Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...of the officer, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. Fla. Stat. § 843.02. 6 violating Fla. Stat. § 316.130,2 Fla. Stat. § 316.072,3 and § 54-2 of the Miami City Code.4 The district court denied Pastor’s motion for summary judgment....

...First, the court found that there was no probable cause, or even arguable probable cause, to arrest Durruthy. See Durruthy v. City of Miami, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1297-98 (S.D. Fla. 2002). The court rejected Pastor’s proffered bases for probable cause, determining that Fla. Stat. § 843.02, Fla. Stat. § 316.072, and § 54-2 of the Miami City Code were not applicable because Durruthy complied with the officer’s 2 Section 316.130 provides, in pertinent part, that “[w]here sidewalks are provided, no pedestrian shall, unless req...

...scene and provide transport of patients in the performance of their duties for an emergency medical services provider licensed under chapter 401 and in accordance with any local emergency medical response protocols. Fla. Stat. § 316.072(3). 4 Section 54-2 of the Miami City Code provides that “[i]t is unlawful for any person or any number of persons to stand, loiter or walk upon any street or sidewalk in the city so as to obstruct free passage over, on or...

...This is in contrast with the other statutes Pastor has proffered as bases for probable cause, all of which require an order or request: Fla. Stat. § 843.02 (making it a misdemeanor to “resist, obstruct, or oppose any officer”); Fla. Stat. § 316.072(3) (making it a misdemeanor “for any person willfully to fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law enforcement officer”); and § 54-2 of the Miami City Code (making it unlawful for any person to “walk upon any street or sidewalk in the city so as to obstruct free passage ....

...signia and other jurisdictional markings prominently displayed on the vehicle and with siren and lights activated. Koch asked to have the jurors also instructed on a permissive lesser included offense, refusal to obey an officer's lawful order under section 316.072(3). The trial court initially agreed. But then it reversed course and declined to give the instruction, reasoning that section 316.072(3) applies only in emergency situations. We disagree. Section 316.072, "Obedience to and effect of traffic laws," states in part: (3) OBEDIENCE TO POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.— It is unlawful and a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.775.082 or s.775.083, for any pers...

...ash investigation officer, by a traffic infraction enforcement officer, or by a "member of the fire department at the scene of a fire, rescue operation, or other emergency." Cf. State v. Mahoy, 575 So.2d 779, 781 n. 5 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (suggesting section 316.072 could be applied to a situation where law enforcement stopped a driver who was weaving and driving slowly on an expressway; no emergency was underway)....

...ous, we are left with the question whether Koch was entitled to the instruction under general principles governing instructions on lesser included offenses. Arguably, the misdemeanor offense *466 of disobeying a lawful order by law enforcement under section 316.072(3) could be characterized as a necessarily, or category one, lesser included offense of fleeing and eluding under section 316.1935(2), the felony with which Koch was charged....

...the lesser offense are alleged in the information and if proof of those elements was presented at trial. Blandin v. State, 916 So.2d 969, 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). The standard jury instructions do not prescribe an instruction for the crime defined in section 316.072(3)....

...ply; (3) with a lawful order or direction of a law enforcement officer. The information against Koch alleged that he failed to stop his car "having knowledge" that he had been directed to do so "by a law enforcement officer." To commit a crime under section 316.072(3), a defendant must "willfully" fail to comply with an officer's orders. "`Willfully' means intentionally, knowingly, and purposely." Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 28.7. Thus the term "willfully" encompasses the concept of "with knowledge" and vice versa. The information alleged the elements of the section 316.072(3) crime, and the proof at trial established both a knowing and willful refusal to comply with law enforcement's orders to stop the car....

...Bryant by pursuing him for his violation of the law, nor did he cause Bryant any harm. Bryant had the absolute duty to stop, and any injuries incurred by him because he failed to do so were caused solely by himself. Bryant attempts to find a duty in section 316.072(5), Florida Statutes (1997), which allows emergency vehicles to disregard certain traffic laws with the following proviso: (c) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of a vehicle specified in paragraph (a) from the duty...

...king by virtue of their continued pursuit, as appellants contend, is for the trier of fact to decide. That pursuing officers do not have carte blanche authority to pursue in any manner they choose, whether or not an emergency exists, is indicated in section 316.072(5)(c), Florida Statutes (1987). While section 316.072(5)(a)1 excepts "[t]he driver of an authorized emergency vehicle ... when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law" from prior provisions of that statute requiring obedience to the traffic laws, section 316.072(5)(c) provides that [t]he foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of a vehicle specified in paragraph (a) from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons. Section 316.072(5)(c) is cited in the above-referenced Pinellas Park policy regarding pursuits of law breakers....

...[5] Section 843.02 provides that whoever shall resist, obstruct, or oppose any police officer in the lawful execution of any legal duty without doing violence to the person of the officer is guilty of a misdemeanor in the first degree. It also appears that the officers had probable cause to charge Mahoy with a violation of section 316.072(3) which provides that it is unlawful and a misdemeanor of the second degree for any person to willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law enforcement officer.

...DAUKSCH and PETERSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Ralph v. City of Daytona Beach, 471 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1983); Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell, 262 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1972); Bank of Central Florida v. Zellwood Farmers Market, Inc., 543 So.2d 455 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). [2] § 316.072(5), Fla....

...Wyatt is a police officer for the City of Miami Beach ("Miami Beach"), who was assisting a funeral procession on that date. Wyatt directed Blackshear not to move his vehicle. Blackshear then exited his vehicle to converse with Wyatt. After the two spoke, Wyatt arrested Blackshear for a violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.072(3), for failure to obey a lawful order of a police officer, and Fla....

...• "At no time during or after Plaintiff conversed with Wyatt did Plaintiff indicate in any way that he was going to move his vehicle" [D.E. 12, ¶ 18]. • "Despite Plaintiff not entering or touching his vehicle and the vehicle not moving, Wyatt arrested Plaintiff for a violation of § 316.072(3), Florida Statutes, for failure to obey a lawful order of a police officer" [D.E. 12, ¶ 19]. • "No legal ground or basis including probable cause existed for Plaintiff's arrest for any charge including a violation of § 316.072(3), Florida Statutes" [D.E....

...are valid even if probable cause was lacking as to some offenses, or even all announced charges." Whittington v. Town of Surfside, 490 F.Supp.2d 1239, 1251 (S.D.Fla.2007)(citing Lee, 284 F.3d at 1196). Plaintiff was arrested for violating Fla. Stat. § 316.072(3), which makes it a misdemeanor "for any person willfully to fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law enforcement officer.....

...An unexpressed intent alone cannot serve as the basis for probable cause because there would be no facts or circumstances sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect was about to commit a crime. Therefore, on this record, arguable probable cause did not exist to arrest Plaintiff for a violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.072(3)....

OF A [POLICE] [FIRE] [TRAFFIC] OFFICIAL § 316.072(3), Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Failure

...of the Miami City Code makes it unlawful for any person to "walk upon any street or sidewalk in the city so as to obstruct free passage ... after a request by a law enforcement officer to move on so as to cease blocking or obstructing free passage." Section 316.072, Fla....

...r reasonable. Accordingly, the Court cannot find that Pastor had arguable probable cause for the arrest based on § 843.02. The Court also finds that the traffic statutes identified by Pastor as alternative bases for an arrest do not suffice. First, § 316.072, Fla....

a police officer, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.072(3). A search of Wilson’s person revealed a valid

excepted by Ch. 316. Section 316.072(1), (2), and (4), F. S. (1976 Supp.). Section 316.072(5)(a), F. S. (1976

the right to travel.' (Emphasis supplied.) Section 316.072(1), F. S. Jurisdiction to control traffic is

and the movement of pedestrians.” Fla. Stat. § 316.072(1). And in keeping with this declaration, pedestrians

access facility to any other street or highway); § 316.072(3) (failure to obey commands of police officials);

...316.1935(1) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. Reckless Driving (if 316.192(1)(b) 28.5 there was evidence that the fleeing was in a motor vehicle) None Disobedience to Police 316.072(3) 28.18 or Fire Department Officials Comments For the category two lesser included offense, see Koch v....

...NO. Fleeing to elude 316.1935(1) 28.6 Reckless Driving (if 316.192(1)(b) 28.5 there is evidence that the fleeing was in a motor vehicle) Disobedience to Police or Fire Department 316.072(3) 28.18 Officials Comments For the category two lesser included offense, see Koch v....

...316.192(1) 28.5 wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is charged or if there is evidence that the fleeing was in a motor vehicle) Disobedience to Police or Fire Department 316.072(3) 28.18 Officials Comments For the category two lesser included offense of Disobedience to Police, see Koch v....

...Reckless Driving Reckless driving 316.192(1) 28.5 (if wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is charged or if there is evidence that the fleeing is in a motor vehicle) Disobedience to Police or Fire 316.072(3) 28.18 Department Officials Comments For the category two lesser included offense of Disobedience to Police, see Koch v....

...5(2) 28.7 Reckless Driving (if Reckless Driving 316.192(1)(b) 28.5 there was evidence that the fleeing was in a motor vehicle) Disobedience to Police or Fire Department 316.072(3) 28.18 Officials Comments For the category two lesser included offense of Disobedience to Police, see Koch v....

...Fleeing to Elude LEO 316.1935(2) 28.7 Reckless Driving (if Reckless Driving 316.192(1)(b) 28.5 there was evidence that the fleeing was in a motor vehicle) Disobedience to Police 316.072(3) 28.18 or Fire Department Officials Comments For the category two lesser included offense of Disobedience to Police, see Koch v....

...EO 316.1935(2) 28.7 Reckless Driving (if Reckless Driving 316.192(1)(b) 28.5 there was evidence that the fleeing was in a motor vehicle) Disobedience to Police or Fire Department 316.072(3) 28.18 Officials Comments For the category two lesser included offense of Disobedience to Police, see Koch v....

...(2) 28.7 - 23 - Reckless Driving (if Reckless Driving 316.192(1)(b) 28.5 there was evidence that the fleeing was in a motor vehicle) Disobedience to Police 316.072(3) 28.18 or Fire Department Officials Comments For the category two lesser included offense of Disobedience to Police, see Koch v....

...3d 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). This instruction was adopted in 2008 [976 So. 2d 1081] and amended in 2011 [73 So. 3d 136], and 2015. 28.18 FAILURE TO OBEY THE LAWFUL ORDER OF A [POLICE] [FIRE] [TRAFFIC] OFFICIAL § 316.072(3), Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Failure to Obey the Lawful Order of a (insert type of official from the list in § 316.072(3) Fla....

...employed by (insert relevant agency listed in § 316.640, Fla. Stat.). Note to judge: A special instruction may be necessary when the defendant claims the order or direction was not lawful. Lesser Included Offenses FAILURE TO OBEY — 316.072(3) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

a law enforcement officer, a violation of section 316.072(3). The trial court declined the request.

of this State. The instruction relating to section 316.072, Florida Statutes (1999), was the following:

OF A [POLICE] [FIRE] [TRAFFIC] OFFICIAL § 316.072(3), Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Failure

dispatch that there was a fire in the area. Section 316.072, Florida Statutes, governing obedience to traffic

direction of any law enforcement officer....” § 316.072(3), Fla. Stat. (2006). The officer had set the

a law enforcement officer, a violation of section 316.072(3), Florida Statutes (2013). The trial court