Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...[1] Specifically, the leased properties were being used as warehouses, gas stations, deli restaurants, fish markets, charter boat sites, and docks. CPA alleged that it was immune from taxation because it was a political subdivision, or in the alternative, it was exempt from taxation pursuant to section 315.11, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...The Florida Constitution does not empower the legislature to designate what entities are immune from ad valorem taxation. See Orange County, 605 So.2d at 1334. Because CPA is not immune from ad valorem taxation, we address CPA's alternative argument that it is exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to section 315.11, Florida Statutes (1991). [7] Section 315.11, which was passed in 1959, provides a statutory exemption from various state and local taxes for port authorities including port authority property. [8] This section has never made the exemption it provides dependent on the use of port authority property. *1229 Respondent contends that sections 196.001 and 196.199, Florida Statutes (1991), supersede section 315.11 and make CPA's leased property taxable to the extent the property is leased to nongovernmental entities for nongovernmental uses....

...leased to nongovernmental entities. These statutes were adopted by the legislature in 1971. Ch. 71-133, Laws of Fla. In the same act, the legislature repealed an exemption in CPA's enabling legislation which was similar to the exemption provided by section 315.11. [10] Although the legislature did not expressly repeal the exemption provided by section 315.11, we find that by passing chapter 71-133, it imposed a limitation on that exemption....

...mental lessee unless the lessee is serving a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function as defined in section 196.012(6) or uses the property exclusively for a literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purpose. We therefore construe section 315.11 in conjunction with sections 196.001, 196.199(2), and 196.199(4), and hold that section 315.11 provides an exemption only when port authority property is being used for a purpose which is specifically set forth in section 196.199(2) and (4)....

...without any constitutional basis. [7] Immunity and exemption differ in that immunity connotes an absence of the power to tax while exemption presupposes the existence of that power. Dickinson, 325 So.2d at 3; Orlando Utilities, 229 So.2d at 264. [8] Section 315.11, Florida Statutes (1991), specifically provides: As adequate port facilities are essential to the welfare of the inhabitants and the industrial and commercial development of the area within or served by the unit, and as the exercise of...

...The Florida Department of Revenue was also named as a defendant in the action. See § 194.181(5), Fla. Stat. (1991). In its complaint, CPA alleged that it was a political subdivision of the state and was therefore immune from taxation. Alternatively, CPA contended that it was exempt from taxation under section 315.11, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Given the nature of the CPA, it is not a political subdivision which is immune from taxation. [11] The CPA's alternative argument is that it is nevertheless exempt. Their claim of exemption concerns the relationship between sections 196.199(4) and 315.11, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...eased to non-governmental lessees who are not using the property "exclusively for literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes." CPA contends that, despite the provisions of section 196.199(4), it is nonetheless exempt from taxation under section 315.11, [12] which provides as follows: As adequate port facilities are essential to the welfare of the inhabitants and the industrial and commercial development of the area within or served by the unit, and as the exercise of the powers conf...

...state. The exemption granted by this section shall not be applicable to any tax imposed by chapter 220 on interest, income, or profits on debt obligations owed by corporations. No case was found that interprets the scope of the exemption afforded by section 315.11 or the effect of enactment of section 196.199 on section 315.11. According to appellants, the enactment of section 196.199 has "limited" the general exemption contained in section 315.11. CPA asserts there is no limitation and that section 315.11 provides a blanket exception for CPA property. [13] Although we might use the word "harmony," rather than "limitation," to describe the relationship between 196.199 and 315.11, appellants appear to be correct that CPA property is exempt only to the extent of its governmental or public use. [14] We cannot agree that use does not matter, especially in light of the fact that exemptions are to be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Straughn, 293 So.2d at 695. Section 315.11 even speaks of "public property" "used for public purposes." "Port facilities," referenced in section 315.11, are defined in the statute to include: harbor, shipping and port facilities, and improvements of every kind, nature, and description, including, but without limitation, channels, turning basins, jetties, breakwaters, public landings,...

...(1991). The legislature has defined the term "port facilities" broadly, but not, we think, so broadly as to embrace property on which commercial activity is being carried on by private lessees at the port facility. All of the enumerated examples in section 315.11 are of the same general kind or class and appear directly related to the basic operation of a port, including the movement of cargo....

...Dist., 341 So.2d 498 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 804, 98 S.Ct. 32, 54 L.Ed.2d 61 (1977). Although "governmental" functions carried out by private entities at Port Canaveral might be interpreted more broadly than in other contexts lacking the specificity of section 315.11, that issue is not before us....

...See Dickinson, 325 So.2d at 3-4. On the other hand, unless the Department of Revenue is correct, the authority for many of the Chapter 196 exceptions is unclear. This confusion of exemption and immunity appears to be of long standing in Florida. See Alford, 107 So.2d at 29. [12] Section 315.11 was enacted in 1959 and was last amended in 1973....