Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...It has been amended to reflect changes in 3.210 and 3.211. The former section (b) and subsection (1) under (b) has been deleted because similar language is now found in the new section (c) below. (c) This new provision, including all its subsections, is designed to reflect the commitment criteria in Section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes, and to reflect that commitment to HRS is to be tied to specific commitment criteria when no less restrictive treatment alternative is available....

...(2) This provision provides for treatment in a custodial facility or other available community residential program. (3) This provision, and its subsections, outlines when a defendant may be committed, and refers to commitment criteria under the provisions of Section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes....

...(b) This provision has been amended to require that the court may recommit a conditionally *1006 released defendant to HRS under the provisions of Chapter 916 only if the court makes a finding that the defendant currently meets the statutory commitment criteria found in Section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes....

...visions for involuntary hospitalization. It is meant to provide as great a flexibility as possible for the trial judge in handling such defendant. *1267 As to criteria for involuntary hospitalization, see section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979). Section 916.13, Florida Statutes complements this rule and provides for the hospitalization of defendants adjudicated incompetent to stand trial....

...It has been amended to reflect changes in rules 3.210 and 3.211. The former subdivisions (b) and (b)(1) have been deleted because similar language is now found in new subdivision (c). (c) This new provision, including all its subdivisions, is designed to reflect the commitment criteria in section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes, and to reflect that commitment to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is to be tied to specific commitment criteria when no less restrictive treatment alternative is available....

...(2) This provision provides for treatment in a custodial facility or other available community residential program. (3) This provision, and its subdivisions, outlines when a defendant may be committed and refers to commitment criteria under the provisions of section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes....

...The current statutory provision specifically provides: •An adjudication of incompetency to stand trial shall not operate as an adjudication of incompetency ... for any other purpose, unless specifically set forth in the court order. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 916.13(2)....

...Experts performed psychological evaluations and diagnosed Mosher as having schizophrenia, undifferentiated type. The trial court found Mosher incompetent to stand trial and committed her to the forensic unit of Florida State Hospital. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.212(c); § 916.13, Fla....

...ly. After the trial court issued an order continuing Mosher's involuntary commitment, her lawyers filed a motion for release from involuntary commitment. The motion alleged that Mosher did not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment required by section 916.13(1)(c) and Fla....

...1845 (emphasis added). Because it was determined at the hearing that there is not a substantial probability that Mosher will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future, she no longer meets the criteria for involuntary commitment required by section 916.13(1)(c)....

...The trial court ordered that Branch undergo a competency and sanity evaluation to determine his competence to stand trial in the upcoming Ryce Act proceeding. This order specifically required the psychologists to use the criteria for competence contained in both Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.211 and section 916.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), presumably because the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure contain no such criteria....

...ly mean that he would also be found to meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization. However, the existence of such fact did provide the court with a basis for exercising its power to determine if Thompson should be involuntarily committed. See § 916.13, Fla....

...t]he possibility that the defendant could be restored to competency was unlikely and remote." Nevertheless, the court's commitment order stated that Oren met the criteria for involuntary commitment for treatment to restore competency as set forth in section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.212(c)(3). Section 916.13(1) states: (1) Every defendant who is charged with a felony and who is adjudicated incompetent to proceed, pursuant to the applicable Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be involuntarily committed for treatment upon a finding by t...

...Indeed, there was no evidence—let alone clear and convincing evidence—presented at the competency hearing establishing a probability that Oren would regain competency. To the contrary, it was established that Oren would never regain competency. Clearly, then, Oren's involuntary commitment was not authorized by section 916.13(1)....

...The court noted that at the hearing on Mosher's motion it was determined that there was no substantial probability that she would regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future. Therefore, she no longer met the criteria for involuntary commitment under section 916.13(1)(c)....

...for involuntary hospitalization. It is meant to provide as great a flexibility as possible for the trial judge in handling such defendant. As to criteria for involuntary hospitalization, see section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes (1979). Section 925.23916.13, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980) [designated as Fla.St. 1980, Supp. § 916.13] complements this rule and provides for the hospitalization of defendants adjudicated incompetent to stand trial....

...*287 The former sectionsubdivisions (b) and subsection (b)(1) under (b) hashave been deleted because similar language is now found in the new sectionsubdivision (c) below. (c) This new provision, including all its subsectionssubdivisions, is designed to reflect the commitment criteria in Ssection 916.13(1), Florida Statutes, and to reflect that commitment to HRSthe Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is to be tied to specific commitment criteria when no less restrictive treatment alternative is available....

...(2) This provision provides for treatment in a custodial facility or other available community residential program. (3) This provision, and its subsections subdivisions, outlines when a defendant may be committed, and refers to commitment criteria under the provisions of Ssection 916.13(1), Florida Statutes....

...(b) This provision has been amended to require thatpermit the court mayto recommit a conditionally released defendant to HRS under the provisions of Cchapter 916 only if the court makes a finding that the defendant currently meets the statutory commitment criteria found in Ssection 916.13(1), Florida Statutes....

...*263 Jose Abreu-Gutierrez, Chattahoochee, pro se. No appearance for appellees. *264 PER CURIAM. Jose Abreu-Gutierrez appeals a trial court order denying his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus which alleged that his involuntary commitment to restore competency to proceed, pursuant to section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2008), was illegal....

...He also argued that he was improperly denied the right to self-representation, and that the court was violating his right to due process by forcing him to proceed with counsel. In addition, he claimed that his latest commitment was illegal because the court failed to comply with section 916.13(1), and because the court did not permit him to cross examine the experts. The trial court denied the petition. Abreu has now been committed for more than three years before trial. In order to commit a defendant pursuant to section 916.13(1)(c), the court must find, among other things, that: "There is a substantial probability that the mental illness causing the defendant's incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future." See also Fla....

...The only evidence considered at the January 4, 2008 hearing indicated that Abreu's condition was not likely to respond to treatment. No evidence was presented that he could be restored to competency within the reasonably foreseeable future. Absent such evidence or findings, Abreu cannot continue to be detained pursuant to section 916.13....

...the court-appointed experts, has frustrated the ability of the court to assess his competency to proceed. Nevertheless, the evidence considered at the January 4, 2008 hearing is insufficient to permit continued commitment to restore competency. See § 916.13, Fla....

...The trial court retains the ultimate responsibility of deciding whether the defendant is competent and qualifies for commitment, and the reports of experts are merely advisory. Muhammad, 494 So.2d at 973. A person may not be detained indefinitely before trial under the pretrial commitment provisions of section 916.13....

...(2008) (emphasis added). Section 916.106(9) defines a "forensic client" as one who has been "committed" to the Department pursuant to statutory criteria: (9) "Forensic client" or "client" means any defendant who has been committed to the department or agency pursuant to s. 916.13, s. 916.15, or s. 916.302. (emphasis added). Section 916.13 permits a court to involuntarily commit a defendant charged with a felony who is found incompetent to proceed because of mental illness. Section 916.13(2) states: A defendant who has been charged with a felony and who has been adjudicated incompetent to proceed due to mental illness, and who meets the criteria for involuntary commitment to the department under the provisions of this chapter, may be committed to the department, and the department shall retain and treat the defendant. (emphasis added). To be committed to the Department's legal custody, a court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the criteria set out in section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes, are met. All parties agree, and the trial court correctly determined, that Amaya does not qualify for commitment under section 916.13....

...The trial court purported to commit Amaya to DCF pursuant to section 916.17, which provides: (1) Except for an inmate currently serving a prison sentence, the committing court may order a conditional release of any defendant in lieu of an involuntary commitment to a facility pursuant to s. 916.13 or s....

...defendant's compliance with the conditions of the release and progress in treatment, with copies to all parties. (Emphasis added). Section 916.17 provides an alternative to placement in a *156 treatment facility for defendants committed to DCF under section 916.13....

...Family Services for further treatment. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.219(b) (emphasis added). The word "recommitted" contemplates a previous "commitment." Nothing in the statutes or rules suggest that an incompetent defendant, who does not meet the criteria of section 916.13, can be "committed" to DCF for purposes of conditional release under section 916.17. DCF is responsible for the treatment of "forensic clients" that have been committed under section 916.13....

...4th DCA 1997) (granting a writ of certiorari and finding that section 916.105(1) did not require HRS to pay for mental health treatment for a pretrial detainee who had not been committed to the Department as a "forensic client"). *157 Amaya does not qualify for commitment to DCF under section 916.13, 916.15, or 916.302; he is, therefore, not a "forensic client" as defined by the statute, and DCF cannot be made responsible for his care and supervision as ordered by the trial court....

...The conditions placed on release under Rule 3.212(d), when a defendant does not qualify for commitment, should not be confused with the "conditional release" that is permitted under section 916.17 as an alternative to commitment to a treatment facility under section 916.13....

...The uncontradicted medical testimony presented to the trial court reveals that Gilliland suffers from dementia that will become progressively worse and that there is little or no probability that she will become competent in the future. Therefore, Gilliland no longer meets the criteria for commitment to the Department under section 916.13(1)(c), Florida Statutes. § 916.13(1)(c), Fla....

...5th DCA 2006) (granting petition for writ of certiorari and quashing lower court's order of commitment to Department of Children and Families; holding that although respondent was adjudicated incompetent to proceed to trial, respondent's commitment to the Department was improper under section 916.13(1)(c) because he suffered from a mental illness that was permanent and there was not a substantial *1263 likelihood that competency would be restored); Andrews v....

...In that same order, the trial court ruled that Defendant was incompetent to proceed due to her mental illness as defined in section 916.106(13), *986 Florida Statutes (2014), and further that Defendant met the criteria for involuntary placement with DCF pursuant to section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2014)....

...future; (C) treatment appropriate for restoration of the defendant’s competence to proceed is available; and (D) no appropriate treatment alternative less restrictive than that involving commitment is available. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.212(c)(3). Under section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2014), the defendant may be committed upon finding by clear and convincing evidence that: (a)The defendant has a mental illness and because of the mental illness: 1....

...d to be inappropriate; and (c) There is a substantial probability that the mental illness causing the defendant’s incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in. the reasonably foreseeable future. ■ § 916.13, Fla....

...tent with ordering Defendant to be committed. Nevertheless, because there was no evidence presented to the trial court to support the findings it made, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by ordering commitment. Under section 916.13, the findings necessary for commitment must be based on experts’ opinions because they involve the diagnosis and treat *988 ment of mental illness....

...ho examined the defendant opined that the defendant could not reach competency through treatment, which is a statutory requirement for commitment. “Because there was no evidence presented below to support [the defendant’s] commitment pursuant to section 916.13(1)(C), we find the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by ordering [the defendant’s] commitment for competency restoration.” Id; see also M.H....

...a remedy on direct appeal.”). In Department of Children and Families v. Clem, 903 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), it was noted that under circumstances where a defendant has been properly committed, [DCF] would have an available remedy provided by section 916.13(2) to report to the trial court, not later than six months following the date of admission, that either the defendant has regained competency or no longer meets the criteria for continued commitment....

...mmit Morrison to the Department for treatment, but this authority does not extend to ordering the specific placement of Morrison to a particular facility. Morrison's specific placement is to be determined by the Department. Neither Rule 3.212(c) nor section 916.13, Florida Statutes (1997), give the trial court the authority in a commitment order to direct that a defendant be placed in a specific facility or to issue instructions to the Department on the manner of treatment....

...olumbia County. The trial judge expressed concern about placing Patton in a facility which had no security. The trial judge subsequently entered the order finding Patton incompetent to proceed and committing Patton to the custody of HRS, pursuant to section 916.13, Florida Statutes....

...v. State, 586 So.2d 98 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), MacNeil filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Fifth District Court of Appeal seeking release from the custody of HRS. MacNeil argued he had been improperly involuntarily committed pursuant to section 916.13. The district court noted that habeas corpus is the traditional remedy used to obtain a person's release from an illegal order of involuntary commitment. Because the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of section 916.13(1) and rule 3.211, the order of commitment was vacated. In Gentzen v. State, 689 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), Gentzen was found incompetent to proceed and was committed pursuant to section 916.13(1) to the custody of HRS for placement in a mental health facility....

...ing. We therefore elect to treat this matter as a petition for writ of certiorari. Patton argues that he does not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment. As he notes, the criteria for involuntary commitment of a criminal defendant are found in section 916.13, Florida Statutes, and the procedures for commitment are set forth in Rule 3.212, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 916.13(1) provides that a defendant adjudicated incompetent to stand trial may be involuntarily committed for treatment upon a finding by the court of clear and convincing evidence that: (1) he is mentally ill; (2) there is a substantial like...

...ppropriate state agencies. Although the procedural rule requires certain findings in order for a defendant to be involuntarily committed for treatment to restore competence, the procedural rule does not preclude commitment of a defendant pursuant to section 916.13(1) in situations when no treatment is available....

...Peters, Department of Children and Families, Orlando, for Petitioner. Vickie Sheridan Benson, Orlando, for Respondent. EVANDER, J. The Department of Children and Families (DCF) has filed a petition for writ of certiorari, seeking review of a trial court order committing Wehrwein to the custody of DCF pursuant to section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...competency was probably permanent. As a result, DCF contends, it was forced to divert limited treatment resources from individuals whose competency was restorable to an individual whose competency was not restorable. The trial court's order violates section 916.13(1)....

...etency could be restored. However, the basis of our decision in Clem was that DCF had the opportunity to bring the defendant back before the court if DCF determined the defendant no longer met the criteria for continued commitment. Clem at 1014. See § 916.13(2), Fla....

...Accordingly, we express no opinion on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's determination that appellant was incompetent to stand trial. Appeal From Commitment Order Not Moot The order on appeal also ordered appellant's involuntary commitment and confinement under section 916.13, Florida Statutes (1991), however....

...In its motion to dismiss (denied by a separate order of this court), the State argued that the entire appeal was moot. Since appellant has been discharged, her appeal poses the question whether an appeal from an involuntary criminal commitment order under section 916.13, Florida Statutes, becomes moot, when the defendant is released from commitment....

...etent, or involuntarily committed persons." Dangerousness Not Proven We therefore reach the merits of appellant's claim that, her mental illness notwithstanding, the evidence did not clearly and convincingly show that she met the criteria set out in section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.212(c) incorporates these statutory criteria by reference. We do not find clear and convincing evidence here of "a substantial likelihood that in the near future [appellant would have] ... inflicted serious bodily harm on h[er]self or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior... ." § 916.13(1), Fla....

...Notwithstanding insufficient funding, the department is charged with the responsibility for maintaining secure facilities and programs for treating defendants charged with felonies who are determined incompetent to proceed and who cannot be treated in a less restrictive setting. Section 916.13(2) also speaks of the department's responsibility....

...d by statute. See § 916.106(9), (11)-(12), Fla. Stat. (2002). If an accused is mentally ill or retarded and is adjudicated incompetent to proceed, he or she may be involuntarily committed under either Part II or Part III of Chapter 916. In Part II, section 916.13 authorizes a court to involuntarily commit an accused who is adjudicated mentally ill and incompetent to proceed....

...02(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002). Several experts testified that Graham did not present a threat to himself or others. There was no evidence that Graham was a violent person who would directly harm himself or others. We reject the sheriff's argument that section 916.13 authorizes Graham's commitment because this statute envisions two groups that may be involuntarily committed—those who are deemed incompetent to proceed because they are "mentally ill" under section 916.13(1)(a), and those who are deemed incompetent to proceed for some other reason under section 916.13(1)(b)....

...Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)) (emphasis in original). Additionally, "[s]tatutes which authorize the deprivation of an individual's liberty must be strictly construed." Lee v. State, 546 So.2d 436, 437 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). Section 916.13(1)(a)-(c), Florida Statutes (2002), addresses the involuntary commitment of those defendants deemed incompetent to proceed because they are mentally ill. The absence of the word "and" before subsection (b) does nothing to change the plain meaning of section 916.13 and does not create another group of individuals, apart from the mentally ill, who may be committed. The drafter's use of a semicolon at the end of section 916.13(1)(a)2....

...See WILLIAM STRUNK, JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE pt. I, § 5 (3d ed.1979). The use of "and" at the end of subsection (b) indicates that subsection (c) is the last component of the list of requirements for involuntary commitment contained in section 916.13(1)....

...Here there was a lack of clear and convincing evidence that Graham was suffering from a "mental illness" as defined in section 916.106(11), or that there was a "substantial likelihood that in the near future" Graham would "inflict serious bodily harm on" himself or another person. § 916.13(1)(a)2., Fla....

...that the section " mandates, as does the statute, that the treatment facility must admit the defendant for hospitalization and treatment." (Emphasis added). These provisions of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure track the statutory language of Section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (1980 Supp.)....

...Bortnick's opinion, standing alone, is insufficient to support the trial judge's order. We disagree. Contrary to DCF's position, nothing in the statutes requires that a majority of the appointed experts find the accused incompetent to stand trial. See §§ 916.115, 916.12, & 916.13, Fla....

...In addition, we are not entitled to reweigh the evidence. See, e.g., Tsavaris v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of Fla., 497 So.2d 1338 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). DCF next argues that there was no evidence that Clem could be treated by DCF in order to restore his competency for purposes of section 916.13(1). DCF points out that none of the three experts, including Dr. Bortnick, made any findings to support the trial court's conclusion that Clem's condition necessitated involuntary commitment to DCF under the standards of section 916.13(1)....

...(2003). Dr. Bortnick's report did not specifically address the criteria set forth in section 916.12(4). Dr. Bortnick merely stated that Clem "may benefit from treatment in a psychiatric facility." However, DCF overlooks another provision of the statute, section 916.13(2), which states: (2) A defendant who has been charged with a felony and who has been adjudicated incompetent to proceed, and who meets the criteria for commitment to the department under the provisions of this chapter, may be committed to the department, and the department shall retain and treat the defendant....

...termined that the defendant has regained competency to proceed or no longer meets the criteria for continued commitment, the administrator or designee shall file a report with the court pursuant to the applicable Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. § 916.13(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). Under the plain terms of section 916.13(2), if at any time the administrator of a treatment program determines that a criminal defendant no longer meets the criteria for continued placement, the administrator is to file a report with the trial court. Consequently, although Dr. Bortnick's report should have addressed the criteria set forth in section 916.12(4) in more detail, the fact remains that in light of section 916.13(2), DCF cannot tenably argue that the trial court's order causes it irreparable harm for purposes of certiorari since under this provision, the administrator of Clem's treatment program may file a report with the trial court upon deter...

...The examining psychiatrist stated that he was unable then to render an opinion as to Blackshear's competency at the time of the plea, or his sanity at the time of the offense. The trial court entered an order committing Blackshear to the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), pursuant to Section 916.13, Florida Statutes (1983), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.740....

...In 1980, defendant was charged with burglary in the circuit court for Clay County, Florida. After a hearing on the question of his competency to stand trial, the court entered an order declaring defendant incompetent and committing him for involuntary hospitalization pursuant to Section 916.13, Florida Statutes....

...purpose. The presumption does not become operative by reason of an order adjudicating defendant incompetent to stand trial and committing him to a hospital for a limited period of time for treatment. This is made quite explicit by the provisions of Section 916.13, Florida Statutes, under which defendant was originally committed in 1980: An adjudication of incompetency to stand trial shall not operate as an adjudication of incompetency ......

...t was insane but, rather, that he was suffering from diminished capacity, and counsel urged the court to consider that as a mitigating factor in passing sentence. The judgment is AFFIRMED. MILLS and SHIVERS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The predecessor to Section 916.13, Florida Statutes, was Section 925.10(2), Florida Statutes (1979), which similarly provided: An adjudication of incompetency to stand trial shall not operate as in adjudication of incompetency for purposes of civil proceedings unless s...

...Both the Attorney General’s Office and Barnett agree that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in committing Barnett to the Department because his involuntary pretrial commitment is not authorized under the provisions of section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2012)....

...ntary hospitalization. Based on Dr. Poorman’s report, the circuit court again adjudged Barnett incompetent to proceed in November 2012, and it again committed him to the Department “to be placed in a mental health treatment facility, pursuant to § 916.13(2), Fla....

...I would be abdicating my responsibility, and I’m not doing it. So no, no, hell no, under the circumstances. So the DCF motion to intervene and vacate is denied. The Department now seeks a writ of cer-tiorari to quash the portion of the order committing Barnett to its care and custody- Section 916.13 permits a court to involuntarily commit a defendant to the Department when that defendant is charged with a felony and found incompetent to proceed because of mental illness. However, the court may commit a defendant only if that defendant “meets the criteria for involuntary commitment to the department under the provisions of this chapter.” § 916.13(2)....

...Those criteria include that there be “a substantial probability that the mental illness causing the defendant’s incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” § 916.13(l)(c) (emphasis added)....

...facility. Pending disposition of the involuntary hospitalization proceeding, the child was ordered to be held by HRS. It is clear from the trial judge's statements on the record that his purpose in issuing such orders was to test the application of section 916.13, Florida Statutes (1993) ("Mentally Deficient and Mentally Ill Defendants") to juveniles....

...That statute details the procedure for court-ordered involuntary commitment of adult defendants found incompetent to stand trial or to be sentenced. The statute, however, by its terms does not appear to apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings. [1] See § 39.0205, et seq. Section 916.13 speaks exclusively in terms of "defendants," "standing trial," "sentencing," "criminal court" and "the Rules of Criminal Procedure." Nothing in the statute suggests the legislature intended to make section 916.13 applicable to delinquency proceedings. See Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.000. The distinction is not irrational since, theoretically, the children are already under the residential care-taking of their parent(s) or guardian(s). The reason the court sought to apply section 916.13 is that the only procedure that is expressly designed for juveniles who are incompetent to proceed with their adjudicatory hearing is found in Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.095....

...The new rule further specifies that while the child is in treatment, the court can re-evaluate competency and decide whether to order hospitalization or treatment "in conformity with this rule." Because of the words chosen by the legislature in drafting section 916.13, we agree with HRS that it is not designed to apply to juveniles alleged to be delinquent....

...the orders but remand to the lower court to consider the value of treatment to restore competency and the effect of the amended Rule 8.095. REVERSED and REMANDED. THOMPSON, J., and ANTOON, J., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] HRS acknowledges that § 916.13 is applicable to juveniles tried as adults....

...The court received reports and testimony from Drs. Henry Dee, Harry McClaren, and Jeffrey Danzinger. The court issued an -7- order finding Huggins incompetent to proceed and committed him to DCF pursuant to section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2006). The court held a status hearing on June 6, 2007, and heard testimony from Drs....

...Section 916.145, which has since been renumbered to section 916.303(a), Florida Statutes (2003), required the dismissal of charges against a defendant who is adjudicated incompetent to stand trial two years after such adjudication. § 916.145, Fla. Stat. (1996). Moreover, section 916.13, Florida Statutes (1996), required that "if criminal charges are subsequently dropped and the client is involuntarily admitted to retardation residential services, the placement at the secure facility may be continued if so ordered by the committing court following a hearing with the same due process requirements as set out in s. 393.11 for an initial involuntary admission." § 916.13(b), Fla....

...We conclude that the proper remedy is certiorari. See Mosher v. State, 876 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Patton v. State, 712 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Among the prerequisites for involuntary commitment of a defendant adjudicated to be incompetent, section 916.13(1)(c), Florida *495 Statutes (2006), requires that the court find clear and convincing evidence that "[t]here is a substantial probability that the mental illness causing the defendant's incompetence will respond to treatment and the d...

...his instance, however, the circuit court expressly found that it is improbable that Andrews can attain competency to proceed in the foreseeable future. As the state correctly concedes, this finding precludes petitioner's involuntary commitment under section 916.13....

...The trial court opined that it should be HRS's responsibility to provide the necessary treatment. Hence, the trial court concluded that it lacked authority to mandate DJJ to provide these services, absent direction by a statute or rule. However, the court also declined to order HRS to provide T.L.'s treatment, noting that section 916.13, Florida Statutes, with analogous provision for adults, did not apply to juveniles, as juvenile proceedings are governed solely by the Rules of Juvenile Procedure and chapter 39, Florida Statutes....

...services pursuant to chapter 394, citing Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. State, 655 So.2d 227 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). In that case, mentally retarded children involved in delinquency proceedings were found incompetent to stand trial. The issue was whether section 916.13, pertaining to the involuntary commitment of mentally ill defendants adjudicated incompetent to stand trial, was applicable to juveniles....

...necessary treatment. Hence, the trial court concluded that it lacked authority to mandate DJJ to provide these services, absent direction by a statute or rule. However, the court also declined to order HRS to provide T.L.’s treatment, noting that section 916.13, Florida Statutes, with analogous provision for adults, did not apply to juveniles, as juvenile proceedings are governed solely by the Rules of Juvenile Procedure and chapter 39, Florida Statutes....

...services pursuant to chapter 394, citing Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. State, 655 So.2d 227 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). In that case, mentally retarded children involved in delinquency proceedings were found incompetent to stand trial. The issue was whether section 916.13, pertaining to the involuntary commitment of mentally ill defendants adjudicated incompetent to stand trial, was applicable to juveniles....

...it of habeas corpus in this court seeking review of the order of the trial court committing him to the state hospital. Horton alleges that he is being illegally detained because he does not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment as outlined in section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2011)....

...[1] We write to explain our reasoning in this instance. If there is an issue regarding a defendant's competency, at least two mental health experts must examine the defendant to determine whether he is competent to proceed to trial. § 916.12(2). If a felony defendant is adjudged to be incompetent, section 916.13(1) sets forth the conditions that must be met before that defendant *440 can be involuntarily committed....

...Among other things, it requires the court to find by clear and convincing evidence that "[t]here is a substantial probability that the mental illness causing the defendant's incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future." § 916.13(1)(c)....

...nce nor does it satisfy the statutory requirement of clear and convincing evidence that there be a "substantial probability" that the petitioner will regain competency in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, Horton's commitment was not authorized by section 916.13(1)....

...urisdiction. See Pino v. Dist. Court of Appeal, Third Dist., 604 So.2d 1232 (Fla.1992). Petitioner was charged with a felony in the Broward County circuit court. That court adjudicated him incompetent to proceed and involuntarily committed him under section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2001), to the Department of Children and Family Services to be placed in a mental health treatment facility....

...We granted in part and denied in part Petition I. McCray, 200 So.3d at 1296-97 . Specifically, we quashed the portion of the order continuing Mr. McCray’s conditional release. We reasoned that because he “did not qualify for involuntary commitment under section 916.13,” he was ineligible “for placement on conditional release under section 916.17 as a matter of statutory text.” Id....

...McCray claims that the trial court’s order ignores our McCray opinion' because it simply 'reimposes many of the same conditions of release. More specifically, Mr. McCray contends that because rule 3.212 is procedural, it does not control over the explicit language of section 916.13, which allows for his involun *497 tary commitment only if he meets certain criteria. This includes if “[tjhere is a substantial probability .that the mental illness causing the defendant’s incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” § 916.13(l)(c)....

...tion by ordering [the Department] to undertake responsibilities beyond what is required by statute.”); Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. State, 124 So.3d 430, 432-33 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (“A court that commits a defendant in violation of [section 916.13] improperly encroaches on the legislature’s authority to prescribe the limits of an agency’s obligations and on an agency’s obligation to expend its appropriated funds in accordance with the laws governing that agency.”)....

...criminal defendant to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services after five years of hospitalization as incompetent to stand trial for murder. Where the circuit court commits a criminal defendant to involuntary hospitalization pursuant to section 916.13, Florida Statutes (1991), as incompetent to stand trial, it retains jurisdiction over the defendant for the purpose of continued hospitalization or release....

...Miller to examine Boclair, who returned a diagnosis of severe schizophrenia and opined that Boclair was incompetent to stand trial, was insane at the time of the offense and met the criteria for involuntary hospitalization. The trial court thereupon entered an order of commitment pursuant to Section 916.13, Florida Statutes (1985) and Rule 3.212(b)(1), Fla.R.Crim.P., committing Boclair to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, which was to report within six months on Boclair's status....

...ndant meets the criteria for involuntary commitment. To meet the criteria for involuntary commitment, Chapter 916 provides that the defendant must suffer from a mental illness, retardation (now referred to as intellectual disability), or autism. See § 916.13(l)(a) (providing for involuntary commitment based on clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has a mental illness); § 916.302(l)(a) (providing for involuntary commitment based on clear and convincing evidence that the defendant suffers from retardation (an in *1138 tellectual disability), or autism)....

...lity that the mental illnessf, retardation (intellectual disability), or autism] causing the defendant’s incompetence will respond to treatment [or training] and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future. § 916.13(1)(a)(2), (b)-(c) (setting forth the criteria for involuntary commitment of a defendant determined to be incompetent to proceed due to mental illness); § 916.302(l)(b)-(d) (setting forth the criteria for involuntary commitment of a defenda...

...mental retardation or autism and does not include intoxication or conditions manifested only by antisocial behavior or substance abuse impairment. . comes from section 916.302 and shows the only differences between the relevant portions of sections 916.13 and 916.302. Section 916.13 discusses "mental illness” and "treatment,” while section 916.302 utilizes the terms "retardation or autism” and "training.” Section 916.13 also allows the trial court to commit a mentally ill defendant, even if he is not an immediate danger to himself or others, if: The defendant is manifestly incapable of surviving alone or with the help of willing and responsible family...

...e alternative services, and, without treatment, the defendant is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for herself or himself and such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to the defendant’s well-being[J Section 916.13(l)(a)l....

...SHARP, Judge. MacNeil petitions this court for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus seeking his release from the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. He argues that he has been improperly involuntarily committed pursuant to section 916.13, Florida Statutes (1989), after being adjudicated incompetent to proceed under Rule 3.210....

...The sheriff is charged solely with the duty to transport MacNeil pursuant to the directions of HRS or subsequent order of the court. In this case, the petition and exhibits establish (without dispute from respondent) that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of rule 3.211 and section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...proceed in the foreseeable future. Neither psychiatrist addressed the availability of acceptable treatment, nor the likelihood of MacNeil attaining competence to proceed. Dr. Danziger’s examination also failed to report on appropriate treatments. Section 916.13(l)(b) requires the court to consider less restrictive treatment alternatives....

...arges had been dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 3.213(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We deny the petitions. Heidrick and Ortiz were defendants who were adjudicated incompetent to stand trial and were involuntarily hospitalized. § 916.13(1), Fla....

...Therefore, the circuit courts dismissed the defendants' charges without prejudice to the State to refile the charges should the defendants be declared competent to stand trial in the future. Further, the circuit courts committed the defendants to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services [HRS]. § 916.13(2)(a), Fla....

...This finding is supported by the testimony of both mental health evaluators appointed by the court to assess Ramos’ competency. Both of these evaluators also found that based on the fact that Ramos does not suffer from a mental illness, he does not meet the criteria for commitment under section 916.13. Nevertheless, the trial court made a finding that Ramos “meets the criteria for involuntary placement with the Department of Children and [Family Services] as provided in [section] 916.13(1).” Section 916.13 is titled “Involuntary commitment of defendant adjudicated incompetent” and provides as follows: (1) Every defendant who is charged with a felony and who is adjudicated incompetent to proceed may be involuntarily committed for trea...

...For the purposes of this chapter, the term does not apply to defendants with only mental retardation or autism and does not include intoxication or conditions manifested only by antisocial behavior or substance abuse impairment. In order to meet the involuntary placement criteria of section 916.13(1), the trial court would have had to have found that Ramos does suffer from a mental illness....

...Because the trial court found that Ramos does not suffer from a mental illness, the court departed from the essential requirements of law in finding that Ramos satisfied the criteria for involuntary placement that is set out by the plain language of section 916.13. See Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. Amaya, 10 So.3d 152, 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“Contrary to the trial court’s order, an incompetent defendant may not be committed to DCF [under section 916.13] if the statutory criteria are not met.”)....

...Hill, Jr., *1179 Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. WEBSTER, Judge. Appellant seeks review of a non-final order finding her incompetent, because of mental illness, to proceed in the criminal case filed against her; and committing her, pursuant to section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (1995), to the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for placement in a mental health facility....

...er he stabbed an individual during an altercation at the group home where he was living. See Everette, 911 So.2d at 119. As a result of Everette's mental retardation, he was declared incompetent to stand trial and involuntarily committed pursuant to section 916.13 of the Florida Statutes to the Mentally Retarded Defendants Program at the Florida State Hospital pending the dismissal of the charges against him. See § 916.13, Fla....

was ruled incompetent in 2001. Pursuant to section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2001) and Florida Rule of

...However, the court found that defendant was mentally ill and committed him to HRS; the court retained jurisdiction and ordered that defendant not be released without court approval. He was again recommitted in 1992. In 1993, the trial court continued defendant's involuntary hospitalization pursuant to section 916.13, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...ed to a treatment facility. A.E. concedes error, and we reverse. The trial court found that A.E. was incompetent to proceed and ordered the ten-year-old male committed to the Department for placement in a mental health treatment facility pursuant to section 916.13(2), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...tect the community, and, purporting to act under Douse, concluded it had the authority to commit Defendant to the state forensic hospital. But no finding was made at the hearing that Defendant met the criteria for involuntary commitment specified in section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...The November 17 order indicated the commitment was based on written reports of the forensic psychologists — which, however, were not attached to the order. In this last order, the court found that Defendant met the criteria for commitment to a treatment facility as provided in section 916.13(1). [2] The basis for Defendant's challenge to his commitment is that no evidence supported a finding that he met the criteria set forth in section 916.13(1)(a)....

...be provided only through commitment. Id. at 840. In this case, however, the trial court had found before the hearing that Defendant did not qualify for involuntary commitment, and no evidence was presented at the hearing to support, with respect to section 916.13(1)(a), [3] the trial court's *9 November 17, 2006 written finding that he did....

...facility, or to order commitment, if the provisions of subdivision (c)(3) are met. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.212(c)(2). Commitment, however, requires that the defendant meet the statutory criteria, Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.212(c)(3)(A) — that is, the criteria of section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes....

..."the court may modify the release conditions. The court may also order that the defendant be returned to the department if it is found, after the appointment and report of experts, that the person meets the criteria for involuntary commitment under s. 916.13 or s. 916.15 [4] .") (emphasis added). Accordingly, we grant the petition and quash the orders on review. The trial court may commit Defendant to the department if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that he meets the criteria of section 916.13(1) [5] ; otherwise, the court may again release Defendant to treatment in the community or order treatment for him in a custodial facility....

...to meet the requirement of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.212(c)(4), which requires a commitment order to contain, inter alia, copies of the reports of the experts filed pursuant to the order of examination. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.212(c)(4)(B). [3] Section 916.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), provides as follows: (a) The defendant has a mental illness and because of the mental illness: 1....

..., adjudging Bronson incompetent to proceed and committing him to DCF’s custody. In its order, the trial court found that Bronson “met the criteria for commitment to a treatment facility of the Department of Children and Families as provided in F.S. 916.13(1).” That subsection provides: (1) Every defendant who is charged with a felony and who is adjudicated incompetent to proceed may be involuntarily committed for treatment upon a finding by the court of clear and convincing evidence that: (a) The defendant has a mental illness and because of the mental illness: 1....

...s highly unlikely defendant would ever respond to treatment). Second, the reports of the expert evaluators demonstrated that Bronson’s incompetence to proceed was the result of organic brain damage, not mental illness, and by its express language, section 916.13(1) was only applicable to defendants suffering from mental illness....

...2d DCA 2007))). We granted in part and denied in part Petition I. McCray, 200 So. 3d at 1296-97. Specifically, we quashed the portion of the order continuing Mr. McCray's conditional release. We reasoned that because he "did not qualify for involuntary commitment under section 916.13," he was ineligible "for placement on conditional release under section 916.17 as a matter of statutory text." Id....

...McCray claims that the trial court's order ignores our McCray opinion because it simply reimposes many of the same conditions of release. More specifically, Mr. McCray contends that because rule 3.212 is procedural, it does not control over the explicit language of section 916.13, which allows for his involuntary commitment only if he meets certain criteria. This includes if "[t]here is a substantial probability that the mental illness causing the defendant's incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future." § 916.13(1)(c)....

...jurisdiction by ordering [the Department] to undertake responsibilities beyond what is required by statute."); Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. State, 124 So. 3d 430, 432- 33 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ("A court that commits a defendant in violation of [section 916.13] improperly encroaches on the legislature's authority to prescribe the limits of an agency's obligations and on an agency's obligation to expend its appropriated funds in accordance with the laws governing that agency.")....

...litative Services (HRS) because of his incompetency to stand trial. In an auxiliary proceeding of the pending criminal prosecution, the circuit court adjudicated the defendant in this case, Allen J. West, incompetent to proceed to trial. Pursuant to section 916.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), [1] and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.212 [2] he was committed to the G....

...1999) (recognizing mootness does not destroy appellate jurisdiction on issues of great public importance or which are likely to recur). 2 incompetent to stand trial. This in turn led to an order of involuntary commitment to the Department for treatment pursuant to section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2011). On May 18, 2011, after further psychological testing, the trial court deemed C.Z. non-restorable. This determination meant C.Z. could no longer be held under section 916.13....

...Generally, this is the 5 type of facility to which a defendant is committed under the conditional release statute for longer term residency and outpatient psychiatric services. In contrast, commitment and treatment pursuant to section 916.13 occurs in secured and locked facilities....

...n which the trial judge found herself in this case. For two years, the court, the State and the Office of the Public Defender had labored to provide assistance to C.Z. As of the time of the hearing in this case, C.Z. could no longer be held under section 916.13, and he was ineligible for involuntary commitment under the Baker Act....

...This statute, entitled “Conditional release,” reads in relevant part: (1) Except for an inmate currently serving a prison sentence, the committing court may order a conditional release of any defendant in lieu of an involuntary commitment to a facility pursuant to s. 916.13 or s....

...After the hearing, the court may modify the release conditions. The court may also order that the defendant be returned to the department if it is found, after the appointment and report of experts, that the person meets the criteria for involuntary commitment under s. 916.13 or s....

...acceptable modification that is available. Subsection (2) then continues: “The court may also order that the defendant be returned to the [D]epartment if it is found, after the appointment and report of experts, that the person meets the criteria for involuntary commitment under s. 916.13 or s. 916.15.” C.Z. meets 9 neither of these requirements. As we have noted already, C.Z. has been found to be non-restorable under section 916.13, and section 916.15 deals with defendants who have been adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity....

...Carmona to be placed indefinitely in the custody of the Department pursuant to the conditional release provision of section 916.17(1), and that the Department assume the cost of the placement. The Second District Court of Appeal quashed the order of the circuit court, stating: [S]ection 916.13 sets the criteria that must be established before the trial court has the authority to involuntarily commit an individual for treatment....

...known as a “conditional release.” In its April 20, 2014, order, the trial court specifically found that Mr. Carmona “does not meet the criteria for commitment to a treatment facility of the Department of Children and Families as provided in [section] 916.13.” And “an incompetent defendant may not be committed to [the Department] if the statutory criteria are not met.” Amaya, 10 So.3d at 156. 159 So....

...pursuant to section 916.17. The Fourth District Court of Appeal quashed the order. As in Carmona, and as we decide today, that Court found that “Section 916.17 provides an alternative to placement in a treatment facility for defendants committed to DCF under section 916.13. Contrary to the trial court’s order, an incompetent defendant may not be committed to DCF if the statutory criteria [in section 916.13] are not met.” Id....

...In the instant case, the trial court used section 916.17 as its statutory authority to find a placement for C.Z. beginning in May 2011, when C.Z. was first found to be non-restorable to competency and no longer met the criteria for involuntary commitment under section 916.13....

...(sic) and becoming a danger to himself and others.” To implement this directive, the trial court returned C.Z. to the custody of the Department. The order is no different in its effect on C.Z. than the original order of commitment issued under section 916.13(1) of the Florida Statutes, albeit with fewer safeguards. Due to the statutory constraints, the trial court was faced with the difficult decision of either placing C.Z....

...trial court found Despaigne incompetent to proceed and involuntarily committed him to DCF. In seeking certiorari relief, DCF argues that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law, because Despaigne did not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment under section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2021). “To obtain a writ of certiorari, a petitioner must show that the nonfinal order entered is ‘(1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the re...

...3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011)). “As a general rule, certiorari is the proper vehicle for seeking this court’s review of orders committing an individual involuntarily.” Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. Lotton, 172 So. 3d 983, 985 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (citation omitted). Section 916.13 requires clear and convincing evidence that, inter alia, (1) the defendant has a mental illness; and (2) there is “a substantial probability that the mental illness causing the defendant’s incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” § 916.13(1)(a), (c), Fla....

the criteria of involuntary commitment under section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2018). Therefore, the

...(Competence to Proceed: Scope of Examination and Report), 3.212 (Competence to Proceed: Hearing and Disposition), 3.704 (The Criminal Punishment Code), and 3.992 (Criminal Punishment Code Scoresheet). 1 The amendments reflect changes to sections 916.12, 916.13, 921.0024, and 775.0823, Florida Statutes, made by 1....

...After adding new subdivision (c)(5), the subsequent subdivisions are renumbered accordingly. In renumbered subdivisions (c)(6) and (c)(6)(A), the timeline for facility administrators to file their report is changed from 6 months to 60 days. These amendments are consistent with the recent updates to section 916.13, Florida Statutes....

...(b) This provision has been amended to permit the court to recommit a conditionally released defendant to HRS under the provisions of chapter 916 only if the court makes a finding that the defendant currently meets the statutory commitment criteria found in section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes....

...Because the record is devoid of clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Pierre "will respond to treatment and . . . will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future," Mr. Pierre does not meet the criteria required for involuntary commitment under section 916.13(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2022). Therefore, we grant the Department's petition and quash the order. Mr....

...hat Mr. Pierre does not meet the statutory requirements of commitment because there was no evidence presented that Mr. Pierre's "incompetence will respond to treatment and [he] will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future." § 916.13(1)(c)....

...2d 453, 455 finding that Mr. Pierre was presently incompetent to proceed. See In re Commitment of Reilly, 970 So. 2d 453, 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Because we grant the petition on the basis that Mr. Pierre does not meet the criteria required for involuntary commitment under section 916.13, we decline to comment on the issue of whether Dr....

...he Department] to undertake responsibilities beyond what is required by statute."). For the trial court to involuntarily commit a defendant to the Department's custody, the defendant must meet the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment. § 916.13(2) ("A defendant who has been charged with a felony and who has been adjudicated incompetent to proceed due to mental illness, and who meets the criteria for involuntary commitment under this chapter, may be committed to the department, and the department shall retain and treat the defendant."); see also Fla. R....

...lear and convincing evidence that "[t]here is a substantial probability that the mental illness causing the defendant's incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future." § 916.13(1)(c) (emphasis added)....

...2d DCA 2012). 4  The record in this case is void of any evidence that Mr. Pierre's "incompetence will respond to treatment" or that he "will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future." See § 916.13(1)(c)....

...not meet the criteria for commitment); Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. Barnett, 124 So. 3d 430, 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (holding that a defendant that is not restorable to competency does not satisfy the requirements for involuntary commitment under section 916.13(1)(c)); Oren v....

...3d 919, 924 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) ("[T]he trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered the department to involuntarily commit 5 Garcia after he was found incompetent without evidence that he met the criteria under section 916.13(1)(c)."). In its response to the petition, the State asks this court to provide additional guidance and "issue a ruling which would allow the State a finite period of time to conclusively determine, in a secure setting, the viabi...

...3d at 433. Because there was no clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Pierre's condition will respond to treatment or that he will regain competency in the reasonably foreseeable future, Mr. Pierre failed to meet the criteria for involuntary commitment. For this reason, his commitment was not authorized by section 916.13, and the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law when it ordered that Mr....

...5th DCA 2014) (citing Douse, 930 So. 2d at 839). Here, because there was insufficient evidence at the time Smith was detained for the trial court to find that she qualified for involuntary commitment, the only other option was to release her with the appropriate conditions. See § 916.13(1), Fla....

...al.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted). On the first argument, we conclude that the circuit court’s one-sentence order describing the evaluation to be conducted as a “risk assessment evaluation” is insufficient as a matter of law. Section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2011), authorizes a court to order what may be characterized as a “risk assessment evaluation” of a defendant adjudicated incompetent, but only as part of a broader evaluation of whether the defendant may be involuntarily committed for treatment. Section 916.13(1), entitled “Involuntary commitment of defendant adjudicated incompetent,” provides: Every defendant who is charged with a felony and who is adjudicated incompetent to proceed may be involuntarily committed for treatment upon a fi...

...l regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future. (emphasis added). The emphasized language, which may be characterized as a “risk assessment evaluation,” is only part of the broader evaluation authorized under the entirety of section 916.13(1) to determine whether a defendant adjudicated incompetent may be involuntarily committed for treatment....

...on” is insufficient as a matter of law. Rather, the order should have described the evaluation as an “involuntary commitment evaluation,” i.e., an evaluation to determine whether the defendant may be involuntarily committed for treatment under section 916.13(1). The order then should have described the scope of the evaluation by tracking verbatim the criteria contained in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 916.13(1)....

...In Davis, the defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking to quash a circuit court order directing him to submit to a “violence risk assessment.” Although the order was described as a “violence risk assessment” and did not track verbatim the criteria contained in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 916.13(1), the order contained some specificity which appeared relevant to section 916.13(l)(a)2.’s criteria....

...Therefore, we denied the petition because the circuit court’s order did not depart from the essential requirements of the law. Our opinion in this case now mandates that an order requiring a defendant to submit to an involuntary commitment evaluation under section 916.13(1) must involve a court-appointed expert (or experts) and must track verbatim the criteria contained in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 916.13(1). Based on the foregoing, we grant the petition and quash the order at issue. We remand for the circuit court to appoint its own expert(s) to determine whether the defendant may be involuntarily committed for treatment under section 916.13(1). The order shall describe the scope of the evaluation by tracking verbatim the criteria contained in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 916.13(1)....

...ause it is affected by the order and no other remedy is available. See Dep’t of Children & Families v. Harter, 861 So.2d 1274, 1275 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). *984 The circuit court order under review involuntarily committed Davis to DCF pursuant to section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2011), which governs the involuntary commitment of defendants who are mentally ill....

...Bernstein’s competency evaluation did not conclude that Davis was mentally ill and recommended less restrictive treatment alternatives, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law in ordering the involuntary commitment of Davis to DCF. See § 916.13(l)(a), (b), Fla....

...2d DCA 2012) (holding when defendant is not mentally ill, trial court cannot commit defendant to DCF based on finding defendant’s incompetence to proceed is due to “education issues”); Graham v. Jenne, 837 So.2d 554, 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (finding that section 916.13, Florida Statutes, authorizes commitment of defendants who are both incompetent to proceed and meet criteria for commitment)....

...Legislature is presumed to know the statutes that are in existence 3 at the time it enacts new legislation. Barnett v. Dep’t of Mgmt. Servs., 931 So. 2d 121, 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). The Legislature enacted the relevant statutory language in 1983 in section 916.13(3)....

...When the new language was added, it read: In no case may a client’s placement in a secure facility pursuant to this part exceed the maximum sentence for the crime for which he was charged. At the time, the Legislature enacted the above language in section 916.13(3), trial courts had been authorized to structure sentences consecutively under section 775.021(4) for seven years, see section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1976), and singular versions of words included the plural versions of words for decades, see section 1.01, Florida Statutes (1941)....

...Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent, State of Florida. No Appearance for Respondent Wazim Nawaz Kamaluddin. EVANDER, J. The Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) seeks certiorari review of a trial court order committing Wazim Kamaluddin to its custody pursuant to section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2017)....

...eeding below, it has standing to seek certiorari review of the trial court’s order because it is affected by the order, and no other remedy is available. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Lotton, 172 So. 3d 983, 985 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). Section 916.13, Florida Statutes, provides: (1) Every defendant who is charged with a felony and who is adjudicated incompetent to proceed may be involuntarily committed for treatment upon a finding by...

...(c) There is a substantial probability that the mental illness causing the defendant’s incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future. § 916.13(1), Fla....

...to DCF); Dep’t of Children & Families v. Wehrwein, 942 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (holding that trial court’s order committing defendant, who had previously been adjudicated incompetent to proceed to trial, back to custody of DCF violated section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2005), where overwhelming evidence was that mental illness causing defendant’s incompetency would not respond to treatment and it was highly unlikely defendant would ever respond to treatment). PETITIO...

criteria for commitment for treatment set forth in section 916.13, Florida Statutes (1993). Based on the psychiatrists’

...Each expert prepared a report that was submitted to the court, and both later testified at the hearing to determine whether Sanders was to be involuntarily committed to the State Hospital. The trial court found that Sanders should be committed under section 916.13(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2017), which provides: (1) Every defendant who is charged with a felony and who is adjudicated incompetent to proceed may be involuntarily committed for treatment up...

...the 2In Boller, the First District Court of Appeal addressed an involuntary commitment pursuant to the 1999 version of the Baker Act; specifically, section 394.467(1)(a)2.a., the language and requirements of which are nearly identical to section 916.13(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2017)....

...The Department cited section 916.105(3), Florida Statutes (2000) which provides that treatment in community outpatient settings be provided whenever it is a feasible alternative to treatment in a state forensic facility. Additionally, the Department cited section 916.13(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2000), which authorizes commitment only after a finding by clear and convincing evidence that all available, less restrictive treatment alternatives are inappropriate....

...uling that Petitioner suffered from some unspecified mental illness under section 916.106(14), rather than an intellectual disability under section 916.106(13). 4 Additionally, had the parties and the court proceeded under section 916.302 instead of section 916.13, the course of this case might have been dramatically different....

DCF for treatment. II. THE PERTINENT STATUTE Section 916.13 addresses .the question of the involuntary

...t that involuntarily committed Nelci S. Tetley to its care. We agree with the Department that the circuit court’s order is not supported by clear and convincing evidence that Tetley meets the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment under section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2020), and we therefore grant the petition. I. In 2018, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Ms....

...The Department has now filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court, arguing that the circuit court’s order departs from the essential requirements of the law because Ms. Tetley did not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment under section 916.13(1). II. “[T]o obtain a writ of certiorari, there must exist (1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the...

...he criminal case or commitment proceeding, it has standing to seek certiorari review of the circuit court order because it is affected by the order and no other remedy is available.” Id. III. Under section 916.13(1), before a court involuntarily commits a defendant charged with a felony, it must make several findings supported by “clear and convincing evidence,” and those findings “must be based on experts’ opinions because they involve the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness.” Lotton, 172 So....

...Among the required findings is that “[t]here is a substantial probability that the mental illness causing the defendant’s incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” § 916.13(1)(c), Fla....

...convincing evidence to indicate a substantial probability that Ms. Tetley will regain competency in the reasonably foreseeable future. Therefore, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law when it involuntarily committed Ms. Tetley under section 916.13(1)....

was ruled incompetent in 2001. Pursuant to section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2001) and Florida Rule of

...The trial court committed Forestal under section 916.18, Florida Statutes, which pertains to defendants who are adjudicated incompetent to proceed due to a mental illness, although none of the experts who evaluated Forestal opined that he was mentally ill. Moreover, persons committed under section 916.13 are committed to the Department of Children and Famihes....

...Appellant’s involuntary commitment followed a finding that he is incompetent to proceed in his pending violation of probation hearing. Petitioner argues that the trial court’s findings and the underlying evidence do not fulfill the criteria of section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (1993), and of Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.211 and 3.212(e)(1) (1993)....

...For these reasons, we find the trial court’s order deviated from the essential requirements of law, resulting in irreparable injury. We therefore grant the petition, and quash the order of the trial court to the extent it commits the respondent to the Department of Children and Families under section 916.13(1) and directs the transfer of him to a Chapter 916 mental health treat *1030 ment facility for restoration of his competence to proceed....

...treatment appropriate for the defendant’s condition is available” at the facility. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.212(c)(1). The court must also put in place procedures for periodic review like those required when a defendant is involuntarily committed. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.212(c)(5); §§ 916.13(2), .302(2)(a), Fla....

...To order treatment in a custodial facility, the court must make the findings required for pretrial detention under the Florida Constitution and the Florida Statutes. Blair, 39 So. 3d at 1194–95. Moreover, treatment in a custodial facility should only be ordered as a last resort. For example, both section 916.13 and Rule 3.212 provides that a trial court may involuntarily commit a defendant for treatment only if all available, less restrictive treatment alternatives have been determined to be inappropriate. § 916.13(1)(b), Fla....

...Adjudged Incompetent to Proceed Pursuant to § 916.17 Fla. Stat." Included in that order was the finding that Mr. Carmona "does not meet the criteria for commitment to a treatment facility of the Department of Children and Families as provided in section 916.13(1)." However, the order did find that Mr....

...Carmona clearly support the trial court's conclusion that in fact Mr. Carmona is incompetent to proceed. Accordingly, the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law in determining that Mr. Carmona is incompetent to proceed to trial. However, section 916.13 sets the criteria that must be established before the trial court has the authority to involuntarily commit an individual for treatment....

...commitment known as a "conditional release." In its April 20, 2014, order, the trial court specifically found that Mr. Carmona "does not meet the criteria for commitment to a treatment facility of the Department of Children and Families as provided in [section] 916.13." And "an incompetent defendant may not be committed to [the Department] if the statutory criteria are not met." Amaya, 10 So....

...n 916.17 is appropriate only when a defendant meets the criteria for commitment to [the Department]." See id. Here, after finding that Mr. Carmona does not meet the statutory requirements for involuntary commitment as prescribed in section 916.13, the trial court ordered the Department to place Mr....

...The Department of Children and Families, (“Department”), seeks certiorari review of an order finding Anthony R. Alvarado incompetent to proceed in his criminal case, and involuntarily committing Alvarado to the Department for mental health treatment pursuant to section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...commitment or outpatient treatment, and because it did not find that Petitioner was incapable of surviving alone or with the help of friends, or that he was likely to inflict serious bodily harm to himself or others. § 916.17(1), Fla. Stat. (2012); § 916.13(l)(a), Fla....

...respondent, Jamalah Lewis, who is a defendant in pending cases on the circuit court’s felony docket. DCF argues that there was no clear and convincing evidence before the court for the court to find that Lewis met the criteria for commitment under section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2023), because there was no recent or current evaluation from an expert witness supporting the order for involuntary commitment....

...2, 2024) (granting DCF’s petition for writ of certiorari and quashing order involuntarily committing the defendant to DCF’s care when the commitment order was based on a stale expert evaluation), and Department of Children & Families v. Lotton, 172 So. 3d 983, 987–88 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (holding that “[u]nder section 916.13, the findings necessary for commitment must be based on experts’ opinions because they involve the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness” and that “[w]ithout reports or testimony from experts who examined and evaluated the de...

...Generally, an expert witness is required “to determine [Elvey’s] mental condition . . . , including competency to proceed, insanity, involuntary placement, and treatment.” See § 916.115(1), Fla. Stat. Finally, when, as here, Elvey has been adjudged incompetent due to a mental illness, section 916.13(1) sets forth the criteria that must be met before he may be committed to the Department for competency restoration treatment....

...evidence to adjudge Elvey incompetent to proceed. 2. Likewise, the trial court had before it sufficient evidence to involuntarily commit Elvey to the Department for competency restoration treatment at the state hospital. “[U]nder section 916.13(1) there must be clear and convincing evidence that the criteria under this statute are met before a felony defendant adjudicated incompetent to proceed due to mental illness may be involuntarily committed to [the Department] for treatment.” Kirshner, 49 Fla....

...3d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (quoting Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. Lotton, 172 So. 3d 983, 987–88 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)); see also Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. Tetley, 365 So. 3d 479, 480–81 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023). Pertinent here, as to placement, section 916.13 requires the court to conclude that because of mental illness, “[t]here is a substantial likelihood that in the near future the defendant will inflict serious bodily harm on . . . himself or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm.” See § 916.13(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The trial court also must conclude that all other available less- restrictive treatment alternatives are inappropriate. See § 6 916.13(1)(b), Fla. Stat. Finally, the trial court must find that there is a substantial probability that Elvey will regain competence “in the reasonably foreseeable future.” See § 916.13(1)(c), Fla....

...light of this evidence presented by Dr. Davis’s November 13, 2023 report to the court (limited by Elvey’s refusal to allow a renewed evaluation), and considering the nature of the underlying charges against him, such evidence is sufficient under section 916.13 to establish that “[t]here is a substantial likelihood that in the near future the [Elvey] will inflict serious bodily harm on . . . himself or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm[.]” See § 916.13(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. Further, commitment to the Department is the least restrictive means available that “would offer an opportunity for improvement of the defendant’s condition . . . . ” See § 916.13(1)(b), Fla....

...competence and placement with the information before it in this case. Elvey’s obstruction of Dr. Davis’s evaluation—and the trial court’s ability to receive a complete evaluation more fully considering Elvey’s competence and each of the factors set forth in section 916.13—will not operate to defeat the trial court’s decision to commit Elvey....

...pondent, Shannon Edward Ewell, to the Florida *328 State Hospital for treatment to restore him to competency. 1 The only medical expert who evaluated Ewell opined that Ewell ydll not be able to reach competency through any known therapeutic program. Section 916.13(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2006), requires that before a defendant is committed to the Department for competency restoration, there must be “clear and convincing evidence that ......

...[t]here is a substantial probability that the mental illness causing the defendant’s incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Because there was no evidence presented below to support Ewell’s commitment pursuant to section 916.13(l)(c), we find the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by ordering Ewell’s commitment for competency restoration....

...this court for the issuance of a writ of certiorari. It requests that the trial court’s order involuntarily committing Deborah Kirshner to its care be quashed because there was no competent substantial evidence that Kirshner met the criteria under section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2023), for commitment....

...2023, it rendered the subject order involuntarily committing Kirshner to DCF for care and treatment. The order found that Kirshner remained incompetent to proceed due to mental illness but that she now met the criteria for involuntary placement under section 916.13(1). 2 It is from this order that DCF seeks certiorari 1 See § 784.08(2)(a), Fla. Stat. 2 Section 916.13(1) provides: 2 (1) Every defendant who is charged with a felony and who is adjudicated incompetent to proceed may be involuntarily committed for treatment upon a finding by the court of clear and...

...Accordingly, as DCF has raised the same argument here that it did in Campbell, we find that it has demonstrated the requisite irreparable harm for this court to exercise jurisdiction. Turning to the first prong of our certiorari analysis, under section 916.13(1) there must be clear and convincing evidence that the criteria under this statute are met before a felony defendant adjudicated incompetent to proceed due to mental illness may be alternative treatment options have been fully...

...However, the trial court also found that “[a]ll available, less restrictive treatment alternatives, including treatment in community residential facilities or community inpatient or outpatient settings, which would offer an opportunity for improvement of [Gatlin’s] condition [had] been judged to be inappropriate.” See § 916.13(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011). If there is an issue regarding a defendant’s competency, at least two mental health experts must examine the defendant to determine whether he or she is competent to proceed to trial. § 916.12(2). In accordance with section 916.13(1): Every defendant who is charged with a felony and who is adjudicated incompetent to proceed may be involuntarily committed for treatment upon a finding by the court of clear and convincing evidence that: (a) The defendant has a mental illness and because of the mental illness: 1....

...Accordingly, in our earlier order granting relief, we left undisturbed the trial court’s finding that Gatlin is incompetent to proceed but quashed that portion of the order involuntarily committing him to DCF. Because Gatlin is incompetent to proceed but his involuntary commitment to DCF was not authorized under section 916.13(1), we directed the trial court to hold a hearing to determine the appropriate mental health treatment for Gatlin in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.212(c)(1), (2), and (d). Petition granted. WHATLEY, KELLY, and WALLACE, JJ., Concur. . See Oren v. Judd, 940 So.2d 1271 , 1272 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). . The trial court made various findings in accordance with section 916.13(l)(a) that are not supported by clear and convincing evidence....

...The Department of Children and Families (DCF) petitions this Court for certiorari review, challenging the circuit court's order committing Randy Doyle Ross, Jr., to their care. DCF argues the order departs from the essential requirements of law because Ross does not meet the statutory requirements for commitment. See § 916.13, Fla....

...The Department of Children and Families (DCF) petitions this Court for certiorari review, challenging the circuit court's order committing Randy Doyle Ross, Jr., to their care. DCF argues the order departs from the essential requirements of law because Ross does not meet the statutory requirements for commitment. See § 916.13, Fla....

...at 503–04 (quoting Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. Despaigne, 348 So. 3d 1221, 1222 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)). Under certain circumstances, a court may involuntarily commit a defendant who is charged with a felony but is adjudicated incompetent to go to trial. See § 916.13(1), Fla....

...There is a substantial likelihood that in the near future the defendant will inflict serious bodily harm on herself or himself or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm[.] § 916.13(1)(a), Fla....

...ments of law.” See Kellond v. State, 206 So. 3d 138, 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). Here, the court wrote that Petitioner “meets the criteria for commitment to a treatment facility of the Department of Children and Family Services as provided in section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes, for psychiatric stabilization and restoration of competency related abilities.” The court explained that based on Petitioner’s court appearances, Petitioner “is clearly delusional and reports irrational beli...

...Petitioner’s counsel advised that Petitioner “has no family or friends in Jacksonville, who could assist [Petitioner] in her care and treatment,” and that Petitioner has no place to live in the area.1 These statements fall short of making the specific findings mandated by section 916.13(1), which “renders the order facially deficient.” See Kellond, 206 So. 3d at 139. Accordingly, we grant the petition and quash Petitioner’s involuntary commitment. On remand, the court may involuntarily commit Petitioner by entering an order that comports with section 916.13(1).2 PETITION GRANTED, ORDER QUASHED in part, and REMANDED. EDWARDS, C.J., and LAMBERT and JAY, JJ., concur. 1 The court first made these statements in its order adjudicating Petitioner incompetent to proceed and involuntarily committing her to the Department of Children and Families....

...the treatment of forensic clients who have been determined incompetent to proceed due to mental illness or who have been acquitted of a felony by reason of insanity.” A “forensic client” includes one who has been committed to DCF custody under section 916.13(1)....

...nt to section 916.17. Section 916.17 mandates: (1) Except for an inmate currently serving a prison sentence, the committing court may order a conditional release of any defendant in lieu of an involuntary commitment to a facility pursuant to s. *404 916.13 or s....

committing him to the Department's care pursuant to section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2018). The trial court

committing him to the Department's care pursuant to section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2018). The trial court

...this Court. Order, Sept. 22, 2005. The Department argues that under the applicable statute, the court may commit a defendant to the Department, but cannot designate the specific facility in which the Department determines to place the defendant. See § 916.13(2), Fla....

...Because the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law in denying the State's motion, we deny the petition, but we write to address the availability of release conditions for defendants who are incompetent but do not qualify for involuntary commitment under section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2016). Spuhler was charged with driving while license suspended and driving while license suspended causing death, and he was determined to be incompetent and not restorable in July 2016....

...year of conditional release. As the end of that year approached, the State sought an additional period of conditional release pursuant to rule 3.212(d). The trial court denied its motion, determining that because Spuhler did not meet the criteria for commitment under section 916.13, conditional release was not available and the State's only remedy was under the Baker Act, if appropriate. "[C]ertiorari review is proper when it is alleged that the circuit court's interpretation of a statute violate...

...Barnett, 124 So. 3d 430, 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (concluding that the trial court "should consider whether appropriate conditions may again be lawfully imposed under rule 3.212(d)" when releasing a defendant who was ineligible for further commitment under section 916.13 because he was not restorable to competency); Dep't of Children & Families v....

...Wood was charged with a third-degree felony alleged to have been committed in Pinellas County, Florida, in May 2022. On March 16, 2023, the trial court found her incompetent to proceed and committed her to the Department of Children and Families (Department) for placement in a mental health treatment facility pursuant to section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2022)....

...ts who have been placed in a forensic facility as a result of having been found incompetent to proceed. 2 " 'Forensic client' . . . means any defendant who has been committed to the department or agency pursuant to s. 916.13, s....

...Schofield's appointed counsel filed a motion to have Mr. Schofield's competence evaluated. After receiving a report and evaluation from a court-appointed expert, the circuit court entered an order on April 13, 2016, adjudicating Mr. Schofield incompetent to proceed. Pursuant to section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2015), he was 1The protected individual under the permanent injunction was Mr. Schofield's mother, who, the officer determined, lived 129 feet from where Mr....

...Statutes (2016), of the Baker Act. The letter cited to Mosher v. State, 876 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), and suggested to the circuit court that "individuals whose competence is non-restorable no longer meet the criteria for commitment pursuant to [section 916.13, Florida Statutes (2017)] and therefore, should either be released or the State shall initiate civil commitment proceedings." Mr....

...THE COURT: Well, but they're the same . . . I assume you're talking about civil commitment. MR. TOLLIVER: Correct. THE COURT: The standard is the same. The criteria for civil commitment is identical to the criteria for commitment [for restoration under section 916.13]....

...Florida statutes now codify the substantive inquiries that underlie a competency determination. See generally § 916.12. Florida statutes also provide a mechanism through which an incompetent defendant may be committed and provided treatment for the purpose of restoring his or her competency. See § 916.13....

...2d DCA 2013): [T]he court may commit a defendant only if that defendant "meets the criteria for involuntary commitment to the [D]epartment [of Children and Families] under the provisions of this chapter." § 916.13(2)....

...Those criteria include that there be "a substantial probability that the mental illness causing the defendant's incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future." § 916.13(1)(c)....

...3.212(c)(3)(A). (Emphasis and citations omitted.) As an alternative to residential commitment, section 916.17 authorizes a form of "conditional release," under the continuing supervision of the trial court, in which the incompetent defendant may receive treatment outside the confines of a section 916.13 residential commitment—but, here as well, only if the incompetent defendant would otherwise meet the criteria for commitment, which includes the "substantial 8 probability" that the defendant "will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future." § 916.13(1)(c); see also Dep't of Children & Families v....

...defendant accused of aggravated battery who had been found incompetent to proceed due to her schizophrenia. The trial court in Mosher had refused to release the defendant from involuntary commitment in spite of the fact that she did not meet the criteria for commitment under section 916.13(1) because it was "extremely unlikely" she could have her competency restored in the foreseeable future....

...establishing a probability that Oren would regain competency. To the contrary, it was established that Oren would never regain competency. Clearly, then, Oren's involuntary commitment was not authorized by section 916.13(1). .... The [Mosher] court noted that at the hearing on Mosher's motion it was determined that there was no substantial probability that she would regain competency to 10  proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future. Therefore, she no longer met the criteria for involuntary commitment under section 916.13(1)(c)....

...2d at 1274; Mosher, 876 So. 2d at 1232).6 Since then, the implicit reformulation of Jackson's holding has been carried along in Florida law, intermittently and in differing variations, when an incompetent defendant who is ineligible for commitment under section 916.13 challenges his or her continued commitment....

...r three-judge panel no longer carries the force of law."). Third, issues of constitutionality aside, there is no statutory authority to impose release conditions over a nonrestorable, incompetent defendant who is not eligible for commitment under section 916.13....

...Schofield, though perhaps understandable, was no less unlawful. III. Consistent with Jackson, we once again hold that when a criminal defendant has been found incompetent to proceed and is not eligible for commitment pursuant to section 916.13 because there is no substantial probability that the defendant will regain competency in the reasonably foreseeable future, pursuant to Jackson, the State must either institute civil commitment proceedings or release that defendant....

...the department to involuntarily commit Garcia where there was no evidence of a substantial probability that he would regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future, as required for involuntary commitment under Florida Statutes section 916.13(1)(c). Factual Background and Procedural History On August 2, 2017, a Monroe County sheriff’s deputy found the eighty-one year old Garcia walking with a five pound bucket full of Florida spiny lobsters. T...

...Mishara’s written report as evidence. Based on Dr. Mishara’s report, the trial court found Garcia incompetent to proceed with the trial in the case. The trial court also found that Garcia met the criteria for commitment to a treatment facility as provided in section 916.13(1), and committed Garcia to the department to be placed in a secure mental health treatment facility....

...In the rehearing motion, the department highlighted the part of Dr. Mishara’s report where she opined that it was doubtful Garcia’s competency could be restored. The department also pointed the trial court to the involuntary commitment statute, section 916.13(1), which provides that the defendant may be involuntarily committed only on a finding by clear and convincing evidence that there’s a substantial probability he will respond to treatment and will regain 3 competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future....

...Garcia responded that we should grant the certiorari petition because all competent evidence – i.e., Dr. Mishara’s report – indicated that Garcia was not restorable, and therefore, he could not be committed to the state hospital under section 916.13(1). The Attorney General, in her response, agreed: DCF asserts that the law prohibits their assuming the care and custody of Mr. Garcia. The cited statute, section 916.13, Florida Statutes, places into DCF’s care subjects who have a “substantial probability” 4  of responding to treatment for their mental illness....

...inappropriate; and (c) There is a substantial probability that the mental illness causing the defendant’s incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future. § 916.13(1), Fla....

...rs from dementia that will become progressively worse and that there is little or no probability that she will become competent in the future. Therefore, Gilliland no longer meets the criteria for commitment to the Department under section 916.13(1)(c), Florida Statutes. § 916.13(1)(c), Fla....

...5th DCA 2006) (granting petition for writ of certiorari and quashing lower court's order of commitment to Department of Children and Families; holding that although respondent was adjudicated incompetent to proceed to trial, respondent’s commitment to the Department was improper under section 916.13(1)(c) because he suffered from a mental illness that was permanent and there was not a substantial likelihood that competency would be restored); Andrews v....

...State Hospital for treatment to restore him to competency. The only 8  medical expert who evaluated Ewell opined that Ewell will not be able to reach competency through any known therapeutic program. Section 916.13(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2006), requires that before a defendant is committed to the Department for competency restoration, there must be “clear and convincing evidence that ......

...t's incompetence will respond to treatment and the defendant will regain competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Because there was no evidence presented below to support Ewell’s commitment pursuant to section 916.13(1)(c), we find the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by ordering Ewell’s commitment for competency restoration....

...is doubtful Garcia will be restored to competency. As in Gilliland and Ewell, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered the department to involuntary commit Garcia after he was found incompetent without evidence that he met the criteria under section 916.13(1)(c). Conclusion We quash the trial court’s February 26, 2018 order to the extent it committed Garcia to the department for involuntary hospitalization pursuant to section 916.13(1)....

...not properly before this Court, they also contend that there is nothing in chapter 916 indicating that the legislature intended to delineate between persons charged with felonies and persons charged with misdemeanors. Thus, the State points out that section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (1995), [3] specifies that "every person" adjudicated incompetent to stand trial may be involuntarily committed upon the finding of certain criteria. The fallacy in the State's argument is that section 916.13(1) also specifies that these findings are to be made by "the court." Because the word "court" is defined to mean "circuit court" in section 916.106(2), it necessarily follows that only the circuit court can make the findings necessary for a forensic commitment under chapter 916....

...in this responsibility to the now defunct Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. [2] We note, however, that an involuntary commitment under the Baker Act may only be entered by the circuit court. § 394.455(7), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1996). [3] Section 916.13(1) reads in pertinent part: (1) CRITERIA.—Every person adjudicated incompetent to stand trial or incompetent for sentencing, pursuant to the applicable Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be involuntarily committed for treatment...

...The court received reports and testimony from Drs. Henry Dee, Harry McClaren, and Jeffrey Danzinger. The court issued an -7- order finding Huggins incompetent to proceed and committed him to DCF pursuant to section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (2006). The court held a status hearing on June 6, 2007, and heard testimony from Drs....