CopyCited 872 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 53 U.S.L.W. 2573, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 249, 1985 Fla. LEXIS 3238
...1984) (alimony and child support enforcement); §
77.28, Fla. Stat. (1983) (garnishment); §
718.303, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1984) (condominium actions); §
725.07, Fla. Stat. (1983) (credit discrimination actions); §
742.031, Fla. Stat. (1983) (paternity determinations); §
376.313, Fla....
CopyCited 64 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20486, 53 ERC (BNA) 2153, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 3328, 2002 WL 331961
...PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In May 1997, Blasland sued the City for failure to pay for some of the work
Blasland had performed under the contract. Blasland’s theories of recovery
included breach of contract, account stated, quantum meruit, CERCLA, and
Florida Statutes § 376.313 (a state cleanup-cost-recovery statute)....
CopyCited 44 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20677, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15403, 1995 WL 611149
...dictional requirements of RCRA regarding notice and is barred from seeking injunctive relief. (2) Mobil argues that Painewebber has sought relief pursuant to § 6972(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and Florida Statute, Section 376.313, and that these statutes do not provide Painewebber with a private cause of action for monetary damages....
CopyCited 41 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2007 WL 1138393
...water treatment plant; (2) each Plaintiff had sustained personal injury or death caused
by exposure to hazardous substances that were stored on the land prior to Crescent’s
and Rinehart’s ownership of it; and (3) Crescent and Rinehart were liable pursuant
to § 376.313 Florida Statutes, a statute that creates a strict liability cause of action
against owners of real property in Florida for damages caused by surface or ground
water contaminants on the property.
Crescent removed the cases to feder...
...ffs’ exposure to hazardous
substances, pollutants, and chemicals and Rinehart’s use of the land, which it
acquired years later.
4
Each Plaintiff moved to remand to state court, arguing that § 376.313, Fla....
...For the same reasons, Plaintiffs also
argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Crescent.
Rinehart and Crescent argue that the district court properly concluded that
Plaintiffs could not maintain a cause of action against them pursuant to § 376.313,
Fla....
...bility that [the
Plaintiffs] could have maintained a cause of action against [the resident defendant]
in . . . state court.”
454 F.3d at 1281-82.
We turn now to consideration of the cause of action asserted in Plaintiffs’
complaints. Section
376.313, Fla....
...To support their contention that they can
maintain such an action, Plaintiffs cite Aramark Uniform and Career Apparel, Inc.
v. Easton,
894 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2004), which holds that the statute creates a strict
liability cause of action. In Aramark, the Florida Supreme Court stated that section
376.313 “creat[es] a damages remedy for the non-negligent discharge of pollution
without proof that the defendant caused it.” Id....
CopyCited 37 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 29 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 551, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20115, 2004 Fla. LEXIS 1743, 2004 WL 2251847
...Easton sought damages and injunctive relief from Aramark for the prior and ongoing migration of contaminated groundwater onto his property. He asserted various common law theories (reckless or negligent endangerment/failure to warn, strict liability, trespass, private nuisance, and negligence), as well as a claim under section 376.313(3), Florida Statutes (2002)....
...alue by $153,000. It concluded, however, that Easton had failed to prove that either Aramark or Servisco had caused the contamination, and thus entered judgment in Aramark's favor. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that section
376.313(3) created a cause of action for strict liability against an adjoining landowner and did not require proof that the defendant had caused the contamination. See Easton,
825 So.2d at 998. The court relied on two other cases holding that section
376.313 creates a cause of action. See Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp.,
558 So.2d 93, 98-99 (Fla. 1st DCA) (holding that the allegations in the complaint stated a cause of action under section
376.313), review denied,
574 So.2d 139 (Fla.1990); Kaplan v. Peterson,
674 So.2d 201, 205 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (holding that section
376.313(3) creates a cause of action), review dismissed,
687 So.2d 1305 (Fla.1997)....
...e.g., §
376.3071(3), Fla. Stat. (2002). The statutory scheme provides for both civil and criminal penalties. See §
376.302(2)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2002). Section
376.308 authorizes the DEP to sue polluters and force the cleanup of contaminated sites. Section
376.313, entitled "Nonexclusiveness of remedies and individual cause of action for damages under ss.
376.30-376.319," allows private parties to sue for damages "resulting from a discharge or other condition of pollution covered by ss.
376.30-376.319." §
376.313(3). Section
376.313(3) establishes the parameters of a private suit for damages....
...Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s.
376.308. The issue we must resolve is whether section
376.313(3) creates a cause of action or merely modifies existing causes of action by dispensing with the standard of care (negligence) requirement....
...We analyze (A) the precise cause of action the statute authorizes; (B) the limited defenses the statute allows; and (C) other evidence in the statute itself that it intends to create a cause of action. Finally, in section (D), we address Aramark's arguments for a contrary interpretation. A. The Cause of Action Provided Under Section 376.313(3) This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation....
...Motors Corp.,
561 So.2d 656, 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (stating *24 that strict liability in tort requires the product's user to establish the existence of proximate causal connection between the condition of the manufacturer's product and his injuries or damages). In contrast, section
376.313(3) provides, with exceptions not relevant here, that "in any such suit, it is not necessary for such person to plead or prove negligence in any form or manner. Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred." On its face, therefore, section
376.313(3) departs from the common law by creating a damages remedy for the non-negligent discharge of pollution without proof that the defendant caused it....
...tion, this Court has held that `[t]he legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended'"). Therefore, we must assume that the omission of a causation requirement in section 376.313(3) was deliberate. We believe this sufficient evidence in itself that the statute creates a new cause of action. But there is more. B. The Defenses Available Under Section 376.313(3) The statute's enumeration of specific and exclusive defenses provides further evidence that the Legislature intended to create a cause of action rather than to modify existing ones. The last sentence of section 376.313(3) states that "[t]he only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s....
...Such defenses would be superfluous if a plaintiff had to prove, as part of the cause of action, that the defendant caused the contamination. See Acosta v. Richter,
671 So.2d 149, 153-54 (Fla.1996) (stating that a statute should be interpreted to give effect to all of its provisions). The apparent purpose of section
376.313(3) is to make it easier for victims of pollution to recover for damages resulting from a pollutive discharge or conditions of pollution....
...ictims to maintain an action against the owners of contaminated property, while allowing such owners to avoid liability if they can prove they did not cause the contamination and did not know about it when they bought the property. C. Other Parts of Section 376.313(3) Evidencing an Intent to Create a Cause of Action Other aspects of the statute further evidence the legislature's intent to create a cause of action rather than modify existing ones. The title of section 376.313, "Nonexclusiveness of remedies and individual cause of action for damages under ss....
...Webb,
398 So.2d 820, 824-25 (Fla.1981). "The title is more than an index to what the section is about or has reference to; it is a direct statement by the legislature of its intent." Id. Another subsection further illuminates the Legislature's intent. Section
376.313(1) provides that "[t]he remedies in ss.
376.30-376.319 shall be deemed to be cumulative and not exclusive." This language evidences an intent in section
376.313(3) to create an entirely new cause of action cumulative to the common law....
...1995), to foreclose other remedies "would be less than intellectually credible"). Finally, we find it probative that the statute contains an attorney's fees provision allowing a plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney's and expert witness fees. See § 376.313(6), Fla....
...statute, including the inclusion of lack of causation as an affirmative defense; and other aspects of the statute such as its title, the cumulative remedies clause and the attorney's fees provision when combined with the statutory directive that section 376.313(3) should be liberally construed lead to the inevitable conclusion that the statute creates a cause of action for strict liability regardless of causation. See Gary K. Hunter, Statutory Strict Liability for Environmental Contamination: A Private Cause of Action to Remedy Pollution or Mere Legislative Jargon?, Fla. Bar J., Jan. 1998, at 50, 51 (proposing that given the title of section 376.313(3) and the phrase not prohibiting a cause of action, "[c]oupled with the further direction in the statute that such a suit would not require the plaintiff `to plead or prove negligence in any form or manner'; the specification of the...
..."). D. Aramark's Arguments Aramark asserts several arguments for a contrary interpretation of the statute, which we now address. Aramark first asks us to adopt the rationale in Mostoufi. In that case, the court relied on the introductory language in section 376.313(3), which states that "nothing contained in ss....
...It is just as possible and, given the other provisions we have examined earlier, we believe more probable that the statute refers to a new cause of action created in the statute. Moreover, the narrow interpretation applied in Mostoufi ignores the directive in section
376.315 that the statutory scheme, of which section
376.313 is part, be liberally construed....
...fails to act immediately, the department may arrange for the removal of the pollutant...."). The primary purpose of a DEP suit is to enforce the statute and eliminate the pollution. The main purpose of a private suit is to compensate *28 the innocent victim of pollution. Section
376.313(6) reflects the essentially private purpose of individual suits by providing for attorney's fees and litigation costs only upon a determination that such an award is in the "public interest." Cf. Boardman Petroleum, Inc. v. Tropic Tint of Jupiter, Inc.,
668 So.2d 308, 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (noting that an attorneys fees award was sufficiently in the "public interest" under section
376.313(6), even though the private plaintiff unquestionably received a personal benefit from the lawsuit)....
...ision to allow private parties, the actual victims of pollution, greater ability to recover damages from the owners of contaminated property. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, we approve the First District's decision in this case and hold that section 376.313 creates a cause of action. We disapprove Mostoufi to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. In accordance with the district court's decision, this case should be remanded to the circuit court to apply section 376.313(3) as a strict liability statute, without requiring proof that the petitioners caused the contamination on their own property, and to determine whether any of the statutory exceptions and defenses apply....
CopyCited 33 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 19935
...40.11, Florida Statutes); (2) whether the trial court erred in dismissing claims based on public nuisance (Section
376.205, Florida Statutes); (3) whether the trial court erred in dismissing claims based on common law and statutory strict liability (Section
376.313, Florida Statutes); (4) whether the trial judge erred in prohibiting appellants' attorneys from showing certain photographs of appellees' premises to witnesses during depositions; and (5) whether the trial judge erred in ordering appe...
...it lacks standing to sue for public nuisance." (emphasis added). III. STRICT LIABILITY; ANTIPOLLUTION STATUTES We hold that Count V of the complaint fails to state a cause of action pursuant to Section
376.205, Florida Statutes, but states a cause of action as to Section
376.313, Florida Statutes....
...rface and ground waters posed by the storage, transportation, and disposal of pollutants. Section
376.30(2)(b), Florida Statutes, declares the legislative intent to deal with discharge of pollutants that pose a great danger to citizens of the state. Section
376.313, Florida Statutes ("Nonexclusiveness of remedies and individual cause of action for damages under ss....
CopyCited 23 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...declined as a result of the perceived health risks of the contamination.
The plaintiffs initially asserted Florida common-law claims sounding in
negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, trespass, and nuisance, as well as a
statutory claim under Fla. Stat. § 376.313....
...&W to The Acreage).
8
Case: 12-16396 Date Filed: 10/06/2014 Page: 9 of 37
law claims for strict liability, negligence, and nuisance, as well as a statutory claim
under Fla. Stat. § 376.313(3)....
...26
Case: 12-16396 Date Filed: 10/06/2014 Page: 27 of 37
Florida courts have not endorsed such a rule. We see no basis for imposing it
here.4
As for the plaintiffs’ § 376.313(3) claim, Leslie is the only case suggesting a
minimum contamination requirement. And the cursory statement from that case
cited above is at odds with the Florida Supreme Court’s recent conclusion that §
376.313 is part of “a far-reaching statutory scheme aimed at remedying,
preventing, and removing the discharge of pollutants from Florida’s waters and
lands” and provides “private causes of action to any person who can demonstrate
damages as defined under the statute.” Curd v....
...contamination”
plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
D
The district court also ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently plead
causation. We disagree.
First, a claim under § 376.313(3) does not require a typical showing of
causation....
...ion
issue, the First District reversed the trial court’s order granting class certification in
a case in which property owners were suing a paper company (for trespass,
nuisance, unjust enrichment, strict liability, negligence, and violation of §
376.313(3)) for dumping contaminants from a nearby mill....
...use and enjoyment of
land”) (emphasis added).
C
Based on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Curd, we come to the
same conclusion with respect to the strict liability, negligence, and § 376.313(3)
claims.
In Curd, decided five years after Leslie, commercial fishermen alleged that
contaminants from wastewater in a storage area had polluted Tampa Bay, the body
of water from which they earned a livelihood. The fishermen, who did not claim
an ownership in the damaged plant and marine life in Tampa Bay, sued the owner
of the storage area, asserting negligence and strict liability claims, as well as a
claim under § 376.313(3)....
...were able to catch and
attempt to sell,” and at “least implicitly” sought “monetary damages in the nature
of lost income or profits.”
39 So. 3d at 1218-19.
Answering a certified question, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that under §
376.313(3) the fishermen could “recover damages for their loss of income despite
the fact that [they] do not own any real or personal property damaged by the
pollution.” Id....
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 40 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20172, 2010 A.M.C. 2211, 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 341, 71 ERC (BNA) 1005, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 944, 2010 WL 2400384
...fishermen are able to catch and attempt to sell. At least implicitly, they are alleging monetary damages in the nature of lost income or profits. The complaint included three counts. Count 1 attempted to allege a claim for statutory liability under section 376.313(3), Florida Statutes (2004)....
...Accordingly, the court further reasoned that Mosaic did not owe the fishermen an independent duty of care to protect their purely economic interests. See id. at 1082-83 . Additionally, in evaluating the fishermen’s statutory liability claim under section 376.313(3), the court concluded that there is no Florida precedent that permits a recovery for damages under section 376.313(3) when the party seeking the damages does not own or have a possesso-ry interest in the property damaged by the pollution....
...Further, the court said that there is no express language from the Legislature stating that it intended the statute to create a wide array of claims- by people indirectly affected by pollution. See id. The court also declined to read into the statute a legislative intent in section 376.313(3) to allow such economic claims based on the fishermen’s unique relationship with the fish or based on the fact that the fishermen hold commercial fishing licenses....
...questions above to be of great public importance. See Curd,
993 So.2d at 1079 . We granted review to answer the certified questions. ANALYSIS Statutory Cause of Action We first address whether the private cause of action recognized in section *1220
376.313(3), Florida Statutes (2004), 1 allows commercial fishermen to recover damages for their loss of income despite the fact that the fishermen do not own any property damaged by the pollution....
...nstrued several provisions of the chapter in pari materia and given effect to the various sections. See E.A.R. v. State,
4 So.3d 614, 629 (Fla.2009); McDonald v. State,
957 So.2d 605, 610 (Fla.2007); Zold v. Zold,
911 So.2d 1222, 1229-30 (Fla.2005). Section
376.313(3), Florida Statutes (2004), provides as follows: Except as provided in s....
...Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s.
376.308. (Emphasis added.) The Second District Court of Appeal provided the following legislative history regarding section
376.313(3): Chapter 376 regulates the discharge of pollution....
...Section
376.30 further provides that the Legislature found and declared that escapes of pollutants “pose threats of great danger and damage ... to citizens of the state, and to other interests deriving livelihood from the state.” §
376.30(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added). We find that section
376.313(3) and the language used in section
376.30 are clear and unambiguous, and we rely solely on their plain language to discover the legislative intent. Section
376.313(3) provides that “nothing ... prohibits any person from bringing a cause of action ... for all damages resulting from a discharge or other condition of pollution.” §
376.313(3)....
...Moreover, the Legislature intended that the statute be liberally construed. See §
376.315 (“Sections
376.30-376.319 ... shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes set forth under ss.
376.30-376.319 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended.”). The title of section
376.313, “Nonexclusiveness of remedies and individual cause of action for damages under ss....
...t be given to the title of the section because “the title is more than an index to what the section is about or has reference to; it is a direct statement'by the legislature of its intent”). Importantly, in Aramark,
894 So.2d at 24, we held that section
376.313(3) creates a private cause of action by creating a damages remedy for the non negligent discharge of pollution without proof that the *1222 defendant caused it....
...Therefore, a defendant can be held liable even without proof that it caused the pollutive discharge, that is, the plaintiff does not have to plead or prove negligence in any form. See id. at 23-24. We noted that the following factors demonstrate that section 376.313(3) creates a cause of action for strict liability regardless of causation: [T]he statute’s provision of a damages remedy for the non negligent discharge of pollution; the defenses provided in the statute, including the inclusion of lack of causation as an affirmative defense; and other aspects of the statute such as its title, the cumulative remedies clause and the attorney’s fees provision — -when combined with the statutory directive that section 376.313(3) should be liberally construed.......
...1998, at 50, 51). We find that some of those factors are relevant in this case and would allow commercial fishermen to recover damages for their loss of income despite the fact that the fishermen do not own any real or personal property damaged by the pollution. Section 376.313(3) provides that “in any such suit ......
...pollution. First, it must be noted that under the definition of damages cited above, one can recover for damages to real or personal property but one can also recover for damages to “natural resources, including all living things.” Furthermore, section 376.313(3) states that “[t]he only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s....
...ision of the Second District. It is so ordered. PARIENTE, LEWIS, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. POLSTON, J, concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. CANADY, J., recused. . While the plaintiffs filed one of their causes of action under section
376.313, which provides for individual causes of action for pollution of surface and ground waters, it should be noted that section
376.205, Florida Statutes (2004), provides for individual causes of action for pollution of coastal waters and lands also....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24098, 59 ERC (BNA) 1741
...contaminants, and petroleum products caused or contributed to by the United States that may present an imminent and substantial endangerment in or around MIA. 10. Count VIII seeks cost recovery, contribution, and declaratory relief pursuant *1325 to Section 376.313, Florida Statutes. Section 376.313 allows an individual to bring a cause of action for damages and contribution resulting from pollution discharges....
...entirety. G. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Counts VIII, IX and X Brought Pursuant to Florida Statutes and the Miami-Dade County Code 98. Counts VIII, IX, and X alleges claims for contribution and other relief *1354 under state law, Fla. Stat. §§
376.313 and
403.727, and Chapter 24 of the Miami-Dade County Code....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 268910
...Suarez and the Suarez Family Trust, the equitable and legal owners of the property where the garbage was dumped, brought suit against the City asserting claims for (a) inverse condemnation, (b) continuing trespass, and (c) declaratory relief as to a statutory cause of action under section 376.313(3), Florida Statutes (2002)....
...orts of a non-continuing [sic] nature, where discrete wrongful acts often have lasting consequences"). C. The Statutory Claim The appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting the City's motion for summary judgment as to this claim because section 376.313(3) provides a private right of action for clean-up costs....
...See Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel, Inc. v. Easton,
894 So.2d 20 (Fla.2004). This issue, however, was not the basis for the trial court's ruling. In their initial brief, the appellants do not in any manner challenge the trial court's unequivocal ruling that the claim asserted under section
376.313(3) was barred by the statute of limitations....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19576, 1995 WL 775004
...Further, the act provides that in any suit for damages arising from a prohibited discharge, it is unnecessary for a party to prove or plead negligence. It is only necessary that the person plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge. (F.S. Chapters
376.205, and
376.313)....
...Plaintiffs properly seek response costs, which are costs incurred in assessing and containing the damage caused by the solvent contamination. However, Plaintiffs make no mention of any damages incurred as a result of cleaning up or removing the assessed contamination. "To interpret section 376.313(3) to provide for a private right of action for damages from pollutant discharge unconnected with the cleanup or removal of the discharge would impact negatively on the stated purposes of the act." Id....
...he global ad damnum clause at the end of the Complaint. However, the only mention of any statutory authority for such requests is found in Plaintiffs Demand for Judgment, where Plaintiffs request recovery of attorney's fees as to Count V pursuant to Section
376.313, Florida Statutes. Nevertheless, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Count V contemporaneously with the filing of this Motion to Strike, and the Motion was granted by this Court. Although Sections
376.205, and
376.313(6), Florida Statutes, provide for the recovery of attorney's fees in actions brought under Chapter 376, Plaintiffs claim under it is disregarded because this Court has previously dismissed Count V of Plaintiffs' Complaint....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1993 WL 114770
...His first challenge is to the trial court's apparent finding that appellant has no cause of action for damages. Appellant asserts that neither Presto's status as a remote predecessor in title nor the doctrine of caveat emptor are valid defenses to the statutory cause of action that appellant alleges was created by section 376.313, Florida Statutes (1989). We conclude, however, that section 376.313 does not create a statutory cause of action as sought to be alleged by appellant....
...Stores, Inc. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Regulation,
556 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied,
564 So.2d 1085 (Fla. 1990). Appellant then brought his action against appellees attempting to allege in Count I a strict liability statutory cause of action based on section
376.313, and in Count II a common law negligence cause of action using section
376.313 as a statutory *1374 standard of care which appellees were alleged to have breached....
...e value of Plaintiff's property and also that Plaintiff has been ordered to incur significant costs and expense in rehabilitating the Property. It is without dispute that appellant grounds his complaint against appellees on the statutory language of section 376.313(3)....
...[I]n any such suit, it is not necessary for such person to plead or prove negligence in any form or manner. Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. Appellant argues that section 376.313(3) creates a statutory cause of action in private parties to seek monetary damages resulting from the mere fact of the discharge of petroleum without alleging any other demonstrable damages except for alleged loss of market value....
...denied,
591 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1991), for the rule that caveat emptor bars appellant's action against appellees for undisclosed defects in the commercial real property, particularly when appellee Presto was a remote predecessor in title to appellant. In arguing that section
376.313(3) creates a private right of action for damages, appellant makes the following arguments in his initial brief: This is a matter of first impression, as there is no case law interpreting the private party recovery provisions of Florida Statutes section
376.313....
...ions of the act and do not relate to private causes of action for damages. It is also puzzling that appellant relies for authority for its position on the federal act because the language of the federal act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365, and the Florida act, section 376.313(3), are quite dissimilar....
...Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n,
354 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1977); State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973). While we are not required by this appeal to reach the issue, there is some indication of an intent by the legislature, in enunciating standards of proof in section
376.313(3) and (4), to impose in some existing causes of action a new standard of care of strict liability for pollution damages that are found to have occurred....
...Gables By The Sea, Inc.,
167 So.2d 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964), cert. denied,
174 So.2d 32 (Fla. 1965); 1 Fla.Jur.2d Actions § 26. Under common law doctrines, without resulting demonstrable damage, a wrong in itself is not compensable. There is no clear legislative mandate in section
376.313 to provide otherwise. Moreover, to interpret section
376.313 otherwise would lead to a subversion of the principal purpose of sections
376.30 to 376.319, Florida Statutes (1989). The chief thrust of those statutory enactments is to protect the lands and waters of Florida and to provide for the prompt containment and removal of damage to those lands and waters by pollutant discharge. See §
376.30. To interpret section
376.313(3) to provide for a private right of action for damages from pollutant discharge unconnected with the cleanup or removal of the discharge would impact negatively on the stated purposes of the act....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 1788830
...a result of the dumping. Appellees' motion for class certification was premised on the following counts: (1) continuing trespass; (2) continuing nuisance; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) strict liability; (5) negligence; and (6) statutory liability under section 376.313(3), Florida Statutes (providing a civil cause of action for damages suffered as a result of a prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition; no negligence need be proven)....
...Cotter Corp.,
65 F.3d 823 (10th Cir.1995). Furthermore, Appellees' own expert, Dr. Flowers, opined that lime grits were likely not a source of contamination. Thus, for any class member whose property only contains lime grits, causation could not be established. Even under section
376.313, Florida Statutes (2004), which does not require proof of causation, Appellees would not prevail. See §
376.313, Fla....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 476458
...In May 1992, ISS sued McMullen for damages associated with the contamination. Its complaint included a count alleging that McMullen was strictly liable under Florida's Pollutant Discharge Prevention and Control Act, Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and praying for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 376.313(5), Florida Statutes (1991)....
...PARKER, C.J., and LAZZARA, J., concur. NOTES [1] On appeal McMullen does not challenge the trial court's rejection of its assertion that it was entitled to a fee award under the alternative statutory grounds provided in sections
45.061, Florida Statutes (1990), and
376.313(5), Florida Statutes (1989). [2] Section
376.313(5), Florida Statutes (1991), on which ISS had based its prayer for attorney's fees, did not provide for an award of fees to the prevailing party....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 1800555
...Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed this count with prejudice. 5. Violation of Statutes. Ms. Morgan attempted to assert a private cause of action against W.R. Grace based upon her allegations that W.R. Grace violated sections
376.30 to 376.319, Florida Statutes (1983). [2] This court has previously held that section
376.313(3), Florida Statutes (1991), does not create a private cause of action....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1996 WL 283690
...However, Futura did not involve a claim based on chapter 376. Mostoufi v. Presto Food Stores, Inc.,
618 So.2d 1372 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied,
626 So.2d 207 (Fla.1993) did involve such a claim. In Mostoufi, as in this case, the plaintiff essentially argued section
376.313 (1989) created a cause of action which is not barred by caveat emptor....
...y to state standards, [7] which allegedly occurred in this case, and requires any person discharging pollutants to "immediately undertake to contain, remove, and abate the discharge to the department's satisfaction." §
376.305(1), Fla.Stat. (1989). Section
376.313(3) also provides that nothing in the law affects the right of any person to clean up and remove pollutant, and that doing so shall not affect that person's rights against any third party whose acts or omission caused or contributed to the discharge. Attorney fees and costs of litigation may be awarded. §
376.313(5), Fla.Stat....
...Further, the right to recover contribution from persons responsible *205 for pollution are provided for in the Florida law. [16] In Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp.,
558 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied,
574 So.2d 139 (Fla.1990), the court held that section
376.313 creates an individual cause of action for persons injured by a defendant's release of hazardous materials which causes environmental as well as health hazards. The court held that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to state a cause of action pursuant to section
376.313: [T]he toxic substances utilized by the defendants was a pollutant within the meaning of chapter 376; the defendant's plant was a facility within the meaning of the statute; the defendants violated the statute by discharging the pollu...
...und waters which had been contaminated. If neighbors and employees are afforded a remedy against a polluter, there is little reason or equity to deny a subsequent landowner who has been similarly damaged, such a remedy. A recent amendment to chapter 376.313, Florida Statutes (1992) has clarified that private causes of action brought by private parties are contemplated and permitted. Section 376.313(3) provides that private persons may bring a cause of action in a court of competent jurisdiction for all damages resulting from pollution covered by the chapter....
...is legislation was not designed to protect subsequent purchasers of polluted property, who may or may not have known about the pollution and no matter whether they had taken measures to protect themselves at the time of the purchase. The language of section 376.313(3) itself suggests that a "person" suing for damages would have to have been the victim of a discharge or other covered condition of pollution....
...Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit or diminish a party's right to contribution from other parties jointly or severally liable for a prohibited discharge of pollutants or hazardous substances or other pollution conditions..... [16] §
376.09(5) & (6), Fla.Stat. (1989). [17] Section
376.313, Florida Statutes (1989) provides: (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, nothing contained in ss....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...Williams’ sole source of causation
evidence, the Court, in the same order, granted Mosaic’s motion for summary
judgment as to all claims requiring a showing of causation.
When the dust settled, Ms. Williams had one remaining claim: her
“prohibited discharge” claim. This claim was brought under Section 376.313 of
the Florida Statutes, which confers a private right of action on citizens who suffer
damage from a discharge of materials in violation of Florida’s environmental
standards....
...der, the District Court granted
summary judgment for Mosaic sua sponte as to the remaining claim. The Court
observed that Ms. Williams “was on notice that she was required to come forth
with all her evidence regarding the damages element of the Section 376.313
claim,” yet failed to produce anything more than her own inadmissible testimony.
Thus, the Court found that summary judgment was warranted as to her “prohibited
discharge” claim on account of her failure to prove any damages resulting from the
discharge....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 4224835
...action and affirm the order on appeal. Because we conclude that the issue of whether commercial fishermen may recover economic losses arising from the release of pollution in Florida waters, either under principles of common law negligence or under section 376.313, Florida Statutes (2004), is a matter of great public importance, we certify two questions to the Florida Supreme Court: DOES FLORIDA RECOGNIZE A COMMON LAW THEORY UNDER WHICH COMMERCIAL FISHERMEN CAN RECOVER FOR ECONOMIC LOSSES PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENT RELEASE OF POLLUTANTS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE FISHERMEN DO NOT OWN ANY PROPERTY DAMAGED BY THE POLLUTION? DOES THE PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION RECOGNIZED IN SECTION 376.313, FLORIDA STATUTES (2004), PERMIT COMMERCIAL FISHERMEN TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR THEIR LOSS OF INCOME DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE FISHERMEN DO NOT OWN ANY PROPERTY DAMAGED BY THE POLLUTION? According to the allegations in the fishermen's co...
...fishermen are able to catch and attempt to sell. At least implicitly, they are alleging monetary damages in the nature of lost income or profits. The complaint included three counts. Count 1 attempted to allege a claim for statutory liability under section 376.313(3), Florida Statutes (2004)....
...Simply put, Mosaic did not owe an independent duty of care to protect the fishermen's purely economic intereststhat is, their expectation of profits from fishing for healthy fish. II. THE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILED TO ALLEGE A RECOGNIZED CLAIM UNDER CHAPTER 376 The fishermen's final claim is a statutory claim under section 376.313(3)....
...tion of powers issues are created, and that tension must be resolved in favor of the Legislature's right to act in this area."). Thus, the analysis of this claim rests simply on statutory interpretation, examining whether the legislature intended in section 376.313(3) to provide fishermen a cause of action for their economic losses due to pollution....
...The legislature expanded the reach of chapter 376 when it enacted the Water Quality Assurance Act of 1983, ch. 83-310, Laws of Fla. Section 84 of chapter 83-310 effectively created a private cause of action for damages caused by pollution. Ch. 83-310, § 84, at 1885, Laws of Fla. This provision is currently codified in section 376.313(3). Section 376.313(3) reads: Except as provided in s....
...to measure recoverable damages under this statute. While courts cannot abrogate or defeat statutory causes of action by applying common-law rules, the legislature itself often creates statutory causes of action with an eye toward the common law. In section 376.313(3), the legislature did not directly state that it was creating a cause of action; it explained that "nothing contained" in the statute "prohibits any person from bringing a cause of action." If the legislature had actually intended t...
...the special interest in exercising the public right to fish and dig clams). [8] We do not rule out the possibility that the legislature could give commercial fishermen special rights in this context, but this court declines to read this intent into section 376.313(3) or to provide this right as a matter of tort law....
...Finding no support for the fishermen's claim that they are entitled to recover for their economic losses absent injury to their persons or property, we affirm the trial court's order dismissing their claims. We recognize, however, that this conclusion is based upon general negligence principles and the interpretation of section 376.313(3), with regards to matters that are subject to some dispute....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14883, 1997 WL 391607
...which confer jurisdiction here. See Bunger v. Hartman,
851 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.Fla.1994). In addition, the state law claims alleged in the Amended Complaint, raise novel and complex issues of state statutes and county regulations. For example, whether §
376.313 alleged in Counts III and IV establishes a private cause of action has only been addressed by one Florida court which answered the question in the negative....
...Ferguson, United States District Judge, within ten (10) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. See Nettles v. Wainwright,
677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). NOTES [1] Counts III and IV seek recovery costs and contribution under §
376.313(3), Fla.Stat....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1996 WL 71262
...r S. Roumbos, Gulfbreeze, for appellants. Randall Denker of Lehrman and Denker, Tallahassee, for appellees. STEVENSON, Judge. This is an appeal from a final judgment awarding costs and attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff pursuant to sections
376.313(5) (Pollutant Discharge Prevention and Control Act) and
45.061 (offer of settlement), Florida Statutes (1993)....
...That judgment became final and was not appealed. Therefore, we must presume the correctness of the trial court's determination that appellees were entitled to bring suit under the Act. In this appeal, we merely decide whether or not the award of attorney's fees was proper. Section 376.313(5) provides that the court may award attorney's fees and other litigation costs in any action for damages under the Act "whenever the court determines such an award is in the public interest." We reject the appellants' contention that appellees were not entitled to fees under section 376.313 because the litigation merely advanced appellees' private interests in obtaining monetary damages....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 387944
...Publix alleged that its eligibility for this program immunized it from suit pursuant to section
376.3078(3). Courtney's reply to Publix's affirmative defenses stated that section
376.3078(3) only immunizes polluters from a suit to require rehabilitation, and another portion of the same chapter, section
376.313, Florida Statutes (1995), specifically states that damage actions may still proceed....
...In this case, the trial court concluded that sections
376.3078(3) and (11) should be read to grant immunity from all causes of action where damages for the diminution in value were sought because any other interpretation would render the sections "toothless." However, section
376.313(3) states that the remedies of the WQAA "shall be deemed cumulative and not exclusive," and that a suit for damages shall remain viable....
...e landowner to recover rehabilitation costs, and section
376.3078 immunizes a real property owner from liability for rehabilitation costs. Therefore, under section
376.3078, all common law causes of action must be prohibited, despite the language of section
376.313 preserving these causes of action....
...those actions seeking rehabilitation of property damaged by contamination in Mostoufi v. Presto Food Stores, Inc.,
618 So.2d 1372, 1376-77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). In Mostoufi, the plaintiff was a successor landowner suing his predecessor in title under section
376.313(3) for strict liability for damages resulting from petroleum contamination of the plaintiff's real property. Id. at 1373. This court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action, holding that section
376.313(3) did not create a cause of action for damages resulting from contamination and that the doctrine of caveat emptor prevented the plaintiff from asserting any common law causes of action....
...It seems clear to us that the intent of the statute is to insure that it is not interpreted as preempting any private rights that were already in existence. Id. at 1376-77 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Under Mostoufi, whether a plaintiff can or cannot state a cause of action under 376.313(3) does not undermine any common law causes of action that he may possess. Here Courtney has not even asserted a cause of action under the WQAA. Rather, it has asserted common law causes of action, which by the very terms of section 376.313(3) are preserved....
...ant immunity only from suit for rehabilitation costs, it would have understood that a plaintiff would still be able to bring suit for other types of damages. This is perfectly consistent with the legislature's decision to leave the savings clause in section 376.313(3), even though other portions of the statute were amended by the 1994 legislation....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, N.D. Florida | 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103108, 2011 WL 4056077
...McKinnon Motors, LLC,
329 F.3d 805 , 808 n. 4 (11th Cir. 2003). While Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney’s fees with regard to their common law claims, Plaintiffs also seek recovery under the WQAA, which authorizes recovery of attorney’s fees to a prevailing Plaintiff. Fla. Stat. §
376.313 (6) (“The court, in issuing any final judgment in any such action, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney’s and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such an award is in the public interest.”)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9007, 2011 WL 346528
...The Dixon Lawsuit The Dixon plaintiffs, consisting of both construction workers (the "Construction Defendants") and landowners living in areas neighboring the Dania Property (the "Residential Defendants"), pled causes of action in negligence, violation of the Florida Pollutant Discharge Prevention and Control Act, Fla. Stat. § 376.313, nuisance and trespass....
...) failing to warn the Dixon plaintiffs of the toxic contamination of the local groundwater; and/or (f) failing to remedy the contamination and migration of toxic chemicals into the local groundwater. In the 90 counts alleging violation of Fla. Stat. § 376.313, the Dixon plaintiffs claim they suffered physical damages as a result of the discharge of pollutants from the Dania Property....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 31 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1225, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 20129, 2010 WL 5391519
...human health and safety. Plaintiffs claim damages for the physical illnesses (and, in some cases, death), caused by then* exposure to this toxic pollution while working at the facility. Florida’s Water Quality Assurance Act The WQAA, specifically section 376.313, provides a strict liability cause of action against owners of real property for damages caused by surface or ground water contaminants on the property. A person bringing a WQAA suit does not need to “plead or prove negligence in any form or manner ... [but] need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred.” § 376.313(3), Fla....
...Section
440.11(1) makes workers’ compensation the “exclusive” remedy for an employee’s injuries, “in place of all other liability” against his or her employer. Thus, section
440.11(1) would afford General Dynamics workers’ compensation immunity from Plaintiffs’ WQAA claims. However, section
376.313(3) limits defenses for a WQAA claim to “only” those listed in section
376.308....
...tigate) the issue or case[,]” such as “res judicata, collateral estoppel,” and other similar defenses. Id. Although this language from the Sher-win-Williams case is clearly dicta, even Plaintiffs concede that it would not be reasonable to read section
376.313(3) as barring all legal and statutory defenses not listed in section
376.308, Florida Statutes, as a bar to WQAA claims....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida
...iation has been completed" within a reasonable time constitutes a breach of the Contract. ( Id. ¶ 35). Accordingly, Plaintiff initiated the instant suit, bringing a claim for breach of contract (Count I) and a claim for violation of Florida Statute § 376.313 for the contamination of the Property (Count II)....
...Because the facts alleged indicate that Defendants have not obtained a NFA Letter, this allegation is sufficient to state a claim for breach of contract under Florida law. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss Count I will be denied. B. Count II: Violation of Florida Statute § 376.313 In Count II, Plaintiff brings a claim for strict liability against Perdido for violation of Florida Statute § 376.313(3), which creates a private right of action for "all damages resulting from a discharge or other condition of pollution covered by [the Pollutant Discharge Prevention and Removal Act]." Because PCE is covered under this statute, Plaintiff...
...Since several federal courts have held that CERCLA claims are not barred by "as is" clauses, then it stands to reason that "as is" clauses should not bar claims brought under §
373.313. The Court thus finds that the Contract does not bar a claim under §
376.313....
...The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s.
376.308. §
373.313(3). The defenses specified in §
376.308 do not include the doctrine of caveot emptor , indicating that it was the legislature's intent to not allow the doctrine to bar a claim under §
376.313(3)....
...And at least one Florida court agrees. In Kaplan v. Peterson ,
674 So.2d 201 , 205 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), the court held that a current owner of commercial real property could recover from prior owners who allegedly caused environmental contamination of the property pursuant to §
376.313....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 11184, 2002 WL 1790889
...the prior and ongoing migration of contaminated groundwater from commercial property owned by Appellee Aramark Uniform and Career and its predecessors in title, onto his adjacent commercial property. The bench trial of Appellant's claims pursuant to section 376.313, Florida Statutes (2000), and various common law theories, resulted in a final judgment in favor of Appellees....
...re not recoverable unless Appellees caused the contamination on their own property, and alternatively, (ii) finding that there was no evidence of Aramark's predecessor's conduct in causing the contamination [1] . Because we agree with Appellant that section 376.313(3), Florida Statutes (2000), provides a cause of action for strict liability, we reverse. *998 I. Section 376.313(3) states: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, nothing contained in ss....
...The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s.
376.308. (Emphasis added). Appellees argue that the trial court did not err, citing Mostoufi v. Presto Food Stores, Inc.,
618 So.2d 1372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). In Mostoufi, the court concluded that "section
376.313 does not create a statutory cause of action as sought to be alleged by appellant." Id. at 1373. Mostoufi, a landowner, sought damages pursuant to section
376.313 against his predecessor in title....
...The court further held that caveat emptor barred Mostoufi's claim for damages due to the alleged loss of market value of his commercial real property. Id. Mostoufi is not applicable because Appellant is an adjoining landowner rather than a successor in interest. To the extent that Mostoufi may be read to hold that section 376.313 does not create a statutory cause of action for these circumstances, we decline to follow it....
...exist. It seems clear to us that the intent of the statute is to insure that it is not interpreted as preempting any private rights that were already in existence."). This court has previously decided that a cause of action may be stated pursuant to section 376.313....
...1st DCA 1990), the court held that the plaintiffs, seeking damages from their employer resulting from exposure to toxic substances resulting in respiratory problems, liver damage, brain tumors, pulmonary disease, cancer, and other disorders, stated a cause of action pursuant to section
376.313. Likewise, Appellant's claim for damages pursuant to section
376.313(3) states a cause of action. See also Kaplan v. Peterson,
674 So.2d 201, 205 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)(ruling that legislative history of section
376.313 indicates that private causes of action brought by private parties are contemplated and permitted; "[s]ection
376.313(3) provides that private persons may bring a cause of action in a court of competent jurisdiction for all damages resulting from pollution covered by the chapter."). A plain reading of section
376.313 indicates that a cause of action for strict liability was created....
...Moreover, subsection (3) also states that the "only defenses to such cause of action *999 shall be those specified in section
376.308." This reference to the "only defenses to such cause of action" indicates that a cause of action was created by the statute. We do not read section
376.313(3) to require Appellant to prove that Appellees caused the contamination on their own property....
...Because the circuit court held that Appellant's damages were not recoverable unless Appellees caused the contamination on their own property, the exceptions in subsections (4) and (5) and potential defenses specified in section
376.308 were not addressed by the trial court. We therefore remand to the trial court to apply section
376.313(3) as a strict liability statute, without requiring Appellant's proof that Appellees caused the contamination on their own property, and to determine whether the exceptions and defenses specified within the statute are applicable....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2002 Fla. App. LEXIS 12395, 2002 WL 1972320
...denied,
799 So.2d 218 (Fla.2001), the court considered whether the passing of The Water Quality Assurance Act (WQAA) precluded a property owner from pursuing a common law cause of action for diminution in value of land for damages done by dry-cleaning chemical pollution. The statute under consideration, section
376.313(3), stated “that the remedies of the WQAA ‘shall be deemed cumulative and not exclusive,’ and that a suit for damages shall remain viable.” Id....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93127, 2009 WL 3193152
...On August 5, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Amended Complaint (the “Amended Complaint,” Doe. 61) asserting causes of action against Defendant for trespass, private nuisance, unjust enrichment, negligence, strict liability and liability under Fla. Stat. § 376.313 ....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Argued: Aug 23, 2023
...In its complaint, the City al-
leged that three parties were liable to it under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(g)(2), and Florida Statute
§ 376.313....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...declined as a result of the perceived health risks of the contamination.
The plaintiffs initially asserted Florida common-law claims sounding in
negligence, negligence per se, strict liability, trespass, and nuisance, as well as a
statutory claim under Fla. Stat. § 376.313....
...&W to The Acreage).
8
Case: 12-16396 Date Filed: 10/06/2014 Page: 9 of 37
law claims for strict liability, negligence, and nuisance, as well as a statutory claim
under Fla. Stat. § 376.313(3)....
...26
Case: 12-16396 Date Filed: 10/06/2014 Page: 27 of 37
Florida courts have not endorsed such a rule. We see no basis for imposing it
here.4
As for the plaintiffs’ § 376.313(3) claim, Leslie is the only case suggesting a
minimum contamination requirement. And the cursory statement from that case
cited above is at odds with the Florida Supreme Court’s recent conclusion that §
376.313 is part of “a far-reaching statutory scheme aimed at remedying,
preventing, and removing the discharge of pollutants from Florida’s waters and
lands” and provides “private causes of action to any person who can demonstrate
damages as defined under the statute.” Curd v....
...contamination”
plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
D
The district court also ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently plead
causation. We disagree.
First, a claim under § 376.313(3) does not require a typical showing of
causation....
...ion
issue, the First District reversed the trial court’s order granting class certification in
a case in which property owners were suing a paper company (for trespass,
nuisance, unjust enrichment, strict liability, negligence, and violation of §
376.313(3)) for dumping contaminants from a nearby mill....
...use and enjoyment of
land”) (emphasis added).
C
Based on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Curd, we come to the
same conclusion with respect to the strict liability, negligence, and § 376.313(3)
claims.
In Curd, decided five years after Leslie, commercial fishermen alleged that
contaminants from wastewater in a storage area had polluted Tampa Bay, the body
of water from which they earned a livelihood. The fishermen, who did not claim
an ownership in the damaged plant and marine life in Tampa Bay, sued the owner
of the storage area, asserting negligence and strict liability claims, as well as a
claim under § 376.313(3)....
...were able to catch and
attempt to sell,” and at “least implicitly” sought “monetary damages in the nature
of lost income or profits.”
39 So. 3d at 1218-19.
Answering a certified question, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that under §
376.313(3) the fishermen could “recover damages for their loss of income despite
the fact that [they] do not own any real or personal property damaged by the
pollution.” Id....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...This court affirmed and certified questions of great public importance; the Florida Supreme Court quashed this court's opinion and held that the economic loss rule did not bar the fishermen from pursuing both a common law negligence claim as well as a statutory cause of action under section
376.313(3), Florida Statutes (2004). Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC ,
39 So.3d 1216 (Fla. 2010) (quashing Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC ,
993 So.2d 1078 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ). The supreme court concluded that section
376.313(3) provides "private causes of action to any person who can demonstrate damages as defined under the statute," id....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida
well as a statutory cause of action under section
376.313(3), Florida Statutes (2004). Curd v. Mosaic
CopyPublished | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...The Hintons also
allege that they have lost uses of their property and that home values have
been damaged by the stigma.
The Hintons’ complaint
The Hintons brought the underlying action in 2007. The operative
complaint raises five counts. Count I seeks strict liability damages under
section 376.313, Florida Statutes, for discharge of hazardous substances
from the Lincoln Park Complex....
...judgment against Walter and Joan Hinton. In part, the court rejected the
City’s argument that, because no waiver of sovereign immunity exists for
a claim of strict liability against the government, the Hintons cannot
maintain a claim for damages under section 376.313.
2 The trial court granted summary judgment for the City on this count.
4
The City filed additional motions for summary judgment in March 2016
and July 2017....
...3d DCA 1999). The court reasoned that, contrary to claims for money
damages, claims in equity are not subject to the limitations for tort liability
in section
768.28(5), Florida Statutes. The court concluded that the
Hintons’ claims for damages under section
376.313 and the negligence
claim are subject to the sovereign immunity waiver caps in section
768.28(5)....
...failed to act
following environmental testing in 1997 because this involved planning-
level decisions related to site development. The court denied summary
judgment as to the negligence claim, inverse condemnation claim, and
claim for damages under section 376.313, finding no immunity....
...is
The City raises five points on appeal: (1) the medical monitoring claim
is completely barred because there is no waiver of sovereign immunity for
a claim in equity; (2) a claim for strict liability for discharge of hazardous
substances under section 376.313 is completely barred because the
sovereign immunity waiver statute applies only to negligence and the
discharge statute does not include an express waiver of sovereign
immunity; (3) if medical monitoring is a negligence claim, then it...
...unctions. We
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction questions about whether the damage caps
in section
768.28(5) apply and as to how many incidents or occurrences
the Hintons may be entitled to recover. We dismiss as untimely the City’s
challenge to the section
376.313 claim....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...In that case,
the homeowner sued a nearby factory, alleging that the factory emitted toxic
chemicals and was liable under a Florida statute that created a private right of
action for those damaged by a discharge of materials in violation of Florida’s
environmental standards. See id. at 1242-44 (citing Fla. Stat. § 376.313)....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida
...ironmental contamination to real property it owns. Specifically, Painewebber sought relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6972 of the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) for hazardous waste discharge in Count I and, pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 376.313, in Count II for contractual indemnification, Count III for statutory strict liability, Count IV for common law strict liability, Count V for negligence, Count VI for trespass, Count VII for nuisance and Count VIII for breach of an indemnity agreement....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2017
...ronmental contamination to real property it owns. Specifically, Paine-webber sought relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6972 of the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) for hazardous waste discharge in Count I and, pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 376.313, in Count II for contrac- • tual indemnification, Count III for statutory strict liability, Count IV for common law strict liability, Count V for negligence, Count VI for trespass, Count VII for nuisance and Count VIII for breach of an indemnity agreement....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...rt of Appeal in Simon’s
Trucking, Inc. v. Lieupo,
244 So. 3d 370, 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018), a case in which
the First District certified the following question of great public importance:
DOES THE PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION CONTAINED IN
SECTION
376.313(3), FLORIDA STATUTES, [of the 1983 Water
Quality Assurance Act] PERMIT RECOVERY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY?
For the reasons explained below and receding from precedent as requested by
Lieupo, we answer the certified question in the affirmative....
...ies,
spilling battery acid onto the highway. Lieupo alleged he responded
to the scene to tow away the truck and came into contact with the
battery acid, which caused him serious personal injuries. He filed his
complaint under section 376.313(3), Florida Statutes, [of the 1983
Water Quality Assurance Act] which imposes strict liability for the
discharge of certain types of pollutants.
Simon’s Trucking argued that Lieupo could not seek recovery
under section 376.313(3) because that statute did not permit recovery
for personal injury....
...definition of damages in its definition section. See §
376.301, Fla. Stat. (2011)
(setting forth the definitions for sections
376.30-376.317,
376.70, and
376.75 (the
1983 act)). Instead, the 1983 act provides for the recovery of “all damages.”
Specifically, section
376.313(3), Florida Statutes (2011), of the 1983 act states as
follows:
Except as provided in s....
...discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The
only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s.
376.308.
(Emphasis added.)
In this case, because Lieupo filed his cause of action under section
376.313(3) of the 1983 act, the “all damages” language of the 1983 act applies, not
the more restrictive definition of the 1970 act that expressly only applies to the
1970 act....
...n”); see also State v.
Brake,
796 So. 2d 522, 528 (Fla. 2001) (“[W]here a statute does not specifically
define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and
ordinary sense.”). Moreover, the Legislature has directed that section
376.313(3)
be liberally construed. See §
376.315, Fla. Stat. (2011) (“Sections
376.30–376.317
. . . shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes set forth under ss.
376.30–
376.317 . . . .”). Accordingly, section
376.313(3) of the 1983 act provides for the
-7-
recovery of personal injury damages....
...3d at 1230 (Polston, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we answer the certified question in the affirmative
and hold that the plain meaning of “all damages” in section 376.313(3) of the 1983
act includes personal injury damages....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Cynthia’s claim for strict liability under Fla. Stat. §
376.313. The Santiagos’ amended complaint added a fourth
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...personal injuries that the jury found he suffered after a tractor-
trailer owned by Simon’s Trucking was involved in an accident.
Simon’s Trucking argues the case should never have gone to trial
because the Florida Supreme Court held that the statutory cause
of action created by section 376.313(3), Florida Statutes, under
which Lieupo filed his claim, does not permit recovery for
personal injuries....
...hile transporting
batteries, spilling battery acid onto the highway. Lieupo alleged
he responded to the scene to tow away the truck and came into
contact with the battery acid, which caused him serious personal
injuries. He filed his complaint under section 376.313(3), Florida
Statutes, which imposes strict liability for the discharge of
certain types of pollutants.
Simon’s Trucking argued that Lieupo could not seek recovery
under section 376.313(3) because that statute did not permit
recovery for personal injury....
...The trial court rejected this
argument, and the case proceeded to trial. 1 The jury found the
battery acid caused Lieupo’s injuries and awarded him a total of
$5,211,500 in damages. This appeal follows.
II. Analysis
The sole issue before this court is whether section 376.313(3)
permits recovery for personal injury....
...was excessive was not before this court.
2
We conclude that the supreme court’s decision in Curd v.
Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC,
39 So. 3d 1216 (Fla. 2010), precludes
personal injury claims from being brought under section
376.313(3), but we certify a question of great public importance
asking the court to clarify this issue.
A....
...the
term: . . . ‘Damage’ means . . . .”).
The 1983 act, under which appellee brought his cause of
action, permits “any person [to] bring[] a cause of action . . . for
all damages resulting from . . . pollution” regulated by that act. §
376.313(3), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added); see also Aramark Unif. &
Career Apparel, Inc. v. Easton,
894 So. 2d 20, 28 (Fla. 2004)
(finding the cause of action created by section
376.313(3) is one of
strict liability)....
...Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC,
39 So. 3d 1216, 1220 (Fla. 2010).
However, the parties dispute whether this application was dicta,
or whether the supreme court intended to hold that this
definition of damages applies in all causes of action brought
under section
376.313(3). This presents a close question primarily
because the opinion alternatingly states that the court relied
solely on the plain language of section
376.313(3) to reach its
decision and that the court relied on an in pari materia reading of
the definition of “damages” from the 1970 act....
...at 1218.
The trial court dismissed their claim because the fishermen
lacked an ownership interest in the fish. Id. at 1219. The Second
District affirmed that decision, but the supreme court reversed.
Id. The supreme court framed the issue before it as “whether the
private cause of action recognized in section 376.313(3), Florida
Statutes (2004), allows commercial fishermen to recover damages
for their loss of income despite the fact that the fishermen do not
own any property damaged by the pollution.” Id....
...including “public health and safety,” “the environment,” and
“other interests deriving livelihood from the state.” Id. at 1221
(citing §§
376.315 &
376.30(2)(b), Fla. Stat.).
4
The court then stated, “We find that section
376.313(3) and
the language used in section
376.30 are clear and unambiguous,
and we rely solely on their plain language to discover the
legislative intent.” Id. The court quoted section
376.313(3) and
emphasized that it provides “any person” may bring a cause of
action for “all damages.” Id.
However, the court then applied the definition of “damages”
from the 1970 act, characterizing it as applying to the e...
...Such a holding would contradict the plain language of section
376.031, which states the “damages” definition only applies to the
1970 act. It would also contradict the court’s statement that it
reached its decision based “solely” on the “plain language” of
sections
376.313(3) and
376.30, and the court’s finding that the
1983 act should be liberally construed....
...However, because it is difficult to discern
whether the Curd court actually intended for this definition of
damages from the 1970 act to be applied to all causes of action
brought under the 1983 act, we certify the following question as
one of great public importance:
DOES THE PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION CONTAINED IN
SECTION 376.313(3), FLORIDA STATUTES, PERMIT
RECOVERY FOR PERSONAL INJURY?
REVERSED; QUESTION CERTIFIED.
ROBERTS and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.
7
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla....
