Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...hen such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception and the purpose of such interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act." Fla. Stat. § 934.03(2)(c)....

...ion from being received in evidence in any trial "if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter." A lawful interception of communications occurs when all of the parties to the communication have given prior consent. See § 934.03(2)(d), Fla....

...Chapter 934 declares that it is lawful for a law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication when such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception and the purpose of such interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act. § 934.03(2)(c) Fla....

...ly that the Florida Legislature recognizes the right of a police officer to intercept an oral communication when such person is a party to the conversation or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception. § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

...I cannot agree that Sarmiento's rights under article I, section 12, were violated by the interception of his conversation with the undercover detective by way of a monitoring device. In monitoring the conversation, the police officers were acting in accordance with section 934.03(2)(c)....

...ntercept an oral communication when such person is a party to the conversation or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception and the purpose of the interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act. Section 934.03(2)(c)....

...United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 347 (1966); see also Walker v. State, 222 So.2d 760 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969), and cases cited therein. The above principle is applicable to Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution (1968), and is codified in Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1975): *648 "(c) It is lawful under this chapter for a law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication when such person is a...

...The district court relied upon its prior decision in Springle v. State, 613 So.2d 65, 68 (Fla. 4th DCA), review dismissed, 626 So.2d 208 (Fla. 1993), which held that such secret and unauthorized tape recordings violate Florida's constitutional right of privacy as well as section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...stee had no reasonable expectation of privacy while conversing in back seat of police car); Marland, 355 N.W.2d 378 (holding that detainees, not under formal arrest, had no reasonable expectation of privacy while conversing in a police car). We find section 934.03, which provides that it is a crime to willfully intercept oral communications, to be inapplicable to this case....

...mstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication." § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). Thus, for an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable. State v. Inciarrano, 473 So.2d 1272 (Fla. 1985). Because we find that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a police car, section 934.03 does not apply to conversations that take place in those vehicles....

...We also disapprove the opinion in Springle to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion. We remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., OVERTON, J., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur. SHAW and KOGAN, JJ., dissent. NOTES [1] Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1991), provides in relevant part: (1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any person who: (a) Intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication; ......

...ded on a tape found by the investigating officer in the victim's desk. Inciarrano was indicted for the first-degree premeditated murder of the victim. He moved to suppress the tape of the conversation between himself and the victim on the basis that section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1981), proscribed the interception of these oral communications and section 934.06 requires that these proscribed interceptions be excluded from evidence at trial....

...1973), not to rule contrary to decisions of this Court, the Fourth District reversed the order denying Inciarrano's motion to suppress on the authority of State v. Walls and State v. Tsavaris . Walls and Tsavaris, however, do not control in the present case. Section 934.03 describes the limited circumstances where the interception of oral communications is lawful. In Walls, this Court addressed the constitutionality of sections 934.02(2), 934.03, and 934.06 and the question of whether an extortionary threat delivered personally to the victim in his home was an "oral communication" as defined in section 934.02(2)....

...utes (1975), the electronic recording of the "oral communication" without the consent of all parties to the communication was prohibited; and held that the subject communication did not fall within any situations permitting interception set forth in section 934.03(2)....

...reasonable. Assuming he had a subjective expectation of privacy, we conclude that such expectation, under the circumstances, was not justified. Without a reasonable expectation of privacy, Inciarrano's "oral communications" were not protected under section 934.03, and the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress....

...41 As to Cody Lisenby, all judges find the conversations admissible. Both federal and Florida statutes expressly permit the interception of phone calls where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2511 (2)(c); Fla.Stat. 934.03(2)(c) (the Florida prior consent provision applies only where the person is a government agent)....

...(Emphasis supplied.) But for exceptions specifically spelled out in chapter 934, anyone who willfully intercepts a wire or oral communication or who discloses the contents of an unlawfully intercepted wire or oral communication is guilty of a felony in the third degree. § 934.03(1)(a) and (c). None of the exceptions listed in section 934.03(2) applies in the present factual situation....

...The Court reached a similar conclusion in Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 920, 98 S.Ct. 1480, 55 L.Ed.2d 513 (1978). In that case various newspapers mounted a wholesale attack upon the constitutionality of section 934.03(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1979), which requires that all parties to a conversation give consent before that conversation may be lawfully intercepted....

...oral communication when such person is a party to the communication or when one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal act. § 934.03(2)(d), Fla....

...parties to a defined wire or oral communication to give prior consent: It is lawful under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire or oral communication when all of the parties to the communication have given prior consent to such interception. § 934.03(d)(2), Fla....

...Equally certain is the fact that the 1974 amendment to chapter 934 was designed to proscribe the method of interception used in this case. On the floor of the Florida House of Representatives, the only recorded debate on the two-party consent requirement of section 934.03(2)(d) was this comment by Representative Shreve: [What this bill does] is to prevent, make it illegal, for a person to record a conversation, even though he's a party to it, without the other person's consent....

..., grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the state, or a political subdivision thereof, if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter. [Emphasis supplied.] Section 934.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: (1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any person who: (a) Willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire or oral communication; ... . shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084. [Emphasis supplied.] Since none of the exceptions enumerated in section 934.03 apply to the present facts, if Dr....

...Sunbeam Television Corp ., this Court was not confronted with the issue of whether the recording of a conversation by one of the participants without the consent of the other was an interception. Sunbeam Television Corporation had filed a complaint challenging the constitutionality of section 934.03(2)(d) insofar as it required all parties to consent before a legal interception of a conversation could be had. Sunbeam alleged that this statute was a prior restraint in violation of the first amendment. This Court held that section 934.03(2)(d) is not a restraint on the press and does not violate the first amendment....

...In order to hold that the present recording is not an interception, it is not necessary that we recede from our holding in Sunbeam that where, in fact, there has been an "interception" by a member of the press, the first amendment does not exempt that interception from the requirement of section 934.03(2)(d) that all the parties to the oral or wire communication consent before the interception is lawful....

...If the legislature had intended to make it unlawful for any person to record an oral or wire communication, it could easily have done so in plain and simple language. It did not. Instead, it criminalized only the willful interception of wire or oral communication. Section 934.03(1)(a)....

...This portion of the trial judge's order is not before us for review. [2] This case does not involve the issue of whether the interception was conducted by a law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer pursuant to section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...However, such is not the case here. Every state in this circuit has made wiretapping of the sort James engaged in a crime. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-31 (1994); O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62 (1999); FLA. STAT. 19 ANN. § 934.03(1) (2001)....

...or both. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-69 (1999). Violation of the Florida statute is also a felony and carries a penalty of up to five years in prison, up to a $5,000 fine, and possible additional penalties for habitual felony offenders. F LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.03(4)(a) & 775.082 to .083 (2001)....

...vice if he intentionally installs or places a device in a private place with knowledge it is to be used for eavesdropping and without permission of the owner and any lessee or tenant or guest for hire of the private place.”) and FLA . STAT . ANN . § 934.03 (“[A]ny person who: (a) Intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication ....

...On 25 July 1977, Troelstrup sent West a letter stating that West was relieved of all official duties and was suspended without pay on the grounds that (1) West had willfully made nonconsensual recordings of wire communications in violation of FDCLE general orders and in violation of Section 934.03, Florida Statutes, and (2) West had capitalized upon confidential insider information for his own personal gain or benefit in violation of Section 112.313(8)....

...We reaffirm and follow that decision today in holding that such eavesdropping constitutes an "interception" of the defendant's private communications within the meaning of Article I, Section 12, of the Florida Constitution. The state argues in effect that Hajdu is no longer good law because the subsequent passage of Sections 934.03(2)(c), [1] 934.08(3), [2] Florida Statutes (1977) impliedly overruled this decision by authorizing that electronic eavesdropping conducted in this case....

...cept a wire or oral communication when such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception and the purpose of such interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act." § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

...Briggs, by invoking the attorney-client privilege, cannot be compelled to produce the tapes. We hereby issue a writ of certiorari and remand the case to the circuit court with instructions that it quash the state's subpoena. SCHEB, C.J., and OTT, J., concur. NOTES [1] State v. Walls, 356 So.2d 294 (Fla. 1978), holds that Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1979), prohibits the secret recording of a conversation by a party to that conversation....

...In fact, Article I, section 12 expressly provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated" ... (emphasis mine) Furthermore, section 934.03, Florida Statutes, makes it unlawful for any person (including law enforcement officers) to wilfully intercept, use or disclose any wire or oral communication, or to endeavor to do so or procure another to do so, punishable by five yea...

...First and foremost, the videotaping was an unreasonable interception of the defendant's private communication with his brother in violation of Article I, sections 12 and 23, of the Florida Constitution. 2. The videotaping was an unlawful interception of an oral communication in violation of section 934.03, Florida Statutes, and must be excluded from evidence pursuant to section 934.06, Florida Statutes....

...United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 347 (1966); see also Walker v. State, 222 So.2d 760 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969) and cases cited therein. The above principle is applicable to Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution (1968) and is codified in Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statute (1975): "(c) It is lawful under this chapter for a law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication when such person is a party...

...or) police officers to make. Such direct testimony easily falls in the class of those exceptions where establishment of probable cause and securance of a warrant or order are not required." 272 So.2d 494. It is clear that if there is compliance with Section 934.03(2)(c) and Tollett, supra, electronic reproductions of communications between an informer and the accused may be introduced into evidence and the securance of an intercept warrant or order are not necessary regardless of whether there was sufficient time to obtain one....

...The court was not presented with that issue and, accordingly, did not pass on it. If anything, the language of the opinion appears to announce a decided preference for intercept warrants as the normal method by which governmental electronic surveillance should be conducted. I recognize that Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), tracks prior electronic eavesdropping law before 1968 and, as interpreted, places beyond the scope of the electronic eavesdropping statute any electronic interceptions of a conversation outside the home...

...Thomson, of Paul & Thomson, Miami, for appellees. Thomas W. McAliley and David J. White, of Beckham, McAliley & Proenza, Miami, for American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, as amicus curiae. ADKINS, Justice. This is an interlocutory appeal from the Circuit Court of Dade County which held Section 934.03(2)(d), Florida Statutes, to be unconstitutional. We have accepted jurisdiction and will treat the interlocutory appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline Ry. Co., 290 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1974). Section 934.03(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1969), permitted the interception of defined wire or oral communications when one party to the communication gave prior consent: "It is not unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law...

...n such person is a party to the communication or when one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal act." (Emphasis supplied.) Section 934.03(2)(d), Florida Statutes, was amended in 1974, by Chapter 74-249 [S.459], Laws of Florida, to require all parties to the defined wire or oral communication to give prior consent to a defined interception: "It is lawful under this chapte...

...The public through its elected and appointed law enforcement officers regularly utilizes informers, and in proper circumstances may assert a privilege against disclosing the identity of these informers." (Emphasis supplied.) At 681-98, 92 S.Ct. at 2656-2665. Section 934.03(2)(d), Florida Statutes, is not a restraint or restriction on what the press may publish, nor is there an expressed or implied command that the press publish which it prefers to withhold....

...Todd, Baudo and Zudans brought a shareholders' derivative suit on behalf of FEI against Dr. Minotty. They alleged claims for appointment of a receiver, breach of fiduciary duty, securities fraud, common law fraud, and illegal interception of communications under section 934.03, Florida Statutes....

...t harmed FEI. It alleged that an independent valuation of the Surgicenter had valued it at significantly less than the purchase price that Dr. Minotty negotiated for himself. Finally, it alleged illegal interception of communications in violation of section 934.03, based upon the use of the hidden security cameras....

...the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." § 934.02(3), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added). Thus, the plaintiffs argue, interception of the video images is actionable, even without the interception of oral communications. We disagree. Section 934.03(1)(a) provides: *830 Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited....

...However, the Legislature limited civil causes of action to cases of actual interception. Section 934.10, Florida Statutes provides: Civil remedies. (1) Any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of ss. 934.03-934.09 shall have a civil cause of action against any person or entity who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person or entity to intercept, disclose, or use, such communications and shall be entitled to recover ......

...ant's residence. We do not agree. Subsequent to the Sarmiento decision, this court ruled in Franco v. State, 376 So.2d 1168 (Fla.3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 386 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1980), that a warrant is not required when, as here, the requirements of Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977) and Tollett v....

...al communication other than: "any telephone * * * instrument * * * furnished to the subscriber or user * * * being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business * * *." (and other exceptions not here material) Florida Statute 934.03, F.S.A....

...We begin with an examination of the statutory scheme, and then proceed to a review of the relevant ease law. Royal Health alleges a claim under section 934.10 of the Act. That provision creates a civil remedy for “[a]ny person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted ... in violation of [sections] 934.03-934.09.” Fla.Stat.Ann....

...ted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981. 10 . Assuming no exception applies, under Florida law both parties to a phone call must consent before that call may be recorded. Fla.Stat. Ann. § 934.03(2)(d) (West Supp.1990)....

...Brian Brennan of Brennan, Brown & Avery, West Palm Beach, for appellee. KARL, Justice. We have for review on petition for writ of certiorari granted an interlocutory order of the trial court upholding the constitutional validity of Sections 934.02(2), 934.03 and 934.06, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...interception prohibited by Section 943.03, Florida Statutes, and that use of the electronic recording as evidence is prohibited by Section 934.06, Florida Statutes. Granting the motion to suppress, the trial judge expressly ruled Sections 934.02(2), 934.03 and 934.06 constitutional....

...any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting." Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1975), provides in part: "Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any person who: "(a) Willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to interce...

...tion of this chapter." We agree with the trial court that an extortionary threat delivered personally to the victim in the victim's home is an "oral communication" within the definition of Section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes (1975); that pursuant to Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1975), the electronic recording of such "oral communication" without the consent of all parties to the communication was prohibited; and that Section 934.06, Florida Statutes (1975), expressly prohibits the use of such electronic recording as evidence. The subject electronic recording did not fall within any of the situations permitting interception delineated in Section 934.03(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Section 934.06, Florida Statutes (1975), contains no exception to the prohibition against use of the illegally intercepted wire or oral communication as evidence. Appellant argues that such electronic recording may not constitutionally be suppressed from evidence and that Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to this cause. Appellant in effect requests this Court to create an exception to Section 934.06, Florida Statutes (1975), and Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Botts, 88 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1956). The function of this Court is to interpret the law and is neither to legislate nor determine the wisdom of the policy of the Legislature. Holley v. Adams, 238 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1970). Recently, upholding the constitutional validity of Section 934.03(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1975), this Court, in Shevin v....

...fficers outside the home. Appellee Kelly allegedly was present and participated in both sales. It is conceded that no intercept warrant was obtained, and no contention is made by the State that the officers had insufficient time to obtain a warrant. Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977), provides: *1046 (c) It is lawful under this Chapter for a law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication when such p...

...United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d [374] (1966); see also Walker v. State, 222 So.2d 760 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1969), and cases cited therein. The above principle is applicable to Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution (1968) and is codified in Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statute (1975).......

...ut the constitutional protections afforded private communications, while at the same time giving guidance to law enforcement as to the legitimate circumstances under which they may use the interception of communications as an investigative tool. See section 934.03(1)(a)-(d)....

...II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520). [3] The definition of "oral communication" in the Florida statute substantially follows the same language found in Title III. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2) with section 934.03(2)....

...In determining the extent of reliance on pre- Sarmiento law we look to the law in effect at the time of the decision. As pointed out by Justice Alderman in his dissent to Sarmiento, in recording the conversations the police acted in accordance with section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977), and the United States Supreme Court has held that it is not an unreasonable or unconstitutional search and seizure for an agent to record the conversations he was a party to....

...ave been admissible. In Franco v. State, 376 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 386 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1980), the Third District addressed the issue of the admissibility of recordings of the communications where there has been compliance with section 934.03(2)(c) and held: A wrongdoer who voluntarily speaks to another of his wrongdoings, only has the hope or expectation, not a constitutionally protected right, that the other person will not breach his confidence and testify as to the contents of their conversations....

...In the present case, Hoberman, who had no reasonable expectation that Dr. Airan would not go to the authorities and report what had transpired in their conversations, likewise had no reasonable expectation that Dr. Airan would not record this conversation. The recording was lawful under section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides: It is lawful under this chapter for a law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication when such perso...

...Hoberman's rights under article I, section 12, Florida Constitution, and the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution were not violated because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy that his conversations with Dr. Airan were not being recorded. Furthermore, the recordings were lawful in accordance with section 934.03(2)(c)....

...Shortly thereafter, he received a letter from Defendant Katherine Fernandez-Rundle, the Miami-Dade County State Attorney, informing him that his recording violated the Florida Security of Communications Act, and that the violation was a felony. See Fla. Stat. § 934.03 (2016)....

...dment right to free speech. The parties cross moved for summary judgment and the court granted Fernandez-Rundle’s motion. See McDonough v. Fernandez Rundle, No. 15-20038-CIV-ALTONAGA/O’Sullivan (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2015). The court did not parse § 934.03, assuming that it applied to the recording. Instead, it analyzed the recording under the First Amendment nonpublic forum principles because the recording took place in a police station. Id. at 8-11. The court held that § 934.03 as applied to McDonough did not violate the First Amendment because it was “reasonable and viewpoint neutral” and denied McDonough’s request for relief. Id. at 15-16. He appeals and we reverse. We hold that McDonough did not violate § 934.03 and, consequently, the government’s threatened prosecution has no basis in the law....

...ving the documents to Chief Rolle and proved that he was not candid when he denied having received them. A month later, McDonough received a letter dated December 9, 2014 from Fernandez-Rundle threatening him with arrest and felony prosecution under § 934.03....

...The letter stated: A complaint has' been filed with our office stating that on February 7, 2014, you recorded conversations you had with *1318 Chief Alexander Rolle and Internal Affairs Detective Antonio Acquino at the Chiefs offices located at #4 South Krome Avenue in Homestead, Florida. Florida Statute § 934.03, Interception and Disclosure of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications prohibits any party from intentionally intercepting any wire, oral, or electronic communication without the consent of the other party....

...We are bringing this to your attention to prevent any further violation of Florida law, as a future violation would expose you to criminal prosecution. Enclosed is a copy of the pertinent law. Appendix at 13. In response to the threat of prosecution, McDonough sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , alleging that section 934.03 did not apply to him and that if it did, it violated the First Amendment....

...We review de novo a grant of summary judgment and the legal principles on which it is based. See Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 978 (11th Cir. 2017); Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005). 2 *1319 DISCUSSION The district court did not reach what we determine is a dispositive issue: whether § 934.03 even applies to McDon-ough....

...communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection; ... shall be punished as provided in subsection (4). Fla. Stat. § 934.03 (2016)....

...The letter from the State Attorney warns explicitly that “a future violation would expose you to criminal prosecution,” and refers to the fact that McDon-ough recorded his conversation with Chief Rolle and Acquino. Appendix at 13. It also emphasized that his action was a "violation” of Florida Statute § 934.03 and is therefore "a 3[rd] degree felony.” Id....

...redressed by an injunction. McDonough has alleged that he would have to choose between foregoing his First Amendment speech rights or risking a felony prosecution. This injury-in-fact is directly traceable to the letter threatening prosecution under § 934.03....

...of his cousin, Edward Kountze (Edward), for lack of personal jurisdiction. Edward sued Neely for recording a telephone conversation between the two without Edward's permission in violation of the Florida Security of Communications Act (the Act). See § 934.03, Fla....

...The Act makes it a crime to intentionally intercept a person's electronic communications, including a telephone call, without prior consent of all parties to the communication, and permits a private cause of action providing for a minimum of $1000 in liquidated damages for an interception in violation of chapter 934. See §§ 934.03, .10, *251 Fla....

...was operating a business in Florida. See § 48.193(1)(a). [2] Thus, for Neely to have committed an act that allows for this civil remedy, it would seem to be necessary that Neely's conduct in his office in Nebraska constitute a criminal violation of section 934.03 in Florida.

...4th DCA 1981), which affirmed the conviction of petitioner for attempted trafficking in stolen property and certified the following question as being of great public importance: Does Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution prohibit reliance upon Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979) as to the interception of a private communication emanating from a location other than the defendant's "home"? 405 So.2d at 782....

...rant. The motion was denied. At trial, the informants testified and identified the tape recordings, as did the police officers who monitored and recorded the conversations. These recordings were admitted in evidence over objection on the sanction of section 934.03(2)(c) and the consent obtained from Salerno and Stanzione....

...The district court affirmed the judgment and certified the foregoing question. Petitioner maintains that article I, section 12, Florida Constitution, prohibits the warrantless interception of private communications notwithstanding the provision of section 934.03(2)(c)....

...titution, and that the defendant's home was an area specifically protected by Florida's constitution. That constitutional protection of the home, recognized in Sarmiento, does not extend to the defendant's office or place of business. We hereby hold section 934.03(2)(c) constitutional under these facts....

...ces to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence. § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

...wful compensation, § 838.016, Florida Statutes. We affirm the order appealed. Among other contentions, appellant alleges error based upon the court's denial of a motion to suppress tape recordings made from the warrantless interception, pursuant to § 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes, of conversations between appellant and a police informant....

...ral communication when such person is a party to the communication or when one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal act." Section 934.03(2)(d)....

...ing it, there is no illegal intercept. United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.1976); Smith v. Wunker, 356 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.Ohio 1972). However, effective October 1, 1974 (the very day on which Ms. Williams made the first tape recording), *1316 Section 934.03(2)(d), Florida Statutes, was amended to read: "It is lawful under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire or oral communication when all of the parties to the communication have given prior consent to such interception." The federal act has not been so amended....

...t of both parties is required strongly implies that the legislature intended to allow each party to a conversation to have an expectation of privacy from interception by the other party. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that at the same time Section 934.03(2)(d) was amended, the words "and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting," were added to the definition of "oral communication" in Section 934.02(2)....

...ording this conversation without the consent of all parties to the conversation, provided the conversation is not public as provided by Section 934.02(2) or the intercept is not conducted for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a criminal act under Section 934.03(2)(c)....

...ntified himself and asked Edwards if he had a tape recorder. Edwards responded affirmatively, and immediately produced the tape recorder. Lieutenant Wells ascertained the tape recorder was turned on, then placed Edwards under arrest for violation of section 934.03, Florida Statutes, which prohibits, among other things, the interception of oral communications....

...Thereafter, the Commission issued its final order, adopting the hearing officer's findings of fact. [2] The Commission held that because a court of competent jurisdiction had ruled there were insufficient grounds to support the charge that Edwards violated section 934.03(1), the Department did not have cause to discipline Edwards for this rule violation....

...tent evidence." PERC v. Dade County PBA, 467 So.2d at 989. Application of that deference to the facts of this case indicates the investigation should be construed as primarily disciplinary. The Department's *632 interest in the possible violation of section 934.03(1) related solely to discipline of a permanent career service employee. The third issue raised in this appeal concerns the propriety of the Department's decision to terminate Edwards's employment. Since that dismissal was based upon the alleged violation of section 934.03(1), we must determine whether the protection afforded by the statute is applicable in the circumstances of this case. Pursuant to section 934.03(1)(a) and (4), any person who "[i]ntentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication," is guilty of a third-degree felony....

...mmunication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication. "[F]or an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable." State v. Smith, 641 So.2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1994). In State v. Walls, 356 So.2d 294, 296 (Fla. 1978), the supreme court held that the electronic recording of an oral communication without the consent of all parties to the communication was prohibited by section 934.03, Florida Statutes....

...warding back pay, attorney's fees, and costs. We do so, because we conclude the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the Commission's determination that the Department did not have cause to discipline Edwards for a violation of section 934.03(1), Florida Statutes, or for exceeding his law enforcement authority. It appears the protections afforded by section 934.03 are inapplicable in the circumstances of this case....

...Smith, 641 So.2d at 852. The Commission was entitled to find that supervising law enforcement officers engaged in the investigation and interrogation of a subordinate officer had no subjective expectation of privacy in their statements. Since the protections of section 934.03 do not apply to the oral communications here at issue, the Department has failed to show cause for terminating Edwards's employment, either for a rule violation or for exceeding his law enforcement authority....

...Bonavita, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. POLEN, J. This appeal arises from a rather bizarre set of circumstances resulting in the Appellant, Albert Guilder, being charged with unlawfully intercepting and/or endeavoring to intercept an oral communication in violation of section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...The trial court withheld adjudication and placed Guilder on probation for 2 1/2 years. On appeal, Guilder argues that tape recording a face-to-face conversation in which one is participating, without prior consent from all participants, does not constitute an interception of an oral communication prohibited by section 934.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1999). Guilder recognizes that the Florida Supreme Court has already addressed this issue directly, and in favor of the State here, but argues that the supreme court misapplied prior precedent and misinterpreted legislative intent. Section 934.03 provides, in relevant part, that "any person who ......

...Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So.2d 723, 725 (Fla.1977), two media entities claimed that secret recordings during investigative reporting activities were necessary to insure the accuracy of the information gathered and to preserve the conversation. Accordingly, the entities argued that the then recent amendment to section 934.03(2)(d) [6] impaired its news *417 gathering dissemination activities and constituted a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment....

...at 726-27. The supreme court again addressed this issue in State v. Walls, 356 So.2d 294, 296 (Fla.1978), when it held that "an extortionary threat delivered personally to the victim in the victim's home is an `oral communication' ... [and] pursuant to Section 934.03, the electronic recording of such `oral communication' without the consent of all parties to the communication was prohibited." Although the issue at bar had been touched upon, it was not until State v....

...Equally certain is the fact that the 1974 amendment to chapter 934 was designed to proscribe the method of interception used in this case. On the floor of the Florida House of Representatives, the only recorded debate on the two-party consent requirement of section 934.03(2)(d) was this comment by Representative Shreve: (What this bill does) is to prevent, make it illegal, for a person to record a conversation, even though he's a party to it, without the other person's consent....

...If the legislature had intended to make it unlawful for any person to record an oral or wire communication, it could easily have done so in plain and simple language. It did not. Instead, it criminalized only the willful interception of wire or oral communication. § 934.03(1)(a)....

...Aiuppa, 298 So.2d 391, 404 (Fla.1974) (citing McClain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 311 U.S. 527, 61 S.Ct. 373, 85 L.Ed. 319 (1940)). As the supreme court has already declined to revisit the issue and the legislature has also failed to take issue with the interpretation given to section 934.03 by the supreme court, we affirm under the precedent of Tsavaris....

...[3] Guilder claims he suffers from narcolepsy, and that neither he nor others know when he is sleeping. [4] The first words Guilder spoke at the arraignment were: "Can I tape this for my own record?" [5] Judge Tobin refused to allow Guilder to record the proceeding, which he proceeded to do without permission. [6] "Section 934.03(2)(d), Florida Statutes, was amended in 1974, by Chapter 74-249 (S.459), Laws of Florida, to require all parties to the defined wire or oral communication to give prior consent to a defined interception: `It is lawful under this chapte...

...nst the use of illegally obtained evidence set forth in section 934.06. The investigator who conducted the interception of oral communications in McClure's office acted pursuant to the authority of a state attorney and therefore acted lawfully under section 934.03(2)(c)....

...Flaming Fountain, Inc., 327 So.2d 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); McCormick on Evidence, 732-33 (E. Cleary 3rd ed. 1984). Welker, 504 So.2d at 806 n. 3. Accord Palmer v. State, 448 So.2d 55 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). For purposes of obtaining evidence of a criminal act, section 934.03(2)(c) authorizes a law enforcement officer to intercept a communication electronically when one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent....

...3d DCA 1977). Since Braswell validly consented to the mid-September interceptions and was working in conjunction with law enforcement officers, evidence from telephone conversations to which he was a party [2] is admissible even without a court order. [3] § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

...It must be assumed, though, that Braswell was not a party to all of the intercepted conversations during the long period of time that the "bug" was in operation. Braswell's consent does not resolve the admissibility of the conversations to which he was not a party. § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

...Nonetheless, we observe that the Fourth District Court of Appeal has determined that Sarmiento has no application to the situation where the consenting party to a telephone interception is located outside the defendant's home and is acting pursuant to Section 934.03(2)(c)....

...nication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial ... if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter. [Emphasis added] Section 934.03(1)(c) makes it a crime to willfully disclose the contents of any wire communication knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire communication in violation of Section 934.03(1). Section 934.03(1)(a) makes it a crime to willfully intercept a wire communication except as specifically permitted by Chapter 934....

...The result would be the same if he had answered first on the regular telephone receiver and then punched the speaker phone so that Detective Poindexter could hear. There is a further reason why Detective Poindexter's hearing the conversation did not constitute a prohibited interception. Section 934.03(2)(c) provides that: It is lawful under this chapter for a law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication when such person is a party to the communi...

...to establish that one party received a specific direction from the other. With respect to the interception of a wire communication by a person who is not a law enforcement officer and who is not acting at the direction of a law enforcement officer, Section 934.03(2)(d) provides: It is lawful under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire or oral communication when all of the parties to the communication have given prior consent to such interception....

...News-Press Pub. Co., 338 So.2d 1313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), this court held that the tape recording of a telephone conversation by one party to the conversation without the consent of the other party was an illegal intercept. We pointed out that the provision in Section 934.03(2)(d) requiring the consent of all parties for a lawful interception was enacted in 1974 and that prior to 1974, Section 934.03(2)(d) required the consent of only one party to a conversation for a lawful interception....

...isclosure of that information would be in violation of Chapter 934. "That information" clearly refers to the contents of the communication. Evidence derived "therefrom" refers, in our view, to evidence derived from the contents of the communication. Section 934.03(1)(c) makes it a crime to willfully disclose the contents of a communication knowing or having reason to know *66 that the information was obtained through an unlawful interception....

...interrupt the progress or course of. Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed. unabridged) [7] Chapter 934 contains the same provision. § 934.09(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979). The words "intercept and record" are also used in subparagraph (2)(g) of § 934.03, which was added to § 934.03 in 1978....

...The lower court rejected this argument without a detailed explanation. On appeal, appellant again argues that warrantless use of the bionic ears was improper because it constitutes an unauthorized interception of an "oral communication" in violation of Chapter 934, Florida Statutes (1993). Section 934.03 provides in part that any person who intercepts an "oral ......

...denied, 344 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1977); Hajdu v. State, 189 So.2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), cert. denied, 196 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1967). The statutory law, both federal and state, appears to authorize the subject electronic eavesdropping. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(2)(c) (1970); §§ 934.03(2)(c), 934.08(3), Fla....

...For all of these reasons, I sincerely regret the court's decision herein and can only hope that someday it will be reversed. Until then, we live in a country which is less free than our founding fathers envisioned. NOTES [1] These issues are relevant only in the absence of consent. Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (Supplement 1978), provides: "It is lawful under this chapter for a law enforcement officer ......

...Sarmiento, 397 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1981). The Court held that such conduct violated the provisions of Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution, which prohibits the unreasonable interception of private communications, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977), which authorizes the interception of a communication when a law enforcement officer or one under his direction is a party to it or where one of the parties to such communication has given prior consent to the interception....

...First, the testimony would not have been excluded by federal constitutional considerations. The supreme court found that the Florida Constitution imposes a stricter standard. Second, the behavior which resulted in acquiring the evidence was sanctioned by Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...We conclude that the Florida Supreme Court is equally impressed with the necessity for singling out a man's home for such special treatment and that the court's concern found expression in Sarmiento. We therefore interpret Sarmiento as rendering inadmissible a communication obtained in a manner otherwise permissible under Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979) only where that communication emanates from the defendant's home....

...conviction appealed from here. *782 Because the subject is one we believe to be of great public interest we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida the following question: Does Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution prohibit reliance upon Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979) as to the interception of a private communication emanating from a location other than the defendant's "home"? AFFIRMED AND QUESTION CERTIFIED....

...fficult to discern a viable rationale that would limit the application of the Sarmiento holding to the home. At first blush the majority's interpretation of Sarmiento appears eminently reasonable. In Sarmiento, our Supreme Court held Florida Statute 934.03(2)(c) unconstitutional under Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution "insofar as that statute authorizes the warrantless interception of a private conversation conducted in the home " (emphasis in original)....

...This conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme Court's decision in Odom v. State, 403 So.2d 936 (Fla. 1981), which held, while making no specific *784 reference to the defendant's home, that the warrantless recording of a conversation between the defendant and another pursuant to the provisions of Section 934.03(2)(c) constituted an unreasonable interception of a private communication in violation of the provisions of Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution....

...erson cannot record such a conversation without his conversation partner's permission. State v. Tsavaris, 394 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1981). The same protection prevents police authorities from intercepting private communications without a warrant. However, Section 934.03(2)(c) attempts to authorize a police officer, without a warrant, to intercept a conversation if he secures the permission of one of the parties. In other words the officer is authorized to do what the private party cannot do himself. And, under Section 934.03(2)(c), the officer's authority is unrestricted so long as it is exercised "to obtain evidence of a criminal act." The officer can intercept innocent as well as incriminating conversations based solely on his own judgment that he is doing so to obtain evidence of a criminal act....

...response to this contention is simple; insofar as that statute authorizes the warrantless interception of a private conversation conducted in the home, it is unconstitutional and unenforceable. (Emphasis in original.) 397 So.2d 643 at 645. NOTES [1] § 934.03(2)(c) reads: (c) It is lawful under this chapter for a law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication when such person is a party to the communication or...

...(1993)]. The circuit court, however, never determined the point on appeal urged by the respondent but, instead, reached out on its own and concluded that the tape recording was inadmissible in evidence because it was made by the police in violation of Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1993), a ground which was never urged by the respondent at trial or on appeal....

...gation was proper, if at all, only if it could have been conducted by a private citizen. A reference to the statute governing interception of oral communications establishes that this investigation could not have been conducted by a private citizen. Section 934.03(2)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: (c) It is lawful under this chapter for a law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication when such...

...of the conversations she had with Commerford. Nevertheless, Commerford argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police failed to obtain a warrant and then had the victim surreptitiously record a conversation with him. We disagree. Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), permits a warrantless interception of oral communications where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception and the purpose of the interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act. Tollett v. State, 272 So.2d 490 (Fla.1973), receded from on other grounds sub. nom. State v. Welker, 536 So.2d 1017, 1020 (Fla. 1988); Waters v. State, 444 So.2d 1135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); § 934.03, Fla....

...The various taped conversations plus other evidence supported the charge that Baker was being solicited by Miller to kill Miller's former wife. Appellant contends that his conversation taped by Baker in California on his own initiative as a private citizen was inadmissible as evidence in Florida under Section 934.03(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1979), because both parties had not consented to the recording of the conversation....

...ly surrendered to the police. Cal. Penal Code § 633.5; People v. Ayers, 51 Cal. App.3d 370, 124 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Cal.Ct. App. 1975). We need not reach this conflicts of law issue as we hold the tape recording of the conversation was admissible under Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...We believe that the presence of the officer was sufficient to bring this recording within the purview of the above statute. Regarding the other two conversations, appellant maintains that they were inadmissible because the State Attorney's Office failed to obtain a warrant. Although Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), does not require a warrant, appellant contends that under the holding of State v....

...home is not admissible in evidence. Morningstar v. State, 405 So.2d 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Sarmiento is inapplicable in a situation where one of the parties to a telephone conversation is located outside the person's home and is acting pursuant to Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...he sounds of gunfire and identification of the victim as the source of the sounds of a dying man. Chapter 934 proscribes the interception of wire or oral communications except under certain very limited circumstances. The prohibition is contained in Section 934.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...ould personally testify to the nature of those threats at trial. 356 So.2d at 295. The court held that each party to a conversation had a legitimate expectation of privacy, so that its interception by another party was appropriately circumscribed by Section 934.03(2)(d), citing Shevin v....

...Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Gary O. Welch, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. CAMPBELL, Judge. Appellant, Anthony J. LaPorte, was convicted of five felony counts of interception of oral communications in violation of section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1983), and one misdemeanor count of a scheme to defraud in violation of section 817.035(1), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...if the person whose conversation or voice is being recorded expects that their conversation or voice will not be recorded and the circumstances justify that expectation and society is prepared to accept that expectation as reasonable, a violation of section 934.03 has occurred regardless of whether the recorded words are of a private nature or privileged content....

...Some of the more current information upon which the wiretap order was based was obtained by police listening in on a telephone conversation between appellant and a confidential informant with the latter's consent. This was not an illegal interception as one party consented. § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

...We think that the trial court erred in entering its order compelling petitioner to answer interrogatories on pain of the entry of a default judgment. As petitioner correctly points out, the interception of telephone conversations by electronic or mechanical means carries a criminal as well as a civil penalty. Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...the parking lot of a shopping center. One of the agents was wearing an electronic listening device which transmitted the conversations to other officers stationed nearby who monitored and recorded the entire transaction. This action was pursuant to section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), which provides as follows: It is lawful under this chapter for a law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication when...

...lf and an undercover police officer. The court held that such conduct violated Article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, which prohibits the unreasonable interception of private communications. The court further held that to the extent that section 934.03(2)(c), authorizes the "warrantless interception of a private conversation conducted in the home, it is unconstitutional and unenforceable." (emphasis in original) Id. at 645. Sarmiento has been interpreted as affirming the constitutionality of section 934.03(2)(c) except insofar as it authorizes a warrantless interception of a private conversation conducted in the home....

...Emanating from a rather contentious divorce proceeding is an issue we must resolve regarding application of certain provisions of the Security of Communications Act (the Act) found in Chapter 934, Florida Statutes (2003). Specifically, we must determine whether the trial court properly concluded that pursuant to section 934.03(1), Florida Statutes (2003), certain communications were inadmissible because they were illegally intercepted by the Wife who, unbeknownst to the Husband, had installed a spyware program on a computer used by the Husband that copied and stored electronic communications between the Husband and another woman....

...In opposition, the Husband contends that the Spector spyware installed on the computer acquired his electronic communications real-time as they were in transmission and, therefore, are intercepts illegally obtained under the Act. The trial court found that the electronic communications were illegally obtained in violation of section 934.03(1)(a)(e), and so we begin our analysis with the pertinent provisions of that statute, which subjects any person to criminal penalties who engages in the following activities: (a) Intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or pro...

...stigation, has obtained or received the information in connection with a criminal investigation, and intends to improperly obstruct, impede, or interfere with a duly authorized criminal investigation; shall be punished as provided in subsection (4). § 934.03(1)(a)-(e), Fla....

...The purpose of the Act is to protect every person's right to privacy and to prevent the pernicious effect on all citizens who would otherwise feel insecure from intrusion into their private conversations and communications. Id. The clear intent of the Legislature in enacting section 934.03 was to make it illegal for a person to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications....

...We agree with this reasoning and conclude that the intercepted electronic communications in the instant case are not excludable under the Act. But this does not end the inquiry. Although not specifically excludable under the Act, it is illegal and punishable as a crime under the Act to intercept electronic communications. § 934.03, Fla....

...ffice. Spangler, Wausau and Rissman all filed answers to Keating's complaint generally denying liability. Thereafter, following discovery, Rissman filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that judgment should be entered in its favor on Keating's section 934.03 claim because Spangler had no duty to prevent Rothstein from committing the criminal act of tape recording the conversation in Keating's office....

...t constitute procurement of the taping. Keating further argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment *419 on the issue of whether Spangler improperly disclosed or used the contents of Rothstein's illegally obtained tapes. We agree. Section 934.03(1)(c) and (d) of the Florida Statutes (1995), sets forth criminal penalties for any person who "intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing...

...avors to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection." See § 934.03(1)(c) & (d), Fla....

...oral communication when such person is a party to the communication or when one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal act. § 934.03(2)(d), Fla....

...officials. Prior to the telephone call, police made no attempt to obtain judicial authorization for the interception and recording of the conversation. A transcript of the conversation was submitted as evidence during the motion to suppress hearing. Section 934.03 (2)(c), Florida Statutes (1993) provides: It is lawful under ss. 934.03-934.09 for an investigative or law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication when such person is a party to the communica...

...arties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception and the purpose of such interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act. The trial court found that the interception and recording in the instant case were permitted under section 934.03(2)(c) because Garren was a consenting party and she was *658 acting at the direction of a law enforcement officer....

...934.07, that the Legislature is clearly indicating that police cannot obtain authorization from a court of competent jurisdiction, to conduct an interception to gather evidence of this crime. .... That this court finds that under the facts of this case, that the provisions of Fla.Stat. 934.03(2)(c), which permits Ms....

...rticle I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution as it applied to the use of a pen register device. Shaktman did not discuss whether article I, section 23 applied to telephone conversations taped with the consent of one of the parties as provided in section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...1996), the Fifth District Court of Appeal, on facts similar to those before us, concluded: [T]hat the trial court properly admitted the audiotape of a telephone conversation Barr held with his daughter because it was taped under the direction of a law enforcement officer as permitted by paragraph 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...ied (both as to his consent and the contents of his discussion) in that in the search for the truth it is by far the most reliable evidence possible. Id. at 1170. Accordingly, we hold that the interception here complied with the requirements of *659 section 934.03(2)(c) and that Stout had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone conversation with Garren....

...The issuing court's order below thus amounted to an unconstitutional general warrant since it failed to state in the order that the order would terminate once the desired communications had been first intercepted. [3] The issue remaining on appeal is whether the evidence gathered from the electronic surveillance was saved by section 934.03(2)(c) due to Townsend's voluntary consent to the interception. This section provides: 934.03 Interception and Disclosure of Wire or Oral Communications Prohibited....

...communication has given prior consent to such interception and the *847 purpose of such interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act. The Supreme Court of Florida held in State v. Sarmiento, 397 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1981), that, "insofar as [section 934.03(2)(c)] authorizes the warrantless interception of a private conversation conducted in the home, it is unconstitutional and unenforceable." (Emphasis in original.) The court subsequently remarked in Hill v....

...t, by employing the words "warrantless" and "warrant" in the above-quoted phrases of Sarmiento and Hill, intended to convey the message that where a person is speaking inside his home with someone who fits within the category of persons described in section 934.03(2)(c) ( e.g., an undercover police officer or informant), as here, the constitutional requirements for a search warrant need be satisfied, but the other procedures of chapter 934, such as sections 934.07 and 934.09, need not be. Appellant, noting that the supreme court twice used the term "intercept warrant" in Sarmiento, replies that the court meant to say that the constitutional requirements and the other provisions of chapter 934 must be satisfied in order for section 934.03(2)(c) to operate....

...ommunications by any means. See § 934.01(2). To decide, as the state suggests, that the procedures of chapter 934 need not be complied with where a person is speaking inside his home with someone who fits within the category of persons described in section 934.03(2)(c) ( e.g., an undercover police officer or informant), while at the same time recognizing, as the state must, that the procedures of chapter 934 need be satisfied in a case where a person is talking inside his home with one who does not fall within the category of persons described in section 934.03(2)(c) ( e.g., an accomplice), would be to hold that a person's expectation of privacy in the former situation with respect to unknown listeners outside his home is somehow "less reasonable" and less worthy of protection than is a person's expectation of privacy in the latter situation....

...Chapter 934, which deals with the security of communications, was enacted by the Florida Legislature in order to assure personal rights of privacy in the area of oral and wire communications. The sweeping scope of this chapter is marked by the clear and comprehensive language of section 934.03(1), Florida Statutes (1979), which states in pertinent part: (1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any person who: (a) Willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire or oral communication; ......

...advantage in the divorce agreement. This conduct runs contrary to fundamental concepts of privacy and is specifically prohibited under chapter 934. The teeth of this prohibition are located in the criminal and civil sanctions provided by statute. §§ 934.03(1)(a) and 934.10....

...A suspected criminal is subjected to a wire intercept conducted by certain members of a police department. The wiretap is unauthorized and violates chapter 934. Those persons involved in the illegal surveillance are guilty of a third-degree felony. § 934.03(1)(a)....

...Nunn moved to suppress the controlled call, arguing that the Coral Springs officer violated the Florida Security of Communications Act, 1 which requires all parties to a wire, electronic, or private oral conversation to consent to the recording of the conversation. § 934.03(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2010). Although the act provides for an exception to law enforcement officers, allowing officers to record a communication in furtherance of a criminal investigation if one party consents, § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

...ry clause." That statute, however, exempts from its operation the interception of oral communications by a police officer when the officer is one of the communicants or where one party to the conversation has given prior consent to the interception. § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

...The court recognized that the United States Supreme Court had held that the Federal Constitution permitted this type of electronic intrusion into the home, but concluded, in holding it unconstitutional under the Florida Constitution as follows: [I]nsofar as that statute [§ 934.03(2)(c)] authorizes the warrantless interception of a private conversation conducted in the home, it is unconstitutional and unenforceable....

...However, this is distinguishable from selling the Sex Tape purely for commercial purposes. Cf. Michaels I, 5 F.Supp.2d 823 . . Mr. Bollea cites to the offense of video voyeurism, section 810.145(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), and to the offense of interception and disclosure of electronic communications, section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2006), in support of his contention....

...In their brief, DPR and Johnson argue that the denial of their motions to dismiss determined the court's personal jurisdiction over them. DPR argues it is not a "person" under the definition of Chapter 934, [2] and therefore, it cannot make an illegal interception of an oral communication pursuant to section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...ward). Leonard moved to suppress the taped conversations between himself and Garcia. The trial judge granted the motion to suppress on the ground that the tapes were inadmissable because Garcia was unavailable to testify with respect to his consent. Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977) [1] allows a warrantless interception of an oral communication where one of the parties to the communication has given his prior consent to the interception and the purpose of the interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act....

...ment assigned to the Fort Walton Beach Field Office, Fort Walton Beach, Florida, you did wilfully make nonconsensual recordings of wire communications in violation of General Orders 3 and 12 of this Department and, more particularly, in violation of section 934.03, F.S....

...off from work, he was going to kill her god damn ass." At this point Miss Bentley immediately hung up the phone, although the conversation continued for a few minutes longer. Over objection, the above testimony was admitted. Appellant contends that Section 934.03(2)(d) Florida Statutes (1975), which prohibits the interception of oral or wire communication by a person unless " all of the parties to the communication have given prior consent to such interception" controls and that pursuant to Sec...

...The phone calls in question were initiated by a consenting police agent from a telephone outside Morris's home to a phone inside his home and were recorded by means of an induction coil attached to the outside phone. The warrantless interceptions were made pursuant to section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), which provides: It is lawful under this chapter for a law enforcement officer or a person acting *478 under the direction of a law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication when such...

...the conversation was by telephone and only the target of the investigation was within her home. We decline to characterize this conversation as having been conducted in her home. We therefore hold that Sarmiento does not apply and, accordingly, that section 934.03(2)(c) does....

...lee insured. The coverage was declared to exist for damages claimed in a suit against the insured for the insured's unlawful interceptions, through recordings, of telephone conversations with the plaintiffs *1242 in that suit in alleged violation of section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1983). Section 934.03 provides, in pertinent part, that [A]ny person who ......

...committed by or with the knowledge or consent of any insured... . We conclude that the coverage claimed by the insured in this case is excluded by that provision. That the complaint in the damage suit against the insured alleges that the recordings were "intentional," whereas section 934.03 refers to "willful" conduct, is, contrary to the insured's argument, of no moment....

...ntentional act as an element of a crime. That is, we construe the word "willful" in the insurance policy in this case in the criminal law context in which it was used. Contrary to the insured's arguments, to be in willful or intentional violation of section 934.03 and therefore to be excluded from coverage under the above-quoted policy provision, an act need not be intended to cause harm or violate the law. Id. at 247. That is, just as section 934.03, by providing that the willful interception of wire or oral communications is a crime, establishes a general intent crime which does not require for its commission a specific intent to cause harm or violate the law, id., so also, we co...

...... committed by or with the knowledge or consent of any insured."). In other words, the intent to do the act of recording the telephone conversations was equivalent to the intent to cause the natural consequences of that act, to wit, the harm which section 934.03 was enacted to interdict and for which section 934.10 provides a civil remedy....

..."A person's subjective intent to cause the particular result is irrelevant to general intent crimes because the law ascribes to him a presumption that he intended such a result." Id. We have serious doubts that advice of counsel, which was pleaded by the insured in this case as a defense to a section 934.03 crime and is argued on appeal, can be a valid defense to a general intent crime like that under that section in which there is such clearly delineated notice of the proscribed conduct....

...From the nature of the communications of the insured with its attorney in that regard, as shown by the testimony of the insured's owner and its vice-president of operations, it is clear that the insured had received no advice of counsel upon which it could have relied in good faith for a belief that no violation of section 934.03 would occur from recording the telephone conversations without the consent of the other parties to those conversations....

...calls between the parties. Specifically, Mr. France alleged that he was in Florida at the time of the telephone calls and that the recording of the calls took place without his consent, in violation of Florida’s Security of Communications Act. See § 934.03, Fla....

...c communications, including a telephone call, without prior consent of all parties to the communication, and permits a private cause of action providing for a minimum of $1,000 in liquidated damages for an interception in violation of the Act. See §§ 934.03, .10, Fla....

...amages. Furthermore, as observed by the Kountze court, for Ms. France to have committed an act that allowed for a civil remedy under section 934.10, it would seem to be necessary that her conduct in North Carolina constituted a criminal violation of section 934.03 in Florida....

...that its conversations not be secretly recorded by law enforcement. See Article 1, sections 12 and 23, Florida Constitution. Having found a reasonable expectation of privacy, it necessarily follows that what transpired sub judice was in violation of section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1991), and consequently, the evidence derived therefrom is inadmissible under section 934.06, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...the amendment. Therefore, article I, section 12, Florida Constitution (1968), applies to this case. The state argues that State v. Sarmiento , does not compel the district court's holding and should not be extended to apply to the present situation. Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: It is lawful under this chapter for a law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication when such person is a...

...the accused which took place inside the home of the accused was, even though the police had the consent of one of the parties to the conversation, unreasonable and violated article I, section 12, Florida Constitution (1968). Regarding the effect of section 934.03(2)(c), the Court said that "insofar as that statute authorizes the warrantless interception of a private conversation conducted in the home, it is unconstitutional and unenforceable." 397 So.2d at 645 (emphasis in original)....

...Here the conversation was by telephone and only the target of the investigation was within her home. We decline to characterize this conversation as having been conducted in her home. We therefore hold that Sarmiento does not apply and, accordingly, that section 934.03(2)(c) does....

...Interception of wire and oral communications should further be limited to certain major types of offenses and specific categories of crime with assurance that the interception is justified and that the information obtained thereby will not be misused. See also, Fla. Stat. § 934.03(2)(c)....

...e tape recording [of] a seized conversation, the consenting party must testify that he consented to the recording") review denied, 397 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1981). Other cases have discussed the Tollett requirement as if it were based on a construction of § 934.03....

...They also moved to suppress the intercepted communications, on grounds of non-compliance with Section 934.09(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), and to compel disclosure of one confidential informant's identity in order to establish whether the state had obtained consent to the first intercepted communication as required by Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...State, 272 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1973), to support their contention that the confidential informant who allegedly agreed to the state's initial eavesdropping should have been identified and produced for cross-examination as to whether consent was freely given, as required by Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...State, 194 So.2d 250, 252 (Fla. 1967), and *606 we are persuaded that the more lenient standard is equally applicable to a wiretap authorization order. We now hold that when information acquired through the interception of communications under the procedure authorized by Section 934.03(2)(c) is used only to establish probable cause, the state need not establish consent through the direct testimony of the consenting party....

...I agree with the majority that the bookmaking statute is constitutional. State v. Barnett, 366 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1978). I would remand the case to the trial court for a finding by the trial judge as to whether consent was given by the informant as required by Florida Statute 934.03(2)(c), because any interception of a wire or oral communication is unlawful without the required consent....

...The telephonic conversations were recorded by telephone monitors while the person-to-person conversations were transmitted by a "body bug" to a recorder outside the building. The court interpreted Sarmiento "as rendering inadmissible a communication obtained in a manner otherwise permissible under Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979) only where that communication emanates from the defendant's home." The court also certified the following question as being of great public importance: Does Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution prohibit reliance upon Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979) as to the interception of a private communication *406 emanating from a location other than the defendant's "home"? In Morningstar II, the Supreme Court answered in the negative, stating that Sarmiento he...

...The tape recordings were obtained under the direction of law enforcement personnel, to obtain evidence of criminal activity, and with the prior consent of a participant to the conversation (the informant, who wore a "body bug") who testified at the trial. Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes, thus authorized the warrantless interception, by tape, of the subject conversations, and the tapes were properly admitted into evidence....

...88-184, § 5, at 1024, and § 7, at 1025 (codified as amended at §§ 934.07 and 934.09, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988)); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516 and 2518 (1986). The legislature also followed Congress' lead by exempting pen registers from the protection of the amended wiretap law. Ch. 88-184, § 2, at 1022 (codified as amended at § 934.03(2)(i)1., Fla....

...vidence in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's decision. State v. Hebert, 8 So.3d 393, 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Still, legal issues decided by the trial court are subject to de novo review. Id. Both Hentz and the State agree that section 934.03, Florida Statutes, is determinative in the present case....

...on, has obtained or received the information in connection with a criminal investigation, and intends to improperly obstruct, impede, or interfere with a duly authorized criminal investigation; shall be punished as provided in subsection (4).[ [2] ] § 934.03(1), Fla....

...er intended to intercept the phone conversations Menzel took part in while awaiting his interview. Neither party cites any case law to assist this court in determining whether the officers intentionally intercepted the phone conversation. Insofar as section 934.03 is a criminal statute, whether the officers intentionally intercepted the conversation, within the meaning of the statute, turns on whether the statute contemplates general intent or specific intent....

...NOTES [1] Co-defendant Menzel joined in Hentz's motion to suppress evidence. Accordingly, both Menzel and Hentz offered evidence and testimony in support of the motion to suppress. [2] Subsection (4) provides that a violation of subsection (1) is a third degree felony. § 934.03(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). [3] The statute does provide an exception for interception of communication by law enforcement officers where either the officer is a party to the intercepted communication or has the prior consent of a party to the communication. § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

...: 1. The tape was not properly safeguarded by the State in accordance with the provisions of Section 934.09(7)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1977). 2. The alleged attempted bribe did not constitute a criminal act, so as to justify an interception under Section 934.03(2)(c). Section 934.03(2)(c) provides: It is lawful under this chapter for a law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication when such person is a party to the communicatio...

...ents of any wire or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom under § 934.08(3). (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court applied the provisions of Sections 934.09(7)(a), (b) in requiring the state, even in conducting consent interceptions under Section 934.03(2)(c), to seal its tapes with the court....

...There is no indication in the record that the recordings were altered in any way. We believe that the custody and seal provisions of Section 934.09 apply only to intercepts made pursuant to court authorization. There are no similar requirements for consent interceptions authorized by Section 934.03(2)(c), for there is no judge controlling their applications....

...Valid consent interceptions are lawful and require no prior judicial authorization. All other interceptions must be judicially authorized and regulated and the contents thereof protected in accordance with the provisions of Section 934.09(7)(a), (b). *935 Section 934.03(2)(e), Florida Statutes, requires that a consent interception must be for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a criminal act....

...The state appeals from an order suppressing recorded telephone conversations with the defendant in an ambulance chasing prosecution. The interceptions took place with the consent of a participating informant and under the direction of investigative officers of the Insurance department—all in full compliance with section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...a botanically unacceptable conclusion *547 that apples grow on orange trees or vice versa, we reverse. Briefly, it is clear that the lower court's ruling is both totally unsupported by the language of section 934.07 and directly contrary to that of section 934.03(2)(c) which indeed refers to obtaining evidence of "a"— meaning "any," Izadi v....

...Braddock, 452 N.W.2d 785 (S.D.1990). We likewise find no merit in the defendant's alternative argument for affirmance which, as we understand it, is that the Insurance personnel involved in this case do not qualify as "investigative ... officer[s]" under section 934.03(2)(c). To the contrary, the prior version of section 934.03(2)(c) was amended in 1988, Ch....

...icers. [emphasis supplied] The appellee has constructed an elaborate argument based on the fact that, in 1988, the definition of "investigative or law enforcement officer" contained in section 934.02(6) was not amended to conform to the expansion of section 934.03(2)(c)....

...For these reasons, the order under review is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to deny the motion to suppress. Reversed. NOTES [1] Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited. * * * * * * (c) It is lawful under ss. 934.03-934.09 for an investigative or law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication when such person is a party to the communica...

...[2] Authorization for interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications.— The Governor, the Attorney General, the statewide prosecutor, or any state attorney may authorize an application to a judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in conformity with ss. 934.03-934.09, an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications by the Department of Law Enforcement or any law enforcement agency as defined in s....

...the authenticity of the tape. This is so, appellant claims, because defense counsel advised the court that Detective Tiderington, after listening to the tape, had indicated that in his opinion "it was a third degree felony violation of the law" (see section 934.03, Florida Statutes, dealing with interception of communication) and that this was made even more coercive by both the court and the state attorney advising appellant of his right against self-incrimination....

...exclusion that states: This policy does not apply ... to any claim for injury arising out of a willful violation of a penal statute or ordinance committed by or with the knowledge of the insured. The Rubino complaint asserted claims for violation of section 934.03, Florida Statutes, [1] and common law invasion of privacy alleging that (1) Bates violated section 934.03, Florida Statutes, by intercepting or causing others to intercept plaintiffs' oral communications without their consent; and, (2) Bates intentionally intruded upon plaintiffs' seclusion by intercepting their oral communications; and, such actions were "outrageous, willful, hostile, intentional, wanton, malicious, and done in bad faith." These claims assert facts that fall within the policy exclusion. Section 934.03, a penal statute, provides, in pertinent part, that unless all parties to the communication have consented, any person who "[i]ntentionally intercepts ......

...communication ... is guilty of a felony of the third degree." Bates' argument that the exclusion does not apply because the complaint does not allege a "willful" violation of penal law is without merit. The complaint allegations assert the violation of section 934.03 which requires the intentional interception of oral communications without the party's consent....

...City of Palmyra, 650 F.Supp. 981 (E.D.Mo.1987). Accordingly, the court erred in determining that Acceptance had a duty to defend Bates in the Rubino action. Reversed and remanded. NOTES [1] Section 934.10 provides an injured party with civil remedies for violation of section 934.03....

...In addition, we are precluded from following Bates' suggestion and considering a good-faith defense, § 934.10(2), Fla. Stat. (2001), as we are limited to reviewing the allegations of the complaint. [3] We hold that Reliance Insurance remains persuasive despite its construction of a predecessor version of section 934.03; the applicable version substitutes the term "intentionally" for "willfully." See Ch....

...Odom, relied upon by the trial court, was based on a pre-amended version of article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, and it barred only the tape of the conversation, not the witness' statement about it. Had this conversation occurred over the telephone, there would be nothing amiss about it pursuant to section 934.03(2)(c), because it was taped with the consent of one party and for the purpose of gathering evidence about a crime....

...o the charges, we reverse and remand for new trial. Based on our disposition, we deem it unnecessary to address the sentencing issues. *219 Appellant was charged by information with two counts of intercepting a telephone conversation in violation of section 934.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...law permitted the conduct. The court declined to give the request. The jury subsequently returned a guilty verdict on each of the two counts, and appellant was sentenced to concurrent one year probationary terms. Appellant was charged with violating section 934.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), which provides: (1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any person who: (a) Intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication[] * * * * * * shall be punished as provided in subsection (4). *220 Section 934.03(4) provides that except in cases dealing with certain radio communications, such offense is a third degree felony. Appellant attempted to raise a defense under section 934.10(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), which states: (2) A good faith reliance on: (a) A court order, subpoena, or legislative authorization as provided in ss. 934.03-934.09, or (b) A good faith determination that federal or Florida law permitted the conduct complained of * * * * * * shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal, or administrative action arising out of such conduct under the laws of this state....

...The error cannot be considered harmless as it went directly to appellant's only defense; therefore, the case must be reversed and remanded for new trial. In so saying, we note that the state has argued that Florida has greater privacy protection than the federal government provides. This is true. See section 934.03(2)(d), requiring that all parties to a communication consent to the interception, unlike 18 U.S.C....

...ecordings were not alleged to have been disclosed or used in Florida. [2] We affirm. The Wiretap Statute provides in pertinent part that: 1) Any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of ss. 934.03-934.09 shall have a civil cause of action against any person or entity who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person or entity to intercept, disclose, or use, such communications.......

...f there is a reasonable expectation of privacy which is recognized by society. See Jatar v. Lamaletto, 758 So.2d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). See also State v. Smith, 641 So.2d 849, 852 (Fla.1994) ("[F]or an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable.")....

...An arson victim taped a phone conversation with an acquaintance who was the primary suspect for a crime. We hold that a law enforcement officer's verbal authorization to the victim to tape any such phone conversation was sufficient to render the victim's "interception" of the phone communication lawful under section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...The owner recorded this second conversation. At trial, the state offered the recording in evidence. The trial judge overruled Mead's objection and the jury listened to the recording. Mead was convicted as charged. The trial court properly admitted the recording into evidence under subsection 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2006). Subsection 934.03(1) generally prohibits the intentional interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications. However, subsection 934.03(2) provides several exceptions to the general prohibition, including this one: It is lawful ......

...merford v. State, 728 So.2d 796, 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (statute satisfied where victim "agreed with police to record her conversation" with defendant). Schuler's direction to the owner was sufficient to bring the recording under the umbrella of subsection 934.03(2)(c). Mead relies on Miller v. State, 411 So.2d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), for the proposition that there must be something more *883 than a law enforcement officer's authorization to make an interception lawful under subsection 934.03(2)(c)....

...Id. The recording of the telephone conversation was admitted at the husband's trial. See id. Affirming a conviction of criminal solicitation, we held "that the presence of the officer was sufficient to bring this recording within the purview of" subsection 934.03(2)(c). Id. at 946. In Miller, we did not create a rule that an officer had to be present when a recording was made in order for a recording to comply with section 934.03. Rather, we held that the facts in Miller satisfied subsection 934.03(2)(c), without creating any minimum requirements....

ANSTEAD, Judge. The state challenges an order dismissing charges against David Sells, for endeavoring to intercept oral communications in violation of section 934.03(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...arrant. Hill argued, therefore, that Munson's recantation of his testimony as to his consent to wear the body bug defeated the state's claim that this case was within the consent exception to a warrantless interception of an oral communication under section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...nication is intercepted, disclosed or used in violation of this chapter shall have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or use, such communications * *" F.S. 934.03, Florida Statutes 1973, provides in material part: "(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any person who: (a) Willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to in...

...interception of private communications by any means. Florida has recognized as reasonable the authority of a police officer to intercept an oral communication where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception. Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...tatutes (2005). See LaPorte v. State, 512 So.2d 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (holding that defendant who surreptitiously recorded conversations between models in the *817 dressing room of his modeling studio intercepted oral communications in violation of section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1983)); Brandin v....

...“Where the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, courts need not employ principles of statutory construction to determine and effectuate legislative intent.” Johnson, 78 So. 3d at 1310 (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. P.E., 14 So. 3d 228, 234 (Fla. 2009)). Section 934.03(1), Florida Statutes (2010), contains a general prohibition on the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communications....

...ibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication.” Section 934.03(2), Florida Statutes (2010), contains a list of specific exceptions to the general prohibition in section 934.03(1). One of these exceptions is for situations in which all parties to the conversation have consented. § 934.03(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2010). None of the exceptions allow for the interception of conversations based on one’s status as the victim of a crime. The State does not argue that any of the exceptions listed in section 934.03(2) are applicable in this case. Section 934.06 provides that the contents of any improperly intercepted communication may not be used as evidence: -9-  Whenever any wire or o...

...The Court explained: We agree with the trial court that an extortionary threat delivered personally to the victim in the victim’s home is an “oral communication” within the definition of Section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes (1975); that pursuant to Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1975), the electronic recording of such “oral communication” without the consent of all parties to the communication was prohibited; and that Section 934.06, Florida Statutes (1975), expressly prohibits the use of such electronic recording as evidence. The subject electronic recording did not fall within any of the situations permitting interception delineated in Section 934.03(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...justifying” his expectation that his statements would not be recorded. § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). The recordings were made surreptitiously. McDade did not consent to the conversations being recorded, and none of the other exceptions listed in section 934.03(2) apply....

...nts against electronic interception of communications for evidentiary purposes than any such protection afforded by federal guidelines, constitutional or statutory. He cites the landmark case of State v. Sarmiento, 397 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1981), holding section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977) [2] unconstitutional "insofar as that statute authorizes the warrantless interception of a private conversation conducted in the home......

...be recorded. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and the recording was played during Mr. Thompson's trial. We affirm. The communication at issue here was recorded by a law enforcement officer with the consent of the victim as authorized by section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), which provides: 934.03 Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited.- * * * (2)(c) It is lawful under ss. 934.03-934.09 for an investigative or law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication when such person is a party to the communica...

...der the statutory exception for the use of secret recordings. We disagree. Section 934.06, Florida Statutes, provides that secret recordings cannot be used as evidence unless an exception applies. See McDade v. State, 154 So.3d 292, 297 (Fla. 2014). Section 934.03(2)(c) provides an exception to the general rule prohibiting secret recordings when the recording is made “under the direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer.” Further, absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court’s admission of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal....

...The next morning, Shawn gave the detectives the recording. The fact that Shawn was the one to suggest that he wear a wire does not affect whether the recording was made “under the direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer” and does not prevent application of section 934.03(2)(c). In Mead v. State, 31 So.3d 881, 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), the court held that a recording may qualify under the exception in section 934.03(2)(c), even if the witness is the first person to suggest making the recording....

...This appeal follows the denial of appellant's motion for new trial. Appellant maintains that the audio and video recordings violate his rights of privacy under Article I, section 23 [1] of the Florida Constitution (1980 Amendment) so as to preclude their admission into evidence, notwithstanding the provisions of section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...— Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law. [2] § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

...t to privacy as protected by article I, sections 12 and 23 of the Florida Constitution. In addition, appellant urges the statements were inadmissible as being the result of an illegal interception and disclosure of oral communications, prohibited by section 934.03, Florida Statutes....

...is essentially a prisoner. Id. at 851 (citations omitted). See also Lanza v. New York, 870 U.S. 139 , 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218 , 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (“In prison, official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day.”). On the subject of section 934.03, the supreme court focused on the statutory phrase requiring the oral communication to be “ ‘uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation Id. at 852 (citing to section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes (1991)) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the court applied the same rule, that is, “for an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable.” Id. Because it found there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a police car, the supreme court concluded “section 934.03 does not apply to conversations that take place in those vehicles.” Id....

...Braulio Jatar appeals an adverse final summary judgment. We affirm. Jatar brought an action for civil remedies pursuant to section 934.10, Florida Statutes (1989), alleging that defendants Camilo Lamaletto and Balgres Distributing Company, Inc. [collectively “defendants”], violated section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1989), making it unlawful to intercept and disclose oral communications without the prior consent of the parties....

...Lamaletto asserted that Jatar had already met with his relatives, Balgres’ co-owners, in Venezuela. Relying on his relatives’ reports of the meeting, Lamaletto was convinced Jatar had called the meeting to demand money. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that section 934.03 had not been violated: Lamaletto had a good faith belief to fear an extortion attempt; and Lamaletto did not disseminate the recording, the tape was stolen from him....

...The trial court properly granted summary judgment because Jatar had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his oral communication. In the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, Jatar’s *1169 oral communications were not protected under section 934.03, and he is not entitled to civil remedies....

...expectation .... From this language, it is clear that the legislature did not intend that every oral communication be free from interception without the prior consent of all the parties to the communication. An oral communication is protected under section 934.03 if it satisfies two conditions: “A reasonable expectation of privacy under a given set of circumstances depends upon one’s actual subjective expectation of privacy as well as whether society is prepared to recognize this expectation as reasonable.” Inciarrano, 473 So.2d at 1275 ....

...ent, substantial evidence. See Chackal v. Staples, 991 So.2d 949, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). But see O’Brien v. O’Brien, 899 So.2d 1133, 1137-38 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (reviewing the trial court’s decision to exclude electronic communications under section 934.03 for an abuse of discretion)....

...es” requirement in the statute. III. INCIARRANO UNINTENTIONALLY WEAKENED THE LEGISLATIVE POLICY PROTECTING OUR PRIVACY Third, and related to my concerns in the preceding section, by shifting the analysis of this statute from the strong language in section 934.03(1) to the definition of “oral communication” in section 934.02(2), the decision in Inciarrano weakened the legislative policy protecting privacy....

...tions. The policy created a prohibition of secret recordings that was enforced by both civil and criminal penalties, as well as by the statutory exclusionary rule contained is section 934.06. This broad policy was subject to enumerated exceptions in section 934.03(2)....

...a person free to record the conversation. This is true even though the recording party, before the recording device is turned on, can never be certain what the recorded party will say after it is turned on. By relying on section 934.02(2) instead of section 934.03, the holding in Inciarrano flips the burden of proof and persuasion from the party seeking an exception to the statute to the party seeking the protection of the statute....

...§ 251 l(2)(a)(iii)(d) (2012); see generally Carol M. Bast, What’s Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of the Law of Eavesdropping, 47 DePaul L.Rev. 837 (1998) (surveying state-by-state consent laws). . Arguably, the societal-approval test is actually a determination that section 934.03(1) is unconstitutional as applied under the strict scrutiny analysis required by article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution....

consent of all of the parties, in violation of section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2004). The trial court found

...lephone system was the equipment that intercepted the communication. This Court finds this to be the crux of the arguments posed by the parties in this action. Furthermore, the Tsavaris court focused its attention on whether the exceptions listed in section 934.03(2), Fla....

...Brummer, Public Defender, and Todd G. Scher, Special Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Douglas J. Glaid, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before GREEN and SHEPHERD, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

because he feared that his own criminal violation of § 934.03(l)(a) would be exposed. The basic difficulty with

...cleaner to disrupt neighbor as she was entertaining guests, engaging in noisy behavior on his property, tossing an empty plastic water bottle towards neighbor’s car, and throwing garbage onto neighbor’s property— were insufficient to constitute stalking). Section 934.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2017), prohibits the intercepting or recording of oral communications under certain circumstances as defined in section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes (2017), but the defendant was not charged with intercepting oral communications....

...after she left the house. II. CHAPTER 934: FROM INCIARRANO TO MCDADE II Under chapter 934, it is a criminal offense to "[i]ntentionally intercept[]" or to "endeavor[] to intercept" any "oral . . . communication." § 934.03(1)(a). For purposes of section 934.03, an "oral communication" is defined as "any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation . . . ." § 934.02(2). Except "in cases of prosecution for criminal interception" under chapter 934, a recording made in violation of section 934.03 is inadmissible as evidence in any trial or legal proceeding. § 934.06. Section 934.03(2) enumerates exceptions to the general prohibitions in section 934.03(1). One of these allows for the interception of oral communications when all parties to the communication have consented to the recording. § 934.03(2)(d). In State v....

...Belle failed in his burden in at least two respects. First, Mr. Belle did not establish that his girlfriend "intentionally intercept[ed]" those communications that occurred after she left the home when the cellphone was in Mr. Belle's possession. See § 934.03(1)(a)....

...2022 Page: 4 of 13 4 Opinion of the Court 20-11699 County’s defense attorneys, Zabijaka, wrote to Chance’s attorney that some of the recordings violated Florida’s privacy law, Fla. Stat. § 934.03....

...planned to introduce the recordings at trial and explained that the defense would move to strike them if the recordings were intro- duced. Chance’s attorney responded that the criminal accusation was “irresponsible,” and that in his opinion, “judicial applications of section 934.03 in the workplace were vanishingly small.” The defense attorneys for the County then went to the “law enforcement authorities with jurisdiction over Wakulla County ....

...County Sheriff’s Office then obtained a search warrant for Chance’s home from a state circuit judge. 5 The officers executing 3 Florida law generally bans the intentional interception of any “wire, oral, or electronic communication.” Fla. Stat. § 934.03(1) (2012). 4 Chance labels the defense attorneys’ reporting of the information about her recordings as a “criminal complaint,” but it is unclear how formal the report- ing was and to which law enforcement entity the Wakulla attorneys...

...subse- quent § 1985(2) claim. B. Turning to the present case, Chance alleges that when the County’s defense attorneys reported the recordings to local law enforcement as potentially violative of Fla. Stat. § 934.03, the de- fense attorneys were not acting within the scope of their repre- sentation and that such a reporting constituted using force, threat, or intimidation to deter Chance from continuing her lawsuit for sexual harassment against the County....

...Florida USCA11 Case: 20-11699 Date Filed: 09/28/2022 Page: 13 of 13 20-11699 Brasher, J., Concurring 3 has a two-party consent law, which generally bans the intentional recording of private conversations without all parties’ consent. Fla Stat. § 934.03(1) (2012)....

James Nursey Chief of Police Orlando QUESTIONS: 1. Is a municipal police department an `other entity' within the purview of s. 934.03 (2)(g)(1)., F. S.? 2. If question 1 is answered in the affirmative, may a municipal police department with published emergency telephone numbers intercept and record incoming wire communications, pursuant to s. 934.03 (2)(g), F. S., on all its telephone lines or only on those with published emergency numbers? SUMMARY: A municipal police department is not an `other entity' within the purview of s. 934.03 (2)(g)1., F. S., for the purpose of intercepting and recording incoming wire communications on published emergency telephone numbers. AS TO QUESTION 1: Section 934.03 (2)(g), F....

...An agency operating an emergency telephone number `911' system established pursuant to s. 365.171 , to intercept and record incoming wire communications; however, such public utility may intercept and record incoming wire communications on published emergency telephone numbers only. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 934.03 (2)(g)1., F. S., provides one of several categories of exceptions to the general prohibition established in s. 934.03 (1) that, except as otherwise specifically provided in that chapter , interception and disclosure of wire or oral communications is a felony offense of the third degree....

...y. Therefore, as an exception to a constitutional right it must be strictly construed and narrowly limited in application to the uses delineated by the Florida Legislature.' In re Grand Jury Investigation, 287 So.2d 43 , 47 (Fla. 1973). As stated in s. 934.03 (1), the exceptions are limited to those specifically provided in Ch. 934. The exception created by s. 934.03 (2)(g)1., F....

...service, fire station, or public utility (namely, telephone, telegraph, electricity, and gas utilities with published emergency telephone numbers). From an examination of the named classes and their statutory definitions incorporated by reference in s. 934.03 (2)(g)1., I am compelled to conclude that a municipal police department, being a law enforcement agency, is not of a similar character, class, or kind to any of them and, therefore, is not included in the phrase `any other entity' which follows the enumeration of those classes in s. 934.03 (2)(g)1....

...American Surety Company of New York, 99 So.2d 877 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1958); cf . Farrey, supra , and Coe, supra . Since interception and use of wire or oral communications is specifically authorized and provided for law enforcement agencies and officers in ss. 934.03 (2)(c) and 934.07 , et seq ., F. S., and, since law enforcement agencies were not named in the exception provided in s. 934.03 (2)(g)1., they are impliedly excluded from the interception and recordation of incoming wire communications authorized in subparagraph (2)(g)1. of s. 934.03 . Please note, however, that s. 934.03 (2)(g)2., F....

...mstances other than those expressly authorized by statute or by statutory procedures available to law enforcement personnel. In summary, therefore, I am of the opinion that a municipal police department is not an `other entity' within the purview of s. 934.03 (2)(g)1., F....

amended motion to suppress. The State relied on section 934.03(2)(k), Florida Statutes, arguing that the

...The State appeals a pretrial order granting appellee’s motion in limine 1 to exclude from evidence ten tape recordings of telephone conversations between appellee and Kraus. Because the parties agree that Kraus consented to the taping of the calls, we reverse and remand. State v. Welker, 536 So.2d 1017 (Fla.1988); § 934.03(2)(c), Fla.Stat....

KAHN, Judge. The court below granted appellee Edwards’ Criminal Rule 3.190(c)(4) motion and dismissed a criminal charge brought under section 934.03(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Although the order does not elaborate upon the trial court’s reasoning, it seems that the court agreed with the argument that although Edwards had tape recorded certain statements made by his superiors at work, these statements did not constitute “oral statements” within the purview of section 934.03, since the superiors actually set up a meeting because they suspected Edwards was attempting to tape record their conversations....

...benefit of the court. The conversations which were intercepted here were not authorized by court order nor were they required by law to be; therefore, the provisions of § 934.09 have no application to the conversation intercepted by Officer Herron. Section 934.03(2)(c) permits a law enforcement officer or person acting under his direction to intercept a communication when either is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such intercepti...

...and the purpose for the interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act. The Florida Security of Communications Act was patterned after the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. The federal counterpart to § 934.03(2)(c) is § 2511(2)(c) which permits a person “under color of law to intercept a ......

...pellees as well as the Firm based on the recording of the phone call and the 1 Dorsch and McLean were employees of Quality Automotive. 2 disclosure of its existence, which he asserted were violations of section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2021). Specifically, as to the Firm, he alleged that the Firm illegally disclosed, endeavored to disclose, used, or endeavored to use the existence of the phone call in violation of section 934.03(1)(c) and (d)....

...ate." Kountze, 996 So. 2d at 252. The tortious act complained of here was the Firm's purported disclosure, endeavor to disclose, use, or endeavor to use the contents of the May 2019 phone call in its response to Ellis's interrogatory questions. Section 934.03(1)(c) and (d) prohibits the intentional disclosure or endeavor to disclose to any other person, or the use or endeavor to use, the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication where a party knew or had reason to know that th...

NESBITT, Judge. The state appeals an order suppressing a taped phone conversation. We affirm. Through chapter 934 our legislature has acted to protect the privacy of wire, oral and electronic communication. See § 934.01, Fla.Stat. (1989). Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1989), prohibits the intentional interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication except as specifically provided by chapter 934. Section 934.03(2)(c) allows a law enforcement officer to intercept a communication when one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception and the purpose of such interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act....

...as frightened, and she was pressured into cooperating. The defendant, as an aggrieved person to an unlawful interception, § 934.09(9), claimed the conversation should be suppressed because her friend had not voluntarily consented to place the call. § 934.03(2)(c)....

...In appellant’s appeal from a final summary judgment in favor of the City and its officers based on her complaint alleging false arrest, appellant contends that the court erred in finding that the police officers had probable cause to arrest her for intercepting oral communications in violation of the wiretap statute, section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2009), and for obstructing without violence in violation of section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...o conclude that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest her for obstruction. Therefore, I would reverse the summary judgment. Whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Ford for violation of Florida’s wiretapping statute, section 934.03, Florida Statutes Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2009), as it existed in 2009 is substantively the same as today’s version....

...ors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept . . . any . . . oral . . . communication; .... shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) [imposing criminal liability]. § 934.03(1)(a), Fla....

...expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication.” § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). The statute provides a list of specific exceptions to the general prohibition in section 934.03(1). § 934.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). One of these exceptions is for situations in which all parties to the conversation have given prior consent. § 934.03(2)(d), Fla....

...2009); State v. Inciarrano, 473 10 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Fla. 1985); Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), approved, 655 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1995). “[F]or an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03, the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable.” State v....

...with the deputy with a handheld tape recorder. Id. at 263. Upon noticing the recorder, the deputy told Migut to turn the recorder off. Id. Migut refused and the officer placed Migut under arrest for intercepting an oral communication in violation of section 934.03. The court held that the deputy had “arguable probable cause” to believe Migut was violating section 934.03(1)(a) when Migut taped their conversation and where the deputy did not consent. Id. at 267. In its reasoning, the court simply stated that “it was not unreasonable for [the deputy] to expect that the conversation would be protected under § 934.03(1)(a),” citing to Keen....

...Claimant previously appealed an order of the deputy commissioner denying him wage loss benefits for an earlier period because he had failed to perform an adequate good faith job search. The order was affirmed on appeal without opinion. Snowdon v. Sambo’s and Cigna, 480 So.2d 1298 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). . Section 934.03(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1983), makes unlawful any tape recording of an “oral communication” unless “all parties to the communication have given prior consent" to the recording....

...The deputy’s finding and the E/C’s argument certainly imply that Captain Titus had knowledge of the tape recorder. Additionally, both claimant and Mr. Bubeck testified that the tape recorder was in plain view. Since neither the deputy nor the E/C have relied upon the provisions of section 934.03 to support denial of benefits to claimant, we do not consider claimant’s use of the tape recorder in the interview with Captain Titus to be fatal to his job search efforts.

...H, J. This is an appeal from an order granting a motion to suppress. The question is whether a deputy sheriff had authority to intercept a telephone conversation when only one of the parties to the conversation gave consent. The pertinent statute is section 934.03(2)(c) and it provides that it is lawful for a law enforcement official to intercept a telephone conversation if only one of the parties gives consent if “the purpose of such interception is to obtain evidence of a *39 criminal act.�...

has given prior consent to such interception. § 934.03(2)(c), Fla.Stat. (1987). Merely listening on a

...under circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication." The Florida Supreme Court has held that "for an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable." State v....

...iolations of the Act, including unlawfully recording phone calls without the consent of all parties. See § 934.10(1), Fla. Stat. (2019) (“Any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of ss. 934.03-934.09 shall have a civil cause of action against any person or entity who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person or entity to intercept, disclose, or use, such communications . . . .”); § 934.03(2)(d), Fla....

...ency personnel in the course of day-to-day business? In sum: The "business extension" exception or "extension phone" exception is not applicable to law enforcement agencies and the authority of these agencies to record telephone calls is governed by section 934.03 (2)(g), Florida Statutes, which provides that a law enforcement agency may intercept incoming and outgoing calls on its emergency telephone numbers only....

..., and you ask whether this exception may permit municipal police departments to record incoming and outgoing telephone calls on nonemergency telephone lines. These would include the ordinary day-to-day business calls made by personnel of the agency. Section 934.03 (2)(g), Florida Statutes, has been amended since issuance of the 1985 Attorney General's Opinion and now reads as follows: "It is lawful under ss. 934.03 - 934.09 for an employee of: 1....

...8 The "business extension" exception is a general restatement of the terms of section 934.02 (4)(a), Florida Statutes. Authorization for law enforcement agencies to record telephone calls is specifically addressed in another, separate statutory provision, section 934.03 (2)(g), Florida Statutes....

...agencies. Therefore, it is my opinion that the "business extension" exception or "extension phone" exception is not applicable to a law enforcement agency and that the authority of a law enforcement agency to record telephone calls is controlled by section 934.03 (2)(g), Florida Statutes, which provides that a law enforcement agency may only intercept incoming and outgoing calls of the agency on emergency telephone numbers....

of the right of privacy and a violation of section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1991). See Springle v. State

WARNER, J. Kenneth Atkins appeals his conviction for sexual battery and claims that the court erred in admitting a taped telephone conversation between the victim and her Mend, as admission of the conversation violated the wiretap statute, sections 934.03-934.09, Florida Statutes....

...that she told Atkins in rather strong language that she hated him and she told other persons around the party what occurred, thus impeaching Doctor’s prior testimony that she did not believe a rape occurred. The admission of this tape is the subject of this appeal. Section 934.03 makes intentional interception of telephone conversations unlawful, unless it falls within the exceptions of the act. Section 934.03(2)(c) provides a law enforcement exception: It is lawful under ss. 934.03-934.09 for an investigative or law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication when such person is a party to the communica...

...officer as to what was permissible to record. The statute permits a law enforcement officer to direct the recording of a conversation with a consenting participant where the “purpose of such interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act.” § 934.03(2)(c), Fla. Stat. In State v. Napoli, 373 So.2d 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), our court determined that the recording of a conversation between a state investigator posing as a clerk for a judge and a defendant was permissible under section 934.03(2)(c)....

...There, the defendant had already approached the investigator with a bribe. The officer secured a body bug and then met with the defendant and recorded the bribe. Thus, the purpose of the recording was to obtain “evidence of the criminal act,” i.e., the bribe itself. Id. at 935 ; § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

...State, 731 So.2d 819 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); State v. Stout, 693 So.2d 657 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Franco v. State, 376 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). We have not found a single case in which any court has approved the admission of a recorded conversation under section 934.03(2)(c), or pursuant to other counterparts around the country, which did not involve a conversation with the defendant being tried and was either part of a criminal act itself or an admission of a criminal act....

...tions interception statute, by state or local law enforcement or one acting in concert with officer, 27 A.L.R.4th 449 (1984). We conclude that a conversation surreptitiously recorded with a mere witness is not the type- of conversation allowed under section 934.03(2)(c)....

...They enlisted the help of a friend of the child, who contacted Sobel, the child’s mother. In a recorded conversation, Sobel encouraged the friend to lie to the police. That conversation was the basis of the charge against her. The fifth district held that the recording of that conversation fell within the authority of section 934.03(2)(c) even though at the time of the call Sobel was not implicated in any crime....

...Judge Sharp wrote a strong dissent. We do not have to decide whether we agree or disagree with the majority in Sobel in this case, because it is factually distinguishable, as we have just explained. The recording of the conversation between A.S. and Doctor violated section 934.03....

...e was not in custody. In this motion, he alleges that his claim is now “newly discovered,” because at the evidentiary hearing, he learned that it was a “non-custodial” statement and argues that it should have been suppressed as illegal under section 934.03, Florida Statutes....

...We reverse Appellant’s conviction and sentence on the authority of Springle v. State, 613 So.2d 65 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). The secret and unauthorized tape recording of Appellant’s conversation in the back seat of a police car constitutes an invasion of his privacy and a violation of Florida Statutes Section 934.03....

...Without appellant’s consent or other authorization, the police recorded his conversation. In Springle v. State, 613 So.2d 65 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), this court held such secret and unauthorized tape recordings constitute an invasion of the right of privacy and a violation of section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...n which he engaged in illegal bookmaking. Since these conversations were recorded with the consent of the other party, one Alpert, and under police direction and supervision, there is no question that the “bugging” was entirely permissible under Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Defendants contend that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the confidential informant’s taped telephone conversations. They argue that the informant should have been required to testify in person for the court to determine his consent to the recordings. , Section 934.03(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1983), permits a warrantless interception of oral communications where one of the parties to the communication has given pri- or consent to interception and the purpose of the interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act....

...at 24 , 87 S.Ct. at 828 . We have examined the other three points raised by defendants and find they have no *748 arguable merit. Accordingly, we affirm Evans and Anderson’s convictions and sentences. GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHEB and OTT, JJ., concur. . Section 934.03(2)(c) provides: It is lawful under this chapter for a law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of a law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication when such person is a party to the communicatio...

oral communication of another in violation of Section 934.-03(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1978), and unlawfully

...We have already determined that an insurer’s appraiser has no legitimate expectation of privacy while in an insured’s home for an inspection, and thus audio and video recording of the inspection was allowed. In Silversmith v. State Farm Insurance Co., 324 So. 3d 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), we specifically found that section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2020), which prohibits the audio recording of oral conversations unless both parties have given prior consent, did not apply to those circumstances. We said: As argued by the insured, “for an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable.” State v....

...insurer has shown nothing that precludes the homeowner or her representatives from openly making a recording of the inspection. Id. at 518. 4  In State v. Smith, 641 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1994), our supreme court construed section 934.03 to require more than a subjective expectation of privacy: In order to fall within the ambit of chapter 934, an oral communication must be “uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communicat...

...and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication.” § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). Thus, for an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable....

...Silversmith 2 opinion cited by the majority in support of that result. Appellants want the court to authorize both audio and video recording of an appraisal without the consent, and over the specific objection, of their insurer and its adjuster. Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2019), 2 Silversmith v....

...See Guilder v. State, 899 So. 2d 412, 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (holding that tape recording of a face-to-face conversation by a participant, without prior consent from all participants, constitutes an unlawful interception of an oral communication under section 934.03); see also Horning-Keating v. Emps....

...openly recording an inspection of her own home. 324 So. 3d at 518. As a result, Silversmith is in direct conflict not only with the statute but with our prior decisions in both Guilder and Horning-Keating. Silversmith merely made passing reference to section 934.03 in its analysis, while noting that “for an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable.” Id....

...by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication.” § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2019). Section 934.03(2) contains a list of specific exceptions to the general prohibition against audio recording found in section 934.03(1); among those exceptions, the statute provides for situations in which all parties to the conversation have consented to the recording. § 934.03(2)(d), Fla....

...that occurred inside a home with the consent of the homeowner but not the other party. In that case, the Court held that even an extortionary threat “delivered personally to the victim in the victim’s home is an ‘oral communication’ . . . [and] pursuant to Section 934.03, the electronic recording of such ‘oral communication’ without the consent of all parties to the communication was prohibited.” Id. at 296 (emphasis added). The statute also does not contain any exception for business interactions, nor is there a carve-out for situations where more than one other person is present. See § 934.03, Fla....

...We have already determined that an insurer’s appraiser has no legitimate expectation of privacy while in an insured’s home for an inspection, and thus audio and video recording of the inspection was allowed. In Silversmith v. State Farm Insurance Co., 324 So. 3d 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), we specifically found that section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2020), which prohibits the audio recording of oral conversations unless both parties have given prior consent, did not apply to those circumstances. We said: As argued by the insured, “for an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable.” State v....

...insurer has shown nothing that precludes the homeowner or her representatives from openly making a recording of the inspection. Id. at 518. 4  In State v. Smith, 641 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1994), our supreme court construed section 934.03 to require more than a subjective expectation of privacy: In order to fall within the ambit of chapter 934, an oral communication must be “uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communicat...

...and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication.” § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). Thus, for an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable....

...Silversmith 2 opinion cited by the majority in support of that result. Appellants want the court to authorize both audio and video recording of an appraisal without the consent, and over the specific objection, of their insurer and its adjuster. Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2019), 2 Silversmith v....

...See Guilder v. State, 899 So. 2d 412, 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (holding that tape recording of a face-to-face conversation by a participant, without prior consent from all participants, constitutes an unlawful interception of an oral communication under section 934.03); see also Horning-Keating v. Emps....

...openly recording an inspection of her own home. 324 So. 3d at 518. As a result, Silversmith is in direct conflict not only with the statute but with our prior decisions in both Guilder and Horning-Keating. Silversmith merely made passing reference to section 934.03 in its analysis, while noting that “for an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable.” Id....

...by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication.” § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2019). Section 934.03(2) contains a list of specific exceptions to the general prohibition against audio recording found in section 934.03(1); among those exceptions, the statute provides for situations in which all parties to the conversation have consented to the recording. § 934.03(2)(d), Fla....

...that occurred inside a home with the consent of the homeowner but not the other party. In that case, the Court held that even an extortionary threat “delivered personally to the victim in the victim’s home is an ‘oral communication’ . . . [and] pursuant to Section 934.03, the electronic recording of such ‘oral communication’ without the consent of all parties to the communication was prohibited.” Id. at 296 (emphasis added). The statute also does not contain any exception for business interactions, nor is there a carve-out for situations where more than one other person is present. See § 934.03, Fla....

...An insured homeowner appeals an order denying her motion for summary judgment and ruling that no one may audio/video record the inspection of her home by the insurer’s appraiser unless all participants consent. We reverse. The trial court erred in applying section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2020), which precludes interception of oral communications in some circumstances....

...her from openly recording a visitor within her own home. At the hearing on the motion, the court announced that, under Florida law, “the only way to record by way of video or audio is with the full consent of all parties participating.” The court was apparently relying on section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2020), which precludes interception of oral communications in some circumstances. The court erred. As argued by the insured, “for an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable.” State v....

...gainst Plaintiff. Plaintiff next contends that Defendant Mostert violated his Fourth Amendment rights by recording a telephone conversation *1315 between Plaintiff and a minor without Plaintiff's consent. Pursuant to Florida law, It is lawful under ss. 934.03-934.09 for an investigative or law enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of an investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication when such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception and the purpose of such interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act. § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

intentional interception of wire communication. See § 934.03(l)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. It also prohibits the intentional

competent, substantial evidence.”). Section 934.03, Florida Statutes prohibits the interception

...ed on an aggrieved party’s motion. The issue here is whether the telephone company’s use of the computer in this manner was an unlawful interception of a wire communication under chapter 934, Florida Statutes (1981). We conclude that it was not. Section 934.03(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides that it is unlawful to intercept any wire communication except as specifically provided in chapter 934. We find the type of device used here did not accomplish an unlawful “interception” within the meaning of the statute. Section 934.03(2)(f) states, It is lawful under this chapter for an employee of a telephone company to intercept a wire communication for the sole purpose of tracing the origin of such communication when the interception is requested by the recipient...

...The individual conducting the interception shall notify local police authorities within 48 hours after the time of the interception, (emphasis added). Accordingly, if there was a statutorily defined “intercept” by the telephone company in this case, it apparently was authorized by the first sentence of section 934.03(2)(f)....

...(The federal statute’s definitions of “intercept” and “contents” [sections 2510(4) and (8)] are the same as those of the Florida statute, [sections 934.-02(3) and (7)]; however, the federal statute does not contain a provision comparable to section 934.03(2)(f) for notification to the police by a telephone company)....

...574 , 166 S.E.2d 232 (1969) (evidence obtained through use of pen register admissible at defendant’s trial for making obscene telephone calls). Our conclusion that the trace in this case was not an “intercept” may seem to leave unanswered the question, “What does the language of section 934.03(2)(f) purport to govern if it does not govern the trace involved here?” The apparent answer is that although arguably the legislature may have had in mind the purpose of limiting the actions of a telephone company in situations like this, the statutory language cannot be construed to apply to these facts....

...Burkett, 344 So.2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Campbell v. State, 365 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 374 So.2d 98 (Fla.1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 934 , 100 S.Ct. 282 , 62 L.Ed.2d 193 (1979); State v. Leonard, 376 So.2d 427 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); § 934.03(2)(c), Fla.Stat....

...roviding a false official statement. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress 1 the recorded exit interview, arguing her statements were oral communications, as defined in section 934.02, Florida Statutes (2019), obtained in violation of section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2019), and subject to statutory suppression under section 934.06, Florida Statutes (2019)....

...FDOC’s policy mandated that both the exit interview and its subject matter be documented; the subject matter involved matters of great public importance; the interview was witnessed by another FDOC employee; and the interview took place on government property. We agree. Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2019), prohibits the interception or recording of private oral communications in Florida....

...mmunication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial . . . if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.” Our supreme court has held that an oral communication is protected under section 934.03 if it satisfies a two-part test: “for an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable.” State v....

...McDonough secretly recorded the meeting with the Chief, which took place in the Chief’s office and in the presence of McDonough’s friend and a Homestead Police Department Internal Affairs detective. Id. In concluding that McDonough had not violated section 934.03, the Eleventh Circuit noted that “the expectations of privacy needed to trigger application of the statute must be exhibited; in other words they must be ‘shown externally’ or ‘demonstrated.’” Id....

... Case No. 5D2023-2681 LT Case No. 2020-CF-001719 KILBANE, J., concurring specially. I agree with the majority that this case should be affirmed. I write separately to address the application of section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2020), where, as here, the conduct alleged could support a charge of either the interception of a “wire” or an “oral” communication. Maddie Joy Langlois was originally charged with the unlawful interception of an “oral communication” in violation of section 934.03(a)(1) after she recorded a phone conversation to which she was a party without the consent of the other party....

...She filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the other party did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. After the hearing on Langlois’s motion to dismiss, the State amended the information and instead charged Langlois with unlawful interception of a “wire communication,” also in violation of section 934.03(a)(1). Thereafter, Langlois pled to unlawfully intercepting a “wire communication.” When a statute may be violated in separate and distinct ways, a person may be charged based on how the statute was violated. See generally Graham v....

...Florida’s wiretapping statute states, in relevant part, that “any person who . . . [i]ntentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication . . . is guilty of a felony of the third degree.” § 934.03(1)(a), 4(a), Fla....

...5th DCA 2020). “Notably, the definition of ‘wire communication’ does not include the same qualifying ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ language as the definition of oral communication.” Id. Accordingly, if a person is charged under section 934.03(1)(a) for unlawfully intercepting a “wire communication,” there is no requirement that the person whose communication was intercepted have a reasonable expectation of privacy. See § 934.02(1), Fla. Stat. This is true even though a person charged under section 934.03(1)(a), the same statutory subsection, for unlawfully intercepting an “oral communication” would be subject to such a requirement....

...4th DCA 2023) (“When a statute includes an explicit definition, [courts] must follow that definition . . . .” (first alteration in original) (quoting Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000))). However, all three defined communications remain subject to the consent requirement. See § 934.03(2)(d), Fla. Stat....

...Discretion, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014))). As technology continues to progress, the ease with which a conversation may be surreptitiously recorded progresses along with it. Consequently, prosecutors are being faced with even more circumstances where section 934.03(1)(a) may be implicated....

ORFINGER, LAMBERT and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. See § 934.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2015) (forbidding the intentional

ORFINGER, LAMBERT and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. See § 934.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2015) (forbidding the intentional

...interpretation of statutes is de novo.” B.Y. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 887 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004). The communication was wrongfully intercepted without consent where the nurse had expected the conversation to be private. Section 934.03(1) generally prohibits the interception of “any wire, oral, or electronic communication[.]” § 934.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2023) (emphasis added). Section 934.03(2) provides exceptions to the general prohibition from intercepting an oral communication. See § 934.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2023). One exception that would have allowed the interception of the oral communication here is if the nurse had consented to the recording. See § 934.03(2)(d), Fla....

168 So.2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). Thus, since Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1977), makes the interception

...In 2019 Dorsch and fellow employee Sam McClean recorded a telephone conversation with Ellis without his knowledge. At the time, Dorsch and McClean were in Indiana, while Ellis was in Florida. Ellis subsequently sued Quality and Dorsch in Pinellas County alleging violations of section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2019), which prohibits the recording and disclosure of telephone conversations without the consent of the person being recorded. Ellis's complaint alleged that the Pinellas County court had jurisdiction over th...

...act in Florida, thereby bringing the defendant within the long-arm jurisdiction of Florida. In Kountze, this court reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss based on the lack of personal jurisdiction. We held that while section 934.03 "creates a private cause of action for the nonconsensual interception of a communication originating within Florida[, it] cannot transform a defendant's out-of-state act of recording that communication, standing alone, into a 'tortious act within this state' for jurisdictional purposes." Id....

are found in s. 934.03(2)(c), (d), and (g). Section 934.03(2)(c) permits a law enforcement officer to

...Blanchard Judicial Center be legal with or without notice to the caller that his or her conversation may be recorded for security reasons? In sum: Unless the State Attorney's Office is intercepting and recording telephone calls to published emergency telephone numbers as provided in section 934.03 (2)(g), Florida Statutes, or has obtained a court order pursuant to sections 934.07 and 934.09 , Florida Statutes, on the basis that such interception may provide or has provided evidence of the commission of certain crimes, the State...

...The bomb threats have caused considerable disruption of the functions in the Judicial Center. Chapter 934 , Florida Statutes, is entitled the Security of Communications Law, and was enacted by the Florida Legislature in order to assure personal rights of privacy in the area of oral and wire communications. 1 Section 934.03 (1), Florida Statutes, generally makes it unlawful for a person to willfully intercept, endeavor to intercept, or procure any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire or oral communication....

...ater societal value than the interest served by permitting eavesdropping or wiretapping." 5 The Court noted that "the Florida act evinces a greater concern for the protection of one's privacy interests in a conversation than does the federal act." 6 Section 934.03 (1), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part that "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any person who ....

...to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication . . . is guilty of a felony of the third degree . . ." However, an exception to the general prohibition against the interception of wire communications is provided in section 934.03 (2)(g), Florida Statutes, for certain law enforcement purposes. Pursuant to this paragraph: "It is lawful under ss. 934.03 - 934.09 for an employee of: 1....

...The exception does not represent a principle of law outside the scope of the Security of Communications Act. As Attorney General's Opinion 97-16 notes, authorization for law enforcement agencies to record telephone calls is specifically addressed in another, separate statutory provision of section 934.03 (2), Florida Statutes....

...ord incoming and outgoing telephone calls on the nonemergency telephone numbers of those agencies. The only provisions of Chapter 934 , Florida Statutes, that authorize interception of wire communications by a law enforcement agency are contained in section 934.03 (2), Florida Statutes, for published emergency telephone numbers, and in sections 934.07 and 934.09 , Florida Statutes, providing a procedure for obtaining a court order authorizing such interception. Further, this office has previously determined that the exception in section 934.03 (2), permitting the interception of a wire communication by a law enforcement officer when he is a party to the communication or when one of the parties thereto has given prior consent and the purpose of the interception is to obtain e...

...in the statute creates the inference that no other exceptions were intended. 15 Therefore, it is my opinion that unless the State Attorney's Office is intercepting and recording telephone calls to published emergency telephone numbers as provided in section 934.03 (2)(g), Florida Statutes, or has obtained a court order pursuant to sections 934.07 and 934.09 , Florida Statutes, on the basis that such interception may provide or has provided evidence of the commission of certain crimes, the State...

...de to that office either with notice or without notice to the caller that his or her conversation is being recorded. Sincerely, Robert A. Butterworth Attorney General RAB/tgh 1 See , s. 934.01 , Fla. Stat., setting forth legislative findings. 2 See, s. 934.03 (4), Fla. Stat., making violations of the statute a felony and prescribing penalties; and s. 934.10 , Fla. Stat., providing a civil cause of action against violators of ss. 934.03 - 934.09 , Fla....

...I would note that the statutes now permit the recording of outgoing calls on emergency "911" lines when the recording is of a call to the number from which the incoming emergency call was placed and is necessary to obtain information required to provide the emergency services being requested, see , s. 934.03 (2)(g), Fla....

...Defendant made very incriminating statements during the telephone conversation. After defendant’s motion to suppress the taped conversation was denied, the tape was played twice for the jury (the second time being at the jury’s request during its deliberations). Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), allows a law enforcement officer or person working under the direction of a law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication when the person doing the intercepting is a party to the comm...

...He argued that the recording violated section 934.01(4), Florida Statutes (2009), and his right to privacy. After a hearing at which only the 911 operator testified, the trial court denied the motion. The court determined that the recording fell within the exception in section 934.03(2)(g)2, which the court broadly construed to allow an emergency agency to intercept and record any wire communication in order to acquire necessary information to render aid and assistance....

...24 months of probation. This timely appeal follows. The facts material to the motion to suppress are not in dispute. Accordingly, we review the trial court's ruling on the motion de novo. See Miles v. State, 60 So.3d 447, 450-51 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Section 934.03 prohibits the intentional interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications without the parties' consent or court authorization....

...It is also lawful for such employee to intercept and record outgoing wire communications to the numbers from which such incoming wire communications were placed when necessary to obtain information required to provide the emergency services being requested. § 934.03(2)(g)2, Fla....

...limited exception not applicable *715 here. See § 934.06, Fla. Stat. (2009). Accordingly, as the trial court recognized, the disposition of the motion to suppress turns on whether the recording of the outgoing 911 call falls within the exception in section 934.03(2)(g)2....

...e provision of emergency services to individuals in need. However, the court's broad interpretation of the statute is contrary to the plain language of the statute. It is also contrary to the legislative history of the statute. The plain language of section 934.03(2)(g)2 allows emergency agencies to record only (1) incoming 911 calls, and (2) outgoing call-backs by the 911 dispatcher to the number from which the incoming call was placed when the call-back is necessary to obtain information required for emergency assistance....

...arty gives permission for the call to be recorded." Id. The legislative history of the language emphasized above provides further support for this "narrow" interpretation of the statute. Prior to this language being added to the statute in 1987, [1] section 934.03(2)(g)2 authorized law enforcement agencies to record incoming 911 calls, but not outgoing calls. See § 934.03(2)(g)2, Fla....

...the outgoing calls which may be recorded are those calls made to the same numbers from which the incoming emergency calls are made." Id. In light of the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, we reject the State's contention that section 934.03(2)(g)2 should be broadly construed to allow the recording of all outgoing calls by 911 dispatchers in the interest of promoting public safety....

...City of Lake Worth, 978 So.2d 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (affirming summary judgment in favor of city for recording outgoing calls from emergency call center other than "911 call-backs" because even though the recording did not fall within the exception in section 934.03(2)(g)2, the city had a good faith belief that the recording was authorized by other provisions of Florida law governing 911 systems); § 934.10(2)(c), Fla....

...33 at 1) cautioned Nece that a motion for leave to amend the complaint is "distinctly disfavored after issuance of this order" and nine months after Quicken moved for summary judgment, Nece moves (Doc. 108) for leave to amend the complaint to assert a claim under Section 934.03(1), which prohibits the intentional interception of "any wire, oral, or electronic communication." The motion warrants denial for three reasons....

...See Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178 , 182, 83 S.Ct. 227 , 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962) (explaining that an order need not allow a "futil[e]" amendment). Nece alleges that Quicken "recorded" Nece's calls using a third-party program, CallCopy. Liability under Section 934.03(1) requires that the defendant "intercept" a call, but the Florida Statutes provide a "business extension exception." A company incurs no liability under Section 934.03(1) if the company intercepts the call through a telephone or telephone equipment furnished by a "provider of wire or electronic communication service" and if the interception occurs in the "ordinary course of business." Applying the statutory definition of "intercept," Royal Health Care Services., Inc....

...106 at 7) Because AT & T, a "provider of wire or electronic communication" service, furnished the telephone number through which Quicken intercepted Nece's calls and because Quicken intercepted the calls in the ordinary course of business, the "business extension" provisions except Quicken from liability under Section 934.03(1)....

...Second, Nece unduly delayed moving for leave to amend. See Foman , 371 U.S. at 182 , 83 S.Ct. 227 (explaining that "undue delay" warrants denying leave to amend). Nece discovered in January 2017 that Quicken recorded the calls. (Doc. 40-1 at 2-3) Under Nece's (erroneous) interpretation of Section 934.03, the unauthorized and undisclosed recording established a claim (Doc....

...108 at 7), but Nece fails to explain persuasively the ten-month delay in moving for leave to assert that claim. Nece attributes the delay to the August 2017 depositions of Quicken's corporate representatives, who purportedly "confirmed" Quicken's violation of Section 934.03, but Nece identifies no new information uncovered through the depositions....

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

...3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County, Lawrence J. Semento, Judge. Ray Crosby, Lake City, pro se. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock McGuigan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

...ons which suggests that the consent must be proven only by the testimony of the consenting party.... [T]he deputy’s testimony that [the informant] consented to the intercept sufficed to permit the introduction of the tape recordings.”); see also § 934.03(2)(c), Fla....

Chapter 934, Florida Statutes, inasmuch as Section 934.-03(2)(c) purports to excuse any Chapter 934 authorization

...At the hearing on the motion to suppress the confidential informant did not testify. Appellants contend that failure of the informant to testify that he gave his consent to the taping of the conversation was error, citing Tollett v. State, 272 So.2d 490 (Fla.1973). We agree and reverse. Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), permits a warrantless interception of an oral communication where one of the parties to the communication has given pri- or consent to the interception and the purpose of the interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act....

carries a criminal as well as a civil penalty. Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (1977). Accordingly, the

State , 154 So.3d 292, 296-97 (Fla. 2014). Section 934.03(1), Florida Statutes (2016), generally prohibits

State , 154 So.3d 292, 296-97 (Fla. 2014). Section 934.03(1), Florida Statutes (2016), generally prohibits

...Dockery, 676 So. 2d at 474. Because as a matter of law the officers could not have had a reasonable “expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation” as required by the wiretap statute, section 934.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), and section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes (2009), there was no probable cause to arrest appellant for violation of the wiretap statute....

...I concur with the majority opinion reversing the summary judgment. Because as a matter of law the officers could not have had a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy, there was no probable cause to arrest appellant for violation of the wiretap statute, section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...This ground was never raised at trial or on appeal, and it is improper to raise new issues on appeal in a motion for rehearing. We therefore do not address it. 5  Whether the officers had probable cause to arrest appellant for violation of Florida’s wiretapping statute, section 934.03, Florida Statutes. Section 934.03, Florida Statutes, as it existed in 2009, is substantively the same as today’s version....

...ntercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept . . . any . . . oral . . . communication; .... shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) [imposing criminal liability]. § 934.03(1)(a), Fla....

...es justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication.” § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). “[F]or an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03, the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable.” State v....

...of privacy. The facts in the opinion do not show that the officer involved was engaged in any performance of his legal duties when he was conversing with the defendant. More importantly, Keen was decided well prior to State v. Smith, which held that section 934.03 required both an actual subjective expectation of privacy as well as a societal recognition of that expectation. Migut is likewise distinguishable....

...ith the deputy with a handheld tape recorder. Id. at 263. Upon noticing the recorder, the deputy told Migut to turn the recorder off. Id. Migut refused, and the officer placed Migut under arrest for intercepting an oral communication in violation of section 934.03. The court held that the deputy had “arguable probable cause” to believe Migut was violating section 934.03(1)(a) when Migut taped their conversation and where the deputy did not consent. Id. at 267. In its reasoning, the court simply stated that “it was not unreasonable for [the deputy] to expect that the conversation would be protected under § 934.03(1)(a),” citing to Keen....

...gathering information about police conduct, the police can hardly have an expectation that their communications during the performance of their duties can be subject to their personal expectation of privacy. At the time of appellant’s arrest for violation of section 934.03, the law was well established that a person must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy which society recognizes is reasonable....

...Accordingly, the officers did not have probable cause to arrest appellant for obstruction of justice. Intercepting Oral Communications Arrest Appellant was also arrested for intercepting oral communications in violation of section 934.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), which generally prohibits the recording of oral communications as defined in section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes (2009). Section 934.02(2) defines oral communications as “any oral communication utt...

...not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication.” § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). The statutory prohibition from intercepting or recording oral communications exempts consensual recordings. § 934.03(2)(d), Fla....

interrelated, they will be answered together. Section 934.03, Florida Statutes, provides: "Except as otherwise

...However, we withdraw our prior opinion of April 12, 2024, and substitute the following in its place. Michael L. Waite appeals a judgment entered after a nolo contendere plea to five counts of unlawful interception of “oral communication” in violation of section 934.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2020), one count of battery on a law enforcement officer, and one count of resisting arrest with violence....

...Waite sent a copy of the audio recording of that call via email to the CCSO records department and requested an internal investigation. In February 2021, Detective Jacob Chenoweth sought to obtain an arrest warrant based on the recorded conversation attached to Waite’s email. The State alleged that Waite violated section 934.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by unlawfully intercepting an “oral communication” when he recorded the conversation with Sergeant Blair without his consent....

...As such, “the motion is somewhat similar to a motion for summary judgment in a civil case.” State v. Jones, 642 So. 2d 804, 805 n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (citing Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044, 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); State v. Giesy, 243 So. 2d 635, 636 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)). Under section 934.03(1)(a), it is unlawful for any person to intentionally intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication. § 934.03(1)(a), Fla....

...justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication.” Id. § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). “[F]or an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable.” State v. Smith, 641 So....

...Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Edwards, 654 So. 2d 628, 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). 3 Our decision is also based on the charges that were filed. The State charged Waite with unlawfully intercepting “oral communications” in violation of section 934.03(1)(a)....

...deputies were on duty, and involved phones utilized for official police business. Under these circumstances, and in spite of Waite’s concession that none of the deputies gave consent for him to record which is also required, Waite did not violate section 934.03(1)(a)’s prohibition on intercepting “oral communications” when he recorded the conversations with the deputies because they did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy....

....190(c)(4) motion to dismiss must be reversed. Cf. Ford v. City of Boynton Beach, 323 So. 3d 215, 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (reversing summary judgment based on reasonable expectation of privacy requirement for intercepting “oral communication” in section 934.03(1)(a) and section 934.02(2)).4 B....

...stated, because Waite did not intercept oral communications the charges against him are nullities. The Solicitor General urges that the panel certify the following question of great public importance: “Whether a person is liable for unlawful wiretapping under Section 934.03 for surreptitiously recording phone conversations with law- enforcement officers.” The answer to that question is “yes,” provided a nonconsensual interception of a wire communication occurred, such as the phone calls in this case....

...1st DCA 2016). Smiley argues that his recorded statements were obtained in violation of Florida’s wiretap law, which provides that with certain exceptions, it is unlawful to “[i]ntentionally intercept[ ] . . . any wire, oral, or electronic communication.” § 934.03, Fla....

...nation of invasion of his or her right to hold a private telephone conversation without redress, solely because the wires were tapped by their husband or wife. Granted, Mrs. Burgess could have leveled criminal charges against Mr. Burgess pursuant to Section 934.03(l)(d), which makes such conduct a felony of the third degree; or, Mrs....

...The trial court found in its final summary judgment that “[t]he methods used by Lake Worth were reasonable and comported with Florida law” and “[t]he recordings were made within the statutory scheme, and within the scheme provided for 911 calls and responses thereto.” Section 934.03(1), Florida Statutes (2000), of the Florida Communications Act prohibits the intentional interception of any “wire, oral, or electronic communication[s].” However, the Act provides exceptions for law enforcement agencies, two of which are relevant but inapplicable to this case....

...e or law enforcement officer when the officer is “a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception and the purpose of such interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act.” § 934.03(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2000). This exception does not apply to a blanket recording of every telephone call received on a police department’s emergency complaint and information lines. Another exception is found in section 934.03(2)(g), Florida Statutes (2000), which authorizes recordings of incoming calls on designated 911 telephone lines and published non-emergency telephone lines, and outgoing 911 call-backs....

...However, the City recorded all incoming and outgoing calls- from its communications center, which included unpublished non-emergency lines, an unpublished non-emergency number, along with outgoing calls that are not 911 call-backs, taking this case outside the exception. Beyond the exceptions found in section 934.03, the City argues that the Florida Emergency Telephone Act permits it to record all incoming and outgoing calls from its 911 call center....

...that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” § 810.145(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). That issue is not before us, and our supreme court already has commented on a similar issue in Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1977), which upheld section 934.03(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1969), prohibiting the interception of certain wire or oral communications unless all parties thereto give prior consent....

...IAM. As to the admissibility of the tape recordings, we affirm upon the authority of Odum v. State, 403 So.2d 936 (Fla.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 925 , 102 S.Ct.1970, 72 L.Ed.2d 440 (1982), Tumulty v. State, 489 So.2d 150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), and section 934.03(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Defendant’s contention that the police violated his right to privacy by utilizing a “body bug” in the defendant’s office is without merit. In Morningstar v. State, 428 So.2d 220 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 86 , 78 L.Ed.2d 95 (1983), the supreme court, finding section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1979) constitutional, held that article 1, section 12 of the Florida Constitution does not prohibit a warrantless electronic interception of a defendant’s conversation by an undercover police officer in a defendant’s office or place of business....

...Waite sent the audio recording of that call via email to the CCSO records department and requested an internal investigation. In February 2021, Detective Jacob Chenoweth sought to obtain an arrest warrant based on the recorded conversation attached to Waite’s email. The State alleged that Waite violated section 934.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2020), by recording the conversation with Sergeant Blair without his consent....

...2d 1044, 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); State v. Giesy, 243 So. 2d 635, 636 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)). Under Florida’s wiretapping statute, it is unlawful for any person to intentionally intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication. § 934.03(1)(a), Fla....

...subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication.” Id. § 934.02(2) (emphasis added). “[F]or an oral conversation to be protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the expectation is reasonable.” State v....

...Importantly, this is based on the record before us as there is no dispute that all conversations concerned matters of public business, occurred while the deputies were on duty, and involved phones utilized for work purposes. As such, Waite did not violate section 934.03(1)(a) when he recorded the conversations with the deputies, all of whom were acting in their official capacities at the time of the recordings, just as if he had the conversations face-to- face....

...phone in their official capacities as law enforcement officers regarding public business, the recordings did not fall within the definition of “oral communication” in section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes (2020), such that the wiretapping statute, section 934.03(1)(a), applied. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the rule 3.190(c)(4) motion to dismiss the wiretapping charges and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion....