Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...We quash the decision below and adopt the holding of the Second District in McShay. Petitioner, Eugene Johnson, was found not guilty by reason of insanity on two separate murder charges in 1981. He was committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for involuntary hospitalization pursuant to section 916.15, Florida Statutes (1981), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.217....

...Courts are not to presume that a given statute employs "useless language." Times Publishing Company v. Williams, 222 So.2d 470, 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). After applying these rules of statutory construction and carefully considering the applicable statute and rule, we conclude that both section 916.15(2), Florida Statutes (1981), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.218 require a judicial hearing, if requested, whether the hospital administrator recommends release or continued hospitalization. The hospital administrator's report which precipitated petitioner's motion for a judicial hearing and examination by independent experts was prepared pursuant to section 916.15(2) which provides that reports are to be filed by the hospital administrator on three separate occasions: 1....

...er or not the hospital administrator determined that the patient continued to meet the criteria for further commitment. To conclude otherwise would render this distinction meaningless. The provision requiring reports is followed by subsection (3) of section 916.15 which discusses the requisite judicial hearings. Subsection (3) provides that both the patient and the state have the right to a hearing before the committing court in "all proceedings" under section 916.15....

...[11] The trial court entered (1) an order finding Thompson not guilty by reason of insanity and acquitting him of the offenses, (2) an order finding and adjudging Thompson to be incompetent, and (3) an order finding that Thompson met the criteria set forth in section 916.15, Florida Statutes *173 (Supp....

...dgment of not guilty by reason of insanity. For complementary statute providing for hospitalization of defendant adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity, see section 925.25912.15, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980) [designated as Fla.St. 1980, Supp. § 916.15]....

...outpatient treatment at a specific appropriate facility; or (3) commit the defendant to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services facilities for involuntary hospitalization." State v. Vigil, 410 So.2d 528, 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). See also § 916.15, Fla....

...Department of Children and Families v. W.M.J., 849 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Department of Children and Families v. M.C., 847 So.2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Department of Children and Families v. E.M.S., 841 So.2d 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). [2] Section 916.15(2), Florida Statutes (2002), states in pertinent part: Every defendant acquitted of criminal charges by reason of insanity and found to meet the criteria for involuntary commitment may be committed and treated in accordance with the provisions of this section and the applicable Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure....

...See also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.218(a). The court determines whether the defendant should be involuntarily committed, and retains jurisdiction to determine whether a committed defendant should continue to be hospitalized or released from commitment. See §§ 916.15(1) and 916.16(1), Fla....

...3d DCA 2007) (citing § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2006)). In providing for the possibility of civil commitment, moreover, *483 the Legislature has codified the commonsense view that a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity may nevertheless pose a danger to society. See § 916.15(2), Fla....

...Background On July 25, 2002, an information was filed charging the petitioner with attempted first-degree murder. On June 12, 2003, the trial court entered an order finding the petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity and ordering his commitment to the Department of Children and Family Services pursuant to section 916.15, Florida Statutes, for treatment in a mental health facility....

...DCF. This appeal followed. Analysis The petitioner argues that the trial court's order was deficient because the trial court did not make any factual findings regarding whether the petitioner was a manifest danger to himself or others. According to section 916.15(2): A defendant who is acquitted of criminal charges because of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity may be involuntarily committed pursuant to such finding if the defendant has a mental illness and, because of the illness, is manifestly dangerous to himself or herself or others. § 916.15(2), Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis added). Thus, for commitment to be continued pursuant to section 916.15, the court must find that the defendant is mentally ill and is manifestly dangerous to himself or to others....

...Similarly, because of the liberty interests at stake in this case, we hold that when a trial court fails to make the statutory findings necessary to continue involuntary commitment after a defendant has been found not guilty by reason of insanity under section 916.15, it has departed from the essential requirements of law....

...CASANUEVA, Acting Chief Judge. Michael Wisniewski has appealed from an order entered on February 4, 2000, which continued his commitment after he was found not guilty by reason of insanity for the 1994 murder of his teenage son. For commitment to be continued pursuant to section 916.15(1), Florida Statutes (1999), the court must find that the defendant is mentally ill and is manifestly dangerous to himself or to others....

...Tavares' condition worsened during the course of the three interviews that he conducted with him, and that his thinking is "likely to be disoriented ... confusing ... bizarre." The jury found Mr. Tavares not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court subsequently held a hearing pursuant to section 916.15, Florida Statutes (2003), and Rule 3.217, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure....

...The trial court agreed with the State and entered an order involuntarily committing Mr. Tavares to DCF. Mr. Tavares appeals the rendition of that order. Following a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, a trial court can involuntarily commit a defendant for treatment by adhering to the requirements of *976 section 916.15, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...o discharge the defendant, or order the defendant to outpatient treatment at a specific appropriate facility. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979); State v. Vigil, 410 So.2d 528, 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); see also § 916.15, Fla....

...Tavares argued for a conditional release in accordance with section 916.17, Florida Statutes (2003). The trial court, however, decided to commit Mr. Tavares to DCF on the strength of the trial testimony and reports. Mr. Tavares takes the position that the burden to demonstrate that he fits the section 916.15 criteria should fall on the State....

...are to be automatically committed to DCF. An involuntary commitment of a defendant acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity is not imposed as a punishment. Rather, the trial court must be satisfied in order to do so that the criteria enunciated in section 916.15 are first met....

...therefore he is entitled to an order of release. Reliance on the likely-to-injure standard analyzed in Hill v. State, 358 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) is no longer justified. The test laid down by Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982) and Section 916.15, Florida Statutes (1981), and now applicable to a person acquitted of criminal charges by a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, is whether he is "manifestly dangerous to himself or others." The trial court found that Thomas met this criteria and that finding is supported by the evidence....

...usion that appellant is eligible for commitment. After conducting an evidentiary hearing in which expert witnesses submitted oral testimony and written reports on the issue of whether appellant met the criteria for involuntary commitment pursuant to section 916.15(1), Florida Statutes (1997), the trial court entered an order stating simply that "the Defendant currently meets the criteria for commitment to the Department of Children and Families." Section 916.15(1) provides that a person may be involuntarily committed upon a finding that "the person is mentally ill and, because of the person's illness, is manifestly dangerous to himself or herself or others." The order committing the defendant...

...n the event the defendant cannot afford counsel, the court shall appoint a public defender to represent him." For the reasons stated above, we find that appellant was deprived of his rights as provided in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.218 and section 916.15, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...5th DCA 1989) (habeas corpus petition granted and petitioner discharged from order of commitment for involuntary treatment under the Comprehensive Alcoholism Prevention Control and Treatment Act); Thurston v. Navarro, 546 So.2d 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (habeas corpus petition seeking release from involuntary commitment under section 916.15; petition granted and order of commitment quashed)....

CRENSHAW, Judge. Yusef Furqan petitions this court for certiorari review of a September 28, 2010, circuit court order continuing his involuntary commitment pursuant to section 916.15(2), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...ngs that he has a mental illness and, as a result of that illness, is manifestly dangerous to himself or others. The State concedes that the order is facially insufficient. Because we find that the order fails to include the requisite findings under section 916.15(2), we grant the petition, quash the order, and remand for further proceedings. 1 Under section 916.15(2), “[a] defendant who is acquitted of criminal charges because of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity may be involuntarily committed pursuant to such finding if the defendant has a mental illness and, because of the illnes...

...talization. He contends the order is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence; the trial court failed to consider alternatives to involuntary hospitalization; the trial court erred in appointing Doctors Sall and Larsen to re-examine him; and Section 916.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), is unconstitutionally vague....

...osecution nor defense witnesses but were neutral experts working for the court. The trial court fully complied with Section 916.11(2) by appointing "a psychiatrist ... designated by the district mental health board." Husk's argument is spurious that Section 916.15(1), Florida Statutes, which requires that the trial court find an acquittee "manifestly dangerous" before ordering involuntary hospitalization, is unconstitutional....

...ioner released forthwith. Prior to the trial court finding petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity, three court appointed doctors and two privately retained doctors each found petitioner did not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment under section 916.15, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...He argues that the order of commitment was facially deficient and a departure from the essential requirements of law because it failed to make specific findings that Petitioner had “a mental illness and, because of the illness, is manifestly dangerous to himself or herself or others.” § 916.15(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). 1 We agree. “[F]or commitment to be continued pursuant to section 916.15, the court must find that the defendant is mentally ill and is manifestly dangerous to himself or to others.” Woods v....

...His report reads: "[A]ppellant remains paranoid and his psychosis is kept under partial control with medication. He definitely meets the criteria for involuntary commitment." The county court entered an order of commitment, finding that appellant "meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization set forth in [section] 916.15(1), and [section] 394.467(1)(a), Florida Statutes." The order committed appellant, pursuant to Fla.R....

...We believe the better procedure to guide the circuit court in the instant circumstances is found in Johnson v. Feder, 485 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1986) (adopting the holding of McShay v. State, 447 So.2d 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)). In Johnson v. Feder , our supreme court resolved an analogous problem under section 916.15 (involuntary commitment of defendant adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity) and related rule 3.218. The court determined that both the patient and the state have the right to a hearing before the committing court in all proceedings under section 916.15. Id. at 411. The court concluded that both section 916.15 and rule 3.218 require a judicial hearing only if requested. Id. We see no good reason, and HRS has provided us none, to treat a defendant committed under 916.12 (as in the instant case) differently from a defendant committed under 916.15 (as in Johnson v....

...This statute, entitled “Conditional release,” reads in relevant part: (1) Except for an inmate currently serving a prison sentence, the committing court may order a conditional release of any defendant in lieu of an involuntary commitment to a facility pursuant to s. 916.13 or s. 916.15 based upon an approved plan for providing appropriate outpatient care and treatment…. (2) Upon the filing of an affidavit or statement under oath by any person that the defendant has failed to comply with the conditi...

...After the hearing, the court may modify the release conditions. The court may also order that the defendant be returned to the department if it is found, after the appointment and report of experts, that the person meets the criteria for involuntary commitment under s. 916.13 or s. 916.15. (emphasis added)....

...Subsection (2) then continues: “The court may also order that the defendant be returned to the [D]epartment if it is found, after the appointment and report of experts, that the person meets the criteria for involuntary commitment under s. 916.13 or s. 916.15.” C.Z. meets 9 neither of these requirements. As we have noted already, C.Z. has been found to be non-restorable under section 916.13, and section 916.15 deals with defendants who have been adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity....

...In 1983 the trial court agreed with a hospital staff recommendation that appellant be transferred to a civil unit at the hospital. Appellant now contends that the trial court thereby relinquished its jurisdic *583 tion over appellant and could not prohibit appellant’s transfer to his brother’s custody- We disagree. Section 916.15 allows a court to hospitalize a person found not guilty by reason of insanity....

...On January 30, 2006, the trial court, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.217 and the stipulation of the parties, entered an order finding Phillips not guilty by reason of insanity of the probation violation. Pursuant to Rule 3.218 and section 916.15, Florida Statutes (2004), Phillips was committed to the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) for hospitalization and treatment....

...the Department of Children and Family Services or shall order outpatient treatment at any other appropriate facility or service, or shall discharge the defendant. . . . Chapter 916 provides the statutory basis for such commitment. Section 916.15 addresses this commitment as follows: (1) A defendant who is acquitted of criminal charges because of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity may be involuntarily committed pursuant to such finding if the...

...except by order of the committing court. The January 2006 order declaring Phillips insane at the time of his probation violation not only resolved the pending violation, but also committed Phillips to DCF. Specifically, the court found that Phillips met the criteria of section 916.15(1), Florida Statutes (2004), noting that due to his mental illness: (a) The Defendant is manifestly incapable of surviving alone or with the help of willing and responsible family or friends, including available alte...

410 So.2d 528, 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). See also § 916.15, Fla.Stat. (1985); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.217. Therefore

...It is undisputed that no hearing was held before the court entered this order, and that neither Mannarelli nor his attorney received any notice of the court’s receipt of the reports. This appeal followed. Mannarelli argues that, under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.218 and section 916.15, Florida Statutes (1997), he was entitled to notice and a hearing before the court entered the order of continuing commitment....

...*215 (b) Right to Hearing if Committed upon Acquittal. The court shall hold a hearing within 30 days of the receipt of any such report from the administrator of the facility on the issues raised thereby, and the defendant shall have a right to be present at the hearing.... Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.218. Section 916.15 provides, in pertinent part, (2) Every defendant acquitted of criminal charges by reason of insanity and found to meet the criteria for hospitalization may be committed and treated in accordance with the provisions of this section and the applicable Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure....

...before the committing court. Evidence at such hearing may be presented by the hospital administrator or the administrator’s designee as well as by the state and the defendant. The defendant shall have the right to counsel at any such hearing. ... § 916.15(2), (3), Fla....

...t. Husk contends on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s findings. We disagree. The evidence clearly shows that Husk is still mentally ill and, because of his illness, is manifestly dangerous to himself or others. Section 916.15(1), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...etition and remand for further proceedings. In 2016, after a bench trial, the trial court acquitted Mr. McDaniel, by reason of insanity, of first-degree arson. The trial court committed him to the Department of Children and Families pursuant to section 916.15, Florida Statutes (2016)....

...McDaniel was conditionally released. His conditional release was later revoked. He was, again, committed to the Department for involuntary hospitalization. He remains in its custody. The Twelfth Circuit Public Defender has represented Mr. McDaniel throughout his commitment. See § 916.15(4). Citing a "maturity gap," Mr....

...court issue a writ for release. Each client shall receive a written notice of the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. A " '[f]orensic client' . . . means any defendant who has been committed to the department or agency pursuant to s. 916.13, s. 916.15, or s. 916.302." § 916.106(9), Fla. Stat. (2024). Mr. McDaniel is a forensic client under section 916.15....

...ovider, Yusef Furqan stipulated to an adjudication of not guilty by reason of insanity and was committed to the Department of Children and Family Services for inpatient treatment. The circuit court retained jurisdiction over him pursuant to sections 916.15 and 916.16, Florida Statutes (2008)....

...Feder, 485 So.2d 409 (Fla.1986) (adopting the holding of McShay v. State, 447 So.2d 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)). Johnson has important parallels with Mr. Furqan’s case and controls the disposition of Mr. Furqan’s petition. 5 In Johnson , the supreme court construed section 916.15, Florida Statutes (1981), and the relevant applicable rules, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.217 and 3.218....

...n for writ of certiorari or a direct appeal, see, e.g., Furqan v. State, 91 So.3d 913 , 914 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), we conclude that reviewing it as a petition for certiorari is the better course in this instance. See also note 5, infra. . Sections 916.15 and 916.16, Florida Statutes (2008), provide the procedure under which a defendant in Mr. Furqan's circumstances shall be committed initially and what shall occur subsequently: 916.15 Involuntary commitment of defendant adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity.— (1) The determination of whether a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity shall be determined in accordance with Rule 3.217, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure....

...d and we discuss below, it appears that a petition for writ of mandamus would also be a proper method to invoke our jurisdiction in circumstances like Mr. Furqan's. . The supreme court in Johnson, 485 So.2d at 410 , was reviewing the 1981 version of section 916.15, but it and its applicable rules presently remain substantively the same....

...We treat her appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. See Woods v. State, 969 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The issues raised in Kendrick’s petition are without merit, and because the order continuing the involuntary commitment of Kendrick contains the necessary findings as required by section 916.15, Florida Statutes, and because those findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence of record, we deny the petition on its merits. The petition for a writ of certiorari is DENIED. THOMAS, MARSTILLER, and BILBREY, J...

...During trial, evidence was presented that Petitioner shot his wife to death and then attempted to kill himself by “goring” and shooting himself. Ultimately, a jury found Petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity. Thereafter, the trial court held a commitment hearing as contemplated by section 916.15(2), Florida Statutes (2023), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.217 to consider whether to involuntarily commit Petitioner to the custody of DCF....

...control of one’s actions, or of the ability to perceive or understand reality, which impairment substantially interferes with the 4 and, because of the illness, is manifestly dangerous to himself or herself or others.” § 916.15(2), Fla....

...Vigil, 410 So. 2d 528, 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)). If a trial judge determines it appropriate to commit a defendant, DCF is statutorily compelled to admit, retain, and treat such a defendant and provide periodic reports as required by the statute. See § 916.15(3)(c), Fla....

...2d at 976, we first note trial courts rightly consider the facts of the underlying case. Here, Petitioner was charged with murdering his wife of approximately fifty-five years and then “goring” and shooting protect the public. As a result, the safety of the public must be given full consideration. See § 916.15(2), Fla....

...or others.”) (emphasis added). 4 In Hill, the First District applied a likely-to-injure standard, which is no longer applicable in cases where a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity. As noted in Thomas v. State, 443 So. 2d 406, 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), and discussed supra, section 916.15 makes clear the trial court must find that a defendant is mentally ill and, because of the illness, manifestly dangerous to himself or others. 6 himself in a failed suicide attempt....

...We treat her appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. See Woods v. State, 969 So.2d 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The issues raised in Kendrick’s petition ax*e without merit, and because the order continuing the involuntary commitment of Kendrick contains the necessary findings as required by section 916.15, Florida Statutes, and because those findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence of record, we deny the petition on its merits....

...Upon receipt of an annual hospital report that appellant met the criteria for continued hospitalization, the court declined to grant appellant’s request for a hearing. Appellee concedes on appeal that, as established by Johnson v. Feder, 485 So.2d 409 (Fla.1986), in accordance with section 916.15, Florida Statutes, and Fla.R.Crim.P....

...Eugene Johnson was charged with several counts of murder and was adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity on April 22, 1981. He was subsequently committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for involuntary hospitalization pursuant to section 916.15, Florida Statutes (1981), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.217(b)....

...en determined incompetent to proceed due to mental illness or who have been acquitted of a felony by reason of insanity.” A “forensic client” includes one who has been committed to DCF custody under section 916.13(1). § 916.106(9), Fla. Stat. Section 916.15 sets forth the process for the commitment of a defendant acquitted of criminal charges by reason of insanity: (2) A defendant who is acquitted of criminal charges because of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity may be involunt...

...ion 916.17. Section 916.17 mandates: (1) Except for an inmate currently serving a prison sentence, the committing court may order a conditional release of any defendant in lieu of an involuntary commitment to a facility pursuant to s. *404 916.13 or s. 916.15 based upon an approved plan for providing appropriate outpatient care and treatment....

...priate agencies or persons to submit periodic reports to the court regarding the defendant’s compliance with the conditions of the release and progress in treatment, with copies to all parties. Related and overlapping with the dictates of sections 916.15 through 916.17 are Rules 3.217 and 3.219, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure....

...th, entitled “Order for Competency Evaluation,” in which it indicated that “the question of competency of [Navarro] to proceed ha[s] been raised in accordance with the provisions of Rule 3.2109(b) [sic], Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and § 916.15, Florida [S]tatutes” and that the court had “reasonable grounds to question [Navarro’s] competency to proceed.” The court appointed Alan J....

...In 1984 the Pinellas County Circuit Court adjudicated the appellant not guilty by reason of insanity of charges of attempted burglary. The appellant was involuntarily hospitalized in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee pursuant to court order. In the mandated review procedures of section 916.15, Florida Statutes (1985), 1 and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.218, 2 the hospital filed a report in which the appellant’s treatment team agreed that the appellant *463 continued to meet the criteria for involuntary commitment....

...tal for attendance at the hearing and that he would not be prejudiced thereby. The appellant appeals from the order denying his motion to transport. 3 The issue before us is a narrow one: At a hearing for continued involuntary commitment pursuant to section 916.15, Florida Statutes (1985), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.218, where all the evidence to be presented recommends continued involuntary commitment, does the defendant have a right to be personally present? We hold that the stat...

...Simply because the evidence is overwhelming and unrefuted cannot deny the defendant’s presence at this adjudicatory hearing, especially when the defendant desires to be present. We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s motion for transport to his hearing in accord with section 916.15, Florida Statutes (1985), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.218....

for continued involuntary hospitalization. Section 916.-15(2), Fla.Stat. (1983). Thus, by mandating in