Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...red employees. See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Smith, 359 So.2d 427 (Fla.1978). The statutory scheme does not allow the injured employee to recover for certain noneconomic damages, such as pain, suffering, humiliation and emotional distress. See § 440.093, Fla....

...ng subsection 440.20(4), but did not make any relevant findings. Instead, the JCC concluded that Dr. Segal’s somewhat equivocal causation testimony was not clear and convincing evidence to support a claim of a compensa-ble psychiatric injury under section 440.093, Florida Statutes (2011). In the alternative, the JCC also found' that even assuming Claimant met the burden of persuasion under section 440.093, the defénse based on MCC was supported by Dr....

...ies’ mediation agreement. Application of Subsection 440.20(4) To prove entitlement to the requested psychiatric treatment, Claimant had the burden to show that the April 1, 2012, Compensable workplace accident is the MCC for his PTSD. §§ 440.09, 440.093, Fla....

...We affirm the fourth point as not yet ripe because the JCC has not yet determined the amount of the fee attributable to the AWW adjustment. We reverse in part the award of TTD benefits challenged on the third point, for the reasons that follow. The E/C contends that the award of TTD benefits contravenes section 440.093(3), which reads: Subject to the payment of permanent benefits under s....

...provement for the injured employee’s physical injury or injuries, which shall be included in the period of 104 weeks as provided in s. 440.15(2) and (4). Mental or nervous injuries are compensable only in accordance with the terms of this section. § 440.093(3), Fla....

...ntributing cause of her PTSD; and that the PTSD renders her temporari *867 ly totally disabled. The JCC awarded her TTD benefits “from July 3, 2014 and continuing so long as she remains entitled to same, and subject to the limitations set forth in Section 440.093(3),” which, the JCC ruled, “should be construed as a cumulative period limiting the total number of months of benefits such benefits are payable after an injured worker reaches physical MMI, and not a consecutive month period.” There is no question that the TTD award here is subject to section 440.093(3); the statute applies here because Claimant received impairment benefits....

...But we find error in the JCC’s interpretation of the statute. See, e.g., Lombardi v. S. Wine & Spirits, 890 So.2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review). In contrast to the JCC’s understanding, we read section 440.093(3) to set a strict deadline after which no TTD benefits are payable on psychiatric injuries....

...ay after the date of physical MMI. See, e.g., Perez v. Rooms To Go, 997 So.2d 511, 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding that, in construing statute, courts must first look to its plain language). The JCC drew a contrast between the operative language in section 440.093(3) — “in no event shall [the benefits] be paid for more than 6 months after [the date of physical MMI]” — and the operative language in section 440.15(2), which limits catastrophic TTD benefits by stating they “must not exte...

...Leverock’s Seafood House, 997 So.2d 476, 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (reaffirming that 104-week cap on temporary disability benefits, found in section 440.15, Florida Statutes, creates “bank” from which benefits are drawn and calculated cumulatively). Applying section 440.093(3) to the instant case, then, results in an award of TTD benefits from July 3, 2014, through July 9, 2014, the latter date being six months after Claimant attained physical MMI....

HAWKES, C.J. In this workers’ compensation appeal, we are required to interpret section 440.093, Florida Statutes, enacted by the Florida Legislature as part of the 2003 Chapter 440 reforms. Section 440.093 discusses the four situations when mental or nervous injuries arise....

...In addition to the claims based on her physical injuries, the Claimant claimed psychiatric injuries and requested treatment with a psychiatrist. The employer/carrier denied the psychological claims, alleging the psychiatric injuries were not compensable. At a hearing before a JCC, both parties’ arguments focused on section 440.093(2), Florida Statutes, which authorizes coverage for psychiatric injuries that manifest themselves as a result of a physical injury otherwise compensable under Chapter 440....

...that Claimant’s laryngeal contusion and vocal cord hematoma alone constitute at least 50% of the cause of her PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder], dysthymic disorder, anxiety disorder or personality disorder.” Claimant now challenges the JCC’s ruling, arguing the JCC erred in its application of section 440.093(2). Because this issue requires us to interpret and apply section 440.093, our review is de novo. See Socolow v. Flanigans *769 Enters., 877 So.2d 742, 743 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Section 440.093 The Workers’ Compensation Law is designed to provide defined benefits for certain injuries caused by workplace accidents. See Chapter 440, Fla. Stat. (2007). Although recovery for psychiatric injuries is limited and restricted under the law, certain psychiatric injuries, which the statute refers to as “mental or nervous injuries,” are compensable. Id. Section 440.093 was added to the chapter as part of the 2003 reforms. This section addresses “mental or nervous injuries” and clarifies when these injuries are either compensable, or when they affect compensability. Id. Section 440.093(1) contains three sentences, with each sentence addressing different situations when mental or nervous injuries may arise in the workplace. Section 440.093(2) defines a fourth situation involving mental or nervous injuries. The following discussion addresses the extent of coverage for these four situations. The first sentence in section 440.093(1) provides: “A mental or nervous injury due to stress, fright, or excitement only is not an injury by accident arising out of the employment.” This first provision precludes coverage for mental or nervous injuries caused only by mental trauma....

...a mental or nervous injury as a consequence of witnessing some horrific event at the workplace. Although the legislature recognizes that such mental or nervous injuries exist, they are not com-pensable pursuant to Chapter 440. The second sentence in section 440.093(1) provides: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow for the payment of benefits under this chapter for mental or nervous injuries without an accompanying physical injury requiring medical treatment.” This second prov...

...See § 440.09, Fla. Stat. (2007). If the employee also suffers a mental or nervous injury separate and apart from the physical injury, the mental or nervous injury would be compensable because it would meet the section 440.09 requirements and also comply with section 440.093(1). In this hypothetical situation, the employee would have simultaneously suffered two compensable workplace injuries: one physical and one mental. The third sentence in section 440.093(1) provides: “A physical injury resulting from mental or nervous injuries unaccompanied by physical trauma requiring medical treatment shall not be com-pensable under this chapter.” This third *770 provision precludes coverage whe...

...the employee to suffer a heart attack or other internal failure. In this hypothetical, the physical injury (the heart attack) was caused by the mental or nervous injury (stress, fright, excitement) and would not be compensable under Chapter 440. Subsection 440.093(2) defines a fourth situation involving mental or nervous injury....

...Under the Workers’ Compensation Law, a “manifestation” is a disease or infection that “naturally or unavoidably” results from an initial, compensable workplace injury, not a synonym for the initial compen-sable injury. § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (2007); Subsection 440.093(2) provides: Mental or nervous injuries occurring as a manifestation of an injury compensa-ble under this chapter shall be demonstrated by clear and convincing medical evidence by a licensed psychiatrist ......

...If the chronic pain eventually results in the employee suffering a mental or nervous injury requiring treatment, the mental or nervous injury would be compensable as the manifestation of the physical injury. The Injury at Issue Here, the parties seem to have conflated the provision enumerated in the second sentence of section 440.093(1) (mental or nervous injury accompanying a physical injury) with that in section 440.093(2) (mental or nervous injury manifesting as a result of an earlier physical injury). The Claimant argues that the JCC erred in finding her mental injuries were not covered under section 440.093(2). As noted, section 440.093(2) addresses only those mental injuries that manifest as a result of a physical injury requiring medical treatment. Thus, in order to support her claim for coverage under section 440.093(2), the Claimant would have had to prove her mental injury was the manifestation of the bruising and temporary loss of voice that she suffered during the attack....

...ury to the Claimant’s neck. Because these mental or nervous injuries may have occurred at the same time as the physical injuries that required medical treatment, the mental or nervous injuries could only be compensable under the second sentence in section 440.093(1). Therefore, the JCC was correct in finding they could not, without further evidence, be compensable under section 440.093(2). In sum, the Claimant presented evidence relating directly to the type of mental or nervous injury defined in the second provision of section 440.093(1), but made an argument based on the type of injury defined in section 440.093(2)....

...Accordingly, the JCC was correct in finding there was insufficient evidence to support the Claimant’s argument that she was entitled to compensation pursuant to the later. However, because it appears that both the Claimant and the employer/carrier were uncertain as to the nuances of section 440.093, we REVERSE and REMAND this matter for further proceedings, including the taking of additional evidence if necessary....

...benefits and denying others. We affirm the order in all respects except to the extent the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) limited his award of temporary total disability benefits to six months. The JCC limited the award to six months by applying section 440.093(3), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...This statute provides that, "[s]ubject to the payment of permanent benefits under s. 440.15, in no event shall temporary benefits for a compensable mental or nervous injury be paid for more than 6 months after the date of [physical MMI]...." The scope of section 440.093(3), Florida Statutes, is an issue of first impression....

...The JCC further found that Dr. Abraham causally related the PTSD to the events occurring on October 19, 2010, not to any physical injury suffered on that date. The JCC also found Dr. Kolin, another psychiatrist authorized by the E/C, shared these opinions. Section 440.093(1), Florida Statutes (2010), the statutory provision applicable here, provides: A mental or nervous injury due to stress, fright, or excitement only is not an injury by accident arising out of the employment....

...rvous injuries without an accompanying physical injury requiring medical treatment. A physical injury resulting from mental or nervous injuries unaccompanied by physical trauma requiring medical treatment shall not be compensable under this chapter. Section 440.093(2), Florida Statutes (2010), is not applicable here because the relevant mental or nervous injury did not “occur[ ] as a manifestation of an injury compensa-ble under this chapter.” Section 440.093 was addressed at length by this Court in McKenzie v. Mental Health Care, Inc., 43 So.3d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). The McKenzie court determined that, with the addition of section 440.093 in 2003, the Legislature described four situations in which mental or nervous injuries may arise in the workplace. Id. at 769 . The situation presented under the facts as found here by the JCC most closely parallels the second sentence in section 440.093(1)....

...See § 440.09, Fla. Stat. (2007). If the employee also suffers a mental or nervous injury separate and apart from the physical injury, the mental or ner *1159 vous injury would be compensable because it would meet the section 440.09 requirements and also comply with section 440.093(1)....

...jury. Further, the JCC explained, the Legislature in 2003 took the opportunity to address psychiatric injuries at some length and limited the duration of temporary benefits paid for psychiatric injuries, but did not similarly limit PTD benefits. See § 440.093(3), Fla....

...of the neurosis, is compensable.” Racz v. Chennault, Inc., 418 So.2d 413, 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The requirement that there be a physical injury is the constant in these cases and, in fact, was expounded on in the 2003 amendments to chapter 440. Section 440.093 was enacted to specifically address “Mental and Nervous Injuries.” See Ch. 03-412, § 18, at 3916, Laws of Fla. In McKenzie v. Mental Health Care, Inc., 43 So.3d 767, 769-70 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), this Court, at length, discussed section 440.093 and concluded that the Legislature described four situations in which mental or nervous injuries may arise in the workplace, two of which would be compensable and two of which were not....

...pted prior judicial construction of a law unless a contrary intention is expressed in the new version”) (citations omitted). Here, there appears to be no such contrary intention expressed because, in the same round of amendments that *590 produced section 440.093, the Legislature opted to place a limit on the duration of temporary disability benefits payable in association with a compensable psychiatric injury. See § 440.093(3), Fla....

...Cristal of Cristal Hanenian, Tampa, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees. Wendy S. Loquasto of Fox & Loquasto, P.A., Tallahassee, and Bradley G. Smith of Smith, Feddeler & Smith, P.A., Lakeland, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. PER CURIAM. The issue before us is the proper interpretation of section 440.093(3), Florida Statutes (2011). Under the plain meaning of the statute, which we will discuss before applying it to the facts of this case, we reverse.  Benefits for Mental or Nervous Injury. At all pertinent times, section 440.093(3) has provided as follows: Subject to the payment of permanent benefits under s....

...employee’s physical injury or injuries, which shall be included in the period of 104 weeks as provided in s. 440.15(2) and (4). Mental or nervous injuries are compensable only in accordance with the terms of this section. Section 440.093(3) must be interpreted in para materia with the subsections that immediately precede it and the sections expressly referenced within it....

...1st DCA 1983) (reading parts of pertinent subsection of workers’ compensation act in para materia to arrive at proper construction); White v. City of Jacksonville, 413 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (same). The subsections immediately preceding section 440.093(3) emphasize the requirement of an “accompanying physical injury requiring medical treatment” before payment of benefits for mental or nervous injuries is allowed. § 440.093(1), Fla....

...Mental or nervous injuries must be demonstrated by “clear and convincing medical evidence by a licensed psychiatrist,” and the compensable physical injury must “be and remain the major contributing cause of the mental or nervous condition.” § 440.093(2), Fla....

...Thus, when a claimant attains physical MMI and the physical injury qualifies for a permanency rating, the claimant is entitled to, and “subject to the payment of permanent benefits” under, section 440.15.1 The dispute before us involves the next phrase in section 440.093(3): “in no event shall temporary benefits for a compensable mental or nervous injury be paid for more than six months after the date of maximum medical improvement for the injured employee’s physical injury or injuries ....

...at 867 (“in construing statute, courts must first look to its plain language”) (citing Perez v. Rooms To Go, 997 So. 2d 511, 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)). We concluded that the plain meaning of the statute required us to reject the “bank of time” interpretation of the six-month limit in section 440.093(3) in favor of a strict calendar-deadline interpretation: In contrast to the JCC’s understanding, we read section 440.093(3) to set a strict deadline after which no [temporary total disability] benefits are payable on psychiatric injuries....

...nefits based on that rating. Id. On July 3, 2014, five months and twenty-four days later, she for the first time obtained the requisite medical opinion that she had a compensable mental injury. Id. The JCC in Huben treated the six-month period of section 440.093(3) as a bank of time that could commence upon the date of the medical opinion as to compensable mental injury....

...in the required medical opinion of compensability for qualifying mental injuries, may have little or no time left in that indemnity benefits window. 2 This may seem unfair in the abstract, and we noted in Huben that a plain-meaning application of section 440.093(3) may lead to results at odds with the overall purpose of the workers’ compensation law. Huben, 165 So. 3d at 867. However, the limited grant of eligibility for mental-health benefits in section 440.093 is an exception to the general rule of non-compensability for such injuries, and limiting that exception is within the province of the Legislature. Limiting the 2 We acknowledge that the second sentence of section 440.093(1), Florida Statutes, provides for a mental or nervous injury accompanying a physical injury that may constitute its own separate injury independent of the compensable physical injury. See McKenzie v....

...unlimited psychiatric indemnity benefits during times when no permanent benefits are being paid. Such a construction would contravene the clear import of the physical injury and permanency prerequisites to eligibility for mental-health benefits imposed in subsections (1) and (2) of section 440.093. When the Legislature provided in the introductory phrase of section 440.093(3) that post-physical MMI temporary disability benefits for mental or nervous injury are “subject to” payment of 3 Notably, this case does not raise the issue of a subsequent re-assignment of a claimant’s physical MMI dat...

...The JCC awarded Claimant three months of psychiatric benefits to begin on the date of the EMA’s deposition, noting the six- month statutory limit. The parties assert on appeal the same arguments they presented to the JCC. The Employer/Carrier assert that section 440.093(3) limits temporary benefits post- physical MMI for a compensable mental or nervous injury to six months and that a request for such benefit ripens the day after physical MMI is attained—but claim no evidence on this record would support such an award during that time period. Claimant argues that section 440.093(3) does not apply because it applies only to claimants who are receiving permanent impairment benefits during the weeks in which they would be receiving the temporary psychiatric disability payments....

...over four years after Claimant reached physical MMI initially or two years after the reassigned MMI due to the decline in physical condition and the recommendation for further remedial care. To the extent that the JCC intended to treat the six-month period of section 440.093(3) as a bank of time that could be doled out over an extended period after Claimant reached physical MMI, this was also error and contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and our holding in Huben....

...This construction gives effect to the legislative expression of intent to begin such benefits in close temporal proximity to the causative physical injury and to terminate their availability in six calendar months. On cross-appeal, Claimant specifically challenges the application of section 440.093(3)’s six-month limitation to her award and challenges the constitutionality of that six-month limit....

...the Judge of Compensation Claims' (JCC's) award of psychiatric treatment. Claimant sought treatment for his diagnosed depression, which he alleged occurred as a manifestation of a compensable *124 physical injury. The relevant statutory provision is section 440.093(2), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...se of the mental or nervous condition and the compensable physical injury as determined by reasonable medical certainty [was] at least 50 percent responsible for the mental or nervous condition as compared to all other contributing causes combined." § 440.093(2), Fla....

...As part of this investigation, the JCC considered whether Claimant had presented “clear and convincing” medical evidence that the compen-sable physical injury “remain[ed] the major contributing cause of the [psychiatric injury],” as required by section 440.093, Florida Statutes (2003). We agree with Claimant that the JCC erred in applying section 440.093 to this case because section 440.093 presents the test for compensability of psychiatric injuries, and, here, as the Employer/Carrier conceded at closing argument, the Employer/Carrier was not challenging compensability of Claimant’s psychiatric injury....

...restrictions on admissible testimony in workers’ compensation cases. We cannot agree. The EMA presumption is not irrebuttable and is permitted elsewhere in the law (in civil and criminal contexts), as well as throughout Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. See § 440.093(2), Fla....

...accompanying physical injury requiring medical treatment. A physical injury resulting from mental or nervous injuries unaccompanied by physical trauma requiring medical treatment shall not be compensable 2  under this chapter. § 440.093(1), Fla....

...g which she was physically touched by the robber and held at gunpoint. She is entitled to compensation under workers compensation law for mental or nervous injuries if they were accompanied by a “physical injury requiring medical treatment.” Id. § 440.093(1)....

...George Kagan and Celine Abramschmitt of Miller, Kagan, Rodriguez & Silver, P.L., West Palm Beach, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. In this workers' compensation appeal Claimant contests the JCC's finding that his heart attack was not a compensable injury pursuant to section 440.093(1), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...nt. The employer/carrier (E/C) denied the claim, asserting that Claimant's heart attack was a physical injury caused by a mental or nervous injury unaccompanied by physical trauma requiring medical treatment, and thus was not compensable pursuant to section 440.093(1)....

...Claimant contends that this statute is inapplicable here because he did not suffer a mental or nervous injury that caused his heart attack, and therefore he was only required to prove that the elevator incident was the major contributing cause of his injury. Section 440.093(1), Florida Statutes (2003), provides: A mental or nervous injury due to stress, fright, or excitement only is not an injury by accident arising out of the employment....

...However, based on Claimant's description of experiencing a panic attack, as well as his continued emotional response to the incident, the JCC found Claimant did suffer from a mental or nervous injury. The JCC also concluded that Claimant did not suffer any physical trauma requiring medical treatment, and thus, section 440.093(1) precluded compensability of the heart attack....

...Neither Claimant's self-diagnosis of experiencing a panic attack, nor the JCC's determination that "common sense" dictated Claimant had in fact suffered a mental or nervous injury, can substitute for the section 440.09(1) evidentiary requirement. Significantly, the first sentence of section 440.093(1) differentiates between mental or nervous injuries caused by "stress, fright, or excitement," and physical injury caused by "mental or nervous injuries." Thus, stress, fright, or excitement does not necessarily equate to a mental or nervous injury....

...Here, there was no CSE that Claimant incurred a mental or nervous injury, or, if he did, that this caused his heart attack. However, even if there had been evidence that Claimant had suffered a mental or nervous injury, his heart attack would have been compensable under section 440.093(1), *713 Florida Statutes, because Claimant's heart attack constituted a physical trauma that required medical treatment....

workers' compensation appeal, Claimant argues that § 440.093(3), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional, and

workers' compensation appeal, Claimant argues that § 440.093(3), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional, and

...___ On appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims. Stephen L. Rosen, Judge. Date of Accident: June 30, 2014. April 3, 2019 OSTERHAUS, J. In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant argues that § 440.093(3), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional, and that the finding that he had no psychiatric work restrictions is unsupported by competent substantial evidence....

...The E/C opposed this petition asserting that the temporary disability claim was unsupported by the record and precluded by the workers’ compensation statute, which cuts off temporary benefits for psychiatric injuries six months after a claimant reaches physical MMI. See § 440.093(3), Fla. Stat. The JCC agreed with the E/C’s argument and denied temporary disability benefits, citing § 440.093(3), as well as Utopia Home Care/Guarantee Insurance Co. v. Alvarez, 230 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), and School Board of Lee County v. Huben, 165 So. 3d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). II. On appeal, Claimant brings a constitutional challenge to § 440.093(3)’s six-month limitation on temporary disability benefits for mental injuries once physical MMI is reached. He argues first that § 440.093(3) unconstitutionally denies his access to the courts, due process, and equal protection by forbidding him from receiving TPD benefits even though his psychiatric injury has not reached MMI. The standard of review for such constitutional challenges is de novo. See Medina v. Gulf Coast Linen Servs., 825 So. 2d 1018, 1020 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Claimant’s constitutional challenge is focused on § 440.093(3) of the workers’ compensation statute, which reads as follows: 2  Subject to the payment of permanent benefits under s. 440.15, in no event shall temporary benefits for a compensable men...

...Mental or nervous injuries are compensable only in accordance with the terms of this section. Under this section, an injured employee’s ability to receive temporary benefits is linked to the existence and duration of the physical injury. First, § 440.093(1) “emphasize[s] the requirement of an ‘accompanying physical injury requiring medical treatment’ before payment of benefits for mental or nervous injuries is allowed.” Utopia Home Care, 230 So....

...3d 964, 965-66 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). 3  In Claimant’s case, TPD benefits were not available based on his psychiatric injury because it arose more than a year after he reached physical MMI on the back injury. Under § 440.093 and the case law, Claimant missed the window for receiving TPD benefits related to his psychiatric injury....

...But because his psychiatric injury manifested more than a year after reaching physical MMI, he missed the period in which TPD benefits were available for it. Dissatisfied with these statutory parameters, Claimant cites Westphal and argues that § 440.093(3)’s limitation on temporary benefits for psychiatric injuries violates his constitutional right to access the courts, as well as his due process and equal protection rights....

...(expressing the Legislature’s intent that the Workers’ Compensation Law be interpreted to assure “the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to an injured worker and to facilitate the worker’s return to gainful reemployment”). Although § 440.093(3) draws narrower parameters for receiving temporary benefits for psychiatric injuries than for physical injuries, it does not force claimants to wait indefinitely to receive permanent disability benefits, or...

...1st DCA 2008) (noting that “the six-month limitation on temporary psychiatric benefits is conditioned upon the payment of permanent benefits for the associated physical injury”). Another reason we don’t see a constitutional problem with § 440.093(3), is that its six-month-post-physical-MMI limitation on temporary benefits applies only to psychiatric injuries, which have historically received less favorable treatment in Florida law....

...Had Claimant’s psychiatric injury arisen closer-in-time to, or contemporaneously with, his related physical injury, he would have qualified to receive TPD benefits. But his psychiatric injury arose more than a year after his physical injury reached maximum improvement, and more than a year after the § 440.093(3) period for receiving temporary benefits had ended....

...For example, benefits have never been available for stand-alone mental injuries without an accompanying physical injury. See Utopia Home Care, 230 So. 3d at 73; Roske, 417 So. 2d at 1161; City Ice & Fuel Div. v. Smith, 56 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. 1952). The 1968-era precursor statute to § 440.093 defined “[a]ccident” to exclude “[a] mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only.” See § 440.02(19), Fla....

...2d 593, 594 (Fla. 1974) (upholding Florida’s “long standing” impact rule that foreclosed recovery for emotional or mental injuries unaccompanied by physical injuries). And so, for purposes of the Westphal analysis, Claimant has not demonstrated that § 440.093(3) departs from past workers’ compensation limitations, or that it renders Florida’s workers’ compensation law an unreasonable alternative to tort litigation. 6  While we recognize that Claimant’s psychiatric injury isn’t a strictly stand-alone injury, and that it relates back to his prior workplace accident, § 440.093(3)’s application to his circumstances is consistent with how such injuries have been treated under Florida’s workers’ compensation law since 1968, when the Constitution conferred the right of access to the courts....

...ithout violating the Constitution’s access-to-courts provision. See Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167, 1171 (Fla. 1991); Acton v. Ft. Lauderdale Hosp., 440 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1983). And we don’t think the temporary benefits limitation in § 440.093(3) reduces benefits to the “tipping point” of creating an unconstitutional system....

...tial disability regardless of fault and without the delay and uncertainty of tort litigation,” at a reasonable cost to employers. Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1171-72. We likewise reject Claimant’s due process and equal protection challenges to § 440.093(3), recognizing the State’s legitimate interest in establishing time limits for benefits associated with psychiatric injuries....