Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Maddox appealed his convictions to the Second District Court of Appeal. The Second District affirmed Maddox's convictions and sentences without comment but wrote to specifically address his contention that the forged traffic citations were inadmissible pursuant to section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes (2001)....

...Therefore, the district court determined that the charges were no longer pending against anyone and, as a result, the documents relating to those charges "were not `citations' as contemplated by the statute, but rather were documentary evidence of Maddox's criminal conduct." Id. Accordingly, the district court held that section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes did not apply to the present case and certified conflict with the First District's decision in Dixon....

...When it was learned that [Dixon] gave a false name, he was charged with forgery under section 831.01 and driving without a valid driver's license. 812 So.2d at 595-96. However, contrary to the decision of the district court in the present case, the First District in Dixon determined that the language of section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes (2000), [2] was unambiguous and for that reason was not subject to any judicial interpretation or construction whatsoever. See id. at 596. Therefore, the district court in Dixon simply determined without elaboration that the language contained in section 316.650(9) — that "traffic citation[s] `shall not be admissible evidence in any trial'" — required the exclusion of forged citations in the State's prosecution for forgery. Id. (quoting § 316.350(9), Fla. Stat. (2000)). Maddox urges this Court to approve and adopt the First District's approach and decision in Dixon and hold that the First District appropriately applied section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes (2000), when it concluded that the language of the section is unambiguous and, therefore, not subject to judicial interpretation....

...Maddox continues that the plain meaning of the particular section makes it absolutely clear that citations simply should not be admissible in any trial under any circumstance. The outcome of this case necessarily turns on the application of principles of statutory construction with regard to section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes....

...in the adoption of this chapter to make uniform traffic laws to apply throughout the state and its several counties and uniform traffic ordinances to apply in all municipalities. § 316.002, Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis supplied). Additionally, when section 316.650 was originally enacted by the Legislature in 1971, the description of the bill expressly stated that it was AN ACT relating to the regulation of traffic on highways; ......

...to provide for a uniform traffic citation; requiring its statewide use; prescribing duties of traffic officers and chief administrative officers in connection with the issuance, distribution and maintenance of records.... Ch. 71-321, preamble, at 1501, Laws of Fla. (emphasis supplied). When section 316.650 is read in the context within the chapter in which it is found, its related statutory provisions, and the legislative history surrounding its passage, it is clear that a strict literal reading of the phrase "any trial," as suggested b...

...th matters directly associated with the substance of the charge upon which the citation is issued — a traffic infraction. Another principle of statutory construction that compels our conclusion that the Second District appropriately determined that section 316.650 is inapplicable to the instant matter is the rule which recognizes that "[t]he legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended." State v....

...ase "any trial," and the exclusion of those same modifiers in the statutory provision under review here, compels us to conclude that the Legislature intended different meanings of the term "any trial" in each statute. If the Legislature had intended section 316.650(9) to include "any trial, civil or criminal, " then the Legislature would have included that language within its enactment, as it did in section 316.066(4). However, the Legislature chose not to include these modifying terms in section 316.650(9), and we conclude that it would not be proper for us to imply this missing language where the Legislature has obviously intended that it be omitted. See State v. Bradford, 787 So.2d 811, 819 (Fla.2001); Beach, 692 So.2d at 152 (quoting Leisure Resorts, Inc., 654 So.2d at 914). Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the Legislature intended that the phrase "any trial" in section 316.650(9) should not be interpreted to mean "any trial, civil or criminal," but instead that the phrase "any trial" in section 316.650(9), consistent with the statutory chapter in which that statutory provision is found, was intended to refer to the use of traffic citations in proceedings in which the manner or method of the operation, maintenance or use of a vehicle is the issue in controversy....

...o show the last person having contact with the officer when the substance of the particular citation was in no way in controversy. We find further support for our conclusion in this matter when recognizing that the First District's interpretation of section 316.650(9) essentially eradicates all prosecutions for forgery of a traffic citation....

...forgery charge and that could potentially prejudice a defendant, a practice that is used by trial courts throughout Florida when a critical piece of probative evidence also contains prejudicial information. When the First District's construction of section 316.650(9) is considered in light of the above, it is clear to us that the Legislature surely did not intend for the phrase "any trial" to be construed so literally to exclude the use of traffic citations in all judicial proceedings — includ...

...ose involving traffic control and related motor vehicle operation matters such as civil litigation flowing from motor vehicle operation. In summary, although the strict meaning of the words in the abstract employed by the Legislature when it drafted section 316.650(9) may admittedly support the outcome of the First District's opinion in Dixon v. State, 812 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), such a sterile literal interpretation should not be adhered to when it would lead to absurd results. See Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1091 (Fla.1981). When section 316.650 is read in the context in which it is found and in conjunction with related statutory provisions, the reasonable construction of this statutory provision is that the Legislature intended only to exclude traffic citations in a more lim...

...1st DCA 2002), that the statute at issue is unambiguous and therefore must be applied as written. I do not believe that we can, or should, circumvent the statute's plain language. Its directive that traffic "citations shall not be admissible evidence in any trial," § 316.650(9), Fla....

...I am not prepared to declare it absurd for the Legislature to make citations inadmissible in all cases. As I explain below, the Legislature could have a rational basis for excluding them, such as preventing undue prejudice to defendants. Because I believe the plain meaning of section 316.650(9) prohibits the introduction of traffic citations in any trial, and that such a reading does not lead to an absurd result, I must dissent....

...Other states have rejected "a rule of blanket exclusion" in favor of a case-by-case approach. Getchell v. Lodge, 65 P.3d 50, 58 (Alaska 2003). Florida has done the opposite. Until recently, our traffic citation statute broadly provided that "citations shall not be admissible evidence in any trial." § 316.650(9), Fla....

...deem itself authorized to depart from the plain meaning of the language which is free from ambiguity." St. Petersburg Bank & *450 Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla.1982) (quoting Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693, 694 (1918)). Section 316.650(9) is as clear, definite, and unambiguous as statutory language gets. It states firmly and without exception that citations " shall not be admissible evidence in any trial. " § 316.650(9), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphases added). That, of course, includes forgery trials. The First District concluded as much, holding that "section 316.650(9) unambiguously provides that traffic citations are not admissible in any trial" and "contains no exceptions to this clear and unambiguous prohibition." Dixon, 812 So.2d at 595-96....

...The majority attributes this narrow construction to two contextual clues: the stated purpose of Florida's traffic laws, and the slightly different language used to prohibit the admissibility of crash reports. I cannot agree that either factor is sufficient to allow us to infer a legislative intent that "any trial" in section 316.650(9) means something less than that. I address each in turn. First, the majority notes that section 316.650(9) appears in the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law, whose opening provision expresses a "legislative intent ......

...to make uniform traffic laws to apply throughout the state," § 316.002, Fla. Stat. (2001), and whose original preamble focused on "the regulation of traffic on highways." Ch. 71-321, Laws of Fla. Highlighting the recurring word "traffic," the majority reasons that section 316.650(9) must have been intended to exclude citations only in traffic-related trials....

...3d DCA 2000) (citing Perry for the proposition that the crash report provision "is applicable to administrative proceedings"). Suffice it for these purposes to say that the modifier "civil or criminal" does not expand the scope of the phrase "any trial." The majority itself adds language to section 316.650(9) to support its narrower construction, qualifying the phrase "in any trial" with the phrase, "in which the manner or method of the operation, maintenance or use of a vehicle is the issue in controversy." Majority op. at 447. According to the majority, the absence of the phrase "civil or criminal" in section 316.650(9) implicitly limits the provision to traffic-related trials....

...(2001) (expressing "the legislative intent... to decriminalize certain violations" of the Uniform Traffic Control Law). Also, as I mentioned, some traffic offenses can result in administrative proceedings, which are neither civil nor criminal. Whether section 316.650(9) applies to civil or criminal trials is thus an entirely separate question from whether it applies to traffic-related trials. Based on this analysis, I continue to believe that the plain meaning of section *452 316.650(9) is that traffic citations may not be admitted as evidence in any trial, even a forgery trial....

...The Legislature, however, has prohibited citations from playing a substantive role by prohibiting their admission as evidence. Instead, they serve three procedural purposes. First, they document the traffic encounter. The statute requires citations to be issued in quintuplicate, § 316.650(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001), and meticulously explains where the copies must be sent and how long they must be kept. Id. § 316.650(3)-(8). Second, they give the accused notice to appear. Id. § 316.650(1)(a)....

...he trier of fact to decide ... and in part on the undue weight concerns"). In Florida, too, citations express legal judgments. They contain various boxes that officers must check when they believe that a listed offense has been committed. See, e.g., § 316.650(1)(a), Fla....

...The only issue is whether it would be absurd to exclude them. I conclude it would not be. Whether the probative value of admitting citations in forgery trials outweighs the risk of prejudice to defendants is, in my view, a policy decision for the Legislature. Earlier this year, the Legislature amended section 316.650(9) to allow the admission of traffic citations to prove forgery....

...(2001), giving false oral reports under the traffic laws, id. § 316.067, or obstructing an officer, id. § 843.02. Because the Legislature could have a rational basis for deciding that the costs of admitting traffic tickets in forgery trials outweigh the benefits, applying the plain meaning of section 316.650(9) cannot be considered absurd....

...[5] In the absence of absurdity, we have a responsibility to the Legislature, which carefully selected the words, and to defendants, whose liberty possibly hinges upon them, to enforce the statute as written. D. Conclusion I conclude from the plain meaning of section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes (2001), that traffic citations may not be admitted as evidence in any trial....

...Maddox, 862 So.2d at 784. While the State's assertion may be true, we conclude that this is a distinction without a material difference. The heart of the conflict revolves around the differences in the district courts' interpretations of the scope of section 316.650(9) of the Florida Statutes (2001). Therefore, we adhere to our initial decision to accept jurisdiction in the instant matter to resolve the conflict presented. [2] The language of the version of section 316.650(9) that was at issue in Dixon was identical to the language found in the version of the statute that is at issue in the instant matter. [3] After we granted review, the Legislature amended section 316.650(9) to include an explicit exception for citations "when used as evidence of falsification, forgery, uttering, fraud or perjury, or when used as physical evidence resulting from a forensic examination of the citation." Ch....

...Therefore, appellant's conviction and sentence for violation of section 322.212, Florida Statutes, is REVERSED. COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] A notice to appear under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.125 or a uniform traffic citation under section 316.650, Florida Statutes (1979) (see Fla.R.Crim.P....

...because she exhibited careless and improper driving during the accident. Sacred Heart objected to this document, because its author had based her evaluation on the fact that Blanchard had received a traffic citation as a result of the accident, and section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes, which prohibits introduction of a traffic citation into evidence....

...evaluation, because Ms. Anderson testified on voir dire outside the jury's presence that her statements about Blanchard's careless driving were based on the fact that Blanchard had been issued a traffic citation, and therefore its admission violated section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes (1990), prohibiting the introduction of a traffic citation into evidence at any trial. As the statements in the personnel evaluation were based on the traffic citation, we consider the evaluation should have been excluded under section 316.650(9)....

...5(b)(1), so that more custodial arrests would occur. NOTES [1] Florida Rule of Traffic Court 6.165(a) provides that "[a]ll prosecutions for criminal traffic offenses by law enforcement officers shall be by uniform traffic citation as provided for in section 316.650, Florida Statutes, or other applicable statutes, or by affidavit, information, or indictment as provided for in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure." [2] We note that giving a false name to a law enforcement officer after being arrested or lawfully detained is a criminal violation....

...Carter may not have been lucid at the time she executed the affidavit. There was also evidence to the contrary. Such is a classic jury question. I am of the view that the affidavit was properly received in evidence. With respect to the traffic citation, such would ordinarily not be admissible, Section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes, as incompetent evidence as to whether the person in fact committed the traffic infraction....

...ection 322.34(1), Florida Statutes (1985). The ticket specified that a court appearance was required within ten days and was duly signed by the officer and Ivory. A copy of the ticket was filed with the clerk of the court within the time required by section 316.650(3), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...The court held that Rule 6.07, the predecessor to Rule 6.165, authorized prosecution on the basis of a traffic ticket prepared by an officer. The court in Hurley also rejected the contention that prosecution by traffic ticket constituted an unconstitutional delegation to the police of prosecutorial authority, noting that section 316.650(3), Florida Statutes, requires deposit of the traffic citation with the court, after which judicial proceedings commence, with the state attorney or his assistant actually prosecuting the charges....

...protects the accused. Because we conclude that service on the accused of a copy of a properly prepared uniform traffic citation containing a notice to appear, and the timely filing of the original and one copy of the traffic citation, as required by section 316.650(3), Florida Statutes in the court having jurisdiction over the alleged offense, invokes the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and commences prosecution of the criminal traffic case for purposes of the statute of limitations, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied....

...Veilleux's true identity when they heard a passenger refer to him by a nickname. The State charged Mr. Veilleux with forgery pursuant to section 831.01, Florida Statutes (2002). He filed a motion in limine to exclude the forged traffic citations based on section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes (2002), and Dixon v. State, 812 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Section 316.650(9) provides that traffic citations "shall not be admissible evidence in any trial." The First District in Dixon specifically held that section 316.650(9) prohibits trial courts from admitting traffic citations as evidence in trials for forgery of the citations....

...Id. The trial court denied his motion, finding that the legislature could not have intended the exclusion of a traffic citation when the execution of the citation is the basis of the offense at trial. Id. The First District reversed, observing that section 316.650(9) contains no exceptions to its clear and unambiguous prohibition against admitting a traffic citation as evidence in any trial....

...lain language where there is "discernable legislative intent" to support such an interpretation, *1227 see Vildibill v. Johnson, 492 So.2d 1047, 1049 (Fla.1986), the court in Dixon had no basis to discern a legislative intent to make an exception to section 316.650(9)'s unambiguous language. Dixon, 812 So.2d at 596. Accordingly, the First District held that, "in view of the absolute mandatory terms of section 316.650(9)," the trial court erred when it denied the defendant's motion in limine in his forgery trial. Id. at 596. Like the First District in Dixon, we have no basis in this case to discern a legislative intent to make an exception to section 316.650(9)'s unambiguous language. The First District concluded it is the legislature's exclusive province to amend section 316.650(9) if it did not intend the result the statute's plain language mandates....

...681, 88 L.Ed.2d 691 (1986) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). We acknowledge that, as the Dixon court observed, applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of section 316.650(9) to these facts "will make convictions for forgery of a traffic citation more difficult...." [2] 812 So.2d at 596....

...Anderson, 746 So.2d 525, 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). The dissent would hold that we may grant certiorari based on the statute's violation of the clearly established constitutional principle of law that only the supreme court can promulgate procedural rules and on the argument that section 316.650(9) is a procedural rule that has not been approved by the supreme court....

...ic importance: WHEN THE SOLE ISSUE IN A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IS THE PLACEMENT OF A FORGED SIGNATURE ON A TRAFFIC CITATION, MAY THE STATE INTRODUCE THE CITATION BEARING THE SIGNATURE INTO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE FORGERY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 316.650(9), FLORIDA STATUTES (2002)? SALCINES, J., Concurs....

...would grant the petition and permit the State to introduce the signature on this official document. I would announce express conflict with the First District's decision in Dixon v. State, 812 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Finally, I would hold that section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes (2002), should not be followed as a procedural rule of evidence until such time as the supreme court adopts this rule of evidence....

...He allegedly signed a traffic citation on February 16, 2002, using the name, "Mark Lee White," instead of his actual name. After the State filed the information, Mr. Veilleux sought a motion in limine to prevent the introduction of the allegedly forged signature into evidence on the ground that section 316.650(9) precluded the introduction of a traffic citation into evidence and that the relevant signature was on a traffic citation....

...forged signature). The trial court concluded that it was bound by the Dixon decision and ruled that the traffic citation containing the alleged forgery could not be introduced into evidence. The State then filed this petition for writ of certiorari. Section 316.650(9) was first enacted in 1963 as part of a law creating a uniform traffic ticket....

...document constituting a uniform traffic citation from being introduced in evidence under any circumstance. Dixon, 812 So.2d at 596. The State primarily argues that the majority decision in Dixon places an unnecessarily expansive interpretation upon section 316.650(9). It encourages *1230 this court to adopt reasoning similar to that of the dissent written by Judge Polston on Dixon. I. I agree with the State that the First District used an unnecessarily expansive interpretation of section 316.650(9)....

...to mean the entire physical document including all signatures and other denotations on that document. I do not understand why the driver's signature is clearly and unambiguously a portion of "such citation." In the context of the initial enactment, section 316.650(9) was enacted to make certain that uniform traffic citations would not become admissible as business records and that traffic officers would still be required to attend traffic court....

...eed to reach that issue at this time. II. Although I believe this court could issue the petition for writ of certiorari based upon the State's argument, implicit within its argument is an even stronger reason to grant certiorari relief in this case. Section 316.650(9), at least in this context, is purely a procedural rule of evidence. Only the supreme court can create a procedural rule of evidence. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.; see also In re Florida Evidence Code, 372 So.2d 1369 (Fla.1979), clarified by In re Evidence Code, 372 So.2d 1369 (Fla.1979). Section 316.650(9) does not define a crime or establish any substantive law....

...PER CURIAM. Richard L. Dixon appeals his convictions for forgery of a written instrument and driving without a valid driver's license. He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine by which he sought to exclude, on the authority of section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes (2000), the admission into evidence of a traffic citation issued to him. Because the language of section 316.650(9) unambiguously provides that traffic citations are not admissible in any trial, we must reverse....

...elow or on appeal that this evidentiary ruling was not dispositive. Florida courts have recognized that signing another person's name to a traffic citation constitutes a forgery. See Rushing v. State, 684 So.2d 856 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Nevertheless, section 316.650(9) provides that a traffic citation "shall not be admissible evidence in any trial." The statute contains no exceptions to this clear and unambiguous prohibition....

...As the Florida Supreme Court stated in Jett: We trust that if the legislature did not intend the result mandated by the statute's plain language, the legislature itself will amend the statute at the next opportunity. 626 So.2d at 693. Accordingly, in view of the absolute mandatory terms of section 316.650(9), we conclude that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion....

...cause is REMANDED with directions to discharge appellant. REVERSED and REMANDED. ALLEN, C.J. and VAN NORTWICK, J., concur and POLSTON, J., dissents with written opinion. *597 POLSTON, J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent because I would not apply section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes (2000) to the forged traffic citation....

...a ticket would be forgery" pursuant to § 831.01). A traffic citation issued to the wrong person [1] and signed with a forged signature is defective, at the very least as to the person whose name is improperly on the citation. [2] A plain reading of section 316.650(9) shows that the Legislature did not exclude defective traffic citations from admission in trial....

...On November 14, 1986, respondent Hancock was charged by a uniform traffic citation with driving while his license was suspended. The officer issuing the citation to Hancock did not file the citation with the Orange County Court Clerk until seventeen days after it was issued, contrary to section 316.650(3), Florida Statutes (1987), which provides that the citation shall be filed with the clerk of the court within five days after issuance....

...Procedure Rule 3.190(c) provides that every ground for a motion to dismiss which is not raised by or at arraignment is waived, unless the objection is based on fundamental grounds. The circuit court reversed, holding that the five day requirement in section 316.650(3) was jurisdictional and fundamental and therefore the motion to dismiss was not untimely and should have been granted....

...This Order, then, rules on the Plaintiffs' motions restyled as Motions for a Permanent Injunction. I. DISCUSSION The Plaintiffs, James H. Babkes and Kevin M. Unger, brought this action against Michael J. Satz, in his official capacity as State Attorney for Broward County, Florida, to enjoin the enforcement of Florida Statute § 316.650(11)....

...shall not be considered a commercial purpose when used for publication in a newspaper or other news periodical, when used for broadcast by radio or television, or when used to inform a person of the availability of driver safety training. Fla.Stat. § 316.650(11) at 1996 Fla.Sess.Law Serv....

...They both allege that this statute violates their First Amendment right to commercial free speech, and Babkes also alleges that the law violates his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. A. Count I: First Amendment By restricting the use to which public information can be put, Florida Statute § 316.650(11) implicates the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech....

...The Florida statute at issue here does not restrict access to government records. The statute does, however, restrict the use to which these records can be put. Specifically, the statute bars the use of these records for commercial purposes except by driving schools and by the print and broadcast media. Fla.Stat. § 316.650(11)....

...em, it must do so through "reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. at 384, 97 S.Ct. at 2709. Florida's present attempt to regulate targeted legal advertisements, Florida Statute § 316.650(11) as found at 1996 Fla.Sess.Law Serv....

...1329) (West), fails the Central Hudson test and therefore violates the First Amendment's protection of truthful, non-misleading commercial speech. [4] *914 The Plaintiffs are entitled to the injunctive relief that they seek. B. Count II: Equal Protection Babkes also claims that Fla.Stat. § 316.650(11) violates his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the laws....

...s the First Amendment protections of commercial speech. II. CONCLUSION THE COURT has considered the motions, and the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Florida Statute § 316.650(11), as found at 1996 Fla.Sess....

...1329) (West), violates the First Amendment's protection of truthful, non-misleading commercial speech, and therefore the Plaintiffs' Motions for a Permanent Injunction [Babkes, DE-2; Unger, DE-3] is hereby GRANTED. The Defendant is hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from enforcing Florida Statute § 316.650(11), as found at 1996 Fla.Sess.Law Serv....

...Maddox went to trial on the forgery and uttering counts, as well as on one count of giving false information to a police officer and one count of driving while license suspended. He was found guilty as charged. On appeal, Maddox argues that, pursuant to section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes (2001), the trial court erred by admitting these traffic citations into evidence. In making this assertion, Maddox relies on the First District's opinion in Dixon v. State, 812 So.2d 595, 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) ("Because the language of section 316.650(9) unambiguously provides that traffic citations are not admissible in any trial, we must reverse [appellant's forgery conviction].")....

...l used the citations to cross-examine the officer. Accordingly, this issue may have been waived. However, even if the objection was not waived, we do not believe the trial court erred in admitting the citations as evidence of the forgeries. Although section 316.650(9) does provide that traffic citations "shall not be admissible evidence in any trial," that statutory proscription does not apply to the facts of this case....

...Although Veilleux and Martinez did elaborate on the reasoning of the Dixon court, these discussions were not directly related to the issues being reviewed by the certiorari standard and thus did not reflect the expressed opinion of this court as to the meaning of section 316.650(9)....

...When issued and served, a uniform traffic citation is the equivalent of an executed information.... [W]e conclude that service on the accused of a copy of *722 a properly prepared uniform traffic citation containing a notice to appear, and the timely filing of the original and one copy of the traffic citation, as required by section 316.650(3), Florida Statutes in the court having jurisdiction over the alleged offense, invokes the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and commences prosecution of the criminal traffic case for purposes of the statute of limitations.......

...See § 316.605(1) (“A violation of this subsection is a noncriminal traffic infraction, punishable as a nonmoving violation as provided in chapter 318.”). The proper procedure to handle the tag alteration charges was for the officers to issue a traffic citation containing a notice to appear, see § 316.650, Fla....

...as a result of the driver failing to stop at a traffic signal. . Rule 6.165. Complaint; Summons; Form; Use (a) Uniform Traffic Citation. All prosecutions for criminal traffic offenses by law enforcement officers shall be by uniform traffic citation as provided for in section 316.650, Florida Statutes, or other applicable statutes, or by affidavit, information, or indictment as provided for in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure....

...When issued and served, a uniform traffic citation is the equivalent of an executed information.... [S]er-vice on the accused of a copy of a properly prepared uniform traffic citation containing a notice to appear, and the timely filing of the original and one copy of the traffic citation, as required by section 316.650(3), Florida Statutes in the court having jurisdiction over the alleged offense, invokes the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and commences prosecution of the criminal traffic case for purposes of the statute of limitations.......

...Copies were served on the felony division of the state attorney's office. Once again, on October 26, the clerk's office returned the filings, advising that no case by the citation numbers given was filed in either division. This all came about because the arresting officer failed to file the citations. Section 316.650, Florida Statutes requires the officer to file the citation within five days....

...Accordingly, because of the series of errors, I don't believe this case can further be prosecuted. In State v. Hancock, 529 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), we held that it was not fatal to the prosecution that the citation was not timely filed as required by section 316.650(3)....

...e. In this case, the first reason does not apply and as this case illustrates, the second appears to be erroneous. The third reason, if it is to be given effect, supports the trial court's decision. If the defendant is not to be given the benefit of section 316.650, he must have speedy trial; otherwise, he is in a Catch 22....

...summons, information or indictment is served upon him in lieu of arrest. Rule 6.165 Complaint; Summons; Form; Use (a) All prosecutions for criminal traffic offenses by law enforcement officers shall be by uniform traffic citation as provided for in section 316.650, Florida Statutes, or other applicable statutes, or by affidavit, information or indictment as provided for in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure....

...th ATS, Eric Arem denied the violation and requested a trial. After hearing the testimony of the TIEO who issued the UTC, the county court found that the City of Hollywood's red light camera program did not comply with sections 316.0083(1)(a) and 316.650(3)(c)10 because the City had improperly delegated various tasks to ATS. Accordingly, it dismissed the citation. Arem, 154 So. 3d at 362. 10 Section 316.650(3)(c) provides that if a UTC is issued, "the traffic infraction enforcement officer shall provide by electronic transmission a replica of the traffic citation data to the court having jurisdiction over the alleged offense or its traffic violations bureau within 5 days after the date of issuance of the traffic citation to the violator." Whether section 316.650(3)(c) permits a city to delegate this task to a private vendor is not an issue in this appeal. - 16 -  On appeal,11 the district court held that the City of Hollywood was...

...tion? 3. Does the fact that the citation data is electronically transmitted to the Clerk of the Court from the vendor's server via a totally automated process without human involvement violate section 316.650(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2014), when it is the law enforcement officer who affirmatively authorizes the transmission process? Id....

...l and post-trial procedures should also apply. RULE 6.165. COMPLAINT; SUMMONS; FORM; USE (a) Uniform Traffic Citation. All prosecutions for criminal traffic offenses by law enforcement officers shall be by uniform traffic citation as provided for in section 316.650, Florida Statutes, or other applicable statutes, or by affidavit, informa-tionL or indictment as provided for in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure....

...ic infraction enforcement officer in the entire process is to push a button saying “Accept” after having viewed the image of an alleged violation electronically transmitted by the vendor? 2. Does Florida Statute 316.650(3)(c) permit a traffic infraction enforcement officer to delegate to a non- governmental entity, such as a private vendor of a municipality, his or her statutory duty to electronically transmit a replica of...

...The Act specifically authorizes the use of TIEOs to enforce red light violations. § 316.0083(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). The City operates a red light camera enforcement program pursuant to these statutes. As allowed by law, the City’s program produces uniform traffic citations by electronic means. § 316.650(1)(c), Fla....

...f the department, a county, or a municipality before issuance of the traffic citation by the traffic infraction enforcement officer. -6- § 316.0083(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). Section 316.650 (3)(c) also provides: If a traffic citation is issued under s....

...transmission a replica of the traffic citation data to the court having jurisdiction over the alleged offense or its traffic violations bureau within 5 days after the date of issuance of the traffic citation to the violator. § 316.650(3)(c), Fla....

...ble cause exists and to issue a notice of violation and citation? Does the fact that the citation data is electronically transmitted to the Clerk of the Court from the vendor's server via a totally automated process without human involvement violate section 316.650(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2014), when it is the law enforcement officer who affirmatively authorizes the transmission process? Id....

PER CURIAM. The officer’s failure to file a traffic citation with the court within five days after issuance to the violator, as required by section 316.650(3), Florida Statutes (2001), was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to the prosecution of the defendant....

...sue” citations, id.; and (3) the Vendor had unfettered discretion to send an electronic copy of the citation to the Clerk of Courts in violation of the statutory requirement that only an officer “shall provide” an electronic copy to the Clerk, section 316.650(3)(c), Fla....

...The third question certified by the trial court reads as follows: Does the fact that the [citation] data is electronically transmitted to the Clerk of the Court from the vendor’s server via a totally automated process without human involvement violate Florida Statute § 316.650(3)(c) when it is the law enforcement officer who affirmatively authorizes the transmission process by selecting the “accept” button? Jimenez contends that the language in the controlling statute stating that the “officer shall provid...

...exists and to issue a notice of violation and citation? 3. Does the fact that the citation data is electronically transmitted to the Clerk of the Court from the vendor’s *172 server via a totally automated process without human involvement violate section 316.650(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2014), when it is the law enforcement officer who affirmatively authorizes the transmission process? Affirmed in part; reversed in part; questions of great public importance certified; and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion....

...3.191, SC2022-1123. 2 Florida Rule of Traffic Court 6.165(a) provides: Uniform Traffic Citation. All prosecutions for criminal traffic offenses by law enforcement officers shall be by uniform traffic citation as provided for in section 316.650, Florida Statutes, or other applicable statutes, or by affidavit, information, or indictment as provided for in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure....

uniform traffic citation as provided for in section 316.650, Florida Statutes, or other applicable statutes

...ich is a traffic infraction, shall not be considered a lesser included offense of the reckless driving charge. Rule 6.320. Complaint; Summons; Forms; Use All citations for traffic infractions shall be by uniform traffic complaint as provided *402 in section 316.650, Florida Statutes, or other applicable statutes, or by affidavit....

serve as a fact-finding forum in such matters. Section 316.650, F. S., provides: (1) The department shall

...criminal traffic offenses not designated felonies under the laws of the state, and sentence imposed thereon. (c) [No change] RULE 6.320. COMPLAINT; SUMMONS; FORMS; USE All citations for traffic infractions shall be by uniform traffic citation as provided in section 316.650, Florida Statutes, or other applicable statutes or by -9- affidavit....

...court’s order granting Oscar Martinez’s motion in limine. Relying on Dixon v. State, 812 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), the trial court held that the traffic citation Martinez is accused of forging cannot be introduced into evidence pursuant to section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...license. Id. at 595-96 . The trial court denied his motion in limine “finding that the legislature could not have intended the exclusion of a traffic citation when the execution of the citation is the basis of the offense at trial.” Id. at 596 . Section 316.650, Florida Statutes (2002), is entitled “Traffic citations.” Section 316.650(9) specifically provides that “[s]uch citations shall not be admissible evidence in any trial.” In Dixon , the First District correctly noted that “[t]he statute contains *20 no exceptions to this clear and unambiguous prohibition.” Dixon, 812 So.2d at 596 . Thus, “in view of the absolute mandatory-terms of section 316.650(9),” the court concluded that the trial court erred when it denied the defendant’s motion in limine....

...Thus, it cannot be said that the trial court’s exclusion of the traffic citation was a departure from the essential requirements of the law. State v. Veilleux, 2003 WL 21749024 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Trepal, 754 So.2d 702 . However, the trial court exceeded the requirements of section 316.650(9) and the First District’s opinion in Dixon when it excluded any reference to the traffic citation. Neither section 316.650(9) nor the opinion in Dixon dictates such a result....

...denying Patino’s petition for writ of prohibition. That order read in pertinent Uniform Traffic Citation. All prosecutions for criminal traffic offenses by law enforcement officers shall be by uniform traffic citation as provided for in section 316.650, Florida Statutes, or other applicable statutes, or by affidavit, information, or indictment as provided for in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure....