CopyCited 29 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 1838948
...State,
902 So.2d 343, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). The court certified the issue to us as one of great public importance: "Does a trial judge have the power and authority to impose on juveniles in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the mandatory surcharges set forth in sections
938.08 and 93[8].085?" Id....
...5th *1279 DCA 2004), but were that not the case I would have resolved this issue differently. In this special concurring opinion, I write to explain my reasons for disagreeing with S.S.M. In S.S.M., a child was assessed a $201.00 surcharge pursuant to section 938.08, Florida Statutes. She pled guilty to two counts of battery, first degree misdemeanors. In this case, V.K.E. pled guilty to a charge of simple battery, a first degree misdemeanor, and was surcharged $201.00 pursuant to section 938.08, Florida Statutes and $151.00 pursuant to section 938.085, Florida Statutes. Sections 938.08 and 938.085 are part of the "general" adult criminal statutes contained in Chapter 938....
...l Cord Injury Rehabilitation Trust Fund; and the County Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Trust Fund; and the Department of Children and Family Services Child Advocacy Trust Fund for the Florida Network of Children's Advocacy Centers, Inc. In the case of section 938.08, $85.00 of the surcharge goes to the Domestic Violence Trust Fund, $1.00 to the Clerk of the Court as a service charge, and the balance to the county to defray costs of incarcerating persons sentenced under section 741.238 (minimum term of imprisonment for domestic violence). In the case of section 938.085, the surcharge goes to the Rape Crisis Program Trust Fund, and $1.00 to the Clerk of Court as a service charge....
...Section 985.233(5)(b) also provides the court must impose either an adult sanction or a juvenile sanction, but not a combination. If, however, the rationale of S.S.M. is accepted, there is no logical limit to assessing juveniles being prosecuted under Chapter 985, with not only the surcharges under sections 938.08 and 938.085, but all, if not many, of the surcharges or court costs set forth in Chapter 938, outlined above, because all of those statutes impose "court costs" or surcharges for funding state and local law enforcement programs based on the fact that a person has violated a state criminal law or municipal ordinance or criminal traffic offense. If sections 938.08 and 938.085 are applicable to juvenile delinquency cases, then all of the costs and assessments provided for in Chapter 938, for the adult penal system, are logically applicable to juveniles....
...of a targeted gender group. It should not follow, without a solid basis, that adult criminal sanctions be imposed on juvenile offenders. Chapter 985 disfavors detention and limits harsher sanctions if other alternatives are available. Yet, sections 938.08 and 938.085 make the payment of substantial funds by the juvenile a condition of not being placed in detention....
...er Chapter 938. None of these terms is defined in Chapter 985 and Chapter 938 uses the terms interchangeably. In my view, that leads to the same logical dilemma left by S.S.M. Are all or most of the costs and surcharges, including those specified in
938.08 and
938.085, provided for in Chapter 938 applicable in juvenile delinquency cases simply because they involve violations of state, county, or municipal law? Because the two penal systems for handling adults and juveniles are so different and guided by such different philosophies and goals, I believe the better answer is that unless the Legislature expressly makes an adult sanction, cost or surcharge expressly applicable to the juvenile system, it should not be applicable. Sections
938.08 and
938.085 make no reference to delinquency proceedings. Thus I would have concluded that the trial court erred in this juvenile case, in imposing the surcharges against V.K.E., pursuant to sections
938.05 and
938.085....
...gislature has demonstrated its awareness of its broad authority to provide for the taxation of costs, fees, and surcharges in both adult and juvenile delinquency proceedings, but has not provided for the assessment of costs under sections
938.05 and
938.085 in juvenile delinquency proceedings....
...The majority has reached the correct result as a matter of statutory interpretation and has acted in accord with the purposes of juvenile sentencing as set forth by the Legislature. Unlike the $50 in costs for the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund authorized by section
938.03(1), Florida Statutes, sections
938.08 and
938.085 do not expressly authorize the $201 and $151 surcharges for domestic violence programs and rape crisis centers in juvenile delinquency cases....
...The costs in section
938.03(1) apply to "[a]ny person pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, or being convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for, any felony, misdemeanor, delinquent act, or criminal traffic offense," and to "[a]ny person whose adjudication is withheld." (Emphasis supplied.) In contrast, nothing in sections
938.08 and
938.085 clearly evinces legislative intent to extend the surcharges to juvenile delinquency proceedings, apart from the fact that juveniles as well as adults can "plead[ ] guilty or nolo contendere to, or [be] found guilty of" one of the enumerated offenses....
...the statutes and to give effect to the Legislature's intent." Zold v. Zold,
911 So.2d 1222, 1229 *1284 (Fla.2005). The use of language explicitly encompassing juvenile delinquents in section
938.03(1) and the absence of similar language in sections
938.08 and
938.085 suggest that the Legislature intended a distinction....
...In his dissenting opinion, Justice Cantero discerns from precedent and dictionary definitions that a surcharge or cost can be distinguished from a fee. However, the Legislature has not defined the terms so that we can be sure that it intended this distinction to be applied to sections 938.08, 938.085, and 985.221. In the absence of express language authorizing the "surcharge" in section 938.08 and 938.085 in delinquency proceedings, section 985.221 is an additional indication that imposition of the surcharge on juvenile delinquents is contrary to legislative intent....
...State,
912 So.2d 613 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); S.S.M. v. State,
898 So.2d 84 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). As these courts consistently have found, the statutes at issue are unambiguous and therefore must be applied as written. The majority instead concludes that sections
938.08 and
938.085, Florida Statutes (2001, 2003), do not apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings....
...In the following discussion, I will (A) analyze the plain meaning of the statutes and conclude that they apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings; and (B) address *1286 the majority's arguments for a contrary interpretation. A. The Plain Meaning of the Statutes The surcharges at issue were mandated under sections
938.08 and
938.085, Florida Statutes (2001, 2003), which state in relevant part:
938.08 Additional cost to fund programs in domestic violence.In addition to any sanction imposed for a violation of ... s.
784.03, ... the court shall impose a surcharge of $201. Payment of the surcharge shall be a condition of probation, community control, or any other court-ordered supervision....
938.085 Additional cost to fund rape crisis centers.In addition to any sanction imposed when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, a violation of ... s.
784.03, ... the court shall impose a surcharge of $151. Payment of the surcharge shall be a condition of probation, community control, or any other court-ordered supervision. The issue is whether sections
938.08 and
938.085 apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings....
..."[T]he statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Holly,
450 So.2d at 219 (quoting McRainey,
137 So. at 159). Thus, the statute's text is the most reliable and authoritative expression of the Legislature's intent. Under the plain language of the statutes in question, sections
938.08 and
938.085, they apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings. Section
938.08 states, without exception, that "[i]n addition to any sanction imposed for a violation of ....
...784.03, . . . the court shall impose a surcharge of $201." (Emphasis added.) The statute thus requires the trial court to impose this surcharge on anyone, juvenile or otherwise, who violates section
784.03 (or any of the other statutes enumerated in section
938.08). This language is clear, definite, and unambiguous. Juveniles, as well as adults, can violate the law. Because V.K.E. pled nolo contendere to simple battery under section
784.03, under section
938.08 she committed a "violation of ......
...nquent." State v. Menuto,
912 So.2d 603, 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (emphasis added) (citing § 985.228(4), Fla. Stat. (2002)). Therefore, notwithstanding the trial court's withholding of adjudication in this case, V.K.E. committed a "violation of law." Section
938.085 contains similar language....
...with felony battery under section
784.041, Florida Statutes (2002). However, the State and V.K.E. later agreed to a plea bargain. To avoid a possible conviction of felony battery, she pled nolo contendere to a violation of section
784.03simple battery. This plea placed her within the ambit of section
938.085 because she pled "nolo contendere to ... a violation of ... s.
784.03." The statute requires the trial court to impose this $151 surcharge on anyone who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a violation of section
784.03 (or any of the other statutes enumerated in section
938.08). The statute contains no exceptions for juveniles. In addition, sections
938.08 and
938.085 explicitly state that "[p]ayment of the surcharge shall be a condition of probation ....
..." (Emphasis added.) The trial court's disposition order did impose the surcharges as a condition of probation. The order includes, among the twenty-three conditions of V.K.E.'s probation, payment of the surcharges. [5] The order reflects the language in sections 938.08 and 938.085 that "[p]ayment of the surcharge shall be a condition of probation." Because the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the analysis must end there. The plain meaning of sections 938.08 and 938.085 controls....
...is clear and unambiguous, the legislative intent must be derived from the words used without involving rules of construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, I conclude that a trial judge has the authority to impose the surcharges set forth in sections 938.08 and 938.085 on juveniles in delinquency proceedings....
...jority offers several grounds *1288 for disregarding the plain language of the statutes in question: (1) the Legislature created a separate juvenile justice system as a distinct rehabilitative alternative to the criminal justice system; (2) sections 938.08 and 938.085 do not specifically include delinquency proceedings; and (3) section 985.221, Florida Statutes (2004), prohibits the imposition of court fees in delinquency cases....
...Section 985.228(4) does not preclude a court from imposing penalties on juveniles. Despite the "public policy underlying Chapter 985," majority op. at 1281 (quoting V.K.E.,
902 So.2d at 346 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)), section 985.228(4) does not preclude a judge from imposing on juveniles the surcharges in sections
938.08 and
938.085....
...This rationale implies that a surcharge that funds a program, such as one for domestic violence, cannot be imposed unless the offense triggering the surcharge relates to that program. No law supports this view, and such an interpretation would render several parts of sections
938.08 and
938.085 inapplicable even to adult offenses. Cf. Unruh v. State,
669 So.2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1996) ("[C]ourts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless."). Many of the offenses triggering the surcharges, enumerated in sections
938.08 and
938.085, are unrelated to rape, sexual assault, or domestic violence....
...s or materials). Accepting Judge Sharp'snow the majority'sview would require us to prohibit the imposition of any surcharges, either upon a juvenile or an adult, when the offense is not directly related to the programs being funded. Yet sections 938.08 and 938.085 require that a court "shall impose" the surcharges at issue when they apply....
...This obligatory language indicates that the Legislature has deemed the surcharges appropriate even when the offense charged is unrelated to rape, sexual assault, or domestic violence. The majority also adopts Judge Sharp's argument that, "[i]f sections 938.08 and 938.085 are applicable to juvenile delinquency cases, then all of the costs and assessments ......
...Thus, the imposition of the surcharges cannot be considered unreasonable or absurd. 2. Absence of Express Application to Delinquency Proceedings The majority next claims that, unlike certain instances where the Legislature *1290 has expressly provided for the taxation of costs and surcharges against juveniles, sections 938.08 and 938.085 do not specify that they apply to delinquency proceedings....
...and prior to any other cost required to be imposed by law, the sum of $50. Any person whose adjudication is withheld shall also be assessed such cost. (Emphasis added.) According to the majority, had the Legislature wanted the surcharges in sections 938.08 and 938.085 to apply to juveniles, it would have explicitly said so....
..."If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the legislative intent must be derived from the words used without involving rules of construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended." Zuckerman,
615 So.2d at 663. As I have noted above, the language of sections
938.08 and
938.085 is clear and unambiguous, and its plain meaning controls....
...the same sentence. It does not apply where something is mentioned in one statute but not in another. One cannot infer from the Legislature's explicit application of section
938.03 to juvenile proceedings that the absence of such language in sections
938.08 and
938.085 reflects an intent not to apply those statutes to juvenile proceedings....
...Section
938.03 applies to certain specified areas: "any felony, misdemeanor, delinquent act, or criminal traffic offense." The principle of expressio unius permits the inference that it does not apply to categories not mentioned in that sentence. On the other hand, the language of sections
938.08 and
938.085 does not indicate that the statutes apply only to adults, or only in specified proceedings....
...isions. Instead, they require, without special language, the imposition of these surcharges "for a violation of" or "when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found guilty of . . . a violation of" any of the enumerated offenses. See §§ 938.08, 938.085....
...sions in harmony with one another." Specially concurring op. at 1283. But as I noted above, we use canons of statutory construction only when statutes are ambiguous. See Knowles,
898 So.2d at 10; Zuckerman,
615 So.2d at 663. The language of sections
938.08 and
938.085 is clear....
...xim noscitur a sociis to section 2(10) of the Securities Act of 1933 creates doubt, instead of reducing it, and arguing that the canon applies only in cases of ambiguity). As the argument goes, because section
938.03 refers to juveniles and sections
938.08 and
938.085 do not, it is now unclear (although it was not before) whether these statutes apply to juveniles....
...Neither section 985.221 in particular nor chapter 985 in general defines the term "court fees." Justice Pariente believes that, because the Legislature failed to define these terms, we cannot be sure that their usual meanings and distinctions should be applied to sections 938.08, 938.085, and 985.221....
...charge, which may be punitive in nature. Based on the ordinary meanings of the terms "fee" and "surcharge," I conclude that section 985.221's prohibition against charging "court fees" does not prohibit the surcharges set forth in sections
938.05 and
938.085....
...ent "restitution in money or in kind, community service, a curfew ... or other nonresidential punishment appropriate to the offense," at least implicitly authorizes imposition of surcharges. Even assuming that section 985.221 conflicts with sections 938.08 and 938.085, the latter statutes govern because they were enacted after section 985.221....
..."The last expression of the Legislature prevails due to the general presumption that later statutes are passed by the Legislature with the knowledge of prior existing laws." Id. (citing Oldham v. Rooks,
361 So.2d 140, 143 (Fla.1978), and J.A. v. State,
633 So.2d 108, 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)). Here, sections
938.08 and
938.085 were enacted in 2001 and 2003, respectively....
...Ch.2001-50, § 5, at 320, Laws of Fla.; ch.2003-114, § 3, at 729, Laws of Fla. Section 985.221 (formerly section 39.073) has been in effect since 1990, ch. 90-208, § 5, at 1150, Laws of Fla., and was last updated in 1997. S.S.M.,
898 So.2d at 85. The Legislature presumably was aware of section 985.221 when passing sections
938.08 and
938.085. See id. Therefore, sections
938.08 and
938.085 represent the last expression of legislative intent and should prevail. C. CONCLUSION I find that the language of the statutes is clear and unambiguous. I agree with the Fifth District's analysis in this case. A trial judge has the authority to impose the mandatory surcharges provided in sections
938.08 and
938.085 in juvenile delinquency proceedings....
...This is especially true in a case like this where even the majority acknowledges that we do not really know what the Legislature intended in regard to the question posed. See majority op. at 1278 note 2. As Justice Cantero explains, the plain language of sections 938.08 and 938.085, Florida Statutes (2001, 2003), should lead us to answer "yes" to the certified question. Neither section 938.083 nor section 938.085 exempts juvenile delinquencies from the convictions triggering the mandatory fines imposed in these statutes. The Legislature mandated that section 938.08, *1294 Florida Statutes (2005), apply "[i]n addition to any sanction imposed for a violation of [the listed statutes]" and that section 938.085, Florida Statutes (2005), apply "in addition to any sanction imposed when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere, or is found guilty of, regardless of adjudication a violation of [the listed statutes.]" (Emphasis added.) While I ag...
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 1250783
...Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Belle B. Schumann, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. The issue in this case is whether or not a trial judge in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is empowered by section
938.08 and section
938.085 to assess surcharges of $201.00 and $151.00, respectively, against the juvenile "as a condition of probation, community control, or any other court-ordered supervisions." We are bound by our prior decision in S.S.M. v. State,
898 So.2d 84 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), which upheld the imposition of a $201.00 surcharge against a child in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, pursuant to section
938.08, Florida Statutes....
...stion to the Florida Supreme Court, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(2): DOES A TRIAL JUDGE HAVE THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE ON JUVENILES IN A JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, THE MANDATORY SURCHARGES SET FORTH IN SECTIONS 938.08 AND 930.085? AFFIRMED; Question CERTIFIED....
...State,
898 So.2d 84 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), but were that not the case I would have resolved this issue differently. In this special concurring opinion, I write to explain my reasons for disagreeing with S.S.M. In S.S.M., a child was assessed a $201.00 surcharge pursuant to section
938.08, Florida Statutes. She pled guilty to two counts of battery, first degree misdemeanors. In this case, V.K.E. pled guilty to a charge of simple battery, a first degree misdemeanor, and was surcharged $201.00 pursuant to section
938.08, Florida Statutes and $151.00 pursuant to section
938.085, Florida Statutes. Sections
938.08 and
938.085 are part of the "general" adult criminal statutes contained in Chapter 938....
...l Cord Injury Rehabilitation Trust Fund; and the County Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Trust Fund; and the Department of Children and Family Services Child Advocacy Trust Fund for the Florida Network of Children's Advocacy Centers, Inc. In the case of section 938.08, $85.00 of the surcharge goes to the Domestic Violence Trust Fund, $1.00 to the Clerk of the Court as a service charge, and the balance to the county to defray costs of incarcerating persons sentenced under section 741.238 (minimum term of imprisonment for domestic violence). In the case of section *345 938.085, the surcharge goes to the Rape Crisis Program Trust Fund, and $1.00 to the Clerk of Court as a service charge....
...Section 985.233(5)(b) also provides the court must impose either an adult sanction or a juvenile sanction, but not a combination. If, however, the rationale of S.S.M. is accepted, there is no logical limit to assessing juveniles being prosecuted under Chapter 985, with not only the surcharges under sections 938.08 and 938.085, but all, if not many, of the surcharges or court costs set forth in Chapter 938, outlined above, because all of those statutes impose "court costs" or surcharges for funding state and local law enforcement programs based on the fact that a person has violated a state criminal law or municipal ordinance or criminal traffic offense. If sections 938.08 and 938.085 are applicable to juvenile delinquency cases, then all of the costs and assessments provided for in Chapter 938, for the adult penal system, are logically applicable to juveniles....
...tion and rehabilitation. [2] It should not follow, without a solid basis, that adult criminal sanctions be imposed on juvenile offenders. Chapter 985 disfavors detention and limits harsher sanctions if other alternatives are available. Yet, sections 938.08 and 938.085 make the payment of substantial funds by the juvenile a condition of not being placed in detention....
...er Chapter 938. None of these terms is defined in Chapter 985 and Chapter 938 uses the terms interchangeably. In my view, that leads to the same logical dilemma left by S.S.M. Are all or most of the costs and surcharges, including those specified in
938.08 and
938.085, provided for in Chapter 938 applicable in juvenile delinquency cases simply because they involve violations of state, county, or municipal law? Because the two penal systems for handling adults and juveniles are so different and guided by such different philosophies and goals, I believe the better answer is that unless the Legislature expressly makes an adult sanction, cost or surcharge expressly applicable to the juvenile system, it should not be applicable. Sections
938.08 and
938.085 make no reference to delinquency proceedings. Thus I would have concluded that the trial court erred in this juvenile case, in imposing the surcharges against V.K.E., pursuant to sections
938.05 and
938.085....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 453, 2017 WL 1366131, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 828
...eal in McNeil v. State,
162 So.3d 274 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). In a separate opinion, the district court, on a motion to certify the question, certified the following question as one of great public importance: ARE THE COSTS IMPOSED PURSUANT TO SECTIONS
938.085,
938.08, AND
938.10, FLORIDA STATUTES (2006), ASSESSED “PER CASE” OR “PER COUNT”? McNeil v. State,
163 So.3d 661 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we answer the certified question by holding that sections
938.08,
938.085, and
938.10(1), Florida Statutes (2006), call for imposition of costs on a per count basis and approve the decision in McNeil,
162 So.3d 274 ....
...cNeil pled nolo contendere to three counts of sexual battery of a child under the age of twelve by a person under the age of eighteen in violation of section
794.011(2), Florida Stat *57 utes (2006), which requires costs to be imposed under sections
938.08,
938.085, and
938.10; and one count of lewd or lascivious molestation in violation of section
800.04(5), Florida Statutes (2006), which requires costs to be imposed under section
938.10. The court imposed costs for each of the four convictions, resulting in costs of $603 pursuant to section
938.08, $453 pursuant to section
938.085, and $404 pursuant to section
938.10(1). Id. at 275 . The trial court imposed costs according to the following 2006 statutes: 1
938.08 Additional cost to fund programs in domestic violence.—In addition to any sanction imposed for a violation of ... s.
794.011, or for any offense of domestic violence described in s.
741.28, the court shall impose a surcharge of $201. Payment of the surcharge shall be a condition of probation, community control, or any other court-ordered supervision....
938.085 Additional cost to fund rape crisis centers.—In addition to any sanction imposed when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, a violation of s....
...The Fifth District affirmed, holding that the costs were properly assessed on a per count basis. McNeil,
162 So.3d at 277 . The district court concluded that the plain language of these statutes reflects that the Legislature intended to impose costs per count, not per case: By the plain language of these statutes, sections
938.08 and
938.085 require costs to be assessed for “a violation” of an enumerated statute, while section
938.10 requires assessment of costs for a nolo contendere or guilty plea to “any offense” enumerated in the statute....
...ts express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications.” Id. at 196 . Therefore, we first look to the plain language of the statutes at issue in this case to determine whether they convey a clear and obvious meaning. Plain Meaning of Sections
938.08,
938.085, and
938.10(1) We agree with the district court’s conclusion that costs imposed under sections
938.08,
938.085, and
938.10(1), Florida Statutes (2006), should be assessed per count, not per case....
...are liable for payment of the costs of prosecution.... ”). (Emphasis added.) Section 27.3455, Florida Statutes (1993), which has since been repealed, also contained similar language. 2 The Legislature chose not to include such language in sections
938.085,
938.08, and
938.10(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....
...rd New International Dictionary 1 (1993). The word “any” is defined as “one, no matter what one: every” or “all.” Id. at 97. In the context of the statutes here, “a violation of’ plainly means each violation. In other words, sections 938.08 and 938.085, Florida Statutes (2006), mandate that a court impose a surcharge for each violation of the enumerated statutes, in addition to any sanction....
...5th DCA 1994) (holding that a plain reading of section 27.3455(1), Florida Statutes (1991), calls for costs to be imposed “in the case”). However, these decisions are not inconsistent with our decision today. As previously noted, these cases did not involve sections
938.085,
938.08, or
938.10, Florida Statutes (2006), nor did the disputed statutes in those cases contain the critical language at issue here—“a violation” or “any offense.” Rather, the relevant statutes in the decisions relied upon by McNeil use the terms “per case” or “in the case,” language that is notably absent in sections
938.085,
938.08, and
938.10, Florida Statutes (2006)....
...at 654 . Moreover, the costs were assessed pursuant to section 27.3455, Florida Statutes (1993), the same statute that was at issue in Mills, which explicitly provided for the imposition of costs “in the case.” Again, in the present case, sections
938.085,
938.08, and
938.10, Florida Statutes (2006), do not provide for the imposition of costs “per case,” but instead impose additional costs for “a violation” or “any offense.” Therefore, we conclude that the precedent relied upon by McNeil is distinguishable and does not compel a similar result here. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we approve the decision of the Fifth District and hold that sections
938.085,
938.08, or
938.10(1), Florida Statutes (2006), require an imposition of costs per count....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...torney General, Tampa, for Appellant. James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and John C. Fisher, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellees. VILLANTI, Judge. The State appeals the trial court's order refusing to assess surcharges of $201 under section
938.08, Florida Statutes (2004), and $151 under section
938.085, Florida Statutes (2004), against five juveniles J.C., J.G., E.G., T.N., and C.C. The trial court refused to assess the surcharges because, in contrast to section
938.03, Florida Statutes (2004), [1] sections
938.08 and 930.085 "make absolutely no reference to being adjudicated delinquent or the commission of a delinquent act." We reverse and certify a question of great public importance....
...was charged with battery on a school board employee. §
784.081, Fla. Stat. (2004). The juveniles all admitted to the offenses as charged. The two judges handling their cases withheld adjudication, and after a hearing, decided not to impose the mandatory surcharges set forth in sections
938.08 and 930.085....
...One judge held a hearing announcing the court's decision, and the other judge entered an order in all the cases. The court's order discussed the language of the statute, statutory construction, and legislative intent, reasoning that "it is impossible to conclude anything other than if the Legislature intended that [sections]
938.08 and
938.085 should be applied to juvenile cases, they would have said so; *849 because they did not, these surcharge[s] do not apply to juvenile cases." Our standard of review is de novo, as this case presents an issue of statutory construction. See S.S.M. v. State,
898 So.2d 84 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Section
938.08 provides: Additional cost to fund programs in domestic violence....
...784.011, s.
784.021, s.
784.03, s.
784.041, s.
784.045, s.
784.048, s.
784.07, s.
784.08, s.
784.081, s.
784.082, s.
784.083, s.
784.085, s.
794.011, or for any offense of domestic violence described in s.
741.28, the court shall impose a surcharge of $201. Section
938.085 provides: Additional cost to fund rape crisis centers.In addition to any sanction imposed when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, a violation of s....
...794.011, the court shall impose a surcharge of $151. The juveniles advance two arguments that these surcharges to fund domestic violence programs and rape crisis centers do not apply to juvenile delinquency matters. First, they argue that sections
938.08 and
938.085 do not expressly impose costs to "persons adjudicated delinquent." Second, they argue that section 985.221, Florida Statutes (2003), prohibits the imposition of "court fees" on "any party to a delinquency petition." The Fifth District has already considered and rejected both arguments in S.S.M.,
898 So.2d 84, and V.K.E. v. State,
902 So.2d 343 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). In S.S.M., the Fifth District reasoned that the plain meaning of section
938.08 supports assessment of the surcharge in a juvenile proceeding. Section
938.08 requires a court to impose the surcharge for "a violation." According to section
985.03(58), Florida Statutes (2004), [2] a delinquent act is by definition a "violation of any law," thus triggering the imposition of the $201 surcharge under section
938.08. S.S.M.,
898 So.2d 84. In V.K.E.,
902 So.2d 343, the Fifth District applied the same reasoning to section
938.085....
...However, this principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, does not apply here. As discussed above, a delinquent act is by definition a "violation of any law." §
985.03(58). Therefore, by imposing surcharges for a "violation" in sections
938.08 and
938.085, the legislature specifically included juvenile offenses....
...The Fifth District also addressed section 985.221's prohibition on the imposition of court fees on parties to a delinquency petition in S.S.M.,
898 So.2d 84. The court explained that if section 985.221, which prohibited imposition of court fees on juveniles, and section
938.08, which required imposition of the surcharge for a *850 violation, were inconsistent, section
938.08 would prevail because it is the more recent [3] of the two statutes....
..."[T]he last expression of legislative intent, in point of time or order, prevails" because there is a presumption that "later statutes are passed by the Legislature with the knowledge of prior existing laws." Id. at 85. The Fifth District also applied this reasoning to section
938.085. [4] V.K.E.,
902 So.2d 343. We agree with the Fifth District's reasoning. Because all five juveniles were found in violation of the laws referenced in sections
938.08 and
938.085, the plain language of those statutes requires imposition of the surcharges....
...We certify the same question of great public importance that the Fifth District certified in V.K.E.,
902 So.2d at 344: DOES A TRIAL JUDGE HAVE THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE ON JUVENILES IN A JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING THE MANDATORY SURCHARGES SET FORTH IN SECTIONS
938.08 AND 930.085? Reversed and remanded; question certified....
...olation of any law of this state, the United States, or any other state which is a misdemeanor or a felony or a violation of a county or municipal ordinance which would be punishable by incarceration if the violation were committed by an adult." [3] Section 938.08 became effective on July 1, 2001. Section 985.221 was last amended in 1997. [4] Section 938.085 became effective on July 1, 2003.
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 31 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 505, 2006 Fla. LEXIS 1475
...State,
902 So.2d 343, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). The court certified the issue to us as one of great public importance: “Does a trial judge have the power and authority to impose on juveniles in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the mandatory surcharges set forth in sections
938.08 and 93[8].085?” Id....
...5th *1279 DCA 2004), but were that not the case I would have resolved this issue differently. In this special concurring opinion, I write to explain my reasons for disagreeing with S.S.M. In S.S.M., a child was assessed a $201.00 surcharge pursuant to section 938.08, Florida Statutes. She pled guilty to two counts of battery, first degree misdemeanors. In this case, V.K.E. pled guilty to a charge of simple battery, a first degree misdemeanor, and was surcharged $201.00 pursuant to section 938.08, Florida Statutes and $151.00 pursuant to section 938.085, Florida Statutes. Sections 938.08 and 938.085 are part of the “general” adult criminal statutes contained in Chapter 938....
...Cord Injury Rehabilitation Trust Fund; and the County Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Trust Fund; and the Department of Children and Family Services Child Advocacy Trust Fund for the Florida Network of Children’s Advocacy Centers, Inc. In the case of section 938.08, $85.00 of the surcharge goes to the Domestic Violence Trust Fund, $1.00 to the Clerk of the Court as a service charge, and the balance to the county to defray costs of incarcerating persons sentenced under section 741.238 (minimum term of imprisonment for domestic violence). In the case of section 938.085, the surcharge goes to the Rape Crisis Program Trust Fund, and $1.00 to the Clerk of Court as a service charge....
...Section 985.233(5)(b) also provides the court must impose either an adult sanction or a juvenile sanction, but not a combination. If, however, the rationale of S.S.M. is accepted, there is no logical limit to assessing juveniles being prosecuted under Chapter 985, with not only the surcharges under sections 938.08 and 938.085, but all, if not many, of the surcharges or court costs set forth in Chapter 938, outlined above, because all of those statutes impose “court costs” or surcharges for funding state and local law enforcement programs based on the fact that a person has violated a state criminal law or municipal ordinance or criminal traffic offense. If sections 938.08 and 938.085 are applicable to juvenile delinquency cases, then all of the costs and assessments provided for in Chapter 938, for the adult penal system, are logically applicable to juveniles....
...ted gender group. It should not follow, without a solid basis, that adult criminal sanctions be imposed on juvenile offenders. Chapter 985 disfavors detention and limits harsher sanctions if other alternatives are available. Yet, sections 988.08 and 938.085 make the payment of substantial funds by the juvenile a condition of not being placed in detention....
...er Chapter 938. None of these terms is defined in Chapter 985 and Chapter 938 uses the terms interchangeably. In my view, that leads to the same logical dilemma left by S.S.M. Are all or most of the costs and surcharges, including those specified in
938.08 and
938.085, provided for in Chapter 938 applicable in juvenile delinquency cases simply because they involve violations of state, county, or municipal law? Because the two penal systems for handling adults and juveniles are so different and guided by such different philosophies and goals, I believe the better answer is that unless the Legislature expressly makes an adult sanction, cost or surcharge expressly applicable to the juvenile system, it should not be applicable. Sections
938.08 and
938.085 make no reference to delinquency proceedings. Thus I would have concluded that the trial court erred in this juvenile case, in imposing the surcharges against V.K.E., pursuant to sections
938.05 and
938.085....
...gislature has demonstrated its awareness of its broad authority to provide for the taxation of costs, fees, and surcharges in both adult and juvenile delinquency proceedings, but has not provided for the assessment of costs under sections
938.05 and
938.085 in juvenile delinquency proceedings....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 12792
VILLANTI, Judge. The State appeals the trial court’s order refusing to assess surcharges of $201 under section
938.08, Florida Statutes (2004), and $151 under section
938.085, Florida Statutes (2004), against five juveniles— J.C., J.G., E.G., T.N., and C.C. The trial court refused to assess the surcharges because, in contrast to section
938.03, Florida Statutes (2004), 1 sections
938.08 and 930.085 “make absolutely no reference to being adjudicated delinquent or the commission of a delinquent act.” We reverse and certify a question of great public importance....
...was charged with battery on a school board employee. §
784.081, Fla. Stat. (2004). The juveniles all admitted to the offenses as charged. The two judges handling their cases withheld adjudication, and after a hearing, decided not to impose the mandatory surcharges set forth in sections
938.08 and 930.085....
...ered an order in all the cases. The court’s order discussed the language of the statute, statutory construction, and legislative intent, reasoning that “it is impossible to conclude anything other than if the Legislature intended that [sections]
938.08 and
938.085 should be applied to juvenile cases, they would have said so; *849 because they did not, these surcharged do not apply to juvenile cases.” Our standard of review is de novo, as this case presents an issue of statutory construction. See S.S.M. v. State,
898 So.2d 84 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Section
938.08 provides: Additional cost to fund programs in domestic violence....
...784.011, s.
784.021, s.
784.03, s.
784.041, s.
784.045, s.
784.048, s.
784.07, s.
784.08, s.
784.081, s.
784.082, s.
784.083, s.
784.085, s.
794.011, or for any offense of domestic violence described in s.
741.28, the court shall impose a surcharge of $201. Section
938.085 provides: Additional cost to fund rape crisis centers....
...794.011, the court shall impose a surcharge of $151. The juveniles advance two arguments that these surcharges to fund domestic violence programs and rape crisis centers do not apply to juvenile delinquency matters. First, they argue that sections
938.08 and
938.085 do not expressly impose costs to “persons adjudicated delinquent.” Second, they argue that section 985.221, Florida Statutes (2003), prohibits the imposition of “court fees” on “any party to a delinquency petition.” The Fifth District has already considered and rejected both arguments in S.S.M.,
898 So.2d 84 , and V.K.E. v. State,
902 So.2d 343 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). In S.S.M., the Fifth District reasoned that the plain meaning of section
938.08 supports assessment of the surcharge in a juvenile proceeding. Section
938.08 requires a court to impose the surcharge for “a violation.” According to section
985.03(58), Florida Statutes (2004), 2 a delinquent act is by definition a “violation of any law,” thus triggering the imposition of the $201 surcharge under section
938.08. S.S.M.,
898 So.2d 84 . In V.K.E.,
902 So.2d 343 , the Fifth District applied the same reasoning to section
938.085....
...However, this principle of statutory con 1 struction, expressio unius est exdusio al-terius, does not apply here. As discussed above, a delinquent act is by definition a “violation of any law.” §
985.03(58). Therefore, by imposing surcharges for a “violation” in sections
938.08 and
938.085, the legislature specifically included juvenile offenses....
...The Fifth District also addressed section 985.221’s prohibition on the imposition of court fees on parties to a delinquency petition in S.S.M.,
898 So.2d 84 . The court explained that if section 985.221, which prohibited imposition of court fees on juveniles, and section
938.08, which required imposition of the surcharge for a *850 violation, were inconsistent, section
938.08 would prevail because it is the more recent 3 of the two statutes....
...“[T]he last expression of legislative intent, in point of time or order, prevails” because there is a presumption that “later statutes are passed by the Legislature with the knowledge of prior existing laws.” Id. at 85 . The Fifth District also applied this reasoning to section
938.085. 4 V.K.E.,
902 So.2d 343 . We agree with the Fifth District’s reasoning. Because all five juveniles were found in violation of the laws referenced in sections
938.08 and
938.085, the plain language of those statutes requires imposition of the surcharges....
...We certify the same question of great public importance that the Fifth District certified in V.K.E.,
902 So.2d at 344 : DOES A TRIAL JUDGE HAVE THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE ON JUVENILES IN A JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING THE MANDATORY SURCHARGES SET FORTH IN SECTIONS
938.08 AND 930.085? Reversed and remanded; question certified....
...olation of any law of this state, the United States, or any other state which is a misdemeanor or a felony or a violation of a county or municipal ordinance which would be punishable by incarceration if the violation were committed by an adult.” . Section 938.08 became effective on July 1, 2001. Section 985.221 was last amended in 1997. . Section 938.085 became effective on July 1, 2003.
