Home
Menu
Call attorney Graham Syfert at 904-383-7448
Personal Injury Lawyer
Florida Statute 166.021 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 166.021 Case Law from Google Scholar
Statute is currently reporting as:
Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 166.021

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XII
MUNICIPALITIES
Chapter 166
MUNICIPALITIES
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 166.021
166.021 Powers.
(1) As provided in s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the State Constitution, municipalities shall have the governmental, corporate, and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions, and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law.
(2) “Municipal purpose” means any activity or power which may be exercised by the state or its political subdivisions.
(3) The Legislature recognizes that pursuant to the grant of power set forth in s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the State Constitution, the legislative body of each municipality has the power to enact legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the state Legislature may act, except:
(a) The subjects of annexation, merger, and exercise of extraterritorial power, which require general or special law pursuant to s. 2(c), Art. VIII of the State Constitution;
(b) Any subject expressly prohibited by the constitution;
(c) Any subject expressly preempted to state or county government by the constitution or by general law; and
(d) Any subject preempted to a county pursuant to a county charter adopted under the authority of ss. 1(g), 3, and 6(e), Art. VIII of the State Constitution.
(4) The provisions of this section shall be so construed as to secure for municipalities the broad exercise of home rule powers granted by the constitution. It is the further intent of the Legislature to extend to municipalities the exercise of powers for municipal governmental, corporate, or proprietary purposes not expressly prohibited by the constitution, general or special law, or county charter and to remove any limitations, judicially imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those so expressly prohibited. However, nothing in this act shall be construed to permit any changes in a special law or municipal charter which affect the exercise of extraterritorial powers or which affect an area which includes lands within and without a municipality or any changes in a special law or municipal charter which affect the creation or existence of a municipality, the terms of elected officers and the manner of their election except for the selection of election dates and qualifying periods for candidates and for changes in terms of office necessitated by such changes in election dates, the distribution of powers among elected officers, matters prescribed by the charter relating to appointive boards, any change in the form of government, or any rights of municipal employees, without approval by referendum of the electors as provided in s. 166.031. Any other limitation of power upon any municipality contained in any municipal charter enacted or adopted prior to July 1, 1973, is hereby nullified and repealed.
(5) All existing special acts pertaining exclusively to the power or jurisdiction of a particular municipality except as otherwise provided in subsection (4) shall become an ordinance of that municipality on the effective date of this act, subject to modification or repeal as other ordinances.
(6) The governing body of a municipality may require that any person within the municipality demonstrate the existence of some arrangement or contract by which such person will dispose of solid waste in a manner consistent with the ordinances of the county or municipality or state or federal law. For any person who will produce special wastes or biomedical waste, as the same may be defined by state or federal law or county or city ordinance, the municipality may require satisfactory proof of a contract or similar arrangement by which special or biomedical wastes will be collected by a qualified and duly licensed collector and disposed of in accordance with the laws of Florida or the Federal Government.
(7) Entities that are funded wholly or in part by the municipality, at the discretion of the municipality, may be required by the municipality to conduct a performance audit paid for by the municipality. An entity shall not be considered as funded by the municipality by virtue of the fact that such entity utilizes the municipality to collect taxes, assessments, fees, or other revenue. If an independent special district receives municipal funds pursuant to a contract or interlocal agreement for the purposes of funding, in whole or in part, a discrete program of the district, only that program may be required by the municipality to undergo a performance audit.
(8)(a) The Legislature finds and declares that this state faces increasing competition from other states and other countries for the location and retention of private enterprises within its borders. Furthermore, the Legislature finds that there is a need to enhance and expand economic activity in the municipalities of this state by attracting and retaining manufacturing development, business enterprise management, and other activities conducive to economic promotion, in order to provide a stronger, more balanced, and stable economy in the state, to enhance and preserve purchasing power and employment opportunities for the residents of this state, and to improve the welfare and competitive position of the state. The Legislature declares that it is necessary and in the public interest to facilitate the growth and creation of business enterprises in the municipalities of the state.
(b) The governing body of a municipality may expend public funds to attract and retain business enterprises, and the use of public funds toward the achievement of such economic development goals constitutes a public purpose. The provisions of this chapter which confer powers and duties on the governing body of a municipality, including any powers not specifically prohibited by law which can be exercised by the governing body of a municipality, shall be liberally construed in order to effectively carry out the purposes of this subsection.
(c) For the purposes of this subsection, it constitutes a public purpose to expend public funds for economic development activities, including, but not limited to, developing or improving local infrastructure, issuing bonds to finance or refinance the cost of capital projects for industrial or manufacturing plants, leasing or conveying real property, and making grants to private enterprises for the expansion of businesses existing in the community or the attraction of new businesses to the community.
(d) A contract between the governing body of a municipality or other entity engaged in economic development activities on behalf of the municipality and an economic development agency must require the agency or entity receiving municipal funds to submit a report to the governing body of the municipality detailing how the municipal funds are spent and detailing the results of the economic development agency’s or entity’s efforts on behalf of the municipality. By January 15, 2011, and annually thereafter, the municipality shall file a copy of the report with the Office of Economic and Demographic Research and post a copy of the report on the municipality’s website.
(e)1. By January 15, 2011, and annually thereafter, each municipality having annual revenues or expenditures greater than $250,000 shall report to the Office of Economic and Demographic Research the economic development incentives in excess of $25,000 given to any business during the municipality’s previous fiscal year. The Office of Economic and Demographic Research shall compile the information from the municipalities into a report and provide the report to the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Department of Economic Opportunity. Economic development incentives include:
a. Direct financial incentives of monetary assistance provided to a business from the municipality or through an organization authorized by the municipality. Such incentives include, but are not limited to, grants, loans, equity investments, loan insurance and guarantees, and training subsidies.
b. Indirect incentives in the form of grants and loans provided to businesses and community organizations that provide support to businesses or promote business investment or development.
c. Fee-based or tax-based incentives, including, but not limited to, credits, refunds, exemptions, and property tax abatement or assessment reductions.
d. Below-market rate leases or deeds for real property.
2. A municipality shall report its economic development incentives in the format specified by the Office of Economic and Demographic Research.
3. The Office of Economic and Demographic Research shall compile the economic development incentives provided by each municipality in a manner that shows the total of each class of economic development incentives provided by each municipality and all municipalities.
(f)  This subsection does not limit the home rule powers granted by the State Constitution to municipalities.
(9)(a) As used in this subsection, the term:
1. “Authorized person” means a person:
a. Other than an officer or employee, as defined in this paragraph, whether elected or commissioned or not, who is authorized by a municipality or agency thereof to incur travel expenses in the performance of official duties;
b. Who is called upon by a municipality or agency thereof to contribute time and services as consultant or advisor; or
c. Who is a candidate for an executive or professional position with a municipality or agency thereof.
2. “Employee” means an individual, whether commissioned or not, other than an officer or authorized person as defined in this paragraph, who is filling a regular or full-time authorized position and is responsible to a municipality or agency thereof.
3. “Officer” means an individual who, in the performance of his or her official duties, is vested by law with sovereign powers of government and who is either elected by the people, or commissioned by the Governor and who has jurisdiction extending throughout the municipality, or any person lawfully serving instead of either of the foregoing two classes of individuals as initial designee or successor.
4. “Traveler” means an officer, employee, or authorized person, when performing travel authorized by a municipality or agency thereof.
(b) Notwithstanding s. 112.061, the governing body of a municipality or an agency thereof may provide for a per diem and travel expense policy for its travelers which varies from the provisions of s. 112.061. Any such policy provided by a municipality or an agency thereof on January 1, 2003, shall be valid and in effect for that municipality or agency thereof until otherwise amended. A municipality or agency thereof that provides any per diem and travel expense policy pursuant to this subsection shall be deemed to be exempt from all provisions of s. 112.061. A municipality or agency thereof that does not provide a per diem and travel expense policy pursuant to this subsection remains subject to all provisions of s. 112.061.
(c) Travel claims submitted by a traveler in a municipality or agency thereof which is exempted from the provisions of s. 112.061, pursuant to paragraph (b), shall not be required to be sworn to before a notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths, but any claim authorized or required to be made under any per diem and travel expense policy of a municipality or agency thereof must contain a statement that the expenses were actually incurred by the traveler as necessary travel expenses in the performance of official duties and shall be verified by a written declaration that it is true and correct as to every material matter; and any person who willfully makes and subscribes any such claim that he or she does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter, or who willfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or advises the preparation or presentation of such a claim that is fraudulent or is false as to any material matter, whether or not such falsity or fraud is with the knowledge or consent of the person authorized or required to present such claim, commits a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. Whoever receives an allowance or reimbursement by means of a false claim is civilly liable in the amount of the overpayment for the reimbursement of the public fund from which the claim was paid.
History.s. 1, ch. 73-129; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 2, ch. 90-332; s. 2, ch. 92-90; s. 2, ch. 93-207; s. 2, ch. 94-332; s. 1, ch. 95-178; s. 1, ch. 98-37; s. 1, ch. 2003-125; s. 2, ch. 2010-147; s. 22, ch. 2011-34; s. 60, ch. 2011-142; s. 3, ch. 2011-143.

F.S. 166.021 on Google Scholar

F.S. 166.021 on Casetext

Amendments to 166.021


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 166.021
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S166.021 9c - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - MAKE AID FALSE MUNICIPAL TRAVEL CLAIM - M: S
S166.021 10c - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - RENUMBERED. SEE RECORD # 7259 - M: S



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

SWEET SAGE CAF LLC, LLC, LLC, v. TOWN OF NORTH REDINGTON BEACH, FLORIDA,, 380 F. Supp. 3d 1209 (M.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . . § 166.021(1), (3)(c), (4) ). . . .

J. MARTINEZ, v. HERNANDEZ,, 227 So. 3d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Martinez’s final argument is that section 166.021(4), Florida Statutes (2017), precludes the City from . . .

CLASSY CYCLES, INC. v. BAY COUNTY, a a, 201 So. 3d 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .; see also § 166.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . .

ADVISORY OPINION TO ATTORNEY GENERAL RIGHTS OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS REGARDING SOLAR ENERGY CHOICE. FIS, 188 So. 3d 822 (Fla. 2016)

. . . .; §§ 125.01, 166.021, Fla. Stat. (2015); City of Cape Coral v. . . .

D AGASTINO, v. CITY OF MIAMI,, 189 So. 3d 236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Sections 166.021(1), (3), and (4), Florida Statutes (1973), prohibit the exercise of municipal powers . . . imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those so expressly prohibited.... § 166.021 . . . Mulligan, 934 So.2d 1238, 1243 (Fla.2006)), and that pursuant to section 166.021 “a municipality may . . . power to enact legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the state legislature may act,” § 166.021 . . .

DOE I, v. CITY OF PALM BAY,, 169 So. 3d 1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . protect the public from them, and WHEREAS, Article VIII, Section 2(b), Florida Constitution, and Section 166.021 . . .

BEY, v. CITY OF TAMPA CODE ENFORCEMENT,, 607 F. App'x 892 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 166.021(1) & (4) (conferring upon municipal governments all the governmental powers “to enable them . . .

GENERAL EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT COMMITTEE, v. CITY OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH,, 151 So. 3d 1271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .; § 166.021, Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

MASONE, v. CITY OF AVENTURA, v., 147 So. 3d 492 (Fla. 2014)

. . . See also § 166.021, Fla. Stat. (2008) (relating to the exercise of municipal powers). . . . .” § 166.021(4), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

CITY OF PALM BAY, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A., 114 So. 3d 924 (Fla. 2013)

. . . of great public importance: Whether under Article VIII, section 2(b), Florida Constitution, section 166.021 . . . Section 166.021, Florida Statutes (2004), contains general provisions governing the exercise of municipal . . . Section 166.021(1) states: “As provided in s. 2(b), Art. . . . Section 166.021(3) provides in pertinent part as follows: The Legislature recognizes that pursuant to . . . We have also stated that — as is recognized in section 166.021 — “a municipality may legislate concurrently . . . Section 166.021(1) states in relevant part that “municipalities ... may exercise any power for municipal . . . Further, section 166.021(3)(c) provides that the municipality has the power to enact legislation concerning . . . Here, section 166.021 provides that the City may act except where expressly preempted, not impliedly . . . there is no express limitation by section 695.11, The City of Palm Bay had authority under section 166.021 . . .

CITY OF BOCA RATON v. SIML,, 96 So. 3d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . .” § 166.021(1), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 166.021(4), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). . . .

CITY OF ORLANDO v. UDOWYCHENKO,, 98 So. 3d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . However, section 166.021, Florida Statutes (2011), which codified Article VIII, limits that power where . . . Accordingly, the City’s ordinance is contrary to section 166.021(3)(c) as it is expressly preempted by . . .

CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF CITY PENSION FUND FOR FIREFIGHTERS AND POLICE OFFICERS IN CITY OF MIAMI BEACH,, 91 So. 3d 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . collective bargaining statute (Chapter 447, Part I, Florida Statutes), preempts any requirement of Section 166.021 . . . It thus appears to the court that the referendum requirement of Section 166.021(4), Florida Statutes, . . . have under consideration any potential conflict between a collective bargaining agreement and Section 166.021 . . . agreement and any statute or ordinance, it is between two unintentionally conflicting statutes: Section 166.021 . . . ORDERED, DECLARED AND ADJUDGED that the referendum requirement of Section 166.021(4), Florida Statutes . . .

NORTH PORT ROAD AND DRAINAGE DISTRICT, v. WEST VILLAGES IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT,, 82 So. 3d 69 (Fla. 2012)

. . . Section 166.021, Florida Statutes (2008), grants municipalities the powers needed to perform the functions . . . municipal government so long as the power is exercised for a municipal purpose, which is defined in section 166.021 . . . However, section 166.021(3), Florida Statutes (2008), explains that, despite broad home rule powers, . . . assessments on West Villages’ property fall within the limitations on home rule powers delineated in section 166.021 . . . assessments, NPRDD’s assessments fall within the limitations on home rule powers set forth in section 166.021 . . .

CITY OF AVENTURA, v. MASONE,, 89 So. 3d 233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . For example, section 166.021(3)(c), Florida Statutes states: The Legislature recognizes that pursuant . . . subject expressly preempted to the state or county government by the constitution or by general law.... § 166.021 . . . It is undisputed that the City has broad home rule powers as set forth in section 166.021, Florida Statutes . . . For example, section 166.021(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2008), states: The Legislature recognizes that . . . Thus, the City’s ordinance, section 48-26, is in violation of section 166.021(3)(c) which provides that . . .

CITY OF PALM BAY, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A., 67 So. 3d 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . of great public importance: Whether, under Article VIII, section 2(b), Florida Constitution, section 166.021 . . .

MGM CONSTRUCTION SERVICES CORP. v. TRAVELERS CASUALTY SURETY CO. OF AMERICA,, 57 So. 3d 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Miami-Dade County may exercise the same legal powers as any other municipality, and that under section 166.021 . . .

CITY OF PALM BAY, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A., 57 So. 3d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . rule powers granted by article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution, and codified in section 166.021 . . . Asserting that ordinance 97-07 does not encroach into any of the areas prohibited by section 166.021, . . .

M H PROFIT, INC. a v. CITY OF PANAMA CITY, a, 28 So. 3d 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . The Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, section 166.021(4), Florida Statutes (1979), provides in part that . . .

FREEMAN, s s v. TOWN OF EATONVILLE, FLORIDA, J., 225 F. App'x 775 (11th Cir. 2006)

. . . . § 166.021 (extending to municipalities the right to exercise powers of the state, including those powers . . .

CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, v. MULLIGAN,, 934 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 2006)

. . . .; § 166.021(1), (3)(c), (4), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . See § 166.021, Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . Section 166.021 of the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act states in applicable part: (1) As provided in s . . .

AVALON CARRIAGE SERVICE INC. v. CITY OF ST. AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA, a a a St. a, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2006)

. . . Florida Statute § 166.021(5). . . .

CITY OF KISSIMMEE, v. FLORIDA RETAIL FEDERATION, INC., 915 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . .; § 166.021(3)(e), Fla. Stat. . . .

AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION,, 908 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2005)

. . . .” § 166.021(1), Fla. Stat. (1993) (emphasis added). . . . .”); § 166.021(1), Fla. . . . .” § 166.021(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .

CITY OF TEMPLE TERRACE, v. E. TOZIER W., 903 So. 2d 970 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those so expressly prohibited- § 166.021 . . .

BUSH H. v. D. HOLMES, E. H. NAACP a k a PTA AFT AFL- CIO, a Jr. F., 886 So. 2d 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . possessed broad home rule powers under Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution, and section 166.021 . . .

CITY OF MIAMI, v. S. WELLMAN,, 875 So. 2d 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Section 166.021(3), Florida Statutes, of Florida’s Municipal Home Rule Powers Act states that cities . . .

MULLIGAN, v. CITY OF HOLLYWOOD,, 871 So. 2d 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . .” § 166.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis added). . . . Section 166.021(3) recognizes that cities may not legislate in an area expressly preempted by state legislation . . . Const, and § 166.021(3), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .

CITY OF NORTH LAUDERDALE, v. SMM PROPERTIES, INC., 825 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2002)

. . . Florida, with home rule powers under article VIII, section 2(b), Florida Constitution and sections 166.021 . . .

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION AMTRAK CSX f. u. b. o. v. ROUNTREE TRANSPORT AND RIGGING, INC. WOKO f. u. b. o. v. AMTRAK CSX Co. AMTRAK CSX J. E. Jr. f. u. b. o. v. WOKO Co., 286 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2002)

. . . VIII, § 2(b) of the Florida Constitution; (2) the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, Florida Statute § 166.021 . . .

F. QUILES, v. CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH, a, 802 So. 2d 397 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . .; § 166.021, Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .

ROPER, v. CITY OF CLEARWATER,, 796 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 2001)

. . . See §§ 166.021, 166.111(1), 166.141, Fla. . . . codified in chapter 166, Florida Statutes, municipalities have full authority to issue bonds) (citing §§ 166.021 . . .

TURNER, v. CITY OF CLEARWATER,, 789 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 2001)

. . . See §§ 166.021, 166.111(1), 166.141, Fla. . . .

CITY OF GAINESVILLE, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,, 778 So. 2d 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 166.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2000); Contractors and Builders Ass’n v. . . .

M. BOSCHEN, v. CITY OF CLEARWATER,, 777 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 2001)

. . . See §§ 166.021, 166.111(1), 166.141, Fla. . . .

CITY OF PEMBROKE PINES, v. McCONAGHEY,, 728 So. 2d 347 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . State of Florida, is authorized by Article VIII, Section 2, of the Florida Constitution, and section 166.021 . . .

BROWN, v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE BEACH, a, 696 So. 2d 946 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . See § 166.021, Fla. . . .

PIERRE, v. SCHLEMMER,, 932 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Fla. 1996)

. . . Const. (1968); § 166.021, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994); 13 Fla. . . .

FLORIDA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, v. CORCORAN,, 661 So. 2d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . Const. (1968); § 166.021, Fla.Stat. . . .

RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, d b a v. TOWN OF HIGHLAND BEACH,, 18 F.3d 1536 (11th Cir. 1994)

. . . . § 166.021 (1987); City of Ormond Beach v. . . .

J. SNAIR, v. CITY OF CLEARWATER,, 846 F. Supp. 62 (M.D. Fla. 1994)

. . . . § 166.021. . . .

MADISON COUNTY, v. D. FOXX, 636 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . The statutes involved in City of Boca Raton, section 166.021, Florida Statutes and Chapter 170, contain . . . attempted to save its special assessments by declaring that it could levy the assessments under section 166.021 . . .

CITY OF TAMPA, a FOR USE AND BENEFIT OF CITY OF TAMPA CODE ENFORCEMENT BOARD, v. BRAXTON A. s s s, 616 So. 2d 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . the legislature may act, except those subjects described under paragraphs (a) through (d) of section 166.021 . . . Section 166.021(3): (a) The subjects of annexation, merger, and exercise of extraterritorial power, which . . .

J. SNAIR, v. CITY OF CLEARWATER,, 817 F. Supp. 108 (M.D. Fla. 1993)

. . . . § 166.021. . . .

L. THOMAS, v. STATE, 614 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1993)

. . . Section 166.021(3)(c) expressly excludes from municipalities’ powers “any subject expressly preempted . . .

A. EVERETT, v. CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, a, 840 F. Supp. 1528 (N.D. Fla. 1992)

. . . has the authority to enact zoning ordinances pursuant to the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, Section 166.021 . . .

CITY OF OCALA, v. O. J. NYE,, 608 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1992)

. . . contends that under its home rule powers, article VIII, section 2(b), Florida Constitution, and section 166.021 . . . municipalities “may exercise any power for municipal purposes, except when expressly prohibited by law.” § 166.021 . . . Each municipal legislative body shall be elective. .Section 166.021, Florida Statutes (1989), provides . . .

WASHINGTON SHORES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, v. CITY Of ORLANDO,, 602 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 1992)

. . . . §§ 166.021(1), (2), 166.-101(8), 166.111, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

J. SNAIR, v. CITY OF CLEARWATER,, 787 F. Supp. 1401 (M.D. Fla. 1992)

. . . .” § 166.021(5), Fla.Stat. . . .

CITY OF BOCA RATON, v. STATE, 595 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1992)

. . . Section 166.021 provides in pertinent part: (1) As provided in s. 2(b), Art. . . . City of Boca Raton can levy its special assessment unless it is expressly prohibited by law — section 166.021 . . . (1), expressly prohibited by the constitution — section 166.021(3)(b), or expressly preempted to the . . . state or county government by the constitution or by general law — section 166.021(3)(c). . . . collect non-ad valorem assessments supplemental to the home rule powers pursuant to ss. 125.01 and 166.021 . . .

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, v. SEMINOLE COUNTY, 579 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1991)

. . . .; §§ 125.01, 166.021, Fla.Stat. (1989); Tribune Co. v. . . . We explained: Section 166.021(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1987), which is part of the municipal home rule . . .

M. BARRY, AD HOC Lt. E. F. V. W. A. v. GARCIA, a, 573 So. 2d 932 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . Section 166.021(3)(d), Florida Statutes, (1987), reads as follows: "The Legislature recognizes that pursuant . . .

v., 95 T.C. 495 (T.C. 1990)

. . . Ann. sec. 166.021 (West 1977). . . .

O. J. NYE, v. CITY OF OCALA,, 559 So. 2d 360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . defined as “any activity or power which may be exercised by the State or its political subdivisions”, § 166.021 . . .

SEXTON, INC. a a v. CITY OF VERO BEACH,, 555 So. 2d 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . Section 166.021(3)(c), Florida Statutes. . . .

CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND,, 543 So. 2d 824 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . . § 166.021(2), Fla. Stat. (1987). See also Ormond Beach v. . . . Section 166.021(3) specifically provides that: The Legislature recognizes that pursuant to the grant . . .

BARRAGAN, v. CITY OF MIAMI, GIORDANO, v. CITY OF MIAMI,, 545 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1989)

. . . Section 166.021(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1987), which is part of the municipal home rule powers act, . . .

FLORIDA LEAGUE OF CITIES, INC. St. v. DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER, 540 So. 2d 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . authority exists” in violation of Article VIII, section 2 of the Florida Constitution, and section 166.021 . . . That prong fails to give effect to Article VIII, section 2 of the Florida Constitution and section 166.021 . . . subject expressly preempted to a state or county government by the constitution or by general law.” § 166.021 . . . The concept embodied in section 166.021(3)(c) recognizes that “a municipality’s power to legislate is . . . In doing so, the legislature complied with the preemption requirements in section 166.021. . . .

CITY OF ORMOND BEACH, v. COUNTY OF VOLUSIA, a, 535 So. 2d 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . .” § 166.021(2), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . . Chapter 166, Fla.Stat. (1987). . § 166.021(1), Fla.Stat. (1987); City of Miami v. . . .

CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC. a v. CITY OF HIALEAH, D, 688 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D. Fla. 1988)

. . . Fla.Stat.Ann. 166.021(3)(b)—(c) (West 1987). . . .

STATE v. CITY OF PANAMA CITY BEACH,, 529 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1988)

. . . Section 166.021, Florida Statutes (1985), now provides in pertinent part: (1) As provided in s. 2(b), . . .

METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY FAIR HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT APPEALS BOARD, v. SUNRISE VILLAGE MOBILE HOME PARK, INC., 511 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1987)

. . . Section 166.021(3), Florida Statutes (1981), grants to municipalities the power to enact legislation . . . Section 166.021(3), Fla.Stat. (1981), contains certain enumerated exceptions to the grant of legislative . . .

CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, v. AMOCO OIL COMPANY,, 510 So. 2d 609 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . . § 166.021(3)(c), Fla.Stat. (1985); see General Elec. Credit Corp. v. . . .

INTERNATIONAL FOOD BEVERAGE SYSTEMS, a v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, a, 664 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Fla. 1987)

. . . .” § 166.021(2) Fla.Stat. (1983). . . .

SMITH, v. HARVEY,, 648 F. Supp. 1103 (M.D. Fla. 1986)

. . . . § 166.021 (1983); see also Fla.Stat. § 166.042 (legislative intent); Fla. . . .

METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY FAIR HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT APPEALS BOARD, v. SUNRISE VILLAGE MOBILE HOME PARK, INC., 485 So. 2d 865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . Section 166.021(3), Fla.Stat. (1985), in turn provides, with exceptions not applicable here, that municipalities . . .

CITY OF SWEETWATER, a C. v. A. PENEDO,, 485 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . 5.03, Metropolitan Dade County Charter; §§ 168.01, 166.01-.02,166.05, Fla.Stat. (1955); see also § 166.021 . . .

CITY OF CASSELBERRY, v. ORANGE COUNTY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 482 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1986)

. . . See § 166.021(4), Fla.Stat. (1979). . . .

WALLACE v. TOWN OF PALM BEACH, a, 624 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Fla. 1985)

. . . . § 166.021, Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, Palm Beach in 1958 enacted Article V, Sections 17-92 and . . .

CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, v. PERCIO, 476 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1985)

. . . .” § 166.021(2), Fla.Stat. (1983). . . . subject expressly preempted to state or county government by the constitution or by general law.” § 166.021 . . .

LAKE WORTH UTILITIES AUTHORITY, v. CITY OF LAKE WORTH,, 468 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1985)

. . . through 84-15 of the City Commission of the City of Lake Worth be declared void as violative of section 166.021 . . .

JAMES, F. H. S. E. v. CITY OF SARASOTA, FLORIDA E. T. J., 611 F. Supp. 25 (M.D. Fla. 1985)

. . . . § 166.021 which requires a referendum to change election plans. . . . .

TRIBUNE COMPANY, v. CANNELLA, DePERTE, v. TRIBUNE COMPANY,, 458 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1984)

. . . Florida law, under section 166.021, Florida Statutes (1981), which cites article VIII, section 2(b) of . . .

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF CITY OF DUNEDIN MUNICIPAL FIREFIGHTERS RETIREMENT SYSTEM, v. DULJE,, 453 So. 2d 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . maintain that section 175.181 does not expressly pre-empt ordinance number 80-42 as required by section 166.021 . . . Under section 166.021(3)(c), Florida Statutes, a municipality’s power to legislate is limited where the . . .

CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH SHORES, v. STATE, 454 So. 2d 651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . See also § 166.021, Fla. Stat. . . .

D. GAINES, v. CITY OF ORLANDO,, 450 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . Subsection (4) of section 166.021 prohibits any changes in a municipal charter or a special law which . . . “Municipal purpose” is defined in section 166.021(2) as “any activity or power which may be exercised . . . See § 166.021(5), Fla.Stat. (1983). . . . McQuillin, supra note 3, at § 16.69. . § 166.021(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1983). .Article VIII, section 2(c) . . . See also § 166.021(1), Fla.Stat. (1983). . . . .

CITY OF WINTER PARK, a v. J. MONTESI,, 448 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . Municipal Home Rule Powers Act” re-emphasizes the broad grant of power given to municipalities in section 166.021 . . . Section 166.021(2), defines “municipal purpose” as “any activity or power which may be exercised by the . . .

WEST PALM BEACH ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL UNION L. J. L. v. BOARD OF CITY COMMISSIONERS OF CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH,, 448 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . in Chapter 447 the express preemption (as opposed to preemption by implication) required by Section 166.021 . . .

DEL PERCIO v. CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH,, 449 So. 2d 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . .; § 166.021(1), (2), Fla.Stat. (1981). . See 4245 Corporation v. . . .

CITY OF BOCA RATON, v. V. GIDMAN,, 440 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1983)

. . . .” § 166.021(4), Fla.Stat. (1979). . . . The Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, section 166.021(4) of the Florida Statutes (1979) provides in part . . . Section 166.021(2) states that it is “... any activity or power which may be exercised by the state or . . . Section 166.021(4) expresses the intention of the legislature to secure for municipalities the broad . . .

TRIBUNE COMPANY, v. CANNELLA,, 438 So. 2d 516 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . Florida law, under section 166.021, Florida Statutes (1981), which cites article VIII, section 2(b) of . . . Whether general principles or the provisions of section 166.021 are followed, preemption appears to apply . . .

CITY OF LAUDERHILL v. JACKSON, 4 Fla. Supp. 2d 116 (Broward Cty. Ct. 1983)

. . . expressly preempted to state or county government by the Constitution or by general law” Florida Statute 166.021 . . .

CITY OF COCONUT CREEK, v. BROWARD COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,, 430 So. 2d 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . See § 166.021(4), Fla.Stat. (1981), and State v. City of Sunrise, 354 So.2d 1206, 1209 (Fla.1978). . . .

CITY OF VENICE, a v. VALENTE,, 429 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . Section 166.021(2), Florida Statutes (1981), defines “municipal purpose” as “any activity or power which . . . municipality may not enact legislation concerning any subject expressly prohibited by the constitution. § 166.021 . . . municipality may not exercise any power for municipal purposes which is expressly prohibited by law. § 166.021 . . .

E. EDWARDS, v. STATE, 422 So. 2d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . However, under section 166.021(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), the legislative body of a municipality . . .

COUNTY OF VOLUSIA, v. CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH,, 420 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . While Chapter 166.021, Florida Statutes (1973), the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, generally gives a . . . to enact legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the state legislature may act, section 166.021 . . .

V. GIDMAN, L. I. v. CATHOLIC SERVICE BUREAU, v. CITY OF BOCA RATON, a H. J. H. G., 416 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . .” § 166.021(4), Fla. Stat. (1979). . . .

ROLLE, v. CITY OF MIAMI, J. L., 408 So. 2d 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . decision that the subject charter provision must also fall under the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act [§ 166.021 . . . down by the Florida Supreme Court as having been nullified by the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act [§ 166.021 . . .

UNITED STATES v. CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA, v. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, CITY OF MIAMI LODGE NO. R., 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981)

. . . . § 166.021(4X1981); during one of the hearings, the district court concluded that Section 166.021 does . . . Fla.Stat.Ann. § 166.021(4) provides in part: Powers The provisions of this section shall be so construed . . .

RAGUCCI, v. CITY OF PLANTATION, a E., 407 So. 2d 932 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . The effect of the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act upon the City Charter is recited in Section 166.021( . . .

STATE v. CITY OF PENSACOLA,, 397 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1981)

. . . The state’s first argument is premised on section 166.021(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), which states . . .

CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, v. ROCIO CORP. a a a, 404 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . legislation on any subject upon which the state legislature may act unless expressly prohibited by law. 166.021 . . . imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule powers other than those so expressly prohibited. § 166.021 . . . Beach then enacted another rent control ordinance under the expanded authority afforded by section 166.021 . . . It should be so construed as to effectuate that purpose where possible.2 It provides, in new F.S. § 166.021 . . .

CITY OF WINTER PARK, v. D. JONES,, 392 So. 2d 568 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . Article VIII, Section 2(b), Florida Constitution; Section 166.021(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1979). . . .

CITY OF ORMOND BEACH, v. COUNTY OF VOLUSIA,, 383 So. 2d 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . assumed a city service because the City continues to operate its own system under authority of section 166.021 . . .

STATE v. CITY OF MIAMI, a, 379 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1980)

. . . limitations on the borrowing and leasing powers of the City of Miami which have been nullified by section 166.021 . . . any municipal charter enacted or adopted prior to July 1, 1973, is hereby nullified and repealed.” § 166.021 . . .

TOWN OF INDIAN RIVER SHORES, a v. COLL,, 378 So. 2d 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

. . . In a recent case involving this same point we held that Section 166.021(4) authorized a city council . . . In the instant case the broad grant of authority delegated to municipalities under Section 166.021(4) . . .

TWEED, v. CITY OF CAPE CANAVERAL,, 373 So. 2d 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

. . . We reach a different conclusion in this case because Section 166.021, Florida Statutes (1973) effectively . . . This Municipal Home Rule Powers Act says in Section 166.021(4), Florida Statutes (1973) “The provisions . . .

FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY COMPANY, a v. CITY OF MIAMI, a, 372 So. 2d 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

. . . . § 166.021(4), Fla.Stat. (1977). . . .

CITY OF PANAMA CITY, v. FLORIDA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS COMMISSION,, 364 So. 2d 109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)

. . . . § 166.021(3)(c) (1973) provides that municipalities may enact legislation upon any subject matter except . . .

STATE v. CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH,, 360 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1978)

. . . Section 166.021, Florida Statutes (1977), provides: (1) As provided in s. 2(b), Art. . . .