Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...The parties entered into a stipulation of facts and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial judge entered summary judgment in favor of the property appraiser and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment based upon its interpretation of sections 196.192 and 196.199, Florida Statutes (1991). These statutes read in pertinent part as follows: 196.192 Exemptions from ad valorem taxation.— Subject to the provisions of this chapter: (1) All property owned by an exempt entity and used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation....

...e provided by law. (Emphasis added.) The court reasoned that under these statutes the Authority was not entitled to the exemption because legal title to the project was vested in SRH. The court buttressed its conclusion by noting that prior to 1988, section 196.192(1) read: "All property used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation." In 1988, the legislature amended subsection (1) to read: "All property owned by an exempt entity and used exclusively for e...

...Consequently, these cases were properly decided on the unremarkable basis that privately owned property is not entitled to a tax exemption solely because it is leased to a governmental entity for a governmental use. We cannot agree that the 1988 amendment which added the words "owned by an exempt entity" to section 196.192(1) precludes the Authority from obtaining a tax exemption....

...2d DCA 1984), which held that use rather than ownership of the property controlled the granting of a tax exemption. Daniel was a case like Mastroianni in which a private party had leased property to an exempt entity. We do not believe that in enacting the 1988 amendment to section 196.192(1), the legislature intended to preclude an equitable owner who otherwise qualified from receiving a tax exemption....

...The trial court ruled that the County only had a leasehold interest in the property and was not its "equitable owner." Therefore, the Bank, which holds legal title to the property, could be assessed ad valorem taxes on the realty and improvements since it is not an exempt entity pursuant to section 196.192(1)....

...1st DCA 1992) and Mastroianni v. Memorial Medical Center of Jacksonville, Inc., 606 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), for the proposition that in order for property to be exempt from taxation, it must be both owned by an exempt entity and used for exempt purposes. § 196.192(1)....

...court held the property was subject to ad valorem taxation. As in Mastroianni, the court did not consider whether the Port Authority retained equitable ownership of the property under the lease. It held that to be entitled to the tax exemption under section 196.192, a tax exempt entity had to be the owner as well as the user and occupant of the property. We do not think these cases are on point. As explained above, they were decided pursuant to section 196.192(1) and not section 196.199(1)(b), which appellants argue should be applied in this case....

...ad valorem taxation except as otherwise provided by law. An argument could be made that the phrase "all property of this state which is used for governmental purposes ..." includes beneficial ownership, even if as interpreted by the first district, section 196.192(1) only exempts property titled in an exempt entity. An additional distinction is that section 196.192 applies to tax exempt entities such as nonprofit hospital corporations, as in Mastroianni, and a Port Authority created by a special act, as in Ocean Highway, and not to political subdivisions of the state, such as counties, as in this case....

...82% of Unit 1. The property appraiser denied the applications on the ground that, although the property was being used by an exempt lessee for an exempt purpose, the owners of the property were not exempt entities. The property appraiser relied upon section 196.192, Florida Statutes (1989), for his position that the owner of the property must be an exempt entity for the property to be exempt from taxation....

...ging the tax assessment on the subject property. The trial court entered a summary final judgment in their favor, ruling that the subject property was exempt. The second district affirmed, holding that the exemption from ad valorem taxes provided in section 196.192(1), Florida Statutes (1981), applied to property that was used for exempt purposes, without regard to ownership. The court based its holding on the language of section 196.192(1), Florida Statutes (1981), and prior cases construing and applying that statutory language in which the courts emphasized the character of use rather than the character of ownership....

...Murrell Co., Inc., or both); nor does it discuss whether T.M. Murrell Co., Inc., the lessee, had standing to file such an application or to participate in the case as a plaintiff. On the contrary, the sole issue addressed in the opinion was whether section 196.192(1), Florida Statutes (1981), required that the owner of the subject property use the property for exempt purposes....

...f the application. The second district's holding in Daniel, however, is most relevant to our discussion of whether the owner seeking exemption of its property from ad valorem taxation must itself be an "exempt entity." Prior to 1988, the language of section 196.192 involved in Daniel required only that the property be used for an exempt purpose to qualify for exemption from taxation. [3] In 1988, the legislature enacted *763 chapter 88-102, Laws of Florida, which amended section 196.192, [4] to read as follows: 196.192 Exemptions from ad valorem taxation....

...by specifically defining the terms "exempt use of property" or "use of property for exempt purposes" to mean "predominant or exclusive use of property owned by an exempt entity. ..." (Emphasis added.) While our construction of the 1988 amendment to section 196.192 is derived from the plain language of the statute itself, we note that this construction of the statutory language is consistent with its legislative history....

...The last sentence of subsection (2), the portion of the statute on which Taxpayers and the trial court relied, does not state that the owner of the property or facilities leased to a nonprofit corporation need not be an "exempt entity," as required by sections 196.192 and 196.195....

...NOTES [1] Each unit number designates an entire floor of a building in the hospital complex. [2] The term "use exemptions" refers to those exemptions allowed by article VII, section 3(a) of the Florida Constitution and codified in chapter 196, Florida Statutes. [3] From December 31, 1971, through June 16, 1988, section 196.192, Florida Statutes, entitled "Exemptions from ad valorem taxation" read as follows: (1) All property used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation....

...34, 50 L.Ed.2d 63 (1976). Therefore, before the Port Authority can claim an exemption, it must show that it meets the requirements of some other exemption in Chapter 196, Florida Statutes. [2] The Port Authority claims an exemption for the improvements under Section 196.192, Florida Statutes (1989), which provides as follows: Subject to the provisions of this chapter: (1) All property owned by an exempt entity and used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation....

...Moreover, it is using the improvements exclusively for exempt purposes, that is, operating the port, which was declared a public purpose under chapter 21418. Thus, the Port Authority claims that its "property," the improvements, should be declared tax exempt. We cannot agree. While section 196.192, as it existed when the Port Authority entered into the leases in 1986, allowed for a tax exemption for "[a]ll property used exclusively for exempt purposes," [3] section 196.192 was amended in 1988 to require that the property be "owned by an exempt entity and used exclusively for exempt purposes" before an ad valorem tax exemption would be allowed. See Ch. 88-102, § 2, Laws of Fla.; § 196.192, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988). Thus, under the plain language of section 196.192, an ad valorem tax exemption is only permitted when the property in question is both owned and used by the tax-exempt entity....

...corporations but then leased back for hospital use, because it did not have legal title to property). It is undisputed in the instant case that the Port Authority does not own the real property; therefore, it is not entitled to a tax exemption under section 196.192....

...nal property belonging to persons residing in this state; and (2) All leasehold interests in property of the United States, of the state, or any political subdivision, municipality, agency, authority, or other public body corporate of the state. [3] § 196.192, Fla....

...n. Answers were filed, after which appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, the lower court granted final summary judgment in favor of appellees, ruling that the relevant property was exempt. The lower court, basing its ruling upon section 196.192, Florida Statutes (1981) [1] and section 196.012(1), Florida Statutes (1981), [2] held that property which is used exclusively for educational purposes need not be titled in the name of the educational institution in order to be exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to section 196.192, Florida Statutes....

...ducational purposes, controls and therefore a concurrence of educational use and ownership of the property by the institution is required for the exemption to apply. Appellants urge that, moreover, when section 196.198 is read together with sections 196.192 and 196.012(4), [4] the clear meaning of the total statutory enactment is that an educational institution must also be the holder of the legal title in order for the exemption to apply....

...the educational institution must coincide. Id. at 281. Although Coppock was factually similar to the instant case, in affirming, the district court of appeal was called upon to construe the provisions of section 192.06(3), Florida Statutes, [5] not section 196.192(1), Florida Statutes, the statutory section upon which the trial court based its holding in the instant case. Moreover, Coppock was decided prior to the enactment of section 196.192, Florida Statutes (1981). Thus, appellants' reliance on Coppock is misplaced. As appellees point out, section 196.192(1), which emphasizes the "use" of property, is new language added by the legislature in 1971 by chapter 71-133, section 3, Laws of Florida....

...1955); Tre-O-Ripe Groves, Inc. v. Mills, 266 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). As pointed out by the trial court, article VII, section 3, Florida Constitution (1968 Revision), [6] emphasizes use rather than ownership for purposes of exemption. Further, section 196.192 specifically exempts from ad valorem taxation all property used exclusively for exempt purposes rather than exempting property from taxation generally as provided by section 196.198, Florida Statutes. We agree with the trial court, whose ruling comes to this court clothed in the presumption of correctness, that section 196.192(1), Florida Statutes, controls the validity of the exemption in this case. We therefore hold that the exemption from ad valorem taxes provided in section 196.192(1), Florida Statutes, applies to the subject property, which is used for exempt purposes, without regard to legal ownership. Accordingly, we affirm the final summary judgment. AFFIRMED. SCHEB and RYDER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 196.192, Fla....

...) had the option of purchasing the properties at the end of the leases at fair market value. We find that Lessee was not the equitable owner of the properties; therefore, Lessee was not entitled to a charitable tax exemption on the properties. Under section 196.192(1), Florida Statutes (1999), "[a]ll property owned by an exempt entity and used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation." (emphasis added). In general, a tax exempt lessee "owns" leased property for purposes of section 196.192(1) if the lessee is found to be the equitable owner of the leased property....

...[8] Aside from my disagreement as to taxable status of this leasehold, I cannot reconcile the majority's decision with the Constitution and the statutes in another respect. The total exemption conferred by the Court's majority entirely neglects Article VII, Section 3(a), Fla. Const. and Section 196.192(2), Fla....

...rom ad valorem taxation based on its use for educational purposes. Our decision as to the issue of whether the trial court correctly found that the property qualified for an ad valorem tax educational use exemption under Sections *326 196.012(1) and 196.192(1), Florida Statutes (1985), depends upon an analysis of whether, under these particular facts, the property can be said to have been in "actual use" for educational purposes on the assessment date....

...We recognize that an argument can be made that neither the Lake Worth Towers, Inc. case nor the Dade County Taxing Authorities case should control our decision. The Lake Worth Towers, Inc. case did not construe the educational use exemption derived from Sections 196.012(1) and 196.192(1), Florida Statutes (1985), and these sections, which apply to the present case, do not require that a particular qualifying type of institution be in existence or operating as of January 1 of the taxable year for the property to be exempt....

...AND, ON THE ASSESSMENT DATE, IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING REMODELED FOR EDUCATIONAL USE BY THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, DOES THE PROPERTY QUALIFY AS BEING IN "ACTUAL USE" FOR PURPOSES OF ACQUIRING THE EDUCATIONAL TAX EXEMPTION UNDER SECTIONS 196.012(1) AND 196.192(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985)? Reversed....

...ution. It argues that under the Florida Constitution and statutes, educational property tax exemptions under Chapter 196 are restricted to property owners who qualify as an "educational institution." This argument lacks merit because the language of Section 196.192(1), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that property only has to be "used" for an exempt purpose in order to qualify for an exemption. See Daniel v. T.M. Murrell Co., Inc., 445 So.2d 587 (2d DCA) (property qualifies for educational exemption under Section 196.192(1) where lessee uses property exclusively for educational purposes without regard to status of legal owner), rev. denied, 453 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1984). We note that under the language of the revised Section 196.192(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...This appeal concerns only that portion of Poinciana's assets located in Osceola County. Osceola denied the Utility a tax exemption because it was created under chapter 163, and not chapter 196. Governmental entities are exempt from taxes and assessments under both of these chapters. §§ 163.01(7)(g)4; 196.192; 196.199(1)(c)....

...The net effect of the delays and botched procedures was an improper denial of FGUA's right to an exemption and a denial of a review by the Value Adjustment Board. This whole fiasco was inexcusable and cost the taxpayers dearly in wasted attorney's fees. NOTES [1] Section 196.192, Exemptions from ad valorem taxation, provides: Subject to the provisions of this chapter: (1) All property owned by an exempt entity and used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation....

...As such, it does not qualify as a charitable purpose permitting exemption. We disagree. Property used predominantly for exempt purposes is exempted from ad valorem taxation to the extent of the ratio that such predominant use bears on the nonexempt use. § 196.192(2), Fla....

...1976); Markham v. PPI, Inc., 843 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). A. 2005 to 2012 Taxes “All property owned by an exempt entity and used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation.” § 196.192(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). The law requires that the exempt entity both own and use the property. Ocean Highway & Port Auth. v. Page, 609 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (“[U]nder the plain language of section 196.192, an ad valorem tax exemption is only permitted when the property in question is both owned and used by the tax-exempt entity.”) (emphasis in original); see also Metropolitan Dade Cty....

...At oral argument, Genesis admitted that Lighthouse was a completely separate corporate entity. Because the undisputed evidence shows Genesis was not the entity that used the property for exempt purposes from 2005 to 2012, it was not entitled to tax exemption during those years. See § 196.192(1), Fla....

...nd-raising activity. In the remaining months of 2000, the Association held various meetings at the site with architects and representatives from its bank. The Association sought an exemption from ad valorem taxes for its corporate headquarters under section 196.192, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...The Property Appraiser denied the exemption as did the Value Adjustment Board. The Association then filed suit in the circuit court, challenging the denial of its exemption. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the Association’s property was entitled to the exemption. Section 196.192(1) provides that “[a]ll property owned by an exempt entity *242 and used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation.” Section 196.012(1) defines “[ejxempt use of property” or “use of pro...

...Less than 50 percent of the medical arts building sub judice was used for exempt purposes.[5] Unless more than 50 percent of the medical building is being used for a charitable, exempt purpose, the tax exemption on the building should be denied in toto. Section 196.192, Fla....

educational purposes as contemplated by Fla.Stat. § 196.192(1) or Fla. Stat. § 196.198. The property was purchased

educational purposes by the institution. Generally, section 196.192, Florida Statutes, states in pertinent part:

...1st DCA 1992), and Mastroianni v. Memorial Medical Center of Jacksonville, Inc., 606 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), which had disapproved exemptions from ad valorem taxation, because the owners of the leased properties failed to comply with the provisions of section 196.192(1), Florida Statutes, requiring that property be owned by an exempt entity and used for an exempt purpose in order to qualify for the exemption. In reaching its decision, the Fifth District distinguished the facts in its case, commenting that Mastroianni and Ocean Highway involved the application of section 196.192 to leased property operated respectively by a nonprofit hospital corporation and a port authority, whereas the pertinent statute essential for resolving the issue before it was section 196.199(1)(b), allowing an exemption for property of the state and its subdivisions used for governmental purposes....

...We cannot agree with the Fifth District's decision that the facts in First Union militate in favor of a different result from that reached in Mastroianni and Ocean Highway. Nor do we agree, as was implied in First Union, that the provisions of sections 196.192 and 196.199 may be read in isolation from each other. Although it is correct that this court emphasized the provisions of section 196.192 in Mastroianni and Ocean Highway, and not those of section 196.199, as in First Union, we regard this to be an immaterial distinction....

...sion that all property must be owned and used for a public purpose by an exempt entity in order for it to acquire an exempt status. In our judgment, if the Fifth District had taken into proper account the legislative history of the 1988 amendment to section 196.192, a reasonable construction would have required a decision that legal title to the property in dispute be in the entity seeking the exemption. Before the 1988 amendment to section 196.192, subsection (1) thereof had provided: "All property used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation." After its amendment, subsection (1) provided: "All property owned by an exempt entity and used...

...y, rather than the nature of its ownership. In Mastroianni, this court traced the legislative history leading up to the 1988 amendment, concluding its examination with the following pertinent comments: While our construction of the 1988 amendment to section 196.192 is derived from the plain language of the statute itself, we note that this construction of the statutory language is consistent with its legislative history....

...at—property may not be owned solely by an exempt entity or used only for an exempt purpose—but must be both owned by the exempt person and used for an exempt purpose before it is entitled to the exemption provided by law. Although the amendment to section 196.192 did not expressly state that the owner must have legal title to the property sought to be exempted, we think it clear from a review of the legislative history and an examination of current Florida statutes on the same subject which pr...

...which is entitled by law to exemption from taxation as a result of its ownership and use shall, on or before March 1 of each year, file an application for exemption with the county property appraiser. (Emphasis added.) Thus, reading the term "owned" in section 196.192(1) in pari materia with that of "legal title" in section 196.011(1), leads to the conclusion that the legislature, in enacting the 1988 amendment, had no purpose other than to require legal title to the property by the entity which uses it for an exempt purpose....

...He further held that the remaining property was exclusively used for educational purposes and, therefore, was exempt from ad valorem taxation. After severing the orange grove the trial court held that the Foundation was liable for ad valorem taxes on the five-acre grove. Florida Statute 196.192 states: “All property used predominantly for exempt purposes shall be exempted from ad valorem taxation to the extent of the ratio that such predominant use bears to the nonexempt use.” The Lake Thonotosassa property being one tract of la...

...Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities Dist., 341 So. 2d 498, 502 (Fla. 1976)). Property owned by “exempt entities” and used predominantly for “exempt purposes” is exempt from ad valorem taxation, to the extent of the exempt use. § 196.192(2), Fla....

...Appellant argues that because it performs an educational function – a charitable purpose – and because the government spends tax dollars on education, Appellant is entitled to a tax exemption under section 196.012(7), Florida Statutes. In 1988, the Legislature amended section 196.192 to require that property used for exempt purposes be owned by an “exempt entity” in order to receive ad valorem tax exemption. Mastroianni v....

...As a result, exemptions for educational uses of property are restricted to property owned by “educational institutions.” See Metropolitan Dade Cty. v. Miami-Dade Cty. Cmty. College Found., Inc., 545 So. 2d 324, 326 n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (holding that to qualify for tax exemption under the pre-1988 language of section 196.192(1), applicants could claim exemption for educational use, regardless of the status of the owner, but under the revised language, property used for educational purposes would need to be owned by an (5) ‘Educational institution...

...We affirm the trial court’s order and hold that an entity enjoying such a credit does not qualify for exempt entity status. To receive an ad valorem tax exemption the property in question must be “owned by an exempt entity and used exclusively for exempt purposes-” § 196.192(1), Fla....

...Additionally, Foundation was “nonprofit” as that term is defined in section 196.195, Florida Statutes. (2) All property owned by an exempt entity and used “predominantly for exempt purposes is to be exempted from ad valorem taxation to the extent of the ratio that such predominant use bears to the non-exempt *363 use. § 196.192(2), Fla....

...hich held that approximately 2400 acres of land owned by appellee was entitled to an exemption from ad valorem taxes for the years 2003 and 2004. Except as to a thirty acre portion of this parcel, we find no error in the trial court's determination. Section 196.192, Florida Statutes (2003), provides in pertinent part: (1) All property owned by an exempt entity and used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation....

...ward County qualifies for exemption as a nonprofit organization, within the meaning of s. 196.195 , F.S., nevertheless, before exemption from ad valorem taxation may be granted, the use of the property must be one of the exempt uses specified above. Section 196.192 , F.S.; AGO's 071-342, 062-6, and 061-76....

...John, 197 So. 549 (Fla. 1940). The use of the land to graze an individual's cattle is not within those exempted by s. 196.012 , supra. Such use is not charitable, educational, literary, scientific, religious, or governmental. Sections 196.012 (3) and 196.192 , however, allow an exemption from taxation for property which, although not exclusively, is predominantly (more than 50 percent) used for one of the exempt purposes stated above. Should the tax assessor determine from the facts presented to him that the predominant use of the subject property for Girl Scout activities is a charitable exempt use, then an exemption in that percentage of predominant use may be granted. Section 196.192 (2) and AGO's 074-74 and 074-130....

...tific, religious, charitable, or governmental use." (Emphasis supplied.) Further definitions of the above terms and criteria for establishing whether or not use of property qualifies for the exemption are provided in Ch. 196 , F.S. See ss. 196.021 , 196.192 , 196.195 , and 196.196 ....

...n satisfied. I do not believe the tax assessor will find that property used for the service or sale of alcoholic beverages to club members and guests satisfies the requisite criteria of exempt uses of property found in the constitution and statutes. Section 196.192 (2), F.S., provides that "[a]ll property used predominantly for exempt purposes shall be exempted from ad valorem taxation to the extent of the ratio that such predominant use bears to the nonexempt use." Thus, to the extent that a cl...

...Its population is made up of one-third medicare patients, one-third medicaid patients and one-third private paying patients. As a result, the appraiser argues that the nursing home is not entitled to a complete exemption, but *941 only to a two-thirds exemption. Section 196.192(2), Florida Statutes (1987) states: All property used predominantly for exempt purposes shall be exempted from ad valorem taxation to the extent of the ratio that such predominant use bears to the nonexempt use....