified to run for town commissioner under both Article II, Section 5, of the Florida Constitution, and section 99.012(7)....

...tion 5(a), of the Florida Constitution prohibits a municipal police officer employed by and receiving a salary from one municipality from holding office and receiving a salary as a town commissioner in another, different municipality; and 2) whether section 99.012(7), Florida Statutes (1989), requires a person employed as a police officer in one municipality to take an unpaid leave of absence therefrom while running for election to the office of town commissioner in a different municipality? The...

...a notary public or military officer may hold another office, and any officer may be a *503 member of a constitution revision commission, taxation and budget reform commission, constitutional convention or statutory body having only advisory powers. Section 99.012(7), Florida Statutes (1989), states: For the purposes of this section, no individual who is a subordinate personnel, deputy sheriff, or police officer need resign pursuant to subsection (2) or subsection (3) unless such individual is s...

...However, the statute also could not be clearer that the legislature intended such officer should take a leave of absence from the police department during the period in which he is seeking election to another office. The rationale behind the legislative act contained in section 99.012(7) is that it is unfair to permit an elected official or appointive official holding office to use the prestige and power of that office in seeking election to a higher or different office....

...Jerald S. Beer, a candidate for circuit court judge, Group 13. Abramson asserted that Beer was required to resign from his position as a traffic court hearing officer in order to seek election to judicial office, under Florida's "resign-to-run" law, section 99.012, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...After a series of hearings the circuit court found that Gonzalez's complaint was without merit. [1] I. RESIGNATION IN LIEU OF A LEAVE OF ABSENCE No "officer" may qualify as a candidate for another public office without first resigning from the office currently held. § 99.012(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). However, a "subordinate officer," as defined in section 99.012(1)(b), need not resign "unless he is seeking to qualify for a public office which is currently held by an officer who has authority to appoint, employ, promote, or otherwise supervise that person and who has qualified as a candidate for reelection to that office." § 99.012(5), Fla. Stat. (1991). As an assistant state attorney, Vogel was a "subordinate officer." Thus, it is undisputed that she had no legal obligation to resign in order to run for this position. Section 99.012(5) states: "However, upon qualifying, the subordinate officer ......

...n a future date, there is nothing to suggest that the legislature intended to remove this option from subordinate officers. Thus, the dispositive question is whether Vogel satisfied the requirements applicable to a resignation. II. RESIGNATION UNDER SECTION 99.012(3) Resignation under section 99.012(3) must be irrevocable, must be submitted at least ten days prior to qualifying, and must be effective no later than the date the new office commences or the officer's successor must assume office....

...The trial *477 court did, and was entitled to, accept this testimony as true. The controversy does not end with these findings. Gonzalez also maintains that Vogel should be disqualified because she failed to provide copies of her letter of resignation to the Governor and the Secretary of State. § 99.012(3)(e)2, Fla....

...FRANK, A.C.J., and HALL and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur. ON MOTION FOR REHEARING In his motion for rehearing Gonzalez takes issue with several aspects of our original opinion. Only one of his arguments merits discussion. Gonzalez suggests we erred in applying section 99.012(3)(e)2, Florida Statutes (1991), to the facts of this case....

...endered her resignation to Bill James, as state attorney of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, sufficiently complied with the statute despite belated service of copies to the Governor and Secretary of State. Gonzalez disputes that Vogel is governed by Section 99.012(3)(e)2. He maintains that she is a state officer rather than a district, county or municipal officer. Thus, he argues that *478 her resignation should have gone directly to the Governor. § 99.012(3)(e)3, Fla....

...expedite. [2] See § 106.23(2), Fla. Stat. (1991). [3] Assuming the trial court had found a violation of the leave of absence requirement, we do not need to decide whether disqualification would be the only remedy available to the trial court under section 99.012(6), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Vogel suggests this was proper because the resignation was conditional. However, we believe the dispositive fact was Lambeth's failure to have tendered the resignation to anyone until one day before expiration of the qualifying period, contrary to the express ten-day requirement of section 99.012.

that such a resignation was not required by section 99.012(5), Florida Statutes (2006). In response to

...The candidate has not qualified for any "other public office in the state, the term of which office or any part thereof runs concurrent with that of the office he or she seeks;" and 5. He or she has resigned from any office from which he or she is required to resign pursuant to section 99.012....

LaROSE, Judge. We are called upon to address Florida’s “resign-to-run” law, section 99.012(5), Florida Statutes (2006), in the context of the 2007 Tampa mayoral election....

...Based upon the information Mr. Lewis provided concerning his chain of command, the Department opined that he did not have to resign. 1 The City had a different view. The City Attorney issued a formal written opinion concluding that Mr. Lewis was required, under section 99.012(5) and Parker v....

...Lewis qualified, maintaining that he was not required to and, in fact, did not resign. In late January 2007, the City ousted Mr. Lewis from his position and filed its action for declaratory judgment. See § 86.011, Fla. Stat. (2006). The City sought a ruling that section 99.012(5) required Mr....

...Lewis to resign and that he was deemed to have resigned when he executed the Oath of Candidate. See Baker v. Alderman, 766 F.Supp. 1112, 1115 (M.D.Fla.1991), aff'd sub nom. Baker v. Parker, 979 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir.1992). We are not aware that anyone challenged Mr. Lewis’ qualifications to seek office. See § 99.012(6) (“The name of any person who does not comply with this section may be removed from every ballot on which it appears when ordered by a circuit court upon the petition of an elector or the Department of State.”)....

...Lewis had to quit his job to run for political office against his boss. Accordingly, we must determine if Mayor lorio was Mr. Lewis’s boss. That determination requires an analysis of statutes and codes. As framed by the record before us, therefore, whether section 99.012(5) required Mr....

...idate in any election for: (1) A City of Tampa office.... Tampa, Fla., Code of Ordinances part B, art. IV, § 4.23(B) (1990) (emphasis added). If this law applied, Mr. Lewis would have been required to take only a leave of absence to run for office. Section 99.012(5), however, imposes a more stringent requirement: A person who is a subordinate officer, deputy sheriff, or police officer must resign effective upon qualifying pursuant to this chapter if the person is seeking to qualify for a public office that is currently held by an officer who has authority to appoint, employ, promote, or otherwise supervise that person and who has qualified as a candidate for reelection to that office. (Emphasis added.) Both section 4.23(B) and section 99.012(5) deal with government employees seeking public office. But, section 99.012(5) controls where an employee is seeking office against an incumbent “who has authority to appoint, employ, promote, or otherwise supervise” him. Section 99.012(5) addresses a specific issue that section 4.23(B) does not and, consequently, governs our analysis. See Parker, 499 So.2d at 845 . 4 *1099 As a matter of law, Mayor lorio, at a minimum, had the authority to supervise Mr. Lewis. Thus, section 99.012(5) required him to resign....

...vests her with the ultimate authority to supervise Mr. Lewis. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to the City on this point. It follows, necessarily, that Mr. Lewis was not entitled to a final summary judgment. Conclusion Section 99.012(5) dictated that Mr....

...876.OS-876.10, Florida Statutes; that he or she has qualified for no other public office in the state, the term of which office or any part thereof runs concurrent[ly] with that of the office he or she seeks; and that he or she has resigned from any office from which he or she is required to resign pursuant to s. 99.012, Florida Statutes....

...Lewis’ resignation, we note that Parker did not address that issue. See 499 So.2d 843 . We must also observe that Parker, 499 So.2d 843 , and Baker, 766 F.Supp. 1112 , a federal case involving allegations of wrongful discharge, were decided before the amendment of section 99.012 to include the provision that "[t]he name of any person who does not comply with this section may be removed from every ballot on which it appears when ordered by a circuit court upon the petition of an elector or the Department of *1099 State.” See § 99.012(6), Fla. Stal. (2002 Supp.); Ch. 91-107, § 31, at 899, Laws of Fla. Although section 99.012(6) was in effect at the time Mr. Lewis sought office, its applicability was not raised below. Further, because the issue was not presented to us, we have no occasion to address it here. Whether section 99.012(6) applies to the issue of resignation or to the remedies that might have been available to the City, we leave for further development on remand....

...County for the term beginning January 5, 1971. The trial court, after a full hearing, held that at the time appellee James A. McCauley filed his qualifying papers as a candidate for such judicial position he was not subject to the provisions of F.S. Section 99.012, F.S.A., and denied the injunctive relief sought by appellant....

the election. Under the provisions of Fla.Stat. § 99.-012, F.S.A., it is evident that Mrs. Oes-terle was

...“Larry” Johnston from the ballot as a candidate for the *168 office of Circuit Judge for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Group Three, maintaining that Johnston had not “irrevocably” resigned as County Judge, pursuant to the requirements of Section 99.012(2) and (3), Florida Statutes (1985). Rosier based his allegation on a postscript to Johnston’s letter of resignation which stated that “[t]his letter is conditioned only upon it being construed as a timely letter within the provisions of F.S. 99.012....

...lections Tallahassee QUESTIONS: 1. How should the term `subordinate personnel,' as used in Ch. 79-391, Laws of Florida, an act relating to campaigns, exempting certain persons from the resigh-to-run requirement, be defined? 2. Does this amendment to s. 99.012 , F....

...ly with the term of the office which he currently holds, to submit an irrevocable letter of prospective resignation prior to qualifying for election, which resignation shall be effective regardless of whether the candidate is elected to such office. Section 99.012 (2) and (3), F....

...Because of the extent of the controversy surrounding this amendment, as well as the importance of the law itself, it is appropriate that I exercise my authority to issue my legal opinion on these matters. Chapter 79-391, Laws of Florida, about which you inquire, amends s. 99.012 , F....

...AS TO QUESTIONS 2 AND 3: Both your second and third questions concern the applicability of Ch. 79-391, Laws of Florida, to a public school teacher who seeks to become a candidate for the district school board or for school superintendent. As I stated in the discussion to question 1, the 1979 amendment to s. 99.012 , F....

...Chapter 79-391, Laws of Florida, is an amendment to the Resign-to-Run Law. It provides an exemption to certain officers who otherwise would be required by that law to resign their offices in order to qualify for another. See, e.g ., the operative subsections (1), (2), and (6) of s. 99.012 , which begin, `[n]o individual may qualify as a candidate ....

...The trial judge has denied appellant's claim for a mandatory injunction to remove Candidate Beer's name from the ballot. The argument is that Beer was required to resign from his position as a civil traffic infraction hearing officer to qualify for election to judicial office under Florida's "resign-to-run" law. § 99.012, Fla....

...The operative statutory text provides that: "No officer may qualify as a candidate for another public office, whether state, district, county, or municipal, if the terms or any part thereof run concurrently with each other, without resigning from the office he or she presently holds." [e.s.] § 99.012(3)(a), Fla....

ARE NOT REQUIRED TO RESIGN UNDER STATE LAW? Section 99.012, F.S., Florida's Resign to Run Law, requires

...Lambeth, Jr., who also qualified as a candidate for the same office. Appellee’s complaint sought to prevent the printing of appellant Lam-beth’s name on the ballot for the general election to be held November 5, 1974, be *430 cause said appellant had not complied with § 99.012, F.S.1973....

...On July 23rd the letter and copies thereof were delivered to the town clerk and town commissioners. On July 27, 1974, four days after the period for qualifying had expired, the town commission accepted appellant’s resignation effective that date. The trial court found that appellant Lambeth was subject to the provisions of § 99.012, F.S.1973, and that he had failed to comply with the statute; that the letter tendering his resignation was not effective as a resignation by its express term until the date it was acted upon by the town commission, by which time the qualifying period had expired....

...ffirmed. Because of the exigency of this matter and the time factor involved, the privilege of filing a petition for rehearing is dispensed with and this decision shall become immediately effective. Affirmed. WALDEN, CROSS and DOWNEY, JJ., concur. . Section 99.012(2) provides: “No individual may qualify as a candidate for public office who holds another elective or appointive office, whether state, county or municipal, the term of which or any part thereof runs concurrent with the term of offi...

...Petitioner seeks a Writ of Prohibition against the respondent circuit judge, to prohibit him from performing any further acts in this cause because he resigned to run for a vacancy on the Florida Supreme Court pursuant to provisions of Florida Statutes § 99.012, the so-called Resign-to-run Act, and by virtue thereof no longer occupies the office of circuit judge....

...ich he would assume office, if elected to the office to which he seeks to qualify,” (2) “the expiration date of the term of the office which he presently holds” or (3) “the general election day at which his successor is elected.” Fla.Stat. § 99.012(2)....

...1st DCA 2020). Baker argues, as he did below, that Jordan must be disqualified as a candidate for three reasons: (i) he failed to withdraw from the hospital board race before qualifying as a candidate for property appraiser and thereby qualified for more than one office, in violation of section 99.012(2), Florida Statutes (2024); (ii) he did not file his paperwork to qualify as a candidate for property appraiser until after the noon qualifying deadline had passed; and (iii) he failed to pay the qualifying fee from a campaign account opened specifically for his campaign for property appraiser....

...See 5 § 99.061(7)(a)1.–5., Fla. Stat. Further, Florida law expressly prohibits an individual from qualifying “for more than one public office, whether federal, state, district, county, or municipal, if the terms or any part thereof run concurrently with each other.” § 99.012(2), Fla....

...DS-DE 9), designating a “change” in office sought to Lake County Property Appraiser; and (2) a check for $10,685.04 from the “Mark V. Jordan Campaign Account” in payment of the qualifying fee. Upon receiving and reviewing the papers required by section 99.012(2), Florida Statutes, the Lake County Supervisor of Elections certified Jordan as a qualified candidate for property appraiser....

...First, Baker suggests that Jordan failed to properly withdraw from the hospital board race before qualifying as a candidate for property appraiser. As a result, Jordan in effect qualified for two offices with concurrent terms, which is plainly prohibited by section 99.012(2), Florida Statutes....

consistent with the resign-to-run law. Under section 99.012(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), an officer

...n in question with other legislation which presumably was intended to reflect the same public policy. See Florida Jai Alai, Inc. v. Lake Howell Water & *154 Reclamation Dist., 274 So.2d 522 (Fla.1973). Not only in § 104.31(3), F.S., but also in § 99.012, the “resign to run law” which was significantly amended by the same legislature that passed ch....

...We affirm the ruling of the trial court denying the petition for injunction to remove the appellee’s name from the ballot for election to the City Council of Boca Raton. Appellant claimed that appellee Kneiser had failed to comply with the resign to run statute. See § 99.012, Fla....

...ive office, although a rule or regulation of the State Board of Education or local community college district board of trustees may prohibit such activity. Such comptroller is not required to resign to run for the office of state legislator, because s. 99.012 , F....

...Fla., 1976), wherein the court upheld a municipal code provision prohibiting municipal employees from becoming candidates; Jones v. Board of Control, 131 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1961), upholding a rule promulgated by the Board of Regents which prohibited university employees from seeking election to public office. AS TO QUESTION 2: Section 99.012 (2), F....

serve as `certified reserve police officer.' Section 99.012(2), F. S., Florida's Resign-to-Run Law, provides

should observe regular hours of eating and in § 99.12 he states: “Diabetics who do not have other disease

...s; that he has qualified for no other public office in the state, the term of which office or any part thereof runs concurrent with that of the office he seeks; and that he has resigned from any office from which he is required to resign pursuant to Section 99.012 Florida Statutes....

...However, any such personnel, deputy sheriff or police officer shall take a leave of absence without pay from his employment during the period which he is seeking election to public office. Property Appraiser sought a declaratory judgment seeking a declaration of the rights of the parties under section 99.012(7). The circuit court held that section 99.012(7) did not apply; instead, section 25 of the Hillsborough County Civil Service Law Chapter 82-30 applied and Plaintiff was not required to resign in order to run against Daniel. The Second District Court of Appeal, reversed the circuit court’s decision and held that section 99.012(7) applied to Plaintiff and Plaintiff was required to resign his position at the Property Appraiser’s Office before running against his supervisor....

...ard during a post-termination hearing; 3. Violation of procedural due process in that Plaintiff was denied a penalty hearing; 4. Violation of procedural due process due to Defendant’s failure to notify Plaintiff of the existence and application of section 99.012(7); 5....

...Wrongful discharge based on improper motivation; 10. Discrimination on the basis of political party affiliation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and 11. Unconstitutionality of section 99.012(7) of the Florida Statutes....

...Plaintiff contends that he took a leave of absence without pay in accordance with Section 25 of the Hillsborough County Civil Service Law; Chapter 82-305. Note that the Second District Court of Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court ruled against Plaintiff and held that 99.012, Florida Statutes, did apply to Baker....

...d not yet commenced.” Id. at 1547 . Plaintiff in this case therefore had no “reasonable opportunity.” This case can be distinguished from the one before this Court because Plaintiff could have attacked the constitutionality of Florida Statutes 99.012(7) at the time....

...(1) Baker was aware of the Oath of Candidate form that Plaintiff executed the day he became an official candidate for public office and that that form stated that Baker has “resigned from any office from which he is required to resign pursuant to section 99.012, Florida Statutes.” (2) That Plaintiff received actual notice from Defendants that the Florida Statute *207 had been referenced in the Oath of Candidate form less than one month after Plaintiff filed his first Amended Complaint. (3) In Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint he states that he had “no knowledge of the existence of Florida Statutes § 99.012,” yet Plaintiffs response was that “he did not know that the statute referred to him at the time that the Plaintiff signed the form.” Defendants contend that there is a clear inconsistency in Plaintiffs testimony....

...Plaintiff, in his reply to Defendant’s motion for sanctions and award of costs and attorney’s fees, shows no legal basis for his claims or legal basis that would deny defendant’s motion. Plaintiff states that (1) that Baker was told by defendant—HCCSB that the Florida Statutes § 99.012 did not apply to him; (2) that this was later confirmed by the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in Florida....

...2 In adopting the objective standard in Lee it is clear that after a reasonable inquiry Plaintiff should have believed that the pleadings he filed were not well-grounded in facts and law. Plaintiff also had read Defendants’ response which informed Plaintiff that he had sworn to the “Resign to Run” Law, Florida Statutes § 99.012 which discharged him from his employment at the Hillsborough Property Appraiser’s Office by “Operation of Law.” The Second District Court of Appeals ruled on this....

...sight). 4 Plaintiff may want to advance the theory that his case was a case of “first impression” (which would give his case a good chance of avoiding sanctions); however the law governing Plaintiffs candidacy for public office, Florida Statutes § 99.012 was very specific as it relates to the action which Plaintiff should take (i.e., resignation from his job)....

...Humphries, a Florida highway patrolman for 24 years, tentatively agreed with his supporters that he would run for sheriff of Orange County. He checked with Dixie Barber, the Orange County Supervisor of Elections regarding the applicability to him of Section 99.012(7), 1 Florida Statutes (1979), which exempts “subordinate personnel, deputy sheriffs], or police officer[s]” from the general resign-to-run requirements of Section 99.012, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...resign-to-run. Shortly, thereafter, Humphries submitted a letter to Colonel Beach, the Director of the Florida Highway Patrol, detailing his plans and Beach requested an opinion from the Department’s general counsel regarding the applicability of Section 99.012(7). The general counsel’s opinion was issued on November 1, 1979, and concluded that the operation of Section 99.-012(7) was restricted to the provisions of Section 99.012 generally and did not affect the requirements of Section 110.092(4)(a) *1313 [now 110.233(4)(a)] 2 which requires that a Career Service employee get permission to run for office before becoming a candidate....

...n before he began his political campaign and must avoid any suggestion that he was campaigning while still a member of the Highway Patrol. On November 14, 1979, Humphries contacted Representative Reynolds, the sponsor of the bill which culminated in Section 99.012(7), and asked if Reynolds intended that the exception include the Highway Patrol....

...and actively campaigning for sheriff while working as a Florida highway patrolman. He was given written notice that he was in violation of departmental policy and statutory law. In response, he requested a leave of absence whenever appropriate under Section 99.012(7)....

...rules, regulations and departmental policy. Humphries, meanwhile, had requested a formal opinion from Glisson which was issued on May 2,1980, and which opined that Humphries was an “officer” and “subordinate personnel” within the meaning of Section 99.012(7). However, the opinion specifically noted that it was limited to construction of Section 99.012(7) and did not purport to construe Section 110.233(4) and concluded: “Therefore, Florida highway patrol officers should not rely upon this ruling as a decision construing Section 110.233(4), F.S.” Humphries first argues that any violation of law or policy on his part was not willful....

...The record contains competent, substantial evidence supporting the Department’s finding that he willfully violated the applicable statutes as interpreted by the Department as well as the rules and regulations of the Department. We must also conclude that the Department’s interpretation of the law is correct. Section 99.012(7) begins “For purposes of this section .... ” This language is not ambiguous and clearly restricts the application of subsection (7) to Section 99.-012. We reject appellant’s argument that Sections 99.012(7) and 110.233(4)(a) are so repugnant as to justify an implied repeal of one by the other....

...with candidates for public office who already hold elective or appointive *1314 office with the state, a county or a municipality, and requires these persons to resign from their present office before becoming a candidate for another public office; Section 99.012(7) exempts certain named groups from this requirement, allowing them to take a leave of absence rather than resign....

...Absent some indication that the legislature intended to make a major substantive change in the application of this prohibition or repeal it with respect to Florida highway patrolmen or any other specific group of Career Service employees, we decline to find an implied repeal in Section 99.012(7)....

...All Career Service employees are subject to the requirements of Section 110.-233(4)(a); relatively few are elected or appointed officers. Those who are must comply with the requirements of both statutes. Assuming that Humphries was included within the purview of Section 99.012 and then exempted by Section 99.012(7), he would still be required to comply with Section 110.233(4)(a). We must also reject appellant’s argument that the dismissal was premature in that Humphries had not yet become a candidate. Under the provisions of Section 99.012(7) upon which Humphries seeks to rely, a person exempted from actually resigning to run “shall take a leave of absence without pay from his employment during the period in which he is seeking election to public office.” Certainly a...

...d were being distributed to potential voters. These activities were officially sanctioned by Humphries and support the conclusion that he was a candidate within the meaning of Section 110.233(4)(a) and was seeking public office within the meaning of Section 99.012(7), even though he had not yet qualified....

branches unless expressly provided herein. . § 99.012(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1993).

procedures provided in the municipal charter. Section 99.012(2), F. S., provides in pertinent part that:

...at the time of his election to the city council on January 29, 2008, but must resign prior to assuming office on April 23, 2008, at which time he will be sworn in and his city council term will begin. Sincerely, Bill McCollum Attorney General 1 Cf. s. 99.012 , Fla. Stat., Florida's Resign to Run Law, which places restrictions on persons running for office while holding an office if the terms or any part thereof run concurrently with each other. Section 99.012 (6)(b), however, provides that the statute does not apply to "[p]ersons serving without salary as members of an appointive board or authority." 2 630 So....

...establishes a comprehensive body of law on the topic of elections, including rules regulating candidate qualification. In the chapter governing candidates, the applicable language defines the term “qualify” as “to fulfill the requirements set forth in s. 99.061(7)(a).” § 99.012(1)(b), Fla....

without resigning from such office. . . ." Section 99.012(2) was subsequently amended and now refers

...f mandamus in the circuit court seeking to compel the Supervisor to hold an election to fill the District Five School Board vacancy. The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition with prejudice, reasoning that under the Florida Constitution and section 99.012, Florida Statutes (2024)—the "resign-to-run" law—an election was not required because the vacancy created by Tatem's resignation would be filled by gubernatorial appointment until the November 2026 election. "In order to be en...

...an indisputable legal duty to perform the requested action, and the petitioner must have no other adequate remedy available." Villa Bellini 2 Tatem is required to resign his school board position to qualify to run for the legislature. See § 99.012(3)(a), Fla....

...resignation of the incumbent" occurs on the date an incumbent's resignation is tendered or the date on which it is effective. The "resign-to-run" law, however, unequivocally provides that "[t]he office is deemed vacant upon the effective date of the resignation submitted by the official in his or her letter of resignation." § 99.012(3)(f) (emphasis added)....

...2018), we hold that the remainder of the term of office should be calculated from the effective date of the resignation. Accordingly, the circuit court properly dismissed Golden's mandamus petition. Golden argues that this court should ignore the plain language of section 99.012(3)(f)....

...office[s]" and "elective charter county office[s] or elective municipal office[s]" and explicitly provided that only the latter were "deemed vacant upon the effective date of the resignation submitted by the official in his or her letter of resignation." § 99.012(3)(f)1, 2, Fla. Stat. (2005). But in that opinion, the supreme court addressed only the former, i.e., "elective office[s]." See Sheriff & Jud. Vacancies, 928 So. 2d at 1222 (quoting § 99.012(3)(f)1, Fla....

...Now, however, the statute makes no such distinction; rather, it explicitly provides, as to all offices falling within its ambit, that "[t]he office is deemed vacant upon the effective date of the resignation submitted by the official in his or her letter of resignation." § 99.012(3)(f), Fla. Stat. (2024). By enacting the current version of section 99.012(3)(f), the legislature has chosen specifically to define a vacancy under article X, section 3, as occurring upon the effective date of the incumbent official's resignation....

...e W. Wright, the other respondent, as a duly qualified candidate for the office of member, Florida House of Representatives, District 106, on the grounds that the said Wright is not a duly qualified candidate because his candidacy is in violation of Section 99.012(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., known as the “Resign-to-Run Law”....

...rning their becoming a candidate for nomination in primary elections. . . .” In the case at bar, it appears from the exhibits attached to the petition that the relator’s contention that respondent Wright is in violation of the Resign-to-Run Law, Section 99.012(2), Florida Statutes, is not without merit....

PER CURIAM. Spencer Slate brought an action in the Circuit Court for Leon County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on a claim that David Rice had violated the Resign to Run Law, section 99.012, Florida Statutes (2006), and asking that Rice’s name be removed from the ballot as a Republican Party candidate for the Florida House of Representatives in District 120....

...law provides: “No officer may qualify as a candidate for another state, district, county, or municipal public office if the terms or any part thereof run concurrently with each other without resigning from the office he or she presently holds.” § 99.012(3)(a), Fla....

...we entered orders accelerating briefing and oral argument. II. Standard of Review In this case we are called upon to reconcile section 4.07 of the Sweetwater Charter with Article II, Section 5(a) of the Florida Constitution8 and section 99.012 of the Florida Statutes....

...3d DCA 2010). Florida’s resign-to-run law states, in relevant part, that “[n]o officer may qualify as a candidate for another . . . municipal office if the terms or any part thereof run concurrently with each other without resigning from the office he or she presently holds.” § 99.012(3)(a), Fla....

...te, and require Diaz to comply with, Florida’s resign to run law. B. Diaz’s Argument 9 Florida’s resign-to-run law includes a specific remedial provision: the name of any person not complying with the law may not appear on the ballot. § 99.012(5), Fla....

...186.506 (1), Fla. Stat. 14 239 So.2d 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970), cert. den., 239 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1970). The court considered a regional planning council established under former Ch. 160, Fla. Stat. ( see now ss. 186.501 - 186.513 , Fla. Stat.). 15 See , s. 99.012 , Fla....

...lic office who holds another elective or appointive office, whether state, county, or municipal, the term of which or any part thereof runs concurrently with the term of office for which he seeks to qualify without resigning from such office. . . ." Section 99.012 was subsequently amended and now refers to district offices in addition to state, county and municipal offices; however, at the time the court reached its opinion in Orange County v....